apex-code 0.0.6 → 0.1.0

package/dist/core/sandbox/child-entry.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"child-entry.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/core/sandbox/child-entry.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AACpD,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAC3C,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AACrC,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AACvD,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAChE,OAAO,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAC5E,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAEpF,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC;AACzB,kBAAkB,CAAC,wBAAwB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;AACrD,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,GAAG,WAAW,CAAC;AACnC,OAAO,CAAC,WAAW,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,EAAC,CAAC,CAA+B,CAAC;AAC/D,uBAAuB,EAAE,CAAC;AAC1B,oFAAoF;AACpF,2FAA2F;AAC3F,oCAAoC,EAAE,CAAC;AACvC,6EAA6E;AAC7E,8EAA8E;AAC9E,2DAA2D;AAC3D,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,2BAA2B,CAAC,CAAC;AAClE,IAAI,gBAAgB;IAAE,iBAAiB,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAAC;AAE1D,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACnC,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,eAAe,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC","sourcesContent":["import { parseCliCommand } from \"../../cli/args.ts\";\nimport { APP_NAME } from \"../../config.ts\";\nimport { main } from \"../../main.ts\";\nimport { setApexEnvironment } from \"../environment.ts\";\nimport { configureHttpDispatcher } from \"../http-dispatcher.ts\";\nimport { installSandboxNetworkRefusalMessages } from \"./network-refusal.ts\";\nimport { applyTerminalSize, TERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE } from \"./terminal-size.ts\";\n\nprocess.title = APP_NAME;\nsetApexEnvironment(\"APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT\", \"true\");\nprocess.env.AI_AGENT = \"apex-code\";\nprocess.emitWarning = (() => {}) as typeof process.emitWarning;\nconfigureHttpDispatcher();\n// Only the sandboxed child installs this, which is what makes attributing a refused\n// request to the sandbox allowlist accurate rather than a guess about whose proxy replied.\ninstallSandboxNetworkRefusalMessages();\n// bwrap --new-session leaves this process without a controlling terminal, so\n// its stdout reports a window size frozen at sandbox creation. The supervisor\n// publishes the real one; adopt it before any UI is built.\nconst terminalSizePath = process.env[TERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE];\nif (terminalSizePath) applyTerminalSize(terminalSizePath);\n\nconst args = process.argv.slice(2);\nawait main(args, { sessionLeaseOwner: \"supervisor\", parsedCommand: parseCliCommand(args) });\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/cli-launch.d.ts

@@ -1,162 +0,0 @@
-import type { ParsedCliCommand } from "../../cli/args.ts";
-import type { HostToolBinary } from "../../utils/tools-manager.ts";
-import type { SandboxLaunch } from "./supervisor.ts";
-/**
- * OS containment is the normal startup path for every parsed command that can
- * construct an agent session. Classification consumes the same typed parse result
- * as execution, so option values and text after `--` cannot impersonate metadata.
- */
-export declare function requiresSandboxedChild(command: ParsedCliCommand): boolean;
-export interface SandboxedCliLaunch extends SandboxLaunch {
-    readonly environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
-    /**
-     * The supervisor's own 0700 state directory, outside every writable root the child
-     * has.
-     */
-    readonly supervisorStateDirectory: string;
-}
-export declare function getSandboxSessionDirectory(workspace: string): string;
-/**
- * Env var naming the file that carries the host's `policy` and `user` permission scopes
- * into the child (PS.3).
- *
- * Deliberately absent from `SAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS`: only the supervisor's own
- * resolution may name it, never the invoking shell and never a project file (ADR 0016).
- */
-export declare const POLICY_SNAPSHOT_PATH_VARIABLE = "APEX_CODE_POLICY_SNAPSHOT_PATH";
-/**
- * The marker asserting that an OS boundary is actually enforcing this process (PS.5).
- *
- * Set only on the supervisor's own launch environment for a child it is about to contain.
- * It is not in the child-environment allowlist, so a value of this name in the invoking
- * shell never survives into a child; the supervisor's own value is the only one that can.
- * `core/sdk.ts` reads it for `sandbox: "required"` and keeps the same two literals -- a
- * marker spelled two ways would be a drift the SDK could not detect at runtime, so
- * `test/sdk-sandbox-contract.test.ts` pins them to each other.
- */
-export declare const SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VARIABLE = "APEX_CODE_SANDBOX_ENFORCED";
-export declare const SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VALUE = "1";
-export interface SupervisorStateDirectory {
-    /** A 0700 directory under the supervisor temp root, outside every child-writable root. */
-    readonly path: string;
-    readonly dispose: () => void;
-}
-/**
- * Allocate the directory the supervisor keeps its own launch state in.
- *
- * Everything the supervisor writes for a launch -- the terminal handoff latch, the
- * published terminal size, the network relay, the git credential helper, the permission
- * snapshot -- used to live in `workspace/.apex-code/sandbox-state`, which is inside the
- * one writable bind the child has. A child that planted a symlink there redirected the
- * *next* launch's supervisor writes onto arbitrary host paths, and could rewrite the
- * scripts the supervisor was about to run. Under the supervisor temp root the child sees
- * these files through the read-only root bind (Linux) or Seatbelt's write denial outside
- * the workspace (macOS), so it can neither replace them nor plant a link where one goes.
- */
-export declare function createSupervisorStateDirectory(): SupervisorStateDirectory;
-/**
- * The managed policy file this host resolves, read before the child's environment exists.
- *
- * `cli-launch`'s child-environment allowlist filters `APEX_CODE_POLICY_PATH` out, so a
- * host that configured a custom managed policy had it silently disappear at the boundary
- * and the child fell back to the system path -- the config-projection defect PS.3 closes.
- * Resolution here mirrors `core/permissions/store.ts`'s own default exactly.
- */
-export declare function resolveSupervisorPolicyPath(environment?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): string;
-/**
- * Capture the host `policy` and `user` permission scopes into the supervisor's private
- * directory and return the file's path.
