auto-permission-system 3.9.0 → 3.12.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +0 -9
- package/README.md +19 -20
- package/extensions/guard.ts +23 -8
- package/extensions/permission-mode.ts +4 -4
- package/extensions/sandbox.ts +1 -1
- package/package.json +8 -10
- package/{sandbox.cloud.json → sandbox.claude.json} +1 -0
- package/sandbox.default.json +12 -2
- package/skills/auto-permission-system/SKILL.md +10 -9
- package/src/core/policy/patterns.ts +57 -0
- package/src/core/trust.ts +1 -1
- package/src/detect/sensitive-file-scanner/patterns.ts +27 -0
- package/src/l1-sandbox/bash-ops.ts +82 -11
- package/src/l1-sandbox/config.ts +18 -1
- package/src/l1-sandbox/host-bridge.ts +99 -0
- package/src/l1-sandbox/manager.ts +14 -2
- package/src/l1-sandbox/network-ask.ts +6 -6
- package/src/l2-guard/exposure.ts +5 -15
- package/src/l2-guard/program-grants.ts +5 -5
- package/src/l2-guard/program-id.ts +3 -3
- package/src/l2-guard/prompts.ts +4 -4
- package/src/ui/ask-flow.ts +21 -9
- package/src/ui/ask-selector.ts +84 -11
- package/src/ui/ask.ts +2 -2
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@@ -9,11 +9,12 @@ import { homedir } from "node:os";
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import { dirname } from "node:path";
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import { SandboxManager, type SandboxRuntimeConfig } from "@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime";
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import { type BashOperations } from "@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent";
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-
import { askReadCandidates, extractBlockedPath, isBlockedAccessError, isSafeFolderGrant, isWriteBlockError, matchedAskCommands, matchesPolicyPattern, outsideProjectMode, outsideProjectReadCandidates, outsideProjectReadDenied, sandboxFilesystem } from "../core/index";
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import { askReadCandidates, extractBlockedPath, extractLoopbackEndpoint, isBlockedAccessError, isLoopbackConnectionRefused, isSafeFolderGrant, isWriteBlockError, matchedAskCommands, matchesPolicyPattern, outsideProjectMode, outsideProjectReadCandidates, outsideProjectReadDenied, sandboxFilesystem } from "../core/index";
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import { audit } from "../shared/audit";
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import { canonicalize } from "../shared/canonicalize";
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import { askMain, askMainWithRemember, askRememberFile, MainChoice, type AskCtx } from "../ui/ask-flow";
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import { loadConfig, projectTrusted } from "./config";
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import { injectBridgesIntoBwrap, startHostPortBridges, type HostPortBridge } from "./host-bridge";
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/** First whitespace-separated token of a bash command — used to name the binary in prompt titles. */
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function firstWord(command: string): string {
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@@ -40,7 +41,7 @@ function linkRow(absPath: string, spelled: string | undefined): string[] {
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const auditL1 = (entry: Record<string, unknown>) => audit({ layer: 1, tool: "bash", ...entry });
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/**
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* In-memory filesystem grants from "Yes, for this
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* In-memory filesystem grants from "Yes, for this conversation" (ADR-010, ADR-012).
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* A read grant is the absolute path; a write grant is the parent directory (a
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* whole path would not let a new file be created — ADR-021), falling back to the
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* exact path when the parent is an unsafe folder to grant (root, home, …).
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@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@ const auditL1 = (entry: Record<string, unknown>) => audit({ layer: 1, tool: "bas
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*/
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const sessionReadGrants: string[] = [];
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const sessionWriteGrants: string[] = [];
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/** askRead (.env)
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/** askRead (.env) conversation grants, kept apart so they never leak into allowRead (ADR-019). */
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const sessionAskReadGrants: string[] = [];
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export function clearFilesystemSessionGrants(): void {
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@@ -76,11 +77,15 @@ async function preflightSensitiveCommands(
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const matched = matchedAskCommands(command, ask, cwd, homedir());
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if (!matched.length) return undefined;
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const ui = opts.ctx as AskCtx;
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const
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const bodyLines: string[] = [
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`Command ${matched.join(", ")}`,
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`Risk environment variables often hold API keys and tokens`,
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`Note can only be allowed one run at a time`,
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]
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];
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if (command.includes("\n")) {
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bodyLines.push(`\nScript:\n${command}`);
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}
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const body = bodyLines.join("\n");
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const choice = await askMain(ui, `Let ${matched[0]} print your environment variables?`, body, { once: true, remember: false, icon: "cred" });
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const subject = matched.join(", ");
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if (choice === "once") {
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@@ -158,7 +163,7 @@ async function preflightOutsideReads(
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if (choice === MainChoice.Session) {
