bare-agent 0.28.0 → 0.29.0

package/README.md

@@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ const { policy, onLlmResult, onToolResult, filterTools } = wireGate(gate, {
     if (toolName === 'shell_exec') return { type: 'bash', args, _ctx: ctx };
     if (toolName === 'shell_read') return { type: 'read', args, _ctx: ctx };
     if (toolName === 'shell_write') return { type: 'write', args, _ctx: ctx }; // gate by fs.writeScope
+    if (toolName === 'shell_edit')  return { type: 'edit',  args, _ctx: ctx }; // same fs.writeScope as write
     return defaultActionTranslator(toolName, args, ctx);
   },
 });

package/bareagent.context.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # bareagent — Integration Guide
 
 > For AI assistants and developers wiring bareagent into a project.
-> v0.28.0 | Node.js >= 18 | zero required deps (`bareguard >=0.9.0 <0.13.0` optional peer for governance) | Apache 2.0
+> v0.29.0 | Node.js >= 18 | zero required deps (`bareguard >=0.9.0 <0.13.0` optional peer for governance) | Apache 2.0
 >
 > Full human guide with composition examples, design philosophy, and recipes: [Usage Guide](docs/02-features/usage-guide.md)
 
@@ -65,7 +65,8 @@ Eight entry points:
 | Assess website privacy risk | createBrowsingTools + Loop (requires `npm install wearehere`) |
 | Control Android/iOS devices | createMobileTools + Loop |
 | Control mobile (token-efficient, disk-based) | `baremobile` CLI session — snapshots to `.baremobile/*.yml` |
-| Read/write files, list directories, run shell commands, grep | createShellTools (shell_read/grep/**write**/run/exec) + Loop({ policy }) — gate `shell_write` via `fs.writeScope` with an actionTranslator |
+| Read/write files, list directories, run shell commands, grep | createShellTools (shell_read/grep/**write**/**edit**/run/exec) + Loop({ policy }) — gate `shell_write`/`shell_edit` via `fs.writeScope` with an actionTranslator |
+| Change one span of a big file without re-emitting the whole thing | `shell_edit({path, oldText, newText})` — anchored exact-once replace; the surgical alternative to whole-file `shell_write` (BA-13). Gate it as `{type:'edit'}` |
 | Auto-discover MCP servers from IDE configs | createMCPBridge |
 | Gate MCP tools with allow/deny lists | createMCPBridge + `.mcp-bridge.json` |
 | Gate every tool call with one policy hook | `wireGate(gate).policy` → `Loop({ policy })` |
@@ -423,6 +424,7 @@ const { policy, onToolResult } = wireGate(gate, {
     if (toolName === 'shell_run')   return { type: 'bash', args, _ctx: ctx };   // reads args.argv → joins to cmd
     if (toolName === 'shell_read')  return { type: 'read',  args, _ctx: ctx };  // reads args.path
     if (toolName === 'shell_write') return { type: 'write', args, _ctx: ctx };  // gate by fs.writeScope (reads args.path)
+    if (toolName === 'shell_edit')  return { type: 'edit',  args, _ctx: ctx };  // same fs.writeScope as write (reads args.path)
     return { type: toolName, args, _ctx: ctx };          // fall through to defaultActionTranslator
   },
 });
@@ -1247,6 +1249,7 @@ Mobile tools follow the observe-act pattern: action tools auto-return a fresh sn
 |---|---|
 | `shell_read` | Read a file (utf8, 256KB cap) or list a directory (tab-separated). `~` expands to home. |
 | `shell_write` | Write (or `append:true`) UTF-8 text to a file, creating parent dirs. 5MB cap. No shell, so it gates cleanly through `fs.writeScope` once translated to `{type:'write'}`. **`content` is REQUIRED** — see the truncation guard below. |
