apex-code 0.0.5 → 0.1.0

package/dist/core/sandbox/host-approval.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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An approval asserted from\n * inside the boundary is indistinguishable, at the supervisor, from one forged by a\n * postinstall script or a git hook -- the code the boundary exists to contain -- so the\n * human's answer is read by the side that owns the decision, on a terminal borrowed back\n * from the child for the duration.\n *\n * Returning undefined when there is no terminal is the mechanism, not a fallback. The\n * proxy's own deny-without-asking path then runs unchanged, so ADR 0005's headless, print,\n * JSON, and RPC behaviour holds by construction rather than by a mode check that a later\n * change could forget to make.\n */\nexport interface TerminalPromptOptions {\n\thandoff: TerminalHandoff;\n\tinput?: NodeJS.ReadStream;\n\toutput?: NodeJS.WriteStream;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build a yes/no prompt the supervisor owns, or nothing at all when there is no terminal.\n *\n * Both sandbox escalations ask the same shape of question and must fail closed the same\n * way, so they share one implementation. Returning undefined rather than a\n * function-that-says-no is deliberate: the caller's own refuse path then runs untouched,\n * which is how ADR 0005's headless behaviour stays correct without a mode check.\n */\nfunction createTerminalPrompt(\n\toptions: TerminalPromptOptions,\n\tcompose: (subject: string) => { question: string; granted: string; refused: string },\n): ((subject: string) => Promise<boolean>) | undefined {\n\tconst input = options.input ?? process.stdin;\n\tconst output = options.output ?? process.stdout;\n\tif (!input.isTTY || !output.isTTY) return undefined;\n\n\tfunction readAnswer(): Promise<string> {\n\t\treturn new Promise((resolve) => {\n\t\t\tlet buffer = \"\";\n\t\t\tconst finish = (value: string) => {\n\t\t\t\tinput.off(\"data\", onData);\n\t\t\t\tinput.off(\"error\", onError);\n\t\t\t\tinput.off(\"end\", onEnd);\n\t\t\t\t// The child had stdin in raw mode and takes it back on resume, so the\n\t\t\t\t// supervisor leaves the stream paused rather than owning it past the answer.\n\t\t\t\tinput.pause();\n\t\t\t\tresolve(value);\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t\tconst onData = (chunk: Buffer | string) => {\n\t\t\t\tbuffer += chunk.toString();\n\t\t\t\tconst newline = buffer.indexOf(\"\\n\");\n\t\t\t\tif (newline >= 0) finish(buffer.slice(0, newline));\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t\t// Anything unreadable declines. Treating an unanswerable prompt as consent would\n\t\t\t// hand the grant to whatever broke the terminal.\n\t\t\tconst onError = () => finish(\"\");\n\t\t\tconst onEnd = () => finish(buffer);\n\t\t\tinput.on(\"data\", onData);\n\t\t\tinput.on(\"error\", onError);\n\t\t\tinput.on(\"end\", onEnd);\n\t\t\tinput.resume();\n\t\t});\n\t}\n\n\treturn (subject: string): Promise<boolean> =>\n\t\toptions.handoff.borrowTerminal(async () => {\n\t\t\tconst text = compose(subject);\n\t\t\toutput.write(`\\n${text.question}`);\n\t\t\tconst answer = (await readAnswer()).trim().toLowerCase();\n\t\t\tconst approved = answer === \"y\" || answer === \"yes\";\n\t\t\toutput.write(`${approved ? text.granted : text.refused}\\n\\n`);\n\t\t\treturn approved;\n\t\t});\n}\n\n/** Approve one refused host for the rest of the session. */\nexport function createHostApprover(\n\toptions: TerminalPromptOptions,\n): ((hostname: string, port: number) => Promise<boolean>) | undefined {\n\tconst prompt = createTerminalPrompt(options, (subject) => ({\n\t\tquestion:\n\t\t\t`The sandboxed session asked to reach ${subject}, which is not on the network allowlist.\\n` +\n\t\t\t`Allow it for this session only? [y/N] `,\n\t\tgranted: `Allowed ${subject} for this session. Add it to \"network.allowedHosts\" in your global settings to make it permanent.`,\n\t\trefused: `Refused ${subject}.`,\n\t}));\n\tif (!prompt) return undefined;\n\treturn (hostname: string, port: number) => prompt(`${hostname}:${port}`);\n}\n\n/**\n * Release the host's own git credential for one host, for the rest of the session.\n *\n * Separate from the host approval above even though both are yes/no, because they are\n * different grants and conflating them would let approving a push also release a token to\n * everything else the session later contacts.\n */\nexport function createCredentialReleaser(\n\toptions: TerminalPromptOptions,\n): ((host: string) => Promise<boolean>) | undefined {\n\treturn createTerminalPrompt(options, (subject) => ({\n\t\tquestion:\n\t\t\t`The sandboxed session asked for your git credential for ${subject}.\\n` +\n\t\t\t`It is read from your host credential store and never written into the workspace.\\n` +\n\t\t\t`Release it for this session only? [y/N] `,\n\t\tgranted: `Released the ${subject} credential for this session.`,\n\t\trefused: `Refused the ${subject} credential.`,\n\t}));\n}\n\n/**\n * Approve one command to run in a separate child with one extra writable root.\n *\n * Unlike a host or a credential, nothing is remembered. A command is not a stable subject\n * to grant against, and a remembered approval would silently cover the next command that\n * happened to name the same root.\n */\nexport function createCommandEscalationApprover(\n\toptions: TerminalPromptOptions,\n): ((request: { command: string; writableRoot: string }) => Promise<boolean>) | undefined {\n\tconst prompt = createTerminalPrompt(options, (subject) => ({\n\t\tquestion:\n\t\t\t`The sandboxed session asked to run a command with write access outside its workspace.\\n\\n` +\n\t\t\t`  ${subject}\\n\\n` +\n\t\t\t`It runs once, in a separate sandbox. The session's own boundary does not change.\\n` +\n\t\t\t`Allow it? [y/N] `,\n\t\tgranted: \"Ran the command once with that root writable.\",\n\t\trefused: \"Refused.\",\n\t}));\n\tif (!prompt) return undefined;\n\treturn (request) => prompt(`${request.command}\\n  (writable: ${request.writableRoot})`);\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/host-approval.js

@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Build a yes/no prompt the supervisor owns, or nothing at all when there is no terminal.
- *
- * Both sandbox escalations ask the same shape of question and must fail closed the same
- * way, so they share one implementation. Returning undefined rather than a
- * function-that-says-no is deliberate: the caller's own refuse path then runs untouched,
- * which is how ADR 0005's headless behaviour stays correct without a mode check.
- */
-function createTerminalPrompt(options, compose) {
-    const input = options.input ?? process.stdin;
-    const output = options.output ?? process.stdout;
-    if (!input.isTTY || !output.isTTY)
-        return undefined;
-    function readAnswer() {
-        return new Promise((resolve) => {
-            let buffer = "";
-            const finish = (value) => {
-                input.off("data", onData);
-                input.off("error", onError);
-                input.off("end", onEnd);
-                // The child had stdin in raw mode and takes it back on resume, so the
-                // supervisor leaves the stream paused rather than owning it past the answer.
-                input.pause();
-                resolve(value);
-            };
-            const onData = (chunk) => {
-                buffer += chunk.toString();
-                const newline = buffer.indexOf("\n");
-                if (newline >= 0)
-                    finish(buffer.slice(0, newline));
-            };
-            // Anything unreadable declines. Treating an unanswerable prompt as consent would
-            // hand the grant to whatever broke the terminal.
-            const onError = () => finish("");
-            const onEnd = () => finish(buffer);
-            input.on("data", onData);
-            input.on("error", onError);
-            input.on("end", onEnd);
-            input.resume();
-        });
-    }
-    return (subject) => options.handoff.borrowTerminal(async () => {
-        const text = compose(subject);
-        output.write(`\n${text.question}`);
-        const answer = (await readAnswer()).trim().toLowerCase();
-        const approved = answer === "y" || answer === "yes";
-        output.write(`${approved ? text.granted : text.refused}\n\n`);
-        return approved;
-    });
-}
-/** Approve one refused host for the rest of the session. */
-export function createHostApprover(options) {
-    const prompt = createTerminalPrompt(options, (subject) => ({
-        question: `The sandboxed session asked to reach ${subject}, which is not on the network allowlist.\n` +
-            `Allow it for this session only? [y/N] `,
-        granted: `Allowed ${subject} for this session. Add it to "network.allowedHosts" in your global settings to make it permanent.`,
-        refused: `Refused ${subject}.`,
-    }));
-    if (!prompt)
-        return undefined;
-    return (hostname, port) => prompt(`${hostname}:${port}`);
-}
-/**
- * Release the host's own git credential for one host, for the rest of the session.
- *
- * Separate from the host approval above even though both are yes/no, because they are
- * different grants and conflating them would let approving a push also release a token to
- * everything else the session later contacts.
