apex-code 0.0.1-alpha.8 → 0.0.4

package/dist/core/sandbox/child-entry.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"child-entry.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/core/sandbox/child-entry.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"","sourcesContent":["import { APP_NAME } from \"../../config.ts\";\nimport { main } from \"../../main.ts\";\nimport { setApexEnvironment } from \"../environment.ts\";\nimport { configureHttpDispatcher } from \"../http-dispatcher.ts\";\nimport { installSandboxNetworkRefusalMessages } from \"./network-refusal.ts\";\nimport { applyTerminalSize, TERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE } from \"./terminal-size.ts\";\n\nprocess.title = APP_NAME;\nsetApexEnvironment(\"APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT\", \"true\");\nprocess.env.AI_AGENT = \"apex-code\";\nprocess.emitWarning = (() => {}) as typeof process.emitWarning;\nconfigureHttpDispatcher();\n// Only the sandboxed child installs this, which is what makes attributing a refused\n// request to the sandbox allowlist accurate rather than a guess about whose proxy replied.\ninstallSandboxNetworkRefusalMessages();\n// bwrap --new-session leaves this process without a controlling terminal, so\n// its stdout reports a window size frozen at sandbox creation. The supervisor\n// publishes the real one; adopt it before any UI is built.\nconst terminalSizePath = process.env[TERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE];\nif (terminalSizePath) applyTerminalSize(terminalSizePath);\n\nawait main(process.argv.slice(2), { sessionLeaseOwner: \"supervisor\" });\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"child-entry.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/core/sandbox/child-entry.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"","sourcesContent":["import { parseCliCommand } from \"../../cli/args.ts\";\nimport { APP_NAME } from \"../../config.ts\";\nimport { main } from \"../../main.ts\";\nimport { setApexEnvironment } from \"../environment.ts\";\nimport { configureHttpDispatcher } from \"../http-dispatcher.ts\";\nimport { installSandboxNetworkRefusalMessages } from \"./network-refusal.ts\";\nimport { applyTerminalSize, TERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE } from \"./terminal-size.ts\";\n\nprocess.title = APP_NAME;\nsetApexEnvironment(\"APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT\", \"true\");\nprocess.env.AI_AGENT = \"apex-code\";\nprocess.emitWarning = (() => {}) as typeof process.emitWarning;\nconfigureHttpDispatcher();\n// Only the sandboxed child installs this, which is what makes attributing a refused\n// request to the sandbox allowlist accurate rather than a guess about whose proxy replied.\ninstallSandboxNetworkRefusalMessages();\n// bwrap --new-session leaves this process without a controlling terminal, so\n// its stdout reports a window size frozen at sandbox creation. The supervisor\n// publishes the real one; adopt it before any UI is built.\nconst terminalSizePath = process.env[TERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE];\nif (terminalSizePath) applyTerminalSize(terminalSizePath);\n\nconst args = process.argv.slice(2);\nawait main(args, { sessionLeaseOwner: \"supervisor\", parsedCommand: parseCliCommand(args) });\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/child-entry.js

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import { parseCliCommand } from "../../cli/args.js";
 import { APP_NAME } from "../../config.js";
 import { main } from "../../main.js";
 import { setApexEnvironment } from "../environment.js";
@@ -18,5 +19,6 @@ installSandboxNetworkRefusalMessages();
 const terminalSizePath = process.env[TERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE];
 if (terminalSizePath)
     applyTerminalSize(terminalSizePath);
-await main(process.argv.slice(2), { sessionLeaseOwner: "supervisor" });
+const args = process.argv.slice(2);
+await main(args, { sessionLeaseOwner: "supervisor", parsedCommand: parseCliCommand(args) });
 //# sourceMappingURL=child-entry.js.map

package/dist/core/sandbox/child-entry.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"child-entry.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/core/sandbox/child-entry.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AACpD,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAC3C,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AACrC,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AACvD,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAChE,OAAO,EAAE,oCAAoC,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAC5E,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAEpF,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC;AACzB,kBAAkB,CAAC,wBAAwB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;AACrD,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,GAAG,WAAW,CAAC;AACnC,OAAO,CAAC,WAAW,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,EAAC,CAAC,CAA+B,CAAC;AAC/D,uBAAuB,EAAE,CAAC;AAC1B,oFAAoF;AACpF,2FAA2F;AAC3F,oCAAoC,EAAE,CAAC;AACvC,6EAA6E;AAC7E,8EAA8E;AAC9E,2DAA2D;AAC3D,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,2BAA2B,CAAC,CAAC;AAClE,IAAI,gBAAgB;IAAE,iBAAiB,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAAC;AAE1D,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACnC,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,eAAe,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC","sourcesContent":["import { parseCliCommand } from \"../../cli/args.ts\";\nimport { APP_NAME } from \"../../config.ts\";\nimport { main } from \"../../main.ts\";\nimport { setApexEnvironment } from \"../environment.ts\";\nimport { configureHttpDispatcher } from \"../http-dispatcher.ts\";\nimport { installSandboxNetworkRefusalMessages } from \"./network-refusal.ts\";\nimport { applyTerminalSize, TERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE } from \"./terminal-size.ts\";\n\nprocess.title = APP_NAME;\nsetApexEnvironment(\"APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT\", \"true\");\nprocess.env.AI_AGENT = \"apex-code\";\nprocess.emitWarning = (() => {}) as typeof process.emitWarning;\nconfigureHttpDispatcher();\n// Only the sandboxed child installs this, which is what makes attributing a refused\n// request to the sandbox allowlist accurate rather than a guess about whose proxy replied.\ninstallSandboxNetworkRefusalMessages();\n// bwrap --new-session leaves this process without a controlling terminal, so\n// its stdout reports a window size frozen at sandbox creation. The supervisor\n// publishes the real one; adopt it before any UI is built.\nconst terminalSizePath = process.env[TERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE];\nif (terminalSizePath) applyTerminalSize(terminalSizePath);\n\nconst args = process.argv.slice(2);\nawait main(args, { sessionLeaseOwner: \"supervisor\", parsedCommand: parseCliCommand(args) });\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/cli-launch.d.ts

@@ -1,15 +1,84 @@
+import type { ParsedCliCommand } from "../../cli/args.ts";
 import type { HostToolBinary } from "../../utils/tools-manager.ts";
 import type { SandboxLaunch } from "./supervisor.ts";
 /**
- * OS containment is the normal startup path for every command that can construct an
- * agent session. Commands that only inspect or maintain host configuration do not
- * create a runtime and therefore remain outside this child boundary.
+ * OS containment is the normal startup path for every parsed command that can
+ * construct an agent session. Classification consumes the same typed parse result
+ * as execution, so option values and text after `--` cannot impersonate metadata.
  */
-export declare function requiresSandboxedChild(args: readonly string[]): boolean;
+export declare function requiresSandboxedChild(command: ParsedCliCommand): boolean;
 export interface SandboxedCliLaunch extends SandboxLaunch {
     readonly environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
+    /**
+     * The supervisor's own 0700 state directory, outside every writable root the child
+     * has.
+     */
+    readonly supervisorStateDirectory: string;
 }
 export declare function getSandboxSessionDirectory(workspace: string): string;
+/**
+ * Env var naming the file that carries the host's `policy` and `user` permission scopes
+ * into the child (PS.3).
+ *
+ * Deliberately absent from `SAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS`: only the supervisor's own
+ * resolution may name it, never the invoking shell and never a project file (ADR 0016).
+ */
+export declare const POLICY_SNAPSHOT_PATH_VARIABLE = "APEX_CODE_POLICY_SNAPSHOT_PATH";
+/**
+ * The marker asserting that an OS boundary is actually enforcing this process (PS.5).
+ *
+ * Set only on the supervisor's own launch environment for a child it is about to contain.
+ * It is not in the child-environment allowlist, so a value of this name in the invoking
+ * shell never survives into a child; the supervisor's own value is the only one that can.
+ * `core/sdk.ts` reads it for `sandbox: "required"` and keeps the same two literals -- a
+ * marker spelled two ways would be a drift the SDK could not detect at runtime, so
+ * `test/sdk-sandbox-contract.test.ts` pins them to each other.
+ */
+export declare const SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VARIABLE = "APEX_CODE_SANDBOX_ENFORCED";
+export declare const SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VALUE = "1";
+export interface SupervisorStateDirectory {
+    /** A 0700 directory under the supervisor temp root, outside every child-writable root. */
+    readonly path: string;
+    readonly dispose: () => void;
+}
+/**
+ * Allocate the directory the supervisor keeps its own launch state in.
+ *
+ * Everything the supervisor writes for a launch -- the terminal handoff latch, the
+ * published terminal size, the network relay, the git credential helper, the permission
+ * snapshot -- used to live in `workspace/.apex-code/sandbox-state`, which is inside the
+ * one writable bind the child has. A child that planted a symlink there redirected the
+ * *next* launch's supervisor writes onto arbitrary host paths, and could rewrite the
+ * scripts the supervisor was about to run. Under the supervisor temp root the child sees
+ * these files through the read-only root bind (Linux) or Seatbelt's write denial outside
+ * the workspace (macOS), so it can neither replace them nor plant a link where one goes.
+ */
+export declare function createSupervisorStateDirectory(): SupervisorStateDirectory;
+/**
+ * The managed policy file this host resolves, read before the child's environment exists.
+ *
+ * `cli-launch`'s child-environment allowlist filters `APEX_CODE_POLICY_PATH` out, so a
+ * host that configured a custom managed policy had it silently disappear at the boundary
+ * and the child fell back to the system path -- the config-projection defect PS.3 closes.
+ * Resolution here mirrors `core/permissions/store.ts`'s own default exactly.
+ */
+export declare function resolveSupervisorPolicyPath(environment?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): string;
+/**
+ * Capture the host `policy` and `user` permission scopes into the supervisor's private
+ * directory and return the file's path.
+ *
+ * Called before `buildSandboxedCliLaunch` repoints `APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR` at a
+ * workspace directory the child can write. Without it the child's `user` scope came from a
+ * file the child itself owns, and its `policy` scope from a path the environment allowlist
+ * had already removed.
+ */
+export declare function writeSupervisorPolicySnapshot(options: {
+    directory: string;
+    /** The *host* agent directory, before the launch repoints it. */
+    agentDir: string;
+    policyPath?: string;
+    environment?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
+}): string;
 /**
  * Read supervisor policy only from global settings; project settings are untrusted here.
  *
@@ -65,8 +134,15 @@ export declare function buildSandboxedCliLaunch(options: {
     args: readonly string[];
     environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
     allowedHosts?: readonly string[];
+    additionalWritableRoots?: readonly string[];
     readOnlyPaths?: readonly string[];
+    sessionPath?: string;
     authPath?: string;
+    /**
+     * A synthesized two-key git config, projected read-only so the child can author a
+     * commit as the user. Absent when the host had no global identity to resolve.
