better-call 0.0.0-experimental.01ff4b77

package/dist/capability.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,417 @@
+Object.defineProperty(exports, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: "Module" });
+const require_module = require("./module.cjs");
+const require_index = require("./index.cjs");
+const require_attrs = require("./plugins/http/attrs.cjs");
+//#region src/capability.ts
+const subtle = globalThis.crypto.subtle;
+const b64 = (bytes) => {
+	const view = bytes instanceof Uint8Array ? bytes : new Uint8Array(bytes);
+	let binary = "";
+	for (const byte of view) binary += String.fromCharCode(byte);
+	return btoa(binary).replaceAll("+", "-").replaceAll("/", "_").replace(/=+$/, "");
+};
+const unb64 = (text) => {
+	const binary = atob(text.replaceAll("-", "+").replaceAll("_", "/"));
+	const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length);
+	for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) bytes[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i);
+	return bytes;
+};
+const utf8 = (text) => new TextEncoder().encode(text);
+const generateKeypair = async () => {
+	const pair = await subtle.generateKey({ name: "Ed25519" }, true, ["sign", "verify"]);
+	return {
+		id: b64(await subtle.exportKey("raw", pair.publicKey)),
+		sign: async (payload) => b64(await subtle.sign("Ed25519", pair.privateKey, utf8(payload)))
+	};
+};
+const verifySignature = async (publicKeyId, payload, signature) => {
+	try {
+		const key = await subtle.importKey("raw", unb64(publicKeyId), { name: "Ed25519" }, false, ["verify"]);
+		return await subtle.verify("Ed25519", key, unb64(signature), utf8(payload));
+	} catch {
+		return false;
+	}
+};
+const fnOf = (cap) => typeof cap === "string" ? cap : cap.fn;
+const pinOf = (cap) => typeof cap === "string" ? void 0 : cap.input;
+const fmtCap = (cap) => typeof cap === "string" || !cap.input ? fnOf(cap) : `${cap.fn}(${JSON.stringify(cap.input)})`;
+const sameJson = (a, b) => JSON.stringify(a) === JSON.stringify(b);
+/** Does holding `parent` justify holding `child`? Same fn, and every
+* field the parent pins must be pinned identically by the child. */
+const covers = (parent, child) => {
+	if (fnOf(parent) !== fnOf(child)) return false;
+	const pin = pinOf(parent);
+	if (!pin) return true;
+	const childPin = pinOf(child);
+	if (!childPin) return false;
+	return Object.entries(pin).every(([field, value]) => sameJson(childPin[field], value));
+};
+/** Do these held caps authorize calling `fn` with `input`? */
+const permits = (caps, fn, input) => caps.some((cap) => {
+	if (fnOf(cap) !== fn) return false;
+	const pin = pinOf(cap);
+	if (!pin) return true;
+	return Object.entries(pin).every(([field, value]) => sameJson(input?.[field], value));
+});
+const now = () => Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3);
+/** Deterministic serialization: object keys sorted at every depth so the
+* signed bytes never depend on construction order or a re-serializing
+* intermediary. This IS the signing format - both minting and verifying
+* go through it. */
+const canonical = (value) => {
+	if (value === void 0) return "null";
+	if (value === null || typeof value !== "object") return JSON.stringify(value);
+	if (Array.isArray(value)) return `[${value.map(canonical).join(",")}]`;
+	const source = value;
+	return `{${Object.keys(source).filter((key) => source[key] !== void 0).sort().map((key) => `${JSON.stringify(key)}:${canonical(source[key])}`).join(",")}}`;
+};
+const payloadOf = (token) => {
+	const { sig, ...rest } = token;
+	return canonical(rest);
+};
+const mintDelegation = async (issuer, body) => {
+	const unsigned = {
+		typ: "dlg",
+		iss: issuer.id,
+		...body
+	};
+	return {
+		...unsigned,
+		sig: await issuer.sign(payloadOf(unsigned))
+	};
+};
+const mintInvocation = async (holder, call, proof, input) => {
+	const unsigned = {
+		typ: "inv",
+		iss: holder.id,
+		call,
+		input,
+		exp: now() + 30,
+		nonce: b64(crypto.getRandomValues(/* @__PURE__ */ new Uint8Array(8))),
+		prf: proof
+	};
+	return {
+		...unsigned,
+		sig: await holder.sign(payloadOf(unsigned))
+	};
+};
+var CapabilityError = class extends Error {
+	constructor(message) {
+		super(message);
+		this.name = "CapabilityError";
+	}
+};
+/** A crafted chain of self-signed links (valid until the root check at the
+* very bottom) would otherwise force unbounded recursion and signature
+* verifications - a cheap denial-of-service. Cap the depth. */
+const MAX_DELEGATION_DEPTH = 16;
+/** Walk the chain: every link signed, attenuating, unexpired, rooted. */
+const verifyDelegation = async (root, link, depth = 0) => {
+	if (depth > 16) throw new CapabilityError("delegation chain too deep");
+	if (link.typ !== "dlg") throw new CapabilityError("not a delegation");
+	if (link.exp < now()) throw new CapabilityError("delegation expired");
+	if (!await verifySignature(link.iss, payloadOf(link), link.sig)) throw new CapabilityError("bad delegation signature");
+	if (!link.prf) {
+		if (link.iss !== root) throw new CapabilityError("chain does not root at this server");
+		return link;
+	}