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sessionReadGrants.push(absPath);
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auditL1({ subject: absPath, decision: "session", scope: "session", reason: "outside-project-read", note: "preflight", cwd });
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opts.ctx.ui?.notify?.(`pi-sandbox: allowed read of ${absPath} for this
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opts.ctx.ui?.notify?.(`pi-sandbox: allowed read of ${absPath} for this conversation (not saved)`, "info");
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continue;
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}
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if (choice !== MainChoice.Remember || !grant) {
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@@ -215,7 +220,26 @@ export function createSandboxedBashOps(opts?: SandboxedBashOpts): BashOperations
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const grantedWriteFolders = new Set<string>();
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const grantedWriteFiles = new Set<string>();
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const attempt = async (writeOnce: string[]): Promise<{ exitCode: number | null }> => {
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const
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const cfg = loadConfig(cwd);
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const allowLocalhost = cfg.allowLocalhost ?? cfg.network?.allowLocalhost ?? true;
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let bridges: HostPortBridge[] = [];
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if (!allowLocalhost && process.platform === "linux") {
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const hostPorts = cfg.bridgeHostPorts ?? [3274];
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bridges = await startHostPortBridges(hostPorts);
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}
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const rawWrapped = await SandboxManager.wrapWithSandbox(command, undefined, buildCustom(writeOnce));
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let wrappedCommand = rawWrapped;
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if (process.platform === "linux") {
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if (allowLocalhost) {
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wrappedCommand = wrappedCommand.replace(" --unshare-net ", " ");
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} else if (bridges.length > 0) {
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wrappedCommand = injectBridgesIntoBwrap(wrappedCommand, bridges);
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}
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}
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const cleanupBridges = () => {
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bridges.forEach((b) => b.close());
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};
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return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
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const child = spawn("bash", ["-c", wrappedCommand], {
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@@ -251,11 +275,13 @@ export function createSandboxedBashOps(opts?: SandboxedBashOpts): BashOperations
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child.on("error", (err) => {
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if (timeoutHandle) clearTimeout(timeoutHandle);
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cleanupBridges();
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SandboxManager.cleanupAfterCommand();
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reject(err);
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});
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const onAbort = () => {
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cleanupBridges();
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if (child.pid) {
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try {
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process.kill(-child.pid, "SIGKILL");
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@@ -270,6 +296,7 @@ export function createSandboxedBashOps(opts?: SandboxedBashOpts): BashOperations
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child.on("close", async (code) => {
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if (timeoutHandle) clearTimeout(timeoutHandle);
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signal?.removeEventListener("abort", onAbort);
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cleanupBridges();
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SandboxManager.cleanupAfterCommand();
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@@ -326,6 +353,50 @@ export function createSandboxedBashOps(opts?: SandboxedBashOpts): BashOperations
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` or write inside the project directory (${cwd}).\n`;
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}
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blockedHint += ` Policy: ~/.pi/agent/extensions/sandbox.json (+ <cwd>/.pi/sandbox.json overrides).\n`;
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} else if (code !== 0 && isLoopbackConnectionRefused(outputTail)) {
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const endpointInfo = extractLoopbackEndpoint(outputTail, command);
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const endpointStr = endpointInfo?.port ? `${endpointInfo.host}:${endpointInfo.port}` : (endpointInfo?.host ?? "127.0.0.1");
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const serviceName = endpointInfo?.service;
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auditL1({
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subject: endpointStr,
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decision: "loopback-refused",
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reason: "Linux sandbox network namespace (--unshare-net) isolates host loopback",
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cwd: opts?.ctx?.cwd,
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note: serviceName ? `service:${serviceName}` : undefined,
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});
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const notifyMsg = serviceName === "Diffusion Studio"
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? "pi-sandbox: Diffusion Studio is running on host port 3274, but sandboxed bash cannot reach host localhost. Connect it via MCP in ~/.pi/agent/mcp.json."