+     */
+    gitConfigPath?: string;
     toolBinaries?: readonly HostToolBinary[];
     /**
      * Host user-scope skill directories, pre-filtered by the caller to those that
@@ -78,5 +154,9 @@ export declare function buildSandboxedCliLaunch(options: {
     skillPaths?: HostSkillPaths;
     /** The supervisor-owned credential write channel, when one was opened. */
     credentialChannel?: SandboxLaunch["credentialChannel"];
+    /** The supervisor's private 0700 state directory for this launch. */
+    supervisorStateDirectory?: string;
+    /** The captured host permission scopes, named to the child read-only. */
+    policySnapshotPath?: string;
 }): SandboxedCliLaunch;
 //# sourceMappingURL=cli-launch.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/sandbox/cli-launch.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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Commands that only inspect or maintain host configuration do not\n * create a runtime and therefore remain outside this child boundary.\n */\nexport function requiresSandboxedChild(args: readonly string[]): boolean {\n\tif (NON_SESSION_COMMANDS.has(args[0] ?? \"\")) return false;\n\tif (args.some((argument) => METADATA_FLAGS.has(argument))) return false;\n\tif (args.includes(\"--help\") || args.includes(\"-h\")) return false;\n\treturn true;\n}\n\nexport interface SandboxedCliLaunch extends SandboxLaunch {\n\treadonly environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n}\n\nexport function getSandboxSessionDirectory(workspace: string): string {\n\treturn join(workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-sessions\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Read supervisor policy only from global settings; project settings are untrusted here.\n *\n * The built-in provider hosts are added unless explicitly refused, because a deny-all\n * default made a fresh install unable to reach any model while giving the user no way to\n * learn which host to permit. Configured hosts are additive on top, and\n * `allowDefaultHosts: false` restores the strict behaviour for anyone who wants it.\n */\nexport function resolveSupervisorAllowedHosts(cwd: string, agentDir: string): readonly string[] | undefined {\n\tconst settings = SettingsManager.create(cwd, agentDir, { projectTrusted: false });\n\tconst network = settings.getNetworkSettings();\n\tconst configured = network?.allowedHosts ?? [];\n\tif (network?.allowDefaultHosts === false) return configured;\n\t// The configured `web_search` backend's host, added only when a credential for it\n\t// is present. Without this the tool would be configured and still unreachable,\n\t// which reads as a broken search rather than a missing allowlist entry. Nothing is\n\t// opened for a user who never set the key.\n\tconst webSearchHost = resolveWebSearchHost(settings.getWebSearchSettings());\n\treturn [...new Set([...resolveDefaultAllowedHosts(), ...configured, ...(webSearchHost ? [webSearchHost] : [])])];\n}\n\n/**\n * The host's two user-scope skill roots, each present only when it exists on the\n * host. Kept as two named slots rather than one list because\n * `core/package-manager.ts` discovers them in different modes -- root `.md` files\n * count as skills under `agentSkills` (\"pi\" mode) and are ignored under\n * `agentsHomeSkills` (\"agents\" mode), per `docs/skills.md` -- and a flat list of 0-2\n * paths cannot tell the child which root a lone survivor was.\n */\nexport interface HostSkillPaths {\n\t/** Host `<agentDir>/skills`. */\n\treadonly agentSkills?: string;\n\t/** Host `<home>/.agents/skills`. */\n\treadonly agentsHomeSkills?: string;\n}\n\n/** A candidate skill root that exists but was excluded, and why. */\nexport interface HostSkillPathRefusal {\n\treadonly root: keyof HostSkillPaths;\n\treadonly path: string;\n\treadonly reason: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ResolvedHostSkillPaths {\n\treadonly paths: HostSkillPaths;\n\treadonly refusals: readonly HostSkillPathRefusal[];\n}\n\n/**\n * True when `candidate` is the host home directory itself, or an ancestor of it.\n * Both paths must already be resolved (`realpathSync`), so a symlink can't disguise\n * either side. Mounting such a candidate read-only would re-expose the entire home\n * tree the sandbox's `--tmpfs /home` (Linux) / `(deny file-read* USER_HOME)` (macOS)\n * deliberately hides -- SSH keys, cloud credentials, other projects -- not just a\n * skills subtree.\n */\nfunction isHomeOrAncestorOfHome(candidate: string, home: string): boolean {\n\tif (candidate === home) return true;\n\tconst prefix = candidate.endsWith(sep) ? candidate : candidate + sep;\n\treturn home.startsWith(prefix);\n}\n\n/** Resolve one candidate root: absent, refused (symlinked onto the host home), or usable. */\nfunction resolveHostSkillRoot(\n\troot: keyof HostSkillPaths,\n\tcandidate: string,\n\thomeDir: string,\n): { path?: string; refusal?: HostSkillPathRefusal } {\n\tif (!existsSync(candidate)) return {};\n\tlet realCandidate: string;\n\tlet realHome: string;\n\ttry {\n\t\trealCandidate = realpathSync(candidate);\n\t\trealHome = realpathSync(homeDir);\n\t} catch (error) {\n\t\tconst message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);\n\t\treturn { refusal: { root, path: candidate, reason: `could not resolve real path: ${message}` } };\n\t}\n\tif (isHomeOrAncestorOfHome(realCandidate, realHome)) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\trefusal: {\n\t\t\t\troot,\n\t\t\t\tpath: candidate,\n\t\t\t\treason: \"resolves to the host home directory or an ancestor of it\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\treturn { path: candidate };\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the host's user-scope skill directories, before the sandbox exists to hide\n * them. Read only from the runtime environment and the host agent directory --\n * never from project files -- matching ADR 0016's rule that supervisor policy is\n * trust-first. Mirrors `core/package-manager.ts`'s own user-scope roots so the two\n * sides agree on where a skill lives. A candidate that resolves (directly or via a\n * symlink) onto the host home or an ancestor of it is refused rather than mounted --\n * see `isHomeOrAncestorOfHome` -- and reported so the caller can surface a startup\n * diagnostic instead of silently mounting or silently skipping it.\n */\nexport function resolveHostSkillPaths(agentDir: string, homeDir: string): ResolvedHostSkillPaths {\n\tconst agentSkills = resolveHostSkillRoot(\"agentSkills\", join(agentDir, \"skills\"), homeDir);\n\tconst agentsHomeSkills = resolveHostSkillRoot(\"agentsHomeSkills\", join(homeDir, \".agents\", \"skills\"), homeDir);\n\treturn {\n\t\tpaths: {\n\t\t\t...(agentSkills.path ? { agentSkills: agentSkills.path } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(agentsHomeSkills.path ? { agentsHomeSkills: agentsHomeSkills.path } : {}),\n\t\t},\n\t\trefusals: [agentSkills.refusal, agentsHomeSkills.refusal].filter(\n\t\t\t(refusal): refusal is HostSkillPathRefusal => refusal !== undefined,\n\t\t),\n\t};\n}\n\nconst SAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS = new Set([\n\t\"PATH\",\n\t\"LANG\",\n\t\"LC_ALL\",\n\t\"LC_CTYPE\",\n\t\"TERM\",\n\t\"COLORTERM\",\n\t\"NO_COLOR\",\n\t\"FORCE_COLOR\",\n\t\"TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_OFFLINE\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_SKIP_VERSION_CHECK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_STARTUP_BENCHMARK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_TIMING\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_CLEAR_ON_SHRINK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_HARDWARE_CURSOR\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_MODEL_CATALOG_URL\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_SHARE_VIEWER_URL\",\n\t\"VISUAL\",\n\t\"EDITOR\",\n]);\n\n// Provider API keys are explicit credential inputs, unlike arbitrary ambient variables.\n// Keep this list in sync with the documented provider environment-variable reference.\nconst SAFE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEYS = new Set([\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN\",\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN\",\n\t\"ANT_LING_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_BASE_URL\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_RESOURCE_NAME\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_API_VERSION\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_DEPLOYMENT_NAME_MAP\",\n\t\"DEEPSEEK_API_KEY\",\n\t\"NVIDIA_API_KEY\",\n\t\"GEMINI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"GROQ_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CEREBRAS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"FIREWORKS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"TOGETHER_API_KEY\",\n\t\"BASETEN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENROUTER_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ZAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ZAI_CODING_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MISTRAL_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MINIMAX_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MOONSHOT_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENCODE_API_KEY\",\n\t\"KIMI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_GATEWAY_ID\",\n\t\"QWEN_TOKEN_PLAN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"QWEN_TOKEN_PLAN_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_AMS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_SGP_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AWS_PROFILE\",\n\t\"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID\",\n\t\"AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\",\n\t\"AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK\",\n\t\"AWS_REGION\",\n]);\n\n// Credentials for tools rather than model providers. Separate from the provider set\n// above so the provider list stays a mirror of the documented provider reference.\nconst SAFE_TOOL_CREDENTIAL_KEYS = new Set([\"EXA_API_KEY\"]);\n\nfunction buildChildEnvironment(environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): NodeJS.ProcessEnv {\n\treturn Object.fromEntries(\n\t\tObject.entries(environment).filter(\n\t\t\t([key]) =>\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS.has(key) ||\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEYS.has(key) ||\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_TOOL_CREDENTIAL_KEYS.has(key),\n\t\t),\n\t);\n}\n\n/**\n * Drop empty files left in the child's tools directory by a previous launch.\n *\n * A projected tool is bind-mounted over a file there, and bwrap materialises that\n * mountpoint as an empty file on the host which outlives the namespace. If the host\n * tool later disappears, nothing is projected over the stub and the child would\n * otherwise find a 0-byte file where its binary should be. A real downloaded binary\n * is never empty, so size is a safe discriminator.\n */\nfunction clearStaleToolMountpoints(toolsDirectory: string): void {\n\tfor (const entry of readdirSync(toolsDirectory, { withFileTypes: true })) {\n\t\tif (!entry.isFile()) continue;\n\t\tconst entryPath = join(toolsDirectory, entry.name);\n\t\tif (statSync(entryPath).size === 0) {\n\t\t\trmSync(entryPath, { force: true });\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Allocate agent-owned state under the sole writable workspace mount. The child does\n * not inherit a host home or a host session/config directory, preventing the sandbox\n * from presenting a write boundary while its own state quietly escapes it.\n */\nexport function buildSandboxedCliLaunch(options: {\n\tworkspace: string;\n\tcommand: string;\n\targs: readonly string[];\n\tenvironment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n\tallowedHosts?: readonly string[];\n\treadOnlyPaths?: readonly string[];\n\tauthPath?: string;\n\ttoolBinaries?: readonly HostToolBinary[];\n\t/**\n\t * Host user-scope skill directories, pre-filtered by the caller to those that\n\t * exist and pass the host-home escape check (SKILL.4). Mounted read-only at their\n\t * original host location -- Seatbelt cannot remap a path, so this must hold for\n\t * both backends -- and named to the child via `APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_*` so its\n\t * discovery can find them under the sandbox's own repointed `HOME`/agent dir.\n\t */\n\tskillPaths?: HostSkillPaths;\n\t/** The supervisor-owned credential write channel, when one was opened. */\n\tcredentialChannel?: SandboxLaunch[\"credentialChannel\"];\n}): SandboxedCliLaunch {\n\tconst stateDirectory = join(options.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-state\");\n\tconst agentDirectory = join(options.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-agent\");\n\tconst sessionDirectory = getSandboxSessionDirectory(options.workspace);\n\t// Mirrors getBinDir() as the child will compute it from APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR,\n\t// so a projected tool lands exactly where the child's own lookup already checks.\n\tconst toolsDirectory = join(agentDirectory, \"bin\");\n\tconst xdgDirectories = {\n\t\tXDG_CONFIG_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"config\"),\n\t\tXDG_CACHE_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"cache\"),\n\t\tXDG_DATA_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"data\"),\n\t\tXDG_STATE_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"state\"),\n\t};\n\tfor (const directory of [\n\t\tstateDirectory,\n\t\tagentDirectory,\n\t\tsessionDirectory,\n\t\ttoolsDirectory,\n\t\t...Object.values(xdgDirectories),\n\t]) {\n\t\tmkdirSync(directory, { recursive: true });\n\t}\n\tclearStaleToolMountpoints(toolsDirectory);\n\tconst childEnvironment = buildChildEnvironment(options.environment);\n\tconst { agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills } = options.skillPaths ?? {};\n\tconst skillMountPaths = [agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills].filter((path): path is string => path !== undefined);\n\tconst readOnlyPaths = [...(options.readOnlyPaths ?? []), ...skillMountPaths];\n\tconst readOnlyFiles = options.authPath ? [options.authPath] : [];\n\tconst readOnlyBinaries = (options.toolBinaries ?? []).map((binary) => ({\n\t\tsource: binary.path,\n\t\tdestination: join(toolsDirectory, binary.name),\n\t}));\n\treturn {\n\t\tcommand: options.command,\n\t\targs: [...options.args],\n\t\tpolicy: { workspace: options.workspace, allowedHosts: options.allowedHosts ?? [] },\n\t\treadOnlyPaths,\n\t\treadOnlyFiles,\n\t\treadOnlyBinaries,\n\t\t// Travels on the launch contract so the platform backend projects the socket;\n\t\t// the environment entry above is what tells the child where to find it.\n\t\t...(options.credentialChannel ? { credentialChannel: options.credentialChannel } : {}),\n\t\tenvironment: {\n\t\t\t...childEnvironment,\n\t\t\t...(options.authPath ? { APEX_CODE_AUTH_PATH: options.authPath } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(options.credentialChannel\n\t\t\t\t? { APEX_CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PATH: options.credentialChannel.childSocketPath }\n\t\t\t\t: {}),\n\t\t\t// After childEnvironment: these come only from the supervisor's own\n\t\t\t// resolution, never from the invoking shell, so their value always wins over\n\t\t\t// anything of the same name that childEnvironment's allowlist let through.\n\t\t\t...(agentSkills ? { APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_AGENT: agentSkills } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(agentsHomeSkills ? { APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_AGENTS_HOME: agentsHomeSkills } : {}),\n\t\t\tAPEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR: agentDirectory,\n\t\t\tAPEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_SESSION_DIR: sessionDirectory,\n\t\t\tHOME: stateDirectory,\n\t\t\tTMPDIR: stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t...xdgDirectories,\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n"]}