- */
-export function createCredentialReleaser(options) {
-    return createTerminalPrompt(options, (subject) => ({
-        question: `The sandboxed session asked for your git credential for ${subject}.\n` +
-            `It is read from your host credential store and never written into the workspace.\n` +
-            `Release it for this session only? [y/N] `,
-        granted: `Released the ${subject} credential for this session.`,
-        refused: `Refused the ${subject} credential.`,
-    }));
-}
-/**
- * Approve one command to run in a separate child with one extra writable root.
- *
- * Unlike a host or a credential, nothing is remembered. A command is not a stable subject
- * to grant against, and a remembered approval would silently cover the next command that
- * happened to name the same root.
- */
-export function createCommandEscalationApprover(options) {
-    const prompt = createTerminalPrompt(options, (subject) => ({
-        question: `The sandboxed session asked to run a command with write access outside its workspace.\n\n` +
-            `  ${subject}\n\n` +
-            `It runs once, in a separate sandbox. The session's own boundary does not change.\n` +
-            `Allow it? [y/N] `,
-        granted: "Ran the command once with that root writable.",
-        refused: "Refused.",
-    }));
-    if (!prompt)
-        return undefined;
-    return (request) => prompt(`${request.command}\n  (writable: ${request.writableRoot})`);
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=host-approval.js.map

package/dist/core/sandbox/host-approval.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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An approval asserted from\n * inside the boundary is indistinguishable, at the supervisor, from one forged by a\n * postinstall script or a git hook -- the code the boundary exists to contain -- so the\n * human's answer is read by the side that owns the decision, on a terminal borrowed back\n * from the child for the duration.\n *\n * Returning undefined when there is no terminal is the mechanism, not a fallback. The\n * proxy's own deny-without-asking path then runs unchanged, so ADR 0005's headless, print,\n * JSON, and RPC behaviour holds by construction rather than by a mode check that a later\n * change could forget to make.\n */\nexport interface TerminalPromptOptions {\n\thandoff: TerminalHandoff;\n\tinput?: NodeJS.ReadStream;\n\toutput?: NodeJS.WriteStream;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build a yes/no prompt the supervisor owns, or nothing at all when there is no terminal.\n *\n * Both sandbox escalations ask the same shape of question and must fail closed the same\n * way, so they share one implementation. Returning undefined rather than a\n * function-that-says-no is deliberate: the caller's own refuse path then runs untouched,\n * which is how ADR 0005's headless behaviour stays correct without a mode check.\n */\nfunction createTerminalPrompt(\n\toptions: TerminalPromptOptions,\n\tcompose: (subject: string) => { question: string; granted: string; refused: string },\n): ((subject: string) => Promise<boolean>) | undefined {\n\tconst input = options.input ?? process.stdin;\n\tconst output = options.output ?? process.stdout;\n\tif (!input.isTTY || !output.isTTY) return undefined;\n\n\tfunction readAnswer(): Promise<string> {\n\t\treturn new Promise((resolve) => {\n\t\t\tlet buffer = \"\";\n\t\t\tconst finish = (value: string) => {\n\t\t\t\tinput.off(\"data\", onData);\n\t\t\t\tinput.off(\"error\", onError);\n\t\t\t\tinput.off(\"end\", onEnd);\n\t\t\t\t// The child had stdin in raw mode and takes it back on resume, so the\n\t\t\t\t// supervisor leaves the stream paused rather than owning it past the answer.\n\t\t\t\tinput.pause();\n\t\t\t\tresolve(value);\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t\tconst onData = (chunk: Buffer | string) => {\n\t\t\t\tbuffer += chunk.toString();\n\t\t\t\tconst newline = buffer.indexOf(\"\\n\");\n\t\t\t\tif (newline >= 0) finish(buffer.slice(0, newline));\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t\t// Anything unreadable declines. Treating an unanswerable prompt as consent would\n\t\t\t// hand the grant to whatever broke the terminal.\n\t\t\tconst onError = () => finish(\"\");\n\t\t\tconst onEnd = () => finish(buffer);\n\t\t\tinput.on(\"data\", onData);\n\t\t\tinput.on(\"error\", onError);\n\t\t\tinput.on(\"end\", onEnd);\n\t\t\tinput.resume();\n\t\t});\n\t}\n\n\treturn (subject: string): Promise<boolean> =>\n\t\toptions.handoff.borrowTerminal(async () => {\n\t\t\tconst text = compose(subject);\n\t\t\toutput.write(`\\n${text.question}`);\n\t\t\tconst answer = (await readAnswer()).trim().toLowerCase();\n\t\t\tconst approved = answer === \"y\" || answer === \"yes\";\n\t\t\toutput.write(`${approved ? text.granted : text.refused}\\n\\n`);\n\t\t\treturn approved;\n\t\t});\n}\n\n/** Approve one refused host for the rest of the session. */\nexport function createHostApprover(\n\toptions: TerminalPromptOptions,\n): ((hostname: string, port: number) => Promise<boolean>) | undefined {\n\tconst prompt = createTerminalPrompt(options, (subject) => ({\n\t\tquestion:\n\t\t\t`The sandboxed session asked to reach ${subject}, which is not on the network allowlist.\\n` +\n\t\t\t`Allow it for this session only? [y/N] `,\n\t\tgranted: `Allowed ${subject} for this session. Add it to \"network.allowedHosts\" in your global settings to make it permanent.`,\n\t\trefused: `Refused ${subject}.`,\n\t}));\n\tif (!prompt) return undefined;\n\treturn (hostname: string, port: number) => prompt(`${hostname}:${port}`);\n}\n\n/**\n * Release the host's own git credential for one host, for the rest of the session.\n *\n * Separate from the host approval above even though both are yes/no, because they are\n * different grants and conflating them would let approving a push also release a token to\n * everything else the session later contacts.\n */\nexport function createCredentialReleaser(\n\toptions: TerminalPromptOptions,\n): ((host: string) => Promise<boolean>) | undefined {\n\treturn createTerminalPrompt(options, (subject) => ({\n\t\tquestion:\n\t\t\t`The sandboxed session asked for your git credential for ${subject}.\\n` +\n\t\t\t`It is read from your host credential store and never written into the workspace.\\n` +\n\t\t\t`Release it for this session only? [y/N] `,\n\t\tgranted: `Released the ${subject} credential for this session.`,\n\t\trefused: `Refused the ${subject} credential.`,\n\t}));\n}\n\n/**\n * Approve one command to run in a separate child with one extra writable root.\n *\n * Unlike a host or a credential, nothing is remembered. A command is not a stable subject\n * to grant against, and a remembered approval would silently cover the next command that\n * happened to name the same root.\n */\nexport function createCommandEscalationApprover(\n\toptions: TerminalPromptOptions,\n): ((request: { command: string; writableRoot: string }) => Promise<boolean>) | undefined {\n\tconst prompt = createTerminalPrompt(options, (subject) => ({\n\t\tquestion:\n\t\t\t`The sandboxed session asked to run a command with write access outside its workspace.\\n\\n` +\n\t\t\t`  ${subject}\\n\\n` +\n\t\t\t`It runs once, in a separate sandbox. The session's own boundary does not change.\\n` +\n\t\t\t`Allow it? [y/N] `,\n\t\tgranted: \"Ran the command once with that root writable.\",\n\t\trefused: \"Refused.\",\n\t}));\n\tif (!prompt) return undefined;\n\treturn (request) => prompt(`${request.command}\\n  (writable: ${request.writableRoot})`);\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/linux-backend.d.ts

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
-import { type CommandEscalationRequest } from "./rpc/command-proxy.ts";
-import { fillHostGitCredential } from "./rpc/git-credential-helper.ts";
-import type { SandboxBackend } from "./supervisor.ts";
-import type { SandboxViolationStore } from "./violations.ts";
-export interface LinuxSandboxBackendOptions {
-    /** Injectable only for preflight tests; production uses the running platform. */
-    platform?: NodeJS.Platform;
-    commandExists?: (command: string) => boolean;
-    violationStore?: SandboxViolationStore;
-    /** Injectable only to prove crash cleanup in tests; production spawns `bwrap` directly. */
-    spawnChild?: typeof spawn;
-    /**
-     * Injectable only for tests, which have no terminal and would otherwise be unable to
-     * exercise a released credential at all. Production builds the releaser from the
-     * terminal handoff, and its absence there is what makes a headless session refuse.
-     */
-    requestGitCredentialRelease?: (host: string) => Promise<boolean>;
-    /** Injectable only for tests; production resolves against the real host store. */
-    fillGitCredential?: typeof fillHostGitCredential;
-    /** Injectable only for tests, which have no terminal to approve an escalation at. */
-    requestCommandEscalation?: (request: CommandEscalationRequest) => Promise<boolean>;
-    /** Retained for source compatibility; launch state is now required on each launch. */
-    supervisorStateDirectory?: string;
-}
-/**
- * Where the supervisor's proxy socket lives on each side of the boundary.
