apex-code 0.0.1-alpha.6 → 0.0.1-alpha.8

package/dist/core/sandbox/cli-launch.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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{ existsSync, mkdirSync, readdirSync, realpathSync, rmSync, statSync } from \"node:fs\";\nimport { join, sep } from \"node:path\";\nimport type { HostToolBinary } from \"../../utils/tools-manager.ts\";\nimport { SettingsManager } from \"../settings-manager.ts\";\nimport { resolveDefaultAllowedHosts } from \"./default-hosts.ts\";\nimport type { SandboxLaunch } from \"./supervisor.ts\";\n\nconst NON_SESSION_COMMANDS = new Set([\"auth\", \"config\", \"install\", \"remove\", \"uninstall\", \"update\", \"list\"]);\nconst METADATA_FLAGS = new Set([\"--version\", \"-v\", \"--export\", \"--list-models\"]);\n\n/**\n * OS containment is the normal startup path for every command that can construct an\n * agent session. 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Configured hosts are additive on top, and\n * `allowDefaultHosts: false` restores the strict behaviour for anyone who wants it.\n */\nexport function resolveSupervisorAllowedHosts(cwd: string, agentDir: string): readonly string[] | undefined {\n\tconst network = SettingsManager.create(cwd, agentDir, { projectTrusted: false }).getNetworkSettings();\n\tconst configured = network?.allowedHosts ?? [];\n\tif (network?.allowDefaultHosts === false) return configured;\n\treturn [...new Set([...resolveDefaultAllowedHosts(), ...configured])];\n}\n\n/**\n * The host's two user-scope skill roots, each present only when it exists on the\n * host. Kept as two named slots rather than one list because\n * `core/package-manager.ts` discovers them in different modes -- root `.md` files\n * count as skills under `agentSkills` (\"pi\" mode) and are ignored under\n * `agentsHomeSkills` (\"agents\" mode), per `docs/skills.md` -- and a flat list of 0-2\n * paths cannot tell the child which root a lone survivor was.\n */\nexport interface HostSkillPaths {\n\t/** Host `<agentDir>/skills`. */\n\treadonly agentSkills?: string;\n\t/** Host `<home>/.agents/skills`. */\n\treadonly agentsHomeSkills?: string;\n}\n\n/** A candidate skill root that exists but was excluded, and why. */\nexport interface HostSkillPathRefusal {\n\treadonly root: keyof HostSkillPaths;\n\treadonly path: string;\n\treadonly reason: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ResolvedHostSkillPaths {\n\treadonly paths: HostSkillPaths;\n\treadonly refusals: readonly HostSkillPathRefusal[];\n}\n\n/**\n * True when `candidate` is the host home directory itself, or an ancestor of it.\n * Both paths must already be resolved (`realpathSync`), so a symlink can't disguise\n * either side. Mounting such a candidate read-only would re-expose the entire home\n * tree the sandbox's `--tmpfs /home` (Linux) / `(deny file-read* USER_HOME)` (macOS)\n * deliberately hides -- SSH keys, cloud credentials, other projects -- not just a\n * skills subtree.\n */\nfunction isHomeOrAncestorOfHome(candidate: string, home: string): boolean {\n\tif (candidate === home) return true;\n\tconst prefix = candidate.endsWith(sep) ? candidate : candidate + sep;\n\treturn home.startsWith(prefix);\n}\n\n/** Resolve one candidate root: absent, refused (symlinked onto the host home), or usable. */\nfunction resolveHostSkillRoot(\n\troot: keyof HostSkillPaths,\n\tcandidate: string,\n\thomeDir: string,\n): { path?: string; refusal?: HostSkillPathRefusal } {\n\tif (!existsSync(candidate)) return {};\n\tlet realCandidate: string;\n\tlet realHome: string;\n\ttry {\n\t\trealCandidate = realpathSync(candidate);\n\t\trealHome = realpathSync(homeDir);\n\t} catch (error) {\n\t\tconst message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);\n\t\treturn { refusal: { root, path: candidate, reason: `could not resolve real path: ${message}` } };\n\t}\n\tif (isHomeOrAncestorOfHome(realCandidate, realHome)) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\trefusal: {\n\t\t\t\troot,\n\t\t\t\tpath: candidate,\n\t\t\t\treason: \"resolves to the host home directory or an ancestor of it\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\treturn { path: candidate };\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the host's user-scope skill directories, before the sandbox exists to hide\n * them. 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A candidate that resolves (directly or via a\n * symlink) onto the host home or an ancestor of it is refused rather than mounted --\n * see `isHomeOrAncestorOfHome` -- and reported so the caller can surface a startup\n * diagnostic instead of silently mounting or silently skipping it.\n */\nexport function resolveHostSkillPaths(agentDir: string, homeDir: string): ResolvedHostSkillPaths {\n\tconst agentSkills = resolveHostSkillRoot(\"agentSkills\", join(agentDir, \"skills\"), homeDir);\n\tconst agentsHomeSkills = resolveHostSkillRoot(\"agentsHomeSkills\", join(homeDir, \".agents\", \"skills\"), homeDir);\n\treturn {\n\t\tpaths: {\n\t\t\t...(agentSkills.path ? { agentSkills: agentSkills.path } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(agentsHomeSkills.path ? { agentsHomeSkills: agentsHomeSkills.path } : {}),\n\t\t},\n\t\trefusals: [agentSkills.refusal, agentsHomeSkills.refusal].filter(\n\t\t\t(refusal): refusal is HostSkillPathRefusal => refusal !== undefined,\n\t\t),\n\t};\n}\n\nconst SAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS = new Set([\n\t\"PATH\",\n\t\"LANG\",\n\t\"LC_ALL\",\n\t\"LC_CTYPE\",\n\t\"TERM\",\n\t\"COLORTERM\",\n\t\"NO_COLOR\",\n\t\"FORCE_COLOR\",\n\t\"TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_OFFLINE\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_SKIP_VERSION_CHECK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_STARTUP_BENCHMARK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_TIMING\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_CLEAR_ON_SHRINK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_HARDWARE_CURSOR\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_MODEL_CATALOG_URL\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_SHARE_VIEWER_URL\",\n\t\"VISUAL\",\n\t\"EDITOR\",\n]);\n\n// Provider API keys are explicit credential inputs, unlike arbitrary ambient variables.\n// Keep this list in sync with the documented provider environment-variable reference.\nconst SAFE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEYS = new Set([\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN\",\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN\",\n\t\"ANT_LING_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_BASE_URL\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_RESOURCE_NAME\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_API_VERSION\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_DEPLOYMENT_NAME_MAP\",\n\t\"DEEPSEEK_API_KEY\",\n\t\"NVIDIA_API_KEY\",\n\t\"GEMINI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"GROQ_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CEREBRAS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"FIREWORKS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"TOGETHER_API_KEY\",\n\t\"BASETEN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENROUTER_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ZAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ZAI_CODING_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MISTRAL_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MINIMAX_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MOONSHOT_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENCODE_API_KEY\",\n\t\"KIMI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_GATEWAY_ID\",\n\t\"QWEN_TOKEN_PLAN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"QWEN_TOKEN_PLAN_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_AMS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_SGP_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AWS_PROFILE\",\n\t\"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID\",\n\t\"AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\",\n\t\"AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK\",\n\t\"AWS_REGION\",\n]);\n\nfunction buildChildEnvironment(environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): NodeJS.ProcessEnv {\n\treturn Object.fromEntries(\n\t\tObject.entries(environment).filter(\n\t\t\t([key]) => SAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS.has(key) || SAFE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEYS.has(key),\n\t\t),\n\t);\n}\n\n/**\n * Drop empty files left in the child's tools directory by a previous launch.