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: `pi-sandbox: connection to host ${endpointStr} refused. Sandboxed bash cannot reach host localhost.`;
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opts?.ctx?.ui?.notify?.(notifyMsg, "warning");
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blockedHint = `\n💡 pi-sandbox: localhost / loopback connection refused.\n` +
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` Target: ${endpointStr}${serviceName ? ` (${serviceName})` : ""}\n` +
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` Why: The Linux sandbox runs inside an isolated network namespace (--unshare-net).\n` +
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` Services running on your HOST's 127.0.0.1/localhost are isolated and cannot\n` +
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` be reached directly from sandboxed bash commands.\n`;
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if (serviceName === "Diffusion Studio" || /dapi|diffusion|3274/i.test(command)) {
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blockedHint +=
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` Resolution for Diffusion Studio:\n` +
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` • Diffusion Studio exposes an MCP server on http://127.0.0.1:3274/mcp\n` +
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` • Add it to ~/.pi/agent/mcp.json so Pi connects directly on the host:\n` +
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` {\n` +
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` "mcpServers": {\n` +
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` "diffusion-studio": { "url": "http://127.0.0.1:3274/mcp" }\n` +
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` }\n` +
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` }\n` +
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` • Once added, restart or reload Pi: the agent gets native MCP tools\n` +
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` (context, check, capture, probe) with Layer 2 security, no bash needed.\n` +
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` • Or run pi with --yolo for one-off host access.\n`;
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} else {
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blockedHint +=
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` Resolution:\n` +
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` • If this is an MCP service, configure it in ~/.pi/agent/mcp.json.\n` +
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` • Pi runs on the host and can communicate with local MCP servers directly.\n` +
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` • Or run pi with --yolo if this task requires interacting with host network services.\n`;
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}
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}
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/**
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* Emit the block explanation only when the command is not re-run with a
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if (choice === MainChoice.Once) readOnce.push(absPath);
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else sessionReadGrants.push(absPath);
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auditL1({ subject: absPath, decision: choice, scope: choice === MainChoice.Once ? "invocation" : "session", cwd: opts.ctx.cwd, note: "outside-project-read" });
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opts.ctx.ui?.notify?.(`pi-sandbox: allowed read of ${absPath} ${choice === MainChoice.Once ? "once" : "for this
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onData(Buffer.from(`\n✅ pi-sandbox: read of ${absPath} allowed ${choice === MainChoice.Once ? "once" : "for this
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opts.ctx.ui?.notify?.(`pi-sandbox: allowed read of ${absPath} ${choice === MainChoice.Once ? "once" : "for this conversation"} — re-running the command`, "warning");
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onData(Buffer.from(`\n✅ pi-sandbox: read of ${absPath} allowed ${choice === MainChoice.Once ? "once" : "for this conversation"}. Command output with the new permission follows.\n`));
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resolve(attempt([]));
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return;
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}
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sessionWriteGrants.push(value);
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(value === parentDir ? grantedWriteFolders : grantedWriteFiles).add(value);
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auditL1({ subject: value, granularity: value === parentDir ? "folder" : "file", original: absPath, decision: "session", scope: "session", cwd: opts.ctx.cwd, note: "write-session" });
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opts.ctx.ui?.notify?.(`pi-sandbox: allowed ${value} for this
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onData(Buffer.from(`\n✅ pi-sandbox: write to ${value} allowed for this
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opts.ctx.ui?.notify?.(`pi-sandbox: allowed ${value} for this conversation (not saved) — re-running the command`, "info");
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onData(Buffer.from(`\n✅ pi-sandbox: write to ${value} allowed for this conversation. Command output with the new permission follows.\n`));
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resolve(attempt([]));
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return;
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}
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package/src/l1-sandbox/config.ts
CHANGED
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outsideProject?: { read?: ReadPosture; allowRead?: string[] };
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}
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export interface
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export interface SandboxNetwork extends Partial<NonNullable<SandboxRuntimeConfig["network"]>> {
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/** Whether to allow localhost / loopback on all ports (default: true). Set false to strictly isolate network. */
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allowLocalhost?: boolean;
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/** Host TCP ports to bridge into the Linux sandbox namespace when allowLocalhost is false. */
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bridgeHostPorts?: number[];
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}
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export interface SandboxConfig extends Omit<SandboxRuntimeConfig, "filesystem" | "network"> {
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enabled?: boolean;
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/** `default` = rules only; `advanced-secure` adds secret/credential detection (ADR-018). */
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mode?: PermissionMode;
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network?: SandboxNetwork;
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filesystem?: SandboxFilesystem;
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/**
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* Additive project-local overrides written by the ask-tier prompts (Layer 1
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};
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/** Commands/paths that can print secrets (env, proc environ) and must ask first. */
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commands?: { ask?: string[] };
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/** Allow all Unix domain sockets on Linux (disables seccomp socket blocking). */
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allowAllUnixSockets?: boolean;
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/** Allow local port binding. */
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allowLocalBinding?: boolean;
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/** Whether to allow localhost / loopback on all ports (default: true). Set false to strictly isolate network. */
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allowLocalhost?: boolean;
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/** Host TCP ports to bridge into the Linux sandbox namespace when allowLocalhost is false. */
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bridgeHostPorts?: number[];
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}
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const BUILTIN_CONFIG: SandboxConfig = {
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network: {
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allowedDomains: [...BUILTIN_NETWORK_ALLOWED],
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deniedDomains: [],
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allowLocalhost: true,
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},
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filesystem: {
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denyRead: [...DEFAULT_DENY_READ],
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/**
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* Host loopback port bridge for Linux sandbox.
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*
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* Bubblewrap on Linux isolates the network namespace via `--unshare-net`.
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* In that isolated namespace, loopback `127.0.0.1` is disconnected from the host,
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* preventing tools (like Diffusion Studio CLI `dapi` or local dev servers) from
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* reaching services running on the host's localhost (e.g. port 3274).
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*
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* This module creates a lightweight Unix domain socket bridge on the host
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* (using Node's built-in `node:net`), bind-mounts the socket into bwrap,
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* and starts a `socat` listener inside the container forwarding container
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* `127.0.0.1:${port}` to the host service.
