auriga-cli 1.15.2 → 1.17.0

package/dist/server.js

@@ -0,0 +1,759 @@
+// HTTP server for the Web UI (`auriga-cli web-ui`).
+//
+// Responsibilities: token + Origin auth, /api/state scanner endpoint,
+// /api/apply (202 + SSE-progress), /api/progress (SSE with Last-Event-ID
+// resume + 200-event ring buffer), /api/shutdown (graceful drain), and
+// static asset serve from the extracted UI bundle dir.
+//
+// Public contract is anchored in docs/architecture/web-ui.md §4 (server
+// surface), §6 (data flow + types), §7 (errors).
+import { createServer } from "node:http";
+import { Buffer } from "node:buffer";
+import { randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
+import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { buildScanCatalog } from "./scan-catalog.js";
+import { scanState } from "./state.js";
+// Body parsing cap. /api/apply payloads are tiny (an array of item refs);
+// 1 MiB is generously above the largest realistic batch and small enough that
+// abusive clients can't pin memory.
+const MAX_JSON_BODY = 1 * 1024 * 1024;
+// SSE replay cache: keep at least 200 events per job for at least 5 minutes
+// after the job's `all-done` event so reconnecting clients can resume
+// (spec §6.5).
+const SSE_BUFFER_CAP = 200;
+const SSE_JOB_TTL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Generic error helpers — bodies are byte-identical for matching status codes
+// so probers can't distinguish *why* auth failed (spec §7 anti-probing).
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+const UNAUTHORIZED_BODY = JSON.stringify({ error: "unauthorized" });
+const FORBIDDEN_BODY = JSON.stringify({ error: "forbidden" });
+function sendJson(res, status, body) {
+    if (res.headersSent || res.writableEnded)
+        return;
+    const payload = typeof body === "string" ? body : JSON.stringify(body);
+    res.statusCode = status;
+    res.setHeader("content-type", "application/json; charset=utf-8");
+    res.setHeader("cache-control", "no-store");
+    res.end(payload);
+}
+function sendUnauthorized(res) {
+    sendJson(res, 401, UNAUTHORIZED_BODY);
+}
+function sendForbidden(res) {
+    sendJson(res, 403, FORBIDDEN_BODY);
+}
+function send404(res) {
+    // Generic 404 for unknown routes / missing static assets. Body is JSON for
+    // consistency with the other error surfaces; tests only assert the status.
+    sendJson(res, 404, { error: "not-found" });
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Token: timing-safe constant-time compare on equal-length byte buffers.
+// Returns false fast on length mismatch (length is not secret).
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+function tokensEqual(a, b) {
+    if (typeof a !== "string" || typeof b !== "string")
+        return false;
+    if (a.length !== b.length)
+        return false;
+    if (a.length === 0)
+        return false;
+    const ab = Buffer.from(a, "utf8");
+    const bb = Buffer.from(b, "utf8");
+    // Buffer.from on a string always returns a buffer of byte-length matching
+    // utf8 encoding; for our hex token shape, byte length == char length, but
+    // even with multibyte inputs the length check above + the equal-length
+    // guard below keep this safe.
+    if (ab.length !== bb.length)
+        return false;
+    return timingSafeEqual(ab, bb);
+}
+// Extracts token from Authorization header. Returns null if not a well-formed
+// `Bearer <value>` (single space, non-empty value). Strict by design — spec
+// A3 says the canonical shape is "Bearer <token>".
+function parseBearer(authHeader) {
+    if (!authHeader)
+        return null;
+    // Reject any internal whitespace beyond the single delimiter between scheme
+    // and value. `Bearer  token` (double space) → reject.
+    const m = /^Bearer ([^\s]+)$/.exec(authHeader);
+    if (!m)
+        return null;
+    return m[1] ?? null;
+}
+// Extracts ?token=... from the URL search string. URL is parsed against a
+// dummy base so we can reuse the WHATWG parser without needing the real host.
