arkaos 4.19.0 → 4.20.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +1 -1
- package/VERSION +1 -1
- package/arka/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/departments/dev/skills/exploit-triage/SKILL.md +77 -0
- package/departments/dev/skills/ml-adoption-playbook/SKILL.md +88 -0
- package/departments/dev/skills/mle-workflow/SKILL.md +97 -0
- package/departments/dev/skills/safety-review/SKILL.md +75 -0
- package/knowledge/skills-manifest.json +53 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/pyproject.toml +1 -1
package/README.md
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package/VERSION
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package/arka/SKILL.md
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# ArkaOS — Main Orchestrator
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> **The Operating System for AI Agent Teams**
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> 86 agents. 17 departments.
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> 86 agents. 17 departments. 287 skills. Multi-runtime. Dashboard. Knowledge RAG.
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## ⛔ Evidence flow — 4 gates (NON-NEGOTIABLE)
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---
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name: dev/exploit-triage
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description: >
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Reviews code for the vulnerabilities that are actually reachable and
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actually exploitable — SSRF, auth bypass, injection, insecure
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deserialisation, IDOR — biased toward a remote, unauthenticated
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attacker, and discards the theoretical. Answers "can someone reach and
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weaponise this?", not "is this textbook-perfect?". TRIGGER: "/dev
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exploit-triage", "is this exploitable", "attack surface", "can this be
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reached", "SSRF/IDOR/auth bypass", "isto é explorável?", "que dano real
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se tira daqui?"; run on a diff touching auth, input handling, requests,
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deserialisation, or file/db access. SKIP: broad OWASP/quality pass ->
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dev/security-audit wins; adversarially breaking a diff (abuse cases,
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threat-modelling a change) -> dev/adversarial-review wins; planning a
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full offensive engagement (signed RoE, ATT&CK campaign) -> dev/red-team
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wins; agent/prompt-injection threats -> dev/ai-security wins.
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allowed-tools: [Read, Grep, Glob]
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metadata:
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origin: arkaos
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---
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# Exploit Triage — `/dev exploit-triage`
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> **Agent:** Bruno (Security Engineer) | **Framework:** Reachability-first, attacker-economics, CWE Top 25
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A security review that lists every theoretical weakness buries the one
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that gets you breached. This lens inverts the priority: it starts from a
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remote, unauthenticated attacker and asks, of each finding, whether they
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can reach the code path and whether reaching it actually pays. A missing
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security header on an internal admin page is a note; an SSRF on a
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user-supplied URL that reaches the cloud metadata endpoint is the report.
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Reachability and impact rank everything; the textbook comes second.
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## What to hunt (reachability-first)
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| Class | The question that decides severity |
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|-------|-----------------------------------|
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| **SSRF** (CWE-918) | Does a user-controlled URL/host reach a fetch, and can it hit internal services or a metadata endpoint? |
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| **Auth / access bypass** (CWE-287/862, IDOR CWE-639) | Can the check be skipped, or an object accessed by ID without ownership (IDOR)? |
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| **Injection** (CWE-74: SQLi/command/template) | Does untrusted input reach a query, a shell, or a template unparameterised? |
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| **Insecure deserialisation** (CWE-502) | Is attacker-controlled data deserialised into objects (pickle, unsafe YAML, native serialisers)? |
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| **Path traversal / upload** | Can a user steer a file path or upload an executable/served type? |
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| **Secrets & SSRF-adjacent** | A leaked credential or an open redirect that chains into the above. |
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## Process
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1. Map the **entry points** in the diff — what an unauthenticated request can reach, then what an authenticated-but-untrusted user can.
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2. For each candidate, trace the taint: does attacker input reach the sink, and is there a real control in the way?
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3. Rank by **reachability × impact**, not by CWE checklist order. Discard the theoretically-imperfect-but-unreachable with a one-line note, so the real findings are not buried.
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4. For each real finding, give the **concrete attack** (the request an attacker sends) and the fix.