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*/
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import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
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import { existsSync, unlinkSync } from "node:fs";
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import net from "node:net";
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import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
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import { join } from "node:path";
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export interface HostPortBridge {
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port: number;
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sockPath: string;
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close: () => void;
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}
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/**
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* Start a Unix domain socket bridge on the host forwarding to host 127.0.0.1:port.
|
|
29
|
+
*/
|
|
30
|
+
export async function startHostPortBridge(port: number): Promise<HostPortBridge> {
|
|
31
|
+
const id = randomBytes(6).toString("hex");
|
|
32
|
+
const sockPath = join(tmpdir(), `pi-host-bridge-${port}-${id}.sock`);
|
|
33
|
+
|
|
34
|
+
const server = net.createServer((client) => {
|
|
35
|
+
const target = net.connect(port, "127.0.0.1");
|
|
36
|
+
client.pipe(target).pipe(client);
|
|
37
|
+
client.on("error", () => target.destroy());
|
|
38
|
+
target.on("error", () => client.destroy());
|
|
39
|
+
});
|
|
40
|
+
|
|
41
|
+
await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
|
|
42
|
+
server.listen(sockPath, () => resolve());
|
|
43
|
+
server.on("error", reject);
|
|
44
|
+
});
|
|
45
|
+
|
|
46
|
+
return {
|
|
47
|
+
port,
|
|
48
|
+
sockPath,
|
|
49
|
+
close: () => {
|
|
50
|
+
try {
|
|
51
|
+
server.close();
|
|
52
|
+
} catch (err) {
|
|
53
|
+
void err;
|
|
54
|
+
}
|
|
55
|
+
try {
|
|
56
|
+
if (existsSync(sockPath)) unlinkSync(sockPath);
|
|
57
|
+
} catch (err) {
|
|
58
|
+
void err;
|
|
59
|
+
}
|
|
60
|
+
},
|
|
61
|
+
};
|
|
62
|
+
}
|
|
63
|
+
|
|
64
|
+
/**
|
|
65
|
+
* Start bridges for multiple ports concurrently.
|
|
66
|
+
*/
|
|
67
|
+
export async function startHostPortBridges(ports: number[]): Promise<HostPortBridge[]> {
|
|
68
|
+
if (process.platform !== "linux" || !ports.length) return [];
|
|
69
|
+
return Promise.all(ports.map((p) => startHostPortBridge(p)));
|
|
70
|
+
}
|
|
71
|
+
|
|
72
|
+
/**
|
|
73
|
+
* Inject the bridges into the bwrap command invocation on Linux.
|
|
74
|
+
*/
|
|
75
|
+
export function injectBridgesIntoBwrap(wrappedCommand: string, bridges: HostPortBridge[]): string {
|
|
76
|
+
if (process.platform !== "linux" || !bridges.length) return wrappedCommand;
|
|
77
|
+
|
|
78
|
+
const dashIndex = wrappedCommand.indexOf(" -- ");
|
|
79
|
+
if (dashIndex === -1) return wrappedCommand;
|
|
80
|
+
|
|
81
|
+
// 1. Add --bind for each socket before " -- "
|
|
82
|
+
const binds = bridges.map((b) => `--bind ${b.sockPath} ${b.sockPath}`).join(" ");
|
|
83
|
+
const bwrapPart = `${wrappedCommand.slice(0, dashIndex)} ${binds}`;
|
|
84
|
+
let shellPart = wrappedCommand.slice(dashIndex + 4);
|
|
85
|
+
|
|
86
|
+
// 2. Start socat listeners inside the container
|
|
87
|
+
const socatStarters = bridges
|
|
88
|
+
.map((b) => `socat TCP-LISTEN:${b.port},fork,reuseaddr UNIX-CONNECT:${b.sockPath} >/dev/null 2>&1 &\n_pi_bridge_pids="$_pi_bridge_pids $!"`)
|
|
89
|
+
.join("\n");
|
|
90
|
+
|
|
91
|
+
if (shellPart.includes("socat TCP-LISTEN:3128")) {
|
|
92
|
+
shellPart = shellPart.replace("socat TCP-LISTEN:3128", `${socatStarters}\nsocat TCP-LISTEN:3128`);
|
|
93
|
+
// Include our bridge pids in the script EXIT trap cleanup
|
|
94
|
+
shellPart = shellPart.replace("kill %1 %2 2>/dev/null;", "kill %1 %2 $_pi_bridge_pids 2>/dev/null;");
|
|
95
|
+
return `${bwrapPart} -- ${shellPart}`;
|
|
96
|
+
}
|
|
97
|
+
|
|
98
|
+
return wrappedCommand;
|
|
99
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -36,11 +36,13 @@ const SUPPRESSED_PROJECT_FILES = new Set([
|
|
|
36
36
|
*/
|
|
37
37
|
export function suppressGhostDotfiles(): void {
|
|
38
38
|
try {
|
|
39
|
+
/* SAFETY: DANGEROUS_FILES is an array of strings in sandbox-runtime. */
|
|
39
40
|
const files = DANGEROUS_FILES as unknown as string[];
|
|
40
41
|
const filteredFiles = files.filter((f) => !SUPPRESSED_PROJECT_FILES.has(f));
|
|
41
42
|
files.length = 0;
|
|
42
43
|
files.push(...filteredFiles);
|
|
43
44
|
|
|
45
|
+
/* SAFETY: DANGEROUS_DIRECTORIES is an array of strings in sandbox-runtime. */
|
|
44
46
|
const dirs = DANGEROUS_DIRECTORIES as unknown as string[];
|
|
45
47
|
const filteredDirs = dirs.filter((d) => d === ".git");
|
|
46
48
|
dirs.length = 0;
|
|
@@ -64,8 +66,17 @@ type Layer1FilesystemKind = typeof OverrideKind.AllowWrite | typeof OverrideKind
|
|
|
64
66
|
* filesystem.outsideProject.read gates reads.