+| `shell_edit` | Anchored exact-string replace — the **surgical** alternative to whole-file `shell_write` (BA-13). `{path, oldText, newText}`: `oldText` must occur **exactly once** (quote surrounding lines to be unique); `newText` is spliced in **verbatim** (`""` deletes). Returns a compact `edited <path>: 1 replacement` receipt, never the body. 0 or 2+ matches → a refusal **returned as the tool result** (the model re-anchors; file untouched). Gates through `fs.writeScope` translated to `{type:'edit'}` — see the note below. |
 | `shell_grep` | JavaScript regex search across files. Walks directories, skips binary files, returns `{hits: [{file, line, text}], truncated, fileCount}`. |
 | `shell_run` | Run a command with an **argv array** via `child_process.execFile` (no shell, no metacharacter interpretation). Returns `{stdout, stderr, code, timedOut}`. **Use this when you need a policy allowlist.** |
 | `shell_exec` | Run a raw shell command string via `/bin/sh -c` (or `cmd.exe`). Returns the same shape. **Shell metacharacters are interpreted — naive allowlists are bypassable.** Use only when you genuinely need shell features (pipes, redirects, globs). |
@@ -1255,6 +1258,8 @@ Mobile tools follow the observe-act pattern: action tools auto-return a fresh sn
 
 > **⚠️ `shell_write` requires `content` — and a gate cannot cover for it (v0.27+).** `content` used to default to `''`, so a tool call that OMITTED it silently overwrote the target with **zero bytes** and returned `"wrote 0 bytes to <path>"` as success. That is the ordinary shape of a model hitting its **output-token cap** mid-generation on a long file — observed live emptying a 1789-line source file. **No policy can catch it:** a 0-byte write is a *legal* write, and bareguard's `fs` primitive judges `{type:'write', path}` without inspecting the body (the gate correctly `allow`s it). `shell_write` now **rejects** an absent, `null`, or non-string `content` and leaves the file byte-identical; the error tells the model to retry with the full content. An explicit `content: ""` still empties the file — that one is deliberate.
 
+> **`shell_edit` — the surgical write (BA-13).** Changing one line of an 800-line file with `shell_write` forces the model to re-emit **all 800 lines** as tool-call JSON: an output-token tax ∝ file size (output is the expensive token class), paid on every revision, and the maximal broken-tree surface (a truncated rewrite mangles the lines it never meant to touch — the BA-4/BA-6 class). `shell_edit({path, oldText, newText})` emits only the anchor + replacement. Semantics worth knowing: `oldText` must match **exactly once** (a 0/2+ match is a refusal *returned as the tool result*, so the loop continues and the model widens the anchor — not a throw, so a repeated-identical miss is bounded by maxTurns/budget, not the spin guard); missing/empty `oldText` or missing/non-string `newText` **throw** (BA-4 guards; `newText:""` is a legal deletion); the write is **atomic** (sibling temp + rename, mode preserved) so an fs failure never leaves a partial file; and `newText` is a **literal splice** (a `$&`/`$1` in it lands verbatim, unlike `String.replace`). Gate it exactly like `shell_write` but as `{type:'edit'}` — **bareguard gates `edit` by the same `fs.writeScope` as `write` with zero config** (its FS primitive's `FS_TYPES` already includes `edit`).
+
 > **⚠️ `shell_exec` injection caveat.** `"ls"` passes a base-command allowlist like `args.command.split(/\s+/)[0]`, but so does `"ls;rm -rf /tmp/x"` — the shell runs both. **A base-command allowlist is NOT safe for `shell_exec`.** For policy-gated use, prefer `shell_run({argv})` and allow-list on `args.argv[0]` — there is no shell in that path, so metacharacters are just literal argument bytes. Use `shell_exec` only when the agent needs pipes/redirects/globs, and gate it at a higher level (human approval, narrow intent).