+	const parent = await verifyDelegation(root, link.prf, depth + 1);
+	if (parent.aud !== link.iss) throw new CapabilityError("delegation not issued by its parent's audience");
+	if (parent.sub !== link.sub) throw new CapabilityError("delegation changes subject");
+	for (const cap of link.caps) if (!parent.caps.some((held) => covers(held, cap))) throw new CapabilityError(`delegation escalates: ${fmtCap(cap)}`);
+	return link;
+};
+const verifyInvocation = async (root, token) => {
+	if (token?.typ !== "inv") throw new CapabilityError("not an invocation");
+	if (token.exp < now()) throw new CapabilityError("invocation expired");
+	if (!await verifySignature(token.iss, payloadOf(token), token.sig)) throw new CapabilityError("bad invocation signature");
+	const proof = await verifyDelegation(root, token.prf);
+	if (proof.aud !== token.iss) throw new CapabilityError("invocation not signed by delegation holder");
+	return {
+		subject: proof.sub,
+		caps: proof.caps,
+		holder: token.iss
+	};
+};
+const verifyAttestation = async (root, token) => {
+	if (token?.typ !== "idt") throw new CapabilityError("not an attestation");
+	if (token.exp < now()) throw new CapabilityError("attestation expired");
+	if (token.iss !== root) throw new CapabilityError("attestation not signed by this server");
+	if (!await verifySignature(token.iss, payloadOf(token), token.sig)) throw new CapabilityError("bad attestation signature");
+	return token.sub;
+};
+const capability = require_index.v.var("capability", { default: null });
+const validateCaller = (fnKey) => require_index.v.on(fnKey, async (c, next) => {
+	const wire = c.capability;
+	if (!wire) return next();
+	if (wire.entry === fnKey) {
+		if (!permits(wire.caps, fnKey, c.input)) throw new CapabilityError(`"${fnKey}" refused: caller's references do not cover it (held: ${wire.caps.map(fmtCap).join(", ") || "none"})`);
+		c.capability = {
+			...wire,
+			entry: null
+		};
+		return next();
+	}
+	return next();
+});
+/**
+* The remote boundary - the ONLY place a reference is ever reified or
+* verified, and the only construction in the whole model. Capabilities
+* are not registered or created anywhere: the fns you serve ARE the
+* capability space, one per key, and EVERY one of them validates its
+* caller - there is no public list. Everything crosses as data: a fn
+* key, JSON input, and a freshly minted invocation. Verification sets
+* `c.capability`; `validateCaller` on every fn does the rest.
+*/
+const serve = async (modules, authority) => {
+	const key = await generateKeypair();
+	const ttl = authority.ttl ?? 3600;
+	const challenges = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+	let challengeSeq = 0;
+	const spent = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+	const spend = async (token) => {
+		const held = await verifyInvocation(key.id, token);
+		const t = now();
+		for (const [seen, exp] of spent) if (exp < t) spent.delete(seen);
+		const id = `${token.iss}:${token.nonce}`;
+		if (spent.has(id)) throw new CapabilityError("invocation already spent");
+		spent.set(id, token.exp);
+		return held;
+	};
+	const issue = (holder, subject, caps) => mintDelegation(key, {
+		aud: holder,
+		sub: subject,
+		caps,
+		exp: now() + ttl
+	});
+	const mintAttestation = async (subject) => {
+		const unsigned = {
+			typ: "idt",
+			iss: key.id,
+			sub: subject,
+			exp: now() + ttl
+		};
+		return {
+			...unsigned,
+			sig: await key.sign(payloadOf(unsigned))
+		};
+	};
+	const attest = authority.attest ?? mintAttestation;
+	const verify = authority.verify ?? ((attestation) => verifyAttestation(key.id, attestation));
+	/** A reference is only as real as its fn: naming one that is not
+	* served is refused outright - there is no registry it could exist in
+	* instead. */
+	const assertServed = (caps, fns) => {
+		for (const cap of caps) if (!fns[fnOf(cap)]) throw new CapabilityError(`no fn "${fnOf(cap)}" to have a cap for`);
+	};
+	const fns = {};
+	const builtins = { request: require_index.v.fn("capability.request", { input: {
+		holder: require_index.v.string({ optional: true }),
+		token: require_index.v.any(),
+		attestation: require_index.v.any(),
+		caps: require_index.v.any(),
+		goal: require_index.v.string({ optional: true })
+	} }, async (c) => {
+		const caps = c.input.caps;
+		if (!caps) {
+			const holder = c.input.holder;
+			if (!holder) throw new CapabilityError("no holder");
+			const subject = c.input.attestation ? await verify(c.input.attestation) : null;
+			if (c.input.attestation && subject == null) throw new CapabilityError("attestation does not pass");
+			const granted = authority.defaults(subject);
+			assertServed(granted, fns);
+			return {
+				status: subject ? "approved" : "challenge",
+				delegation: await issue(holder, subject ?? `anon:${holder}`, granted)
+			};
+		}
+		const token = c.input.token;
+		if (token?.call !== "capability.request") throw new CapabilityError("invocation not minted for capability.request");
+		const held = await spend(token);
+		assertServed(caps, fns);
+		const payout = async () => ({
+			status: "approved",
