authhero 9.15.0 → 9.17.0

package/dist/types/authentication-flows/passwordless.d.ts

@@ -561,8 +561,8 @@ export declare function passwordlessGrantUser(ctx: Context<{
         } | undefined;
         authenticated_at?: string | undefined;
     };
-    connectionType: "sms" | "email" | "username";
-    authConnection: "sms" | "email" | "username";
+    connectionType: "email" | "sms" | "username";
+    authConnection: "email" | "sms" | "username";
     session_id: string | undefined;
     authParams: {
         audience?: string | undefined;

package/dist/types/generated/locale-types.d.ts

@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ export interface LoginScreen {
     editEmailText: () => string;
     emailPlaceholder: () => string;
     enterACodeBtn: () => string;
+    enterACodeShortBtn: () => string;
     federatedConnectionButtonText: (vars: {
         connectionName: string;
     }) => string;

package/dist/types/helpers/dcr/metadata-mapping.d.ts

@@ -23,9 +23,9 @@ export declare const dcrRequestSchema: z.ZodObject<{
     grant_types: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>;
     response_types: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>;
     token_endpoint_auth_method: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodEnum<{
-        none: "none";
         client_secret_post: "client_secret_post";
         client_secret_basic: "client_secret_basic";
+        none: "none";
         client_secret_jwt: "client_secret_jwt";
         private_key_jwt: "private_key_jwt";
     }>>;

package/dist/types/helpers/reserved-claims.d.ts

@@ -14,9 +14,9 @@ export declare const USERINFO_RESERVED_CLAIMS: readonly ["iss", "sub", "aud", "e
  * vendor/tenant for downstream APIs while `sub` stays `auth-service`.
  * Client-bound mints keep `azp` locked (see below).
  */
-export declare const SERVICE_TOKEN_RESERVED_CLAIMS: ("sid" | "client_id" | "scope" | "tenant_id" | "org_name" | "sub" | "exp" | "iat" | "org_id" | "iss" | "aud" | "auth_time" | "acr" | "amr" | "permissions" | "nbf" | "jti" | "act" | "requested_userinfo_claims" | "gty")[];
+export declare const SERVICE_TOKEN_RESERVED_CLAIMS: ("tenant_id" | "client_id" | "org_name" | "sid" | "permissions" | "scope" | "sub" | "auth_time" | "iss" | "aud" | "exp" | "nbf" | "iat" | "jti" | "acr" | "amr" | "act" | "org_id" | "requested_userinfo_claims" | "gty")[];
 /** Client-bound mints: `azp` must stay the registered client id. */
-export declare const CLIENT_SERVICE_TOKEN_RESERVED_CLAIMS: ("sid" | "client_id" | "scope" | "tenant_id" | "org_name" | "sub" | "exp" | "iat" | "org_id" | "iss" | "aud" | "auth_time" | "acr" | "amr" | "azp" | "permissions" | "nbf" | "jti" | "act" | "requested_userinfo_claims" | "gty")[];
+export declare const CLIENT_SERVICE_TOKEN_RESERVED_CLAIMS: ("tenant_id" | "client_id" | "org_name" | "sid" | "permissions" | "scope" | "sub" | "auth_time" | "iss" | "aud" | "exp" | "nbf" | "iat" | "jti" | "azp" | "acr" | "amr" | "act" | "org_id" | "requested_userinfo_claims" | "gty")[];
 export type AccessTokenReservedClaim = (typeof ACCESS_TOKEN_RESERVED_CLAIMS)[number];
 export type IdTokenReservedClaim = (typeof ID_TOKEN_RESERVED_CLAIMS)[number];
 /**