 
 ```javascript

package/examples/with-bareguard.mjs

@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ const actionTranslator = (toolName, args, ctx) => {
     case 'shell_grep': return { type: 'read', path: args?.path, args, _ctx: ctx ?? null };
     // shell_write is a write — gate it through fs.writeScope (add writeScope to the Gate config to enforce).
     case 'shell_write': return { type: 'write', path: args?.path, args, _ctx: ctx ?? null };
+    // shell_edit is an anchored edit — bareguard gates {type:'edit'} by the SAME fs.writeScope as write.
+    case 'shell_edit':  return { type: 'edit',  path: args?.path, args, _ctx: ctx ?? null };
     default:           return { type: toolName, args, _ctx: ctx ?? null };
   }
 };

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "bare-agent",
-  "version": "0.28.0",
+  "version": "0.29.0",
   "files": [
     "index.js",
     "index.d.ts",

package/tools/shell.d.ts

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ declare namespace _exports {
     export { createShellTools };
     export { _grepCore };
     export { writeFile as _writeFile };
+    export { editFile as _editFile };
 }
 export = _exports;
 type GrepArgs = {
@@ -97,3 +98,41 @@ declare function writeFile({ path: rawPath, content, append, maxBytes }: {
     append?: boolean;
     maxBytes?: number;
 }): Promise<string>;
+/**
+ * Anchored exact-string replace (BA-13) — the surgical counterpart to the whole-file `shell_write`.
+ * Changing one line of an 800-line file with `shell_write` forces the model to EMIT all 800 lines as
+ * tool-call JSON: an output-token tax ∝ file size (output is the expensive token class), paid on every
+ * revision, and the maximal broken-tree surface (a truncated rewrite mangles the 799 lines it never meant
+ * to touch — the BA-4/BA-6 truncation class). `shell_edit` emits only the anchor and its replacement.
+ *
+ * TWO error classes, deliberately split:
+ *   - ANCHOR failures (`oldText` matches 0 or 2+ times) RETURN a refusal string as a normal tool RESULT —
+ *     the loop continues and the model re-anchors, and the refusal names the count so the retry is a DISTINCT
+ *     call. (Tradeoff, chosen with eyes open: a result does NOT feed the Loop's `maxIdenticalToolErrors` spin
+ *     guard, so a model that repeats the byte-identical wrong anchor is bounded only by maxTurns/budget, not
+ *     short-circuited. A widened anchor is a different call and recovers naturally; the exact-repeat spin is
+ *     the rare degenerate case. This matches the ask's "refusal, not a throw" contract.)
+ *   - fs-layer errors (missing file, a directory) and BA-4 param-guard violations THROW at the tool boundary.
+ *
+ * BA-4 param guards (guarded from birth this time — cf. `shell_write` zeroing files on an absent arg):
+ * `oldText` a required NON-EMPTY string, `newText` a required string — both THROW when absent/wrong-type (an
+ * absent param is the truncated-call signature, never a silent default). Explicit `newText:""` is a legal
+ * deletion; an absent `newText` is not.
+ *
+ * ATOMIC: read → splice in memory → write a sibling temp (same filesystem, so `rename` is atomic) carrying
+ * the original's mode → rename over the original. Any throw before the rename leaves the original
+ * byte-identical and cleans the temp up, so a reader never sees a partial file, and an edit can't silently
+ * drop the executable bit.
+ *
+ * LITERAL splice, NOT `String.replace`: `.replace(oldText, newText)` interprets `$&`/`$1`/`` $` `` patterns in
+ * `newText` and would corrupt any edit whose replacement contains a `$`. We index + slice, so every byte of
+ * `newText` lands verbatim.