|
|
65
67
|
*/
|
|
66
68
|
function runtimeConfig(cwd: string, config: SandboxConfig): SandboxRuntimeConfig {
|
|
69
|
+
const allowLocalhost = config.allowLocalhost ?? config.network?.allowLocalhost ?? true;
|
|
70
|
+
const network = config.network
|
|
71
|
+
? {
|
|
72
|
+
...config.network,
|
|
73
|
+
allowAllUnixSockets: config.allowAllUnixSockets ?? config.network.allowAllUnixSockets,
|
|
74
|
+
allowLocalBinding: config.allowLocalBinding ?? config.network.allowLocalBinding ?? allowLocalhost,
|
|
75
|
+
}
|
|
76
|
+
: undefined;
|
|
77
|
+
|
|
67
78
|
return {
|
|
68
|
-
network:
|
|
79
|
+
network: network as NonNullable<SandboxRuntimeConfig["network"]>,
|
|
69
80
|
filesystem: config.filesystem
|
|
70
81
|
? sandboxFilesystem(config.filesystem, { cwd, home: homedir() })
|
|
71
82
|
: { denyRead: [], allowRead: [], allowWrite: [], denyWrite: [], disabled: true },
|
|
@@ -87,7 +98,8 @@ export async function initSandbox(cwd: string, config: SandboxConfig, deps?: Net
|
|
|
87
98
|
export async function resetSandbox(): Promise<void> {
|
|
88
99
|
try {
|
|
89
100
|
await SandboxManager.reset();
|
|
90
|
-
} catch {
|
|
101
|
+
} catch (err) {
|
|
102
|
+
void err;
|
|
91
103
|
}
|
|
92
104
|
}
|
|
93
105
|
|
|
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
|
|
4
4
|
* Uses the same two-screen ask-tier as Layer 2 (once / session / remember
|
|
5
5
|
* project|global) and the same grant semantics:
|
|
6
6
|
*
|
|
7
|
-
* -
|
|
7
|
+
* - conversation grants: in memory only, cleared at `session_start`, never saved;
|
|
8
8
|
* - "once" grants: one bash command's connections to that host (the proxy
|
|
9
9
|
* calls back per request, so a redirect or a parallel connection must not
|
|
10
10
|
* re-prompt), scoped by `beginNetworkCommand`/`endNetworkCommand`;
|
|
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
|
|
|
14
14
|
*
|
|
15
15
|
* Headless (`hasUI === false`) denies, like every other gate.
|
|
16
16
|
*
|
|
17
|
-
*
|
|
17
|
+
* Conversation grants use the parent-domain wildcard when useful (covers all sibling
|
|
18
18
|
* subdomains). Screen 2 hides the "in this project" rows in untrusted
|
|
19
19
|
* projects so the user can't quietly trust a widening file.
|
|
20
20
|
*/
|
|
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
|
|
|
22
22
|
import { domainMatches, GrantScope, OverrideKind } from "../core/index";
|
|
23
23
|
import { askMainWithRemember, askRememberHost, ASK_TIMEOUT_MS, MainChoice, parentDomainWildcard, type AskCtx, type HostGrant } from "../ui/ask-flow";
|
|
24
24
|
|
|
25
|
-
/** In-memory
|
|
25
|
+
/** In-memory conversation grants ("Yes, for this conversation"). Cleared at session_start. */
|
|
26
26
|
const sessionGrants: string[] = [];
|
|
27
27
|
/** Hosts allowed for the current bash command ("Yes, just this once" covers its connections). */
|
|
28
28
|
let commandGrants: Set<string> | null = null;
|
|
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ function firstWord(command: string | undefined): string | null {
|
|
|
87
87
|
|
|
88
88
|
/**
|
|
89
89
|
* Screen 1 (once / session / remember) plus, for remember, screen 2 (scope and
|
|
90
|
-
* pattern). A
|
|
90
|
+
* pattern). A conversation grant uses the parent-domain wildcard when the host has
|
|
91
91
|
* a useful parent, so any sibling subdomain is covered for the rest of the
|
|
92
92
|
* session; apex hosts (2 parts) fall back to the exact host because
|
|
93
93
|
* `*.example.com` would not match `example.com`.