+function parseQueryToken(reqUrl) {
+    if (!reqUrl)
+        return null;
+    try {
+        const u = new URL(reqUrl, "http://localhost");
+        const t = u.searchParams.get("token");
+        return t === null || t === "" ? null : t;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Host / Origin whitelist.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+function buildAllowedHosts(port) {
+    // Stored lowercased; comparisons normalize the incoming header the same way.
+    return new Set([
+        `127.0.0.1:${port}`,
+        `localhost:${port}`,
+        `[::1]:${port}`,
+    ]);
+}
+function isHostAllowed(hostHeader, allowed) {
+    if (!hostHeader) {
+        // HTTP/1.1 requires Host; if absent, treat as bad. (HTTP/1.0 callers don't
+        // exist in this app's threat model.)
+        return false;
+    }
+    return allowed.has(hostHeader.toLowerCase());
+}
+function isOriginAllowed(originHeader, allowed) {
+    if (originHeader === undefined)
+        return true; // missing Origin = programmatic / file://
+    if (originHeader === "null")
+        return true; // file:// origin sends "null"
+    // Strip scheme. Only http://host:port is allowed (no https on loopback).
+    const m = /^https?:\/\/(.+)$/i.exec(originHeader);
+    if (!m)
+        return false;
+    return allowed.has(m[1].toLowerCase());
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Request URL: parse path + search without depending on host header (which
+// may be hostile — Host is validated separately).
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+function parseRequestUrl(reqUrl) {
+    if (!reqUrl)
+        return { pathname: "/", searchParams: new URLSearchParams() };
+    const u = new URL(reqUrl, "http://localhost");
+    return { pathname: u.pathname, searchParams: u.searchParams };
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Body reader with a hard cap so malicious clients can't OOM the server by
+// streaming forever. Resolves with the buffered string or rejects.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+function readJsonBody(req) {
+    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+        let total = 0;
+        const chunks = [];
+        req.on("data", (chunk) => {
+            total += chunk.length;
+            if (total > MAX_JSON_BODY) {
+                reject(new Error("body-too-large"));
+                req.destroy();
+                return;
+            }
+            chunks.push(chunk);
+        });
+        req.on("end", () => resolve(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString("utf8")));
+        req.on("error", reject);
+    });
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// ApplyRequest body validation. Returns null if invalid. Validates only the
+// shape we promise to consumers — Slice C / the apply runner may add deeper
+// checks (e.g. name ∈ catalog) later.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+const VALID_CATEGORIES = new Set([
+    "workflow",
+    "skill",
+    "recommended-skill",
+    "plugin",
+    "hook",
+]);
+const VALID_ACTIONS = new Set(["install", "update", "uninstall"]);
+const VALID_SCOPES = new Set(["project", "user"]);
+const VALID_LANGS = new Set(["en", "zh-CN"]);
+function parseApplyRequest(raw) {
+    let parsed;
+    try {
+        parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+    if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== "object")
+        return null;
+    const items = parsed.items;
+    if (!Array.isArray(items))
+        return null;
+    for (const it of items) {
+        if (!it || typeof it !== "object")
+            return null;
+        const { category, name, action, scope, lang } = it;
+        if (typeof category !== "string" || !VALID_CATEGORIES.has(category)) {
+            return null;
+        }
+        if (typeof name !== "string" || name.length === 0)
+            return null;
+        if (typeof action !== "string" || !VALID_ACTIONS.has(action))
+            return null;
+        // Scope is optional. When present it must be a known value AND must not
+        // be paired with `category === "workflow"` (workflow is a single root
+        // file with no scope concept).
+        if (scope !== undefined) {
+            if (typeof scope !== "string" || !VALID_SCOPES.has(scope))
+                return null;
+            if (category === "workflow")
+                return null;
+        }
+        // Lang is optional and only meaningful for category="workflow". Any
+        // other pairing is a client bug and we reject loudly.