- *
- * Called before `buildSandboxedCliLaunch` repoints `APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR` at a
- * workspace directory the child can write. Without it the child's `user` scope came from a
- * file the child itself owns, and its `policy` scope from a path the environment allowlist
- * had already removed.
- */
-export declare function writeSupervisorPolicySnapshot(options: {
-    directory: string;
-    /** The *host* agent directory, before the launch repoints it. */
-    agentDir: string;
-    policyPath?: string;
-    environment?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
-}): string;
-/**
- * Read supervisor policy only from global settings; project settings are untrusted here.
- *
- * The built-in provider hosts are added unless explicitly refused, because a deny-all
- * default made a fresh install unable to reach any model while giving the user no way to
- * learn which host to permit. Configured hosts are additive on top, and
- * `allowDefaultHosts: false` restores the strict behaviour for anyone who wants it.
- */
-export declare function resolveSupervisorAllowedHosts(cwd: string, agentDir: string): readonly string[] | undefined;
-/**
- * The host's two user-scope skill roots, each present only when it exists on the
- * host. Kept as two named slots rather than one list because
- * `core/package-manager.ts` discovers them in different modes -- root `.md` files
- * count as skills under `agentSkills` ("pi" mode) and are ignored under
- * `agentsHomeSkills` ("agents" mode), per `docs/skills.md` -- and a flat list of 0-2
- * paths cannot tell the child which root a lone survivor was.
- */
-export interface HostSkillPaths {
-    /** Host `<agentDir>/skills`. */
-    readonly agentSkills?: string;
-    /** Host `<home>/.agents/skills`. */
-    readonly agentsHomeSkills?: string;
-}
-/** A candidate skill root that exists but was excluded, and why. */
-export interface HostSkillPathRefusal {
-    readonly root: keyof HostSkillPaths;
-    readonly path: string;
-    readonly reason: string;
-}
-export interface ResolvedHostSkillPaths {
-    readonly paths: HostSkillPaths;
-    readonly refusals: readonly HostSkillPathRefusal[];
-}
-/**
- * Resolve the host's user-scope skill directories, before the sandbox exists to hide
- * them. Read only from the runtime environment and the host agent directory --
- * never from project files -- matching ADR 0016's rule that supervisor policy is
- * trust-first. Mirrors `core/package-manager.ts`'s own user-scope roots so the two
- * sides agree on where a skill lives. A candidate that resolves (directly or via a
- * symlink) onto the host home or an ancestor of it is refused rather than mounted --
- * see `isHomeOrAncestorOfHome` -- and reported so the caller can surface a startup
- * diagnostic instead of silently mounting or silently skipping it.
- */
-export declare function resolveHostSkillPaths(agentDir: string, homeDir: string): ResolvedHostSkillPaths;
-/**
- * Allocate agent-owned state under the sole writable workspace mount. The child does
- * not inherit a host home or a host session/config directory, preventing the sandbox
- * from presenting a write boundary while its own state quietly escapes it.
- */
-export declare function buildSandboxedCliLaunch(options: {
-    workspace: string;
-    command: string;
-    args: readonly string[];
-    environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
-    allowedHosts?: readonly string[];
-    additionalWritableRoots?: readonly string[];
-    readOnlyPaths?: readonly string[];
-    sessionPath?: string;
-    authPath?: string;
-    /**
-     * A synthesized two-key git config, projected read-only so the child can author a
-     * commit as the user. Absent when the host had no global identity to resolve.
-     */
-    gitConfigPath?: string;
-    toolBinaries?: readonly HostToolBinary[];
-    /**
-     * Host user-scope skill directories, pre-filtered by the caller to those that
-     * exist and pass the host-home escape check (SKILL.4). Mounted read-only at their
-     * original host location -- Seatbelt cannot remap a path, so this must hold for
-     * both backends -- and named to the child via `APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_*` so its
-     * discovery can find them under the sandbox's own repointed `HOME`/agent dir.
-     */
-    skillPaths?: HostSkillPaths;
-    /** The supervisor-owned credential write channel, when one was opened. */
-    credentialChannel?: SandboxLaunch["credentialChannel"];
-    /** The supervisor's private 0700 state directory for this launch. */
-    supervisorStateDirectory?: string;
-    /** The captured host permission scopes, named to the child read-only. */
-    policySnapshotPath?: string;
-}): SandboxedCliLaunch;
-//# sourceMappingURL=cli-launch.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/sandbox/cli-launch.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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Classification consumes the same typed parse result\n * as execution, so option values and text after `--` cannot impersonate metadata.\n */\nexport function requiresSandboxedChild(command: ParsedCliCommand): boolean {\n\treturn command.kind === \"session\";\n}\n\nexport interface SandboxedCliLaunch extends SandboxLaunch {\n\treadonly environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n\t/**\n\t * The supervisor's own 0700 state directory, outside every writable root the child\n\t * has.\n\t */\n\treadonly supervisorStateDirectory: string;\n}\n\nexport function getSandboxSessionDirectory(workspace: string): string {\n\treturn join(workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-sessions\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Env var naming the file that carries the host's `policy` and `user` permission scopes\n * into the child (PS.3).\n *\n * Deliberately absent from `SAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS`: only the supervisor's own\n * resolution may name it, never the invoking shell and never a project file (ADR 0016).\n */\nexport const POLICY_SNAPSHOT_PATH_VARIABLE = \"APEX_CODE_POLICY_SNAPSHOT_PATH\";\n\n/**\n * The marker asserting that an OS boundary is actually enforcing this process (PS.5).\n *\n * Set only on the supervisor's own launch environment for a child it is about to contain.\n * It is not in the child-environment allowlist, so a value of this name in the invoking\n * shell never survives into a child; the supervisor's own value is the only one that can.\n * `core/sdk.ts` reads it for `sandbox: \"required\"` and keeps the same two literals -- a\n * marker spelled two ways would be a drift the SDK could not detect at runtime, so\n * `test/sdk-sandbox-contract.test.ts` pins them to each other.\n */\nexport const SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VARIABLE = \"APEX_CODE_SANDBOX_ENFORCED\";\nexport const SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VALUE = \"1\";\n\nexport interface SupervisorStateDirectory {\n\t/** A 0700 directory under the supervisor temp root, outside every child-writable root. */\n\treadonly path: string;\n\treadonly dispose: () => void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Allocate the directory the supervisor keeps its own launch state in.