+			delegation: await issue(held.holder, held.subject, [...held.caps, ...caps])
+		});
+		const open = [...challenges.values()].find((challenge) => challenge.holder === held.holder && sameJson(challenge.caps, caps));
+		if (open) {
+			if (open.status === "pending") return {
+				status: "challenge",
+				id: open.id
+			};
+			challenges.delete(open.id);
+			return open.status === "approved" ? payout() : { status: "denied" };
+		}
+		const verdict = (authority.decide ?? (() => "challenge"))({
+			subject: held.subject,
+			caps,
+			goal: c.input.goal
+		});
+		if (verdict === "deny") return { status: "denied" };
+		if (verdict === "approve") return payout();
+		const id = `chal_${++challengeSeq}`;
+		challenges.set(id, {
+			id,
+			subject: held.subject,
+			holder: held.holder,
+			caps,
+			goal: c.input.goal,
+			status: "pending"
+		});
+		return {
+			status: "challenge",
+			id
+		};
+	}) };
+	const builtinKeys = new Set(Object.values(builtins).map((builtin) => builtin.key));
+	for (const fn of Object.values({
+		...require_module.collectFns([modules]),
+		...builtins
+	})) fns[fn.key] = fn;
+	assertServed(authority.defaults(null), fns);
+	const guards = Object.fromEntries(Object.keys(fns).filter((fnKey) => !builtinKeys.has(fnKey)).map((fnKey) => [`guard ${fnKey}`, validateCaller(fnKey)]));
+	/** ANY fn can prove identity: when `identify` reads a subject out of a
+	* result, attested proof of WHO rides back alongside it. */
+	const attestors = Object.fromEntries(Object.keys(fns).filter((fnKey) => !builtinKeys.has(fnKey)).map((fnKey) => [`attest ${fnKey}`, require_index.v.on(fnKey, async (_c, next) => {
+		const result = await next();
+		const subject = authority.identify(result);
+		if (subject == null) return result;
+		return {
+			...result,
+			attestation: await attest(subject)
+		};
+	})]));
+	const exec = require_index.v.fn("capability.exec", {
+		input: {
+			call: require_index.v.string(),
+			input: require_index.v.any(),
+			token: require_index.v.any()
+		},
+		use: [
+			modules,
+			{ capability },
+			guards,
+			attestors
+		]
+	}, async (c) => {
+		const target = fns[c.input.call];
+		if (!target) throw new CapabilityError(`no fn "${c.input.call}"`);
+		if (!builtinKeys.has(c.input.call)) {
+			const token = c.input.token;
+			if (!token) throw new CapabilityError("no capability presented");
+			if (token.call !== c.input.call) throw new CapabilityError("invocation minted for a different fn");
+			if (!sameJson(token.input, c.input.input)) throw new CapabilityError("invocation minted for different input");
+			c.capability = {
+				...await spend(token),
+				entry: c.input.call
+			};
+		}
+		const inputSchema = target.$schema?.input;
+		if (inputSchema !== void 0) require_attrs.rejectServerOnly(inputSchema, c.input.input, c.input.call);
+		return target(c.input.input, c);
+	});
+	/** The user's side of a challenge - the demo calls it directly; a real
+	* server surfaces it in the IDP, an email, wherever the user is. */
+	const decide = (id, approve) => {
+		const challenge = challenges.get(id);
+		if (challenge) challenge.status = approve ? "approved" : "denied";
+		return challenge;
+	};
+	return {
+		exec,
+		decide,
+		challenges,
+		key: key.id
+	};
+};
+/**
+* An agent: a keypair plus whatever reified references it holds. Born
+* asking - creation requests the default caps. Without attestation, the
+* answer is the bootstrap challenge: a delegation whose only power is
+* signing in. With attestation (passed in, or earned by a call whose
+* result attests), the answer is the defaults. EVERY call re-mints a
+* single-use invocation over the fn AND the input; nothing is public.
+*/
+const createAgent = async (transport, options) => {
+	const me = await generateKeypair();
+	let held = null;
+	let attestation = options?.attestation ?? null;
+	const requestDefaults = async () => {
+		const result = await transport({
+			call: "capability.request",
+			input: {
+				holder: me.id,
+				attestation: attestation ?? void 0
+			}
+		});
+		if (result.delegation) held = result.delegation;
+		return result;
+	};
+	await requestDefaults();
+	return {
+		id: me.id,
+		attestation: () => attestation,
+		hold: (delegation) => {
+			held = delegation;
+		},
+		held: () => held,
+		call: async (call, input) => {
+			if (!held) throw new CapabilityError("agent holds no delegation");
+			const result = await transport({
+				call,
+				input,
+				token: await mintInvocation(me, call, held, input)
+			});
+			if (result?.attestation != null) {
+				attestation = result.attestation;
+				await requestDefaults();
+			}
+			return result;
+		},
+		request: async (caps, goal) => {
+			if (!held) throw new CapabilityError("agent holds no delegation");
+			const result = await transport({
+				call: "capability.request",
+				input: {
+					token: await mintInvocation(me, "capability.request", held),
+					caps,
+					goal
+				}
+			});
+			if (result.status === "approved") held = result.delegation;
+			return result;
+		},
+		/** Hand a SLICE of held references to another agent, re-minted for
+		* their key - fewer fns, or the same fn pinned to narrower input.
