atabey 0.1.1-beta → 0.1.2

package/dist/shared/src/sandbox.js

@@ -1,179 +1,2 @@
-/**
- * OS-level subprocess isolation via uid/gid (no Docker required).
- *
- * On Unix, child_process.spawn accepts `uid` and `gid`. When configured,
- * agent-triggered shell commands run as a restricted system user so that
- * even a hallucinated destructive command hits EACCES / Permission Denied
- * on protected paths.
- *
- * Windows: uid/gid are ignored; isolation is a no-op (allow-list still applies).
- *
- * Configuration (any of):
- *   ATABEY_SANDBOX_UID=501
- *   ATABEY_SANDBOX_GID=20
- *   ATABEY_SANDBOX_USER=atabey-sandbox   (resolved via `id -u` / `id -g` when possible)
- *   ATABEY_SANDBOX_ENABLED=true|false   (default: true when uid/gid resolvable)
- */
-import { spawn } from "child_process";
-import { execFileSync } from "child_process";
-import os from "os";
-let cachedIdentity = null;
-function parseUint(value) {
-    if (value === undefined || value === "")
-        return undefined;
-    const n = Number.parseInt(value, 10);
-    if (!Number.isFinite(n) || n < 0)
-        return undefined;
-    return n;
-}
-function resolveUserIds(username) {
-    if (process.platform === "win32")
-        return {};
-    try {
-        const uidRaw = execFileSync("id", ["-u", username], {
-            encoding: "utf8",
-            timeout: 2000,
-            stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"],
-        }).trim();
-        const gidRaw = execFileSync("id", ["-g", username], {
-            encoding: "utf8",
-            timeout: 2000,
-            stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"],
-        }).trim();
-        return {
-            uid: parseUint(uidRaw),
-            gid: parseUint(gidRaw),
-        };
-    }
-    catch {
-        return {};
-    }
-}
-/**
- * Resolve sandbox identity from env (cached).
- * Call `clearSandboxIdentityCache()` in tests after env changes.
- */
-export function resolveSandboxIdentity() {
-    if (cachedIdentity)
-        return cachedIdentity;
-    if (process.platform === "win32") {
-        cachedIdentity = {
-            enabled: false,
-            reason: "uid/gid isolation is not available on Windows",
-        };
-        return cachedIdentity;
-    }
-    const explicitOff = process.env.ATABEY_SANDBOX_ENABLED === "false" ||
-        process.env.ATABEY_SANDBOX_ENABLED === "0";
-    if (explicitOff) {
-        cachedIdentity = { enabled: false, reason: "ATABEY_SANDBOX_ENABLED=false" };
-        return cachedIdentity;
-    }
-    let uid = parseUint(process.env.ATABEY_SANDBOX_UID);
-    let gid = parseUint(process.env.ATABEY_SANDBOX_GID);
-    const user = process.env.ATABEY_SANDBOX_USER?.trim() || undefined;
-    if (user && (uid === undefined || gid === undefined)) {
-        const resolved = resolveUserIds(user);
-        uid = uid ?? resolved.uid;
-        gid = gid ?? resolved.gid;
-    }
-    // Never drop privileges to root (0) — that would be a no-op or worse
-    if (uid === 0) {
-        cachedIdentity = {
-            enabled: false,
-            reason: "ATABEY_SANDBOX_UID=0 (root) is refused",
-            uid,
-            gid,
-            user,
-        };
-        return cachedIdentity;
-    }
-    if (uid === undefined) {
-        // Optional: if current process is already non-root and no sandbox user
-        // configured, we leave sandbox disabled rather than inventing a user.
-        cachedIdentity = {
-            enabled: false,
-            reason: "No ATABEY_SANDBOX_UID / ATABEY_SANDBOX_USER configured — shell runs as current user",
-            user,
-        };
-        return cachedIdentity;
-    }
-    // Dropping privileges only works if we are root (or have CAP_SETUID).
-    // If we are a normal user with a different target uid, spawn will fail —
-    // detect and warn via reason, still pass options (caller sees Permission error).