\n *\n * Everything the supervisor writes for a launch -- the terminal handoff latch, the\n * published terminal size, the network relay, the git credential helper, the permission\n * snapshot -- used to live in `workspace/.apex-code/sandbox-state`, which is inside the\n * one writable bind the child has. A child that planted a symlink there redirected the\n * *next* launch's supervisor writes onto arbitrary host paths, and could rewrite the\n * scripts the supervisor was about to run. Under the supervisor temp root the child sees\n * these files through the read-only root bind (Linux) or Seatbelt's write denial outside\n * the workspace (macOS), so it can neither replace them nor plant a link where one goes.\n */\nexport function createSupervisorStateDirectory(): SupervisorStateDirectory {\n\tconst path = mkdtempSync(join(supervisorTempDirectory(), `apex-supervisor-${process.pid}-`), { encoding: \"utf8\" });\n\tchmodSync(path, 0o700);\n\treturn {\n\t\tpath,\n\t\tdispose: () => {\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\trmSync(path, { force: true, recursive: true });\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t// A leftover directory under the supervisor's own temp root is not worth\n\t\t\t\t// failing a session teardown over.\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n\n/**\n * The managed policy file this host resolves, read before the child's environment exists.\n *\n * `cli-launch`'s child-environment allowlist filters `APEX_CODE_POLICY_PATH` out, so a\n * host that configured a custom managed policy had it silently disappear at the boundary\n * and the child fell back to the system path -- the config-projection defect PS.3 closes.\n * Resolution here mirrors `core/permissions/store.ts`'s own default exactly.\n */\nexport function resolveSupervisorPolicyPath(environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): string {\n\tif (environment.APEX_CODE_POLICY_PATH) return environment.APEX_CODE_POLICY_PATH;\n\treturn process.platform === \"win32\"\n\t\t? join(environment.ProgramData ?? \"C:\\\\ProgramData\", \"apex-code\", \"policy.json\")\n\t\t: \"/etc/apex-code/policy.json\";\n}\n\n/**\n * The two host-owned permission scopes, captured verbatim.\n *\n * Raw file text rather than parsed rules, so the child's store applies exactly the same\n * validation -- and reports exactly the same malformed-file error -- as it would have on\n * the host. A snapshot that pre-parsed would have to decide what a malformed host policy\n * means, and the only safe answer to that lives in the store.\n */\ninterface SupervisorPolicySnapshotFile {\n\treadonly version: 1;\n\treadonly policy: string | null;\n\treadonly user: string | null;\n}\n\nfunction readHostScopeText(path: string): string | null {\n\ttry {\n\t\treturn readFileSync(path, \"utf8\");\n\t} catch {\n\t\t// Absent is the ordinary case for both files; an unreadable one projects as absent\n\t\t// rather than as authority the child cannot see the shape of.\n\t\treturn null;\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Capture the host `policy` and `user` permission scopes into the supervisor's private\n * directory and return the file's path.\n *\n * Called before `buildSandboxedCliLaunch` repoints `APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR` at a\n * workspace directory the child can write. Without it the child's `user` scope came from a\n * file the child itself owns, and its `policy` scope from a path the environment allowlist\n * had already removed.\n */\nexport function writeSupervisorPolicySnapshot(options: {\n\tdirectory: string;\n\t/** The *host* agent directory, before the launch repoints it. */\n\tagentDir: string;\n\tpolicyPath?: string;\n\tenvironment?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n}): string {\n\tconst directory = join(options.directory, \"policy\");\n\tmkdirSync(directory, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });\n\tconst snapshot: SupervisorPolicySnapshotFile = {\n\t\tversion: 1,\n\t\tpolicy: readHostScopeText(options.policyPath ?? resolveSupervisorPolicyPath(options.environment)),\n\t\tuser: readHostScopeText(join(options.agentDir, \"permissions.json\")),\n\t};\n\tconst path = join(directory, \"permission-snapshot.json\");\n\twriteFileSync(path, JSON.stringify(snapshot), { mode: 0o600 });\n\treturn path;\n}\n\n/**\n * Read supervisor policy only from global settings; project settings are untrusted here.\n *\n * The built-in provider hosts are added unless explicitly refused, because a deny-all\n * default made a fresh install unable to reach any model while giving the user no way to\n * learn which host to permit. Configured hosts are additive on top, and\n * `allowDefaultHosts: false` restores the strict behaviour for anyone who wants it.\n */\nexport function resolveSupervisorAllowedHosts(cwd: string, agentDir: string): readonly string[] | undefined {\n\tconst settings = SettingsManager.create(cwd, agentDir, { projectTrusted: false });\n\tconst network = settings.getNetworkSettings();\n\tconst configured = network?.allowedHosts ?? [];\n\tif (network?.allowDefaultHosts === false) return configured;\n\t// The configured `web_search` backend's host, added only when a credential for it\n\t// is present. Without this the tool would be configured and still unreachable,\n\t// which reads as a broken search rather than a missing allowlist entry. Nothing is\n\t// opened for a user who never set the key.\n\tconst webSearchHost = resolveWebSearchHost(settings.getWebSearchSettings());\n\treturn [...new Set([...resolveDefaultAllowedHosts(), ...configured, ...(webSearchHost ? [webSearchHost] : [])])];\n}\n\n/**\n * The host's two user-scope skill roots, each present only when it exists on the\n * host. Kept as two named slots rather than one list because\n * `core/package-manager.ts` discovers them in different modes -- root `.md` files\n * count as skills under `agentSkills` (\"pi\" mode) and are ignored under\n * `agentsHomeSkills` (\"agents\" mode), per `docs/skills.md` -- and a flat list of 0-2\n * paths cannot tell the child which root a lone survivor was.\n */\nexport interface HostSkillPaths {\n\t/** Host `<agentDir>/skills`. */\n\treadonly agentSkills?: string;\n\t/** Host `<home>/.agents/skills`. */\n\treadonly agentsHomeSkills?: string;\n}\n\n/** A candidate skill root that exists but was excluded, and why. */\nexport interface HostSkillPathRefusal {\n\treadonly root: keyof HostSkillPaths;\n\treadonly path: string;\n\treadonly reason: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ResolvedHostSkillPaths {\n\treadonly paths: HostSkillPaths;\n\treadonly refusals: readonly HostSkillPathRefusal[];\n}\n\n/**\n * True when `candidate` is the host home directory itself, or an ancestor of it.