+ * @param {{path: string, oldText: string, newText: string, maxBytes?: number}} args
+ * @returns {Promise<string>}
+ */
+declare function editFile({ path: rawPath, oldText, newText, maxBytes }: {
+    path: string;
+    oldText: string;
+    newText: string;
+    maxBytes?: number;
+}): Promise<string>;

package/tools/shell.js

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
  *   shell_read  — read a file or list a directory
  *   shell_grep  — regex search across files (JS regex, no grep/rg/findstr)
  *   shell_write — write/overwrite (or append to) a file, creating parent dirs (no shell)
+ *   shell_edit  — anchored exact-string replace: change one span without rewriting the whole file
  *   shell_run   — run a command via an argv array (no shell, allowlist-friendly on argv[0])
  *   shell_exec  — run a raw shell command with timeout + max buffer
  *
@@ -16,11 +17,13 @@
  * GATING WITH bareguard's fs/bash PRIMITIVES: these tools carry tool-named actions by default
  * (`{ type:'shell_write' }`), which match `tools.allowlist`/`tools.denylist` but do NOT activate the
  * `fs`/`bash` primitives — those need `action.type ∈ {read,write,edit,bash}` with `action.path`/`action.cmd`.
- * To gate `shell_write` by `fs.writeScope` (so a write outside the allowed root is denied BEFORE it touches
- * disk), translate it at the gate — see `examples/with-bareguard.mjs` for the `wireGate(gate, { actionTranslator })`
- * mapping (`shell_write` → `{ type:'write', path }`, `shell_read`/`shell_grep` → `{ type:'read', path }`,
- * `shell_run`/`shell_exec` → `{ type:'bash', cmd }`). A write tool alone is NOT auto-gated — validated by
- * poc/ba2-write-tool-gate.mjs (without the translator the out-of-scope write leaks).
+ * To gate `shell_write`/`shell_edit` by `fs.writeScope` (so a write outside the allowed root is denied BEFORE it
+ * touches disk), translate it at the gate — see `examples/with-bareguard.mjs` for the `wireGate(gate, { actionTranslator })`
+ * mapping (`shell_write` → `{ type:'write', path }`, `shell_edit` → `{ type:'edit', path }`, `shell_read`/`shell_grep`
+ * → `{ type:'read', path }`, `shell_run`/`shell_exec` → `{ type:'bash', cmd }`). bareguard gates `edit` by
+ * `fs.writeScope` identically to `write` (its FS primitive's `FS_TYPES` includes `edit`), so a consumer that
+ * fences `write` gets `edit` fenced by the same scope with ZERO extra config. A write/edit tool alone is NOT
+ * auto-gated — validated by poc/ba2-write-tool-gate.mjs (without the translator the out-of-scope write leaks).
  *
  * CAVEAT (applies to read AND write scopes): bareguard's `fs` primitive matches paths LEXICALLY (no
  * `realpath`/symlink resolution), so a symlink that lives INSIDE the allowed scope but points OUTSIDE it is
@@ -33,6 +36,7 @@
 
 const fs = require('node:fs/promises');
 const path = require('node:path');
+const crypto = require('node:crypto');
 const { exec, execFile } = require('node:child_process');
 const { Worker } = require('node:worker_threads');
 
@@ -127,6 +131,101 @@ async function writeFile({ path: rawPath, content, append = false, maxBytes }) {
   return `${append ? 'appended' : 'wrote'} ${bytes} bytes to ${resolved}`;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Anchored exact-string replace (BA-13) — the surgical counterpart to the whole-file `shell_write`.
+ * Changing one line of an 800-line file with `shell_write` forces the model to EMIT all 800 lines as
+ * tool-call JSON: an output-token tax ∝ file size (output is the expensive token class), paid on every
+ * revision, and the maximal broken-tree surface (a truncated rewrite mangles the 799 lines it never meant
+ * to touch — the BA-4/BA-6 truncation class). `shell_edit` emits only the anchor and its replacement.
+ *
+ * TWO error classes, deliberately split:
+ *   - ANCHOR failures (`oldText` matches 0 or 2+ times) RETURN a refusal string as a normal tool RESULT —
+ *     the loop continues and the model re-anchors, and the refusal names the count so the retry is a DISTINCT
+ *     call. (Tradeoff, chosen with eyes open: a result does NOT feed the Loop's `maxIdenticalToolErrors` spin
+ *     guard, so a model that repeats the byte-identical wrong anchor is bounded only by maxTurns/budget, not
+ *     short-circuited. A widened anchor is a different call and recovers naturally; the exact-repeat spin is
+ *     the rare degenerate case. This matches the ask's "refusal, not a throw" contract.)