+        if (lang !== undefined) {
+            if (typeof lang !== "string" || !VALID_LANGS.has(lang))
+                return null;
+            if (category !== "workflow")
+                return null;
+        }
+    }
+    return parsed;
+}
+function namesInCatalog(items, catalog) {
+    for (const it of items) {
+        const set = catalog[it.category];
+        if (!set || !set.has(it.name))
+            return false;
+    }
+    return true;
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Static asset handler. When `uiDir` is configured, we serve files from
+// there with SPA fallback (any unknown path → index.html). When not
+// configured (tests, no-bundle environments), every request returns 404.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+const MIME_BY_EXT = {
+    ".html": "text/html; charset=utf-8",
+    ".js": "application/javascript; charset=utf-8",
+    ".mjs": "application/javascript; charset=utf-8",
+    ".css": "text/css; charset=utf-8",
+    ".svg": "image/svg+xml",
+    ".png": "image/png",
+    ".jpg": "image/jpeg",
+    ".jpeg": "image/jpeg",
+    ".webp": "image/webp",
+    ".ico": "image/x-icon",
+    ".json": "application/json; charset=utf-8",
+    ".woff": "font/woff",
+    ".woff2": "font/woff2",
+    ".ttf": "font/ttf",
+    ".map": "application/json; charset=utf-8",
+};
+async function handleStatic(pathname, uiDir, res) {
+    if (!uiDir) {
+        send404(res);
+        return;
+    }
+    // Strip leading `/`. Path traversal defense: resolve and verify the
+    // result stays inside uiDir.
+    const requested = pathname.replace(/^\/+/, "");
+    const target = requested === "" ? "index.html" : requested;
+    const resolved = path.resolve(uiDir, target);
+    const uiDirResolved = path.resolve(uiDir);
+    const isInside = resolved === uiDirResolved ||
+        resolved.startsWith(uiDirResolved + path.sep);
+    if (!isInside) {
+        send404(res);
+        return;
+    }
+    try {
+        const content = await readFile(resolved);
+        sendFile(res, resolved, content);
+        return;
+    }
+    catch {
+        // SPA fallback: serve index.html for unknown paths (excluding asset-like
+        // extensions). This keeps client-side routing usable without 404 noise.
+        if (!/\.[a-z0-9]+$/i.test(target)) {
+            try {
+                const index = await readFile(path.join(uiDirResolved, "index.html"));
+                sendFile(res, "index.html", index);
+                return;
+            }
+            catch {
+                /* fall through to 404 */
+            }
+        }
+        send404(res);
+    }
+}
+function sendFile(res, filePath, body) {
+    if (res.headersSent || res.writableEnded)
+        return;
+    const ext = path.extname(filePath).toLowerCase();
+    const type = MIME_BY_EXT[ext] ?? "application/octet-stream";
+    res.statusCode = 200;
+    res.setHeader("content-type", type);
+    res.setHeader("cache-control", "no-store");
+    res.end(body);
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// startServer
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+export async function startServer(opts) {
+    // Lifecycle flags. Mutated only by the close path.
+    let closing = false;
+    // Track open sockets so close() can forcibly tear down idle keep-alive
+    // connections (Node's `server.close` only stops accepting; it waits for
+    // open sockets indefinitely otherwise).
+    const openSockets = new Set();
+    // Heartbeat state. `lastPingAt` is bumped on each POST /api/ping. The
+    // interval fires periodically and triggers shutdown if too much time
+    // has passed without a ping — implementing "closing the browser closes
+    // the server" UX.
+    let lastPingAt = Date.now();
+    let heartbeatTimer = null;
+    // Per-instance helpers that need the port (chosen after listen()).
+    let allowedHosts;
+    // ---- Apply / SSE state ----
+    // Job cache. Keyed by jobId; entries are deleted SSE_JOB_TTL_MS after the
+    // job finishes. Late subscribers and Last-Event-ID resume both read from
+    // here. `currentJobId` enforces serial execution: a second /api/apply that
+    // arrives while another job is in-flight returns 409 (spec §6.4 — installers
+    // contend on shared files like settings.json + skills-lock.json).