+		* The other agent spends with their own signature. */
+		delegate: async (toAgentId, caps) => {
+			if (!held) throw new CapabilityError("agent holds no delegation");
+			return mintDelegation(me, {
+				aud: toAgentId,
+				sub: held.sub,
+				caps,
+				exp: held.exp,
+				prf: held
+			});
+		}
+	};
+};
+//#endregion
+exports.CapabilityError = CapabilityError;
+exports.MAX_DELEGATION_DEPTH = MAX_DELEGATION_DEPTH;
+exports.capability = capability;
+exports.covers = covers;
+exports.createAgent = createAgent;
+exports.fmtCap = fmtCap;
+exports.fnOf = fnOf;
+exports.generateKeypair = generateKeypair;
+exports.mintDelegation = mintDelegation;
+exports.mintInvocation = mintInvocation;
+exports.permits = permits;
+exports.serve = serve;
+exports.validateCaller = validateCaller;
+exports.verifyAttestation = verifyAttestation;
+exports.verifyDelegation = verifyDelegation;
+exports.verifyInvocation = verifyInvocation;
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=capability.cjs.map

package/dist/capability.cjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"capability.cjs","names":["v","collectFns"],"sources":["../src/capability.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { collectFns, type FnDefination, type Module, v } from \"./index\";\nimport { rejectServerOnly } from \"./plugins/http/attrs\";\n\nconst subtle = globalThis.crypto.subtle;\n\nconst b64 = (bytes: ArrayBuffer | Uint8Array) => {\n\tconst view = bytes instanceof Uint8Array ? bytes : new Uint8Array(bytes);\n\tlet binary = \"\";\n\tfor (const byte of view) binary += String.fromCharCode(byte);\n\treturn btoa(binary)\n\t\t.replaceAll(\"+\", \"-\")\n\t\t.replaceAll(\"/\", \"_\")\n\t\t.replace(/=+$/, \"\");\n};\n\nconst unb64 = (text: string) => {\n\tconst binary = atob(text.replaceAll(\"-\", \"+\").replaceAll(\"_\", \"/\"));\n\tconst bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length);\n\tfor (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) bytes[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i);\n\treturn bytes;\n};\n\nconst utf8 = (text: string) => new TextEncoder().encode(text);\n\nexport type Keypair = {\n\tid: string;\n\tsign: (payload: string) => Promise<string>;\n};\n\nexport const generateKeypair = async (): Promise<Keypair> => {\n\tconst pair = (await subtle.generateKey({ name: \"Ed25519\" }, true, [\n\t\t\"sign\",\n\t\t\"verify\",\n\t])) as CryptoKeyPair;\n\tconst id = b64(await subtle.exportKey(\"raw\", pair.publicKey));\n\treturn {\n\t\tid,\n\t\tsign: async (payload) =>\n\t\t\tb64(await subtle.sign(\"Ed25519\", pair.privateKey, utf8(payload))),\n\t};\n};\n\nconst verifySignature = async (\n\tpublicKeyId: string,\n\tpayload: string,\n\tsignature: string,\n) => {\n\t// Malformed base64, a wrong-length key, or a bad signature are all just\n\t// \"this did not verify\" - never a thrown DOMException that escapes the\n\t// CapabilityError contract the callers rely on.\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst key = await subtle.importKey(\n\t\t\t\"raw\",\n\t\t\tunb64(publicKeyId),\n\t\t\t{ name: \"Ed25519\" },\n\t\t\tfalse,\n\t\t\t[\"verify\"],\n\t\t);\n\t\treturn await subtle.verify(\"Ed25519\", key, unb64(signature), utf8(payload));\n\t} catch {\n\t\treturn false;\n\t}\n};\n\n/** The name of a right: a fn key, optionally pinned to exact input\n * fields. Never signed on its own - delegations carry caps, invocations\n * spend them. */\nexport type Cap = string | { fn: string; input?: Record<string, unknown> };\n\nexport const fnOf = (cap: Cap) => (typeof cap === \"string\" ? cap : cap.fn);\n\nconst pinOf = (cap: Cap) => (typeof cap === \"string\" ? undefined : cap.input);\n\nexport const fmtCap = (cap: Cap) =>\n\ttypeof cap === \"string\" || !cap.input\n\t\t? fnOf(cap)\n\t\t: `${cap.fn}(${JSON.stringify(cap.input)})`;\n\nconst sameJson = (a: unknown, b: unknown) =>\n\tJSON.stringify(a) === JSON.stringify(b);\n\n/** Does holding `parent` justify holding `child`? Same fn, and every\n * field the parent pins must be pinned identically by the child. */\nexport const covers = (parent: Cap, child: Cap) => {\n\tif (fnOf(parent) !== fnOf(child)) return false;\n\tconst pin = pinOf(parent);\n\tif (!pin) return true;\n\tconst childPin = pinOf(child);\n\tif (!childPin) return false;\n\treturn Object.entries(pin).every(([field, value]) =>\n\t\tsameJson(childPin[field], value),\n\t);\n};\n\n/** Do these held caps authorize calling `fn` with `input`? */\nexport const permits = (caps: Cap[], fn: string, input: unknown) =>\n\tcaps.some((cap) => {\n\t\tif (fnOf(cap) !== fn) return false;\n\t\tconst pin = pinOf(cap);\n\t\tif (!pin) return true;\n\t\treturn Object.entries(pin).every(([field, value]) =>\n\t\t\tsameJson((input as Record<string, unknown>)?.[field], value),\n\t\t);\n\t});\n\nexport type Delegation = {\n\ttyp: \"dlg\";\n\tiss: string;\n\taud: string;\n\tsub: string;\n\tcaps: Cap[];\n\texp: number;\n\tprf?: Delegation;\n\tsig: string;\n};\n\nexport type Invocation = {\n\ttyp: \"inv\";\n\tiss: string;\n\tcall: string;\n\tinput?: unknown;\n\texp: number;\n\tnonce: string;\n\tprf: Delegation;\n\tsig: string;\n};\n\nconst now = () => Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n\n/** Deterministic serialization: object keys sorted at every depth so the\n * signed bytes never depend on construction order or a re-serializing\n * intermediary. This IS the signing format - both minting and verifying\n * go through it. */\nconst canonical = (value: unknown): string => {\n\t// Mirror JSON.stringify's treatment of undefined so the signed bytes\n\t// survive a JSON wire round-trip: an undefined object field is dropped,\n\t// an undefined array slot becomes null.