-    const canSetUid = typeof process.getuid === "function" && process.getuid() === 0;
-    if (!canSetUid && typeof process.getuid === "function" && process.getuid() !== uid) {
-        cachedIdentity = {
-            enabled: false,
-            uid,
-            gid,
-            user,
-            reason: `Sandbox uid=${uid} requested but process uid=${process.getuid()} is not root; ` +
-                `setuid will fail. Run MCP as root with a dedicated sandbox user, or unset sandbox env.`,
-        };
-        return cachedIdentity;
-    }
-    cachedIdentity = {
-        enabled: true,
-        uid,
-        gid,
-        user,
-    };
-    return cachedIdentity;
-}
-export function clearSandboxIdentityCache() {
-    cachedIdentity = null;
-}
-/**
- * Build spawn options with uid/gid when sandbox is active.
- */
-export function applySandboxToSpawnOptions(options = {}) {
-    const { disableSandbox, ...rest } = options;
-    if (disableSandbox)
-        return { ...rest };
-    const identity = resolveSandboxIdentity();
-    if (!identity.enabled || identity.uid === undefined) {
-        return { ...rest };
-    }
-    return {
-        ...rest,
-        uid: identity.uid,
-        ...(identity.gid !== undefined ? { gid: identity.gid } : {}),
-    };
-}
-/**
- * spawn() wrapper that applies OS sandbox identity when configured.
- */
-export function sandboxSpawn(command, args, options = {}) {
-    const opts = applySandboxToSpawnOptions(options);
-    return spawn(command, args, opts);
-}
-/**
- * Human-readable status for CLI diagnostics.
- */
-export function getSandboxStatus() {
-    return {
-        platform: process.platform,
-        identity: resolveSandboxIdentity(),
-        processUid: typeof process.getuid === "function" ? process.getuid() : null,
-        processGid: typeof process.getgid === "function" ? process.getgid() : null,
-    };
-}
-/** Default restricted paths agents should not touch even with shell allow-list. */
-export const SANDBOX_PROTECTED_HINTS = [
-    "/etc",
-    "/usr",
-    "/bin",
-    "/sbin",
-    "/System",
-    pathHomeDotSsh(),
-];
-function pathHomeDotSsh() {
-    try {
-        return `${os.homedir()}/.ssh`;
-    }
-    catch {
-        return "~/.ssh";
-    }
-}
+export * from "./modules/sandbox/sandbox.js";
 //# sourceMappingURL=sandbox.js.map

package/dist/shared/src/sandbox.js.map

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package/dist/shared/src/secrets.d.ts

@@ -1,99 +1 @@
-/**
- * Secret Management & Leak Guard (Phase 1.5)
- *
- * Provides:
- *   1. Encrypted local secret vault (.atabey/secrets.vault.json) using AES-256-GCM
- *      with per-secret random salt (HKDF-SHA256) and 96-bit IV.
- *   2. Subprocess environment scrubber (strips sensitive keys before spawning child processes).
- *   3. Secret leak scanner (detects API keys, cloud credentials, private keys, and vault values).
- */
-export interface VaultEntry {
-    /** Base64-encoded 16-byte HKDF salt */
-    salt: string;
-    /** Base64-encoded 12-byte GCM initialization vector */
-    iv: string;
-    /** Base64-encoded 16-byte GCM authentication tag */
-    tag: string;
-    /** Base64-encoded ciphertext */
-    ciphertext: string;
-    /** ISO-8601 creation timestamp */
-    createdAt: string;
-    /** ISO-8601 last update timestamp */
-    updatedAt: string;
-    /** Optional non-sensitive description */
-    description?: string;
-}
-export interface VaultFile {
-    version: 1;
-    entries: Record<string, VaultEntry>;
-}
-export interface SecretMetadata {
-    name: string;
-    createdAt: string;
-    updatedAt: string;
-    description?: string;
-}
-export interface SecretFinding {
-    ruleId: string;
-    description: string;
-    matchPreview: string;
-    index: number;
-}
-export declare class SecretManager {
-    private static resolveVaultDir;
-    private static resolveMasterKey;
-    private static vaultFilePath;
-    private static readVault;
-    private static writeVault;
-    /**
-     * Encrypt and store a secret in the local AES-256-GCM vault.
-     */
-    static setSecret(name: string, value: string, options?: {
-        description?: string;
-        vaultDir?: string;
-    }): void;
-    /**
-     * Retrieve and decrypt a secret by name.
-     * Checks process.env[name] fallback only when allowEnvFallback is true.