\n *\n * A projected tool is bind-mounted over a file there, and bwrap materialises that\n * mountpoint as an empty file on the host which outlives the namespace. If the host\n * tool later disappears, nothing is projected over the stub and the child would\n * otherwise find a 0-byte file where its binary should be. A real downloaded binary\n * is never empty, so size is a safe discriminator.\n */\nfunction clearStaleToolMountpoints(toolsDirectory: string): void {\n\tfor (const entry of readdirSync(toolsDirectory, { withFileTypes: true })) {\n\t\tif (!entry.isFile()) continue;\n\t\tconst entryPath = join(toolsDirectory, entry.name);\n\t\tif (statSync(entryPath).size === 0) {\n\t\t\trmSync(entryPath, { force: true });\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Allocate agent-owned state under the sole writable workspace mount. The child does\n * not inherit a host home or a host session/config directory, preventing the sandbox\n * from presenting a write boundary while its own state quietly escapes it.\n */\nexport function buildSandboxedCliLaunch(options: {\n\tworkspace: string;\n\tcommand: string;\n\targs: readonly string[];\n\tenvironment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n\tallowedHosts?: readonly string[];\n\treadOnlyPaths?: readonly string[];\n\tauthPath?: string;\n\ttoolBinaries?: readonly HostToolBinary[];\n\t/**\n\t * Host user-scope skill directories, pre-filtered by the caller to those that\n\t * exist and pass the host-home escape check (SKILL.4). Mounted read-only at their\n\t * original host location -- Seatbelt cannot remap a path, so this must hold for\n\t * both backends -- and named to the child via `APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_*` so its\n\t * discovery can find them under the sandbox's own repointed `HOME`/agent dir.\n\t */\n\tskillPaths?: HostSkillPaths;\n}): SandboxedCliLaunch {\n\tconst stateDirectory = join(options.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-state\");\n\tconst agentDirectory = join(options.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-agent\");\n\tconst sessionDirectory = join(options.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-sessions\");\n\t// Mirrors getBinDir() as the child will compute it from APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR,\n\t// so a projected tool lands exactly where the child's own lookup already checks.\n\tconst toolsDirectory = join(agentDirectory, \"bin\");\n\tconst xdgDirectories = {\n\t\tXDG_CONFIG_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"config\"),\n\t\tXDG_CACHE_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"cache\"),\n\t\tXDG_DATA_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"data\"),\n\t\tXDG_STATE_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"state\"),\n\t};\n\tfor (const directory of [\n\t\tstateDirectory,\n\t\tagentDirectory,\n\t\tsessionDirectory,\n\t\ttoolsDirectory,\n\t\t...Object.values(xdgDirectories),\n\t]) {\n\t\tmkdirSync(directory, { recursive: true });\n\t}\n\tclearStaleToolMountpoints(toolsDirectory);\n\tconst childEnvironment = buildChildEnvironment(options.environment);\n\tconst { agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills } = options.skillPaths ?? {};\n\tconst skillMountPaths = [agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills].filter((path): path is string => path !== undefined);\n\tconst readOnlyPaths = [...(options.readOnlyPaths ?? []), ...skillMountPaths];\n\tconst readOnlyFiles = options.authPath ? [options.authPath] : [];\n\tconst readOnlyBinaries = (options.toolBinaries ?? []).map((binary) => ({\n\t\tsource: binary.path,\n\t\tdestination: join(toolsDirectory, binary.name),\n\t}));\n\treturn {\n\t\tcommand: options.command,\n\t\targs: [...options.args],\n\t\tpolicy: { workspace: options.workspace, allowedHosts: options.allowedHosts ?? 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Configured hosts are additive on top, and\n * `allowDefaultHosts: false` restores the strict behaviour for anyone who wants it.\n */\nexport function resolveSupervisorAllowedHosts(cwd: string, agentDir: string): readonly string[] | undefined {\n\tconst settings = SettingsManager.create(cwd, agentDir, { projectTrusted: false });\n\tconst network = settings.getNetworkSettings();\n\tconst configured = network?.allowedHosts ?? [];\n\tif (network?.allowDefaultHosts === false) return configured;\n\t// The configured `web_search` backend's host, added only when a credential for it\n\t// is present. Without this the tool would be configured and still unreachable,\n\t// which reads as a broken search rather than a missing allowlist entry. Nothing is\n\t// opened for a user who never set the key.\n\tconst webSearchHost = resolveWebSearchHost(settings.getWebSearchSettings());\n\treturn [...new Set([...resolveDefaultAllowedHosts(), ...configured, ...(webSearchHost ? [webSearchHost] : [])])];\n}\n\n/**\n * The host's two user-scope skill roots, each present only when it exists on the\n * host. Kept as two named slots rather than one list because\n * `core/package-manager.ts` discovers them in different modes -- root `.md` files\n * count as skills under `agentSkills` (\"pi\" mode) and are ignored under\n * `agentsHomeSkills` (\"agents\" mode), per `docs/skills.md` -- and a flat list of 0-2\n * paths cannot tell the child which root a lone survivor was.\n */\nexport interface HostSkillPaths {\n\t/** Host `<agentDir>/skills`. */\n\treadonly agentSkills?: string;\n\t/** Host `<home>/.agents/skills`. */\n\treadonly agentsHomeSkills?: string;\n}\n\n/** A candidate skill root that exists but was excluded, and why. */\nexport interface HostSkillPathRefusal {\n\treadonly root: keyof HostSkillPaths;\n\treadonly path: string;\n\treadonly reason: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ResolvedHostSkillPaths {\n\treadonly paths: HostSkillPaths;\n\treadonly refusals: readonly HostSkillPathRefusal[];\n}\n\n/**\n * True when `candidate` is the host home directory itself, or an ancestor of it.\n * Both paths must already be resolved (`realpathSync`), so a symlink can't disguise\n * either side. Mounting such a candidate read-only would re-expose the entire home\n * tree the sandbox's `--tmpfs /home` (Linux) / `(deny file-read* USER_HOME)` (macOS)\n * deliberately hides -- SSH keys, cloud credentials, other projects -- not just a\n * skills subtree.\n */\nfunction isHomeOrAncestorOfHome(candidate: string, home: string): boolean {\n\tif (candidate === home) return true;\n\tconst prefix = candidate.endsWith(sep) ? candidate : candidate + sep;\n\treturn home.startsWith(prefix);\n}\n\n/** Resolve one candidate root: absent, refused (symlinked onto the host home), or usable. */\nfunction resolveHostSkillRoot(\n\troot: keyof HostSkillPaths,\n\tcandidate: string,\n\thomeDir: string,\n): { path?: string; refusal?: HostSkillPathRefusal } {\n\tif (!existsSync(candidate)) return {};\n\tlet realCandidate: string;\n\tlet realHome: string;\n\ttry {\n\t\trealCandidate = realpathSync(candidate);\n\t\trealHome = realpathSync(homeDir);\n\t} catch (error) {\n\t\tconst message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);\n\t\treturn { refusal: { root, path: candidate, reason: `could not resolve real path: ${message}` } };\n\t}\n\tif (isHomeOrAncestorOfHome(realCandidate, realHome)) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\trefusal: {\n\t\t\t\troot,\n\t\t\t\tpath: candidate,\n\t\t\t\treason: \"resolves to the host home directory or an ancestor of it\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\treturn { path: candidate };\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the host's user-scope skill directories, before the sandbox exists to hide\n * them. Read only from the runtime environment and the host agent directory --\n * never from project files -- matching ADR 0016's rule that supervisor policy is\n * trust-first. Mirrors `core/package-manager.ts`'s own user-scope roots so the two\n * sides agree on where a skill lives. A candidate that resolves (directly or via a\n * symlink) onto the host home or an ancestor of it is refused rather than mounted --\n * see `isHomeOrAncestorOfHome` -- and reported so the caller can surface a startup\n * diagnostic instead of silently mounting or silently skipping it.