|
|
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ async function decide(deps: NetworkAskDeps, host: string, port: number | undefin
|
|
|
124
124
|
bodyParts.join("\n"),
|
|
125
125
|
{
|
|
126
126
|
session: true,
|
|
127
|
-
sessionLabel: "Yes, all in group for this
|
|
127
|
+
sessionLabel: "Yes, all in group for this conversation",
|
|
128
128
|
allowFirst: true,
|
|
129
129
|
icon: "net",
|
|
130
130
|
timeoutMs: ASK_TIMEOUT_MS,
|
|
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ async function decide(deps: NetworkAskDeps, host: string, port: number | undefin
|
|
|
161
161
|
if (mainChoice === MainChoice.Session) {
|
|
162
162
|
sessionGrants.push(wildcard);
|
|
163
163
|
deps.audit({ ...base, decision: "session", grant: wildcard, requested: host });
|
|
164
|
-
ctx.ui.notify?.(`pi-sandbox: allowed for this
|
|
164
|
+
ctx.ui.notify?.(`pi-sandbox: allowed for this conversation (not saved) → ${wildcard}`, "info");
|
|
165
165
|
return true;
|
|
166
166
|
}
|
|
167
167
|
|
package/src/l2-guard/exposure.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -5,15 +5,10 @@ import { scanToolOutput } from "../detect/index";
|
|
|
5
5
|
export interface Exposure {
|
|
6
6
|
/** Finding types, e.g. ["SECRET_ASSIGNMENT"]. Empty means clean. */
|
|
7
7
|
types: string[];
|
|
8
|
-
/** One block: `
|
|
8
|
+
/** One block: `Tool` header then `Finding <lineNo>: <line>` per detected line. */
|
|
9
9
|
hits: string[];
|
|
10
10
|
}
|
|
11
11
|
|
|
12
|
-
const MAX_LINES = 8;
|
|
13
|
-
const MAX_LINE_CHARS = 200;
|
|
14
|
-
|
|
15
|
-
const clip = (s: string) => (s.length > MAX_LINE_CHARS ? `${s.slice(0, MAX_LINE_CHARS)}…` : s);
|
|
16
|
-
|
|
17
12
|
export function collectExposure(content: ReadonlyArray<{ type: string; text?: string }>, subject: string): Exposure {
|
|
18
13
|
const types = new Set<string>();
|
|
19
14
|
const lines: string[] = [];
|
|
@@ -29,14 +24,9 @@ export function collectExposure(content: ReadonlyArray<{ type: string; text?: st
|
|
|
29
24
|
if (after[i] !== before[i] && before[i].trim()) matchedIndices.push(i);
|
|
30
25
|
}
|
|
31
26
|
if (matchedIndices.length === 0) continue;
|
|
32
|
-
|
|
33
|
-
|
|
34
|
-
const
|
|
35
|
-
const moreMatched = matchedIndices.length > MAX_LINES;
|
|
36
|
-
const moreBelow = lastIdx < before.length - 1;
|
|
37
|
-
if (firstIdx > 0) lines.push(" \u2026");
|
|
38
|
-
for (const idx of shown) lines.push(`${idx + 1}: ${clip(before[idx].trim())}`);
|
|
39
|
-
if (moreMatched || moreBelow) lines.push(" \u2026");
|
|
27
|
+
lines.push(`Tool ${subject}`);
|
|
28
|
+
// One `Finding` row per detected line, showing the complete line (no clipping).
|
|
29
|
+
for (const idx of matchedIndices) lines.push(`Finding ${idx + 1}: ${before[idx].trim()}`);
|
|
40
30
|
}
|
|
41
|
-
return { types: [...types], hits: lines.length ? [
|
|
31
|
+
return { types: [...types], hits: lines.length ? [lines.join("\n")] : [] };
|
|
42
32
|
}
|
|
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
/**
|
|
2
|
-
* In-memory
|
|
2
|
+
* In-memory conversation grants for the Advanced Secure output gate (ADR-018).
|
|
3
3
|
*
|
|
4
4
|
* When a CLI like `composio` returns output that matches a secret pattern
|
|
5
5
|
* (JWT, OAuth refresh token, etc.), the user can pick "Yes, all <program>
|
|
6
|
-
* output for this
|
|
6
|
+
* output for this conversation" instead of approving every block. The program id
|
|
7
7
|
* is added here, and the output gate short-circuits for the rest of the
|
|
8
|
-
*
|
|
8
|
+
* conversation — same shape as path/host conversation grants, but for tool output.