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Classification consumes the same typed parse result\n * as execution, so option values and text after `--` cannot impersonate metadata.\n */\nexport function requiresSandboxedChild(command: ParsedCliCommand): boolean {\n\treturn command.kind === \"session\";\n}\n\nexport interface SandboxedCliLaunch extends SandboxLaunch {\n\treadonly environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n\t/**\n\t * The supervisor's own 0700 state directory, outside every writable root the child\n\t * has.\n\t */\n\treadonly supervisorStateDirectory: string;\n}\n\nexport function getSandboxSessionDirectory(workspace: string): string {\n\treturn join(workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-sessions\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Env var naming the file that carries the host's `policy` and `user` permission scopes\n * into the child (PS.3).\n *\n * Deliberately absent from `SAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS`: only the supervisor's own\n * resolution may name it, never the invoking shell and never a project file (ADR 0016).\n */\nexport const POLICY_SNAPSHOT_PATH_VARIABLE = \"APEX_CODE_POLICY_SNAPSHOT_PATH\";\n\n/**\n * The marker asserting that an OS boundary is actually enforcing this process (PS.5).\n *\n * Set only on the supervisor's own launch environment for a child it is about to contain.\n * It is not in the child-environment allowlist, so a value of this name in the invoking\n * shell never survives into a child; the supervisor's own value is the only one that can.\n * `core/sdk.ts` reads it for `sandbox: \"required\"` and keeps the same two literals -- a\n * marker spelled two ways would be a drift the SDK could not detect at runtime, so\n * `test/sdk-sandbox-contract.test.ts` pins them to each other.\n */\nexport const SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VARIABLE = \"APEX_CODE_SANDBOX_ENFORCED\";\nexport const SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VALUE = \"1\";\n\nexport interface SupervisorStateDirectory {\n\t/** A 0700 directory under the supervisor temp root, outside every child-writable root. */\n\treadonly path: string;\n\treadonly dispose: () => void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Allocate the directory the supervisor keeps its own launch state in.\n *\n * Everything the supervisor writes for a launch -- the terminal handoff latch, the\n * published terminal size, the network relay, the git credential helper, the permission\n * snapshot -- used to live in `workspace/.apex-code/sandbox-state`, which is inside the\n * one writable bind the child has. A child that planted a symlink there redirected the\n * *next* launch's supervisor writes onto arbitrary host paths, and could rewrite the\n * scripts the supervisor was about to run. Under the supervisor temp root the child sees\n * these files through the read-only root bind (Linux) or Seatbelt's write denial outside\n * the workspace (macOS), so it can neither replace them nor plant a link where one goes.\n */\nexport function createSupervisorStateDirectory(): SupervisorStateDirectory {\n\tconst path = mkdtempSync(join(supervisorTempDirectory(), `apex-supervisor-${process.pid}-`), { encoding: \"utf8\" });\n\tchmodSync(path, 0o700);\n\treturn {\n\t\tpath,\n\t\tdispose: () => {\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\trmSync(path, { force: true, recursive: true });\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t// A leftover directory under the supervisor's own temp root is not worth\n\t\t\t\t// failing a session teardown over.\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n\n/**\n * The managed policy file this host resolves, read before the child's environment exists.\n *\n * `cli-launch`'s child-environment allowlist filters `APEX_CODE_POLICY_PATH` out, so a\n * host that configured a custom managed policy had it silently disappear at the boundary\n * and the child fell back to the system path -- the config-projection defect PS.3 closes.\n * Resolution here mirrors `core/permissions/store.ts`'s own default exactly.\n */\nexport function resolveSupervisorPolicyPath(environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): string {\n\tif (environment.APEX_CODE_POLICY_PATH) return environment.APEX_CODE_POLICY_PATH;\n\treturn process.platform === \"win32\"\n\t\t? join(environment.ProgramData ?? \"C:\\\\ProgramData\", \"apex-code\", \"policy.json\")\n\t\t: \"/etc/apex-code/policy.json\";\n}\n\n/**\n * The two host-owned permission scopes, captured verbatim.\n *\n * Raw file text rather than parsed rules, so the child's store applies exactly the same\n * validation -- and reports exactly the same malformed-file error -- as it would have on\n * the host. A snapshot that pre-parsed would have to decide what a malformed host policy\n * means, and the only safe answer to that lives in the store.\n */\ninterface SupervisorPolicySnapshotFile {\n\treadonly version: 1;\n\treadonly policy: string | null;\n\treadonly user: string | null;\n}\n\nfunction readHostScopeText(path: string): string | null {\n\ttry {\n\t\treturn readFileSync(path, \"utf8\");\n\t} catch {\n\t\t// Absent is the ordinary case for both files; an unreadable one projects as absent\n\t\t// rather than as authority the child cannot see the shape of.\n\t\treturn null;\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Capture the host `policy` and `user` permission scopes into the supervisor's private\n * directory and return the file's path.\n *\n * Called before `buildSandboxedCliLaunch` repoints `APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR` at a\n * workspace directory the child can write. Without it the child's `user` scope came from a\n * file the child itself owns, and its `policy` scope from a path the environment allowlist\n * had already removed.\n */\nexport function writeSupervisorPolicySnapshot(options: {\n\tdirectory: string;\n\t/** The *host* agent directory, before the launch repoints it. */\n\tagentDir: string;\n\tpolicyPath?: string;\n\tenvironment?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n}): string {\n\tconst directory = join(options.directory, \"policy\");\n\tmkdirSync(directory, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });\n\tconst snapshot: SupervisorPolicySnapshotFile = {\n\t\tversion: 1,\n\t\tpolicy: readHostScopeText(options.policyPath ?? resolveSupervisorPolicyPath(options.environment)),\n\t\tuser: readHostScopeText(join(options.agentDir, \"permissions.json\")),\n\t};\n\tconst path = join(directory, \"permission-snapshot.json\");\n\twriteFileSync(path, JSON.stringify(snapshot), { mode: 0o600 });\n\treturn path;\n}\n\n/**\n * Read supervisor policy only from global settings; project settings are untrusted here.\n *\n * The built-in provider hosts are added unless explicitly refused, because a deny-all\n * default made a fresh install unable to reach any model while giving the user no way to\n * learn which host to permit. Configured hosts are additive on top, and\n * `allowDefaultHosts: false` restores the strict behaviour for anyone who wants it.\n */\nexport function resolveSupervisorAllowedHosts(cwd: string, agentDir: string): readonly string[] | undefined {\n\tconst settings = SettingsManager.create(cwd, agentDir, { projectTrusted: false });\n\tconst network = settings.getNetworkSettings();\n\tconst configured = network?.allowedHosts ?? [];\n\tif (network?.allowDefaultHosts === false) return configured;\n\t// The configured `web_search` backend's host, added only when a credential for it\n\t// is present. Without this the tool would be configured and still unreachable,\n\t// which reads as a broken search rather than a missing allowlist entry. Nothing is\n\t// opened for a user who never set the key.\n\tconst webSearchHost = resolveWebSearchHost(settings.getWebSearchSettings());\n\treturn [...new Set([...resolveDefaultAllowedHosts(), ...configured, ...(webSearchHost ? [webSearchHost] : [])])];\n}\n\n/**\n * The host's two user-scope skill roots, each present only when it exists on the\n * host. Kept as two named slots rather than one list because\n * `core/package-manager.ts` discovers them in different modes -- root `.md` files\n * count as skills under `agentSkills` (\"pi\" mode) and are ignored under\n * `agentsHomeSkills` (\"agents\" mode), per `docs/skills.md` -- and a flat list of 0-2\n * paths cannot tell the child which root a lone survivor was.\n */\nexport interface HostSkillPaths {\n\t/** Host `<agentDir>/skills`. */\n\treadonly agentSkills?: string;\n\t/** Host `<home>/.agents/skills`. */\n\treadonly agentsHomeSkills?: string;\n}\n\n/** A candidate skill root that exists but was excluded, and why. */\nexport interface HostSkillPathRefusal {\n\treadonly root: keyof HostSkillPaths;\n\treadonly path: string;\n\treadonly reason: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ResolvedHostSkillPaths {\n\treadonly paths: HostSkillPaths;\n\treadonly refusals: readonly HostSkillPathRefusal[];\n}\n\n/**\n * True when `candidate` is the host home directory itself, or an ancestor of it.\n * Both paths must already be resolved (`realpathSync`), so a symlink can't disguise\n * either side. Mounting such a candidate read-only would re-expose the entire home\n * tree the sandbox's `--tmpfs /home` (Linux) / `(deny file-read* USER_HOME)` (macOS)\n * deliberately hides -- SSH keys, cloud credentials, other projects -- not just a\n * skills subtree.\n */\nfunction isHomeOrAncestorOfHome(candidate: string, home: string): boolean {\n\tif (candidate === home) return true;\n\tconst prefix = candidate.endsWith(sep) ? candidate : candidate + sep;\n\treturn home.startsWith(prefix);\n}\n\n/** Resolve one candidate root: absent, refused (symlinked onto the host home), or usable. */\nfunction resolveHostSkillRoot(\n\troot: keyof HostSkillPaths,\n\tcandidate: string,\n\thomeDir: string,\n): { path?: string; refusal?: HostSkillPathRefusal } {\n\tif (!existsSync(candidate)) return {};\n\tlet realCandidate: string;\n\tlet realHome: string;\n\ttry {\n\t\trealCandidate = realpathSync(candidate);\n\t\trealHome = realpathSync(homeDir);\n\t} catch (error) {\n\t\tconst message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);\n\t\treturn { refusal: { root, path: candidate, reason: `could not resolve real path: ${message}` } };\n\t}\n\tif (isHomeOrAncestorOfHome(realCandidate, realHome)) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\trefusal: {\n\t\t\t\troot,\n\t\t\t\tpath: candidate,\n\t\t\t\treason: \"resolves to the host home directory or an ancestor of it\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\treturn { path: candidate };\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the host's user-scope skill directories, before the sandbox exists to hide\n * them. Read only from the runtime environment and the host agent directory --\n * never from project files -- matching ADR 0016's rule that supervisor policy is\n * trust-first. Mirrors `core/package-manager.ts`'s own user-scope roots so the two\n * sides agree on where a skill lives. A candidate that resolves (directly or via a\n * symlink) onto the host home or an ancestor of it is refused rather than mounted --\n * see `isHomeOrAncestorOfHome` -- and reported so the caller can surface a startup\n * diagnostic instead of silently mounting or silently skipping it.\n */\nexport function resolveHostSkillPaths(agentDir: string, homeDir: string): ResolvedHostSkillPaths {\n\tconst agentSkills = resolveHostSkillRoot(\"agentSkills\", join(agentDir, \"skills\"), homeDir);\n\tconst agentsHomeSkills = resolveHostSkillRoot(\"agentsHomeSkills\", join(homeDir, \".agents\", \"skills\"), homeDir);\n\treturn {\n\t\tpaths: {\n\t\t\t...(agentSkills.path ? { agentSkills: agentSkills.path } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(agentsHomeSkills.path ? { agentsHomeSkills: agentsHomeSkills.path } : {}),\n\t\t},\n\t\trefusals: [agentSkills.refusal, agentsHomeSkills.refusal].filter(\n\t\t\t(refusal): refusal is HostSkillPathRefusal => refusal !== undefined,\n\t\t),\n\t};\n}\n\nconst SAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS = new Set([\n\t\"PATH\",\n\t\"LANG\",\n\t\"LC_ALL\",\n\t\"LC_CTYPE\",\n\t\"TERM\",\n\t\"COLORTERM\",\n\t\"NO_COLOR\",\n\t\"FORCE_COLOR\",\n\t\"TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_OFFLINE\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_SKIP_VERSION_CHECK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_STARTUP_BENCHMARK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_TIMING\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_CLEAR_ON_SHRINK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_HARDWARE_CURSOR\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_MODEL_CATALOG_URL\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_SHARE_VIEWER_URL\",\n\t\"VISUAL\",\n\t\"EDITOR\",\n]);\n\n// Provider API keys are explicit credential inputs, unlike arbitrary ambient variables.\n// Keep this list in sync with the documented provider environment-variable reference.