-     */
-    static getSecret(name: string, options?: {
-        vaultDir?: string;
-        allowEnvFallback?: boolean;
-    }): string | null;
-    /**
-     * Delete a secret from the vault.
-     */
-    static deleteSecret(name: string, options?: {
-        vaultDir?: string;
-    }): boolean;
-    /**
-     * List stored secret metadata without exposing plaintext values.
-     */
-    static listSecrets(options?: {
-        vaultDir?: string;
-    }): SecretMetadata[];
-    /**
-     * Re-encrypt all vault entries under a new 32-byte master key.
-     *
-     * Safe ordering: decrypt everything first, build the new vault in memory,
-     * then atomically swap. The previous key is kept as `master.key.bak` for
-     * the duration of the swap and restored on failure, so a mid-rotation error
-     * cannot make the vault permanently undecryptable.
-     */
-    static rotateMasterKey(newKeyMaterial: string | Buffer, options?: {
-        vaultDir?: string;
-    }): number;
-}
-/**
- * Scrub sensitive credentials from an environment object before passing to a child process.
- */
-export declare function scrubEnvForSubprocess(env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, extraAllowedKeys?: string[]): NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
-/**
- * Scan arbitrary text (command output, file content, tool arguments) for leaked secrets.
- */
-export declare function scanForSecrets(text: string): SecretFinding[];
-/**
- * Redact leaked secrets from text before it is returned to an AI/LLM.
- * Complements PII masking with cloud-credential/private-key patterns.
- */
-export declare function redactSecrets(text: string): string;
+export * from "./modules/security/secrets.js";

package/dist/shared/src/secrets.js

@@ -1,371 +1,2 @@
-/**
- * Secret Management & Leak Guard (Phase 1.5)
- *
- * Provides:
- *   1. Encrypted local secret vault (.atabey/secrets.vault.json) using AES-256-GCM
- *      with per-secret random salt (HKDF-SHA256) and 96-bit IV.
- *   2. Subprocess environment scrubber (strips sensitive keys before spawning child processes).
- *   3. Secret leak scanner (detects API keys, cloud credentials, private keys, and vault values).
- */
-import crypto from "crypto";
-import fs from "fs";
-import path from "path";
-import { resolveFrameworkDir } from "./storage.js";
-/** Env var names or patterns that must never leak into untrusted subprocesses. */
-const SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERNS = [
-    /_KEY$/i,
-    /_KEYS$/i,
-    /_SECRET/i,
-    /_TOKEN$/i,
-    /_PASSWORD$/i,
-    /_PASSWD$/i,
-    /(^|_)PWD$/i,
-    /^PGPASSWORD$/i,
-    /_CREDENTIAL/i,
-    /_PRIVATE/i,
-    /_PASSPHRASE$/i,
-    /ACCESS_KEY/i,
-    /_APIKEY$/i,
-    /_DSN$/i,
-    /(^|_)AUTH$/i,
-    /_SALT$/i,
-    /(^|_)SECRETKEY/i,
-    /^ATABEY_AUDIT_HMAC_KEY$/i,
-    /^ATABEY_MASTER_KEY$/i,
-    /^MCP_AUTH_TOKEN$/i,
-    /^MCP_AUTH_USERS$/i,
-    /^DATABASE_URL$/i,
-    /^REDIS_URL$/i,
-    /^OPENAI_API_KEY$/i,
-    /^ANTHROPIC_API_KEY$/i,
-    /^GEMINI_API_KEY$/i,
-    /^GOOGLE_API_KEY$/i,
-    /^AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY$/i,
-    /^AWS_SESSION_TOKEN$/i,
-    /^GITHUB_TOKEN$/i,
-    /^GH_TOKEN$/i,
-    /^GITLAB_TOKEN$/i,
-    /^NPM_TOKEN$/i,
-    /^SLACK_BOT_TOKEN$/i,
-    /^STRIPE_SECRET_KEY$/i,
-];
-const SECRET_LEAK_PATTERNS = [
-    {
-        id: "aws-access-key",
-        description: "AWS Access Key ID",
-        regex: /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA|ABIA|ACCA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/g,
-    },
-    {
-        id: "github-pat",
-        description: "GitHub Personal Access Token",
-        regex: /\b(?:ghp|gho|ghu|ghs|ghr)_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,255}\b|\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{80,255}\b/g,
-    },
-    {
-        id: "openai-anthropic-key",
-        description: "OpenAI / Anthropic API Key",
-        regex: /\bsk-(?:proj-|ant-api\d{2}-|live-|test-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,200}\b/g,
-    },
-    {
-        id: "google-api-key",
-        description: "Google Cloud / Gemini API Key",
-        regex: /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/g,
-    },
-    {
-        id: "slack-token",
-        description: "Slack API Token",
-        regex: /\bxox[baprs]-[0-9]{10,13}-[0-9]{10,13}[a-zA-Z0-9-]*\b/g,
-    },
-    {