\n */\nexport function resolveHostSkillPaths(agentDir: string, homeDir: string): ResolvedHostSkillPaths {\n\tconst agentSkills = resolveHostSkillRoot(\"agentSkills\", join(agentDir, \"skills\"), homeDir);\n\tconst agentsHomeSkills = resolveHostSkillRoot(\"agentsHomeSkills\", join(homeDir, \".agents\", \"skills\"), homeDir);\n\treturn {\n\t\tpaths: {\n\t\t\t...(agentSkills.path ? { agentSkills: agentSkills.path } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(agentsHomeSkills.path ? { agentsHomeSkills: agentsHomeSkills.path } : {}),\n\t\t},\n\t\trefusals: [agentSkills.refusal, agentsHomeSkills.refusal].filter(\n\t\t\t(refusal): refusal is HostSkillPathRefusal => refusal !== undefined,\n\t\t),\n\t};\n}\n\nconst SAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS = new Set([\n\t\"PATH\",\n\t\"LANG\",\n\t\"LC_ALL\",\n\t\"LC_CTYPE\",\n\t\"TERM\",\n\t\"COLORTERM\",\n\t\"NO_COLOR\",\n\t\"FORCE_COLOR\",\n\t\"TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_OFFLINE\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_SKIP_VERSION_CHECK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_STARTUP_BENCHMARK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_TIMING\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_CLEAR_ON_SHRINK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_HARDWARE_CURSOR\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_MODEL_CATALOG_URL\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_SHARE_VIEWER_URL\",\n\t\"VISUAL\",\n\t\"EDITOR\",\n]);\n\n// Provider API keys are explicit credential inputs, unlike arbitrary ambient variables.\n// Keep this list in sync with the documented provider environment-variable reference.\nconst SAFE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEYS = new Set([\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN\",\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN\",\n\t\"ANT_LING_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_BASE_URL\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_RESOURCE_NAME\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_API_VERSION\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_DEPLOYMENT_NAME_MAP\",\n\t\"DEEPSEEK_API_KEY\",\n\t\"NVIDIA_API_KEY\",\n\t\"GEMINI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"GROQ_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CEREBRAS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"FIREWORKS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"TOGETHER_API_KEY\",\n\t\"BASETEN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENROUTER_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ZAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ZAI_CODING_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MISTRAL_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MINIMAX_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MOONSHOT_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENCODE_API_KEY\",\n\t\"KIMI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_GATEWAY_ID\",\n\t\"QWEN_TOKEN_PLAN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"QWEN_TOKEN_PLAN_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_AMS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_SGP_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AWS_PROFILE\",\n\t\"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID\",\n\t\"AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\",\n\t\"AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK\",\n\t\"AWS_REGION\",\n]);\n\n// Credentials for tools rather than model providers. Separate from the provider set\n// above so the provider list stays a mirror of the documented provider reference.\nconst SAFE_TOOL_CREDENTIAL_KEYS = new Set([\"EXA_API_KEY\"]);\n\nfunction buildChildEnvironment(environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): NodeJS.ProcessEnv {\n\treturn Object.fromEntries(\n\t\tObject.entries(environment).filter(\n\t\t\t([key]) =>\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS.has(key) ||\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEYS.has(key) ||\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_TOOL_CREDENTIAL_KEYS.has(key),\n\t\t),\n\t);\n}\n\n/**\n * Drop empty files left in the child's tools directory by a previous launch.\n *\n * A projected tool is bind-mounted over a file there, and bwrap materialises that\n * mountpoint as an empty file on the host which outlives the namespace. If the host\n * tool later disappears, nothing is projected over the stub and the child would\n * otherwise find a 0-byte file where its binary should be. A real downloaded binary\n * is never empty, so size is a safe discriminator.\n */\nfunction clearStaleToolMountpoints(toolsDirectory: string): void {\n\tfor (const entry of readdirSync(toolsDirectory, { withFileTypes: true })) {\n\t\tif (!entry.isFile()) continue;\n\t\tconst entryPath = join(toolsDirectory, entry.name);\n\t\tif (statSync(entryPath).size === 0) {\n\t\t\trmSync(entryPath, { force: true });\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Allocate agent-owned state under the sole writable workspace mount. The child does\n * not inherit a host home or a host session/config directory, preventing the sandbox\n * from presenting a write boundary while its own state quietly escapes it.\n */\nexport function buildSandboxedCliLaunch(options: {\n\tworkspace: string;\n\tcommand: string;\n\targs: readonly string[];\n\tenvironment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n\tallowedHosts?: readonly string[];\n\treadOnlyPaths?: readonly string[];\n\tauthPath?: string;\n\ttoolBinaries?: readonly HostToolBinary[];\n\t/**\n\t * Host user-scope skill directories, pre-filtered by the caller to those that\n\t * exist and pass the host-home escape check (SKILL.4). Mounted read-only at their\n\t * original host location -- Seatbelt cannot remap a path, so this must hold for\n\t * both backends -- and named to the child via `APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_*` so its\n\t * discovery can find them under the sandbox's own repointed `HOME`/agent dir.\n\t */\n\tskillPaths?: HostSkillPaths;\n\t/** The supervisor-owned credential write channel, when one was opened. */\n\tcredentialChannel?: SandboxLaunch[\"credentialChannel\"];\n}): SandboxedCliLaunch {\n\tconst stateDirectory = join(options.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-state\");\n\tconst agentDirectory = join(options.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-agent\");\n\tconst sessionDirectory = getSandboxSessionDirectory(options.workspace);\n\t// Mirrors getBinDir() as the child will compute it from APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR,\n\t// so a projected tool lands exactly where the child's own lookup already checks.\n\tconst toolsDirectory = join(agentDirectory, \"bin\");\n\tconst xdgDirectories = {\n\t\tXDG_CONFIG_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"config\"),\n\t\tXDG_CACHE_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"cache\"),\n\t\tXDG_DATA_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"data\"),\n\t\tXDG_STATE_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"state\"),\n\t};\n\tfor (const directory of [\n\t\tstateDirectory,\n\t\tagentDirectory,\n\t\tsessionDirectory,\n\t\ttoolsDirectory,\n\t\t...Object.values(xdgDirectories),\n\t]) {\n\t\tmkdirSync(directory, { recursive: true });\n\t}\n\tclearStaleToolMountpoints(toolsDirectory);\n\tconst childEnvironment = buildChildEnvironment(options.environment);\n\tconst { agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills } = options.skillPaths ?? {};\n\tconst skillMountPaths = [agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills].filter((path): path is string => path !== undefined);\n\tconst readOnlyPaths = [...