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## Proactive Triggers
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Surface these WITHOUT being asked:
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- a user-supplied URL or hostname flowing into an HTTP client → the SSRF, and whether it can reach the metadata endpoint
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- an object fetched by an ID from the request with no ownership check → the IDOR and the horizontal access it grants
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- `pickle.loads` / `yaml.load` / a native deserialiser on request data → the deserialisation-to-RCE path
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## Output
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```markdown
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## Exploit Triage
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**Scope:** {diff / entry points reviewed}
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**Attacker model:** {remote unauth / authenticated untrusted}
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### Exploitable (reachable + impactful)
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- **{class}** {file}:{line}
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- **Reach:** {how the attacker gets input to the sink}
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- **Attack:** {the concrete request/payload}
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- **Impact:** {what it grants}
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- **Fix:** {the specific control}
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### Noted, not exploitable (unreachable or low impact)
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- {finding} — {why it does not pay}, one line each
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```
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---
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name: dev/ml-adoption-playbook
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description: >
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Decides whether a problem needs ML at all, then adds it to a non-ML
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codebase the cheap way — heuristic baseline first, a defined metric and
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mistake budget, data readiness, and a decoupled seam before any model.
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TRIGGER: "/dev ml-adoption-playbook", "should we use ML for this", "add
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ML to", "is this an ML problem", "machine learning for X", "vale a pena
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ML aqui?", "adicionar ML ao projeto", "modelo ou regras?". SKIP: the
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model is already chosen and the job is to productionise it ->
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dev/mle-workflow wins; a ranking/feed pipeline's plumbing ->
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dev/rag-architect or dev/architecture-design wins.
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allowed-tools: [Read, Grep, Glob]
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metadata:
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origin: arkaos
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---
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# ML Adoption Playbook — `/dev ml-adoption-playbook`
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> **Agent:** Salvador (AI Engineering Specialist) | **Framework:** Heuristic-first, metric-and-mistake-budget, incremental adoption
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The most expensive way to add machine learning to a product is to reach
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for a model before asking whether rules would do. A regex, a threshold,
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or a lookup table ships in an afternoon, is trivial to debug, and is
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often within a few points of what a model would give — and if it is not,
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it becomes the baseline the model has to beat. This playbook decides
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whether the problem is really an ML problem, and if it is, adds ML to a
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codebase that has none of the scaffolding, one committed step at a time.
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## Phase 1 — Framing & feasibility (before any model)
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- **Heuristic check.** Could a rule, threshold, or lookup solve this
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acceptably? If yes, ship that first — it is the baseline and often the
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answer. A model that cannot beat a well-tuned heuristic is not worth
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its operational cost.
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- **Metric.** Define how success is measured, tied to the product
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decision — before touching data. No metric, no project.
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- **Mistake budget.** State what a wrong prediction costs and how many
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are tolerable. This sets the bar the model must clear and whether a
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human stays in the loop.
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- **Data reality.** Do labelled examples exist, or a path to them? Is the
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outcome observable, and when? A problem with no labels and no path to
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them is not yet an ML problem.
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## Phase 2 — Data readiness
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- Locate the data that would feed the model; assess volume, quality, and
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bias before assuming it is usable.
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- Confirm the label is available at the time a prediction is needed, not
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only in hindsight.
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## Phase 3 — Architectural seam
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- Add a decoupled boundary where the prediction plugs in — an interface
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the current heuristic satisfies too, so the model can replace the rule
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without rewiring the app.
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- Keep the heuristic as the fallback and the regression baseline.
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## Phase 4 — Baseline model
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- Integrate the simplest model that could work behind the seam; compare
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it to the heuristic on the defined metric and mistake budget.
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- Promote only if it clears the bar. If it does not, the heuristic stays
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and the finding is recorded — a negative result is still a result.
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## Proactive Triggers
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Surface these WITHOUT being asked:
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- a request to "use ML" for something a threshold or lookup handles → propose the heuristic baseline first and the bar the model must beat
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- an ML plan with no defined metric or mistake budget → stop; those come before data
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- no labelled data and no path to it → this is not yet an ML problem; name what would make it one
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## Output
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```markdown
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## ML Adoption Assessment
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**Problem:** {what decision needs to be made}
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**Heuristic baseline:** {the rule that ships today, and how close it gets}
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**Verdict:** {ML justified? / heuristic suffices / not yet an ML problem}
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### If ML is justified
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- **Metric & bar:** {measure + threshold the model must beat the baseline by}
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- **Mistake budget:** {cost of a wrong call + human-in-loop or not}
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- **Data readiness:** {labels? volume? label latency?}
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- **Seam:** {the interface where the model plugs in, heuristic as fallback}
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```
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name: dev/mle-workflow
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description: >
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Turns model work into a production ML system — data contracts,
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reproducible training, measurable eval gates, a deployable artifact,
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and monitoring with a rollback path — using only the lanes the system
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needs. TRIGGER: "/dev mle-workflow", "productionise this model", "ML
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pipeline", "ranking/recommender/classifier/forecasting system", "model
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refresh", "pôr o modelo em produção", "notebook para pipeline", "eval
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gate do modelo". SKIP: RAG retrieval/context design -> dev/rag-architect
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wins; the app/API around the model with no ML lifecycle concern ->
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dev/architecture-design wins; prompt-injection/model-abuse threats ->
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dev/ai-security wins.