-        id: "private-key-pem",
-        description: "PEM Private Key Block",
-        regex: /-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |ENCRYPTED )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g,
-    },
-    {
-        id: "stripe-secret",
-        description: "Stripe Live/Test Secret Key",
-        regex: /\b(?:sk|rk)_(?:live|test)_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24,99}\b/g,
-    },
-];
-function deriveSubkey(masterKey, salt) {
-    return Buffer.from(crypto.hkdfSync("sha256", masterKey, salt, Buffer.from("atabey-vault-v1", "utf8"), 32));
-}
-function redactPreview(match) {
-    if (match.length <= 8)
-        return "***";
-    return `${match.slice(0, 4)}...${match.slice(-3)}`;
-}
-export class SecretManager {
-    static resolveVaultDir(customDir) {
-        if (customDir)
-            return customDir;
-        const envDir = process.env.ATABEY_TEST_DIR || process.env.ATABEY_FRAMEWORK_DIR;
-        if (envDir && envDir.trim())
-            return envDir.trim();
-        return resolveFrameworkDir();
-    }
-    static resolveMasterKey(vaultDir) {
-        const envKey = process.env.ATABEY_MASTER_KEY?.trim();
-        if (envKey) {
-            return crypto.createHash("sha256").update(envKey, "utf8").digest();
-        }
-        const keyPath = path.join(vaultDir, "master.key");
-        if (fs.existsSync(keyPath)) {
-            const raw = fs.readFileSync(keyPath);
-            if (raw.length === 32)
-                return raw;
-            return crypto.createHash("sha256").update(raw).digest();
-        }
-        fs.mkdirSync(vaultDir, { recursive: true });
-        const generated = crypto.randomBytes(32);
-        fs.writeFileSync(keyPath, generated, { mode: 0o600 });
-        return generated;
-    }
-    static vaultFilePath(vaultDir) {
-        return path.join(vaultDir, "secrets.vault.json");
-    }
-    static readVault(vaultDir) {
-        const filePath = this.vaultFilePath(vaultDir);
-        if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) {
-            return { version: 1, entries: {} };
-        }
-        const raw = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(filePath, "utf8"));
-        if (!raw || raw.version !== 1 || typeof raw.entries !== "object" || raw.entries === null) {
-            throw new Error("Invalid or unsupported secrets.vault.json format.");
-        }
-        return raw;
-    }
-    static writeVault(vaultDir, vault) {
-        fs.mkdirSync(vaultDir, { recursive: true });
-        const filePath = this.vaultFilePath(vaultDir);
-        const tmpPath = `${filePath}.tmp.${process.pid}`;
-        fs.writeFileSync(tmpPath, JSON.stringify(vault, null, 2), { mode: 0o600 });
-        fs.renameSync(tmpPath, filePath);
-    }
-    /**
-     * Encrypt and store a secret in the local AES-256-GCM vault.
-     */
-    static setSecret(name, value, options = {}) {
-        const keyName = name.trim();
-        if (!keyName || !/^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_.-]{0,127}$/.test(keyName)) {
-            throw new Error(`Invalid secret name "${name}". Use alphanumeric, '_', '.', or '-' characters.`);
-        }
-        const vaultDir = this.resolveVaultDir(options.vaultDir);
-        const masterKey = this.resolveMasterKey(vaultDir);
-        const salt = crypto.randomBytes(16);
-        const iv = crypto.randomBytes(12);
-        const subkey = deriveSubkey(masterKey, salt);
-        const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv("aes-256-gcm", subkey, iv);
-        cipher.setAAD(Buffer.from(keyName, "utf8"));
-        const encrypted = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(value, "utf8"), cipher.final()]);
-        const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
-        const vault = this.readVault(vaultDir);
-        const now = new Date().toISOString();
-        const existing = vault.entries[keyName];
-        vault.entries[keyName] = {
-            salt: salt.toString("base64"),
-            iv: iv.toString("base64"),
-            tag: tag.toString("base64"),
-            ciphertext: encrypted.toString("base64"),
-            createdAt: existing?.createdAt ?? now,
-            updatedAt: now,
-            description: options.description ?? existing?.description,
-        };
-        this.writeVault(vaultDir, vault);
-    }
-    /**
-     * Retrieve and decrypt a secret by name.