(options.readOnlyPaths ?? []), ...skillMountPaths];\n\tconst readOnlyFiles = options.authPath ? [options.authPath] : [];\n\tconst readOnlyBinaries = (options.toolBinaries ?? []).map((binary) => ({\n\t\tsource: binary.path,\n\t\tdestination: join(toolsDirectory, binary.name),\n\t}));\n\treturn {\n\t\tcommand: options.command,\n\t\targs: [...options.args],\n\t\tpolicy: { workspace: options.workspace, allowedHosts: options.allowedHosts ?? [] },\n\t\treadOnlyPaths,\n\t\treadOnlyFiles,\n\t\treadOnlyBinaries,\n\t\t// Travels on the launch contract so the platform backend projects the socket;\n\t\t// the environment entry above is what tells the child where to find it.\n\t\t...(options.credentialChannel ? { credentialChannel: options.credentialChannel } : {}),\n\t\tenvironment: {\n\t\t\t...childEnvironment,\n\t\t\t...(options.authPath ? { APEX_CODE_AUTH_PATH: options.authPath } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(options.credentialChannel\n\t\t\t\t? { APEX_CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PATH: options.credentialChannel.childSocketPath }\n\t\t\t\t: {}),\n\t\t\t// After childEnvironment: these come only from the supervisor's own\n\t\t\t// resolution, never from the invoking shell, so their value always wins over\n\t\t\t// anything of the same name that childEnvironment's allowlist let through.\n\t\t\t...(agentSkills ? { APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_AGENT: agentSkills } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(agentsHomeSkills ? { APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_AGENTS_HOME: agentsHomeSkills } : {}),\n\t\t\tAPEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR: agentDirectory,\n\t\t\tAPEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_SESSION_DIR: sessionDirectory,\n\t\t\tHOME: stateDirectory,\n\t\t\tTMPDIR: stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t...xdgDirectories,\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/cli-supervisor.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"cli-supervisor.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/core/sandbox/cli-supervisor.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,8BAA8B,CAAC;AACnE,OAAO,EAA2B,KAAK,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAI/E,OAAO,EAA2B,KAAK,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAC/E,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAExD,MAAM,WAAW,sBAAsB;IACtC,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;QAAE,cAAc,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAA;KAAE,KAAK,cAAc,CAAC;IACtF,MAAM,EAAE;QAAE,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAAA;KAAE,CAAC;CAC5C;AAeD;;;GAGG;AACH,wBAAsB,kBAAkB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;IACjD,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACxB,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC;IAC/B,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACjC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAClC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC;IACzC,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,cAAc,CAAC;IAC5B,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAAC;CAC/C,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAmClB","sourcesContent":["import type { HostToolBinary } from \"../../utils/tools-manager.ts\";\nimport { buildSandboxedCliLaunch, type HostSkillPaths } from \"./cli-launch.ts\";\nimport { createLinuxSandboxBackend } from \"./linux-backend.ts\";\nimport { createMacosSandboxBackend } from \"./macos-backend.ts\";\nimport { createSandboxPolicy } from \"./policy.ts\";\nimport { createSandboxSupervisor, type SandboxBackend } from \"./supervisor.ts\";\nimport { SandboxViolationStore } from \"./violations.ts\";\n\nexport interface CliSandboxDependencies {\n\tcreateBackend: (options: { violationStore: SandboxViolationStore }) => SandboxBackend;\n\tstderr: { write(message: string): boolean };\n}\n\n/** Routes to the platform adapter for the running OS; each adapter self-reports\n * `unavailable` on any other platform, so this only needs to pick the one whose\n * enforcement is actually reachable here. */\nfunction createDefaultSandboxBackend(options: { violationStore: SandboxViolationStore }): SandboxBackend {\n\tif (process.platform === \"darwin\") return createMacosSandboxBackend(options);\n\treturn createLinuxSandboxBackend(options);\n}\n\nconst defaultDependencies: CliSandboxDependencies = {\n\tcreateBackend: createDefaultSandboxBackend,\n\tstderr: process.stderr,\n};\n\n/**\n * Start a normal CLI runtime beneath the whole-process boundary. The caller returns\n * the result directly so the outer process never continues into `main()` afterward.\n */\nexport async function launchSandboxedCli(options: {\n\tcommand: string;\n\targs: readonly string[];\n\tenvironment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n\tworkspace: string;\n\tallowedHosts?: readonly string[];\n\treadOnlyPaths?: readonly string[];\n\tauthPath?: string;\n\ttoolBinaries?: readonly HostToolBinary[];\n\tskillPaths?: HostSkillPaths;\n\tdependencies?: Partial<CliSandboxDependencies>;\n}): Promise<number> {\n\tconst dependencies = { ...defaultDependencies, ...options.dependencies };\n\tconst policyResult = createSandboxPolicy({ workspace: options.workspace, allowedHosts: options.allowedHosts });\n\tif (policyResult.kind === \"invalid\") {\n\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(`Error: OS sandbox is not enforcing this agent session: ${policyResult.reason}\\n`);\n\t\treturn 1;\n\t}\n\tconst violationStore = new SandboxViolationStore();\n\tconst backend = dependencies.createBackend({ violationStore });\n\tconst supervisor = createSandboxSupervisor({ backend, policy: policyResult.policy });\n\tconst launch = buildSandboxedCliLaunch({\n\t\tworkspace: policyResult.policy.workspace,\n\t\tcommand: options.command,\n\t\targs: options.args,\n\t\tenvironment: options.environment,\n\t\tallowedHosts: options.allowedHosts,\n\t\treadOnlyPaths: options.readOnlyPaths,\n\t\tauthPath: options.authPath,\n\t\ttoolBinaries: options.toolBinaries,\n\t\tskillPaths: options.skillPaths,\n\t});\n\ttry {\n\t\treturn await supervisor.launch(launch);\n\t} catch (error: unknown) {\n\t\tconst message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : \"Failed to start OS sandbox.\";\n\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(`Error: ${message}\\n`);\n\t\treturn 1;\n\t} finally {\n\t\tfor (const violation of violationStore.list()) {\n\t\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(\n\t\t\t\t`Sandbox violation (${violation.kind}): ${violation.command} — ${violation.detail}\\n`,\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t}\n\t\tawait supervisor.close();\n\t}\n}\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"cli-supervisor.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/core/sandbox/cli-supervisor.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAEA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,8BAA8B,CAAC;AAEnE,OAAO,EAAuD,KAAK,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAK3G,OAAO,EAA2B,KAAK,cAAc,EAAsB,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AACnG,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAExD,MAAM,WAAW,sBAAsB;IACtC,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;QAAE,cAAc,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAA;KAAE,KAAK,cAAc,CAAC;IACtF,MAAM,EAAE;QAAE,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAAA;KAAE,CAAC;CAC5C;AAeD;;;GAGG;AACH,wBAAsB,kBAAkB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;IACjD,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACxB,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC;IAC/B,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACjC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAClC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC;IACzC,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,cAAc,CAAC;IAC5B,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAAC;CAC/C,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CA0ElB","sourcesContent":["import { parseArgs } from \"../../cli/args.ts\";\nimport { reportConcurrentSessionRefusal } from \"../../cli/concurrent-session.ts\";\nimport type { HostToolBinary } from \"../../utils/tools-manager.ts\";\nimport { acquireSessionLease, readLiveSessionLeases } from \"../session-lease.ts\";\nimport { buildSandboxedCliLaunch, getSandboxSessionDirectory, type HostSkillPaths } from \"./cli-launch.ts\";\nimport { createLinuxSandboxBackend } from \"./linux-backend.ts\";\nimport { createMacosSandboxBackend } from \"./macos-backend.ts\";\nimport { createSandboxPolicy } from \"./policy.ts\";\nimport { createCredentialProxy, resolveCredentialChannelPaths } from \"./rpc/credential-proxy.ts\";\nimport { createSandboxSupervisor, type SandboxBackend, type SandboxLaunch } from \"./supervisor.ts\";\nimport { SandboxViolationStore } from \"./violations.ts\";\n\nexport interface CliSandboxDependencies {\n\tcreateBackend: (options: { violationStore: SandboxViolationStore }) => SandboxBackend;\n\tstderr: { write(message: string): boolean };\n}\n\n/** Routes to the platform adapter for the running OS; each adapter self-reports\n * `unavailable` on any other platform, so this only needs to pick the one whose\n * enforcement is actually reachable here. */\nfunction createDefaultSandboxBackend(options: { violationStore: SandboxViolationStore }): SandboxBackend {\n\tif (process.platform === \"darwin\") return createMacosSandboxBackend(options);\n\treturn createLinuxSandboxBackend(options);\n}\n\nconst defaultDependencies: CliSandboxDependencies = {\n\tcreateBackend: createDefaultSandboxBackend,\n\tstderr: process.stderr,\n};\n\n/**\n * Start a normal CLI runtime beneath the whole-process boundary. The caller returns\n * the result directly so the outer process never continues into `main()` afterward.\n */\nexport async function launchSandboxedCli(options: {\n\tcommand: string;\n\targs: readonly string[];\n\tenvironment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n\tworkspace: string;\n\tallowedHosts?: readonly string[];\n\treadOnlyPaths?: readonly string[];\n\tauthPath?: string;\n\ttoolBinaries?: readonly HostToolBinary[];\n\tskillPaths?: HostSkillPaths;\n\tdependencies?: Partial<CliSandboxDependencies>;\n}): Promise<number> {\n\tconst dependencies = { ...defaultDependencies, ...options.dependencies };\n\tconst policyResult = createSandboxPolicy({ workspace: options.workspace, allowedHosts: options.allowedHosts });\n\tif (policyResult.kind === \"invalid\") {\n\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(`Error: OS sandbox is not enforcing this agent session: ${policyResult.reason}\\n`);\n\t\treturn 1;\n\t}\n\tconst violationStore = new SandboxViolationStore();\n\tconst backend = dependencies.createBackend({ violationStore });\n\n\tconst supervisor = createSandboxSupervisor({ backend, policy: policyResult.policy });\n\tlet credentialProxy: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof createCredentialProxy>> | undefined;\n\tlet lease: ReturnType<typeof acquireSessionLease> | undefined;\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst parsed = parseArgs(options.args);\n\t\tconst wantsPersistentSession = !parsed.noSession && !parsed.help && parsed.listModels === undefined;\n\t\tconst sessionDirectory = getSandboxSessionDirectory(policyResult.policy.workspace);\n\t\tif (wantsPersistentSession && !parsed.allowConcurrent) {\n\t\t\tconst liveSessions = readLiveSessionLeases(sessionDirectory, policyResult.policy.workspace);\n\t\t\tif (liveSessions.length > 0) {\n\t\t\t\treportConcurrentSessionRefusal(liveSessions, policyResult.policy.workspace);\n\t\t\t\treturn 1;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tlease = wantsPersistentSession\n\t\t\t? acquireSessionLease(sessionDirectory, policyResult.policy.workspace, `supervisor-${process.pid}`)\n\t\t\t: undefined;\n\n\t\t// Open the host-owned credential channel only after startup checks that can\n\t\t// return early. AuthStorage creates a missing canonical file as 0600, so a\n\t\t// first-run credential writes get the same channel and read-only projection as later runs.\n\t\tlet credentialChannel: SandboxLaunch[\"credentialChannel\"];\n\t\tif (options.authPath && backend.status.kind === \"enforced\") {\n\t\t\tconst paths = resolveCredentialChannelPaths();\n\t\t\tcredentialProxy = await createCredentialProxy({\n\t\t\t\tauthPath: options.authPath,\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t\tsocketPath: paths.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\tcleanupDirectory: paths.hostSocketDirectory,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tcredentialChannel = paths;\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst launch = buildSandboxedCliLaunch({\n\t\t\tworkspace: policyResult.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\tcommand: options.command,\n\t\t\targs: options.args,\n\t\t\tenvironment: options.environment,\n\t\t\tallowedHosts: options.allowedHosts,\n\t\t\treadOnlyPaths: options.readOnlyPaths,\n\t\t\tauthPath: options.authPath,\n\t\t\ttoolBinaries: options.toolBinaries,\n\t\t\tskillPaths: options.skillPaths,\n\t\t\tcredentialChannel,\n\t\t});\n\t\treturn await supervisor.launch(launch);\n\t} catch (error: unknown) {\n\t\tconst message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : \"Failed to start OS sandbox.\";\n\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(`Error: ${message}\\n`);\n\t\treturn 1;\n\t} finally {\n\t\tlease?.release();\n\t\tconst cleanupResults = await Promise.allSettled([supervisor.close(), credentialProxy?.close()]);\n\t\tfor (const violation of violationStore.list()) {\n\t\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(\n\t\t\t\t`Sandbox violation (${violation.kind}): ${violation.command} — ${violation.detail}\\n`,\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor (const result of cleanupResults) {\n\t\t\tif (result.status === \"rejected\") {\n\t\t\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(\"Warning: sandbox cleanup did not complete cleanly.\\n\");\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/cli-supervisor.js

@@ -1,7 +1,11 @@
-import { buildSandboxedCliLaunch } from "./cli-launch.js";
+import { parseArgs } from "../../cli/args.js";
+import { reportConcurrentSessionRefusal } from "../../cli/concurrent-session.js";
+import { acquireSessionLease, readLiveSessionLeases } from "../session-lease.js";
+import { buildSandboxedCliLaunch, getSandboxSessionDirectory } from "./cli-launch.js";
 import { createLinuxSandboxBackend } from "./linux-backend.js";
 import { createMacosSandboxBackend } from "./macos-backend.js";
 import { createSandboxPolicy } from "./policy.js";
+import { createCredentialProxy, resolveCredentialChannelPaths } from "./rpc/credential-proxy.js";
 import { createSandboxSupervisor } from "./supervisor.js";
 import { SandboxViolationStore } from "./violations.js";
 /** Routes to the platform adapter for the running OS; each adapter self-reports
@@ -30,18 +34,48 @@ export async function launchSandboxedCli(options) {
     const violationStore = new SandboxViolationStore();
     const backend = dependencies.createBackend({ violationStore });
     const supervisor = createSandboxSupervisor({ backend, policy: policyResult.policy });
-    const launch = buildSandboxedCliLaunch({
-        workspace: policyResult.policy.workspace,
-        command: options.command,
-        args: options.args,
-        environment: options.environment,
-        allowedHosts: options.allowedHosts,
-        readOnlyPaths: options.readOnlyPaths,
-        authPath: options.authPath,
-        toolBinaries: options.toolBinaries,
-        skillPaths: options.skillPaths,
-    });
+    let credentialProxy;
+    let lease;
     try {
+        const parsed = parseArgs(options.args);
+        const wantsPersistentSession = !parsed.noSession && !parsed.help && parsed.listModels === undefined;
+        const sessionDirectory = getSandboxSessionDirectory(policyResult.policy.workspace);
+        if (wantsPersistentSession && !parsed.allowConcurrent) {
+            const liveSessions = readLiveSessionLeases(sessionDirectory, policyResult.policy.workspace);
+            if (liveSessions.length > 0) {
+                reportConcurrentSessionRefusal(liveSessions, policyResult.policy.workspace);
+                return 1;
+            }
+        }
+        lease = wantsPersistentSession
+            ? acquireSessionLease(sessionDirectory, policyResult.policy.workspace, `supervisor-${process.pid}`)
+            : undefined;
+        // Open the host-owned credential channel only after startup checks that can
+        // return early. AuthStorage creates a missing canonical file as 0600, so a
+        // first-run credential writes get the same channel and read-only projection as later runs.