- *
- * AF_UNIX caps `sun_path` at 108 bytes, so the socket cannot live under the workspace:
- * a deep-but-ordinary project directory exhausts that budget and the sandbox fails to
- * start at all with `listen EINVAL`. The host side therefore gets a short, unique path
- * under the system temp directory, and it is bind-mounted into the child.
- *
- * The child-side path has to sit under `/home`. That is the one writable mount at the
- * point the mountpoint is created — the sandbox root is a read-only bind, so bwrap
- * cannot create a mountpoint at `/run`, `/tmp`, or anywhere else on it.
- */
-export declare function resolveProxySocketPaths(temporaryDirectory?: string): {
-    hostSocketPath: string;
-    childSocketPath: string;
-};
-/**
- * Linux's deliberately small platform adapter. The sandbox starts from a read-only
- * host root and bind-mounts only the canonical workspace as writable. `--unshare-net`
- * removes all direct network interfaces for the child and every descendant.
- */
-export declare function createLinuxSandboxBackend(options?: LinuxSandboxBackendOptions): SandboxBackend;
-//# sourceMappingURL=linux-backend.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/sandbox/linux-backend.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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Production builds the releaser from the\n\t * terminal handoff, and its absence there is what makes a headless session refuse.\n\t */\n\trequestGitCredentialRelease?: (host: string) => Promise<boolean>;\n\t/** Injectable only for tests; production resolves against the real host store. */\n\tfillGitCredential?: typeof fillHostGitCredential;\n\t/** Injectable only for tests, which have no terminal to approve an escalation at. */\n\trequestCommandEscalation?: (request: CommandEscalationRequest) => Promise<boolean>;\n\t/** Retained for source compatibility; launch state is now required on each launch. */\n\tsupervisorStateDirectory?: string;\n}\n\nfunction commandExists(command: string): boolean {\n\tconst result = spawnSync(command, [\"--version\"], { stdio: \"ignore\", timeout: 1_000 });\n\treturn result.status === 0;\n}\n\nfunction waitForExit(child: ReturnType<typeof spawn>): Promise<number> {\n\treturn new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n\t\tchild.once(\"error\", reject);\n\t\tchild.once(\"exit\", (code) => resolve(code ?? 1));\n\t});\n}\n\n/**\n * Where the supervisor's proxy socket lives on each side of the boundary.\n *\n * AF_UNIX caps `sun_path` at 108 bytes, so the socket cannot live under the workspace:\n * a deep-but-ordinary project directory exhausts that budget and the sandbox fails to\n * start at all with `listen EINVAL`. The host side therefore gets a short, unique path\n * under the system temp directory, and it is bind-mounted into the child.\n *\n * The child-side path has to sit under `/home`. That is the one writable mount at the\n * point the mountpoint is created — the sandbox root is a read-only bind, so bwrap\n * cannot create a mountpoint at `/run`, `/tmp`, or anywhere else on it.\n */\nexport function resolveProxySocketPaths(temporaryDirectory: string = tmpdir()): {\n\thostSocketPath: string;\n\tchildSocketPath: string;\n} {\n\tconst name = `apex-${process.pid}-${randomBytes(4).toString(\"hex\")}.sock`;\n\t// An unusually long TMPDIR would reintroduce the very limit this avoids.\n\tconst base = join(temporaryDirectory, name).length + 1 > SUN_PATH_LIMIT ? \"/tmp\" : temporaryDirectory;\n\treturn { hostSocketPath: join(base, name), childSocketPath: `/home/${name}` };\n}\n\n/**\n * Classify an unsuccessful child from what its stderr actually evidences, or return\n * undefined when nothing suggests the boundary refused anything.\n *\n * A non-zero exit is not a violation. An invalid API key, a failing test command, or a\n * script exiting 1 are the child's own business, and recording them as sandbox\n * violations blames the boundary for failures it had no part in — which is worse than\n * silence, because it sends whoever reads the output looking for a refusal that never\n * happened. Only Linux's own refusal wording earns a violation here; the proxy records\n * network refusals itself, before this fallback is consulted.\n */\nfunction classifySandboxFailure(stderr: string): \"filesystem\" | \"network\" | undefined {\n\tif (/Read-only file system|Permission denied|Operation not permitted/i.test(stderr)) return \"filesystem\";\n\tif (/Network is unreachable|ENETUNREACH|EHOSTUNREACH/i.test(stderr)) return \"network\";\n\treturn undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Linux's deliberately small platform adapter. The sandbox starts from a read-only\n * host root and bind-mounts only the canonical workspace as writable. `--unshare-net`\n * removes all direct network interfaces for the child and every descendant.\n */\nexport function createLinuxSandboxBackend(options?: LinuxSandboxBackendOptions): SandboxBackend {\n\tconst platform = options?.platform ?? process.platform;\n\tif (platform !== \"linux\") {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tstatus: { kind: \"unavailable\", reason: \"OS sandbox is supported on Linux only.\" },\n\t\t\tasync launch() {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"Linux sandbox backend is unavailable.\");\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tasync close() {},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\tconst hasCommand = options?.commandExists ?? commandExists;\n\tconst violationStore = options?.violationStore;\n\tlet proxy: SandboxNetworkProxy | undefined;\n\tlet handoff: TerminalHandoff | undefined;\n\tlet gitCredentialProxy: GitCredentialProxy | undefined;\n\tlet gitCredentialDirectory: string | undefined;\n\tlet escalationProxy: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof createCommandEscalationProxy>> | undefined;\n\tlet escalationDirectory: string | undefined;\n\tif (!hasCommand(\"bwrap\")) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tstatus: { kind: \"unavailable\", reason: \"Bubblewrap (bwrap) is required for OS sandboxing.\" },\n\t\t\tasync launch() {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"Linux sandbox backend is unavailable.\");\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tasync close() {},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\treturn {\n\t\tstatus: { kind: \"enforced\" },\n\t\tasync launch(launch: SandboxLaunch): Promise<number> {\n\t\t\tconst supervisorStateDirectory = launch.supervisorStateDirectory;\n\t\t\tmkdirSync(supervisorStateDirectory, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });\n\t\t\tconst stateDirectory = launch.policy.workspace;\n\t\t\tconst acknowledgementPath = join(launch.policy.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-handoff-ack\");\n\t\t\tmkdirSync(join(launch.policy.workspace, \".apex-code\"), { recursive: true });\n\n\t\t\tconst violationCountBeforeLaunch = violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0;\n\n\t\t\tconst { hostSocketPath, childSocketPath } = resolveProxySocketPaths();\n\t\t\thandoff = createTerminalHandoff(supervisorStateDirectory, { acknowledgementPath });\n\t\t\tconst gitCredentialPaths = resolveGitCredentialChannelPaths();\n\t\t\tgitCredentialDirectory = gitCredentialPaths.hostSocketDirectory;\n\t\t\tproxy = await createSandboxNetworkProxy({\n\t\t\t\tsocketPath: hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\tallowedHosts: launch.policy.allowedHosts,\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t\t// Undefined without a terminal, which leaves the proxy's own\n\t\t\t\t// deny-without-asking path in place for headless, print, JSON, and RPC.\n\t\t\t\trequestApproval: createHostApprover({ handoff }),\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t// After the network proxy, because reachability is its answer to give: the\n\t\t\t// credential channel must never hand out a token for a host this session\n\t\t\t// cannot even open a connection to.\n\t\t\tgitCredentialProxy = await createGitCredentialProxy({\n\t\t\t\tsocketPath: gitCredentialPaths.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\tisHostAllowed: (host) => proxy?.isHostReachable(host) ?? false,\n\t\t\t\trequestRelease: options?.requestGitCredentialRelease ?? createCredentialReleaser({ handoff }),\n\t\t\t\t// The supervisor's own environment, deliberately: this runs outside the\n\t\t\t\t// boundary and must resolve against the real host home, which is exactly\n\t\t\t\t// what the child cannot see.\n\t\t\t\tfillCredential: (request) =>\n\t\t\t\t\t(options?.fillGitCredential ?? fillHostGitCredential)(request, { environment: process.env }),\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\twriteGitCredentialHelper(supervisorStateDirectory);\n\n\t\t\tconst escalationPaths = resolveCommandEscalationChannelPaths();\n\t\t\tescalationDirectory = escalationPaths.hostSocketDirectory;\n\n\t\t\t// .cjs forces CommonJS regardless of the target workspace's package.json \"type\"\n\t\t\t// field -- a plain .js here would be parsed as ESM under \"type\": \"module\" and\n\t\t\t// crash on `require`, since Node resolves module type from the nearest package.json.\n\t\t\tconst relayScriptPath = join(supervisorStateDirectory, \"relay.cjs\");\n\t\t\twriteFileSync(\n\t\t\t\trelayScriptPath,\n\t\t\t\t`\nconst net = require(\"node:net\");\nconst child_process = require(\"node:child_process\");\n\nconst socketPath = process.env.APEX_UDS_PATH;\nconst server = net.createServer((c) => {\n\tconst client = net.connect(socketPath);\n\tc.pipe(client).pipe(c);\n\tc.on(\"error\", () => {});\n\tclient.on(\"error\", () => {});\n});\n\nserver.listen(0, \"127.0.0.1\", () => {\n\tconst port = server.address().port;\n\tconst env = Object.assign({}, process.env, {\n\t\tHTTP_PROXY: \\`http://127.0.0.1:\\${port}\\`,\n\t\tHTTPS_PROXY: \\`http://127.0.0.1:\\${port}\\`\n\t});\n\tconst args = process.argv.slice(2);\n\tconst child = child_process.spawn(args[0], args.slice(1), {\n\t\tstdio: \"inherit\",\n\t\tenv: env,\n\t});\n\tchild.on(\"exit\", (code, signal) => {\n\t\tprocess.exit(code ?? (signal ? 128 : 1));\n\t});\n});\nserver.on(\"error\", (err) => {\n\tconsole.error(\"Relay error:\", err);\n\tprocess.exit(1);\n});\n`.trim(),\n\t\t\t);\n\n\t\t\tconst primaryReadOnlyPaths = [\n\t\t\t\tprocess.execPath,\n\t\t\t\tlaunch.command,\n\t\t\t\tsupervisorStateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t...(launch.readOnlyPaths ?? []),\n\t\t\t];\n\t\t\tconst readOnlyFileDescriptors = [\n\t\t\t\t...descriptorBackedReadOnlyPaths(primaryReadOnlyPaths),\n\t\t\t\t...