-     * Checks process.env[name] fallback only when allowEnvFallback is true.
-     */
-    static getSecret(name, options = {}) {
-        const keyName = name.trim();
-        const vaultDir = this.resolveVaultDir(options.vaultDir);
-        const vault = this.readVault(vaultDir);
-        const entry = vault.entries[keyName];
-        if (!entry) {
-            if (options.allowEnvFallback && process.env[keyName] !== undefined) {
-                return process.env[keyName] ?? null;
-            }
-            return null;
-        }
-        const masterKey = this.resolveMasterKey(vaultDir);
-        const salt = Buffer.from(entry.salt, "base64");
-        const iv = Buffer.from(entry.iv, "base64");
-        const tag = Buffer.from(entry.tag, "base64");
-        const ciphertext = Buffer.from(entry.ciphertext, "base64");
-        const subkey = deriveSubkey(masterKey, salt);
-        const decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv("aes-256-gcm", subkey, iv);
-        decipher.setAAD(Buffer.from(keyName, "utf8"));
-        decipher.setAuthTag(tag);
-        const decrypted = Buffer.concat([decipher.update(ciphertext), decipher.final()]);
-        return decrypted.toString("utf8");
-    }
-    /**
-     * Delete a secret from the vault.
-     */
-    static deleteSecret(name, options = {}) {
-        const keyName = name.trim();
-        const vaultDir = this.resolveVaultDir(options.vaultDir);
-        const vault = this.readVault(vaultDir);
-        if (!(keyName in vault.entries))
-            return false;
-        delete vault.entries[keyName];
-        this.writeVault(vaultDir, vault);
-        return true;
-    }
-    /**
-     * List stored secret metadata without exposing plaintext values.
-     */
-    static listSecrets(options = {}) {
-        const vaultDir = this.resolveVaultDir(options.vaultDir);
-        const vault = this.readVault(vaultDir);
-        return Object.entries(vault.entries).map(([name, entry]) => ({
-            name,
-            createdAt: entry.createdAt,
-            updatedAt: entry.updatedAt,
-            description: entry.description,
-        }));
-    }
-    /**
-     * Re-encrypt all vault entries under a new 32-byte master key.
-     *
-     * Safe ordering: decrypt everything first, build the new vault in memory,
-     * then atomically swap. The previous key is kept as `master.key.bak` for
-     * the duration of the swap and restored on failure, so a mid-rotation error
-     * cannot make the vault permanently undecryptable.
-     */
-    static rotateMasterKey(newKeyMaterial, options = {}) {
-        const vaultDir = this.resolveVaultDir(options.vaultDir);
-        if (process.env.ATABEY_MASTER_KEY?.trim()) {
-            throw new Error("[VAULT] ATABEY_MASTER_KEY is authoritative; file-based rotation is disabled while it is set. " +
-                "Rotate by changing ATABEY_MASTER_KEY and re-running `atabey secrets set` for each secret.");
-        }
-        const vault = this.readVault(vaultDir);
-        const names = Object.keys(vault.entries);
-        if (names.length === 0)
-            return 0;
-        // 1. Decrypt everything with the CURRENT key (no writes yet).
-        const decrypted = names.map((name) => {
-            const value = this.getSecret(name, { vaultDir });
-            if (value === null) {
-                throw new Error(`Failed to decrypt secret "${name}" during key rotation.`);
-            }
-            return {
-                name,
-                value,
-                description: vault.entries[name].description,
-                createdAt: vault.entries[name].createdAt,
-            };
-        });
-        const newMasterKey = typeof newKeyMaterial === "string"
-            ? crypto.createHash("sha256").update(newKeyMaterial, "utf8").digest()
-            : newKeyMaterial.length === 32
-                ? Buffer.from(newKeyMaterial)
-                : crypto.createHash("sha256").update(newKeyMaterial).digest();
-        // 2. Build the new vault in memory, encrypted with the new key.