\n\tif (value === undefined) return \"null\";\n\tif (value === null || typeof value !== \"object\") return JSON.stringify(value);\n\tif (Array.isArray(value)) return `[${value.map(canonical).join(\",\")}]`;\n\tconst source = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n\tconst entries = Object.keys(source)\n\t\t.filter((key) => source[key] !== undefined)\n\t\t.sort()\n\t\t.map((key) => `${JSON.stringify(key)}:${canonical(source[key])}`);\n\treturn `{${entries.join(\",\")}}`;\n};\n\nconst payloadOf = (token: Record<string, unknown>) => {\n\tconst { sig, ...rest } = token;\n\treturn canonical(rest);\n};\n\nexport const mintDelegation = async (\n\tissuer: Keypair,\n\tbody: Omit<Delegation, \"typ\" | \"iss\" | \"sig\">,\n): Promise<Delegation> => {\n\tconst unsigned = { typ: \"dlg\" as const, iss: issuer.id, ...body };\n\treturn { ...unsigned, sig: await issuer.sign(payloadOf(unsigned)) };\n};\n\nexport const mintInvocation = async (\n\tholder: Keypair,\n\tcall: string,\n\tproof: Delegation,\n\tinput?: unknown,\n): Promise<Invocation> => {\n\tconst unsigned = {\n\t\ttyp: \"inv\" as const,\n\t\tiss: holder.id,\n\t\tcall,\n\t\tinput,\n\t\texp: now() + 30,\n\t\tnonce: b64(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(8))),\n\t\tprf: proof,\n\t};\n\treturn { ...unsigned, sig: await holder.sign(payloadOf(unsigned)) };\n};\n\nexport class CapabilityError extends Error {\n\tconstructor(message: string) {\n\t\tsuper(message);\n\t\tthis.name = \"CapabilityError\";\n\t}\n}\n\n/** A crafted chain of self-signed links (valid until the root check at the\n * very bottom) would otherwise force unbounded recursion and signature\n * verifications - a cheap denial-of-service. Cap the depth. */\nexport const MAX_DELEGATION_DEPTH = 16;\n\n/** Walk the chain: every link signed, attenuating, unexpired, rooted. */\nexport const verifyDelegation = async (\n\troot: string,\n\tlink: Delegation,\n\tdepth = 0,\n): Promise<Delegation> => {\n\tif (depth > MAX_DELEGATION_DEPTH) {\n\t\tthrow new CapabilityError(\"delegation chain too deep\");\n\t}\n\tif (link.typ !== \"dlg\") throw new CapabilityError(\"not a delegation\");\n\tif (link.exp < now()) throw new CapabilityError(\"delegation expired\");\n\tif (!(await verifySignature(link.iss, payloadOf(link), link.sig))) {\n\t\tthrow new CapabilityError(\"bad delegation signature\");\n\t}\n\tif (!link.prf) {\n\t\tif (link.iss !== root) {\n\t\t\tthrow new CapabilityError(\"chain does not root at this server\");\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn link;\n\t}\n\tconst parent = await verifyDelegation(root, link.prf, depth + 1);\n\tif (parent.aud !== link.iss) {\n\t\tthrow new CapabilityError(\"delegation not issued by its parent's audience\");\n\t}\n\tif (parent.sub !== link.sub) {\n\t\tthrow new CapabilityError(\"delegation changes subject\");\n\t}\n\tfor (const cap of link.caps) {\n\t\tif (!parent.caps.some((held) => covers(held, cap))) {\n\t\t\tthrow new CapabilityError(`delegation escalates: ${fmtCap(cap)}`);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn link;\n};\n\nexport const verifyInvocation = async (root: string, token: Invocation) => {\n\tif (token?.typ !== \"inv\") throw new CapabilityError(\"not an invocation\");\n\tif (token.exp < now()) throw new CapabilityError(\"invocation expired\");\n\tif (!(await verifySignature(token.iss, payloadOf(token), token.sig))) {\n\t\tthrow new CapabilityError(\"bad invocation signature\");\n\t}\n\tconst proof = await verifyDelegation(root, token.prf);\n\t// Proof of possession: ONLY the delegation's audience can spend it. A\n\t// stolen delegation is inert - spending demands a re-mint by `aud`.\n\tif (proof.aud !== token.iss) {\n\t\tthrow new CapabilityError(\"invocation not signed by delegation holder\");\n\t}\n\treturn { subject: proof.sub, caps: proof.caps, holder: token.iss };\n};\n\nexport type Attestation = {\n\ttyp: \"idt\";\n\tiss: string;\n\tsub: string;\n\texp: number;\n\tsig: string;\n};\n\nexport const verifyAttestation = async (root: string, token: Attestation) => {\n\tif (token?.typ !== \"idt\") throw new CapabilityError(\"not an attestation\");\n\tif (token.exp < now()) throw new CapabilityError(\"attestation expired\");\n\tif (token.iss !== root) {\n\t\tthrow new CapabilityError(\"attestation not signed by this server\");\n\t}\n\tif (!(await verifySignature(token.iss, payloadOf(token), token.sig))) {\n\t\tthrow new CapabilityError(\"bad attestation signature\");\n\t}\n\treturn token.sub;\n};\n\nexport const capability = v.var(\"capability\", {\n\tdefault: null as null | {\n\t\tsubject: string;\n\t\tcaps: Cap[];\n\t\tholder: string;\n\t\tentry: string | null;\n\t},\n});\n\nexport const validateCaller = (fnKey: string) =>\n\tv.on(fnKey, async (c, next) => {\n\t\tconst wire = c.capability;\n\t\t// No boundary above this call: the caller reached this fn through\n\t\t// a memory reference it was handed. That possession is the\n\t\t// capability - nothing to verify.