\nconst SAFE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEYS = new Set([\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN\",\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN\",\n\t\"ANT_LING_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_BASE_URL\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_RESOURCE_NAME\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_API_VERSION\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_DEPLOYMENT_NAME_MAP\",\n\t\"DEEPSEEK_API_KEY\",\n\t\"NVIDIA_API_KEY\",\n\t\"GEMINI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"GROQ_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CEREBRAS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"FIREWORKS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"TOGETHER_API_KEY\",\n\t\"BASETEN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENROUTER_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ZAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ZAI_CODING_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MISTRAL_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MINIMAX_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MOONSHOT_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENCODE_API_KEY\",\n\t\"KIMI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_GATEWAY_ID\",\n\t\"QWEN_TOKEN_PLAN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"QWEN_TOKEN_PLAN_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_AMS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_SGP_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AWS_PROFILE\",\n\t\"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID\",\n\t\"AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\",\n\t\"AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK\",\n\t\"AWS_REGION\",\n]);\n\n// Credentials for tools rather than model providers. Separate from the provider set\n// above so the provider list stays a mirror of the documented provider reference.\nconst SAFE_TOOL_CREDENTIAL_KEYS = new Set([\"EXA_API_KEY\"]);\n\nfunction buildChildEnvironment(environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): NodeJS.ProcessEnv {\n\treturn Object.fromEntries(\n\t\tObject.entries(environment).filter(\n\t\t\t([key]) =>\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS.has(key) ||\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEYS.has(key) ||\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_TOOL_CREDENTIAL_KEYS.has(key),\n\t\t),\n\t);\n}\n\n/**\n * Drop empty files left in the child's tools directory by a previous launch.\n *\n * A projected tool is bind-mounted over a file there, and bwrap materialises that\n * mountpoint as an empty file on the host which outlives the namespace. If the host\n * tool later disappears, nothing is projected over the stub and the child would\n * otherwise find a 0-byte file where its binary should be. A real downloaded binary\n * is never empty, so size is a safe discriminator.\n */\nfunction clearStaleToolMountpoints(toolsDirectory: string): void {\n\tfor (const entry of readdirSync(toolsDirectory, { withFileTypes: true })) {\n\t\tif (!entry.isFile()) continue;\n\t\tconst entryPath = join(toolsDirectory, entry.name);\n\t\tif (statSync(entryPath).size === 0) {\n\t\t\trmSync(entryPath, { force: true });\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Allocate agent-owned state under the sole writable workspace mount. The child does\n * not inherit a host home or a host session/config directory, preventing the sandbox\n * from presenting a write boundary while its own state quietly escapes it.\n */\nexport function buildSandboxedCliLaunch(options: {\n\tworkspace: string;\n\tcommand: string;\n\targs: readonly string[];\n\tenvironment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n\tallowedHosts?: readonly string[];\n\tadditionalWritableRoots?: readonly string[];\n\treadOnlyPaths?: readonly string[];\n\tsessionPath?: string;\n\tauthPath?: string;\n\t/**\n\t * A synthesized two-key git config, projected read-only so the child can author a\n\t * commit as the user. Absent when the host had no global identity to resolve.\n\t */\n\tgitConfigPath?: string;\n\ttoolBinaries?: readonly HostToolBinary[];\n\t/**\n\t * Host user-scope skill directories, pre-filtered by the caller to those that\n\t * exist and pass the host-home escape check (SKILL.4). Mounted read-only at their\n\t * original host location -- Seatbelt cannot remap a path, so this must hold for\n\t * both backends -- and named to the child via `APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_*` so its\n\t * discovery can find them under the sandbox's own repointed `HOME`/agent dir.\n\t */\n\tskillPaths?: HostSkillPaths;\n\t/** The supervisor-owned credential write channel, when one was opened. */\n\tcredentialChannel?: SandboxLaunch[\"credentialChannel\"];\n\t/** The supervisor's private 0700 state directory for this launch. */\n\tsupervisorStateDirectory?: string;\n\t/** The captured host permission scopes, named to the child read-only. */\n\tpolicySnapshotPath?: string;\n}): SandboxedCliLaunch {\n\tconst supervisorStateDirectory = options.supervisorStateDirectory ?? createSupervisorStateDirectory().path;\n\tconst stateDirectory = join(options.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-state\");\n\tconst agentDirectory = join(options.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-agent\");\n\tconst sessionDirectory = getSandboxSessionDirectory(options.workspace);\n\t// Mirrors getBinDir() as the child will compute it from APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR,\n\t// so a projected tool lands exactly where the child's own lookup already checks.\n\tconst toolsDirectory = join(agentDirectory, \"bin\");\n\tconst xdgDirectories = {\n\t\tXDG_CONFIG_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"config\"),\n\t\tXDG_CACHE_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"cache\"),\n\t\tXDG_DATA_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"data\"),\n\t\tXDG_STATE_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"state\"),\n\t};\n\tfor (const directory of [\n\t\tstateDirectory,\n\t\tagentDirectory,\n\t\tsessionDirectory,\n\t\ttoolsDirectory,\n\t\t...Object.values(xdgDirectories),\n\t]) {\n\t\tmkdirSync(directory, { recursive: true });\n\t}\n\tclearStaleToolMountpoints(toolsDirectory);\n\tconst childEnvironment = buildChildEnvironment(options.environment);\n\tconst { agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills } = options.skillPaths ?? {};\n\tconst skillMountPaths = [agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills].filter((path): path is string => path !== undefined);\n\tconst readOnlyPaths = [...(options.readOnlyPaths ?? []), ...skillMountPaths];\n\tconst readOnlyFiles = [options.sessionPath, options.authPath, options.gitConfigPath].filter(\n\t\t(path): path is string => path !== undefined,\n\t);\n\tconst readOnlyBinaries = (options.toolBinaries ?? []).map((binary) => ({\n\t\tsource: binary.path,\n\t\tdestination: join(toolsDirectory, binary.name),\n\t}));\n\treturn {\n\t\tcommand: options.command,\n\t\targs: [...options.args],\n\t\tpolicy: {\n\t\t\tworkspace: options.workspace,\n\t\t\tallowedHosts: options.allowedHosts ?? [],\n\t\t\tadditionalWritableRoots: options.additionalWritableRoots ?? [],\n\t\t},\n\t\treadOnlyPaths,\n\t\treadOnlyFiles,\n\t\treadOnlyBinaries,\n\t\t// Travels on the launch contract so the platform backend projects the socket;\n\t\t// the environment entry above is what tells the child where to find it.\n\t\t...(options.credentialChannel ? { credentialChannel: options.credentialChannel } : {}),\n\t\tsupervisorStateDirectory,\n\t\tenvironment: {\n\t\t\t...childEnvironment,\n\t\t\t...(options.authPath ? { APEX_CODE_AUTH_PATH: options.authPath } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(options.credentialChannel\n\t\t\t\t? { APEX_CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PATH: options.credentialChannel.childSocketPath }\n\t\t\t\t: {}),\n\t\t\t// After childEnvironment: these come only from the supervisor's own\n\t\t\t// resolution, never from the invoking shell, so their value always wins over\n\t\t\t// anything of the same name that childEnvironment's allowlist let through.\n\t\t\t...(options.gitConfigPath ? { GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL: options.gitConfigPath } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(agentSkills ? { APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_AGENT: agentSkills } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(agentsHomeSkills ? { APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_AGENTS_HOME: agentsHomeSkills } : {}),\n\t\t\t// The host's own permission scopes, and the assertion that a boundary is\n\t\t\t// enforcing this process. Both are supervisor-resolved for exactly the reason\n\t\t\t// `agentDirectory` below is: the child's copy is writable by the child.\n\t\t\t...(options.policySnapshotPath ? { [POLICY_SNAPSHOT_PATH_VARIABLE]: options.policySnapshotPath } : {}),\n\t\t\t[SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VARIABLE]: SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VALUE,\n\t\t\tAPEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR: agentDirectory,\n\t\t\tAPEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_SESSION_DIR: sessionDirectory,\n\t\t\tHOME: stateDirectory,\n\t\t\tTMPDIR: stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t...xdgDirectories,\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/cli-launch.js

@@ -1,27 +1,114 @@
-import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readdirSync, realpathSync, rmSync, statSync } from "node:fs";
+import { chmodSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, realpathSync, rmSync, statSync, writeFileSync, } from "node:fs";
 import { join, sep } from "node:path";
 import { SettingsManager } from "../settings-manager.js";
 import { resolveWebSearchHost } from "../web-search-provider.js";
 import { resolveDefaultAllowedHosts } from "./default-hosts.js";
-const NON_SESSION_COMMANDS = new Set(["auth", "config", "install", "remove", "uninstall", "update", "list"]);
-const METADATA_FLAGS = new Set(["--version", "-v", "--export", "--list-models"]);
+import { supervisorTempDirectory } from "./supervisor-temp.js";
 /**
- * OS containment is the normal startup path for every command that can construct an
- * agent session. Commands that only inspect or maintain host configuration do not
- * create a runtime and therefore remain outside this child boundary.
+ * OS containment is the normal startup path for every parsed command that can
+ * construct an agent session. Classification consumes the same typed parse result
+ * as execution, so option values and text after `--` cannot impersonate metadata.
  */
-export function requiresSandboxedChild(args) {
-    if (NON_SESSION_COMMANDS.has(args[0] ?? ""))
-        return false;
-    if (args.some((argument) => METADATA_FLAGS.has(argument)))
-        return false;
-    if (args.includes("--help") || args.includes("-h"))
-        return false;
-    return true;
+export function requiresSandboxedChild(command) {
+    return command.kind === "session";
 }
 export function getSandboxSessionDirectory(workspace) {
     return join(workspace, ".apex-code", "sandbox-sessions");
 }
+/**
+ * Env var naming the file that carries the host's `policy` and `user` permission scopes
+ * into the child (PS.3).
+ *
+ * Deliberately absent from `SAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS`: only the supervisor's own
+ * resolution may name it, never the invoking shell and never a project file (ADR 0016).
+ */
+export const POLICY_SNAPSHOT_PATH_VARIABLE = "APEX_CODE_POLICY_SNAPSHOT_PATH";
+/**
+ * The marker asserting that an OS boundary is actually enforcing this process (PS.5).
+ *
+ * Set only on the supervisor's own launch environment for a child it is about to contain.
+ * It is not in the child-environment allowlist, so a value of this name in the invoking
+ * shell never survives into a child; the supervisor's own value is the only one that can.
+ * `core/sdk.ts` reads it for `sandbox: "required"` and keeps the same two literals -- a
+ * marker spelled two ways would be a drift the SDK could not detect at runtime, so
+ * `test/sdk-sandbox-contract.test.ts` pins them to each other.
+ */
+export const SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VARIABLE = "APEX_CODE_SANDBOX_ENFORCED";
+export const SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VALUE = "1";
+/**
+ * Allocate the directory the supervisor keeps its own launch state in.
+ *
+ * Everything the supervisor writes for a launch -- the terminal handoff latch, the
+ * published terminal size, the network relay, the git credential helper, the permission
+ * snapshot -- used to live in `workspace/.apex-code/sandbox-state`, which is inside the
+ * one writable bind the child has. A child that planted a symlink there redirected the
+ * *next* launch's supervisor writes onto arbitrary host paths, and could rewrite the
+ * scripts the supervisor was about to run. Under the supervisor temp root the child sees
+ * these files through the read-only root bind (Linux) or Seatbelt's write denial outside
+ * the workspace (macOS), so it can neither replace them nor plant a link where one goes.
+ */
+export function createSupervisorStateDirectory() {
+    const path = mkdtempSync(join(supervisorTempDirectory(), `apex-supervisor-${process.pid}-`), { encoding: "utf8" });
+    chmodSync(path, 0o700);
+    return {
+        path,
+        dispose: () => {
+            try {
+                rmSync(path, { force: true, recursive: true });
+            }
+            catch {
+                // A leftover directory under the supervisor's own temp root is not worth
+                // failing a session teardown over.
+            }
+        },
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * The managed policy file this host resolves, read before the child's environment exists.
+ *
+ * `cli-launch`'s child-environment allowlist filters `APEX_CODE_POLICY_PATH` out, so a
+ * host that configured a custom managed policy had it silently disappear at the boundary
+ * and the child fell back to the system path -- the config-projection defect PS.3 closes.
+ * Resolution here mirrors `core/permissions/store.ts`'s own default exactly.
+ */
+export function resolveSupervisorPolicyPath(environment = process.env) {
+    if (environment.APEX_CODE_POLICY_PATH)
+        return environment.APEX_CODE_POLICY_PATH;
+    return process.platform === "win32"
+        ? join(environment.ProgramData ?? "C:\\ProgramData", "apex-code", "policy.json")
+        : "/etc/apex-code/policy.json";
+}
+function readHostScopeText(path) {
+    try {
+        return readFileSync(path, "utf8");
+    }
+    catch {
+        // Absent is the ordinary case for both files; an unreadable one projects as absent
+        // rather than as authority the child cannot see the shape of.
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Capture the host `policy` and `user` permission scopes into the supervisor's private
+ * directory and return the file's path.
+ *
+ * Called before `buildSandboxedCliLaunch` repoints `APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR` at a
+ * workspace directory the child can write. Without it the child's `user` scope came from a
+ * file the child itself owns, and its `policy` scope from a path the environment allowlist
+ * had already removed.
