arkaos 4.18.0 → 4.20.0

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package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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  **The Operating System for AI Agent Teams.**
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- 86 agents. 17 departments. 279 skills. Enterprise frameworks. Multi-runtime. One install.
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+ 86 agents. 17 departments. 287 skills. Enterprise frameworks. Multi-runtime. One install.
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  ```bash
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  npx arkaos install
package/VERSION CHANGED
@@ -1 +1 @@
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- 4.18.0
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+ 4.20.0
package/arka/SKILL.md CHANGED
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ measures citation compliance per turn.
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  # ArkaOS — Main Orchestrator
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  > **The Operating System for AI Agent Teams**
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- > 86 agents. 17 departments. 279 skills. Multi-runtime. Dashboard. Knowledge RAG.
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+ > 86 agents. 17 departments. 287 skills. Multi-runtime. Dashboard. Knowledge RAG.
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  ## ⛔ Evidence flow — 4 gates (NON-NEGOTIABLE)
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@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
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  # Mirror of config/skills-provenance.yaml for the agent tree. The parser
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  # (core/agents/provenance.py) closes every way of writing a BROKEN
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  # provenance block, but it cannot see an agent that never writes one:
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- # absence reads as first-party, which is exactly what a forgotten ECC
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- # agent port looks like.
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+ # absence reads as first-party, which is exactly what a forgotten
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+ # third-party agent port looks like.
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  #
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  # EVERY agent YAML must be CLASSIFIED — listed in `first_party` below,
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  # listed in `derived` below, or declaring a `provenance:` block in its
@@ -19,9 +19,9 @@
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  #
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  # What the baseline is and is not:
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  # ASSERTED: these are ArkaOS originals.
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- # PROVEN: none can be ECC-derived — every one was created before
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- # 2026-07-14, the day we first read that repository (git log
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- # --diff-filter=A; verified once).
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+ # PROVEN: none can be externally derived — every one was created
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+ # before 2026-07-14, when this campaign began studying external
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+ # repositories (git log --diff-filter=A; verified once).
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  # The property the control rests on is that the set is CLOSED:
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  # anything new must classify itself.
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  #
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
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  #
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  # derived format:
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  # departments/<dept>/agents/<slug>.yaml:
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- # origin: <lowercase-slug> # e.g. ecc-derived, community
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+ # origin: <lowercase-slug> # e.g. vendor-derived, community
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  # source: https://...
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  # license: MIT
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@@ -30,10 +30,11 @@
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  # ASSERTED, not independently verified: that these 275 are ArkaOS
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  # originals. Nobody re-derived each one from scratch to prove it.
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  #
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- # PROVEN, for the lineage that matters: none of them can be
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- # ECC-derived. `git log --diff-filter=A` puts every creation between
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- # 2026-03-14 and 2026-07-13 — all of them before 2026-07-14, the day
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- # we first read that repository. Zero exceptions.
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+ # PROVEN, for the lineage that matters: none of them can be derived
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+ # from an external source. `git log --diff-filter=A` puts every
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+ # creation between 2026-03-14 and 2026-07-13 — all of them before
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+ # 2026-07-14, when this campaign began studying external repositories.
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+ # Zero exceptions.
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  #
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  # The property the control actually rests on is neither: it is that
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  # the set is CLOSED. Anything new must classify itself, whatever the
@@ -52,32 +53,13 @@
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  #
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  # derived format:
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  # departments/<dept>/skills/<slug>:
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- # origin: <lowercase-slug> # e.g. ecc-derived, community
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+ # origin: <lowercase-slug> # e.g. vendor-derived, community
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  # source: https://... # where it came from
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  # license: MIT # what we are bound by
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  baseline_date: 2026-07-14
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- derived:
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- # ECC review lenses (Track C1) — specialised review skills ArkaOS
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- # lacked, ported from the MIT-licensed everything-claude-code repo and
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- # rewritten in ArkaOS voice with ArkaOS personas.
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- departments/dev/skills/silent-failure-hunter:
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- origin: ecc-derived
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- source: https://github.com/affaan-m/ecc
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- license: MIT
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- departments/dev/skills/type-design-analyzer:
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- origin: ecc-derived
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- source: https://github.com/affaan-m/ecc
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- license: MIT
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- departments/dev/skills/pr-test-analyzer:
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- origin: ecc-derived
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- source: https://github.com/affaan-m/ecc
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- license: MIT
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- departments/dev/skills/click-path-audit:
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- origin: ecc-derived
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- source: https://github.com/affaan-m/ecc
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- license: MIT
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+ derived: {}
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  first_party:
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  - arka
@@ -1,19 +1,18 @@
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  """Agent provenance — supply-chain lineage for every agent YAML.
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- The skill tree got provenance in v4.17.0; agents did not, and the ECC
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- teardown puts ~15 derived agents on the roadmap. An ECC agent ported
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- today would land with exactly the hole skill provenance closes: no
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- origin, no licence trail, indistinguishable from an ArkaOS original.
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- This is the agent-side mirror, and it must land before the first agent
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- port.
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+ The skill tree got provenance in v4.17.0; agents did not. If a
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+ third-party agent is ever ported in, it would land with exactly the
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+ hole skill provenance closes: no origin, no licence trail,
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+ indistinguishable from an ArkaOS original. This is the agent-side
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+ mirror, and it guards that boundary before any such port.
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  An agent YAML may carry a top-level ``provenance`` block:
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- id: silent-failure-hunter
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+ id: example-agent
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  name: ...
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  provenance:
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- origin: ecc-derived
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- source: https://github.com/affaan-m/ecc
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+ origin: vendor-derived
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+ source: https://example.com/upstream
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  license: MIT
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  Absent means first-party. The validation rules are the shared
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ class KnowledgeEntry(BaseModel):
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  # Instinct confidence lives in a band, never at the poles. 0.3 is a weak
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  # hypothesis worth keeping; 0.9 is strong but never certainty (an agent
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  # that is "certain" from a handful of observations is the failure the
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- # band prevents). Mirrors the ECC continuous-learning instinct model.
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+ # band prevents). Follows an established continuous-learning instinct model.
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  INSTINCT_CONFIDENCE_MIN = 0.3
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  INSTINCT_CONFIDENCE_MAX = 0.9
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  INSTINCT_SCOPES = ("project", "global")
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ INSTINCT_SCOPES = ("project", "global")
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  class ActionableInsight(BaseModel):
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  """Actionable insight — generated by agents for proactive presentation.
