better-supabase 0.13.0 → 0.15.0

package/dist/verify-CMou8dWZ.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+/// <reference lib="esnext.temporal" />
+import { f as Result } from "./result-DZeA5KS6.js";
+import { O as AnyFunctions, it as Row, k as AnyModels, ut as TableKey } from "./types-DFdg_4yN.js";
+import { t as BetterSupabase } from "./define-DFBnQyYg.js";
+import { n as VerifyOptions, r as WebhookInput, t as VerifiedWebhook } from "./signatures-Dkx9OE8j.js";
+//#region src/blocks/webhooks/verify.d.ts
+/** The `Stripe-Signature` header for `body`, for tests and local replays. */
+declare function signStripeWebhook(secret: string, body: string, timestamp?: Temporal.Instant): Promise<string>;
+/**
+ * Verifies a `Stripe-Signature` header (`t=…,v1=…`) with the endpoint's
+ * `whsec_…` secret and parses the event. Pass several secrets while rolling the
+ * endpoint secret. Runs on WebCrypto, so it needs no `stripe` package.
+ */
+declare function verifyStripeWebhook<T = unknown>(input: WebhookInput, secrets: string | readonly string[], options?: VerifyOptions): Promise<Result<VerifiedWebhook<T>>>;
+/**
+ * `createWebhookInbox({ source: 'stripe', verify: stripeInboxVerify(secret)
+ * })`: stores Stripe events keyed by their event id.
+ */
+declare function stripeInboxVerify(secrets: string | readonly string[], options?: VerifyOptions): (request: Request, body: string) => Promise<Result<{
+  id: string;
+  payload: unknown;
+}>>;
+interface HookUser {
+  readonly id: string;
+  readonly email?: string;
+  readonly phone?: string;
+  readonly app_metadata?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;
+  readonly user_metadata?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;
+  readonly [key: string]: unknown;
+}
+interface AuthHookError {
+  readonly error: {
+    readonly http_code: number;
+    readonly message: string;
+  };
+}
+interface AuthHooks {
+  custom_access_token: {
+    input: {
+      readonly user_id: string;
+      readonly claims: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>> & {
+        readonly sub: string;
+        readonly role: string;
+      };
+      readonly authentication_method: string;
+    };
+    output: {
+      readonly claims: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;
+    };
+  };
+  send_email: {
+    input: {
+      readonly user: HookUser;
+      readonly email_data: {
+        readonly token: string;
+        readonly token_hash: string;
+        readonly redirect_to: string;
+        readonly email_action_type: string;
+        readonly site_url: string;
+        readonly token_new: string;
+        readonly token_hash_new: string;
+        /** Auth adds fields over time (`old_email`, `factor_type`, ...). */
+        readonly [key: string]: unknown;
+      };
+    };
+    output: Record<never, never>;
+  };
+  send_sms: {
+    input: {
+      readonly user: HookUser;
+      readonly sms: {
+        readonly otp: string;
+      };
+    };
+    output: Record<never, never>;
+  };
+  mfa_verification_attempt: {
+    input: {
+      readonly factor_id: string;
+      readonly factor_type: string;
+      readonly user_id: string;
+      readonly valid: boolean;
+    };
+    output: {
+      readonly decision: "continue" | "reject";
+      readonly message?: string;
+    };
+  };
+  password_verification_attempt: {
+    input: {
+      readonly user_id: string;
+      readonly valid: boolean;
+    };
+    output: {
+      readonly decision: "continue" | "reject";
+      readonly message?: string;
+      readonly should_logout_user?: boolean;
+    };
+  };
+  before_user_created: {
+    input: {
+      readonly metadata: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;
+      readonly user: HookUser;
+    };
+    output: Record<never, never>;
+  };
+}
+type AuthHookKind = keyof AuthHooks;
+/** Rejects a hook with a status and message Supabase Auth passes to the client. */
+declare function hookError(status: number, message: string): AuthHookError;
+/**
+ * A `(request) => Response` handler for a Supabase Auth hook: verifies the
+ * Standard Webhooks signature, types the payload and serializes the answer.