+        let credentialChannel;
+        if (options.authPath && backend.status.kind === "enforced") {
+            const paths = resolveCredentialChannelPaths();
+            credentialProxy = await createCredentialProxy({
+                authPath: options.authPath,
+                violationStore,
+                socketPath: paths.hostSocketPath,
+                cleanupDirectory: paths.hostSocketDirectory,
+            });
+            credentialChannel = paths;
+        }
+        const launch = buildSandboxedCliLaunch({
+            workspace: policyResult.policy.workspace,
+            command: options.command,
+            args: options.args,
+            environment: options.environment,
+            allowedHosts: options.allowedHosts,
+            readOnlyPaths: options.readOnlyPaths,
+            authPath: options.authPath,
+            toolBinaries: options.toolBinaries,
+            skillPaths: options.skillPaths,
+            credentialChannel,
+        });
         return await supervisor.launch(launch);
     }
     catch (error) {
@@ -50,10 +84,16 @@ export async function launchSandboxedCli(options) {
         return 1;
     }
     finally {
+        lease?.release();
+        const cleanupResults = await Promise.allSettled([supervisor.close(), credentialProxy?.close()]);
         for (const violation of violationStore.list()) {
             dependencies.stderr.write(`Sandbox violation (${violation.kind}): ${violation.command} — ${violation.detail}\n`);
         }
-        await supervisor.close();
+        for (const result of cleanupResults) {
+            if (result.status === "rejected") {
+                dependencies.stderr.write("Warning: sandbox cleanup did not complete cleanly.\n");
+            }
+        }
     }
 }
 //# sourceMappingURL=cli-supervisor.js.map

package/dist/core/sandbox/cli-supervisor.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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The caller returns\n * the result directly so the outer process never continues into `main()` afterward.\n */\nexport async function launchSandboxedCli(options: {\n\tcommand: string;\n\targs: readonly string[];\n\tenvironment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n\tworkspace: string;\n\tallowedHosts?: readonly string[];\n\treadOnlyPaths?: readonly string[];\n\tauthPath?: string;\n\ttoolBinaries?: readonly HostToolBinary[];\n\tskillPaths?: HostSkillPaths;\n\tdependencies?: Partial<CliSandboxDependencies>;\n}): Promise<number> {\n\tconst dependencies = { ...defaultDependencies, ...options.dependencies };\n\tconst policyResult = createSandboxPolicy({ workspace: options.workspace, allowedHosts: options.allowedHosts });\n\tif (policyResult.kind === \"invalid\") {\n\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(`Error: OS sandbox is not enforcing this agent session: ${policyResult.reason}\\n`);\n\t\treturn 1;\n\t}\n\tconst violationStore = new SandboxViolationStore();\n\tconst backend = dependencies.createBackend({ violationStore });\n\tconst supervisor = createSandboxSupervisor({ backend, policy: policyResult.policy });\n\tconst launch = buildSandboxedCliLaunch({\n\t\tworkspace: policyResult.policy.workspace,\n\t\tcommand: options.command,\n\t\targs: options.args,\n\t\tenvironment: options.environment,\n\t\tallowedHosts: options.allowedHosts,\n\t\treadOnlyPaths: options.readOnlyPaths,\n\t\tauthPath: options.authPath,\n\t\ttoolBinaries: options.toolBinaries,\n\t\tskillPaths: options.skillPaths,\n\t});\n\ttry {\n\t\treturn await supervisor.launch(launch);\n\t} catch (error: unknown) {\n\t\tconst message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : \"Failed to start OS sandbox.\";\n\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(`Error: ${message}\\n`);\n\t\treturn 1;\n\t} finally {\n\t\tfor (const violation of violationStore.list()) {\n\t\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(\n\t\t\t\t`Sandbox violation (${violation.kind}): ${violation.command} — ${violation.detail}\\n`,\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t}\n\t\tawait supervisor.close();\n\t}\n}\n"]}
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each adapter self-reports\n * `unavailable` on any other platform, so this only needs to pick the one whose\n * enforcement is actually reachable here. */\nfunction createDefaultSandboxBackend(options: { violationStore: SandboxViolationStore }): SandboxBackend {\n\tif (process.platform === \"darwin\") return createMacosSandboxBackend(options);\n\treturn createLinuxSandboxBackend(options);\n}\n\nconst defaultDependencies: CliSandboxDependencies = {\n\tcreateBackend: createDefaultSandboxBackend,\n\tstderr: process.stderr,\n};\n\n/**\n * Start a normal CLI runtime beneath the whole-process boundary. The caller returns\n * the result directly so the outer process never continues into `main()` afterward.\n */\nexport async function launchSandboxedCli(options: {\n\tcommand: string;\n\targs: readonly string[];\n\tenvironment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n\tworkspace: string;\n\tallowedHosts?: readonly string[];\n\treadOnlyPaths?: readonly string[];\n\tauthPath?: string;\n\ttoolBinaries?: readonly HostToolBinary[];\n\tskillPaths?: HostSkillPaths;\n\tdependencies?: Partial<CliSandboxDependencies>;\n}): Promise<number> {\n\tconst dependencies = { ...defaultDependencies, ...options.dependencies };\n\tconst policyResult = createSandboxPolicy({ workspace: options.workspace, allowedHosts: options.allowedHosts });\n\tif (policyResult.kind === \"invalid\") {\n\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(`Error: OS sandbox is not enforcing this agent session: ${policyResult.reason}\\n`);\n\t\treturn 1;\n\t}\n\tconst violationStore = new SandboxViolationStore();\n\tconst backend = dependencies.createBackend({ violationStore });\n\n\tconst supervisor = createSandboxSupervisor({ backend, policy: policyResult.policy });\n\tlet credentialProxy: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof createCredentialProxy>> | undefined;\n\tlet lease: ReturnType<typeof acquireSessionLease> | undefined;\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst parsed = parseArgs(options.args);\n\t\tconst wantsPersistentSession = !parsed.noSession && !parsed.help && parsed.listModels === undefined;\n\t\tconst sessionDirectory = getSandboxSessionDirectory(policyResult.policy.workspace);\n\t\tif (wantsPersistentSession && !parsed.allowConcurrent) {\n\t\t\tconst liveSessions = readLiveSessionLeases(sessionDirectory, policyResult.policy.workspace);\n\t\t\tif (liveSessions.length > 0) {\n\t\t\t\treportConcurrentSessionRefusal(liveSessions, policyResult.policy.workspace);\n\t\t\t\treturn 1;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tlease = wantsPersistentSession\n\t\t\t? acquireSessionLease(sessionDirectory, policyResult.policy.workspace, `supervisor-${process.pid}`)\n\t\t\t: undefined;\n\n\t\t// Open the host-owned credential channel only after startup checks that can\n\t\t// return early. AuthStorage creates a missing canonical file as 0600, so a\n\t\t// first-run credential writes get the same channel and read-only projection as later runs.\n\t\tlet credentialChannel: SandboxLaunch[\"credentialChannel\"];\n\t\tif (options.authPath && backend.status.kind === \"enforced\") {\n\t\t\tconst paths = resolveCredentialChannelPaths();\n\t\t\tcredentialProxy = await createCredentialProxy({\n\t\t\t\tauthPath: options.authPath,\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t\tsocketPath: paths.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\tcleanupDirectory: paths.hostSocketDirectory,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tcredentialChannel = paths;\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst launch = buildSandboxedCliLaunch({\n\t\t\tworkspace: policyResult.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\tcommand: options.command,\n\t\t\targs: options.args,\n\t\t\tenvironment: options.environment,\n\t\t\tallowedHosts: options.allowedHosts,\n\t\t\treadOnlyPaths: options.readOnlyPaths,\n\t\t\tauthPath: options.authPath,\n\t\t\ttoolBinaries: options.toolBinaries,\n\t\t\tskillPaths: options.skillPaths,\n\t\t\tcredentialChannel,\n\t\t});\n\t\treturn await supervisor.launch(launch);\n\t} catch (error: unknown) {\n\t\tconst message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : \"Failed to start OS sandbox.\";\n\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(`Error: ${message}\\n`);\n\t\treturn 1;\n\t} finally {\n\t\tlease?.release();\n\t\tconst cleanupResults = await Promise.allSettled([supervisor.close(), credentialProxy?.close()]);\n\t\tfor (const violation of violationStore.list()) {\n\t\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(\n\t\t\t\t`Sandbox violation (${violation.kind}): ${violation.command} — ${violation.detail}\\n`,\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor (const result of cleanupResults) {\n\t\t\tif (result.status === \"rejected\") {\n\t\t\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(\"Warning: sandbox cleanup did not complete cleanly.