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- Carries the ECC-style instinct fields (confidence, scope,
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+ Carries the instinct fields (confidence, scope,
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  evidence_count) so an insight can strengthen on corroboration, weaken
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  on contradiction, and be promoted from project to global once the
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  same signal is seen across enough projects with high enough mean
@@ -9,12 +9,12 @@ author who ported it moves on.
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  Contract (opt-in, absence means first-party):
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  ---
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- name: dev/silent-failure-hunter
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+ name: dev/example-skill
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  description: ...
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  allowed-tools: [Read, Grep, Glob]
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  metadata:
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- origin: ecc-derived
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- source: https://github.com/affaan-m/ecc
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+ origin: vendor-derived
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+ source: https://example.com/upstream
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  license: MIT
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  ---
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@@ -3,8 +3,7 @@
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  An agent that hits a lint or type error has two ways out: fix the code,
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  or edit the config so the check stops firing. The second is faster and
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  almost always wrong — it silences the signal for the whole team, not
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- just this change. The ECC teardown found a hook for exactly this
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- (`config-protection`), and it is the cheapest high-value control in the
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+ just this change. This gate is the cheapest high-value control in the
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  set: refuse edits to linter/formatter/type-checker configs, and the
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  agent is left with the honest path.
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@@ -13,9 +13,7 @@ description: >
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  brand/design-review wins.
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  allowed-tools: [Read, Grep, Glob]
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  metadata:
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- origin: ecc-derived
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- source: https://github.com/affaan-m/ecc
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- license: MIT
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+ origin: arkaos
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  ---
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  # Click-Path Audit — `/dev click-path-audit`
@@ -33,11 +31,13 @@ clicks.
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  ## The bug this catches
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- A "New Email" button called `setComposeMode(true)` then `selectThread(null)`.
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- Each call was correct on its own, but `selectThread` reset `composeMode`
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- back to false as a side effect, so the button opened nothing no type
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- error, no crash, and no unit test to catch it. Tracing the two calls in
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- order makes the reset obvious on the page.
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+ An "Apply filters" button called `setFilters(next)` and then, to close the
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+ panel, `resetPanel()`. Each worked alone but `resetPanel` cleared the
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+ draft filter state as part of tidying up, so the store ended with the old
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+ filters and the list never changed. No type error, no crash, no failing
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+ unit test; the two setters simply fought and the second won. Walking the
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+ handler's calls in order puts the cleared write next to the one it
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+ cancelled, and the bug is visible without ever running the app.
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  ## Process
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@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
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+ ---
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+ name: dev/exploit-triage
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+ description: >
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+ Reviews code for the vulnerabilities that are actually reachable and
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+ actually exploitable — SSRF, auth bypass, injection, insecure
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+ deserialisation, IDOR — biased toward a remote, unauthenticated
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+ attacker, and discards the theoretical. Answers "can someone reach and
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+ weaponise this?", not "is this textbook-perfect?". TRIGGER: "/dev
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+ exploit-triage", "is this exploitable", "attack surface", "can this be
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+ reached", "SSRF/IDOR/auth bypass", "isto é explorável?", "que dano real
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+ se tira daqui?"; run on a diff touching auth, input handling, requests,
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+ deserialisation, or file/db access. SKIP: broad OWASP/quality pass ->
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+ dev/security-audit wins; adversarially breaking a diff (abuse cases,
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+ threat-modelling a change) -> dev/adversarial-review wins; planning a
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+ full offensive engagement (signed RoE, ATT&CK campaign) -> dev/red-team
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+ wins; agent/prompt-injection threats -> dev/ai-security wins.
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+ allowed-tools: [Read, Grep, Glob]
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+ metadata:
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+ origin: arkaos
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+ ---
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+
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+ # Exploit Triage — `/dev exploit-triage`
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+
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+ > **Agent:** Bruno (Security Engineer) | **Framework:** Reachability-first, attacker-economics, CWE Top 25
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+
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+ A security review that lists every theoretical weakness buries the one
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+ that gets you breached. This lens inverts the priority: it starts from a
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+ remote, unauthenticated attacker and asks, of each finding, whether they
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+ can reach the code path and whether reaching it actually pays. A missing
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+ security header on an internal admin page is a note; an SSRF on a
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+ user-supplied URL that reaches the cloud metadata endpoint is the report.
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+ Reachability and impact rank everything; the textbook comes second.
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+
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+ ## What to hunt (reachability-first)
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+
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+ | Class | The question that decides severity |
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+ |-------|-----------------------------------|
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+ | **SSRF** (CWE-918) | Does a user-controlled URL/host reach a fetch, and can it hit internal services or a metadata endpoint? |
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+ | **Auth / access bypass** (CWE-287/862, IDOR CWE-639) | Can the check be skipped, or an object accessed by ID without ownership (IDOR)? |
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+ | **Injection** (CWE-74: SQLi/command/template) | Does untrusted input reach a query, a shell, or a template unparameterised? |
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+ | **Insecure deserialisation** (CWE-502) | Is attacker-controlled data deserialised into objects (pickle, unsafe YAML, native serialisers)? |
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+ | **Path traversal / upload** | Can a user steer a file path or upload an executable/served type? |
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+ | **Secrets & SSRF-adjacent** | A leaked credential or an open redirect that chains into the above. |
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+
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+ ## Process
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+
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+ 1. Map the **entry points** in the diff — what an unauthenticated request can reach, then what an authenticated-but-untrusted user can.
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+ 2. For each candidate, trace the taint: does attacker input reach the sink, and is there a real control in the way?
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+ 3. Rank by **reachability × impact**, not by CWE checklist order. Discard the theoretically-imperfect-but-unreachable with a one-line note, so the real findings are not buried.
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+ 4. For each real finding, give the **concrete attack** (the request an attacker sends) and the fix.
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+
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+ ## Proactive Triggers
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+
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+ Surface these WITHOUT being asked:
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+
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+ - a user-supplied URL or hostname flowing into an HTTP client → the SSRF, and whether it can reach the metadata endpoint
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+ - an object fetched by an ID from the request with no ownership check → the IDOR and the horizontal access it grants
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+ - `pickle.loads` / `yaml.load` / a native deserialiser on request data → the deserialisation-to-RCE path
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+
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+ ## Output
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+
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+ ```markdown
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+ ## Exploit Triage
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+
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+ **Scope:** {diff / entry points reviewed}
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+ **Attacker model:** {remote unauth / authenticated untrusted}
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+
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+ ### Exploitable (reachable + impactful)
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+ - **{class}** {file}:{line}
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+ - **Reach:** {how the attacker gets input to the sink}
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+ - **Attack:** {the concrete request/payload}
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+ - **Impact:** {what it grants}
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+ - **Fix:** {the specific control}
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+
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+ ### Noted, not exploitable (unreachable or low impact)
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+ - {finding} — {why it does not pay}, one line each
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+ ```
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
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+ ---
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+ name: dev/laravel-review
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+ description: >
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+ Laravel/PHP review against ArkaOS conventions — mass assignment, N+1
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+ queries, Blade XSS, business logic leaking into controllers, missing
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+ FormRequests, and strict-types gaps — with the fix each one needs.