+ */
+export function writeSupervisorPolicySnapshot(options) {
+    const directory = join(options.directory, "policy");
+    mkdirSync(directory, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+    const snapshot = {
+        version: 1,
+        policy: readHostScopeText(options.policyPath ?? resolveSupervisorPolicyPath(options.environment)),
+        user: readHostScopeText(join(options.agentDir, "permissions.json")),
+    };
+    const path = join(directory, "permission-snapshot.json");
+    writeFileSync(path, JSON.stringify(snapshot), { mode: 0o600 });
+    return path;
+}
 /**
  * Read supervisor policy only from global settings; project settings are untrusted here.
  *
@@ -204,6 +291,7 @@ function clearStaleToolMountpoints(toolsDirectory) {
  * from presenting a write boundary while its own state quietly escapes it.
  */
 export function buildSandboxedCliLaunch(options) {
+    const supervisorStateDirectory = options.supervisorStateDirectory ?? createSupervisorStateDirectory().path;
     const stateDirectory = join(options.workspace, ".apex-code", "sandbox-state");
     const agentDirectory = join(options.workspace, ".apex-code", "sandbox-agent");
     const sessionDirectory = getSandboxSessionDirectory(options.workspace);
@@ -230,7 +318,7 @@ export function buildSandboxedCliLaunch(options) {
     const { agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills } = options.skillPaths ?? {};
     const skillMountPaths = [agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills].filter((path) => path !== undefined);
     const readOnlyPaths = [...(options.readOnlyPaths ?? []), ...skillMountPaths];
-    const readOnlyFiles = options.authPath ? [options.authPath] : [];
+    const readOnlyFiles = [options.sessionPath, options.authPath, options.gitConfigPath].filter((path) => path !== undefined);
     const readOnlyBinaries = (options.toolBinaries ?? []).map((binary) => ({
         source: binary.path,
         destination: join(toolsDirectory, binary.name),
@@ -238,13 +326,18 @@ export function buildSandboxedCliLaunch(options) {
     return {
         command: options.command,
         args: [...options.args],
-        policy: { workspace: options.workspace, allowedHosts: options.allowedHosts ?? [] },
+        policy: {
+            workspace: options.workspace,
+            allowedHosts: options.allowedHosts ?? [],
+            additionalWritableRoots: options.additionalWritableRoots ?? [],
+        },
         readOnlyPaths,
         readOnlyFiles,
         readOnlyBinaries,
         // Travels on the launch contract so the platform backend projects the socket;
         // the environment entry above is what tells the child where to find it.
         ...(options.credentialChannel ? { credentialChannel: options.credentialChannel } : {}),
+        supervisorStateDirectory,
         environment: {
             ...childEnvironment,
             ...(options.authPath ? { APEX_CODE_AUTH_PATH: options.authPath } : {}),
@@ -254,8 +347,14 @@ export function buildSandboxedCliLaunch(options) {
             // After childEnvironment: these come only from the supervisor's own
             // resolution, never from the invoking shell, so their value always wins over
             // anything of the same name that childEnvironment's allowlist let through.
+            ...(options.gitConfigPath ? { GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL: options.gitConfigPath } : {}),
             ...(agentSkills ? { APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_AGENT: agentSkills } : {}),
             ...(agentsHomeSkills ? { APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_AGENTS_HOME: agentsHomeSkills } : {}),
+            // The host's own permission scopes, and the assertion that a boundary is
+            // enforcing this process. Both are supervisor-resolved for exactly the reason
+            // `agentDirectory` below is: the child's copy is writable by the child.
+            ...(options.policySnapshotPath ? { [POLICY_SNAPSHOT_PATH_VARIABLE]: options.policySnapshotPath } : {}),
+            [SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VARIABLE]: SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VALUE,
             APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR: agentDirectory,
             APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_SESSION_DIR: sessionDirectory,
             HOME: stateDirectory,

package/dist/core/sandbox/cli-launch.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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Commands that only inspect or maintain host configuration do not\n * create a runtime and therefore remain outside this child boundary.\n */\nexport function requiresSandboxedChild(args: readonly string[]): boolean {\n\tif (NON_SESSION_COMMANDS.has(args[0] ?? \"\")) return false;\n\tif (args.some((argument) => METADATA_FLAGS.has(argument))) return false;\n\tif (args.includes(\"--help\") || args.includes(\"-h\")) return false;\n\treturn true;\n}\n\nexport interface SandboxedCliLaunch extends SandboxLaunch {\n\treadonly environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n}\n\nexport function getSandboxSessionDirectory(workspace: string): string {\n\treturn join(workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-sessions\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Read supervisor policy only from global settings; project settings are untrusted here.\n *\n * The built-in provider hosts are added unless explicitly refused, because a deny-all\n * default made a fresh install unable to reach any model while giving the user no way to\n * learn which host to permit. Configured hosts are additive on top, and\n * `allowDefaultHosts: false` restores the strict behaviour for anyone who wants it.\n */\nexport function resolveSupervisorAllowedHosts(cwd: string, agentDir: string): readonly string[] | undefined {\n\tconst settings = SettingsManager.create(cwd, agentDir, { projectTrusted: false });\n\tconst network = settings.getNetworkSettings();\n\tconst configured = network?.allowedHosts ?? [];\n\tif (network?.allowDefaultHosts === false) return configured;\n\t// The configured `web_search` backend's host, added only when a credential for it\n\t// is present. Without this the tool would be configured and still unreachable,\n\t// which reads as a broken search rather than a missing allowlist entry. Nothing is\n\t// opened for a user who never set the key.\n\tconst webSearchHost = resolveWebSearchHost(settings.getWebSearchSettings());\n\treturn [...new Set([...resolveDefaultAllowedHosts(), ...configured, ...(webSearchHost ? [webSearchHost] : [])])];\n}\n\n/**\n * The host's two user-scope skill roots, each present only when it exists on the\n * host. Kept as two named slots rather than one list because\n * `core/package-manager.ts` discovers them in different modes -- root `.md` files\n * count as skills under `agentSkills` (\"pi\" mode) and are ignored under\n * `agentsHomeSkills` (\"agents\" mode), per `docs/skills.md` -- and a flat list of 0-2\n * paths cannot tell the child which root a lone survivor was.\n */\nexport interface HostSkillPaths {\n\t/** Host `<agentDir>/skills`. */\n\treadonly agentSkills?: string;\n\t/** Host `<home>/.agents/skills`. */\n\treadonly agentsHomeSkills?: string;\n}\n\n/** A candidate skill root that exists but was excluded, and why. */\nexport interface HostSkillPathRefusal {\n\treadonly root: keyof HostSkillPaths;\n\treadonly path: string;\n\treadonly reason: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ResolvedHostSkillPaths {\n\treadonly paths: HostSkillPaths;\n\treadonly refusals: readonly HostSkillPathRefusal[];\n}\n\n/**\n * True when `candidate` is the host home directory itself, or an ancestor of it.\n * Both paths must already be resolved (`realpathSync`), so a symlink can't disguise\n * either side. Mounting such a candidate read-only would re-expose the entire home\n * tree the sandbox's `--tmpfs /home` (Linux) / `(deny file-read* USER_HOME)` (macOS)\n * deliberately hides -- SSH keys, cloud credentials, other projects -- not just a\n * skills subtree.\n */\nfunction isHomeOrAncestorOfHome(candidate: string, home: string): boolean {\n\tif (candidate === home) return true;\n\tconst prefix = candidate.endsWith(sep) ? candidate : candidate + sep;\n\treturn home.startsWith(prefix);\n}\n\n/** Resolve one candidate root: absent, refused (symlinked onto the host home), or usable. */\nfunction resolveHostSkillRoot(\n\troot: keyof HostSkillPaths,\n\tcandidate: string,\n\thomeDir: string,\n): { path?: string; refusal?: HostSkillPathRefusal } {\n\tif (!existsSync(candidate)) return {};\n\tlet realCandidate: string;\n\tlet realHome: string;\n\ttry {\n\t\trealCandidate = realpathSync(candidate);\n\t\trealHome = realpathSync(homeDir);\n\t} catch (error) {\n\t\tconst message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);\n\t\treturn { refusal: { root, path: candidate, reason: `could not resolve real path: ${message}` } };\n\t}\n\tif (isHomeOrAncestorOfHome(realCandidate, realHome)) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\trefusal: {\n\t\t\t\troot,\n\t\t\t\tpath: candidate,\n\t\t\t\treason: \"resolves to the host home directory or an ancestor of it\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\treturn { path: candidate };\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the host's user-scope skill directories, before the sandbox exists to hide\n * them. Read only from the runtime environment and the host agent directory --\n * never from project files -- matching ADR 0016's rule that supervisor policy is\n * trust-first. Mirrors `core/package-manager.ts`'s own user-scope roots so the two\n * sides agree on where a skill lives. A candidate that resolves (directly or via a\n * symlink) onto the host home or an ancestor of it is refused rather than mounted --\n * see `isHomeOrAncestorOfHome` -- and reported so the caller can surface a startup\n * diagnostic instead of silently mounting or silently skipping it.\n */\nexport function resolveHostSkillPaths(agentDir: string, homeDir: string): ResolvedHostSkillPaths {\n\tconst agentSkills = resolveHostSkillRoot(\"agentSkills\", join(agentDir, \"skills\"), homeDir);\n\tconst agentsHomeSkills = resolveHostSkillRoot(\"agentsHomeSkills\", join(homeDir, \".agents\", \"skills\"), homeDir);\n\treturn {\n\t\tpaths: {\n\t\t\t...(agentSkills.path ? { agentSkills: agentSkills.path } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(agentsHomeSkills.path ? { agentsHomeSkills: agentsHomeSkills.path } : {}),\n\t\t},\n\t\trefusals: [agentSkills.refusal, agentsHomeSkills.refusal].filter(\n\t\t\t(refusal): refusal is HostSkillPathRefusal => refusal !== undefined,\n\t\t),\n\t};\n}\n\nconst SAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS = new Set([\n\t\"PATH\",\n\t\"LANG\",\n\t\"LC_ALL\",\n\t\"LC_CTYPE\",\n\t\"TERM\",\n\t\"COLORTERM\",\n\t\"NO_COLOR\",\n\t\"FORCE_COLOR\",\n\t\"TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_OFFLINE\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_SKIP_VERSION_CHECK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_STARTUP_BENCHMARK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_TIMING\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_CLEAR_ON_SHRINK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_HARDWARE_CURSOR\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_MODEL_CATALOG_URL\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_SHARE_VIEWER_URL\",\n\t\"VISUAL\",\n\t\"EDITOR\",\n]);\n\n// Provider API keys are explicit credential inputs, unlike arbitrary ambient variables.\n// Keep this list in sync with the documented provider environment-variable reference.\nconst SAFE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEYS = new Set([\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN\",\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN\",\n\t\"ANT_LING_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_BASE_URL\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_RESOURCE_NAME\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_API_VERSION\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_DEPLOYMENT_NAME_MAP\",\n\t\"DEEPSEEK_API_KEY\",\n\t\"NVIDIA_API_KEY\",\n\t\"GEMINI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"GROQ_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CEREBRAS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"FIREWORKS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"TOGETHER_API_KEY\",\n\t\"BASETEN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENROUTER_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ZAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ZAI_CODING_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MISTRAL_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MINIMAX_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MOONSHOT_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENCODE_API_KEY\",\n\t\"KIMI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_GATEWAY_ID\",\n\t\"QWEN_TOKEN_PLAN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"QWEN_TOKEN_PLAN_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_AMS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_SGP_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AWS_PROFILE\",\n\t\"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID\",\n\t\"AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\",\n\t\"AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK\",\n\t\"AWS_REGION\",\n]);\n\n// Credentials for tools rather than model providers. Separate from the provider set\n// above so the provider list stays a mirror of the documented provider reference.\nconst SAFE_TOOL_CREDENTIAL_KEYS = new Set([\"EXA_API_KEY\"]);\n\nfunction buildChildEnvironment(environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): NodeJS.ProcessEnv {\n\treturn Object.fromEntries(\n\t\tObject.entries(environment).filter(\n\t\t\t([key]) =>\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS.has(key) ||\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEYS.has(key) ||\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_TOOL_CREDENTIAL_KEYS.has(key),\n\t\t),\n\t);\n}\n\n/**\n * Drop empty files left in the child's tools directory by a previous launch.