(launch.readOnlyFiles ?? []),\n\t\t\t].map((path) => openSync(path, \"r\"));\n\t\t\t// The descriptors above are opened before the child spawns and must be closed\n\t\t\t// on every exit path -- including a spawn/wait rejection -- or a crashed launch\n\t\t\t// leaks an open handle onto a host-owned credential file for the process's life.\n\t\t\t// The workspace is bind-mounted read-write into the sandbox, so a file\n\t\t\t// here is visible at the same absolute path on both sides of it.\n\t\t\tconst terminalSizePath = join(supervisorStateDirectory, \"terminal-size\");\n\t\t\tconst stopPublishingTerminalSize = publishTerminalSize(terminalSizePath);\n\n\t\t\t// The second child derives its argv from the same builder as the first, with one\n\t\t\t// extra writable root. Nothing about the original child's namespace changes.\n\t\t\tescalationProxy = await createCommandEscalationProxy({\n\t\t\t\tsocketPath: escalationPaths.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\trequestApproval: options?.requestCommandEscalation ?? createCommandEscalationApprover({ handoff }),\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t\trunEscalated: (request) =>\n\t\t\t\t\trunEscalatedCommand({\n\t\t\t\t\t\trequest,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tstateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tspawnBwrap: options?.spawnChild ?? spawn,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tconst spawnBwrap = options?.spawnChild ?? spawn;\n\t\t\t\tconst child = spawnBwrap(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"bwrap\",\n\t\t\t\t\tbuildBwrapArguments({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tworkspace: launch.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tadditionalWritableRoots: launch.policy.additionalWritableRoots,\n\t\t\t\t\t\treadOnlyPaths: primaryReadOnlyPaths,\n\t\t\t\t\t\treadOnlyFiles: launch.readOnlyFiles ?? [],\n\t\t\t\t\t\treadOnlyBinaries: launch.readOnlyBinaries ?? [],\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsockets: [\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t{ hostPath: hostSocketPath, childPath: childSocketPath },\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t// Its child-side path is what `APEX_CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PATH` names.\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t...(launch.credentialChannel\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t? [\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\thostPath: launch.credentialChannel.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tchildPath: launch.credentialChannel.childSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t]\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t: []),\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\thostPath: gitCredentialPaths.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tchildPath: gitCredentialPaths.childSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t\t],\n\t\t\t\t\t\tenvironment: {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tHOME: launch.environment?.HOME ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tTMPDIR: launch.environment?.TMPDIR ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tAPEX_UDS_PATH: childSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[TERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE]: terminalSizePath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[TERMINAL_HANDOFF_PATH_VARIABLE]: supervisorStateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[TERMINAL_HANDOFF_ACK_PATH_VARIABLE]: acknowledgementPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[GIT_CREDENTIAL_SOCKET_VARIABLE]: gitCredentialPaths.childSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[COMMAND_ESCALATION_SOCKET_VARIABLE]: escalationPaths.childSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcommand: process.execPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\targs: [relayScriptPath, launch.command, ...launch.args],\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t\t{ env: launch.environment, stdio: [\"inherit\", \"inherit\", \"pipe\", ...readOnlyFileDescriptors] },\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t\tlet stderr = \"\";\n\t\t\t\tchild.stderr?.setEncoding(\"utf8\");\n\t\t\t\tchild.stderr?.on(\"data\", (chunk: string) => {\n\t\t\t\t\tstderr += chunk;\n\t\t\t\t\tprocess.stderr.write(chunk);\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t\tconst exitCode = await waitForExit(child);\n\t\t\t\tawait proxy?.close();\n\t\t\t\tconst proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation = (violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0) > violationCountBeforeLaunch;\n\t\t\t\tconst kind = exitCode !== 0 && !proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation ? classifySandboxFailure(stderr) : undefined;\n\t\t\t\tif (kind) {\n\t\t\t\t\tviolationStore?.add({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tkind,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcommand: [launch.command, ...launch.args].join(\" \"),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdetail: stderr.trim(),\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttimestamp: new Date(),\n\t\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn exitCode;\n\t\t\t} finally {\n\t\t\t\tstopPublishingTerminalSize();\n\t\t\t\tfor (const descriptor of readOnlyFileDescriptors) closeSync(descriptor);\n\t\t\t\t// The socket now lives outside the workspace, so nothing else will ever clean\n\t\t\t\t// it up; leaving it would litter the temp directory once per launch.\n\t\t\t\trmSync(hostSocketPath, { force: true });\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n\t\tasync close() {\n\t\t\thandoff?.stop();\n\t\t\tawait escalationProxy?.close();\n\t\t\tif (escalationDirectory) rmSync(escalationDirectory, { force: true, recursive: true });\n\t\t\tawait gitCredentialProxy?.close();\n\t\t\tif (gitCredentialDirectory) rmSync(gitCredentialDirectory, { force: true, recursive: true });\n\t\t\tawait proxy?.close();\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n\n/**\n * Start one approved command in its own child, with one extra writable root.\n *\n * Deliberately minimal compared with the session child: no network relay, no credential\n * channels, no terminal handoff. An escalated command is a single shell invocation the\n * human just read and approved, not a session, and every channel omitted here is one it\n * cannot reach. Its stdio is captured rather than inherited so the session that asked\n * receives the output instead of the escalated process writing over the TUI.\n */\nasync function runEscalatedCommand(options: {\n\trequest: CommandEscalationRequest;\n\tlaunch: SandboxLaunch;\n\tstateDirectory: string;\n\tspawnBwrap: typeof spawn;\n}): Promise<CommandEscalationResult> {\n\tconst { request, launch, stateDirectory } = options;\n\tconst escalatedReadOnlyPaths = launch.readOnlyPaths ?? [];\n\tconst readOnlyFileDescriptors = [\n\t\t...descriptorBackedReadOnlyPaths(escalatedReadOnlyPaths),\n\t\t...(launch.readOnlyFiles ?? []),\n\t].map((path) => openSync(path, \"r\"));\n\tconst child = options.spawnBwrap(\n\t\t\"bwrap\",\n\t\tbuildBwrapArguments({\n\t\t\tworkspace: launch.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\tadditionalWritableRoots: [...launch.policy.additionalWritableRoots, request.writableRoot],\n\t\t\treadOnlyPaths: escalatedReadOnlyPaths,\n\t\t\treadOnlyFiles: launch.readOnlyFiles ?? [],\n\t\t\treadOnlyBinaries: launch.readOnlyBinaries ?? [],\n\t\t\tsockets: [],\n\t\t\tenvironment: {\n\t\t\t\tHOME: launch.environment?.HOME ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\tTMPDIR: launch.environment?.TMPDIR ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tcommand: \"/bin/sh\",\n\t\t\targs: [\"-c\", request.command],\n\t\t}),\n\t\t{ stdio: [\"ignore\", \"pipe\", \"pipe\", ...readOnlyFileDescriptors] },\n\t);\n\tlet stdout = \"\";\n\tlet stderr = \"\";\n\ttry {\n\t\tchild.stdout?.setEncoding(\"utf8\");\n\t\tchild.stdout?.on(\"data\", (chunk: string) => {\n\t\t\tstdout += chunk;\n\t\t});\n\t\tchild.stderr?.setEncoding(\"utf8\");\n\t\tchild.stderr?.on(\"data\", (chunk: string) => {\n\t\t\tstderr += chunk;\n\t\t});\n\t\tconst code = await new Promise<number>((resolveCode) => {\n\t\t\tchild.once(\"error\", () => resolveCode(1));\n\t\t\tchild.once(\"exit\", (exitCode) => resolveCode(exitCode ?? 1));\n\t\t});\n\t\treturn { code, stdout, stderr };\n\t} finally {\n\t\tfor (const descriptor of readOnlyFileDescriptors) closeSync(descriptor);\n\t}\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/linux-backend.js

@@ -1,328 +0,0 @@
-import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
-import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
-import { closeSync, mkdirSync, openSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
-import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
-import { join } from "node:path";
-import { buildBwrapArguments, descriptorBackedReadOnlyPaths } from "./bwrap-arguments.js";
-import { createCommandEscalationApprover, createCredentialReleaser, createHostApprover } from "./host-approval.js";
-import { createSandboxNetworkProxy } from "./network-proxy.js";
-import { COMMAND_ESCALATION_SOCKET_VARIABLE, createCommandEscalationProxy, resolveCommandEscalationChannelPaths, } from "./rpc/command-proxy.js";
-import { fillHostGitCredential, GIT_CREDENTIAL_SOCKET_VARIABLE, resolveGitCredentialChannelPaths, writeGitCredentialHelper, } from "./rpc/git-credential-helper.js";
-import { createGitCredentialProxy } from "./rpc/git-credential-proxy.js";
-import { createTerminalHandoff, TERMINAL_HANDOFF_ACK_PATH_VARIABLE, TERMINAL_HANDOFF_PATH_VARIABLE, } from "./terminal-handoff.js";
-import { publishTerminalSize, TERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE } from "./terminal-size.js";
-/** AF_UNIX `sun_path` is 108 bytes on Linux, including the terminating NUL. */
-const SUN_PATH_LIMIT = 108;
-function commandExists(command) {
-    const result = spawnSync(command, ["--version"], { stdio: "ignore", timeout: 1_000 });
-    return result.status === 0;
-}
-function waitForExit(child) {
-    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-        child.once("error", reject);
-        child.once("exit", (code) => resolve(code ?? 1));
-    });
-}
-/**
- * Where the supervisor's proxy socket lives on each side of the boundary.