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+ TRIGGER: "/dev laravel-review", "review this Laravel", "review the PHP",
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+ "revê este controller", "revê o Eloquent", "isto está seguro em
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+ Laravel?", any diff touching *.php, Blade, or Eloquent models. SKIP:
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+ language-agnostic pre-merge review -> dev/code-review wins; database
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+ schema/migration design -> dev/db-design wins; a security audit of the
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+ whole app -> dev/security-audit wins.
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+ allowed-tools: [Read, Grep, Glob, Bash]
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+ metadata:
15
+ origin: arkaos
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+ ---
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+
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+ # Laravel Review — `/dev laravel-review`
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+
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+ > **Agent:** Gonçalo (Laravel Specialist) | **Framework:** Laravel conventions, OWASP, ArkaOS Services+Repositories standard
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+
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+ Laravel makes the wrong thing easy: `create($request->all())` is one line
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+ and a mass-assignment hole, an Eloquent relation in a Blade loop is one
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+ property access and an N+1, `{!! $x !!}` is shorter than the escaped form
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+ and an XSS. This review reads a PHP diff for the specific ways the
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+ framework's convenience turns into a defect, and holds it to the ArkaOS
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+ Laravel standard — Services and Repositories, FormRequests everywhere,
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+ `declare(strict_types=1)`, not just to PSR-12.
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+
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+ ## Review Priorities
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+
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+ ### Critical — Security
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+ - **Mass assignment**: `create($request->all())` or `$guarded = []` → whitelist `$fillable`, or pass `$request->validated()` from a FormRequest.
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+ - **SQL injection**: `DB::raw()`/`whereRaw()`/string-interpolated queries with user input → parameterised bindings or Eloquent.
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+ - **Blade XSS**: `{!! $userInput !!}` without HTMLPurifier → `{{ }}`, or purify explicitly.
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+ - **Command/path**: `exec`/`shell_exec`/`system` or `Storage` paths from user input → validate and sanitise.
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+ - **Unvalidated uploads**: no MIME/size/extension check on file inputs.
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+ - **Weak crypto / secrets**: MD5 for passwords, hardcoded keys.
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+
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+ ### Critical — Error handling
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+ - **Swallowed exceptions**: `catch (\Throwable $e) {}` with no log and no re-throw.
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+ - **Missing validation**: a controller action with no FormRequest and no inline rules.
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+
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+ ### High — ArkaOS Laravel standard
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+ - **Business logic in controllers** → extract to a Service or Action; the controller orchestrates, it does not decide.
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+ - **Data access outside a Repository** where the ecosystem uses them.
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+ - **No FormRequest** on a write endpoint → `$request->validated()`, never `$request->all()`.
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+ - **Missing `declare(strict_types=1)`** in non-view PHP; untyped public method params/returns.
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+ - **N+1**: an Eloquent relation accessed in a loop or serialisation with no `with()`/`$with`.
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+ - **Missing `$fillable`/`$casts`** on models; **missing Feature test** (`RefreshDatabase`) on the changed behaviour.
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+
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+ ## Process
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+
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+ 1. `git diff -- '*.php' '*.blade.php'` to scope the change.
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+ 2. Run PHPStan/Pint if configured — read their output, do not just report their absence.
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+ 3. Read each changed controller/model/service against the priorities, heaviest first.
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+
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+ ## Proactive Triggers
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+
60
+ Surface these WITHOUT being asked:
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+
62
+ - `$request->all()` reaching a `create`/`update`/`fill` → the mass-assignment hole; name the fields it exposes
63
+ - a relation accessed inside `@foreach` or an API Resource with no eager load → the N+1 and the `with()` that fixes it
64
+ - a controller method over ~15 lines carrying query + business logic → the Service/Action to extract
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+
66
+ ## Output
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+
68
+ ```markdown
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+ ## Laravel Review
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+
71
+ **Scope:** {changed PHP / Blade}
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+ **Verdict:** {APPROVED / CHANGES REQUESTED}
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+
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+ ### Critical
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+ - [ ] {file}:{line} — {the hole} → {the fix}
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+
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+ ### High (ArkaOS standard)
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+ - [ ] {file}:{line} — {the convention broken} → {the fix}
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+
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+ ### Positive
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+ {what follows the standard well}
82
+ ```
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
1
+ ---
2
+ name: dev/ml-adoption-playbook
3
+ description: >
4
+ Decides whether a problem needs ML at all, then adds it to a non-ML
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+ codebase the cheap way — heuristic baseline first, a defined metric and
6
+ mistake budget, data readiness, and a decoupled seam before any model.
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+ TRIGGER: "/dev ml-adoption-playbook", "should we use ML for this", "add
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+ ML to", "is this an ML problem", "machine learning for X", "vale a pena
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+ ML aqui?", "adicionar ML ao projeto", "modelo ou regras?". SKIP: the
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+ model is already chosen and the job is to productionise it ->
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+ dev/mle-workflow wins; a ranking/feed pipeline's plumbing ->
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+ dev/rag-architect or dev/architecture-design wins.
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+ allowed-tools: [Read, Grep, Glob]
14
+ metadata:
15
+ origin: arkaos
16
+ ---
17
+
18
+ # ML Adoption Playbook — `/dev ml-adoption-playbook`
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+
20
+ > **Agent:** Salvador (AI Engineering Specialist) | **Framework:** Heuristic-first, metric-and-mistake-budget, incremental adoption
21
+
22
+ The most expensive way to add machine learning to a product is to reach
23
+ for a model before asking whether rules would do. A regex, a threshold,
24
+ or a lookup table ships in an afternoon, is trivial to debug, and is
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+ often within a few points of what a model would give — and if it is not,
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+ it becomes the baseline the model has to beat. This playbook decides
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+ whether the problem is really an ML problem, and if it is, adds ML to a
28
+ codebase that has none of the scaffolding, one committed step at a time.
29
+
30
+ ## Phase 1 — Framing & feasibility (before any model)
31
+
32
+ - **Heuristic check.** Could a rule, threshold, or lookup solve this
33
+ acceptably? If yes, ship that first — it is the baseline and often the
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+ answer. A model that cannot beat a well-tuned heuristic is not worth
35
+ its operational cost.