\n * Both paths must already be resolved (`realpathSync`), so a symlink can't disguise\n * either side. Mounting such a candidate read-only would re-expose the entire home\n * tree the sandbox's `--tmpfs /home` (Linux) / `(deny file-read* USER_HOME)` (macOS)\n * deliberately hides -- SSH keys, cloud credentials, other projects -- not just a\n * skills subtree.\n */\nfunction isHomeOrAncestorOfHome(candidate: string, home: string): boolean {\n\tif (candidate === home) return true;\n\tconst prefix = candidate.endsWith(sep) ? candidate : candidate + sep;\n\treturn home.startsWith(prefix);\n}\n\n/** Resolve one candidate root: absent, refused (symlinked onto the host home), or usable. */\nfunction resolveHostSkillRoot(\n\troot: keyof HostSkillPaths,\n\tcandidate: string,\n\thomeDir: string,\n): { path?: string; refusal?: HostSkillPathRefusal } {\n\tif (!existsSync(candidate)) return {};\n\tlet realCandidate: string;\n\tlet realHome: string;\n\ttry {\n\t\trealCandidate = realpathSync(candidate);\n\t\trealHome = realpathSync(homeDir);\n\t} catch (error) {\n\t\tconst message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);\n\t\treturn { refusal: { root, path: candidate, reason: `could not resolve real path: ${message}` } };\n\t}\n\tif (isHomeOrAncestorOfHome(realCandidate, realHome)) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\trefusal: {\n\t\t\t\troot,\n\t\t\t\tpath: candidate,\n\t\t\t\treason: \"resolves to the host home directory or an ancestor of it\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\treturn { path: candidate };\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the host's user-scope skill directories, before the sandbox exists to hide\n * them. Read only from the runtime environment and the host agent directory --\n * never from project files -- matching ADR 0016's rule that supervisor policy is\n * trust-first. Mirrors `core/package-manager.ts`'s own user-scope roots so the two\n * sides agree on where a skill lives. A candidate that resolves (directly or via a\n * symlink) onto the host home or an ancestor of it is refused rather than mounted --\n * see `isHomeOrAncestorOfHome` -- and reported so the caller can surface a startup\n * diagnostic instead of silently mounting or silently skipping it.\n */\nexport function resolveHostSkillPaths(agentDir: string, homeDir: string): ResolvedHostSkillPaths {\n\tconst agentSkills = resolveHostSkillRoot(\"agentSkills\", join(agentDir, \"skills\"), homeDir);\n\tconst agentsHomeSkills = resolveHostSkillRoot(\"agentsHomeSkills\", join(homeDir, \".agents\", \"skills\"), homeDir);\n\treturn {\n\t\tpaths: {\n\t\t\t...(agentSkills.path ? { agentSkills: agentSkills.path } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(agentsHomeSkills.path ? { agentsHomeSkills: agentsHomeSkills.path } : {}),\n\t\t},\n\t\trefusals: [agentSkills.refusal, agentsHomeSkills.refusal].filter(\n\t\t\t(refusal): refusal is HostSkillPathRefusal => refusal !== undefined,\n\t\t),\n\t};\n}\n\nconst SAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS = new Set([\n\t\"PATH\",\n\t\"LANG\",\n\t\"LC_ALL\",\n\t\"LC_CTYPE\",\n\t\"TERM\",\n\t\"COLORTERM\",\n\t\"NO_COLOR\",\n\t\"FORCE_COLOR\",\n\t\"TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_OFFLINE\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_SKIP_VERSION_CHECK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_STARTUP_BENCHMARK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_TIMING\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_CLEAR_ON_SHRINK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_HARDWARE_CURSOR\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_MODEL_CATALOG_URL\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_SHARE_VIEWER_URL\",\n\t\"VISUAL\",\n\t\"EDITOR\",\n]);\n\n// Provider API keys are explicit credential inputs, unlike arbitrary ambient variables.\n// Keep this list in sync with the documented provider environment-variable reference.\nconst SAFE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEYS = new Set([\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN\",\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN\",\n\t\"ANT_LING_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_BASE_URL\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_RESOURCE_NAME\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_API_VERSION\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_DEPLOYMENT_NAME_MAP\",\n\t\"DEEPSEEK_API_KEY\",\n\t\"NVIDIA_API_KEY\",\n\t\"GEMINI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"GROQ_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CEREBRAS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"FIREWORKS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"TOGETHER_API_KEY\",\n\t\"BASETEN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENROUTER_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ZAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ZAI_CODING_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MISTRAL_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MINIMAX_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MOONSHOT_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENCODE_API_KEY\",\n\t\"KIMI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_GATEWAY_ID\",\n\t\"QWEN_TOKEN_PLAN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"QWEN_TOKEN_PLAN_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_AMS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_SGP_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AWS_PROFILE\",\n\t\"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID\",\n\t\"AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\",\n\t\"AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK\",\n\t\"AWS_REGION\",\n]);\n\n// Credentials for tools rather than model providers. Separate from the provider set\n// above so the provider list stays a mirror of the documented provider reference.\nconst SAFE_TOOL_CREDENTIAL_KEYS = new Set([\"EXA_API_KEY\"]);\n\nfunction buildChildEnvironment(environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): NodeJS.ProcessEnv {\n\treturn Object.fromEntries(\n\t\tObject.entries(environment).filter(\n\t\t\t([key]) =>\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS.has(key) ||\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEYS.has(key) ||\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_TOOL_CREDENTIAL_KEYS.has(key),\n\t\t),\n\t);\n}\n\n/**\n * Drop empty files left in the child's tools directory by a previous launch.\n *\n * A projected tool is bind-mounted over a file there, and bwrap materialises that\n * mountpoint as an empty file on the host which outlives the namespace. If the host\n * tool later disappears, nothing is projected over the stub and the child would\n * otherwise find a 0-byte file where its binary should be. A real downloaded binary\n * is never empty, so size is a safe discriminator.