+ *   - fs-layer errors (missing file, a directory) and BA-4 param-guard violations THROW at the tool boundary.
+ *
+ * BA-4 param guards (guarded from birth this time — cf. `shell_write` zeroing files on an absent arg):
+ * `oldText` a required NON-EMPTY string, `newText` a required string — both THROW when absent/wrong-type (an
+ * absent param is the truncated-call signature, never a silent default). Explicit `newText:""` is a legal
+ * deletion; an absent `newText` is not.
+ *
+ * ATOMIC: read → splice in memory → write a sibling temp (same filesystem, so `rename` is atomic) carrying
+ * the original's mode → rename over the original. Any throw before the rename leaves the original
+ * byte-identical and cleans the temp up, so a reader never sees a partial file, and an edit can't silently
+ * drop the executable bit.
+ *
+ * LITERAL splice, NOT `String.replace`: `.replace(oldText, newText)` interprets `$&`/`$1`/`` $` `` patterns in
+ * `newText` and would corrupt any edit whose replacement contains a `$`. We index + slice, so every byte of
+ * `newText` lands verbatim.
+ * @param {{path: string, oldText: string, newText: string, maxBytes?: number}} args
+ * @returns {Promise<string>}
+ */
+async function editFile({ path: rawPath, oldText, newText, maxBytes }) {
+  if (typeof rawPath !== 'string' || rawPath.length === 0) {
+    throw new Error('shell_edit requires a non-empty "path" string');
+  }
+  if (typeof oldText !== 'string' || oldText.length === 0) {
+    throw new Error(
+      'shell_edit requires a non-empty "oldText" string to anchor the edit — refusing to edit, the file is unchanged. '
+      + `Got ${oldText === undefined ? 'no oldText argument' : oldText === '' ? 'an empty string' : `oldText of type ${oldText === null ? 'null' : typeof oldText}`}.`,
+    );
+  }
+  if (typeof newText !== 'string') {
+    throw new Error(
+      'shell_edit requires a "newText" string (pass newText:"" to delete the anchored text) — refusing to edit, the file is unchanged. '
+      + `Got ${newText === undefined ? 'no newText argument' : `newText of type ${newText === null ? 'null' : typeof newText}`}`
+      + '. If your output was cut short, retry with the full newText.',
+    );
+  }
+
+  const resolved = path.resolve(expandHome(rawPath));
+  // fs-layer errors (ENOENT for a missing file, EISDIR for a directory) throw — same surface as shell_read.
+  const content = await fs.readFile(resolved, 'utf8');
+
+  // Literal, non-overlapping occurrence count (split on a string does no regex interpretation).
+  const occurrences = content.split(oldText).length - 1;
+  if (occurrences === 0) {
+    return `shell_edit: oldText not found in ${resolved} — no change made. Quote the exact text to replace `
+      + `(check whitespace and indentation), or read the file to re-anchor.`;
+  }
+  if (occurrences > 1) {
+    return `shell_edit: oldText occurs ${occurrences}× in ${resolved} — the anchor must match exactly once. `
+      + `Widen it with surrounding lines so it is unique. No change made.`;
+  }
+
+  const idx = content.indexOf(oldText);
+  const patched = content.slice(0, idx) + newText + content.slice(idx + oldText.length);
+
+  const cap = maxBytes || DEFAULT_WRITE_MAX_BYTES;
+  const bytes = Buffer.byteLength(patched, 'utf8');
+  if (bytes > cap) {
+    throw new Error(`shell_edit result is ${bytes} bytes, over the ${cap}-byte cap (pass maxBytes to raise it)`);
+  }
+
+  // Atomic replace: a sibling temp (same dir → same filesystem → rename is atomic) with the original's mode.