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+ - **Metric.** Define how success is measured, tied to the product
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+ decision — before touching data. No metric, no project.
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+ - **Mistake budget.** State what a wrong prediction costs and how many
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+ are tolerable. This sets the bar the model must clear and whether a
40
+ human stays in the loop.
41
+ - **Data reality.** Do labelled examples exist, or a path to them? Is the
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+ outcome observable, and when? A problem with no labels and no path to
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+ them is not yet an ML problem.
44
+
45
+ ## Phase 2 — Data readiness
46
+
47
+ - Locate the data that would feed the model; assess volume, quality, and
48
+ bias before assuming it is usable.
49
+ - Confirm the label is available at the time a prediction is needed, not
50
+ only in hindsight.
51
+
52
+ ## Phase 3 — Architectural seam
53
+
54
+ - Add a decoupled boundary where the prediction plugs in — an interface
55
+ the current heuristic satisfies too, so the model can replace the rule
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+ without rewiring the app.
57
+ - Keep the heuristic as the fallback and the regression baseline.
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+
59
+ ## Phase 4 — Baseline model
60
+
61
+ - Integrate the simplest model that could work behind the seam; compare
62
+ it to the heuristic on the defined metric and mistake budget.
63
+ - Promote only if it clears the bar. If it does not, the heuristic stays
64
+ and the finding is recorded — a negative result is still a result.
65
+
66
+ ## Proactive Triggers
67
+
68
+ Surface these WITHOUT being asked:
69
+
70
+ - a request to "use ML" for something a threshold or lookup handles → propose the heuristic baseline first and the bar the model must beat
71
+ - an ML plan with no defined metric or mistake budget → stop; those come before data
72
+ - no labelled data and no path to it → this is not yet an ML problem; name what would make it one
73
+
74
+ ## Output
75
+
76
+ ```markdown
77
+ ## ML Adoption Assessment
78
+
79
+ **Problem:** {what decision needs to be made}
80
+ **Heuristic baseline:** {the rule that ships today, and how close it gets}
81
+ **Verdict:** {ML justified? / heuristic suffices / not yet an ML problem}
82
+
83
+ ### If ML is justified
84
+ - **Metric & bar:** {measure + threshold the model must beat the baseline by}
85
+ - **Mistake budget:** {cost of a wrong call + human-in-loop or not}
86
+ - **Data readiness:** {labels? volume? label latency?}
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+ - **Seam:** {the interface where the model plugs in, heuristic as fallback}
88
+ ```
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
1
+ ---
2
+ name: dev/mle-workflow
3
+ description: >
4
+ Turns model work into a production ML system — data contracts,
5
+ reproducible training, measurable eval gates, a deployable artifact,
6
+ and monitoring with a rollback path — using only the lanes the system
7
+ needs. TRIGGER: "/dev mle-workflow", "productionise this model", "ML
8
+ pipeline", "ranking/recommender/classifier/forecasting system", "model
9
+ refresh", "pôr o modelo em produção", "notebook para pipeline", "eval
10
+ gate do modelo". SKIP: RAG retrieval/context design -> dev/rag-architect
11
+ wins; the app/API around the model with no ML lifecycle concern ->
12
+ dev/architecture-design wins; prompt-injection/model-abuse threats ->
13
+ dev/ai-security wins.
14
+ allowed-tools: [Read, Grep, Glob, Bash]
15
+ metadata:
16
+ origin: arkaos
17
+ ---
18
+
19
+ # ML Engineering Workflow — `/dev mle-workflow`
20
+
21
+ > **Agent:** Salvador (AI Engineering Specialist) | **Framework:** Data contracts, reproducible training, eval-gated promotion, monitored rollout
22
+
23
+ A model in a notebook is a result; a model in production is a system that
24
+ has to keep being right as the data underneath it moves. The gap between
25
+ the two is not the algorithm — it is the plumbing that makes a prediction
26
+ reproducible, gated on measured quality, deployable as an artifact, and
27
+ observable once real traffic arrives. This workflow builds that plumbing,
28
+ using only the lanes the system in front of you actually needs.
29
+
30
+ ## Scope calibration first
31
+
32
+ Not every model has labels, online serving, a feature store, GPUs, or A/B
33
+ tests. Pick the lanes that fit and make the missing ones explicit
34
+ assumptions. A change that a data contract, a baseline, an eval script,
35
+ and a rollback note would make reviewable does not need a feature store.
36
+
37
+ ## Lanes
38
+
39
+ ### 1. Data contract
40
+ - Define the input schema, types, and allowed ranges; version it. A model is only as trustworthy as the guarantee on what reaches it.
41
+ - Name the label source and its latency (is the outcome known now, or in 30 days?). Undelayed evaluation of a delayed-label problem is a lie.
42
+ - Guard against **leakage**: a feature that encodes the target, or is computed with information unavailable at prediction time.
43
+
44
+ ### 2. Reproducible training
45
+ - Pin the data snapshot, code version, dependency lockfile/environment, seed, and hyperparameters — a training run nobody can reproduce is not evidence.
46
+ - Separate train/validation/test by the axis that matches production (time-based split for anything time-ordered, not random).
47
+ - Emit a single versioned artifact (weights + preprocessing + the input schema it expects).
48
+
49
+ ### 3. Eval gate (promotion criteria)
50
+ - State the metric and the threshold BEFORE training, tied to the decision the model drives — not accuracy for its own sake.
51
+ - Evaluate on **slices**, not just the aggregate: a model that is 95% overall and 40% on the segment that matters is a failure.
52
+ - Offline gate to promote; where traffic exists, an online check (shadow or canary) before full rollout.
53
+
54
+ ### 4. Deployable artifact & serving
55
+ - The serving path must run the **same** preprocessing as training — train/serve skew is the most common silent production failure.
56
+ - Batch vs online: choose by the freshness the decision needs, not by default.
57
+ - Idempotent, versioned, with a health check.
58
+
59
+ ### 5. Monitoring & rollback
60
+ - Watch input drift, prediction distribution, and — when labels arrive — realised quality against the offline estimate.
61
+ - A **rollback path** to the previous artifact that can be triggered without a retrain.
62
+ - Preserve every production failure (bad feature, stale label, artifact mismatch, drift) as a regression case.
63
+
64
+ ## Process
65
+
66
+ 1. Map the change onto the five lanes; mark which apply and which are explicit assumptions.
67
+ 2. Find the existing training/feature/serving/eval paths before adding a parallel ML stack (`git grep`, read them).
68
+ 3. Build the data contract and the eval gate first — they define what "done" means before any model work.