-        const newEntries = {};
-        const now = new Date().toISOString();
-        for (const item of decrypted) {
-            const salt = crypto.randomBytes(16);
-            const iv = crypto.randomBytes(12);
-            const subkey = deriveSubkey(newMasterKey, salt);
-            const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv("aes-256-gcm", subkey, iv);
-            cipher.setAAD(Buffer.from(item.name, "utf8"));
-            const encrypted = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(item.value, "utf8"), cipher.final()]);
-            newEntries[item.name] = {
-                salt: salt.toString("base64"),
-                iv: iv.toString("base64"),
-                tag: cipher.getAuthTag().toString("base64"),
-                ciphertext: encrypted.toString("base64"),
-                createdAt: item.createdAt,
-                updatedAt: now,
-                description: item.description,
-            };
-        }
-        // 3. Atomically swap key + vault with rollback protection.
-        fs.mkdirSync(vaultDir, { recursive: true });
-        const keyPath = path.join(vaultDir, "master.key");
-        const backupPath = `${keyPath}.bak`;
-        const hadKey = fs.existsSync(keyPath);
-        const oldKey = hadKey ? fs.readFileSync(keyPath) : null;
-        try {
-            if (oldKey)
-                fs.writeFileSync(backupPath, oldKey, { mode: 0o600 });
-            fs.writeFileSync(keyPath, newMasterKey, { mode: 0o600 });
-            this.writeVault(vaultDir, { version: 1, entries: newEntries });
-            if (fs.existsSync(backupPath))
-                fs.unlinkSync(backupPath);
-        }
-        catch (err) {
-            // Restore the previous key so the (unchanged) old vault stays readable.
-            try {
-                if (oldKey)
-                    fs.writeFileSync(keyPath, oldKey, { mode: 0o600 });
-                else if (fs.existsSync(keyPath))
-                    fs.unlinkSync(keyPath);
-                if (fs.existsSync(backupPath))
-                    fs.unlinkSync(backupPath);
-            }
-            catch {
-                /* best-effort rollback */
-            }
-            throw err;
-        }
-        return decrypted.length;
-    }
-}
-/**
- * Scrub sensitive credentials from an environment object before passing to a child process.
- */
-export function scrubEnvForSubprocess(env = process.env, extraAllowedKeys = []) {
-    const allowed = new Set(extraAllowedKeys.map((k) => k.toUpperCase()));
-    const clean = {};
-    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(env)) {
-        if (value === undefined)
-            continue;
-        if (allowed.has(key.toUpperCase())) {
-            clean[key] = value;
-            continue;
-        }
-        const isSensitive = SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERNS.some((re) => re.test(key));
-        if (!isSensitive) {
-            clean[key] = value;
-        }
-    }
-    return clean;
-}
-/**
- * Scan arbitrary text (command output, file content, tool arguments) for leaked secrets.
- */
-export function scanForSecrets(text) {
-    if (!text)
-        return [];
-    const findings = [];
-    for (const pattern of SECRET_LEAK_PATTERNS) {
-        pattern.regex.lastIndex = 0;
-        let match;
-        while ((match = pattern.regex.exec(text)) !== null) {
-            findings.push({
-                ruleId: pattern.id,
-                description: pattern.description,
-                matchPreview: redactPreview(match[0]),
-                index: match.index,
-            });
-        }
-    }
-    return findings;
-}
-/**
- * Redact leaked secrets from text before it is returned to an AI/LLM.
- * Complements PII masking with cloud-credential/private-key patterns.
- */
-export function redactSecrets(text) {
-    if (!text)
-        return text;
-    let out = text;
-    for (const pattern of SECRET_LEAK_PATTERNS) {
-        const flags = pattern.regex.flags.includes("g") ? pattern.regex.flags : `${pattern.regex.flags}g`;
-        out = out.replace(new RegExp(pattern.regex.source, flags), `[REDACTED:${pattern.id}]`);
-    }
-    return out;
-}
+export * from "./modules/security/secrets.js";
 //# sourceMappingURL=secrets.js.map