\n *\n * A projected tool is bind-mounted over a file there, and bwrap materialises that\n * mountpoint as an empty file on the host which outlives the namespace. If the host\n * tool later disappears, nothing is projected over the stub and the child would\n * otherwise find a 0-byte file where its binary should be. A real downloaded binary\n * is never empty, so size is a safe discriminator.\n */\nfunction clearStaleToolMountpoints(toolsDirectory: string): void {\n\tfor (const entry of readdirSync(toolsDirectory, { withFileTypes: true })) {\n\t\tif (!entry.isFile()) continue;\n\t\tconst entryPath = join(toolsDirectory, entry.name);\n\t\tif (statSync(entryPath).size === 0) {\n\t\t\trmSync(entryPath, { force: true });\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Allocate agent-owned state under the sole writable workspace mount. The child does\n * not inherit a host home or a host session/config directory, preventing the sandbox\n * from presenting a write boundary while its own state quietly escapes it.\n */\nexport function buildSandboxedCliLaunch(options: {\n\tworkspace: string;\n\tcommand: string;\n\targs: readonly string[];\n\tenvironment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n\tallowedHosts?: readonly string[];\n\treadOnlyPaths?: readonly string[];\n\tauthPath?: string;\n\ttoolBinaries?: readonly HostToolBinary[];\n\t/**\n\t * Host user-scope skill directories, pre-filtered by the caller to those that\n\t * exist and pass the host-home escape check (SKILL.4). Mounted read-only at their\n\t * original host location -- Seatbelt cannot remap a path, so this must hold for\n\t * both backends -- and named to the child via `APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_*` so its\n\t * discovery can find them under the sandbox's own repointed `HOME`/agent dir.\n\t */\n\tskillPaths?: HostSkillPaths;\n\t/** The supervisor-owned credential write channel, when one was opened. */\n\tcredentialChannel?: SandboxLaunch[\"credentialChannel\"];\n}): SandboxedCliLaunch {\n\tconst stateDirectory = join(options.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-state\");\n\tconst agentDirectory = join(options.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-agent\");\n\tconst sessionDirectory = getSandboxSessionDirectory(options.workspace);\n\t// Mirrors getBinDir() as the child will compute it from APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR,\n\t// so a projected tool lands exactly where the child's own lookup already checks.\n\tconst toolsDirectory = join(agentDirectory, \"bin\");\n\tconst xdgDirectories = {\n\t\tXDG_CONFIG_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"config\"),\n\t\tXDG_CACHE_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"cache\"),\n\t\tXDG_DATA_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"data\"),\n\t\tXDG_STATE_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"state\"),\n\t};\n\tfor (const directory of [\n\t\tstateDirectory,\n\t\tagentDirectory,\n\t\tsessionDirectory,\n\t\ttoolsDirectory,\n\t\t...Object.values(xdgDirectories),\n\t]) {\n\t\tmkdirSync(directory, { recursive: true });\n\t}\n\tclearStaleToolMountpoints(toolsDirectory);\n\tconst childEnvironment = buildChildEnvironment(options.environment);\n\tconst { agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills } = options.skillPaths ?? {};\n\tconst skillMountPaths = [agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills].filter((path): path is string => path !== undefined);\n\tconst readOnlyPaths = [...(options.readOnlyPaths ?? []), ...skillMountPaths];\n\tconst readOnlyFiles = options.authPath ? [options.authPath] : [];\n\tconst readOnlyBinaries = (options.toolBinaries ?? []).map((binary) => ({\n\t\tsource: binary.path,\n\t\tdestination: join(toolsDirectory, binary.name),\n\t}));\n\treturn {\n\t\tcommand: options.command,\n\t\targs: [...options.args],\n\t\tpolicy: { workspace: options.workspace, allowedHosts: options.allowedHosts ?? 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Classification consumes the same typed parse result\n * as execution, so option values and text after `--` cannot impersonate metadata.\n */\nexport function requiresSandboxedChild(command: ParsedCliCommand): boolean {\n\treturn command.kind === \"session\";\n}\n\nexport interface SandboxedCliLaunch extends SandboxLaunch {\n\treadonly environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n\t/**\n\t * The supervisor's own 0700 state directory, outside every writable root the child\n\t * has.\n\t */\n\treadonly supervisorStateDirectory: string;\n}\n\nexport function getSandboxSessionDirectory(workspace: string): string {\n\treturn join(workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-sessions\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Env var naming the file that carries the host's `policy` and `user` permission scopes\n * into the child (PS.3).\n *\n * Deliberately absent from `SAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS`: only the supervisor's own\n * resolution may name it, never the invoking shell and never a project file (ADR 0016).\n */\nexport const POLICY_SNAPSHOT_PATH_VARIABLE = \"APEX_CODE_POLICY_SNAPSHOT_PATH\";\n\n/**\n * The marker asserting that an OS boundary is actually enforcing this process (PS.5).\n *\n * Set only on the supervisor's own launch environment for a child it is about to contain.\n * It is not in the child-environment allowlist, so a value of this name in the invoking\n * shell never survives into a child; the supervisor's own value is the only one that can.\n * `core/sdk.ts` reads it for `sandbox: \"required\"` and keeps the same two literals -- a\n * marker spelled two ways would be a drift the SDK could not detect at runtime, so\n * `test/sdk-sandbox-contract.test.ts` pins them to each other.\n */\nexport const SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VARIABLE = \"APEX_CODE_SANDBOX_ENFORCED\";\nexport const SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VALUE = \"1\";\n\nexport interface SupervisorStateDirectory {\n\t/** A 0700 directory under the supervisor temp root, outside every child-writable root. */\n\treadonly path: string;\n\treadonly dispose: () => void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Allocate the directory the supervisor keeps its own launch state in.\n *\n * Everything the supervisor writes for a launch -- the terminal handoff latch, the\n * published terminal size, the network relay, the git credential helper, the permission\n * snapshot -- used to live in `workspace/.apex-code/sandbox-state`, which is inside the\n * one writable bind the child has. A child that planted a symlink there redirected the\n * *next* launch's supervisor writes onto arbitrary host paths, and could rewrite the\n * scripts the supervisor was about to run. Under the supervisor temp root the child sees\n * these files through the read-only root bind (Linux) or Seatbelt's write denial outside\n * the workspace (macOS), so it can neither replace them nor plant a link where one goes.\n */\nexport function createSupervisorStateDirectory(): SupervisorStateDirectory {\n\tconst path = mkdtempSync(join(supervisorTempDirectory(), `apex-supervisor-${process.pid}-`), { encoding: \"utf8\" });\n\tchmodSync(path, 0o700);\n\treturn {\n\t\tpath,\n\t\tdispose: () => {\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\trmSync(path, { force: true, recursive: true });\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t// A leftover directory under the supervisor's own temp root is not worth\n\t\t\t\t// failing a session teardown over.\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n\n/**\n * The managed policy file this host resolves, read before the child's environment exists.\n *\n * `cli-launch`'s child-environment allowlist filters `APEX_CODE_POLICY_PATH` out, so a\n * host that configured a custom managed policy had it silently disappear at the boundary\n * and the child fell back to the system path -- the config-projection defect PS.3 closes.\n * Resolution here mirrors `core/permissions/store.ts`'s own default exactly.\n */\nexport function resolveSupervisorPolicyPath(environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): string {\n\tif (environment.APEX_CODE_POLICY_PATH) return environment.APEX_CODE_POLICY_PATH;\n\treturn process.platform === \"win32\"\n\t\t? join(environment.ProgramData ?? \"C:\\\\ProgramData\", \"apex-code\", \"policy.json\")\n\t\t: \"/etc/apex-code/policy.json\";\n}\n\n/**\n * The two host-owned permission scopes, captured verbatim.\n *\n * Raw file text rather than parsed rules, so the child's store applies exactly the same\n * validation -- and reports exactly the same malformed-file error -- as it would have on\n * the host. A snapshot that pre-parsed would have to decide what a malformed host policy\n * means, and the only safe answer to that lives in the store.\n */\ninterface SupervisorPolicySnapshotFile {\n\treadonly version: 1;\n\treadonly policy: string | null;\n\treadonly user: string | null;\n}\n\nfunction readHostScopeText(path: string): string | null {\n\ttry {\n\t\treturn readFileSync(path, \"utf8\");\n\t} catch {\n\t\t// Absent is the ordinary case for both files; an unreadable one projects as absent\n\t\t// rather than as authority the child cannot see the shape of.\n\t\treturn null;\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Capture the host `policy` and `user` permission scopes into the supervisor's private\n * directory and return the file's path.\n *\n * Called before `buildSandboxedCliLaunch` repoints `APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR` at a\n * workspace directory the child can write. Without it the child's `user` scope came from a\n * file the child itself owns, and its `policy` scope from a path the environment allowlist\n * had already removed.\n */\nexport function writeSupervisorPolicySnapshot(options: {\n\tdirectory: string;\n\t/** The *host* agent directory, before the launch repoints it. */\n\tagentDir: string;\n\tpolicyPath?: string;\n\tenvironment?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n}): string {\n\tconst directory = join(options.directory, \"policy\");\n\tmkdirSync(directory, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });\n\tconst snapshot: SupervisorPolicySnapshotFile = {\n\t\tversion: 1,\n\t\tpolicy: readHostScopeText(options.policyPath ?? resolveSupervisorPolicyPath(options.environment)),\n\t\tuser: readHostScopeText(join(options.agentDir, \"permissions.json\")),\n\t};\n\tconst path = join(directory, \"permission-snapshot.json\");\n\twriteFileSync(path, JSON.stringify(snapshot), { mode: 0o600 });\n\treturn path;\n}\n\n/**\n * Read supervisor policy only from global settings; project settings are untrusted here.\n *\n * The built-in provider hosts are added unless explicitly refused, because a deny-all\n * default made a fresh install unable to reach any model while giving the user no way to\n * learn which host to permit. Configured hosts are additive on top, and\n * `allowDefaultHosts: false` restores the strict behaviour for anyone who wants it.\n */\nexport function resolveSupervisorAllowedHosts(cwd: string, agentDir: string): readonly string[] | undefined {\n\tconst settings = SettingsManager.create(cwd, agentDir, { projectTrusted: false });\n\tconst network = settings.getNetworkSettings();\n\tconst configured = network?.allowedHosts ?? [];\n\tif (network?.allowDefaultHosts === false) return configured;\n\t// The configured `web_search` backend's host, added only when a credential for it\n\t// is present. Without this the tool would be configured and still unreachable,\n\t// which reads as a broken search rather than a missing allowlist entry. Nothing is\n\t// opened for a user who never set the key.\n\tconst webSearchHost = resolveWebSearchHost(settings.getWebSearchSettings());\n\treturn [...new Set([...resolveDefaultAllowedHosts(), ...configured, ...(webSearchHost ? [webSearchHost] : [])])];\n}\n\n/**\n * The host's two user-scope skill roots, each present only when it exists on the\n * host. Kept as two named slots rather than one list because\n * `core/package-manager.ts` discovers them in different modes -- root `.md` files\n * count as skills under `agentSkills` (\"pi\" mode) and are ignored under\n * `agentsHomeSkills` (\"agents\" mode), per `docs/skills.md` -- and a flat list of 0-2\n * paths cannot tell the child which root a lone survivor was.\n */\nexport interface HostSkillPaths {\n\t/** Host `<agentDir>/skills`. */\n\treadonly agentSkills?: string;\n\t/** Host `<home>/.agents/skills`. */\n\treadonly agentsHomeSkills?: string;\n}\n\n/** A candidate skill root that exists but was excluded, and why. */\nexport interface HostSkillPathRefusal {\n\treadonly root: keyof HostSkillPaths;\n\treadonly path: string;\n\treadonly reason: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ResolvedHostSkillPaths {\n\treadonly paths: HostSkillPaths;\n\treadonly refusals: readonly HostSkillPathRefusal[];\n}\n\n/**\n * True when `candidate` is the host home directory itself, or an ancestor of it.\n * Both paths must already be resolved (`realpathSync`), so a symlink can't disguise\n * either side. Mounting such a candidate read-only would re-expose the entire home\n * tree the sandbox's `--tmpfs /home` (Linux) / `(deny file-read* USER_HOME)` (macOS)\n * deliberately hides -- SSH keys, cloud credentials, other projects -- not just a\n * skills subtree.