package/dist/types/helpers/scopes-permissions.d.ts

@@ -24,23 +24,62 @@ export interface ScopesAndPermissionsResult {
     token_lifetime_for_web: number;
 }
 /**
- * True when the user holds the global `admin:organizations` escape hatch — the
- * single canonical key for "may act on any organization without being a
- * member". It is a management-plane permission, so it is always matched against
- * the Management API audience, never the requested token's audience.
+ * Management API permission that lets a user act on any organization without
+ * being a member. Doubles as a tenant-admin permission on the multi-tenancy
+ * `/tenants` routes, and only bypasses org membership when the tenant has the
+ * `inherit_global_permissions_in_organizations` flag.
+ */
+export declare const ADMIN_ORGANIZATIONS_PERMISSION = "admin:organizations";
+/**
+ * Management API permission that lets a user get org-scoped tokens for (and
+ * list) every organization without being a member. Unlike
+ * `admin:organizations` it carries no tenant-admin rights and needs no tenant
+ * flag: holding the permission is the opt-in.
+ */
+export declare const ACCESS_ALL_ORGANIZATIONS_PERMISSION = "access:all_organizations";
+/**
+ * True when the user holds `permissionName` at global scope on the Management
+ * API audience, directly or through a role.
+ */
+export declare function userHasGlobalManagementPermission(ctx: Context<{
+    Bindings: Bindings;
+    Variables: Variables;
+}>, tenantId: string, userId: string, permissionName: string): Promise<boolean>;
+/**
+ * Single rule for "may this user get an org-scoped token for an organization
+ * they are not a member of?". Used by every org-membership gate
+ * (calculateScopesAndPermissions, token exchange, refresh token) so they can
+ * never disagree.
  *
- * "Global" means an assignment with an empty organization scope (`""`). Both
- * directly-assigned user permissions AND role-derived permissions count, so a
- * user granted the permission either way is treated consistently (see #1198).
+ * True when the user holds, at global scope on the Management API audience:
+ *  - `access:all_organizations` (no tenant flag needed), or
+ *  - `admin:organizations` AND the tenant has
+ *    `inherit_global_permissions_in_organizations` (legacy behaviour).
  *
- * The caller is responsible for gating on the
- * `inherit_global_permissions_in_organizations` tenant flag; this helper only
- * answers whether the permission is present.
+ * Pass `tenant` when the caller already loaded it to skip a second fetch.
+ */
+export declare function userCanAccessAllOrganizations(ctx: Context<{
+    Bindings: Bindings;
+    Variables: Variables;
+}>, tenantId: string, userId: string, tenant?: {
+    flags?: {
+        inherit_global_permissions_in_organizations?: boolean;
+    };
+} | null): Promise<boolean>;
+/**
+ * True when the user may get an org-scoped token for `organizationId`: either
+ * they may access every organization (see `userCanAccessAllOrganizations`) or
+ * they are a member of it. Every org gate (login, silent auth, token grants)
+ * goes through here so they apply the same rule.
  */
-export declare function userHasGlobalOrgAdminPermission(ctx: Context<{
+export declare function userCanAccessOrganization(ctx: Context<{
     Bindings: Bindings;
     Variables: Variables;
-}>, tenantId: string, userId: string): Promise<boolean>;
+}>, tenantId: string, userId: string, organizationId: string, tenant?: {
+    flags?: {
+        inherit_global_permissions_in_organizations?: boolean;
+    };
+} | null): Promise<boolean>;
 /**
  * Returns the subset of `scopes` that the resource server matching `audience`
  * does not define — the scopes that would silently vanish from an issued token.