\n\t\tif (!wire) return next();\n\t\tif (wire.entry === fnKey) {\n\t\t\t// The boundary frame itself: the caller holds no memory\n\t\t\t// reference here, only the reified one - it must cover this fn\n\t\t\t// AND this input.\n\t\t\tif (!permits(wire.caps, fnKey, c.input)) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new CapabilityError(\n\t\t\t\t\t`\"${fnKey}\" refused: caller's references do not cover it (held: ${wire.caps.map(fmtCap).join(\", \") || \"none\"})`,\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// The wire hop is spent: below this frame, every call is\n\t\t\t// fn-to-fn by direct reference again.\n\t\t\tc.capability = { ...wire, entry: null };\n\t\t\treturn next();\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Called from inside by a fn that already passed the boundary\n\t\t// check: its body holds this fn by reference - implied.\n\t\treturn next();\n\t});\n\n/* -------------------------------- authority -------------------------------- */\n\nexport type Challenge = {\n\tid: string;\n\tsubject: string;\n\tholder: string;\n\tcaps: Cap[];\n\tgoal?: string;\n\tstatus: \"pending\" | \"approved\" | \"denied\";\n};\n\n/**\n * Authority never checks a call - `validateCaller` owns that. It answers\n * the questions that come BEFORE any call: what references does a caller\n * start with, what proves WHO a caller acts for, and how are requests\n * for more settled?\n */\nexport type Authority = {\n\t/**\n\t * The first grant: what a request with no caps named pays out, given\n\t * who was proven - and `null` IS an answer. Nobody's defaults should\n\t * be just enough to go earn attestation (here: sign in); there is no\n\t * separate \"bootstrap caps\" list.\n\t */\n\tdefaults: (subject: string | null) => Cap[];\n\t/**\n\t * Reads a proven subject out of ANY fn's result: the moment authority\n\t * learns WHO, attested proof rides back alongside the result.\n\t */\n\tidentify: (result: unknown) => string | null;\n\t/**\n\t * Turns a subject into the portable attestation handed back. Defaults\n\t * to a token this server signs itself; swap together with `verify` to\n\t * lean on an external IDP instead.\n\t */\n\tattest?: (subject: string) => unknown | Promise<unknown>;\n\t/** Decides whether a presented attestation passes. */\n\tverify?: (attestation: unknown) => string | null | Promise<string | null>;\n\t/** How widening requests are settled. Default: challenge everything. */\n\tdecide?: (request: {\n\t\tsubject: string;\n\t\tcaps: Cap[];\n\t\tgoal?: string;\n\t}) => \"approve\" | \"challenge\" | \"deny\";\n\t/** Delegation and attestation lifetime, seconds. */\n\tttl?: number;\n};\n\n/* --------------------------------- server --------------------------------- */\n\n/**\n * The remote boundary - the ONLY place a reference is ever reified or\n * verified, and the only construction in the whole model. Capabilities\n * are not registered or created anywhere: the fns you serve ARE the\n * capability space, one per key, and EVERY one of them validates its\n * caller - there is no public list. Everything crosses as data: a fn\n * key, JSON input, and a freshly minted invocation. Verification sets\n * `c.capability`; `validateCaller` on every fn does the rest.\n */\nexport const serve = async (\n\tmodules: Record<string, unknown>,\n\tauthority: Authority,\n) => {\n\tconst key = await generateKeypair();\n\tconst ttl = authority.ttl ?? 3600;\n\tconst challenges = new Map<string, Challenge>();\n\tlet challengeSeq = 0;\n\n\t// A minted invocation spends exactly ONCE. Its nonce is remembered\n\t// until the invocation would expire anyway; a replay within that window\n\t// is refused. This is what makes \"single-use\" true rather than a claim.\n\tconst spent = new Map<string, number>();\n\tconst spend = async (token: Invocation) => {\n\t\tconst held = await verifyInvocation(key.id, token);\n\t\tconst t = now();\n\t\tfor (const [seen, exp] of spent) if (exp < t) spent.delete(seen);\n\t\tconst id = `${token.iss}:${token.nonce}`;\n\t\tif (spent.has(id)) throw new CapabilityError(\"invocation already spent\");\n\t\tspent.set(id, token.exp);\n\t\treturn held;\n\t};\n\n\tconst issue = (holder: string, subject: string, caps: Cap[]) =>\n\t\tmintDelegation(key, { aud: holder, sub: subject, caps, exp: now() + ttl });\n\n\tconst mintAttestation = async (subject: string): Promise<Attestation> => {\n\t\tconst unsigned = {\n\t\t\ttyp: \"idt\" as const,\n\t\t\tiss: key.id,\n\t\t\tsub: subject,\n\t\t\texp: now() + ttl,\n\t\t};\n\t\treturn { ...unsigned, sig: await key.sign(payloadOf(unsigned)) };\n\t};\n\n\t// What passes as proof of WHO is the authority's policy. The default\n\t// pair is self-generated: this server attests subjects with its own\n\t// signed id token, and only such tokens verify back.\n\tconst attest = authority.attest ?? mintAttestation;\n\tconst verify =\n\t\tauthority.verify ??