+ *
+ * ```ts
+ * export const POST = authHook(
+ *   "custom_access_token",
+ *   env.AUTH_HOOK_SECRET,
+ *   async ({ claims, user_id }) => ({
+ *     claims: { ...claims, tenant_id: await organizationFor(user_id) },
+ *   }),
+ * );
+ * ```
+ */
+declare function authHook<K extends AuthHookKind>(_kind: K, secret: string | readonly string[], handler: (payload: AuthHooks[K]["input"], webhook: VerifiedWebhook<AuthHooks[K]["input"]>) => AuthHooks[K]["output"] | AuthHookError | Promise<AuthHooks[K]["output"] | AuthHookError>, options?: VerifyOptions): (request: Request) => Promise<Response>;
+interface DatabaseWebhookPayload {
+  readonly type: "INSERT" | "UPDATE" | "DELETE";
+  readonly table: string;
+  readonly schema: string;
+  readonly record: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>> | null;
+  readonly old_record: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>> | null;
+}
+interface DatabaseChange<R> {
+  readonly type: "INSERT" | "UPDATE" | "DELETE";
+  readonly table: string;
+  readonly record: R | null;
+  readonly oldRecord: Partial<R> | null;
+}
+declare function isDatabaseWebhook(value: unknown): value is DatabaseWebhookPayload;
+/**
+ * Reads a database webhook payload for `table` as an app-cased change. Returns
+ * `null` for other tables or payloads that aren't database webhooks.
+ */
+declare function databaseChange<M extends AnyModels, D, F extends AnyFunctions, E, T extends TableKey<M>>(betterSupabase: BetterSupabase<M, D, F, E>, table: T, payload: unknown): DatabaseChange<Row<M, T>> | null;
+//#endregion
+export { DatabaseWebhookPayload as a, hookError as c, stripeInboxVerify as d, verifyStripeWebhook as f, DatabaseChange as i, isDatabaseWebhook as l, AuthHookKind as n, authHook as o, AuthHooks as r, databaseChange as s, AuthHookError as t, signStripeWebhook as u };

package/dist/verify-ZLFUdlqE.js

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+import { n as dbError } from "./errors-BVFgt8BZ.js";
+import { c as optionalTemporal, s as nowInstant } from "./temporal-DLZlWbOi.js";
+import { n as temporalMissing } from "./temporal-required-Dy0GGD8E.js";
+import { a as ok, r as err } from "./result-ntFBW2p2.js";
+import { t as toApp } from "./casing-DdFWEtqr.js";
+import { n as hmacHex, r as timingSafeEqual } from "./hmac-B3CTTlfv.js";
+import { a as unauthorized, n as header, r as replayed, s as verifyWebhook } from "./signatures-CNcoq392.js";
+//#region src/blocks/webhooks/verify.ts
+/** Stripe signs with the endpoint secret's UTF-8 bytes, not its base64 decoding. */
+const stripeSignature = hmacHex;
+/** The `Stripe-Signature` header for `body`, for tests and local replays. */
+async function signStripeWebhook(secret, body, timestamp = nowInstant()) {
+	const seconds = String(Math.floor(timestamp.epochMilliseconds / 1e3));
+	return `t=${seconds},v1=${await stripeSignature(secret, `${seconds}.${body}`)}`;
+}
+/**
+* Verifies a `Stripe-Signature` header (`t=…,v1=…`) with the endpoint's
+* `whsec_…` secret and parses the event. Pass several secrets while rolling the
+* endpoint secret. Runs on WebCrypto, so it needs no `stripe` package.