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allowed-tools: [Read, Grep, Glob, Bash]
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metadata:
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origin: arkaos
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---
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# ML Engineering Workflow — `/dev mle-workflow`
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> **Agent:** Salvador (AI Engineering Specialist) | **Framework:** Data contracts, reproducible training, eval-gated promotion, monitored rollout
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A model in a notebook is a result; a model in production is a system that
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has to keep being right as the data underneath it moves. The gap between
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the two is not the algorithm — it is the plumbing that makes a prediction
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reproducible, gated on measured quality, deployable as an artifact, and
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observable once real traffic arrives. This workflow builds that plumbing,
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using only the lanes the system in front of you actually needs.
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## Scope calibration first
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Not every model has labels, online serving, a feature store, GPUs, or A/B
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tests. Pick the lanes that fit and make the missing ones explicit
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assumptions. A change that a data contract, a baseline, an eval script,
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and a rollback note would make reviewable does not need a feature store.
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## Lanes
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### 1. Data contract
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- Define the input schema, types, and allowed ranges; version it. A model is only as trustworthy as the guarantee on what reaches it.
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- Name the label source and its latency (is the outcome known now, or in 30 days?). Undelayed evaluation of a delayed-label problem is a lie.
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- Guard against **leakage**: a feature that encodes the target, or is computed with information unavailable at prediction time.
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### 2. Reproducible training
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- Pin the data snapshot, code version, dependency lockfile/environment, seed, and hyperparameters — a training run nobody can reproduce is not evidence.
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- Separate train/validation/test by the axis that matches production (time-based split for anything time-ordered, not random).
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- Emit a single versioned artifact (weights + preprocessing + the input schema it expects).
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### 3. Eval gate (promotion criteria)
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- State the metric and the threshold BEFORE training, tied to the decision the model drives — not accuracy for its own sake.
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- Evaluate on **slices**, not just the aggregate: a model that is 95% overall and 40% on the segment that matters is a failure.
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- Offline gate to promote; where traffic exists, an online check (shadow or canary) before full rollout.
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### 4. Deployable artifact & serving
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- The serving path must run the **same** preprocessing as training — train/serve skew is the most common silent production failure.
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- Batch vs online: choose by the freshness the decision needs, not by default.
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- Idempotent, versioned, with a health check.
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### 5. Monitoring & rollback
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- Watch input drift, prediction distribution, and — when labels arrive — realised quality against the offline estimate.
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- A **rollback path** to the previous artifact that can be triggered without a retrain.
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- Preserve every production failure (bad feature, stale label, artifact mismatch, drift) as a regression case.
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## Process
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1. Map the change onto the five lanes; mark which apply and which are explicit assumptions.
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2. Find the existing training/feature/serving/eval paths before adding a parallel ML stack (`git grep`, read them).
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3. Build the data contract and the eval gate first — they define what "done" means before any model work.
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## Proactive Triggers
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- a feature computed from data unavailable at prediction time → the leakage, and the realistic offline score once it is removed
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- a random train/test split on time-ordered data → the optimistic metric it produces and the time-based split that fixes it
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- preprocessing written twice (once in training, once in serving) → the train/serve skew waiting to happen; share the code path
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## Output
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```markdown
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## ML Engineering Plan
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**System:** {what the model decides} · **Lanes in scope:** {of the five}
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**Explicit assumptions:** {labels / serving / traffic / monitoring owner}
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### Data contract
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{schema, label source + latency, leakage checks}
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### Training & eval gate
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{reproducibility pins, split axis, metric + threshold + slices}
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### Serving & monitoring
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{batch/online, skew guard, drift signals, rollback trigger}
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### Risks
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- {the failure mode} → {the guard}
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```
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name: dev/safety-review
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description: >
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Audits a change or an automation for destructive, irreversible
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operations — bulk deletes, DROP/TRUNCATE, force pushes, mass emails,
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raw disk or filesystem writes — and checks each has a guard: a scope
|
|
7
|
+
limit, a dry-run, a confirmation, a backup, a rollback. TRIGGER: "/dev
|
|
8
|
+
safety-review", "is this safe to run", "destructive operation", "will
|
|
9
|
+
this delete/overwrite", "review this migration/script/cron", "isto
|
|
10
|
+
apaga alguma coisa?", "revê este script destrutivo", "posso correr isto
|
|
11
|
+
em produção?"; run before shipping a migration, a bulk job, a cron, or
|
|
12
|
+
an autonomous automation. SKIP: exploitable-vulnerability review ->
|
|
13
|
+
dev/exploit-triage wins; general code review -> dev/code-review wins;
|
|
14
|
+
the deploy/rollout mechanics themselves -> dev/deploy wins.