\n */\nfunction clearStaleToolMountpoints(toolsDirectory: string): void {\n\tfor (const entry of readdirSync(toolsDirectory, { withFileTypes: true })) {\n\t\tif (!entry.isFile()) continue;\n\t\tconst entryPath = join(toolsDirectory, entry.name);\n\t\tif (statSync(entryPath).size === 0) {\n\t\t\trmSync(entryPath, { force: true });\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Allocate agent-owned state under the sole writable workspace mount. The child does\n * not inherit a host home or a host session/config directory, preventing the sandbox\n * from presenting a write boundary while its own state quietly escapes it.\n */\nexport function buildSandboxedCliLaunch(options: {\n\tworkspace: string;\n\tcommand: string;\n\targs: readonly string[];\n\tenvironment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n\tallowedHosts?: readonly string[];\n\tadditionalWritableRoots?: readonly string[];\n\treadOnlyPaths?: readonly string[];\n\tsessionPath?: string;\n\tauthPath?: string;\n\t/**\n\t * A synthesized two-key git config, projected read-only so the child can author a\n\t * commit as the user. Absent when the host had no global identity to resolve.\n\t */\n\tgitConfigPath?: string;\n\ttoolBinaries?: readonly HostToolBinary[];\n\t/**\n\t * Host user-scope skill directories, pre-filtered by the caller to those that\n\t * exist and pass the host-home escape check (SKILL.4). Mounted read-only at their\n\t * original host location -- Seatbelt cannot remap a path, so this must hold for\n\t * both backends -- and named to the child via `APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_*` so its\n\t * discovery can find them under the sandbox's own repointed `HOME`/agent dir.\n\t */\n\tskillPaths?: HostSkillPaths;\n\t/** The supervisor-owned credential write channel, when one was opened. */\n\tcredentialChannel?: SandboxLaunch[\"credentialChannel\"];\n\t/** The supervisor's private 0700 state directory for this launch. */\n\tsupervisorStateDirectory?: string;\n\t/** The captured host permission scopes, named to the child read-only. */\n\tpolicySnapshotPath?: string;\n}): SandboxedCliLaunch {\n\tconst supervisorStateDirectory = options.supervisorStateDirectory ?? createSupervisorStateDirectory().path;\n\tconst stateDirectory = join(options.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-state\");\n\tconst agentDirectory = join(options.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-agent\");\n\tconst sessionDirectory = getSandboxSessionDirectory(options.workspace);\n\t// Mirrors getBinDir() as the child will compute it from APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR,\n\t// so a projected tool lands exactly where the child's own lookup already checks.\n\tconst toolsDirectory = join(agentDirectory, \"bin\");\n\tconst xdgDirectories = {\n\t\tXDG_CONFIG_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"config\"),\n\t\tXDG_CACHE_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"cache\"),\n\t\tXDG_DATA_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"data\"),\n\t\tXDG_STATE_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"state\"),\n\t};\n\tfor (const directory of [\n\t\tstateDirectory,\n\t\tagentDirectory,\n\t\tsessionDirectory,\n\t\ttoolsDirectory,\n\t\t...Object.values(xdgDirectories),\n\t]) {\n\t\tmkdirSync(directory, { recursive: true });\n\t}\n\tclearStaleToolMountpoints(toolsDirectory);\n\tconst childEnvironment = buildChildEnvironment(options.environment);\n\tconst { agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills } = options.skillPaths ?? {};\n\tconst skillMountPaths = [agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills].filter((path): path is string => path !== undefined);\n\tconst readOnlyPaths = [...(options.readOnlyPaths ?? []), ...skillMountPaths];\n\tconst readOnlyFiles = [options.sessionPath, options.authPath, options.gitConfigPath].filter(\n\t\t(path): path is string => path !== undefined,\n\t);\n\tconst readOnlyBinaries = (options.toolBinaries ?? []).map((binary) => ({\n\t\tsource: binary.path,\n\t\tdestination: join(toolsDirectory, binary.name),\n\t}));\n\treturn {\n\t\tcommand: options.command,\n\t\targs: [...options.args],\n\t\tpolicy: {\n\t\t\tworkspace: options.workspace,\n\t\t\tallowedHosts: options.allowedHosts ?? [],\n\t\t\tadditionalWritableRoots: options.additionalWritableRoots ?? [],\n\t\t},\n\t\treadOnlyPaths,\n\t\treadOnlyFiles,\n\t\treadOnlyBinaries,\n\t\t// Travels on the launch contract so the platform backend projects the socket;\n\t\t// the environment entry above is what tells the child where to find it.\n\t\t...(options.credentialChannel ? { credentialChannel: options.credentialChannel } : {}),\n\t\tsupervisorStateDirectory,\n\t\tenvironment: {\n\t\t\t...childEnvironment,\n\t\t\t...(options.authPath ? { APEX_CODE_AUTH_PATH: options.authPath } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(options.credentialChannel\n\t\t\t\t? { APEX_CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PATH: options.credentialChannel.childSocketPath }\n\t\t\t\t: {}),\n\t\t\t// After childEnvironment: these come only from the supervisor's own\n\t\t\t// resolution, never from the invoking shell, so their value always wins over\n\t\t\t// anything of the same name that childEnvironment's allowlist let through.\n\t\t\t...(options.gitConfigPath ? { GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL: options.gitConfigPath } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(agentSkills ? { APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_AGENT: agentSkills } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(agentsHomeSkills ? { APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_AGENTS_HOME: agentsHomeSkills } : {}),\n\t\t\t// The host's own permission scopes, and the assertion that a boundary is\n\t\t\t// enforcing this process. Both are supervisor-resolved for exactly the reason\n\t\t\t// `agentDirectory` below is: the child's copy is writable by the child.\n\t\t\t...(options.policySnapshotPath ? { [POLICY_SNAPSHOT_PATH_VARIABLE]: options.policySnapshotPath } : {}),\n\t\t\t[SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VARIABLE]: SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VALUE,\n\t\t\tAPEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR: agentDirectory,\n\t\t\tAPEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_SESSION_DIR: sessionDirectory,\n\t\t\tHOME: stateDirectory,\n\t\t\tTMPDIR: stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t...xdgDirectories,\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/cli-launch.js

@@ -1,366 +0,0 @@
-import { chmodSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, realpathSync, rmSync, statSync, writeFileSync, } from "node:fs";
-import { join, sep } from "node:path";
-import { SettingsManager } from "../settings-manager.js";
-import { resolveWebSearchHost } from "../web-search-provider.js";
-import { resolveDefaultAllowedHosts } from "./default-hosts.js";
-import { supervisorTempDirectory } from "./supervisor-temp.js";
-/**
- * OS containment is the normal startup path for every parsed command that can
- * construct an agent session. Classification consumes the same typed parse result
- * as execution, so option values and text after `--` cannot impersonate metadata.