+*/
+async function verifyStripeWebhook(input, secrets, options = {}) {
+	const value = header(input.headers, "stripe-signature");
+	if (!value) return err(unauthorized("WEBHOOK_MISSING_HEADERS", "Missing Stripe-Signature header"));
+	const parts = value.split(",").map((part) => {
+		const index = part.indexOf("=");
+		return [part.slice(0, index).trim(), part.slice(index + 1).trim()];
+	});
+	const timestamp = parts.find(([name]) => name === "t")?.[1] ?? "";
+	const offered = parts.filter(([name]) => name === "v1").map(([, sig]) => sig);
+	if (!/^\d+$/.test(timestamp)) return err(unauthorized("WEBHOOK_INVALID_TIMESTAMP", "Invalid webhook timestamp"));
+	const namespace = optionalTemporal();
+	if (namespace === void 0) return err(temporalMissing());
+	const seconds = Number(timestamp);
+	const now = (options.now?.() ?? namespace.Now.instant()).epochMilliseconds / 1e3;
+	if (Math.abs(now - seconds) > (options.tolerance ?? 300)) return err(unauthorized("WEBHOOK_TIMESTAMP_OUT_OF_RANGE", "Webhook timestamp is outside the tolerance"));
+	const body = input instanceof Request ? await input.text() : input.body;
+	let valid = false;
+	for (const secret of typeof secrets === "string" ? [secrets] : secrets) {
+		const expected = await stripeSignature(secret, `${timestamp}.${body}`);
+		for (const candidate of offered) if (timingSafeEqual(candidate, expected)) valid = true;
+	}
+	if (!valid) return err(unauthorized("WEBHOOK_INVALID_SIGNATURE", "Invalid webhook signature"));
+	let payload;
+	try {
+		payload = JSON.parse(body);
+	} catch {
+		return err(dbError("invalid_request", "Webhook body is not JSON"));
+	}
+	const id = typeof payload === "object" && payload !== null && "id" in payload ? String(payload.id) : "";
+	const replay = await replayed(options, id, namespace.Instant.fromEpochMilliseconds((seconds + (options.tolerance ?? 300)) * 1e3));
+	if (replay) return err(replay);
+	return ok({
+		id,
+		timestamp: namespace.Instant.fromEpochMilliseconds(seconds * 1e3),
+		payload,
+		body
+	});
+}
+/**
+* `createWebhookInbox({ source: 'stripe', verify: stripeInboxVerify(secret)
+* })`: stores Stripe events keyed by their event id.
+*/
+function stripeInboxVerify(secrets, options = {}) {
+	return async (request, body) => {
+		const verified = await verifyStripeWebhook({
+			headers: request.headers,
+			body
+		}, secrets, options);
+		return verified.ok ? ok({
+			id: verified.data.id,
+			payload: verified.data.payload
+		}) : verified;
+	};
+}
+/** Rejects a hook with a status and message Supabase Auth passes to the client. */
+function hookError(status, message) {
+	return { error: {
+		http_code: status,
+		message
+	} };
+}
+/**
+* A `(request) => Response` handler for a Supabase Auth hook: verifies the
+* Standard Webhooks signature, types the payload and serializes the answer.
+*
+* ```ts
+* export const POST = authHook(
+*   "custom_access_token",
+*   env.AUTH_HOOK_SECRET,
+*   async ({ claims, user_id }) => ({
+*     claims: { ...claims, tenant_id: await organizationFor(user_id) },
+*   }),
+* );
+* ```
+*/
+function authHook(_kind, secret, handler, options) {
+	return async (request) => {
+		const verified = await verifyWebhook(request, secret, options);
+		if (!verified.ok) return Response.json(hookError(verified.error.status, verified.error.message), { status: verified.error.status });
+		try {
+			const answer = await handler(verified.data.payload, verified.data);
+			const status = "error" in answer ? answer.error.http_code : 200;
+			return Response.json(answer, { status });
+		} catch (cause) {
+			console.error("better-supabase: auth hook failed", cause);
+			return Response.json(hookError(500, "Hook failed"), { status: 500 });
+		}
+	};
+}
+function isDatabaseWebhook(value) {
+	if (typeof value !== "object" || value === null) return false;
+	const payload = value;
+	return (payload["type"] === "INSERT" || payload["type"] === "UPDATE" || payload["type"] === "DELETE") && typeof payload["table"] === "string" && typeof payload["schema"] === "string";
+}
+/**
+* Reads a database webhook payload for `table` as an app-cased change. Returns
+* `null` for other tables or payloads that aren't database webhooks.
+*/
+function databaseChange(betterSupabase, table, payload) {
+	const meta = betterSupabase.meta.tables[table];
+	if (!meta || !isDatabaseWebhook(payload) || payload.table !== meta.name || payload.schema !== meta.schema) return null;
+	return {
+		type: payload.type,
+		table,
+		record: payload.record ? toApp(meta, payload.record) : null,
+		oldRecord: payload.old_record ? toApp(meta, payload.old_record) : null
+	};
+}
+//#endregion
+export { signStripeWebhook as a, isDatabaseWebhook as i, databaseChange as n, stripeInboxVerify as o, hookError as r, verifyStripeWebhook as s, authHook as t };

package/dist/view-C8Ve14ja.js

@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+import { n as dbError } from "./errors-BVFgt8BZ.js";
+import { a as invalidActorError, i as delegationOf, n as actorOf } from "./actor-go7p9-CJ.js";
+import { r as impersonatorOf } from "./impersonation-DM3oWNoD.js";
+//#region src/auth/mfa.ts
+/**
+* The session's assurance level from its claims; anything but `aal2` reads as
+* `aal1`.