- *
- * AF_UNIX caps `sun_path` at 108 bytes, so the socket cannot live under the workspace:
- * a deep-but-ordinary project directory exhausts that budget and the sandbox fails to
- * start at all with `listen EINVAL`. The host side therefore gets a short, unique path
- * under the system temp directory, and it is bind-mounted into the child.
- *
- * The child-side path has to sit under `/home`. That is the one writable mount at the
- * point the mountpoint is created — the sandbox root is a read-only bind, so bwrap
- * cannot create a mountpoint at `/run`, `/tmp`, or anywhere else on it.
- */
-export function resolveProxySocketPaths(temporaryDirectory = tmpdir()) {
-    const name = `apex-${process.pid}-${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}.sock`;
-    // An unusually long TMPDIR would reintroduce the very limit this avoids.
-    const base = join(temporaryDirectory, name).length + 1 > SUN_PATH_LIMIT ? "/tmp" : temporaryDirectory;
-    return { hostSocketPath: join(base, name), childSocketPath: `/home/${name}` };
-}
-/**
- * Classify an unsuccessful child from what its stderr actually evidences, or return
- * undefined when nothing suggests the boundary refused anything.
- *
- * A non-zero exit is not a violation. An invalid API key, a failing test command, or a
- * script exiting 1 are the child's own business, and recording them as sandbox
- * violations blames the boundary for failures it had no part in — which is worse than
- * silence, because it sends whoever reads the output looking for a refusal that never
- * happened. Only Linux's own refusal wording earns a violation here; the proxy records
- * network refusals itself, before this fallback is consulted.
- */
-function classifySandboxFailure(stderr) {
-    if (/Read-only file system|Permission denied|Operation not permitted/i.test(stderr))
-        return "filesystem";
-    if (/Network is unreachable|ENETUNREACH|EHOSTUNREACH/i.test(stderr))
-        return "network";
-    return undefined;
-}
-/**
- * Linux's deliberately small platform adapter. The sandbox starts from a read-only
- * host root and bind-mounts only the canonical workspace as writable. `--unshare-net`
- * removes all direct network interfaces for the child and every descendant.
- */
-export function createLinuxSandboxBackend(options) {
-    const platform = options?.platform ?? process.platform;
-    if (platform !== "linux") {
-        return {
-            status: { kind: "unavailable", reason: "OS sandbox is supported on Linux only." },
-            async launch() {
-                throw new Error("Linux sandbox backend is unavailable.");
-            },
-            async close() { },
-        };
-    }
-    const hasCommand = options?.commandExists ?? commandExists;
-    const violationStore = options?.violationStore;
-    let proxy;
-    let handoff;
-    let gitCredentialProxy;
-    let gitCredentialDirectory;
-    let escalationProxy;
-    let escalationDirectory;
-    if (!hasCommand("bwrap")) {
-        return {
-            status: { kind: "unavailable", reason: "Bubblewrap (bwrap) is required for OS sandboxing." },
-            async launch() {
-                throw new Error("Linux sandbox backend is unavailable.");
-            },
-            async close() { },
-        };
-    }
-    return {
-        status: { kind: "enforced" },
-        async launch(launch) {
-            const supervisorStateDirectory = launch.supervisorStateDirectory;
-            mkdirSync(supervisorStateDirectory, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-            const stateDirectory = launch.policy.workspace;
-            const acknowledgementPath = join(launch.policy.workspace, ".apex-code", "sandbox-handoff-ack");
-            mkdirSync(join(launch.policy.workspace, ".apex-code"), { recursive: true });
-            const violationCountBeforeLaunch = violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0;
-            const { hostSocketPath, childSocketPath } = resolveProxySocketPaths();
-            handoff = createTerminalHandoff(supervisorStateDirectory, { acknowledgementPath });
-            const gitCredentialPaths = resolveGitCredentialChannelPaths();
-            gitCredentialDirectory = gitCredentialPaths.hostSocketDirectory;
-            proxy = await createSandboxNetworkProxy({
-                socketPath: hostSocketPath,
-                allowedHosts: launch.policy.allowedHosts,
-                violationStore,
-                // Undefined without a terminal, which leaves the proxy's own
-                // deny-without-asking path in place for headless, print, JSON, and RPC.
-                requestApproval: createHostApprover({ handoff }),
-            });
-            // After the network proxy, because reachability is its answer to give: the
-            // credential channel must never hand out a token for a host this session
-            // cannot even open a connection to.
-            gitCredentialProxy = await createGitCredentialProxy({
-                socketPath: gitCredentialPaths.hostSocketPath,
-                isHostAllowed: (host) => proxy?.isHostReachable(host) ?? false,
-                requestRelease: options?.requestGitCredentialRelease ?? createCredentialReleaser({ handoff }),
-                // The supervisor's own environment, deliberately: this runs outside the
-                // boundary and must resolve against the real host home, which is exactly
-                // what the child cannot see.
-                fillCredential: (request) => (options?.fillGitCredential ?? fillHostGitCredential)(request, { environment: process.env }),
-                violationStore,
-            });
-            writeGitCredentialHelper(supervisorStateDirectory);
-            const escalationPaths = resolveCommandEscalationChannelPaths();
-            escalationDirectory = escalationPaths.hostSocketDirectory;
-            // .cjs forces CommonJS regardless of the target workspace's package.json "type"
-            // field -- a plain .js here would be parsed as ESM under "type": "module" and
-            // crash on `require`, since Node resolves module type from the nearest package.json.
-            const relayScriptPath = join(supervisorStateDirectory, "relay.cjs");
-            writeFileSync(relayScriptPath, `
-const net = require("node:net");
-const child_process = require("node:child_process");
-
-const socketPath = process.env.APEX_UDS_PATH;
-const server = net.createServer((c) => {
-	const client = net.connect(socketPath);
-	c.pipe(client).pipe(c);
-	c.on("error", () => {});
-	client.on("error", () => {});
-});
-
-server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => {
-	const port = server.address().port;
-	const env = Object.assign({}, process.env, {
-		HTTP_PROXY: \`http://127.0.0.1:\${port}\`,
-		HTTPS_PROXY: \`http://127.0.0.1:\${port}\`
-	});
-	const args = process.argv.slice(2);
-	const child = child_process.spawn(args[0], args.slice(1), {
-		stdio: "inherit",
-		env: env,
-	});
-	child.on("exit", (code, signal) => {
-		process.exit(code ?? (signal ? 128 : 1));
-	});
-});
-server.on("error", (err) => {
-	console.error("Relay error:", err);
-	process.exit(1);
-});
-`.trim());
-            const primaryReadOnlyPaths = [
-                process.execPath,
-                launch.command,
-                supervisorStateDirectory,
-                ...(launch.readOnlyPaths ?? []),
-            ];
-            const readOnlyFileDescriptors = [
-                ...descriptorBackedReadOnlyPaths(primaryReadOnlyPaths),
-                ...(launch.readOnlyFiles ?? []),
-            ].map((path) => openSync(path, "r"));
-            // The descriptors above are opened before the child spawns and must be closed
-            // on every exit path -- including a spawn/wait rejection -- or a crashed launch
-            // leaks an open handle onto a host-owned credential file for the process's life.