69
+
70
+ ## Proactive Triggers
71
+
72
+ Surface these WITHOUT being asked:
73
+
74
+ - a feature computed from data unavailable at prediction time → the leakage, and the realistic offline score once it is removed
75
+ - a random train/test split on time-ordered data → the optimistic metric it produces and the time-based split that fixes it
76
+ - preprocessing written twice (once in training, once in serving) → the train/serve skew waiting to happen; share the code path
77
+
78
+ ## Output
79
+
80
+ ```markdown
81
+ ## ML Engineering Plan
82
+
83
+ **System:** {what the model decides} · **Lanes in scope:** {of the five}
84
+ **Explicit assumptions:** {labels / serving / traffic / monitoring owner}
85
+
86
+ ### Data contract
87
+ {schema, label source + latency, leakage checks}
88
+
89
+ ### Training & eval gate
90
+ {reproducibility pins, split axis, metric + threshold + slices}
91
+
92
+ ### Serving & monitoring
93
+ {batch/online, skew guard, drift signals, rollback trigger}
94
+
95
+ ### Risks
96
+ - {the failure mode} → {the guard}
97
+ ```
@@ -12,9 +12,7 @@ description: >
12
12
  dev/silent-failure-hunter wins.
13
13
  allowed-tools: [Read, Grep, Glob, Bash]
14
14
  metadata:
15
- origin: ecc-derived
16
- source: https://github.com/affaan-m/ecc
17
- license: MIT
15
+ origin: arkaos
18
16
  ---
19
17
 
20
18
  # PR Test Analyzer — `/dev pr-test-analyzer`
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
1
+ ---
2
+ name: dev/python-review
3
+ description: >
4
+ Python review against ArkaOS conventions — missing type hints, mutable
5
+ default arguments, bare excepts, unvalidated boundaries, injection, and
6
+ Pydantic/FastAPI mistakes — with the fix each needs. TRIGGER: "/dev
7
+ python-review", "review this Python", "review the FastAPI", "revê o
8
+ Python", "revê este endpoint", "isto está pythonico?", any diff touching
9
+ *.py. SKIP: language-agnostic pre-merge review -> dev/code-review wins;
10
+ pytest coverage of the change -> dev/pr-test-analyzer wins; swallowed-error
11
+ hunt across the codebase -> dev/silent-failure-hunter wins.
12
+ allowed-tools: [Read, Grep, Glob, Bash]
13
+ metadata:
14
+ origin: arkaos
15
+ ---
16
+
17
+ # Python Review — `/dev python-review`
18
+
19
+ > **Agent:** Diogo (Python Backend Specialist) | **Framework:** Type hints, Pydantic validation, PEP 8, ArkaOS core conventions
20
+
21
+ Python trusts the author, and that trust is where the bugs live: a
22
+ mutable default argument shared across every call, a bare `except` that
23
+ buries the traceback, a function with no type hints that the checker
24
+ cannot help. This review reads a Python diff against the ArkaOS core
25
+ standard — type hints on every signature, Pydantic at the boundary,
26
+ functions under thirty lines — and for the runtime traps the interpreter
27
+ will happily let ship.
28
+
29
+ ## Review Priorities
30
+
31
+ ### Critical — Correctness traps
32
+ - **Mutable default argument**: `def f(x=[])` / `={}` → default to `None`, build inside.
33
+ - **Bare `except:` / `except Exception: pass`** → catch the specific type, log, re-raise or handle.
34
+ - **Late-binding closure in a loop** capturing the loop variable → bind explicitly.
35
+
36
+ ### Critical — Boundary & security
37
+ - **Unvalidated input** used as a trusted shape → a Pydantic model at the boundary, not a raw dict.
38
+ - **Injection**: f-string/`%`-built SQL or `subprocess`/`os.system` with user input → parameterise / `shlex`, never interpolate.
39
+ - **`eval`/`exec`/`pickle`** on untrusted data; hardcoded secrets.
40
+
41
+ ### High — ArkaOS core standard
42
+ - **Missing type hints** on a public signature → hint params and return.
43
+ - **A function over 30 lines** or nesting past 3 → decompose (`.claude/rules/python-core.md`).
44
+ - **Pydantic misuse**: validation logic in a route instead of a `field_validator`; a model that admits an illegal state.
45
+ - **Dataclass over Pydantic** where validation is needed; a broad `dict`/`Any` where a model belongs.
46
+
47
+ ### High — Idiom
48
+ - A manual index loop where a comprehension/`enumerate` reads clearer; a `try` used for flow control; string concatenation in a hot loop.
49
+
50
+ ## Process
51
+
52
+ 1. `git diff -- '*.py'` to scope the change.
53
+ 2. Run `ruff`/`mypy`/`pytest` if configured — read the output, do not just note their absence.
54
+ 3. Read each changed function against the priorities, correctness traps first.
55
+
56
+ ## Proactive Triggers
57
+
58
+ Surface these WITHOUT being asked:
59
+
60
+ - a mutable default argument in the diff → the shared-state bug across calls
61
+ - a `dict` passed through several layers as if typed → the Pydantic model that should guard the boundary
62
+ - a function that grew past 30 lines in the diff → the seam to split it on
63
+
64
+ ## Output
65
+
66
+ ```markdown
67
+ ## Python Review
68
+
69
+ **Scope:** {changed Python}
70
+ **Verdict:** {APPROVED / CHANGES REQUESTED}
71
+
72
+ ### Critical
73
+ - [ ] {file}:{line} — {the trap} → {the fix}
74
+
75
+ ### High (ArkaOS standard)
76
+ - [ ] {file}:{line} — {the convention broken} → {the fix}
77
+
78
+ ### Positive
79
+ {what is idiomatic and well-typed}
80
+ ```
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
1
+ ---
2
+ name: dev/safety-review
3
+ description: >
4
+ Audits a change or an automation for destructive, irreversible
5
+ operations — bulk deletes, DROP/TRUNCATE, force pushes, mass emails,
6
+ raw disk or filesystem writes — and checks each has a guard: a scope
7
+ limit, a dry-run, a confirmation, a backup, a rollback. TRIGGER: "/dev
8
+ safety-review", "is this safe to run", "destructive operation", "will
9
+ this delete/overwrite", "review this migration/script/cron", "isto
10
+ apaga alguma coisa?", "revê este script destrutivo", "posso correr isto
11
+ em produção?"; run before shipping a migration, a bulk job, a cron, or
12
+ an autonomous automation. SKIP: exploitable-vulnerability review ->
13
+ dev/exploit-triage wins; general code review -> dev/code-review wins;
14
+ the deploy/rollout mechanics themselves -> dev/deploy wins.