package/dist/types/helpers/signing-certificate-authority.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+import * as x509 from "@peculiar/x509";
+/**
+ * A request to certify a signing key. Everything is plain data so an issuer
+ * can forward it over HTTP: the CA key never has to live in the auth worker.
+ */
+export interface SigningCertificateRequest {
+    /** The key to certify, as an SPKI `PUBLIC KEY` PEM. */
+    publicKey: string;
+    /** Subject distinguished name, e.g. `CN=acme`. */
+    subject: string;
+    /** URI placed in the SubjectAlternativeName, e.g. `urn:authhero:tenant:acme`. */
+    uri: string;
+    notBefore: Date;
+    notAfter: Date;
+}
+/**
+ * Issues signing-key certificates from an intermediate CA.
+ *
+ * `issueCertificate` returns the leaf only. `getIssuerCertificates` returns
+ * every intermediate that may have signed a leaf that is still published —
+ * the current one plus any that were rotated out recently — so the JWKS can
+ * attach the right chain to each key.
+ */
+export interface CertificateIssuer {
+    issueCertificate(request: SigningCertificateRequest): Promise<string>;
+    getIssuerCertificates(): Promise<string[]>;
+}
+export interface SigningCertificateAuthority {
+    issuer: CertificateIssuer;
+    /**
+     * Lifetime of issued certificates, in days. Renewal keeps the key and the
+     * `kid`, so short lifetimes are cheap.
+     *
+     * @default 30
+     */
+    validityDays?: number;
+    /**
+     * The SAN URI that binds a key to its owner. Receives the key's `tenant_id`,
+     * which is undefined for control-plane keys.
+     *
+     * Override this where the storage scope doesn't match ownership — a WFP
+     * tenant worker stores its own keys without a `tenant_id`.
+     *
+     * @default tenant keys → `urn:authhero:tenant:<tenant_id>`, control-plane
+     * keys → `urn:authhero:control-plane`
+     */
+    subjectUri?: (scope: {
+        tenant_id?: string;
+    }) => string;
+}
+export declare const DEFAULT_CA_CERT_VALIDITY_DAYS = 30;
+export declare const TENANT_URI_PREFIX = "urn:authhero:tenant:";
+export declare const CONTROL_PLANE_URI = "urn:authhero:control-plane";
+/** Parameters `createX509Certificate` / `renewX509Certificate` need to issue from the CA. */
+export interface CertificateAuthorityIssuance {
+    issuer: CertificateIssuer;
+    uri: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Resolve how a key should be certified. Only `jwt_signing` keys are
+ * CA-issued: SAML service providers pin certificates for years and gain
+ * nothing from a chain.
+ */
+export declare function certificateAuthorityIssuance(ca: SigningCertificateAuthority | undefined, key: {
+    type: string;
+    tenant_id?: string;
+}): CertificateAuthorityIssuance | undefined;
+export interface LocalCertificateIssuerOptions {
+    /** The issuing (intermediate) CA certificate, PEM. */
+    certificate: string;
+    /** The issuing CA's PKCS#8 private key, PEM. */
+    privateKey: string;
+    /**
+     * Intermediates that were rotated out but may still have signed a
+     * published leaf. They are only used to build `x5c`, never to sign.
+     */
+    previousCertificates?: string[];
+}
+/**
+ * An in-process issuer holding the intermediate's private key. Keep the root
+ * offline; this only ever needs the intermediate.
+ */
+export declare function createLocalCertificateIssuer(options: LocalCertificateIssuerOptions): CertificateIssuer;
+/** True when the certificate was issued by someone other than itself. */
+export declare function isCaIssued(cert: x509.X509Certificate): boolean;
+/**
+ * The published chain for a CA-issued certificate: `x5c` (leaf first, then
+ * its issuer, standard base64 DER per RFC 7517 §4.7) and `x5t#S256`.
+ *
+ * The issuer is matched by name *and* by verifying the leaf's signature, so a
+ * CA that computes key identifiers differently can't produce a wrong chain.
+ * Returns undefined for self-signed certificates and when no known
+ * intermediate signed the leaf — publishing no chain beats publishing a
+ * wrong one.
+ */
+export declare function certificateChainMembers(cert: x509.X509Certificate, issuerCertificates: x509.X509Certificate[]): Promise<{
+    x5c: string[];
+    "x5t#S256": string;
+} | undefined>;

package/dist/types/helpers/signing-keys.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import { SigningKey, KeysAdapter } from "@authhero/adapter-interfaces";
 import { SigningKeyMode, SigningKeyModeOption } from "../types/AuthHeroConfig";
+import { SigningCertificateAuthority } from "./signing-certificate-authority";
 export declare function listControlPlaneKeys(keys: KeysAdapter, type?: string): Promise<SigningKey[]>;
 export declare function resolveSigningKeyMode(option: SigningKeyModeOption | undefined, tenantId: string): Promise<SigningKeyMode>;
 export interface ResolveSigningKeysOptions {
@@ -42,6 +43,12 @@ export interface EnsureSigningKeyOptions {
     name?: string;
     /** Defaults to `"jwt_signing"`. */
     type?: SigningKey["type"];
+    /**
+     * Issue the new key's certificate from this CA (`jwt_signing` only). The
+     * SAN is resolved from `tenantId`, so a WFP tenant worker that stores its
+     * keys without one should set `subjectUri` on the CA config.
+     */
+    certificateAuthority?: SigningCertificateAuthority;
 }
 export interface EnsureSigningKeyResult {
     /** True when a new key was minted; false when a signable key already existed. */