-            // The workspace is bind-mounted read-write into the sandbox, so a file
-            // here is visible at the same absolute path on both sides of it.
-            const terminalSizePath = join(supervisorStateDirectory, "terminal-size");
-            const stopPublishingTerminalSize = publishTerminalSize(terminalSizePath);
-            // The second child derives its argv from the same builder as the first, with one
-            // extra writable root. Nothing about the original child's namespace changes.
-            escalationProxy = await createCommandEscalationProxy({
-                socketPath: escalationPaths.hostSocketPath,
-                requestApproval: options?.requestCommandEscalation ?? createCommandEscalationApprover({ handoff }),
-                violationStore,
-                runEscalated: (request) => runEscalatedCommand({
-                    request,
-                    launch,
-                    stateDirectory,
-                    spawnBwrap: options?.spawnChild ?? spawn,
-                }),
-            });
-            try {
-                const spawnBwrap = options?.spawnChild ?? spawn;
-                const child = spawnBwrap("bwrap", buildBwrapArguments({
-                    workspace: launch.policy.workspace,
-                    additionalWritableRoots: launch.policy.additionalWritableRoots,
-                    readOnlyPaths: primaryReadOnlyPaths,
-                    readOnlyFiles: launch.readOnlyFiles ?? [],
-                    readOnlyBinaries: launch.readOnlyBinaries ?? [],
-                    sockets: [
-                        { hostPath: hostSocketPath, childPath: childSocketPath },
-                        // Its child-side path is what `APEX_CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PATH` names.
-                        ...(launch.credentialChannel
-                            ? [
-                                {
-                                    hostPath: launch.credentialChannel.hostSocketPath,
-                                    childPath: launch.credentialChannel.childSocketPath,
-                                },
-                            ]
-                            : []),
-                        {
-                            hostPath: gitCredentialPaths.hostSocketPath,
-                            childPath: gitCredentialPaths.childSocketPath,
-                        },
-                    ],
-                    environment: {
-                        HOME: launch.environment?.HOME ?? stateDirectory,
-                        TMPDIR: launch.environment?.TMPDIR ?? stateDirectory,
-                        APEX_UDS_PATH: childSocketPath,
-                        [TERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE]: terminalSizePath,
-                        [TERMINAL_HANDOFF_PATH_VARIABLE]: supervisorStateDirectory,
-                        [TERMINAL_HANDOFF_ACK_PATH_VARIABLE]: acknowledgementPath,
-                        [GIT_CREDENTIAL_SOCKET_VARIABLE]: gitCredentialPaths.childSocketPath,
-                        [COMMAND_ESCALATION_SOCKET_VARIABLE]: escalationPaths.childSocketPath,
-                    },
-                    command: process.execPath,
-                    args: [relayScriptPath, launch.command, ...launch.args],
-                }), { env: launch.environment, stdio: ["inherit", "inherit", "pipe", ...readOnlyFileDescriptors] });
-                let stderr = "";
-                child.stderr?.setEncoding("utf8");
-                child.stderr?.on("data", (chunk) => {
-                    stderr += chunk;
-                    process.stderr.write(chunk);
-                });
-                const exitCode = await waitForExit(child);
-                await proxy?.close();
-                const proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation = (violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0) > violationCountBeforeLaunch;
-                const kind = exitCode !== 0 && !proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation ? classifySandboxFailure(stderr) : undefined;
-                if (kind) {
-                    violationStore?.add({
-                        kind,
-                        command: [launch.command, ...launch.args].join(" "),
-                        detail: stderr.trim(),
-                        timestamp: new Date(),
-                    });
-                }
-                return exitCode;
-            }
-            finally {
-                stopPublishingTerminalSize();
-                for (const descriptor of readOnlyFileDescriptors)
-                    closeSync(descriptor);
-                // The socket now lives outside the workspace, so nothing else will ever clean
-                // it up; leaving it would litter the temp directory once per launch.
-                rmSync(hostSocketPath, { force: true });
-            }
-        },
-        async close() {
-            handoff?.stop();
-            await escalationProxy?.close();
-            if (escalationDirectory)
-                rmSync(escalationDirectory, { force: true, recursive: true });
-            await gitCredentialProxy?.close();
-            if (gitCredentialDirectory)
-                rmSync(gitCredentialDirectory, { force: true, recursive: true });
-            await proxy?.close();
-        },
-    };
-}
-/**
- * Start one approved command in its own child, with one extra writable root.
- *
- * Deliberately minimal compared with the session child: no network relay, no credential
- * channels, no terminal handoff. An escalated command is a single shell invocation the
- * human just read and approved, not a session, and every channel omitted here is one it
- * cannot reach. Its stdio is captured rather than inherited so the session that asked
- * receives the output instead of the escalated process writing over the TUI.
- */
-async function runEscalatedCommand(options) {
-    const { request, launch, stateDirectory } = options;
-    const escalatedReadOnlyPaths = launch.readOnlyPaths ?? [];
-    const readOnlyFileDescriptors = [
-        ...descriptorBackedReadOnlyPaths(escalatedReadOnlyPaths),
-        ...(launch.readOnlyFiles ?? []),
-    ].map((path) => openSync(path, "r"));
-    const child = options.spawnBwrap("bwrap", buildBwrapArguments({
-        workspace: launch.policy.workspace,
-        additionalWritableRoots: [...launch.policy.additionalWritableRoots, request.writableRoot],
-        readOnlyPaths: escalatedReadOnlyPaths,
-        readOnlyFiles: launch.readOnlyFiles ?? [],
-        readOnlyBinaries: launch.readOnlyBinaries ?? [],
-        sockets: [],
-        environment: {
-            HOME: launch.environment?.HOME ?? stateDirectory,
-            TMPDIR: launch.environment?.TMPDIR ?? stateDirectory,
-        },
-        command: "/bin/sh",
-        args: ["-c", request.command],
-    }), { stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe", ...readOnlyFileDescriptors] });
-    let stdout = "";
-    let stderr = "";
-    try {
-        child.stdout?.setEncoding("utf8");
-        child.stdout?.on("data", (chunk) => {
-            stdout += chunk;
-        });
-        child.stderr?.setEncoding("utf8");
-        child.stderr?.on("data", (chunk) => {
-            stderr += chunk;
-        });
-        const code = await new Promise((resolveCode) => {
-            child.once("error", () => resolveCode(1));
-            child.once("exit", (exitCode) => resolveCode(exitCode ?? 1));
-        });
-        return { code, stdout, stderr };
-    }
-    finally {
-        for (const descriptor of readOnlyFileDescriptors)
-            closeSync(descriptor);
-    }
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=linux-backend.js.map

package/dist/core/sandbox/linux-backend.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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{ spawn, spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\";\nimport { randomBytes } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport { closeSync, mkdirSync, openSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from \"node:fs\";\nimport { tmpdir } from \"node:os\";\nimport { join } from \"node:path\";\nimport { buildBwrapArguments, descriptorBackedReadOnlyPaths } from \"./bwrap-arguments.ts\";\nimport { createCommandEscalationApprover, createCredentialReleaser, createHostApprover } from \"./host-approval.ts\";\nimport { createSandboxNetworkProxy, type SandboxNetworkProxy } from \"./network-proxy.ts\";\nimport {\n\tCOMMAND_ESCALATION_SOCKET_VARIABLE,\n\ttype CommandEscalationRequest,\n\ttype CommandEscalationResult,\n\tcreateCommandEscalationProxy,\n\tresolveCommandEscalationChannelPaths,\n} from \"./rpc/command-proxy.ts\";\nimport {\n\tfillHostGitCredential,\n\tGIT_CREDENTIAL_SOCKET_VARIABLE,\n\tresolveGitCredentialChannelPaths,\n\twriteGitCredentialHelper,\n} from \"./rpc/git-credential-helper.ts\";\nimport { createGitCredentialProxy, type GitCredentialProxy } from \"./rpc/git-credential-proxy.ts\";\nimport type { SandboxBackend, SandboxLaunch } from \"./supervisor.ts\";\nimport {\n\tcreateTerminalHandoff,\n\tTERMINAL_HANDOFF_ACK_PATH_VARIABLE,\n\tTERMINAL_HANDOFF_PATH_VARIABLE,\n\ttype TerminalHandoff,\n} from \"./terminal-handoff.ts\";\nimport { publishTerminalSize, TERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE } from \"./terminal-size.ts\";\nimport type { SandboxViolationStore } from \"./violations.ts\";\n\n/** AF_UNIX `sun_path` is 108 bytes on Linux, including the terminating NUL. */\nconst SUN_PATH_LIMIT = 108;\n\nexport interface LinuxSandboxBackendOptions {\n\t/** Injectable only for preflight tests; production uses the running platform. */\n\tplatform?: NodeJS.Platform;\n\tcommandExists?: (command: string) => boolean;\n\tviolationStore?: SandboxViolationStore;\n\t/** Injectable only to prove crash cleanup in tests; production spawns `bwrap` directly. */\n\tspawnChild?: typeof spawn;\n\t/**\n\t * Injectable only for tests, which have no terminal and would otherwise be unable to\n\t * exercise a released credential at all. Production builds the releaser from the\n\t * terminal handoff, and its absence there is what makes a headless session refuse.