\n */\nfunction isHomeOrAncestorOfHome(candidate: string, home: string): boolean {\n\tif (candidate === home) return true;\n\tconst prefix = candidate.endsWith(sep) ? candidate : candidate + sep;\n\treturn home.startsWith(prefix);\n}\n\n/** Resolve one candidate root: absent, refused (symlinked onto the host home), or usable. */\nfunction resolveHostSkillRoot(\n\troot: keyof HostSkillPaths,\n\tcandidate: string,\n\thomeDir: string,\n): { path?: string; refusal?: HostSkillPathRefusal } {\n\tif (!existsSync(candidate)) return {};\n\tlet realCandidate: string;\n\tlet realHome: string;\n\ttry {\n\t\trealCandidate = realpathSync(candidate);\n\t\trealHome = realpathSync(homeDir);\n\t} catch (error) {\n\t\tconst message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);\n\t\treturn { refusal: { root, path: candidate, reason: `could not resolve real path: ${message}` } };\n\t}\n\tif (isHomeOrAncestorOfHome(realCandidate, realHome)) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\trefusal: {\n\t\t\t\troot,\n\t\t\t\tpath: candidate,\n\t\t\t\treason: \"resolves to the host home directory or an ancestor of it\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\treturn { path: candidate };\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the host's user-scope skill directories, before the sandbox exists to hide\n * them. Read only from the runtime environment and the host agent directory --\n * never from project files -- matching ADR 0016's rule that supervisor policy is\n * trust-first. Mirrors `core/package-manager.ts`'s own user-scope roots so the two\n * sides agree on where a skill lives. A candidate that resolves (directly or via a\n * symlink) onto the host home or an ancestor of it is refused rather than mounted --\n * see `isHomeOrAncestorOfHome` -- and reported so the caller can surface a startup\n * diagnostic instead of silently mounting or silently skipping it.\n */\nexport function resolveHostSkillPaths(agentDir: string, homeDir: string): ResolvedHostSkillPaths {\n\tconst agentSkills = resolveHostSkillRoot(\"agentSkills\", join(agentDir, \"skills\"), homeDir);\n\tconst agentsHomeSkills = resolveHostSkillRoot(\"agentsHomeSkills\", join(homeDir, \".agents\", \"skills\"), homeDir);\n\treturn {\n\t\tpaths: {\n\t\t\t...(agentSkills.path ? { agentSkills: agentSkills.path } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(agentsHomeSkills.path ? { agentsHomeSkills: agentsHomeSkills.path } : {}),\n\t\t},\n\t\trefusals: [agentSkills.refusal, agentsHomeSkills.refusal].filter(\n\t\t\t(refusal): refusal is HostSkillPathRefusal => refusal !== undefined,\n\t\t),\n\t};\n}\n\nconst SAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS = new Set([\n\t\"PATH\",\n\t\"LANG\",\n\t\"LC_ALL\",\n\t\"LC_CTYPE\",\n\t\"TERM\",\n\t\"COLORTERM\",\n\t\"NO_COLOR\",\n\t\"FORCE_COLOR\",\n\t\"TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_OFFLINE\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_SKIP_VERSION_CHECK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_STARTUP_BENCHMARK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_TIMING\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_CLEAR_ON_SHRINK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_HARDWARE_CURSOR\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_MODEL_CATALOG_URL\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_SHARE_VIEWER_URL\",\n\t\"VISUAL\",\n\t\"EDITOR\",\n]);\n\n// Provider API keys are explicit credential inputs, unlike arbitrary ambient variables.\n// Keep this list in sync with the documented provider environment-variable reference.\nconst SAFE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEYS = new Set([\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN\",\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN\",\n\t\"ANT_LING_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_BASE_URL\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_RESOURCE_NAME\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_API_VERSION\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_DEPLOYMENT_NAME_MAP\",\n\t\"DEEPSEEK_API_KEY\",\n\t\"NVIDIA_API_KEY\",\n\t\"GEMINI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"GROQ_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CEREBRAS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"FIREWORKS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"TOGETHER_API_KEY\",\n\t\"BASETEN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENROUTER_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ZAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ZAI_CODING_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MISTRAL_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MINIMAX_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MOONSHOT_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENCODE_API_KEY\",\n\t\"KIMI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_GATEWAY_ID\",\n\t\"QWEN_TOKEN_PLAN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"QWEN_TOKEN_PLAN_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_AMS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_SGP_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AWS_PROFILE\",\n\t\"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID\",\n\t\"AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\",\n\t\"AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK\",\n\t\"AWS_REGION\",\n]);\n\n// Credentials for tools rather than model providers. Separate from the provider set\n// above so the provider list stays a mirror of the documented provider reference.\nconst SAFE_TOOL_CREDENTIAL_KEYS = new Set([\"EXA_API_KEY\"]);\n\nfunction buildChildEnvironment(environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): NodeJS.ProcessEnv {\n\treturn Object.fromEntries(\n\t\tObject.entries(environment).filter(\n\t\t\t([key]) =>\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS.has(key) ||\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEYS.has(key) ||\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_TOOL_CREDENTIAL_KEYS.has(key),\n\t\t),\n\t);\n}\n\n/**\n * Drop empty files left in the child's tools directory by a previous launch.\n *\n * A projected tool is bind-mounted over a file there, and bwrap materialises that\n * mountpoint as an empty file on the host which outlives the namespace. If the host\n * tool later disappears, nothing is projected over the stub and the child would\n * otherwise find a 0-byte file where its binary should be. A real downloaded binary\n * is never empty, so size is a safe discriminator.\n */\nfunction clearStaleToolMountpoints(toolsDirectory: string): void {\n\tfor (const entry of readdirSync(toolsDirectory, { withFileTypes: true })) {\n\t\tif (!entry.isFile()) continue;\n\t\tconst entryPath = join(toolsDirectory, entry.name);\n\t\tif (statSync(entryPath).size === 0) {\n\t\t\trmSync(entryPath, { force: true });\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Allocate agent-owned state under the sole writable workspace mount. The child does\n * not inherit a host home or a host session/config directory, preventing the sandbox\n * from presenting a write boundary while its own state quietly escapes it.\n */\nexport function buildSandboxedCliLaunch(options: {\n\tworkspace: string;\n\tcommand: string;\n\targs: readonly string[];\n\tenvironment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n\tallowedHosts?: readonly string[];\n\tadditionalWritableRoots?: readonly string[];\n\treadOnlyPaths?: readonly string[];\n\tsessionPath?: string;\n\tauthPath?: string;\n\t/**\n\t * A synthesized two-key git config, projected read-only so the child can author a\n\t * commit as the user. Absent when the host had no global identity to resolve.\n\t */\n\tgitConfigPath?: string;\n\ttoolBinaries?: readonly HostToolBinary[];\n\t/**\n\t * Host user-scope skill directories, pre-filtered by the caller to those that\n\t * exist and pass the host-home escape check (SKILL.4). Mounted read-only at their\n\t * original host location -- Seatbelt cannot remap a path, so this must hold for\n\t * both backends -- and named to the child via `APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_*` so its\n\t * discovery can find them under the sandbox's own repointed `HOME`/agent dir.\n\t */\n\tskillPaths?: HostSkillPaths;\n\t/** The supervisor-owned credential write channel, when one was opened. */\n\tcredentialChannel?: SandboxLaunch[\"credentialChannel\"];\n\t/** The supervisor's private 0700 state directory for this launch. */\n\tsupervisorStateDirectory?: string;\n\t/** The captured host permission scopes, named to the child read-only. */\n\tpolicySnapshotPath?: string;\n}): SandboxedCliLaunch {\n\tconst supervisorStateDirectory = options.supervisorStateDirectory ?? createSupervisorStateDirectory().path;\n\tconst stateDirectory = join(options.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-state\");\n\tconst agentDirectory = join(options.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-agent\");\n\tconst sessionDirectory = getSandboxSessionDirectory(options.workspace);\n\t// Mirrors getBinDir() as the child will compute it from APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR,\n\t// so a projected tool lands exactly where the child's own lookup already checks.\n\tconst toolsDirectory = join(agentDirectory, \"bin\");\n\tconst xdgDirectories = {\n\t\tXDG_CONFIG_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"config\"),\n\t\tXDG_CACHE_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"cache\"),\n\t\tXDG_DATA_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"data\"),\n\t\tXDG_STATE_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"state\"),\n\t};\n\tfor (const directory of [\n\t\tstateDirectory,\n\t\tagentDirectory,\n\t\tsessionDirectory,\n\t\ttoolsDirectory,\n\t\t...Object.values(xdgDirectories),\n\t]) {\n\t\tmkdirSync(directory, { recursive: true });\n\t}\n\tclearStaleToolMountpoints(toolsDirectory);\n\tconst childEnvironment = buildChildEnvironment(options.environment);\n\tconst { agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills } = options.skillPaths ?? {};\n\tconst skillMountPaths = [agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills].filter((path): path is string => path !== undefined);\n\tconst readOnlyPaths = [...(options.readOnlyPaths ?? []), ...skillMountPaths];\n\tconst readOnlyFiles = [options.sessionPath, options.authPath, options.gitConfigPath].filter(\n\t\t(path): path is string => path !== undefined,\n\t);\n\tconst readOnlyBinaries = (options.toolBinaries ?? []).map((binary) => ({\n\t\tsource: binary.path,\n\t\tdestination: join(toolsDirectory, binary.name),\n\t}));\n\treturn {\n\t\tcommand: options.command,\n\t\targs: [...options.args],\n\t\tpolicy: {\n\t\t\tworkspace: options.workspace,\n\t\t\tallowedHosts: options.allowedHosts ?? [],\n\t\t\tadditionalWritableRoots: options.additionalWritableRoots ?? [],\n\t\t},\n\t\treadOnlyPaths,\n\t\treadOnlyFiles,\n\t\treadOnlyBinaries,\n\t\t// Travels on the launch contract so the platform backend projects the socket;\n\t\t// the environment entry above is what tells the child where to find it.\n\t\t...(options.credentialChannel ? { credentialChannel: options.credentialChannel } : {}),\n\t\tsupervisorStateDirectory,\n\t\tenvironment: {\n\t\t\t...childEnvironment,\n\t\t\t...(options.authPath ? { APEX_CODE_AUTH_PATH: options.authPath } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(options.credentialChannel\n\t\t\t\t? { APEX_CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PATH: options.credentialChannel.childSocketPath }\n\t\t\t\t: {}),\n\t\t\t// After childEnvironment: these come only from the supervisor's own\n\t\t\t// resolution, never from the invoking shell, so their value always wins over\n\t\t\t// anything of the same name that childEnvironment's allowlist let through.\n\t\t\t...(options.gitConfigPath ? { GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL: options.gitConfigPath } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(agentSkills ? { APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_AGENT: agentSkills } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(agentsHomeSkills ? { APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_AGENTS_HOME: agentsHomeSkills } : {}),\n\t\t\t// The host's own permission scopes, and the assertion that a boundary is\n\t\t\t// enforcing this process. Both are supervisor-resolved for exactly the reason\n\t\t\t// `agentDirectory` below is: the child's copy is writable by the child.\n\t\t\t...(options.policySnapshotPath ? { [POLICY_SNAPSHOT_PATH_VARIABLE]: options.policySnapshotPath } : {}),\n\t\t\t[SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VARIABLE]: SANDBOX_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_VALUE,\n\t\t\tAPEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR: agentDirectory,\n\t\t\tAPEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_SESSION_DIR: sessionDirectory,\n\t\t\tHOME: stateDirectory,\n\t\t\tTMPDIR: stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t...xdgDirectories,\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/cli-supervisor.d.ts

@@ -19,7 +19,9 @@ export declare function launchSandboxedCli(options: {
     args: readonly string[];
     environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
     workspace: string;
+    agentDir?: string;
     allowedHosts?: readonly string[];
+    additionalWritableRoots?: readonly string[];
     readOnlyPaths?: readonly string[];
     authPath?: string;
     toolBinaries?: readonly HostToolBinary[];