|
|
15
|
+
allowed-tools: [Read, Grep, Glob]
|
|
16
|
+
metadata:
|
|
17
|
+
origin: arkaos
|
|
18
|
+
---
|
|
19
|
+
|
|
20
|
+
# Safety Review — `/dev safety-review`
|
|
21
|
+
|
|
22
|
+
> **Agent:** Bruno (Security Engineer) | **Framework:** Blast-radius analysis, reversibility, guard-before-execute
|
|
23
|
+
|
|
24
|
+
The dangerous change is rarely the one that fails — it is the one that
|
|
25
|
+
succeeds at the wrong scope. A migration that runs, a cleanup cron that
|
|
26
|
+
fires, a bulk update that commits: each does exactly what it was told, to
|
|
27
|
+
more rows or files or people than the author pictured. This pass finds
|
|
28
|
+
the destructive and irreversible operations in a change or an automation
|
|
29
|
+
and checks that every one is fenced — scoped, reversible, dry-runnable,
|
|
30
|
+
or gated behind a confirmation — before it can run unattended.
|
|
31
|
+
|
|
32
|
+
## What to flag
|
|
33
|
+
|
|
34
|
+
| Operation | The guard it needs |
|
|
35
|
+
|-----------|--------------------|
|
|
36
|
+
| **Bulk delete / update** (`DELETE`/`UPDATE` without a tight `WHERE`, `deleteMany`, `rm -rf`) | An explicit scope, a row-count check, and a backup or soft-delete |
|
|
37
|
+
| **Schema destruction** (`DROP`, `TRUNCATE`, a down-migration that loses data) | Reversibility or a snapshot; never irreversible without sign-off |
|
|
38
|
+
| **Force / history rewrite** (`git push --force`, `reset --hard`, `filter-branch`) | Branch scoping; never on a shared branch |
|
|
39
|
+
| **Mass outbound** (bulk email/notification/webhook) | A dry-run count, a rate limit, a test-recipient path |
|
|
40
|
+
| **Raw disk / filesystem** (`dd`, recursive writes, `chmod -R`) | Path scoping and a confirmation |
|
|
41
|
+
| **Unbounded loop / job** over production data | A limit, idempotency, and a resumable/rollback path |
|
|
42
|
+
|
|
43
|
+
## Process
|
|
44
|
+
|
|
45
|
+
1. Grep the change/automation for the destructive verbs — `DELETE`, `DROP`, `TRUNCATE`, `deleteMany`, `rm`, `--force`, `reset --hard`, bulk-send calls.
|
|
46
|
+
2. For each, determine the **blast radius**: what is the maximum it can affect if a parameter is wrong or empty (an empty `WHERE` deletes the table; a null filter matches everything)?
|
|
47
|
+
3. Check the guard is present and correct: scope, dry-run, confirmation, backup, rollback. A destructive op with no guard, or a guard that fails open, is a finding.