+*/
+function aalOf(claims) {
+	return claims["aal"] === "aal2" ? "aal2" : "aal1";
+}
+/** The `amr` claim as typed entries, skipping malformed ones. */
+function amrOf(claims) {
+	const amr = claims["amr"];
+	if (!Array.isArray(amr)) return [];
+	return amr.flatMap((entry) => {
+		if (typeof entry !== "object" || entry === null) return [];
+		const { method, timestamp, provider } = entry;
+		if (typeof method !== "string" || typeof timestamp !== "number") return [];
+		return [typeof provider === "string" ? {
+			method,
+			timestamp,
+			provider
+		} : {
+			method,
+			timestamp
+		}];
+	});
+}
+/**
+* `undefined` when a user session meets `required`; otherwise a `forbidden`
+* error with `required` and code `INSUFFICIENT_AAL`, for the client to start an
+* MFA challenge. Non-user sessions pass: `allow` decides about them.
+*/
+function checkAal(auth, required) {
+	if (required === "aal1" || auth.kind !== "user" || !("claims" in auth)) return;
+	if (aalOf(auth.claims) === "aal2") return;
+	return dbError("forbidden", "Verify a second factor to continue", {
+		code: "INSUFFICIENT_AAL",
+		required
+	});
+}
+//#endregion
+//#region src/auth/snapshot.ts
+/** The `iat` claim in epoch seconds, or `null`. */
+function issuedAtOf(claims) {
+	const iat = claims["iat"];
+	return typeof iat === "number" && Number.isFinite(iat) ? iat : null;
+}
+/** The `authz_ver` claim as a number, or `null` when absent or malformed. */
+function authzVersionOf(claims) {
+	const value = claims["authz_ver"];
+	if (typeof value === "number" && Number.isFinite(value)) return value;
+	if (typeof value === "string" && /^\d+$/.test(value)) return Number(value);
+	return null;
+}
+const branded = /* @__PURE__ */ new WeakSet();
+const sources = /* @__PURE__ */ new WeakMap();
+/**
+* Whether `value` is a snapshot this process built from a verified token. A
+* snapshot that crossed serialization, or was built by hand, is not.
+*/
+function isSessionSnapshot(value) {
+	return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && branded.has(value);
+}
+/** The snapshot of a verified user, or `null` for any other caller. */
+function snapshotOf(auth) {
+	if (auth.kind !== "user" || auth.token === "") return null;
+	const sessionId = auth.claims["session_id"];
+	const snapshot = Object.freeze({
+		accessToken: auth.token,
+		claims: Object.freeze({ ...auth.claims }),
+		sessionId: typeof sessionId === "string" ? sessionId : null,
+		userId: auth.user.id,
+		expiresAt: auth.expiresAt,
+		issuedAt: issuedAtOf(auth.claims),
+		authzVersion: authzVersionOf(auth.claims)
+	});
+	branded.add(snapshot);
+	sources.set(snapshot, auth);
+	return snapshot;
+}
+/**
+* The verified auth state a branded snapshot was built from, or `undefined` for
+* a snapshot this process didn't build.
+*/
+function authOfSnapshot(snapshot) {
+	return sources.get(snapshot);
+}
+/**
+* A stable cache key for a session: user, Auth session and authorization
+* version. It never contains the token, which rotates hourly and would churn
+* every key.
+*/
+function sessionCacheKey(snapshot) {
+	return `${snapshot.userId}:${snapshot.sessionId ?? "-"}:${String(snapshot.authzVersion ?? 0)}`;
+}
+const encoder = new TextEncoder();
+async function tokenKey(token) {
+	const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", encoder.encode(token));
+	let hex = "";
+	for (const byte of new Uint8Array(digest)) hex += byte.toString(16).padStart(2, "0");
+	return hex;
+}
+/**
+* A bounded LRU of verified sessions. Keys derive only from the token, never
+* from a user id or a header, so one instance can serve many users at once
+* (Fluid compute). Create it once at module scope; `createServer` owns one.
