appium-mac2-driver 4.5.1 → 4.6.1

package/node_modules/proxy-addr/package.json

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+{
+  "name": "proxy-addr",
+  "description": "Determine address of proxied request",
+  "version": "2.0.8",
+  "author": "Douglas Christopher Wilson <doug@somethingdoug.com>",
+  "license": "MIT",
+  "keywords": [
+    "ip",
+    "proxy",
+    "x-forwarded-for"
+  ],
+  "repository": "jshttp/proxy-addr",
+  "funding": {
+    "type": "opencollective",
+    "url": "https://opencollective.com/express"
+  },
+  "dependencies": {
+    "forwarded": "0.2.0",
+    "ipaddr.js": "1.9.1"
+  },
+  "devDependencies": {
+    "benchmark": "2.1.4",
+    "beautify-benchmark": "0.2.4",
+    "deep-equal": "1.1.2",
+    "eslint": "7.26.0",
+    "eslint-config-standard": "14.1.1",
+    "eslint-plugin-import": "2.32.0",
+    "eslint-plugin-markdown": "2.2.1",
+    "eslint-plugin-node": "11.1.0",
+    "eslint-plugin-promise": "4.3.1",
+    "eslint-plugin-standard": "4.1.0",
+    "mocha": "8.4.0",
+    "nyc": "15.1.0"
+  },
+  "files": [
+    "LICENSE",
+    "HISTORY.md",
+    "README.md",
+    "index.js"
+  ],
+  "engines": {
+    "node": ">= 0.10"
+  },
+  "scripts": {
+    "bench": "node benchmark/index.js",
+    "lint": "eslint .",
+    "test": "mocha --reporter spec --bail --check-leaks test/",
+    "test-ci": "nyc --reporter=lcov --reporter=text npm test",
+    "test-cov": "nyc --reporter=html --reporter=text npm test"
+  }
+}

package/node_modules/qs/.editorconfig

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+root = true
+
+[*]
+indent_style = space
+indent_size = 4
+end_of_line = lf
+charset = utf-8
+trim_trailing_whitespace = true
+insert_final_newline = true
+max_line_length = 180
+quote_type = single
+
+[test/*]
+max_line_length = off
+
+[LICENSE.md]
+indent_size = off
+
+[*.md]
+max_line_length = off
+
+[*.json]
+max_line_length = off
+
+[Makefile]
+max_line_length = off
+
+[CHANGELOG.md]
+indent_style = space
+indent_size = 2
+
+[LICENSE]
+indent_size = 2
+max_line_length = off
+
+[coverage/**/*]
+indent_size = off
+indent_style = off
+indent = off
+max_line_length = off
+
+[{.nycrc,*.mjs}]
+indent_style = tab
+
+[tea.yaml]
+indent_size = 2

package/node_modules/qs/.github/FUNDING.yml

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+# These are supported funding model platforms
+
+github: [ljharb]
+patreon: # Replace with a single Patreon username
+open_collective: # Replace with a single Open Collective username
+ko_fi: # Replace with a single Ko-fi username
+tidelift: npm/qs
+community_bridge: # Replace with a single Community Bridge project-name e.g., cloud-foundry
+liberapay: # Replace with a single Liberapay username
+issuehunt: # Replace with a single IssueHunt username
+otechie: # Replace with a single Otechie username
+custom: # Replace with a single custom sponsorship URL

package/node_modules/qs/.github/SECURITY.md

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+# Security
+
+Please file a private vulnerability report via GitHub, email [@ljharb](https://github.com/ljharb), or see https://tidelift.com/security if you have a potential security vulnerability to report.
+
+## Incident Response Plan
+
+Please see our [Incident Response Plan](https://github.com/ljharb/.github/blob/main/INCIDENT_RESPONSE_PLAN.md).
+
+## Threat Model
+
+Please see [THREAT_MODEL.md](./THREAT_MODEL.md).