|
|
9
9
|
*
|
|
10
10
|
* Cleared at session_start (ADR-010), never written to disk. The credential
|
|
11
11
|
* tier (denyRead / askRead) still wins on the file side; this only loosens
|
|
@@ -19,12 +19,12 @@ export function clearProgramOutputSessionGrants(): void {
|
|
|
19
19
|
programOutputSessionGrants.clear();
|
|
20
20
|
}
|
|
21
21
|
|
|
22
|
-
/** Add a program to the
|
|
22
|
+
/** Add a program to the conversation grant list. Idempotent. */
|
|
23
23
|
export function grantProgramOutputSession(programId: string): void {
|
|
24
24
|
programOutputSessionGrants.add(programId.toLowerCase());
|
|
25
25
|
}
|
|
26
26
|
|
|
27
|
-
/** True when the program is already granted for the rest of the
|
|
27
|
+
/** True when the program is already granted for the rest of the conversation. */
|
|
28
28
|
export function isProgramOutputGranted(programId: string | undefined): boolean {
|
|
29
29
|
if (!programId) return false;
|
|
30
30
|
return programOutputSessionGrants.has(programId.toLowerCase());
|
|
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
/**
|
|
2
2
|
* Program-id detection for the Advanced Secure output gate.
|
|
3
3
|
*
|
|
4
|
-
* Used to label the
|
|
4
|
+
* Used to label the Advanced Secure output prompt with the binary
|
|
5
5
|
* that produced it (`composio`, `aws`, `gcloud`, …) and to key the per-program
|
|
6
|
-
*
|
|
6
|
+
* conversation grant (`isProgramOutputGranted`). Pure functions, no pi / fs / audit.
|
|
7
7
|
*/
|
|
8
8
|
|
|
9
9
|
/** Strip env assignments (`FOO=bar`), common wrappers (sudo, nice, command, …), and the
|
|
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ export function bashBinary(command: string | undefined): string | undefined {
|
|
|
27
27
|
|
|
28
28
|
/** The program id for a tool call. Bash binaries only — MCP and other tools return
|
|
29
29
|
* `undefined` so the Advanced Secure output gate doesn't offer them a per-program
|
|
30
|
-
*
|
|
30
|
+
* conversation grant (MCP tools handle their own secrets and don't share the
|
|
31
31
|
* composio-style "same binary, same surface" pattern). */
|
|
32
32
|
export function programIdForToolCall(toolName: string | undefined, input: unknown): string | undefined {
|
|
33
33
|
if (!toolName) return undefined;
|
package/src/l2-guard/prompts.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
/**
|
|
2
|
-
* Layer 2 ask-tier prompts,
|
|
2
|
+
* Layer 2 ask-tier prompts, conversation grants, and persisted "always" overrides
|
|
3
3
|
* (ADR-009, ADR-010). Owns the interactive UI calls; policy decisions come from
|
|
4
4
|
* matching.ts.
|
|
5
5
|
*/
|
|
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ export function persistOverride(scope: GrantScope, cwd: string, kind: OverrideKi
|
|
|
32
32
|
}
|
|
33
33
|
|
|
34
34
|
/**
|
|
35
|
-
* Grants from "yes — for this
|
|
35
|
+
* Grants from "yes — for this conversation" (ADR-010). In memory only, cleared on
|
|
36
36
|
* session_start, never written to sandbox.json, never consulted for the
|
|
37
37
|
* absolute-deny tier.
|
|
38
38
|
*/
|
|
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ export type UICtx = {
|
|
|
67
67
|
};
|
|
68
68
|
|
|
69
69
|
/**
|
|
70
|
-
* Ask the user, then apply the answer:
|
|
70
|
+
* Ask the user, then apply the answer: conversation grants stay in memory, "always"
|
|
71
71
|
* grants are persisted and announced to the other layer via `onPersist`.
|
|
72
72
|
* Headless asks deny. A `null` return means the call may proceed.
|
|
73
73
|
*/
|
|
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ export async function askOrBlock(
|
|
|
102
102
|
const value = ask.overrideKind === OverrideKind.AllowDomains || isSafeFolderGrant(parent, homedir()) ? parent : ask.overrideValue;
|
|
103
103
|
sessionGrants.push({ kind: ask.overrideKind, value });
|
|
104
104
|
audit({ layer: 2, tool: ask.tool, subject: ask.subject, reason: ask.reason, decision, grant: value, cwd: ctx.cwd });
|
|
105
|
-
ctx.ui.notify(`security-guard: allowed for this
|
|
105
|
+
ctx.ui.notify(`security-guard: allowed for this conversation (not saved) → ${value}`, "info");
|
|
106
106
|
return null;
|
|
107
107
|
}
|
|
108
108
|
if (decision === Decision.AlwaysCwd || decision === Decision.AlwaysGlobal || decision === Decision.AlwaysCwdFolder || decision === Decision.AlwaysGlobalFolder) {
|
package/src/ui/ask-flow.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
|
|
|
3
3
|
* it only calls the caller's `ctx.ui.select`, so the contract tests can script it.
|
|
4
4
|
*
|
|
5
5
|
* Every prompt is a question. Answers are uniformly `No` / `Yes, just this once` /
|
|
6
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-
* `Yes, for this
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6
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+
* `Yes, for this conversation` / `Yes, always…` so row 2 is always "once". Screen 2
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7
7
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* collapses to "All in folder · in this project" / "Only <name> · in this project" /
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8
8
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* "All in folder · in all projects" / "Only <name> · in all projects" — folder /
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9
9
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* wildcard is preselected (the wider grant is the right answer almost every time).