+*/
+function sessionMemo(expiresAt, options = {}) {
+	const max = Math.max(1, options.max ?? 1e3);
+	const ttlMs = options.ttlMs ?? 3e5;
+	const clock = options.now ?? Date.now;
+	const entries = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+	let hits = 0;
+	let misses = 0;
+	const untilFor = (now, expiresAt) => expiresAt === null ? now + ttlMs : Math.min(now + ttlMs, expiresAt * 1e3);
+	const store = (key, entry) => {
+		entries.delete(key);
+		entries.set(key, entry);
+		while (entries.size > max) {
+			const oldest = entries.keys().next();
+			if (oldest.done) break;
+			entries.delete(oldest.value);
+		}
+	};
+	return {
+		async get(token, load) {
+			const key = await tokenKey(token);
+			const now = clock();
+			const known = entries.get(key);
+			if (known && known.until > now) {
+				hits += 1;
+				store(key, known);
+				return known.promise;
+			}
+			misses += 1;
+			const entry = {
+				promise: load().then((value) => {
+					if (value === null) {
+						if (entries.get(key) === entry) entries.delete(key);
+					} else {
+						entry.value = value;
+						entry.until = Math.min(entry.until, untilFor(entry.until - ttlMs, expiresAt(value)));
+					}
+					return value;
+				}, (cause) => {
+					if (entries.get(key) === entry) entries.delete(key);
+					throw cause;
+				}),
+				until: now + ttlMs
+			};
+			store(key, entry);
+			return entry.promise;
+		},
+		async seed(token, value) {
+			const key = await tokenKey(token);
+			const until = untilFor(clock(), expiresAt(value));
+			store(key, {
+				promise: Promise.resolve(value),
+				value,
+				until
+			});
+		},
+		evict(match) {
+			for (const [key, entry] of entries) if (entry.value !== void 0 && match(entry.value)) entries.delete(key);
+		},
+		clear() {
+			entries.clear();
+			hits = 0;
+			misses = 0;
+		},
+		stats: () => ({
+			hits,
+			misses,
+			size: entries.size
+		})
+	};
+}
+//#endregion
+//#region src/auth/view.ts
+/** Whether the token belongs to an anonymous user (`signInAnonymously()`). */
+function isAnonymousUser(claims) {
+	return "is_anonymous" in claims && claims.is_anonymous === true;
+}
+/** Drops the token from an `AuthState`, leaving only serializable fields. */
+function toSession(auth) {
+	switch (auth.kind) {
+		case "user": {
+			const outcome = actorOf(auth.claims);
+			if (!outcome.ok) return {
+				kind: "invalid",
+				reason: "actor",
+				error: invalidActorError()
+			};
+			const impersonator = impersonatorOf(auth.claims);
+			const actor = outcome.actor;
+			const client = actor?.kind === "oauth-client" || actor?.kind === "agent" && delegationOf(auth.claims) !== void 0 ? actor : void 0;
+			const scopes = client ? delegationOf(auth.claims)?.scopes : void 0;
+			const delegation = client && (scopes || client.chain) ? {
+				scopes: scopes ?? [],
+				...client.chain ? { chain: client.chain } : {}
+			} : void 0;
+			return {
+				kind: "user",
+				user: auth.user,
+				claims: auth.claims,
+				expiresAt: auth.expiresAt,
+				issuedAt: issuedAtOf(auth.claims),
+				authzVersion: authzVersionOf(auth.claims),
+				...auth.profile === void 0 ? {} : { profile: auth.profile },
+				aal: aalOf(auth.claims),
+				anonymous: isAnonymousUser(auth.claims),
+				amr: amrOf(auth.claims),
+				...impersonator ? { impersonator } : {},
+				...actor ? { actor } : {},
+				...delegation ? { delegation } : {}
+			};
+		}
+		case "service": return {
+			kind: "service",
+			keyName: auth.keyName
+		};
+		case "apiKey": return {
+			kind: "apiKey",
+			keyId: auth.keyId,
+			name: auth.name,
+			...auth.organizationId ? { organizationId: auth.organizationId } : {},
+			...auth.userId ? { userId: auth.userId } : {},
+			scopes: auth.scopes,
+			...auth.createdAt ? { createdAt: Math.floor(auth.createdAt.epochMilliseconds / 1e3) } : {},
+			...auth.createdBy ? { createdBy: auth.createdBy } : {}
+		};
+		case "anon": return {
+			kind: "anon",
+			reason: auth.reason
+		};
+		case "invalid": return {
+			kind: "invalid",
+			reason: auth.reason,
+			error: auth.error
+		};
+		default: return auth;
+	}
+}
+//#endregion
+export { isSessionSnapshot as a, sessionMemo as c, amrOf as d, checkAal as f, authzVersionOf as i, snapshotOf as l, toSession as n, issuedAtOf as o, authOfSnapshot as r, sessionCacheKey as s, isAnonymousUser as t, aalOf as u };

package/dist/view-DyFdMCqg.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+import { b as DbError } from "./result-DZeA5KS6.js";
+import { i as InvalidReason, r as AuthState } from "./resolve-CXX6DHv3.js";
+import { a as SessionActor, o as SessionDelegation } from "./actor-CoveJgya.js";
+import { n as Impersonator } from "./impersonation-YTa9dZUv.js";
+import { n as AmrEntry, t as Aal } from "./mfa-oIOYTpvc.js";
+import { JWTClaims, UserClaims } from "@supabase/server";
+//#region src/auth/view.d.ts
+/**
+ * The verified caller as plain data: no token, no clients. Safe to return from
+ * a `'use cache: private'` function and to pass to Client Components.