\\n\");\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/linux-backend.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"linux-backend.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/core/sandbox/linux-backend.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAa,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAMtD,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,cAAc,EAAiB,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AACrE,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAK7D,MAAM,WAAW,0BAA0B;IAC1C,iFAAiF;IACjF,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;IAC3B,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC;IAC7C,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC;IACvC,2FAA2F;IAC3F,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;CAC1B;AA6BD;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,wBAAgB,uBAAuB,CAAC,kBAAkB,GAAE,MAAiB,GAAG;IAC/E,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACxB,CAKA;AAmBD;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAgB,yBAAyB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,0BAA0B,GAAG,cAAc,CA8K9F","sourcesContent":["import { spawn, spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\";\nimport { randomBytes } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport { closeSync, mkdirSync, openSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from \"node:fs\";\nimport { tmpdir } from \"node:os\";\nimport { dirname, join, resolve } from \"node:path\";\nimport { createSandboxNetworkProxy, type SandboxNetworkProxy } from \"./network-proxy.ts\";\nimport type { SandboxBackend, SandboxLaunch } from \"./supervisor.ts\";\nimport type { SandboxViolationStore } from \"./violations.ts\";\n\n/** AF_UNIX `sun_path` is 108 bytes on Linux, including the terminating NUL. */\nconst SUN_PATH_LIMIT = 108;\n\nexport interface LinuxSandboxBackendOptions {\n\t/** Injectable only for preflight tests; production uses the running platform. */\n\tplatform?: NodeJS.Platform;\n\tcommandExists?: (command: string) => boolean;\n\tviolationStore?: SandboxViolationStore;\n\t/** Injectable only to prove crash cleanup in tests; production spawns `bwrap` directly. */\n\tspawnChild?: typeof spawn;\n}\n\nfunction commandExists(command: string): boolean {\n\tconst result = spawnSync(command, [\"--version\"], { stdio: \"ignore\", timeout: 1_000 });\n\treturn result.status === 0;\n}\n\nfunction waitForExit(child: ReturnType<typeof spawn>): Promise<number> {\n\treturn new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n\t\tchild.once(\"error\", reject);\n\t\tchild.once(\"exit\", (code) => resolve(code ?? 1));\n\t});\n}\n\nfunction readOnlyMountArguments(path: string, kind: \"directory\" | \"file\" = \"directory\", descriptor = 3): string[] {\n\tconst target = resolve(path);\n\tconst directory = dirname(target);\n\tconst ancestors: string[] = [];\n\tlet current = directory;\n\twhile (current !== \"/\" && current !== \"/home\") {\n\t\tancestors.push(current);\n\t\tcurrent = dirname(current);\n\t}\n\tconst parentArguments = ancestors.reverse().flatMap((ancestor) => [\"--dir\", ancestor]);\n\treturn kind === \"file\"\n\t\t? [...parentArguments, \"--tmpfs\", directory, \"--perms\", \"0400\", \"--file\", String(descriptor), target]\n\t\t: [...parentArguments, \"--ro-bind\", directory, directory];\n}\n\n/**\n * Where the supervisor's proxy socket lives on each side of the boundary.\n *\n * AF_UNIX caps `sun_path` at 108 bytes, so the socket cannot live under the workspace:\n * a deep-but-ordinary project directory exhausts that budget and the sandbox fails to\n * start at all with `listen EINVAL`. The host side therefore gets a short, unique path\n * under the system temp directory, and it is bind-mounted into the child.\n *\n * The child-side path has to sit under `/home`. That is the one writable mount at the\n * point the mountpoint is created — the sandbox root is a read-only bind, so bwrap\n * cannot create a mountpoint at `/run`, `/tmp`, or anywhere else on it.\n */\nexport function resolveProxySocketPaths(temporaryDirectory: string = tmpdir()): {\n\thostSocketPath: string;\n\tchildSocketPath: string;\n} {\n\tconst name = `apex-${process.pid}-${randomBytes(4).toString(\"hex\")}.sock`;\n\t// An unusually long TMPDIR would reintroduce the very limit this avoids.\n\tconst base = join(temporaryDirectory, name).length + 1 > SUN_PATH_LIMIT ? \"/tmp\" : temporaryDirectory;\n\treturn { hostSocketPath: join(base, name), childSocketPath: `/home/${name}` };\n}\n\n/**\n * Classify an unsuccessful child from what its stderr actually evidences, or return\n * undefined when nothing suggests the boundary refused anything.\n *\n * A non-zero exit is not a violation. An invalid API key, a failing test command, or a\n * script exiting 1 are the child's own business, and recording them as sandbox\n * violations blames the boundary for failures it had no part in — which is worse than\n * silence, because it sends whoever reads the output looking for a refusal that never\n * happened. Only Linux's own refusal wording earns a violation here; the proxy records\n * network refusals itself, before this fallback is consulted.\n */\nfunction classifySandboxFailure(stderr: string): \"filesystem\" | \"network\" | undefined {\n\tif (/Read-only file system|Permission denied|Operation not permitted/i.test(stderr)) return \"filesystem\";\n\tif (/Network is unreachable|ENETUNREACH|EHOSTUNREACH/i.test(stderr)) return \"network\";\n\treturn undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Linux's deliberately small platform adapter. The sandbox starts from a read-only\n * host root and bind-mounts only the canonical workspace as writable. `--unshare-net`\n * removes all direct network interfaces for the child and every descendant.\n */\nexport function createLinuxSandboxBackend(options?: LinuxSandboxBackendOptions): SandboxBackend {\n\tconst platform = options?.platform ?? process.platform;\n\tif (platform !== \"linux\") {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tstatus: { kind: \"unavailable\", reason: \"OS sandbox is supported on Linux only.\" },\n\t\t\tasync launch() {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"Linux sandbox backend is unavailable.\");\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tasync close() {},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\tconst hasCommand = options?.commandExists ?? commandExists;\n\tconst violationStore = options?.violationStore;\n\tlet proxy: SandboxNetworkProxy | undefined;\n\n\tif (!hasCommand(\"bwrap\")) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tstatus: { kind: \"unavailable\", reason: \"Bubblewrap (bwrap) is required for OS sandboxing.\" },\n\t\t\tasync launch() {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"Linux sandbox backend is unavailable.\");\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tasync close() {},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\treturn {\n\t\tstatus: { kind: \"enforced\" },\n\t\tasync launch(launch: SandboxLaunch): Promise<number> {\n\t\t\tconst stateDirectory = join(launch.policy.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-state\");\n\t\t\tmkdirSync(stateDirectory, { recursive: true });\n\n\t\t\tconst violationCountBeforeLaunch = violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0;\n\n\t\t\tconst { hostSocketPath, childSocketPath } = resolveProxySocketPaths();\n\t\t\tproxy = await createSandboxNetworkProxy({\n\t\t\t\tsocketPath: hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\tallowedHosts: launch.policy.allowedHosts,\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t});\n\n\t\t\t// .cjs forces CommonJS regardless of the target workspace's package.json \"type\"\n\t\t\t// field -- a plain .js here would be parsed as ESM under \"type\": \"module\" and\n\t\t\t// crash on `require`, since Node resolves module type from the nearest package.json.\n\t\t\tconst relayScriptPath = join(stateDirectory, \"relay.cjs\");\n\t\t\twriteFileSync(\n\t\t\t\trelayScriptPath,\n\t\t\t\t`\nconst net = require(\"node:net\");\nconst child_process = require(\"node:child_process\");\n\nconst socketPath = process.env.APEX_UDS_PATH;\nconst server = net.createServer((c) => {\n\tconst client = net.connect(socketPath);\n\tc.pipe(client).pipe(c);\n\tc.on(\"error\", () => {});\n\tclient.on(\"error\", () => {});\n});\n\nserver.listen(0, \"127.0.0.1\", () => {\n\tconst port = server.address().port;\n\tconst env = Object.assign({}, process.env, {\n\t\tHTTP_PROXY: \\`http://127.0.0.1:\\${port}\\`,\n\t\tHTTPS_PROXY: \\`http://127.0.0.1:\\${port}\\`\n\t});\n\tconst args = process.argv.slice(2);\n\tconst child = child_process.spawn(args[0], args.slice(1), {\n\t\tstdio: \"inherit\",\n\t\tenv: env,\n\t});\n\tchild.on(\"exit\", (code, signal) => {\n\t\tprocess.exit(code ?? (signal ? 