\n\t */\n\trequestGitCredentialRelease?: (host: string) => Promise<boolean>;\n\t/** Injectable only for tests; production resolves against the real host store. */\n\tfillGitCredential?: typeof fillHostGitCredential;\n\t/** Injectable only for tests, which have no terminal to approve an escalation at. */\n\trequestCommandEscalation?: (request: CommandEscalationRequest) => Promise<boolean>;\n\t/** Retained for source compatibility; launch state is now required on each launch. */\n\tsupervisorStateDirectory?: string;\n}\n\nfunction commandExists(command: string): boolean {\n\tconst result = spawnSync(command, [\"--version\"], { stdio: \"ignore\", timeout: 1_000 });\n\treturn result.status === 0;\n}\n\nfunction waitForExit(child: ReturnType<typeof spawn>): Promise<number> {\n\treturn new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n\t\tchild.once(\"error\", reject);\n\t\tchild.once(\"exit\", (code) => resolve(code ?? 1));\n\t});\n}\n\n/**\n * Where the supervisor's proxy socket lives on each side of the boundary.\n *\n * AF_UNIX caps `sun_path` at 108 bytes, so the socket cannot live under the workspace:\n * a deep-but-ordinary project directory exhausts that budget and the sandbox fails to\n * start at all with `listen EINVAL`. The host side therefore gets a short, unique path\n * under the system temp directory, and it is bind-mounted into the child.\n *\n * The child-side path has to sit under `/home`. That is the one writable mount at the\n * point the mountpoint is created — the sandbox root is a read-only bind, so bwrap\n * cannot create a mountpoint at `/run`, `/tmp`, or anywhere else on it.\n */\nexport function resolveProxySocketPaths(temporaryDirectory: string = tmpdir()): {\n\thostSocketPath: string;\n\tchildSocketPath: string;\n} {\n\tconst name = `apex-${process.pid}-${randomBytes(4).toString(\"hex\")}.sock`;\n\t// An unusually long TMPDIR would reintroduce the very limit this avoids.\n\tconst base = join(temporaryDirectory, name).length + 1 > SUN_PATH_LIMIT ? \"/tmp\" : temporaryDirectory;\n\treturn { hostSocketPath: join(base, name), childSocketPath: `/home/${name}` };\n}\n\n/**\n * Classify an unsuccessful child from what its stderr actually evidences, or return\n * undefined when nothing suggests the boundary refused anything.\n *\n * A non-zero exit is not a violation. An invalid API key, a failing test command, or a\n * script exiting 1 are the child's own business, and recording them as sandbox\n * violations blames the boundary for failures it had no part in — which is worse than\n * silence, because it sends whoever reads the output looking for a refusal that never\n * happened. Only Linux's own refusal wording earns a violation here; the proxy records\n * network refusals itself, before this fallback is consulted.\n */\nfunction classifySandboxFailure(stderr: string): \"filesystem\" | \"network\" | undefined {\n\tif (/Read-only file system|Permission denied|Operation not permitted/i.test(stderr)) return \"filesystem\";\n\tif (/Network is unreachable|ENETUNREACH|EHOSTUNREACH/i.test(stderr)) return \"network\";\n\treturn undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Linux's deliberately small platform adapter. The sandbox starts from a read-only\n * host root and bind-mounts only the canonical workspace as writable. `--unshare-net`\n * removes all direct network interfaces for the child and every descendant.\n */\nexport function createLinuxSandboxBackend(options?: LinuxSandboxBackendOptions): SandboxBackend {\n\tconst platform = options?.platform ?? process.platform;\n\tif (platform !== \"linux\") {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tstatus: { kind: \"unavailable\", reason: \"OS sandbox is supported on Linux only.\" },\n\t\t\tasync launch() {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"Linux sandbox backend is unavailable.\");\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tasync close() {},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\tconst hasCommand = options?.commandExists ?? commandExists;\n\tconst violationStore = options?.violationStore;\n\tlet proxy: SandboxNetworkProxy | undefined;\n\tlet handoff: TerminalHandoff | undefined;\n\tlet gitCredentialProxy: GitCredentialProxy | undefined;\n\tlet gitCredentialDirectory: string | undefined;\n\tlet escalationProxy: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof createCommandEscalationProxy>> | undefined;\n\tlet escalationDirectory: string | undefined;\n\tif (!hasCommand(\"bwrap\")) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tstatus: { kind: \"unavailable\", reason: \"Bubblewrap (bwrap) is required for OS sandboxing.\" },\n\t\t\tasync launch() {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"Linux sandbox backend is unavailable.\");\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tasync close() {},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\treturn {\n\t\tstatus: { kind: \"enforced\" },\n\t\tasync launch(launch: SandboxLaunch): Promise<number> {\n\t\t\tconst supervisorStateDirectory = launch.supervisorStateDirectory;\n\t\t\tmkdirSync(supervisorStateDirectory, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });\n\t\t\tconst stateDirectory = launch.policy.workspace;\n\t\t\tconst acknowledgementPath = join(launch.policy.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-handoff-ack\");\n\t\t\tmkdirSync(join(launch.policy.workspace, \".apex-code\"), { recursive: true });\n\n\t\t\tconst violationCountBeforeLaunch = violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0;\n\n\t\t\tconst { hostSocketPath, childSocketPath } = resolveProxySocketPaths();\n\t\t\thandoff = createTerminalHandoff(supervisorStateDirectory, { acknowledgementPath });\n\t\t\tconst gitCredentialPaths = resolveGitCredentialChannelPaths();\n\t\t\tgitCredentialDirectory = gitCredentialPaths.hostSocketDirectory;\n\t\t\tproxy = await createSandboxNetworkProxy({\n\t\t\t\tsocketPath: hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\tallowedHosts: launch.policy.allowedHosts,\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t\t// Undefined without a terminal, which leaves the proxy's own\n\t\t\t\t// deny-without-asking path in place for headless, print, JSON, and RPC.\n\t\t\t\trequestApproval: createHostApprover({ handoff }),\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t// After the network proxy, because reachability is its answer to give: the\n\t\t\t// credential channel must never hand out a token for a host this session\n\t\t\t// cannot even open a connection to.\n\t\t\tgitCredentialProxy = await createGitCredentialProxy({\n\t\t\t\tsocketPath: gitCredentialPaths.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\tisHostAllowed: (host) => proxy?.isHostReachable(host) ?? false,\n\t\t\t\trequestRelease: options?.requestGitCredentialRelease ?? createCredentialReleaser({ handoff }),\n\t\t\t\t// The supervisor's own environment, deliberately: this runs outside the\n\t\t\t\t// boundary and must resolve against the real host home, which is exactly\n\t\t\t\t// what the child cannot see.\n\t\t\t\tfillCredential: (request) =>\n\t\t\t\t\t(options?.fillGitCredential ?? fillHostGitCredential)(request, { environment: process.env }),\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\twriteGitCredentialHelper(supervisorStateDirectory);\n\n\t\t\tconst escalationPaths = resolveCommandEscalationChannelPaths();\n\t\t\tescalationDirectory = escalationPaths.hostSocketDirectory;\n\n\t\t\t// .cjs forces CommonJS regardless of the target workspace's package.json \"type\"\n\t\t\t// field -- a plain .js here would be parsed as ESM under \"type\": \"module\" and\n\t\t\t// crash on `require`, since Node resolves module type from the nearest package.json.\n\t\t\tconst relayScriptPath = join(supervisorStateDirectory, \"relay.cjs\");\n\t\t\twriteFileSync(\n\t\t\t\trelayScriptPath,\n\t\t\t\t`\nconst net = require(\"node:net\");\nconst child_process = require(\"node:child_process\");\n\nconst socketPath = process.env.APEX_UDS_PATH;\nconst server = net.createServer((c) => {\n\tconst client = net.connect(socketPath);\n\tc.pipe(client).pipe(c);\n\tc.on(\"error\", () => {});\n\tclient.on(\"error\", () => {});\n});\n\nserver.listen(0, \"127.0.0.1\", () => {\n\tconst port = server.address().port;\n\tconst env = Object.assign({}, process.env, {\n\t\tHTTP_PROXY: \\`http://127.0.0.1:\\${port}\\`,\n\t\tHTTPS_PROXY: \\`http://127.0.0.1:\\${port}\\`\n\t});\n\tconst args = process.argv.slice(2);\n\tconst child = child_process.spawn(args[0], args.slice(1), {\n\t\tstdio: \"inherit\",\n\t\tenv: env,\n\t});\n\tchild.on(\"exit\", (code, signal) => {\n\t\tprocess.exit(code ?? (signal ? 