+    const jobs = new Map();
+    let currentJobId = null;
+    function emit(job, event) {
+        const id = String(job.nextId);
+        job.nextId++;
+        job.events.push({ id, event });
+        if (job.events.length > SSE_BUFFER_CAP)
+            job.events.shift();
+        const frame = `id: ${id}\nevent: progress\ndata: ${JSON.stringify(event)}\n\n`;
+        for (const sub of job.subscribers) {
+            try {
+                if (!sub.writableEnded)
+                    sub.write(frame);
+            }
+            catch {
+                /* subscriber went away mid-write — close listener will remove it */
+            }
+        }
+        if (event.type === "all-done") {
+            job.finished = true;
+            // Close all live subscribers — they've received the terminal event.
+            for (const sub of job.subscribers) {
+                try {
+                    if (!sub.writableEnded)
+                        sub.end();
+                }
+                catch {
+                    /* ignore */
+                }
+            }
+            job.subscribers.clear();
+            // Schedule cache eviction. .unref() so we don't keep the process alive.
+            job.cleanupTimer = setTimeout(() => {
+                jobs.delete(job.jobId);
+            }, SSE_JOB_TTL_MS);
+            job.cleanupTimer.unref?.();
+        }
+    }
+    async function runApplyJob(job, items, handlers) {
+        let failedCount = 0;
+        try {
+            for (let i = 0; i < items.length; i++) {
+                const item = items[i];
+                emit(job, {
+                    type: "item:start",
+                    index: i,
+                    total: items.length,
+                    item,
+                });
+                const handler = handlers[item.category];
+                try {
+                    await handler(item.action, item.name, {
+                        onLog: (line, level) => emit(job, { type: "item:log", index: i, line, level }),
+                        scope: item.scope,
+                        lang: item.lang,
+                    });
+                    emit(job, { type: "item:done", index: i, success: true });
+                }
+                catch (err) {
+                    failedCount++;
+                    const msg = err instanceof Error && err.message ? err.message : "handler-failed";
+                    emit(job, {
+                        type: "item:done",
+                        index: i,
+                        success: false,
+                        error: msg,
+                    });
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        finally {
+            // Clear the in-flight slot BEFORE emitting all-done so a client that
+            // reacts immediately to the terminal frame can submit a new apply
+            // without racing (test "after first job finishes, new apply succeeds").
+            if (currentJobId === job.jobId)
+                currentJobId = null;
+            emit(job, {
+                type: "all-done",
+                success: failedCount === 0,
+                failedCount,
+            });
+        }
+    }
+    async function handleApply(req, res) {
+        // 1. Concurrency: serial execution per spec §6.4.
+        if (currentJobId !== null) {
+            sendJson(res, 409, { error: "apply-in-flight" });
+            return;
+        }
+        // 2. Body cap + JSON parse + shape validation.
+        let raw;
+        try {
+            raw = await readJsonBody(req);
+        }
+        catch {
+            sendJson(res, 413, { error: "body-too-large" });
+            return;
+        }
+        const parsed = parseApplyRequest(raw);
+        if (parsed === null) {
+            sendJson(res, 400, { error: "bad-request" });
+            return;
+        }
+        // 3. Catalog membership (only when an applyCatalog was injected).
+        if (opts.applyCatalog) {
+            if (parsed.items.length === 0) {
+                sendJson(res, 400, { error: "items-empty" });
+                return;
+            }
+            if (!namesInCatalog(parsed.items, opts.applyCatalog)) {
+                sendJson(res, 400, { error: "unknown-name" });
+                return;
+            }
+        }
+        // 4. Allocate job. randomBytes(16) → 32 hex chars = 128 bits of entropy.