+  const stat = await fs.stat(resolved);
+  const tmp = `${resolved}.shell_edit-${crypto.randomBytes(9).toString('hex')}.tmp`;
+  try {
+    // flag 'wx' (O_CREAT|O_EXCL) — never follow or clobber a pre-planted file/symlink at the temp path; a
+    // colliding name fails the write instead. Create owner-only (0o600) so the patched body — which may hold
+    // a secret from a sensitive source file — is never briefly world-readable in the window before chmod sets
+    // the original's real mode. (This temp pattern is new to shell_edit, so it carries its own hardening.)
+    await fs.writeFile(tmp, patched, { encoding: 'utf8', flag: 'wx', mode: 0o600 });
+    await fs.chmod(tmp, stat.mode & 0o777);
+    await fs.rename(tmp, resolved);
+  } catch (err) {
+    await fs.rm(tmp, { force: true }).catch(() => {});
+    throw err;
+  }
+
+  const removed = oldText.split('\n').length - 1;
+  const added = newText.split('\n').length - 1;
+  return `edited ${resolved}: 1 replacement (-${removed}/+${added} lines)`;
+}
+
 // Probe the first 1KB for NUL bytes to skip binary files in grep walks.
 /** @param {string} filePath */
 async function isProbablyText(filePath) {
@@ -453,6 +552,30 @@ function createShellTools() {
       execute: async (/** @type {{path: string, content?: string, append?: boolean, maxBytes?: number}} */ args) =>
         writeFile(/** @type {any} */ (args)),
     },
+    {
+      name: 'shell_edit',
+      description: 'Replace an exact, unique text span in a file — the surgical alternative to shell_write, which ' +
+        'rewrites the ENTIRE file. Give oldText (the exact text to replace — it must occur EXACTLY ONCE, so quote ' +
+        'enough surrounding lines to be unique) and newText (its replacement; pass "" to delete). Matched literally ' +
+        '(no regex; whitespace and indentation are significant). Returns a compact "edited <path>: 1 replacement" ' +
+        'receipt, never the file body. If oldText matches 0 or 2+ times the file is left unchanged and the reason is ' +
+        'returned so you can re-anchor. The file must already exist. No shell — gate by path with an fs.writeScope ' +
+        'policy (translate to {type:"edit"}).',
+      parameters: {
+        type: 'object',
+        properties: {
+          path: { type: 'string', description: 'File to edit. ~ expands to home. The file must already exist.' },
+          oldText: { type: 'string', description: 'Exact text to find — must occur exactly once. Quote surrounding lines to disambiguate. Matched literally (no regex); whitespace and indentation are significant.' },
+          newText: { type: 'string', description: 'Replacement text, inserted verbatim (a literal splice — $ is not special). Pass "" to delete the anchored text. Required — a call without it is REJECTED, not treated as a deletion.' },
+          maxBytes: { type: 'integer', description: 'Reject if the resulting file would exceed this many bytes (default 5242880).' },
+        },
+        required: ['path', 'oldText', 'newText'],
+      },
+      // The args are model-authored and UNTRUSTED — oldText/newText may be absent (an output-token-capped
+      // generation), so the boundary type stays loose and editFile enforces the BA-4 contract at runtime.
+      execute: async (/** @type {{path: string, oldText?: string, newText?: string, maxBytes?: number}} */ args) =>
+        editFile(/** @type {any} */ (args)),
+    },
     {
       name: 'shell_run',
       description: 'Run a command with an argv array (no shell, no interpolation) and return {stdout, stderr, code, timedOut}. Use this when a policy allowlist needs to match on argv[0] — no shell metacharacter injection is possible. Default timeout 30s, max output 1MB.',
@@ -493,4 +616,4 @@ function createShellTools() {
   return { tools };
 }
 
-module.exports = { createShellTools, _grepCore, _writeFile: writeFile };
+module.exports = { createShellTools, _grepCore, _writeFile: writeFile, _editFile: editFile };