128 : 1));\n\t});\n});\nserver.on(\"error\", (err) => {\n\tconsole.error(\"Relay error:\", err);\n\tprocess.exit(1);\n});\n`.trim(),\n\t\t\t);\n\n\t\t\tconst primaryReadOnlyPaths = [\n\t\t\t\tprocess.execPath,\n\t\t\t\tlaunch.command,\n\t\t\t\tsupervisorStateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t...(launch.readOnlyPaths ?? []),\n\t\t\t];\n\t\t\tconst readOnlyFileDescriptors = [\n\t\t\t\t...descriptorBackedReadOnlyPaths(primaryReadOnlyPaths),\n\t\t\t\t...(launch.readOnlyFiles ?? []),\n\t\t\t].map((path) => openSync(path, \"r\"));\n\t\t\t// The descriptors above are opened before the child spawns and must be closed\n\t\t\t// on every exit path -- including a spawn/wait rejection -- or a crashed launch\n\t\t\t// leaks an open handle onto a host-owned credential file for the process's life.\n\t\t\t// The workspace is bind-mounted read-write into the sandbox, so a file\n\t\t\t// here is visible at the same absolute path on both sides of it.\n\t\t\tconst terminalSizePath = join(supervisorStateDirectory, \"terminal-size\");\n\t\t\tconst stopPublishingTerminalSize = publishTerminalSize(terminalSizePath);\n\n\t\t\t// The second child derives its argv from the same builder as the first, with one\n\t\t\t// extra writable root. Nothing about the original child's namespace changes.\n\t\t\tescalationProxy = await createCommandEscalationProxy({\n\t\t\t\tsocketPath: escalationPaths.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\trequestApproval: options?.requestCommandEscalation ?? createCommandEscalationApprover({ handoff }),\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t\trunEscalated: (request) =>\n\t\t\t\t\trunEscalatedCommand({\n\t\t\t\t\t\trequest,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tstateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tspawnBwrap: options?.spawnChild ?? spawn,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tconst spawnBwrap = options?.spawnChild ?? spawn;\n\t\t\t\tconst child = spawnBwrap(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"bwrap\",\n\t\t\t\t\tbuildBwrapArguments({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tworkspace: launch.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tadditionalWritableRoots: launch.policy.additionalWritableRoots,\n\t\t\t\t\t\treadOnlyPaths: primaryReadOnlyPaths,\n\t\t\t\t\t\treadOnlyFiles: launch.readOnlyFiles ?? [],\n\t\t\t\t\t\treadOnlyBinaries: launch.readOnlyBinaries ?? [],\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsockets: [\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t{ hostPath: hostSocketPath, childPath: childSocketPath },\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t// Its child-side path is what `APEX_CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PATH` names.\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t...(launch.credentialChannel\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t? [\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\thostPath: launch.credentialChannel.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tchildPath: launch.credentialChannel.childSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t]\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t: []),\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\thostPath: gitCredentialPaths.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tchildPath: gitCredentialPaths.childSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t\t],\n\t\t\t\t\t\tenvironment: {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tHOME: launch.environment?.HOME ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tTMPDIR: launch.environment?.TMPDIR ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tAPEX_UDS_PATH: childSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[TERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE]: terminalSizePath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[TERMINAL_HANDOFF_PATH_VARIABLE]: supervisorStateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[TERMINAL_HANDOFF_ACK_PATH_VARIABLE]: acknowledgementPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[GIT_CREDENTIAL_SOCKET_VARIABLE]: gitCredentialPaths.childSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[COMMAND_ESCALATION_SOCKET_VARIABLE]: escalationPaths.childSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcommand: process.execPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\targs: [relayScriptPath, launch.command, ...launch.args],\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t\t{ env: launch.environment, stdio: [\"inherit\", \"inherit\", \"pipe\", ...readOnlyFileDescriptors] },\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t\tlet stderr = \"\";\n\t\t\t\tchild.stderr?.setEncoding(\"utf8\");\n\t\t\t\tchild.stderr?.on(\"data\", (chunk: string) => {\n\t\t\t\t\tstderr += chunk;\n\t\t\t\t\tprocess.stderr.write(chunk);\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t\tconst exitCode = await waitForExit(child);\n\t\t\t\tawait proxy?.close();\n\t\t\t\tconst proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation = (violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0) > violationCountBeforeLaunch;\n\t\t\t\tconst kind = exitCode !== 0 && !proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation ? classifySandboxFailure(stderr) : undefined;\n\t\t\t\tif (kind) {\n\t\t\t\t\tviolationStore?.add({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tkind,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcommand: [launch.command, ...launch.args].join(\" \"),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdetail: stderr.trim(),\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttimestamp: new Date(),\n\t\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn exitCode;\n\t\t\t} finally {\n\t\t\t\tstopPublishingTerminalSize();\n\t\t\t\tfor (const descriptor of readOnlyFileDescriptors) closeSync(descriptor);\n\t\t\t\t// The socket now lives outside the workspace, so nothing else will ever clean\n\t\t\t\t// it up; leaving it would litter the temp directory once per launch.\n\t\t\t\trmSync(hostSocketPath, { force: true });\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n\t\tasync close() {\n\t\t\thandoff?.stop();\n\t\t\tawait escalationProxy?.close();\n\t\t\tif (escalationDirectory) rmSync(escalationDirectory, { force: true, recursive: true });\n\t\t\tawait gitCredentialProxy?.close();\n\t\t\tif (gitCredentialDirectory) rmSync(gitCredentialDirectory, { force: true, recursive: true });\n\t\t\tawait proxy?.close();\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n\n/**\n * Start one approved command in its own child, with one extra writable root.\n *\n * Deliberately minimal compared with the session child: no network relay, no credential\n * channels, no terminal handoff. An escalated command is a single shell invocation the\n * human just read and approved, not a session, and every channel omitted here is one it\n * cannot reach. Its stdio is captured rather than inherited so the session that asked\n * receives the output instead of the escalated process writing over the TUI.\n */\nasync function runEscalatedCommand(options: {\n\trequest: CommandEscalationRequest;\n\tlaunch: SandboxLaunch;\n\tstateDirectory: string;\n\tspawnBwrap: typeof spawn;\n}): Promise<CommandEscalationResult> {\n\tconst { request, launch, stateDirectory } = options;\n\tconst escalatedReadOnlyPaths = launch.readOnlyPaths ?? [];\n\tconst readOnlyFileDescriptors = [\n\t\t...descriptorBackedReadOnlyPaths(escalatedReadOnlyPaths),\n\t\t...(launch.readOnlyFiles ?? []),\n\t].map((path) => openSync(path, \"r\"));\n\tconst child = options.spawnBwrap(\n\t\t\"bwrap\",\n\t\tbuildBwrapArguments({\n\t\t\tworkspace: launch.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\tadditionalWritableRoots: [...launch.policy.additionalWritableRoots, request.writableRoot],\n\t\t\treadOnlyPaths: escalatedReadOnlyPaths,\n\t\t\treadOnlyFiles: launch.readOnlyFiles ?? [],\n\t\t\treadOnlyBinaries: launch.readOnlyBinaries ?? [],\n\t\t\tsockets: [],\n\t\t\tenvironment: {\n\t\t\t\tHOME: launch.environment?.HOME ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\tTMPDIR: launch.environment?.TMPDIR ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tcommand: \"/bin/sh\",\n\t\t\targs: [\"-c\", request.command],\n\t\t}),\n\t\t{ stdio: [\"ignore\", \"pipe\", \"pipe\", ...readOnlyFileDescriptors] },\n\t);\n\tlet stdout = \"\";\n\tlet stderr = \"\";\n\ttry {\n\t\tchild.stdout?.setEncoding(\"utf8\");\n\t\tchild.stdout?.on(\"data\", (chunk: string) => {\n\t\t\tstdout += chunk;\n\t\t});\n\t\tchild.stderr?.setEncoding(\"utf8\");\n\t\tchild.stderr?.on(\"data\", (chunk: string) => {\n\t\t\tstderr += chunk;\n\t\t});\n\t\tconst code = await new Promise<number>((resolveCode) => {\n\t\t\tchild.once(\"error\", () => resolveCode(1));\n\t\t\tchild.once(\"exit\", (exitCode) => resolveCode(exitCode ?? 1));\n\t\t});\n\t\treturn { code, stdout, stderr };\n\t} finally {\n\t\tfor (const descriptor of readOnlyFileDescriptors) closeSync(descriptor);\n\t}\n}\n"]}