+        const jobId = randomBytes(16).toString("hex");
+        const job = {
+            jobId,
+            events: [],
+            nextId: 1,
+            finished: false,
+            subscribers: new Set(),
+        };
+        jobs.set(jobId, job);
+        currentJobId = jobId;
+        // 5. Accept fast — 202 returns BEFORE any handler runs.
+        sendJson(res, 202, { jobId });
+        // 6. Kick off the worker on the next tick so the response flushes first.
+        const handlers = opts.applyHandlers ?? defaultHandlersNotConfigured;
+        setImmediate(() => {
+            void runApplyJob(job, parsed.items, handlers);
+        });
+    }
+    function handleProgress(req, searchParams, res) {
+        const jobId = searchParams.get("jobId");
+        if (!jobId) {
+            sendJson(res, 400, { error: "missing-jobId" });
+            return;
+        }
+        const job = jobs.get(jobId);
+        if (!job) {
+            sendJson(res, 404, { error: "unknown-job" });
+            return;
+        }
+        // Parse Last-Event-ID. If valid numeric, replay buffered events with
+        // id strictly greater than the cursor. Otherwise replay everything in
+        // the buffer. EventSource spec sends the value verbatim from the last
+        // observed `id:` field.
+        const lastEventIdHeader = req.headers["last-event-id"];
+        let cursor = -1;
+        if (typeof lastEventIdHeader === "string" && lastEventIdHeader.length > 0) {
+            const parsedCursor = Number.parseInt(lastEventIdHeader, 10);
+            if (Number.isFinite(parsedCursor))
+                cursor = parsedCursor;
+        }
+        res.statusCode = 200;
+        res.setHeader("content-type", "text/event-stream; charset=utf-8");
+        res.setHeader("cache-control", "no-store");
+        res.setHeader("connection", "keep-alive");
+        res.flushHeaders?.();
+        // Replay strictly-newer cached events.
+        for (const buffered of job.events) {
+            const bid = Number.parseInt(buffered.id, 10);
+            if (Number.isFinite(bid) && bid <= cursor)
+                continue;
+            res.write(`id: ${buffered.id}\nevent: progress\ndata: ${JSON.stringify(buffered.event)}\n\n`);
+        }
+        if (job.finished) {
+            // No more events will arrive; close cleanly so late subscribers and
+            // resumers don't hold the socket forever.
+            res.end();
+            return;
+        }
+        // Subscribe for live events. Detach on client disconnect.
+        job.subscribers.add(res);
+        const detach = () => {
+            job.subscribers.delete(res);
+        };
+        req.once("close", detach);
+        res.once("close", detach);
+    }
+    const server = createServer(async (req, res) => {
+        try {
+            await handleRequest(req, res);
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            // Last-resort safety net. Never echo error details — they may contain
+            // upstream library messages we don't control.
+            if (!res.headersSent && !res.writableEnded) {
+                sendJson(res, 500, { error: "internal" });
+            }
+            // Log to stderr without surfacing token-bearing context (req.url may
+            // include ?token=, so don't print it).
+            const safeMsg = err instanceof Error ? err.message.replace(/token=[^&\s]*/gi, "token=***") : String(err);
+            // eslint-disable-next-line no-console
+            console.error(`[server] handler error: ${safeMsg}`);
+        }
+    });
+    server.on("connection", (socket) => {
+        openSockets.add(socket);
+        socket.once("close", () => openSockets.delete(socket));
+    });
+    async function handleRequest(req, res) {
+        const { pathname, searchParams } = parseRequestUrl(req.url);
+        const hostHeader = req.headers.host;
+        const originHeader = req.headers.origin;
+        // 1. Host whitelist (DNS-rebinding defense) — applies to ALL paths, even
+        //    public statics. Without this, an attacker could lure the user to a
+        //    rebinding-controlled domain and pull JS off `/`.