\n\t\t((attestation: unknown) =>\n\t\t\tverifyAttestation(key.id, attestation as Attestation));\n\n\t/** A reference is only as real as its fn: naming one that is not\n\t * served is refused outright - there is no registry it could exist in\n\t * instead. */\n\tconst assertServed = (caps: Cap[], fns: Record<string, unknown>) => {\n\t\tfor (const cap of caps) {\n\t\t\tif (!fns[fnOf(cap)]) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new CapabilityError(`no fn \"${fnOf(cap)}\" to have a cap for`);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t};\n\n\tconst fns: Record<string, FnDefination<any, any>> = {};\n\n\t/**\n\t * The one entry point that needs no capability - it is where reified\n\t * references come from. No caps named = asking for the DEFAULTS:\n\t * whoever the presented attestation proves gets that subject's\n\t * defaults; empty hands get NOBODY'S defaults as a challenge - just\n\t * enough power to go earn attestation. Caps named = widening: approve\n\t * / challenge / deny by the authority, and asking again with the same\n\t * caps resumes an open challenge.\n\t */\n\tconst request = v.fn(\n\t\t\"capability.request\",\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tinput: {\n\t\t\t\tholder: v.string({ optional: true }),\n\t\t\t\ttoken: v.any(),\n\t\t\t\tattestation: v.any(),\n\t\t\t\tcaps: v.any(),\n\t\t\t\tgoal: v.string({ optional: true }),\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t},\n\t\tasync (c) => {\n\t\t\tconst caps = c.input.caps as Cap[] | undefined;\n\n\t\t\tif (!caps) {\n\t\t\t\tconst holder = c.input.holder;\n\t\t\t\tif (!holder) throw new CapabilityError(\"no holder\");\n\t\t\t\tconst subject = c.input.attestation\n\t\t\t\t\t? await verify(c.input.attestation)\n\t\t\t\t\t: null;\n\t\t\t\tif (c.input.attestation && subject == null) {\n\t\t\t\t\tthrow new CapabilityError(\"attestation does not pass\");\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t// `null` is an answer: nobody's defaults are the first grant -\n\t\t\t\t// just enough to go earn attestation.\n\t\t\t\tconst granted = authority.defaults(subject);\n\t\t\t\tassertServed(granted, fns);\n\t\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\t\tstatus: subject ? (\"approved\" as const) : (\"challenge\" as const),\n\t\t\t\t\tdelegation: await issue(holder, subject ?? `anon:${holder}`, granted),\n\t\t\t\t};\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// The invocation here proves POSSESSION of a chain - who is\n\t\t\t// asking - not authority over what is asked for; that is the\n\t\t\t// very thing the request is trying to widen. It must still be an\n\t\t\t// invocation minted for THIS builtin, spent once like any other.\n\t\t\tconst token = c.input.token as Invocation | undefined;\n\t\t\tif (token?.call !== \"capability.request\") {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new CapabilityError(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"invocation not minted for capability.request\",\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst held = await spend(token);\n\t\t\tassertServed(caps, fns);\n\t\t\tconst payout = async () => ({\n\t\t\t\tstatus: \"approved\" as const,\n\t\t\t\tdelegation: await issue(held.holder, held.subject, [\n\t\t\t\t\t...held.caps,\n\t\t\t\t\t...caps,\n\t\t\t\t]),\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tconst open = [...challenges.values()].find(\n\t\t\t\t(challenge) =>\n\t\t\t\t\tchallenge.holder === held.holder && sameJson(challenge.caps, caps),\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t\tif (open) {\n\t\t\t\tif (open.status === \"pending\") {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn { status: \"challenge\" as const, id: open.id };\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tchallenges.delete(open.id);\n\t\t\t\treturn open.status === \"approved\"\n\t\t\t\t\t? payout()\n\t\t\t\t\t: { status: \"denied\" as const };\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst verdict = (authority.decide ?? (() => \"challenge\"))({\n\t\t\t\tsubject: held.subject,\n\t\t\t\tcaps,\n\t\t\t\tgoal: c.input.goal,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tif (verdict === \"deny\") return { status: \"denied\" as const };\n\t\t\tif (verdict === \"approve\") return payout();\n\t\t\tconst id = `chal_${++challengeSeq}`;\n\t\t\tchallenges.set(id, {\n\t\t\t\tid,\n\t\t\t\tsubject: held.subject,\n\t\t\t\tholder: held.holder,\n\t\t\t\tcaps,\n\t\t\t\tgoal: c.input.goal,\n\t\t\t\tstatus: \"pending\",\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\treturn { status: \"challenge\" as const, id };\n\t\t},\n\t);\n\n\tconst builtins = { request };\n\tconst builtinKeys = new Set<string>(\n\t\tObject.values(builtins).map((builtin) => builtin.key),\n\t);\n\tfor (const fn of Object.values({\n\t\t...collectFns([modules]),\n\t\t...builtins,\n\t})) {\n\t\tfns[fn.key] = fn;\n\t}\n\tassertServed(authority.defaults(null), fns);\n\n\t// The rule, mounted on every served fn: each validates its own caller.\n\tconst guards = Object.fromEntries(\n\t\tObject.keys(fns)\n\t\t\t.filter((fnKey) => !builtinKeys.has(fnKey))\n\t\t\t.map((fnKey) => [`guard ${fnKey}`, validateCaller(fnKey)]),\n\t) as Module;\n\n\t/** ANY fn can prove identity: when `identify` reads a subject out of a\n\t * result, attested proof of WHO rides back alongside it. */\n\tconst attestors = Object.fromEntries(\n\t\tObject.keys(fns)\n\t\t\t.filter((fnKey) => !builtinKeys.has(fnKey))\n\t\t\t.map((fnKey) => [\n\t\t\t\t`attest ${fnKey}`,\n\t\t\t\tv.on(fnKey, async (_c, next) => {\n\t\t\t\t\tconst result = await next();\n\t\t\t\t\tconst subject = authority.identify(result);\n\t\t\t\t\tif (subject == null) return result;\n\t\t\t\t\treturn { ...result, attestation: await attest(subject) };\n\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t]),\n\t) as Module;\n\n\tconst exec = v.fn(\n\t\t\"capability.exec\",\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tinput: { call: v.string(), input: v.any(), token: v.any() },\n\t\t\tuse: [modules, { capability }, guards, attestors],\n\t\t},\n\t\tasync (c) => {\n\t\t\tconst target = fns[c.input.call];\n\t\t\tif (!target) throw new CapabilityError(`no fn \"${c.input.call}\"`);\n\t\t\tif (!builtinKeys.has(c.input.call)) {\n\t\t\t\tconst token = c.input.token as Invocation | undefined;\n\t\t\t\tif (!token) throw new CapabilityError(\"no capability presented\");\n\t\t\t\tif (token.call !