- */
-export function requiresSandboxedChild(command) {
-    return command.kind === "session";
-}
-export function getSandboxSessionDirectory(workspace) {
-    return join(workspace, ".apex-code", "sandbox-sessions");
-}
-/**
- * Env var naming the file that carries the host's `policy` and `user` permission scopes
- * into the child (PS.3).
- *
- * Deliberately absent from `SAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS`: only the supervisor's own
- * resolution may name it, never the invoking shell and never a project file (ADR 0016).
- */
-export const POLICY_SNAPSHOT_PATH_VARIABLE = "APEX_CODE_POLICY_SNAPSHOT_PATH";
-/**
- * The marker asserting that an OS boundary is actually enforcing this process (PS.5).
- *
- * Set only on the supervisor's own launch environment for a child it is about to contain.
- * It is not in the child-environment allowlist, so a value of this name in the invoking
- * shell never survives into a child; the supervisor's own value is the only one that can.
- * `core/sdk.ts` reads it for `sandbox: "required"` and keeps the same two literals -- a
- * marker spelled two ways would be a drift the SDK could not detect at runtime, so
- * `test/sdk-sandbox-contract.test.ts` pins them to each other.
- */
-export const SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VARIABLE = "APEX_CODE_SANDBOX_ENFORCED";
-export const SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VALUE = "1";
-/**
- * Allocate the directory the supervisor keeps its own launch state in.
- *
- * Everything the supervisor writes for a launch -- the terminal handoff latch, the
- * published terminal size, the network relay, the git credential helper, the permission
- * snapshot -- used to live in `workspace/.apex-code/sandbox-state`, which is inside the
- * one writable bind the child has. A child that planted a symlink there redirected the
- * *next* launch's supervisor writes onto arbitrary host paths, and could rewrite the
- * scripts the supervisor was about to run. Under the supervisor temp root the child sees
- * these files through the read-only root bind (Linux) or Seatbelt's write denial outside
- * the workspace (macOS), so it can neither replace them nor plant a link where one goes.
- */
-export function createSupervisorStateDirectory() {
-    const path = mkdtempSync(join(supervisorTempDirectory(), `apex-supervisor-${process.pid}-`), { encoding: "utf8" });
-    chmodSync(path, 0o700);
-    return {
-        path,
-        dispose: () => {
-            try {
-                rmSync(path, { force: true, recursive: true });
-            }
-            catch {
-                // A leftover directory under the supervisor's own temp root is not worth
-                // failing a session teardown over.
-            }
-        },
-    };
-}
-/**
- * The managed policy file this host resolves, read before the child's environment exists.
- *
- * `cli-launch`'s child-environment allowlist filters `APEX_CODE_POLICY_PATH` out, so a
- * host that configured a custom managed policy had it silently disappear at the boundary
- * and the child fell back to the system path -- the config-projection defect PS.3 closes.
- * Resolution here mirrors `core/permissions/store.ts`'s own default exactly.
- */
-export function resolveSupervisorPolicyPath(environment = process.env) {
-    if (environment.APEX_CODE_POLICY_PATH)
-        return environment.APEX_CODE_POLICY_PATH;
-    return process.platform === "win32"
-        ? join(environment.ProgramData ?? "C:\\ProgramData", "apex-code", "policy.json")
-        : "/etc/apex-code/policy.json";
-}
-function readHostScopeText(path) {
-    try {
-        return readFileSync(path, "utf8");
-    }
-    catch {
-        // Absent is the ordinary case for both files; an unreadable one projects as absent
-        // rather than as authority the child cannot see the shape of.
-        return null;
-    }
-}
-/**
- * Capture the host `policy` and `user` permission scopes into the supervisor's private
- * directory and return the file's path.
- *
- * Called before `buildSandboxedCliLaunch` repoints `APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR` at a
- * workspace directory the child can write. Without it the child's `user` scope came from a
- * file the child itself owns, and its `policy` scope from a path the environment allowlist
- * had already removed.
- */
-export function writeSupervisorPolicySnapshot(options) {
-    const directory = join(options.directory, "policy");
-    mkdirSync(directory, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-    const snapshot = {
-        version: 1,
-        policy: readHostScopeText(options.policyPath ?? resolveSupervisorPolicyPath(options.environment)),
-        user: readHostScopeText(join(options.agentDir, "permissions.json")),
-    };
-    const path = join(directory, "permission-snapshot.json");
-    writeFileSync(path, JSON.stringify(snapshot), { mode: 0o600 });
-    return path;
-}
-/**
- * Read supervisor policy only from global settings; project settings are untrusted here.