+ */
+type AuthSession<C = unknown, P = unknown> = {
+  readonly kind: "user";
+  /**
+   * Read from the verified claims (`sub`, `email`, `role`, `app_metadata`,
+   * `user_metadata`), never from the user object in the cookie, so it is
+   * the same with `tokens-only` cookies. Call `auth.getUser()` when a flow
+   * must see a revoked or changed user.
+   */
+  readonly user: UserClaims;
+  /**
+   * The verified JWT payload, including custom access token hook claims,
+   * typed and validated by `betterSupabase.claims(schema)`.
+   */
+  readonly claims: JWTClaims & C;
+  /** Seconds since epoch, from the token's `exp`. */
+  readonly expiresAt: number | null;
+  /** Seconds since epoch, from the token's `iat`. */
+  readonly issuedAt: number | null;
+  /**
+   * The `authz_ver` claim an access token hook can set, so caches key on
+   * the user's authorization version. `null` without the claim.
+   */
+  readonly authzVersion: number | null;
+  /**
+   * `user_metadata` parsed by `betterSupabase.userMetadata(schema)`, for
+   * display. Absent without a schema or when the metadata fails it. Users
+   * write this data with `auth.updateUser()`: never base access on it.
+   */
+  readonly profile?: P;
+  /** `aal2` once the user verified a second factor in this session. */
+  readonly aal: Aal;
+  /**
+   * Signed in with `signInAnonymously()` (the `is_anonymous` claim). Guards
+   * refuse these users unless `allow` lists `'anonymous'`; `'anon'` means
+   * no session and never admits them.
+   */
+  readonly anonymous: boolean;
+  /** How the user signed in (`password`, `totp`, `sso/saml`, ...). */
+  readonly amr: readonly AmrEntry[];
+  /**
+   * Set when an admin acts as this user in a support session or an
+   * impersonated session (`act.kind`), for a banner. Matches `actor`.
+   */
+  readonly impersonator?: Impersonator;
+  /**
+   * Who acts for the user: an OAuth client or agent (`client_id`, or an
+   * `act` chain without `kind`), a support session or an impersonated
+   * session, read from the `act` and `client_id` claims.
+   */
+  readonly actor?: SessionActor;
+  /**
+   * The scopes the user granted an `oauth-client` actor (or an `agent` on a
+   * token with a `scope`), without the OpenID identity scopes in
+   * `IDENTITY_SCOPES`, plus its `act` chain. Never set for a support or
+   * impersonated session.
+   */
+  readonly delegation?: SessionDelegation;
+} | {
+  readonly kind: "service";
+  readonly keyName: string;
+} | {
+  readonly kind: "apiKey";
+  readonly keyId: string;
+  readonly name: string;
+  readonly organizationId?: string;
+  readonly userId?: string;
+  readonly scopes: readonly string[];
+  /** Seconds since epoch, when the key was created. */
+  readonly createdAt?: number;
+  /** The user who created the key. */
+  readonly createdBy?: string;
+} | {
+  readonly kind: "anon";
+  readonly reason: AnonReason;
+} | {
+  readonly kind: "invalid";
+  readonly reason: InvalidReason;
+  readonly error: DbError;
+};
+type AnonReason = Extract<AuthState, {
+  kind: "anon";
+}>["reason"];
+/** Drops the token from an `AuthState`, leaving only serializable fields. */
+declare function toSession<C, P>(auth: AuthState<C, P>): AuthSession<C, P>;
+//#endregion
+export { toSession as n, AuthSession as t };