|
|
48
|
+
4. Rank by reversibility — an irreversible op with no backup is critical; a scoped, reversible one is clean.
|
|
49
|
+
|
|
50
|
+
## Proactive Triggers
|
|
51
|
+
|
|
52
|
+
Surface these WITHOUT being asked:
|
|
53
|
+
|
|
54
|
+
- a `DELETE`/`UPDATE` whose `WHERE` could evaluate to empty or all-rows → the full-table blast radius and the scope/guard it needs
|
|
55
|
+
- a down-migration or `DROP`/`TRUNCATE` with no snapshot → the irreversible data loss
|
|
56
|
+
- an automation that runs unattended (cron, agent, CI job) touching production data with no dry-run or rollback → the guard to add before it ships
|
|
57
|
+
|
|
58
|
+
## Output
|
|
59
|
+
|
|
60
|
+
```markdown
|
|
61
|
+
## Safety Review
|
|
62
|
+
|
|
63
|
+
**Scope:** {change / automation reviewed}
|
|
64
|
+
**Verdict:** {SAFE TO RUN / GUARDS REQUIRED}
|
|
65
|
+
|
|
66
|
+
### Destructive operations
|
|
67
|
+
- **{operation}** {file}:{line}
|
|
68
|
+
- **Blast radius:** {worst case if a parameter is wrong/empty}
|
|
69
|
+
- **Reversible?** {yes + how / no}
|
|
70
|
+
- **Guard present?** {scope/dry-run/confirmation/backup — or missing}
|
|
71
|
+
- **Fix:** {the guard to add before this runs}
|
|
72
|
+
|
|
73
|
+
### Safe
|
|
74
|
+
{operations already correctly fenced}
|
|
75
|
+
```
|
|
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"_meta": {
|
|
3
3
|
"generator": "scripts/marketplace_gen.py",
|
|
4
|
-
"version": "4.
|
|
4
|
+
"version": "4.20.0",
|
|
5
5
|
"marketplace": "arkaos"
|
|
6
6
|
},
|
|
7
7
|
"structural": {
|
|
@@ -1095,6 +1095,19 @@
|
|
|
1095
1095
|
"origin": "arkaos"
|
|
1096
1096
|
}
|
|
1097
1097
|
},
|
|
1098
|
+
"exploit-triage": {
|
|
1099
|
+
"depts": [
|
|
1100
|
+
"dev"
|
|
1101
|
+
],
|
|
1102
|
+
"curated": false,
|
|
1103
|
+
"plugins": [
|
|
1104
|
+
"arkaos-dev@arkaos"
|
|
1105
|
+
],
|
|
1106
|
+
"collision": false,
|
|
1107
|
+
"provenance": {
|
|
1108
|
+
"origin": "arkaos"
|
|
1109
|
+
}
|
|
1110
|
+
},
|
|
1098
1111
|
"extract-data": {
|
|
1099
1112
|
"depts": [
|
|
1100
1113
|
"strategy"
|
|
@@ -1633,6 +1646,32 @@
|
|
|
1633
1646
|
"origin": "arkaos"
|
|
1634
1647
|
}
|
|
1635
1648
|
},
|
|
1649
|
+
"ml-adoption-playbook": {
|
|
1650
|
+
"depts": [
|
|
1651
|
+
"dev"
|
|
1652
|
+
],
|
|
1653
|
+
"curated": false,
|
|
1654
|
+
"plugins": [
|
|
1655
|
+
"arkaos-dev@arkaos"
|
|
1656
|
+
],
|
|
1657
|
+
"collision": false,
|
|
1658
|
+
"provenance": {
|
|
1659
|
+
"origin": "arkaos"
|
|
1660
|
+
}
|
|
1661
|
+
},
|
|
1662
|
+
"mle-workflow": {
|
|
1663
|
+
"depts": [
|
|
1664
|
+
"dev"
|
|
1665
|
+
],
|
|
1666
|
+
"curated": false,
|
|
1667
|
+
"plugins": [
|
|
1668
|
+
"arkaos-dev@arkaos"
|
|
1669
|
+
],
|
|
1670
|
+
"collision": false,
|
|
1671
|
+
"provenance": {
|
|
1672
|
+
"origin": "arkaos"
|
|
1673
|
+
}
|
|
1674
|
+
},
|
|
1636
1675
|
"moat-analysis": {
|
|
1637
1676
|
"depts": [
|
|
1638
1677
|
"strategy"
|
|
@@ -2475,6 +2514,19 @@
|
|
|
2475
2514
|
"origin": "arkaos"
|
|
2476
2515
|
}
|
|
2477
2516
|
},
|
|
2517
|
+
"safety-review": {
|
|
2518
|
+
"depts": [
|
|
2519
|
+
"dev"
|
|
2520
|
+
],
|
|
2521
|
+
"curated": false,
|
|
2522
|
+
"plugins": [
|
|
2523
|
+
"arkaos-dev@arkaos"
|
|
2524
|
+
],
|
|
2525
|
+
"collision": false,
|
|
2526
|
+
"provenance": {
|
|
2527
|
+
"origin": "arkaos"
|
|
2528
|
+
}
|
|
2529
|
+
},
|
|
2478
2530
|
"scaffold": {
|
|
2479
2531
|
"depts": [
|
|
2480
2532
|
"dev"
|
package/package.json
CHANGED