+        if (!isHostAllowed(hostHeader, allowedHosts)) {
+            sendForbidden(res);
+            return;
+        }
+        // 2. Origin whitelist — also applies to all paths.
+        if (!isOriginAllowed(originHeader, allowedHosts)) {
+            sendForbidden(res);
+            return;
+        }
+        const isApiPath = pathname.startsWith("/api/");
+        // 3. Token (only on /api/*). Static paths are public per spec §6.1.
+        if (isApiPath) {
+            const headerToken = parseBearer(req.headers.authorization);
+            const queryToken = parseQueryToken(req.url);
+            // If BOTH sources present, they must agree (defense against smuggling
+            // ambiguity per A6).
+            if (headerToken !== null && queryToken !== null) {
+                if (!tokensEqual(headerToken, queryToken)) {
+                    sendUnauthorized(res);
+                    return;
+                }
+            }
+            const presented = headerToken ?? queryToken;
+            if (presented === null) {
+                sendUnauthorized(res);
+                return;
+            }
+            if (!tokensEqual(presented, opts.token)) {
+                sendUnauthorized(res);
+                return;
+            }
+        }
+        // 4. Routing.
+        const method = req.method ?? "GET";
+        if (!isApiPath) {
+            await handleStatic(pathname, opts.uiDir, res);
+            return;
+        }
+        if (closing && pathname !== "/api/shutdown") {
+            // After shutdown is initiated, refuse further work cleanly.
+            sendJson(res, 503, { error: "shutting-down" });
+            return;
+        }
+        if (pathname === "/api/catalog" && method === "GET") {
+            await routeCatalog(opts.cwd, res);
+            return;
+        }
+        if (pathname === "/api/state" && method === "GET") {
+            await routeState(opts.cwd, opts.packageRoot ?? opts.cwd, res);
+            return;
+        }
+        if (pathname === "/api/apply" && method === "POST") {
+            await handleApply(req, res);
+            return;
+        }
+        if (pathname === "/api/progress" && method === "GET") {
+            handleProgress(req, searchParams, res);
+            return;
+        }
+        if (pathname === "/api/ping" && method === "POST") {
+            lastPingAt = Date.now();
+            sendJson(res, 200, { ok: true });
+            return;
+        }
+        if (pathname === "/api/shutdown" && method === "POST") {
+            sendJson(res, 200, { ok: true });
+            // Defer the actual teardown so the response can flush.
+            closing = true;
+            setImmediate(() => {
+                void initiateShutdown();
+            });
+            return;
+        }
+        send404(res);
+    }
+    async function initiateShutdown() {
+        closing = true;
+        if (heartbeatTimer) {
+            clearInterval(heartbeatTimer);
+            heartbeatTimer = null;
+        }
+        // Spec §4.3 / §6.6 — graceful shutdown waits for the in-flight job up to
+        // `shutdownGraceMs` (default 30s). Items continue to drive SSE events
+        // through to all-done; new /api/apply is already blocked by `closing`.
+        const graceMs = opts.shutdownGraceMs ?? 30_000;
+        if (currentJobId !== null && graceMs > 0) {
+            await new Promise((resolve) => {
+                const start = Date.now();
+                const timer = setInterval(() => {
+                    if (currentJobId === null || Date.now() - start >= graceMs) {
+                        clearInterval(timer);
+                        resolve();
+                    }
+                }, 50);
+                timer.unref?.();
+            });
+        }
+        // Stop accepting new connections.
+        server.close();
+        // Force-close open keep-alive sockets so close() can resolve promptly.
+        for (const s of openSockets) {
+            s.destroy();
+        }
+        openSockets.clear();
+    }
+    // Listen.