15
+ allowed-tools: [Read, Grep, Glob]
16
+ metadata:
17
+ origin: arkaos
18
+ ---
19
+
20
+ # Safety Review — `/dev safety-review`
21
+
22
+ > **Agent:** Bruno (Security Engineer) | **Framework:** Blast-radius analysis, reversibility, guard-before-execute
23
+
24
+ The dangerous change is rarely the one that fails — it is the one that
25
+ succeeds at the wrong scope. A migration that runs, a cleanup cron that
26
+ fires, a bulk update that commits: each does exactly what it was told, to
27
+ more rows or files or people than the author pictured. This pass finds
28
+ the destructive and irreversible operations in a change or an automation
29
+ and checks that every one is fenced — scoped, reversible, dry-runnable,
30
+ or gated behind a confirmation — before it can run unattended.
31
+
32
+ ## What to flag
33
+
34
+ | Operation | The guard it needs |
35
+ |-----------|--------------------|
36
+ | **Bulk delete / update** (`DELETE`/`UPDATE` without a tight `WHERE`, `deleteMany`, `rm -rf`) | An explicit scope, a row-count check, and a backup or soft-delete |
37
+ | **Schema destruction** (`DROP`, `TRUNCATE`, a down-migration that loses data) | Reversibility or a snapshot; never irreversible without sign-off |
38
+ | **Force / history rewrite** (`git push --force`, `reset --hard`, `filter-branch`) | Branch scoping; never on a shared branch |
39
+ | **Mass outbound** (bulk email/notification/webhook) | A dry-run count, a rate limit, a test-recipient path |
40
+ | **Raw disk / filesystem** (`dd`, recursive writes, `chmod -R`) | Path scoping and a confirmation |
41
+ | **Unbounded loop / job** over production data | A limit, idempotency, and a resumable/rollback path |
42
+
43
+ ## Process
44
+
45
+ 1. Grep the change/automation for the destructive verbs — `DELETE`, `DROP`, `TRUNCATE`, `deleteMany`, `rm`, `--force`, `reset --hard`, bulk-send calls.
46
+ 2. For each, determine the **blast radius**: what is the maximum it can affect if a parameter is wrong or empty (an empty `WHERE` deletes the table; a null filter matches everything)?
47
+ 3. Check the guard is present and correct: scope, dry-run, confirmation, backup, rollback. A destructive op with no guard, or a guard that fails open, is a finding.
48
+ 4. Rank by reversibility — an irreversible op with no backup is critical; a scoped, reversible one is clean.
49
+
50
+ ## Proactive Triggers
51
+
52
+ Surface these WITHOUT being asked:
53
+
54
+ - a `DELETE`/`UPDATE` whose `WHERE` could evaluate to empty or all-rows → the full-table blast radius and the scope/guard it needs
55
+ - a down-migration or `DROP`/`TRUNCATE` with no snapshot → the irreversible data loss
56
+ - an automation that runs unattended (cron, agent, CI job) touching production data with no dry-run or rollback → the guard to add before it ships
57
+
58
+ ## Output
59
+
60
+ ```markdown
61
+ ## Safety Review
62
+
63
+ **Scope:** {change / automation reviewed}
64
+ **Verdict:** {SAFE TO RUN / GUARDS REQUIRED}
65
+
66
+ ### Destructive operations
67
+ - **{operation}** {file}:{line}
68
+ - **Blast radius:** {worst case if a parameter is wrong/empty}
69
+ - **Reversible?** {yes + how / no}
70
+ - **Guard present?** {scope/dry-run/confirmation/backup — or missing}
71
+ - **Fix:** {the guard to add before this runs}
72
+
73
+ ### Safe
74
+ {operations already correctly fenced}
75
+ ```
@@ -13,9 +13,7 @@ description: >
13
13
  dev/pr-test-analyzer wins.
14
14
  allowed-tools: [Read, Grep, Glob]
15
15
  metadata:
16
- origin: ecc-derived
17
- source: https://github.com/affaan-m/ecc
18
- license: MIT
16
+ origin: arkaos
19
17
  ---
20
18
 
21
19
  # Silent Failure Hunter — `/dev silent-failure-hunter`
@@ -12,9 +12,7 @@ description: >
12
12
  schema of a new feature -> dev/db-design or dev/ddd-model wins.
13
13
  allowed-tools: [Read, Grep, Glob]
14
14
  metadata:
15
- origin: ecc-derived
16
- source: https://github.com/affaan-m/ecc
17
- license: MIT
15
+ origin: arkaos
18
16
  ---
19
17
 
20
18
  # Type Design Analyzer — `/dev type-design-analyzer`
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
1
+ ---
2
+ name: dev/typescript-review
3
+ description: >
4
+ TypeScript/Node review for the holes the compiler waves through — `any`
5
+ and unsafe casts, unhandled promise rejections, missing input validation
6
+ at the boundary, and injection in queries or shell calls — with the fix
7
+ each needs. TRIGGER: "/dev typescript-review", "review this TS", "review
8
+ the Node", "revê o TypeScript", "revê este endpoint Node", "isto está
9
+ type-safe?", any diff touching *.ts/*.tsx server or API code. SKIP:
10
+ language-agnostic pre-merge review -> dev/code-review wins; React/Vue
11
+ component rendering bugs -> dev/vue-review or dev/click-path-audit wins;
12
+ type-design depth -> dev/type-design-analyzer wins.
13
+ allowed-tools: [Read, Grep, Glob, Bash]
14
+ metadata:
15
+ origin: arkaos
16
+ ---
17
+
18
+ # TypeScript Review — `/dev typescript-review`
19
+
20
+ > **Agent:** Vera (Node.js / TypeScript Backend Specialist) | **Framework:** Type safety, async correctness, boundary validation
21
+
22
+ TypeScript's guarantees stop at the edges of the program, and that is
23
+ where the bugs get in: an `any` erases every check downstream, a JSON
24
+ body typed as its interface is a lie until something validates it, a
25
+ floating promise swallows the error the caller needed. This review reads
26
+ a TS diff for the places the type system was told to look away, and for
27
+ the async and boundary mistakes no compiler flags.
28
+
29
+ ## Review Priorities
30
+
31
+ ### Critical — Type safety holes
32
+ - **`any` / `as` casts** on external data → validate into a real type (Zod, a type guard); an `any` is an unchecked check for everything it touches.
33
+ - **Non-null `!`** on a value that can be null at runtime → handle the null.
34
+ - **`@ts-ignore` / `@ts-expect-error`** hiding a real type error → fix the type, do not silence it.