- *
- * The built-in provider hosts are added unless explicitly refused, because a deny-all
- * default made a fresh install unable to reach any model while giving the user no way to
- * learn which host to permit. Configured hosts are additive on top, and
- * `allowDefaultHosts: false` restores the strict behaviour for anyone who wants it.
- */
-export function resolveSupervisorAllowedHosts(cwd, agentDir) {
-    const settings = SettingsManager.create(cwd, agentDir, { projectTrusted: false });
-    const network = settings.getNetworkSettings();
-    const configured = network?.allowedHosts ?? [];
-    if (network?.allowDefaultHosts === false)
-        return configured;
-    // The configured `web_search` backend's host, added only when a credential for it
-    // is present. Without this the tool would be configured and still unreachable,
-    // which reads as a broken search rather than a missing allowlist entry. Nothing is
-    // opened for a user who never set the key.
-    const webSearchHost = resolveWebSearchHost(settings.getWebSearchSettings());
-    return [...new Set([...resolveDefaultAllowedHosts(), ...configured, ...(webSearchHost ? [webSearchHost] : [])])];
-}
-/**
- * True when `candidate` is the host home directory itself, or an ancestor of it.
- * Both paths must already be resolved (`realpathSync`), so a symlink can't disguise
- * either side. Mounting such a candidate read-only would re-expose the entire home
- * tree the sandbox's `--tmpfs /home` (Linux) / `(deny file-read* USER_HOME)` (macOS)
- * deliberately hides -- SSH keys, cloud credentials, other projects -- not just a
- * skills subtree.
- */
-function isHomeOrAncestorOfHome(candidate, home) {
-    if (candidate === home)
-        return true;
-    const prefix = candidate.endsWith(sep) ? candidate : candidate + sep;
-    return home.startsWith(prefix);
-}
-/** Resolve one candidate root: absent, refused (symlinked onto the host home), or usable. */
-function resolveHostSkillRoot(root, candidate, homeDir) {
-    if (!existsSync(candidate))
-        return {};
-    let realCandidate;
-    let realHome;
-    try {
-        realCandidate = realpathSync(candidate);
-        realHome = realpathSync(homeDir);
-    }
-    catch (error) {
-        const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
-        return { refusal: { root, path: candidate, reason: `could not resolve real path: ${message}` } };
-    }
-    if (isHomeOrAncestorOfHome(realCandidate, realHome)) {
-        return {
-            refusal: {
-                root,
-                path: candidate,
-                reason: "resolves to the host home directory or an ancestor of it",
-            },
-        };
-    }
-    return { path: candidate };
-}
-/**
- * Resolve the host's user-scope skill directories, before the sandbox exists to hide
- * them. Read only from the runtime environment and the host agent directory --
- * never from project files -- matching ADR 0016's rule that supervisor policy is
- * trust-first. Mirrors `core/package-manager.ts`'s own user-scope roots so the two
- * sides agree on where a skill lives. A candidate that resolves (directly or via a
- * symlink) onto the host home or an ancestor of it is refused rather than mounted --
- * see `isHomeOrAncestorOfHome` -- and reported so the caller can surface a startup
- * diagnostic instead of silently mounting or silently skipping it.
- */
-export function resolveHostSkillPaths(agentDir, homeDir) {
-    const agentSkills = resolveHostSkillRoot("agentSkills", join(agentDir, "skills"), homeDir);
-    const agentsHomeSkills = resolveHostSkillRoot("agentsHomeSkills", join(homeDir, ".agents", "skills"), homeDir);
-    return {
-        paths: {
-            ...(agentSkills.path ? { agentSkills: agentSkills.path } : {}),
-            ...(agentsHomeSkills.path ? { agentsHomeSkills: agentsHomeSkills.path } : {}),
-        },
-        refusals: [agentSkills.refusal, agentsHomeSkills.refusal].filter((refusal) => refusal !== undefined),
-    };
-}
-const SAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS = new Set([
-    "PATH",
-    "LANG",
-    "LC_ALL",
-    "LC_CTYPE",
-    "TERM",
-    "COLORTERM",
-    "NO_COLOR",
-    "FORCE_COLOR",
-    "TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH",
-    "APEX_CODE_OFFLINE",
-    "APEX_CODE_SKIP_VERSION_CHECK",
-    "APEX_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL",
-    "APEX_CODE_STARTUP_BENCHMARK",
-    "APEX_CODE_TIMING",
-    "APEX_CODE_CLEAR_ON_SHRINK",
-    "APEX_CODE_HARDWARE_CURSOR",
-    "APEX_CODE_MODEL_CATALOG_URL",
-    "APEX_CODE_SHARE_VIEWER_URL",
-    "VISUAL",
-    "EDITOR",
-]);
-// Provider API keys are explicit credential inputs, unlike arbitrary ambient variables.
-// Keep this list in sync with the documented provider environment-variable reference.
-const SAFE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEYS = new Set([
-    "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY",
-    "ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN",
-    "ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN",
-    "ANT_LING_API_KEY",
-    "OPENAI_API_KEY",
-    "AZURE_OPENAI_API_KEY",
-    "AZURE_OPENAI_BASE_URL",
-    "AZURE_OPENAI_RESOURCE_NAME",
-    "AZURE_OPENAI_API_VERSION",
-    "AZURE_OPENAI_DEPLOYMENT_NAME_MAP",
-    "DEEPSEEK_API_KEY",
-    "NVIDIA_API_KEY",
-    "GEMINI_API_KEY",
-    "GROQ_API_KEY",
-    "CEREBRAS_API_KEY",
-    "XAI_API_KEY",
-    "FIREWORKS_API_KEY",
-    "TOGETHER_API_KEY",
-    "BASETEN_API_KEY",
-    "OPENROUTER_API_KEY",
-    "AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY",
-    "ZAI_API_KEY",
-    "ZAI_CODING_CN_API_KEY",
-    "MISTRAL_API_KEY",
-    "MINIMAX_API_KEY",
-    "MOONSHOT_API_KEY",
-    "OPENCODE_API_KEY",
-    "KIMI_API_KEY",
-    "CLOUDFLARE_API_KEY",
-    "CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID",
-    "CLOUDFLARE_GATEWAY_ID",
-    "QWEN_TOKEN_PLAN_API_KEY",
-    "QWEN_TOKEN_PLAN_CN_API_KEY",
-    "XIAOMI_API_KEY",
-    "XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_CN_API_KEY",
-    "XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_AMS_API_KEY",
-    "XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_SGP_API_KEY",
-    "AWS_PROFILE",
-    "AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID",
-    "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY",
-    "AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK",
-    "AWS_REGION",
-]);
-// Credentials for tools rather than model providers. Separate from the provider set
-// above so the provider list stays a mirror of the documented provider reference.