+    await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+        const onError = (err) => {
+            server.off("listening", onListening);
+            reject(err);
+        };
+        const onListening = () => {
+            server.off("error", onError);
+            resolve();
+        };
+        server.once("error", onError);
+        server.once("listening", onListening);
+        server.listen(opts.port ?? 0, "127.0.0.1");
+    });
+    const address = server.address();
+    const port = address?.port ?? opts.port ?? 0;
+    allowedHosts = buildAllowedHosts(port);
+    // Start heartbeat if enabled. Interval is half the timeout so the worst-
+    // case detection latency is ≤ timeout + interval. `.unref()` keeps Node
+    // from hanging waiting on this timer if the user kills the process.
+    const heartbeatMs = opts.heartbeatTimeoutMs ?? 0;
+    if (heartbeatMs > 0) {
+        const interval = Math.max(1000, Math.floor(heartbeatMs / 3));
+        heartbeatTimer = setInterval(() => {
+            if (closing)
+                return;
+            if (Date.now() - lastPingAt > heartbeatMs) {
+                void initiateShutdown();
+            }
+        }, interval);
+        heartbeatTimer.unref();
+    }
+    // Tracks "fully stopped" — resolved by Node's http server `close` event,
+    // which fires on either the explicit close() path or the heartbeat-driven
+    // initiateShutdown() path.
+    const closed = new Promise((resolve) => {
+        server.once("close", () => resolve());
+    });
+    return {
+        port,
+        close: async () => {
+            closing = true;
+            if (heartbeatTimer) {
+                clearInterval(heartbeatTimer);
+                heartbeatTimer = null;
+            }
+            // Synchronously break all open sockets so close() resolves quickly
+            // (otherwise keep-alive idle conns would block until their timeout).
+            for (const s of openSockets) {
+                s.destroy();
+            }
+            openSockets.clear();
+            try {
+                await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+                    server.close((err) => (err ? reject(err) : resolve()));
+                });
+            }
+            catch (err) {
+                // `Server.close()` rejects when the server isn't running — happens
+                // when the heartbeat path already shut things down. Treat as success.
+                const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
+                if (!/not running|not listening/i.test(msg))
+                    throw err;
+            }
+            await closed;
+        },
+        closed,
+    };
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Route: GET /api/state
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+async function routeState(cwd, packageRoot, res) {
+    try {
+        const catalog = await buildScanCatalog(packageRoot);
+        const report = await scanState(cwd, catalog);
+        sendJson(res, 200, report);
+    }
+    catch {
+        // Catalog or scan blew up — return a structured 500 so the UI can show
+        // a recovery banner rather than getting an HTML error page.
+        sendJson(res, 500, { error: "scan-failed" });
+    }
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Route: GET /api/catalog
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+async function routeCatalog(cwd, res) {
+    // Read `<cwd>/dist/catalog.json`. The spec (§6.1) says this endpoint
+    // returns the current catalog content; if the catalog is missing (e.g.,
+    // running from a checkout without `npm run build`), return an empty
+    // object so the UI can degrade gracefully rather than 500-ing.
+    const catalogPath = path.join(cwd, "dist", "catalog.json");
+    let body;
+    try {
+        body = await readFile(catalogPath, "utf8");
+        // Validate it parses as JSON before forwarding; if not, fall back to {}.
+        JSON.parse(body);
+    }
+    catch {
+        body = "{}";
+    }
+    res.statusCode = 200;
+    res.setHeader("content-type", "application/json; charset=utf-8");
+    res.setHeader("cache-control", "no-store");
+    res.end(body);
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Default apply handlers: returned when callers don't inject their own.
+// CLI mode (M3 T3.6) replaces this with real installers wired via
+// applyHandlers; tests always inject explicit mocks. The fallback throws so
+// any forgotten wiring surfaces immediately as an item:done failure instead
+// of silently no-op'ing.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+const handlerNotConfigured = async () => {
+    throw new Error("apply handlers not configured");
+};
+const defaultHandlersNotConfigured = {
+    workflow: handlerNotConfigured,
+    skill: handlerNotConfigured,
+    "recommended-skill": handlerNotConfigured,
+    plugin: handlerNotConfigured,
+    hook: handlerNotConfigured,
+};