35
+
36
+ ### Critical — Async correctness
37
+ - **Floating promise**: an `async` call with no `await` and no `.catch` → the rejection is lost.
38
+ - **`await` in a loop** where `Promise.all` is correct → serial latency; and the reverse, unbounded `Promise.all` over a large list.
39
+ - **Missing try/catch** around an `await` on I/O, or a catch that swallows.
40
+
41
+ ### Critical — Boundary
42
+ - **Unvalidated input**: a request body/query/param used as its TS type with no runtime schema → validate at the boundary.
43
+ - **Injection**: string-built SQL or `exec`/`child_process` with user input → parameterise / sanitise.
44
+ - **Secrets**: hardcoded keys; secrets logged.
45
+
46
+ ### High — Standards
47
+ - Public function signatures untyped or returning inferred `any`.
48
+ - `Promise<void>` swallowing a result the caller needs; error thrown as a bare string.
49
+ - Mutating a shared object where an immutable update belongs.
50
+
51
+ ## Process
52
+
53
+ 1. `git diff -- '*.ts' '*.tsx'` to scope the change.
54
+ 2. Run `tsc --noEmit` and the linter if configured — read the output.
55
+ 3. Read each changed handler/service for the priorities, type holes first.
56
+
57
+ ## Proactive Triggers
58
+
59
+ Surface these WITHOUT being asked:
60
+
61
+ - a request body used as `req.body as SomeType` with no validation → the boundary hole and the schema that closes it
62
+ - an `async` function called with no `await`/`.catch` → the floating rejection
63
+ - an `any` introduced in the diff → what it stops the compiler from checking downstream
64
+
65
+ ## Output
66
+
67
+ ```markdown
68
+ ## TypeScript Review
69
+
70
+ **Scope:** {changed TS}
71
+ **Verdict:** {APPROVED / CHANGES REQUESTED}
72
+
73
+ ### Critical
74
+ - [ ] {file}:{line} — {the hole} → {the fix}
75
+
76
+ ### High
77
+ - [ ] {file}:{line} — {the issue} → {the fix}
78
+
79
+ ### Positive
80
+ {what is genuinely type-safe and correct}
81
+ ```
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
1
+ ---
2
+ name: dev/vue-review
3
+ description: >
4
+ Vue 3 / Nuxt review for the framework's own traps — lost reactivity,
5
+ SSR hydration mismatches, missing keys, uncleaned watchers, and props
6
+ mutated in place — with the fix each needs. Composition API and
7
+ TypeScript assumed. TRIGGER: "/dev vue-review", "review this Vue",
8
+ "review the Nuxt", "revê este componente Vue", "revê o composable",
9
+ "porque é que a reactividade não funciona?", any diff touching
10
+ *.vue/composables. SKIP: language-agnostic review -> dev/code-review
11
+ wins; a handler-ordering/state-cancellation bug -> dev/click-path-audit
12
+ wins; visual/brand review -> brand/design-review wins.
13
+ allowed-tools: [Read, Grep, Glob]
14
+ metadata:
15
+ origin: arkaos
16
+ ---
17
+
18
+ # Vue Review — `/dev vue-review`
19
+
20
+ > **Agent:** Diana (Senior Frontend Developer) | **Framework:** Vue 3 Composition API, Nuxt SSR, reactivity correctness
21
+
22
+ Most Vue bugs are not wrong logic — they are the reactivity system doing
23
+ exactly what you told it, which was not what you meant. Destructure a
24
+ `reactive` object and the binding is gone; read a value during SSR that
25
+ only exists on the client and hydration tears; forget a `:key` and the
26
+ list reuses the wrong DOM. This review reads a Vue/Nuxt diff for those
27
+ framework-specific traps, on the assumption of Composition API and
28
+ TypeScript throughout.
29
+
30
+ ## Review Priorities
31
+
32
+ ### Critical — Reactivity
33
+ - **Destructured reactivity**: `const { x } = reactive(...)` or a destructured prop → `toRefs`/`toRef`, or access through the object; the destructured copy is inert.
34
+ - **Ref unwrapped wrong**: `.value` missing in script, or added in template; a `ref` stored in a plain object it is read from without unwrapping.
35
+ - **Prop mutated in place** → emit an event or use a local copy; props are one-way.
36
+
37
+ ### Critical — SSR / Nuxt hydration
38
+ - **Client-only value read during SSR** (`window`, `localStorage`, `Date.now()` in setup) → guard with `import.meta.client`/`onMounted`; the mismatch tears hydration.
39
+ - **Non-deterministic render** between server and client (random, unstable order).
40
+ - **Data fetched without `useAsyncData`/`useFetch`** where SSR needs it → double fetch or hydration gap.
41
+
42
+ ### High — Correctness
43
+ - **Missing `:key`** on a `v-for`, or `:key="index"` on a reorderable list → wrong-DOM reuse.
44
+ - **Watcher/interval/listener not cleaned up** in `onUnmounted` → leak.
45
+ - **`v-if` + `v-for` on the same element**; heavy work in a computed with side effects.
46
+
47
+ ### High — Standards
48
+ - Options API in new code where the project is Composition API; `any`-typed props; a composable that is not prefixed `use` or leaks state across instances.
49
+
50
+ ## Process
51
+
52
+ 1. `git diff -- '*.vue'` plus changed composables to scope the change.
53
+ 2. Read each component's `setup`/template against the priorities, reactivity first.
54
+ 3. Trace any SSR-sensitive value from setup to template.