-const SAFE_TOOL_CREDENTIAL_KEYS = new Set(["EXA_API_KEY"]);
-function buildChildEnvironment(environment) {
-    return Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(environment).filter(([key]) => SAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS.has(key) ||
-        SAFE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEYS.has(key) ||
-        SAFE_TOOL_CREDENTIAL_KEYS.has(key)));
-}
-/**
- * Drop empty files left in the child's tools directory by a previous launch.
- *
- * A projected tool is bind-mounted over a file there, and bwrap materialises that
- * mountpoint as an empty file on the host which outlives the namespace. If the host
- * tool later disappears, nothing is projected over the stub and the child would
- * otherwise find a 0-byte file where its binary should be. A real downloaded binary
- * is never empty, so size is a safe discriminator.
- */
-function clearStaleToolMountpoints(toolsDirectory) {
-    for (const entry of readdirSync(toolsDirectory, { withFileTypes: true })) {
-        if (!entry.isFile())
-            continue;
-        const entryPath = join(toolsDirectory, entry.name);
-        if (statSync(entryPath).size === 0) {
-            rmSync(entryPath, { force: true });
-        }
-    }
-}
-/**
- * Allocate agent-owned state under the sole writable workspace mount. The child does
- * not inherit a host home or a host session/config directory, preventing the sandbox
- * from presenting a write boundary while its own state quietly escapes it.
- */
-export function buildSandboxedCliLaunch(options) {
-    const supervisorStateDirectory = options.supervisorStateDirectory ?? createSupervisorStateDirectory().path;
-    const stateDirectory = join(options.workspace, ".apex-code", "sandbox-state");
-    const agentDirectory = join(options.workspace, ".apex-code", "sandbox-agent");
-    const sessionDirectory = getSandboxSessionDirectory(options.workspace);
-    // Mirrors getBinDir() as the child will compute it from APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR,
-    // so a projected tool lands exactly where the child's own lookup already checks.
-    const toolsDirectory = join(agentDirectory, "bin");
-    const xdgDirectories = {
-        XDG_CONFIG_HOME: join(stateDirectory, "config"),
-        XDG_CACHE_HOME: join(stateDirectory, "cache"),
-        XDG_DATA_HOME: join(stateDirectory, "data"),
-        XDG_STATE_HOME: join(stateDirectory, "state"),
-    };
-    for (const directory of [
-        stateDirectory,
-        agentDirectory,
-        sessionDirectory,
-        toolsDirectory,
-        ...Object.values(xdgDirectories),
-    ]) {
-        mkdirSync(directory, { recursive: true });
-    }
-    clearStaleToolMountpoints(toolsDirectory);
-    const childEnvironment = buildChildEnvironment(options.environment);
-    const { agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills } = options.skillPaths ?? {};
-    const skillMountPaths = [agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills].filter((path) => path !== undefined);
-    const readOnlyPaths = [...(options.readOnlyPaths ?? []), ...skillMountPaths];
-    const readOnlyFiles = [options.sessionPath, options.authPath, options.gitConfigPath].filter((path) => path !== undefined);
-    const readOnlyBinaries = (options.toolBinaries ?? []).map((binary) => ({
-        source: binary.path,
-        destination: join(toolsDirectory, binary.name),
-    }));
-    return {
-        command: options.command,
-        args: [...options.args],
-        policy: {
-            workspace: options.workspace,
-            allowedHosts: options.allowedHosts ?? [],
-            additionalWritableRoots: options.additionalWritableRoots ?? [],
-        },
-        readOnlyPaths,
-        readOnlyFiles,
-        readOnlyBinaries,
-        // Travels on the launch contract so the platform backend projects the socket;
-        // the environment entry above is what tells the child where to find it.
-        ...(options.credentialChannel ? { credentialChannel: options.credentialChannel } : {}),
-        supervisorStateDirectory,
-        environment: {
-            ...childEnvironment,
-            ...(options.authPath ? { APEX_CODE_AUTH_PATH: options.authPath } : {}),
-            ...(options.credentialChannel
-                ? { APEX_CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PATH: options.credentialChannel.childSocketPath }
-                : {}),
-            // After childEnvironment: these come only from the supervisor's own
-            // resolution, never from the invoking shell, so their value always wins over
-            // anything of the same name that childEnvironment's allowlist let through.
-            ...(options.gitConfigPath ? { GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL: options.gitConfigPath } : {}),
-            ...(agentSkills ? { APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_AGENT: agentSkills } : {}),
-            ...(agentsHomeSkills ? { APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_AGENTS_HOME: agentsHomeSkills } : {}),
-            // The host's own permission scopes, and the assertion that a boundary is
-            // enforcing this process. Both are supervisor-resolved for exactly the reason
-            // `agentDirectory` below is: the child's copy is writable by the child.
-            ...(options.policySnapshotPath ? { [POLICY_SNAPSHOT_PATH_VARIABLE]: options.policySnapshotPath } : {}),
-            [SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VARIABLE]: SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VALUE,
-            APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR: agentDirectory,
-            APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_SESSION_DIR: sessionDirectory,
-            HOME: stateDirectory,
-            TMPDIR: stateDirectory,
-            ...xdgDirectories,
-        },
-    };
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=cli-launch.js.map