package/dist/core/sandbox/cli-supervisor.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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The caller returns\n * the result directly so the outer process never continues into `main()` afterward.\n */\nexport async function launchSandboxedCli(options: {\n\tcommand: string;\n\targs: readonly string[];\n\tenvironment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n\tworkspace: string;\n\tallowedHosts?: readonly string[];\n\treadOnlyPaths?: readonly string[];\n\tauthPath?: string;\n\ttoolBinaries?: readonly HostToolBinary[];\n\tskillPaths?: HostSkillPaths;\n\tdependencies?: Partial<CliSandboxDependencies>;\n}): Promise<number> {\n\tconst dependencies = { ...defaultDependencies, ...options.dependencies };\n\tconst policyResult = createSandboxPolicy({ workspace: options.workspace, allowedHosts: options.allowedHosts });\n\tif (policyResult.kind === \"invalid\") {\n\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(`Error: OS sandbox is not enforcing this agent session: ${policyResult.reason}\\n`);\n\t\treturn 1;\n\t}\n\tconst violationStore = new SandboxViolationStore();\n\tconst backend = dependencies.createBackend({ violationStore });\n\n\tconst supervisor = createSandboxSupervisor({ backend, policy: policyResult.policy });\n\tlet credentialProxy: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof createCredentialProxy>> | undefined;\n\tlet lease: ReturnType<typeof acquireSessionLease> | undefined;\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst parsed = parseArgs(options.args);\n\t\tconst wantsPersistentSession = !parsed.noSession && !parsed.help && parsed.listModels === undefined;\n\t\tconst sessionDirectory = getSandboxSessionDirectory(policyResult.policy.workspace);\n\t\tif (wantsPersistentSession && !parsed.allowConcurrent) {\n\t\t\tconst liveSessions = readLiveSessionLeases(sessionDirectory, policyResult.policy.workspace);\n\t\t\tif (liveSessions.length > 0) {\n\t\t\t\treportConcurrentSessionRefusal(liveSessions, policyResult.policy.workspace);\n\t\t\t\treturn 1;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tlease = wantsPersistentSession\n\t\t\t? acquireSessionLease(sessionDirectory, policyResult.policy.workspace, `supervisor-${process.pid}`)\n\t\t\t: undefined;\n\n\t\t// Open the host-owned credential channel only after startup checks that can\n\t\t// return early. AuthStorage creates a missing canonical file as 0600, so a\n\t\t// first-run credential writes get the same channel and read-only projection as later runs.\n\t\tlet credentialChannel: SandboxLaunch[\"credentialChannel\"];\n\t\tif (options.authPath && backend.status.kind === \"enforced\") {\n\t\t\tconst paths = resolveCredentialChannelPaths();\n\t\t\tcredentialProxy = await createCredentialProxy({\n\t\t\t\tauthPath: options.authPath,\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t\tsocketPath: paths.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\tcleanupDirectory: paths.hostSocketDirectory,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tcredentialChannel = paths;\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst launch = buildSandboxedCliLaunch({\n\t\t\tworkspace: policyResult.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\tcommand: options.command,\n\t\t\targs: options.args,\n\t\t\tenvironment: options.environment,\n\t\t\tallowedHosts: options.allowedHosts,\n\t\t\treadOnlyPaths: options.readOnlyPaths,\n\t\t\tauthPath: options.authPath,\n\t\t\ttoolBinaries: options.toolBinaries,\n\t\t\tskillPaths: options.skillPaths,\n\t\t\tcredentialChannel,\n\t\t});\n\t\treturn await supervisor.launch(launch);\n\t} catch (error: unknown) {\n\t\tconst message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : \"Failed to start OS sandbox.\";\n\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(`Error: ${message}\\n`);\n\t\treturn 1;\n\t} finally {\n\t\tlease?.release();\n\t\tconst cleanupResults = await Promise.allSettled([supervisor.close(), credentialProxy?.close()]);\n\t\tfor (const violation of violationStore.list()) {\n\t\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(\n\t\t\t\t`Sandbox violation (${violation.kind}): ${violation.command} — ${violation.detail}\\n`,\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor (const result of cleanupResults) {\n\t\t\tif (result.status === \"rejected\") {\n\t\t\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(\"Warning: sandbox cleanup did not complete cleanly.\\n\");\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"cli-supervisor.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/core/sandbox/cli-supervisor.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAKA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,8BAA8B,CAAC;AAEnE,OAAO,EAIN,KAAK,cAAc,EAGnB,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAOzB,OAAO,EAA2B,KAAK,cAAc,EAAsB,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AACnG,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAExD,MAAM,WAAW,sBAAsB;IACtC,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;QAAE,cAAc,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAA;KAAE,KAAK,cAAc,CAAC;IACtF,MAAM,EAAE;QAAE,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAAA;KAAE,CAAC;CAC5C;AAeD;;;GAGG;AACH,wBAAsB,kBAAkB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;IACjD,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACxB,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC;IAC/B,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACjC,uBAAuB,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAC5C,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAClC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC;IACzC,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,cAAc,CAAC;IAC5B,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAAC;CAC/C,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAuHlB","sourcesContent":["import { rmSync } from \"node:fs\";\nimport { isAbsolute, relative, resolve, sep } from \"node:path\";\nimport { parseArgs } from \"../../cli/args.ts\";\nimport { reportConcurrentSessionRefusal } from \"../../cli/concurrent-session.ts\";\nimport { getAgentDir } from \"../../config.ts\";\nimport type { HostToolBinary } from \"../../utils/tools-manager.ts\";\nimport { acquireSessionLease, readLiveSessionLeases } from \"../session-lease.ts\";\nimport {\n\tbuildSandboxedCliLaunch,\n\tcreateSupervisorStateDirectory,\n\tgetSandboxSessionDirectory,\n\ttype HostSkillPaths,\n\tresolveSupervisorPolicyPath,\n\twriteSupervisorPolicySnapshot,\n} from \"./cli-launch.ts\";\nimport { createProjectedGitConfig, resolveHostGitIdentity } from \"./git-identity.ts\";\nimport { createLinuxSandboxBackend } from \"./linux-backend.ts\";\nimport { createMacosSandboxBackend } from \"./macos-backend.ts\";\nimport { createSandboxPolicy } from \"./policy.ts\";\nimport { createCredentialProxy, resolveCredentialChannelPaths } from \"./rpc/credential-proxy.ts\";\nimport { gitCredentialHelperCommand } from \"./rpc/git-credential-helper.ts\";\nimport { createSandboxSupervisor, type SandboxBackend, type SandboxLaunch } from \"./supervisor.ts\";\nimport { SandboxViolationStore } from \"./violations.ts\";\n\nexport interface CliSandboxDependencies {\n\tcreateBackend: (options: { violationStore: SandboxViolationStore }) => SandboxBackend;\n\tstderr: { write(message: string): boolean };\n}\n\n/** Routes to the platform adapter for the running OS; each adapter self-reports\n * `unavailable` on any other platform, so this only needs to pick the one whose\n * enforcement is actually reachable here. */\nfunction createDefaultSandboxBackend(options: { violationStore: SandboxViolationStore }): SandboxBackend {\n\tif (process.platform === \"darwin\") return createMacosSandboxBackend(options);\n\treturn createLinuxSandboxBackend(options);\n}\n\nconst defaultDependencies: CliSandboxDependencies = {\n\tcreateBackend: createDefaultSandboxBackend,\n\tstderr: process.stderr,\n};\n\n/**\n * Start a normal CLI runtime beneath the whole-process boundary. The caller returns\n * the result directly so the outer process never continues into `main()` afterward.\n */\nexport async function launchSandboxedCli(options: {\n\tcommand: string;\n\targs: readonly string[];\n\tenvironment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n\tworkspace: string;\n\tagentDir?: string;\n\tallowedHosts?: readonly string[];\n\tadditionalWritableRoots?: readonly string[];\n\treadOnlyPaths?: readonly string[];\n\tauthPath?: string;\n\ttoolBinaries?: readonly HostToolBinary[];\n\tskillPaths?: HostSkillPaths;\n\tdependencies?: Partial<CliSandboxDependencies>;\n}): Promise<number> {\n\tconst dependencies = { ...defaultDependencies, ...options.dependencies };\n\tconst policyResult = createSandboxPolicy({\n\t\tworkspace: options.workspace,\n\t\tallowedHosts: options.allowedHosts,\n\t\tadditionalWritableRoots: options.additionalWritableRoots,\n\t});\n\tif (policyResult.kind === \"invalid\") {\n\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(`Error: OS sandbox is not enforcing this agent session: ${policyResult.reason}\\n`);\n\t\treturn 1;\n\t}\n\tconst violationStore = new SandboxViolationStore();\n\tconst backend = dependencies.createBackend({ violationStore });\n\tconst agentDir = options.agentDir ?? getAgentDir();\n\tconst supervisorState = createSupervisorStateDirectory();\n\n\tconst supervisor = createSandboxSupervisor({ backend, policy: policyResult.policy });\n\tlet credentialProxy: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof createCredentialProxy>> | undefined;\n\tlet lease: ReturnType<typeof acquireSessionLease> | undefined;\n\tlet projectedGitConfig: ReturnType<typeof createProjectedGitConfig> | undefined;\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst parsed = parseArgs(options.args);\n\t\tconst resolvedSessionPath =\n\t\t\tparsed.session &&\n\t\t\t(parsed.session.includes(\"/\") || parsed.session.includes(\"\\\\\") || parsed.session.endsWith(\".jsonl\"))\n\t\t\t\t? resolve(options.workspace, parsed.session)\n\t\t\t\t: undefined;\n\t\tconst sessionRelativePath = resolvedSessionPath ? relative(options.workspace, resolvedSessionPath) : undefined;\n\t\tconst externalSessionPath =\n\t\t\tresolvedSessionPath &&\n\t\t\tsessionRelativePath !== undefined &&\n\t\t\tsessionRelativePath !== \"\" &&\n\t\t\t(sessionRelativePath === \"..\" || sessionRelativePath.startsWith(`..${sep}`) || isAbsolute(sessionRelativePath))\n\t\t\t\t? resolvedSessionPath\n\t\t\t\t: undefined;\n\t\tconst wantsPersistentSession = !parsed.noSession && !parsed.help && parsed.listModels === undefined;\n\t\tconst sessionDirectory = getSandboxSessionDirectory(policyResult.policy.workspace);\n\t\tif (wantsPersistentSession && !parsed.allowConcurrent) {\n\t\t\tconst liveSessions = readLiveSessionLeases(sessionDirectory, policyResult.policy.workspace);\n\t\t\tif (liveSessions.length > 0) {\n\t\t\t\treportConcurrentSessionRefusal(liveSessions, policyResult.policy.workspace);\n\t\t\t\treturn 1;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tlease = wantsPersistentSession\n\t\t\t? acquireSessionLease(sessionDirectory, policyResult.policy.workspace, `supervisor-${process.pid}`)\n\t\t\t: undefined;\n\n\t\t// Open the host-owned credential channel only after startup checks that can\n\t\t// return early. AuthStorage creates a missing canonical file as 0600, so a\n\t\t// first-run credential writes get the same channel and read-only projection as later runs.\n\t\tlet credentialChannel: SandboxLaunch[\"credentialChannel\"];\n\t\tif (options.authPath && backend.status.kind === \"enforced\") {\n\t\t\tconst paths = resolveCredentialChannelPaths();\n\t\t\tcredentialProxy = await createCredentialProxy({\n\t\t\t\tauthPath: options.authPath,\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t\tsocketPath: paths.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\tcleanupDirectory: paths.hostSocketDirectory,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tcredentialChannel = paths;\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Resolved here rather than in the caller because this function owns the teardown\n\t\t// that removes the directory again. The supervisor is unsandboxed, so the host home\n\t\t// is still visible at this point; inside the child it is not.\n\t\tconst identity = resolveHostGitIdentity({ environment: options.environment });\n\t\tconst snapshotPath = writeSupervisorPolicySnapshot({\n\t\t\tdirectory: supervisorState.path,\n\t\t\tagentDir,\n\t\t\tpolicyPath: resolveSupervisorPolicyPath(options.environment),\n\t\t\tenvironment: options.environment,\n\t\t});\n\t\t// The helper command is derived from the state directory rather than handed back by\n\t\t// the backend, because the config has to name it before any backend exists. Both\n\t\t// sides derive the same path, so the config never names a file nothing created.\n\t\tprojectedGitConfig = identity\n\t\t\t? createProjectedGitConfig(identity, {\n\t\t\t\t\tcredentialHelper: gitCredentialHelperCommand(supervisorState.path),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t: undefined;\n\n\t\tconst launch = buildSandboxedCliLaunch({\n\t\t\tworkspace: policyResult.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\tcommand: options.command,\n\t\t\targs: options.args,\n\t\t\tenvironment: options.environment,\n\t\t\tallowedHosts: options.allowedHosts,\n\t\t\treadOnlyPaths: options.readOnlyPaths,\n\t\t\tsessionPath: externalSessionPath,\n\t\t\tauthPath: options.authPath,\n\t\t\tgitConfigPath: projectedGitConfig?.path,\n\t\t\ttoolBinaries: options.toolBinaries,\n\t\t\tskillPaths: options.skillPaths,\n\t\t\tcredentialChannel,\n\t\t\tsupervisorStateDirectory: supervisorState.path,\n\t\t\tpolicySnapshotPath: snapshotPath,\n\t\t});\n\t\treturn await supervisor.launch(launch);\n\t} catch (error: unknown) {\n\t\tconst message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : \"Failed to start OS sandbox.\";\n\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(`Error: ${message}\\n`);\n\t\treturn 1;\n\t} finally {\n\t\tlease?.release();\n\t\tif (projectedGitConfig) rmSync(projectedGitConfig.directory, { force: true, recursive: true });\n\t\tconst cleanupResults = await Promise.allSettled([supervisor.close(), credentialProxy?.close()]);\n\t\tsupervisorState.dispose();\n\t\tfor (const violation of violationStore.list()) {\n\t\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(\n\t\t\t\t`Sandbox violation (${violation.kind}): ${violation.command} — ${violation.detail}\\n`,\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor (const result of cleanupResults) {\n\t\t\tif (result.status === \"rejected\") {\n\t\t\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(\"Warning: sandbox cleanup did not complete cleanly.\\n\");\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n"]}