package/node_modules/qs/.github/THREAT_MODEL.md

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+## Threat Model for qs (querystring parsing library)
+
+### 1. Library Overview
+
+- **Library Name:** qs
+- **Brief Description:** A JavaScript library for parsing and stringifying URL query strings, supporting nested objects and arrays. It is widely used in Node.js and web applications for processing query parameters[2][6][8].
+- **Key Public APIs/Functions:** `qs.parse()`, `qs.stringify()`
+
+### 2. Define Scope
+
+This threat model focuses on the core parsing and stringifying functionality, specifically the handling of nested objects and arrays, option validation, and cycle management in stringification.
+
+### 3. Conceptual System Diagram
+
+```
+Caller Application → qs.parse(input, options) → Parsing Engine → Output Object
+                           │
+                           └→ Options Handling
+
+Caller Application → qs.stringify(obj, options) → Stringifying Engine → Output String
+                           │
+                           └→ Options Handling
+                           └→ Cycle Tracking
+```
+
+**Trust Boundaries:**
+- **Input string (parse):** May come from untrusted sources (e.g., user input, network requests). `qs` defines its own key grammar, where bracket groups denote nesting, so the parameter names it derives are deliberately not the flat names produced by `URLSearchParams`, `node:querystring`, or a WHATWG-conformant parser. The parsed object, not the raw string, is the only thing a caller should make trust decisions about; see "Interpretation conflict" below.
+- **Input object (stringify):** The calling application's own data, not a direct untrusted channel. May contain cycles (handled by the cycle detector). Deeply-nested non-cyclic input surfaces as a catchable synchronous `RangeError` (stack overflow), not unbounded resource consumption; callers that serialize externally-influenced objects should bound their depth/size beforehand.
+- **Options:** Provided by the caller
+- **Cycle Tracking:** Used only during stringification to detect and handle circular references
+
+### 4. Identify Assets
+
+- **Integrity of parsed output:** Prevent malicious manipulation of the output object structure, especially ensuring builtins/globals are not modified as a result of parse[3][4][8].
+- **Confidentiality of processed data:** Avoid leaking sensitive information through errors or output.
+- **Availability/performance for host application:** Prevent crashes or resource exhaustion in the consuming application.
+- **Security of host application:** Prevent the library from being a vector for attacks (e.g., prototype pollution, DoS).
+- **Reputation of library:** Maintain trust by avoiding supply chain attacks and vulnerabilities[1].
+
+### 5. Identify Threats
+
+| Component / API / Interaction         | S  | T  | R  | I  | D  | E  |
+|---------------------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|
+| Public API Call (`parse`)             | –  | ✓  | –  | ✓  | ✓  | ✓  |
+| Public API Call (`stringify`)         | –  | ✓  | –  | ✓  | ✓  | –  |
+| Options Handling                      | ✓  | ✓  | –  | ✓  | –  | ✓  |
+| Dependency Interaction                | –  | –  | –  | –  | ✓  | –  |
+
+**Key Threats:**
+- **Tampering:** Malicious input can, if not prevented, alter parsed output (e.g., prototype pollution via `__proto__`, modification of builtins/globals)[3][4][8].
+- **Information Disclosure:** Error messages may expose internal details or sensitive data.
+- **Denial of Service:** Large or malformed input can exhaust memory or CPU.
+- **Elevation of Privilege:** Prototype pollution can lead to unintended privilege escalation in the host application[3][4][8].
+- **Interpretation conflict (out of scope):** An application that parses the same query string with two different parsers, and makes a trust decision on one result while consuming the other, can be attacked by any input the two parsers read differently. `qs`'s bracket grammar guarantees such inputs exist, so this is a property of the deployment, not a defect `qs` can remove. It is the calling application's responsibility to parse once and validate the parsed object.
+
+### 6. Mitigation/Countermeasures
+
+| Threat Identified                                 | Proposed Mitigation |
+|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------|
+| Tampering (malicious input, prototype pollution)  | Strict input validation; keep `allowPrototypes: false` by default; use `plainObjects` for output; ensure builtins/globals are never modified by parse[4][8]. |
+| Information Disclosure (error messages)           | Generic error messages without stack traces or internal paths. |
+| Denial of Service (memory/CPU exhaustion)         | `arrayLimit`, `parameterLimit`, and depth limiting apply with safe defaults. Note that `arrayLimit` is a representation threshold (array vs. object), and `parameterLimit` bounds only the number of `&`-delimited parameters - neither caps the elements produced by `comma: true` splitting. For hard caps on the number of parameters and on each array's length, opt in to `throwOnLimitExceeded: true` (default `false`), which rejects a query string with more than `parameterLimit` parameters, or one that would produce any array longer than `arrayLimit`. `arrayLimit` applies to each array separately, including each parameter's comma-split value, so the total number of values can still reach `parameterLimit` times `arrayLimit`; always bound input size at the transport layer as well[7]. On the `stringify` side, the input is the caller's own object rather than an untrusted string, so unbounded nesting manifests as a catchable `RangeError` (stack overflow) rather than exhaustion; callers serializing externally-influenced objects should bound depth/size beforehand, and may opt into `stringify`'s `depth` option (default `Infinity`) for a deterministic, catchable error. |
+| Elevation of Privilege (prototype pollution)      | Keep `allowPrototypes: false`; validate options against allowlist; use `plainObjects` to avoid prototype pollution[4][8]. |
+| Interpretation conflict (validate-then-use across two parsers) | None available inside `qs`, by construction: `qs` and a flat parser disagree about parameter names for well-formed input, so no hardening can make the two views equal. Parse untrusted input once, with `qs`, and apply deny lists, authorization, and signature checks to the parsed object rather than to raw key text. Text that `qs` cannot place in its grammar is currently dropped, so distinct raw names can share one parsed path ([#619](https://github.com/ljharb/qs/issues/619)). |
+
+### 7. Risk Ranking
+
+- **High:** Denial of Service via array parsing or malformed input (historical vulnerability)
+- **Medium:** Prototype pollution via options or input (if `allowPrototypes` enabled)
+- **Low:** Information disclosure in errors
+
+### 8. Next Steps & Review
+
+1. **Audit option validation logic.**
+2. **Depth limiting:** `parse` enforces a `depth` bound by default (with `strictDepth` to throw); `stringify` offers an opt-in `depth` bound (default `Infinity`, since its input is caller-produced) for defense-in-depth.
+3. **Implement fuzz testing for parser and stringifier edge cases.**
+4. **Regularly review dependencies for vulnerabilities.**
+5. **Keep documentation and threat model up to date.**
+6. **Ensure builtins/globals are never modified as a result of parse.**
+7. **Support round-trip consistency between parse and stringify as a non-security goal, with the right options[5][9].**

package/node_modules/qs/.nycrc

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{
+	"all": true,
+	"check-coverage": false,
+	"reporter": ["text-summary", "text", "html", "json"],
+	"lines": 86,
+	"statements": 85.93,
+	"functions": 82.43,
+	"branches": 76.06,
+	"exclude": [
+		"coverage",
+		"dist"
+	]
+}