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@@ -214,7 +214,17 @@ async function askWithSelect(
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timeoutMs: number,
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footer: string | null,
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): Promise<{ picked: string | undefined; expired: boolean }> {
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-
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217
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+
// Guard against terminal overflow in non-custom/RPC mode for long scripts
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+
let boundedTitle = title;
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219
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+
const lines = title.split("\n");
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220
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+
const MAX_FALLBACK_LINES = 16;
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+
if (lines.length > MAX_FALLBACK_LINES) {
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+
const header = lines[0];
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+
const preview = lines.slice(1, MAX_FALLBACK_LINES).join("\n");
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+
boundedTitle = `${header}\n${preview}\n\n[... ${lines.length - MAX_FALLBACK_LINES} more lines truncated]`;
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+
}
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+
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+
const selectTitle = footer ? `${boundedTitle}\n\n${footer}` : boundedTitle;
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if (timeoutMs === 0) {
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const picked = await ctx.ui.select(selectTitle, options);
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return { picked, expired: false };
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@@ -294,10 +304,10 @@ function withIcon(icon: string | undefined, header: string): string {
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export type MainOpts = {
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295
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/** Offer `Yes, just this once` (default on). */
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once?: boolean;
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297
|
-
/** Offer `Yes, for this
|
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307
|
+
/** Offer `Yes, for this conversation` (opt-in). */
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298
308
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session?: boolean;
|
|
299
|
-
/** Override the session label so the caller can name what the
|
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300
|
-
* (`Yes, for this
|
|
309
|
+
/** Override the session label so the caller can name what the conversation grant covers
|
|
310
|
+
* (`Yes, for this conversation` for files, `Yes, all in group for this conversation` for networks). */
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301
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sessionLabel?: string;
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302
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/** Offer `Yes, always…` (default on). */
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303
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remember?: boolean;
|
|
@@ -322,7 +332,7 @@ export type MainOpts = {
|
|
|
322
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* highlighted.
|
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323
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|
*/
|
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324
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|
export async function askMain(ctx: AskCtx, header: string, body: string, opts: MainOpts = {}): Promise<MainChoice> {
|
|
325
|
-
const sessionLabel = opts.sessionLabel ?? "Yes, for this
|
|
335
|
+
const sessionLabel = opts.sessionLabel ?? "Yes, for this conversation";
|
|
326
336
|
const choices: Array<{ label: string; value: MainChoice }> = [];
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|
327
337
|
choices.push({ label: "No", value: MainChoice.Block });
|
|
328
338
|
if (opts.once !== false) choices.push({ label: "Yes, just this once", value: MainChoice.Once });
|
|
@@ -444,19 +454,21 @@ export type ExposureChoice = (typeof ExposureChoice)[keyof typeof ExposureChoice
|
|
|
444
454
|
|
|
445
455
|
/** Advanced Secure output gate (ADR-018): show where it was found and ask before the output reaches the model.
|
|
446
456
|
* When `programId` is set, an extra option lets the user grant the rest of the
|
|
447
|
-
*
|
|
457
|
+
* conversation for that program — same pattern as path/host conversation grants, but for
|
|
448
458
|
* tool output (display, not access). */
|
|
449
459
|
export async function askExposure(ctx: AskCtx, hits: string[], programId?: string): Promise<ExposureChoice> {
|
|
450
460
|
const choices: Array<{ label: string; value: ExposureChoice }> = [
|
|
451
461
|
{ label: "No, keep it hidden (recommended)", value: ExposureChoice.Block },
|
|
452
462
|
{ label: "Yes, show it this once", value: ExposureChoice.Allow },
|
|
453
463
|
];
|
|
454
|
-
if (programId) choices.push({ label: `Yes, all ${programId} output for this
|
|
464
|
+
if (programId) choices.push({ label: `Yes, all ${programId} output for this conversation`, value: ExposureChoice.ProgramSession });
|
|
455
465
|
const titleParts = [
|
|
456
|
-
`${ICON.
|
|
466
|
+
`${ICON.warn} Sensitive information detected`,
|
|
457
467
|
"",
|
|
458
468
|
hits.join("\n\n"),
|
|
459
469
|
"",
|
|
470
|
+
"Question Should the AI be allowed to see it?",
|
|
471
|
+
"",
|
|
460
472
|
"Note you'll be asked again each time a secret shows up",
|
|
461
473
|
];
|
|
462
474
|
const { picked } = await askSelect(ctx, titleParts.join("\n"), choices.map((c) => c.label), undefined, { footer: "Default: No" });
|