55
+
56
+ ## Proactive Triggers
57
+
58
+ Surface these WITHOUT being asked:
59
+
60
+ - a destructured `reactive`/props in the diff → the binding that is now dead and the `toRefs` fix
61
+ - a `window`/`localStorage`/`Date` read in `setup` of an SSR page → the hydration mismatch it causes
62
+ - a `v-for` with no `:key` or a keyed index on a list that reorders → the DOM-reuse bug
63
+
64
+ ## Output
65
+
66
+ ```markdown
67
+ ## Vue Review
68
+
69
+ **Scope:** {changed components / composables}
70
+ **Verdict:** {APPROVED / CHANGES REQUESTED}
71
+
72
+ ### Critical
73
+ - [ ] {file}:{line} — {the reactivity/SSR trap} → {the fix}
74
+
75
+ ### High
76
+ - [ ] {file}:{line} — {the issue} → {the fix}
77
+
78
+ ### Positive
79
+ {what handles reactivity and SSR correctly}
80
+ ```
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "_meta": {
3
3
  "generator": "scripts/marketplace_gen.py",
4
- "version": "4.18.0",
4
+ "version": "4.20.0",
5
5
  "marketplace": "arkaos"
6
6
  },
7
7
  "structural": {
@@ -580,9 +580,7 @@
580
580
  ],
581
581
  "collision": false,
582
582
  "provenance": {
583
- "origin": "ecc-derived",
584
- "source": "https://github.com/affaan-m/ecc",
585
- "license": "MIT"
583
+ "origin": "arkaos"
586
584
  }
587
585
  },
588
586
  "code-review": {
@@ -1097,6 +1095,19 @@
1097
1095
  "origin": "arkaos"
1098
1096
  }
1099
1097
  },
1098
+ "exploit-triage": {
1099
+ "depts": [
1100
+ "dev"
1101
+ ],
1102
+ "curated": false,
1103
+ "plugins": [
1104
+ "arkaos-dev@arkaos"
1105
+ ],
1106
+ "collision": false,
1107
+ "provenance": {
1108
+ "origin": "arkaos"
1109
+ }
1110
+ },
1100
1111
  "extract-data": {
1101
1112
  "depts": [
1102
1113
  "strategy"
@@ -1438,6 +1449,19 @@
1438
1449
  "origin": "arkaos"
1439
1450
  }
1440
1451
  },
1452
+ "laravel-review": {
1453
+ "depts": [
1454
+ "dev"
1455
+ ],
1456
+ "curated": false,
1457
+ "plugins": [
1458
+ "arkaos-dev@arkaos"
1459
+ ],
1460
+ "collision": false,
1461
+ "provenance": {
1462
+ "origin": "arkaos"
1463
+ }
1464
+ },
1441
1465
  "launch-execute": {
1442
1466
  "depts": [
1443
1467
  "saas"
@@ -1622,6 +1646,32 @@
1622
1646
  "origin": "arkaos"
1623
1647
  }
1624
1648
  },
1649
+ "ml-adoption-playbook": {
1650
+ "depts": [
1651
+ "dev"
1652
+ ],
1653
+ "curated": false,
1654
+ "plugins": [
1655
+ "arkaos-dev@arkaos"
1656
+ ],
1657
+ "collision": false,
1658
+ "provenance": {
1659
+ "origin": "arkaos"
1660
+ }
1661
+ },
1662
+ "mle-workflow": {
1663
+ "depts": [
1664
+ "dev"
1665
+ ],
1666
+ "curated": false,
1667
+ "plugins": [
1668
+ "arkaos-dev@arkaos"
1669
+ ],
1670
+ "collision": false,
1671
+ "provenance": {
1672
+ "origin": "arkaos"
1673
+ }
1674
+ },
1625
1675
  "moat-analysis": {
1626
1676
  "depts": [
1627
1677
  "strategy"
@@ -2127,9 +2177,7 @@
2127
2177
  ],
2128
2178
  "collision": false,
2129
2179
  "provenance": {
2130
- "origin": "ecc-derived",
2131
- "source": "https://github.com/affaan-m/ecc",
2132
- "license": "MIT"
2180
+ "origin": "arkaos"
2133
2181
  }
2134
2182
  },
2135
2183
  "premortem": {
@@ -2238,6 +2286,19 @@
2238
2286
  "origin": "arkaos"
2239
2287
  }
2240
2288
  },
2289
+ "python-review": {
2290
+ "depts": [
2291
+ "dev"
2292
+ ],
2293
+ "curated": false,
2294
+ "plugins": [
2295
+ "arkaos-dev@arkaos"
2296
+ ],
2297
+ "collision": false,
2298
+ "provenance": {
2299
+ "origin": "arkaos"
2300
+ }
2301
+ },
2241
2302
  "quality-management": {
2242
2303
  "depts": [
2243
2304
  "ops"
@@ -2453,6 +2514,19 @@
2453
2514
  "origin": "arkaos"
2454
2515
  }
2455
2516
  },
2517
+ "safety-review": {
2518
+ "depts": [
2519
+ "dev"
2520
+ ],
2521
+ "curated": false,
2522
+ "plugins": [
2523
+ "arkaos-dev@arkaos"
2524
+ ],
2525
+ "collision": false,
2526
+ "provenance": {
2527
+ "origin": "arkaos"
2528
+ }
2529
+ },
2456
2530
  "scaffold": {
2457
2531
  "depts": [
2458
2532
  "dev"
@@ -2587,9 +2661,7 @@
2587
2661
  ],
2588
2662
  "collision": false,
2589
2663
  "provenance": {
2590
- "origin": "ecc-derived",
2591
- "source": "https://github.com/affaan-m/ecc",
2592
- "license": "MIT"
2664
+ "origin": "arkaos"
2593
2665
  }
2594
2666
  },
2595
2667
  "skill-audit": {
@@ -2891,9 +2963,20 @@
2891
2963
  ],
2892
2964
  "collision": false,
2893
2965
  "provenance": {
2894
- "origin": "ecc-derived",
2895
- "source": "https://github.com/affaan-m/ecc",
2896
- "license": "MIT"
2966
+ "origin": "arkaos"
2967
+ }
2968
+ },
2969
+ "typescript-review": {
2970
+ "depts": [
2971
+ "dev"
2972
+ ],
2973
+ "curated": false,
2974
+ "plugins": [
2975
+ "arkaos-dev@arkaos"
2976
+ ],
2977
+ "collision": false,
2978
+ "provenance": {
2979
+ "origin": "arkaos"
2897
2980
  }
2898
2981
  },
2899
2982
  "unit-economics": {
@@ -3024,6 +3107,19 @@
3024
3107
  "origin": "arkaos"
3025
3108
  }
3026
3109
  },
3110
+ "vue-review": {
3111
+ "depts": [
3112
+ "dev"
3113
+ ],
3114
+ "curated": false,
3115
+ "plugins": [
3116
+ "arkaos-dev@arkaos"
3117
+ ],
3118
+ "collision": false,
3119
+ "provenance": {
3120
+ "origin": "arkaos"
3121
+ }
3122
+ },
3027
3123
  "webinar-funnel": {
3028
3124
  "depts": [
3029
3125
  "landing"
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "arkaos",
3
- "version": "4.18.0",
3
+ "version": "4.20.0",
4
4
  "description": "The Operating System for AI Agent Teams",
5
5
  "type": "module",
6
6
  "bin": {
package/pyproject.toml CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  [project]
2
2
  name = "arkaos-core"
3
- version = "4.18.0"
3
+ version = "4.20.0"
4
4
  description = "Core engine for ArkaOS — The Operating System for AI Agent Teams"
5
5
  readme = "README.md"
6
6
  license = {text = "MIT"}