== c.input.call) {\n\t\t\t\t\tthrow new CapabilityError(\"invocation minted for a different fn\");\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tif (!sameJson(token.input, c.input.input)) {\n\t\t\t\t\tthrow new CapabilityError(\"invocation minted for different input\");\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t// The boundary only proves the chain is genuinely held and\n\t\t\t\t// bound to this exact message, spent once. Whether it covers\n\t\t\t\t// the call is the target fn's own check - `entry` tells it\n\t\t\t\t// which frame has no memory reference behind it.\n\t\t\t\tconst held = await spend(token);\n\t\t\t\tc.capability = { ...held, entry: c.input.call };\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// Wire edge: reject http.serverOnly fields before the target\n\t\t\t// validates (object validate would otherwise strip them quietly).\n\t\t\tconst inputSchema = (target as FnDefination<any, any>).$schema?.input;\n\t\t\tif (inputSchema !== undefined) {\n\t\t\t\trejectServerOnly(inputSchema, c.input.input, c.input.call);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn (target as (i: unknown, p: unknown) => unknown)(c.input.input, c);\n\t\t},\n\t);\n\n\t/** The user's side of a challenge - the demo calls it directly; a real\n\t * server surfaces it in the IDP, an email, wherever the user is. */\n\tconst decide = (id: string, approve: boolean) => {\n\t\tconst challenge = challenges.get(id);\n\t\tif (challenge) challenge.status = approve ? \"approved\" : \"denied\";\n\t\treturn challenge;\n\t};\n\n\treturn { exec, decide, challenges, key: key.id };\n};\n\n/* --------------------------------- client --------------------------------- */\n\nexport type Transport = (message: {\n\tcall: string;\n\tinput?: unknown;\n\ttoken?: Invocation;\n}) => Promise<any>;\n\n/**\n * An agent: a keypair plus whatever reified references it holds. Born\n * asking - creation requests the default caps. Without attestation, the\n * answer is the bootstrap challenge: a delegation whose only power is\n * signing in. With attestation (passed in, or earned by a call whose\n * result attests), the answer is the defaults. EVERY call re-mints a\n * single-use invocation over the fn AND the input; nothing is public.\n */\nexport const createAgent = async (\n\ttransport: Transport,\n\toptions?: { attestation?: unknown },\n) => {\n\tconst me = await generateKeypair();\n\tlet held: Delegation | null = null;\n\t// Opaque to the agent: whatever the server hands back as proof of who\n\t// it acts for, kept and re-presented as-is.\n\tlet attestation: unknown = options?.attestation ?? null;\n\n\tconst requestDefaults = async () => {\n\t\tconst result = await transport({\n\t\t\tcall: \"capability.request\",\n\t\t\tinput: { holder: me.id, attestation: attestation ?? undefined },\n\t\t});\n\t\tif (result.delegation) held = result.delegation as Delegation;\n\t\treturn result;\n\t};\n\n\tawait requestDefaults();\n\n\treturn {\n\t\tid: me.id,\n\t\tattestation: () => attestation,\n\t\thold: (delegation: Delegation) => {\n\t\t\theld = delegation;\n\t\t},\n\t\theld: () => held,\n\t\tcall: async (call: string, input?: unknown) => {\n\t\t\tif (!held) throw new CapabilityError(\"agent holds no delegation\");\n\t\t\tconst token = await mintInvocation(me, call, held, input);\n\t\t\tconst result = await transport({ call, input, token });\n\t\t\t// A result carrying attestation is the server saying \"now I\n\t\t\t// know who you act for\" - keep it, trade it for the defaults.\n\t\t\tif (result?.attestation != null) {\n\t\t\t\tattestation = result.attestation;\n\t\t\t\tawait requestDefaults();\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn result;\n\t\t},\n\t\trequest: async (caps: Cap[], goal?: string) => {\n\t\t\tif (!held) throw new CapabilityError(\"agent holds no delegation\");\n\t\t\tconst token = await mintInvocation(me, \"capability.request\", held);\n\t\t\tconst result = await transport({\n\t\t\t\tcall: \"capability.request\",\n\t\t\t\tinput: { token, caps, goal },\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tif (result.status === \"approved\") held = result.delegation;\n\t\t\treturn result;\n\t\t},\n\t\t/** Hand a SLICE of held references to another agent, re-minted for\n\t\t * their key - fewer fns, or the same fn pinned to narrower input.\n\t\t * The other agent spends with their own signature. */\n\t\tdelegate: async (toAgentId: string, caps: Cap[]) => {\n\t\t\tif (!held) throw new CapabilityError(\"agent holds no delegation\");\n\t\t\treturn mintDelegation(me, {\n\t\t\t\taud: toAgentId,\n\t\t\t\tsub: held.sub,\n\t\t\t\tcaps,\n\t\t\t\texp: held.exp,\n\t\t\t\tprf: 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