128 : 1));\n\t});\n});\nserver.on(\"error\", (err) => {\n\tconsole.error(\"Relay error:\", err);\n\tprocess.exit(1);\n});\n`.trim(),\n\t\t\t);\n\n\t\t\tconst readOnlyMounts = [process.execPath, launch.command, ...(launch.readOnlyPaths ?? [])].flatMap((path) =>\n\t\t\t\treadOnlyMountArguments(path),\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t\tconst readOnlyFileMounts = (launch.readOnlyFiles ?? []).flatMap((path, index) =>\n\t\t\t\treadOnlyMountArguments(path, \"file\", index + 3),\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t\tconst readOnlyFileDescriptors = (launch.readOnlyFiles ?? []).map((path) => openSync(path, \"r\"));\n\t\t\t// The descriptors above are opened before the child spawns and must be closed\n\t\t\t// on every exit path -- including a spawn/wait rejection -- or a crashed launch\n\t\t\t// leaks an open handle onto a host-owned credential file for the process's life.\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tconst spawnBwrap = options?.spawnChild ?? spawn;\n\t\t\t\tconst child = spawnBwrap(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"bwrap\",\n\t\t\t\t\t[\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--new-session\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--die-with-parent\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--unshare-user\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--unshare-pid\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--unshare-net\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--ro-bind\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"/\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"/\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--tmpfs\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"/home\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// Immediately after the /home tmpfs: that is the only writable mount at\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// this point, so it is the only place bwrap can create the mountpoint.\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--bind\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\thostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tchildSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...readOnlyMounts,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...readOnlyFileMounts,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--bind\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// After the workspace bind: these destinations sit inside it, and an\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// earlier mount would be masked when the workspace is bound over them.\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...(launch.readOnlyBinaries ?? []).flatMap(({ source, destination }) => [\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--ro-bind\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tsource,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tdestination,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t]),\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--dev\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"/dev\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--proc\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"/proc\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--chdir\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--setenv\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"HOME\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.environment?.HOME ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--setenv\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"TMPDIR\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.environment?.TMPDIR ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--setenv\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"APEX_UDS_PATH\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tchildSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tprocess.execPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\trelayScriptPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.command,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...launch.args,\n\t\t\t\t\t],\n\t\t\t\t\t{ env: launch.environment, stdio: [\"inherit\", \"inherit\", \"pipe\", ...readOnlyFileDescriptors] },\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t\tlet stderr = \"\";\n\t\t\t\tchild.stderr?.setEncoding(\"utf8\");\n\t\t\t\tchild.stderr?.on(\"data\", (chunk: string) => {\n\t\t\t\t\tstderr += chunk;\n\t\t\t\t\tprocess.stderr.write(chunk);\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t\tconst exitCode = await waitForExit(child);\n\t\t\t\tawait proxy?.close();\n\t\t\t\tconst proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation = (violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0) > violationCountBeforeLaunch;\n\t\t\t\tconst kind = exitCode !== 0 && !proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation ? classifySandboxFailure(stderr) : undefined;\n\t\t\t\tif (kind) {\n\t\t\t\t\tviolationStore?.add({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tkind,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcommand: [launch.command, ...launch.args].join(\" \"),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdetail: stderr.trim(),\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttimestamp: new Date(),\n\t\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn exitCode;\n\t\t\t} finally {\n\t\t\t\tfor (const descriptor of readOnlyFileDescriptors) closeSync(descriptor);\n\t\t\t\t// The socket now lives outside the workspace, so nothing else will ever clean\n\t\t\t\t// it up; leaving it would litter the temp directory once per launch.\n\t\t\t\trmSync(hostSocketPath, { force: true });\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n\t\tasync close() {\n\t\t\tawait proxy?.close();\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"linux-backend.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/core/sandbox/linux-backend.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAa,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAMtD,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,cAAc,EAAiB,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAErE,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAK7D,MAAM,WAAW,0BAA0B;IAC1C,iFAAiF;IACjF,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;IAC3B,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC;IAC7C,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC;IACvC,2FAA2F;IAC3F,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;CAC1B;AA6BD;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,wBAAgB,uBAAuB,CAAC,kBAAkB,GAAE,MAAiB,GAAG;IAC/E,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACxB,CAKA;AAmBD;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAgB,yBAAyB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,0BAA0B,GAAG,cAAc,CA4L9F","sourcesContent":["import { spawn, spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\";\nimport { randomBytes } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport { closeSync, mkdirSync, openSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from \"node:fs\";\nimport { tmpdir } from \"node:os\";\nimport { dirname, join, resolve } from \"node:path\";\nimport { createSandboxNetworkProxy, type SandboxNetworkProxy } from \"./network-proxy.ts\";\nimport type { SandboxBackend, SandboxLaunch } from \"./supervisor.ts\";\nimport { publishTerminalSize, TERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE } from \"./terminal-size.ts\";\nimport type { SandboxViolationStore } from \"./violations.ts\";\n\n/** AF_UNIX `sun_path` is 108 bytes on Linux, including the terminating NUL. */\nconst SUN_PATH_LIMIT = 108;\n\nexport interface LinuxSandboxBackendOptions {\n\t/** Injectable only for preflight tests; production uses the running platform. */\n\tplatform?: NodeJS.Platform;\n\tcommandExists?: (command: string) => boolean;\n\tviolationStore?: SandboxViolationStore;\n\t/** Injectable only to prove crash cleanup in tests; production spawns `bwrap` directly. */\n\tspawnChild?: typeof spawn;\n}\n\nfunction commandExists(command: string): boolean {\n\tconst result = spawnSync(command, [\"--version\"], { stdio: \"ignore\", timeout: 1_000 });\n\treturn result.status === 0;\n}\n\nfunction waitForExit(child: ReturnType<typeof spawn>): Promise<number> {\n\treturn new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n\t\tchild.once(\"error\", reject);\n\t\tchild.once(\"exit\", (code) => resolve(code ?? 1));\n\t});\n}\n\nfunction readOnlyMountArguments(path: string, kind: \"directory\" | \"file\" = \"directory\", descriptor = 3): string[] {\n\tconst target = resolve(path);\n\tconst directory = dirname(target);\n\tconst ancestors: string[] = [];\n\tlet current = directory;\n\twhile (current !== \"/\" && current !== \"/home\") {\n\t\tancestors.push(current);\n\t\tcurrent = dirname(current);\n\t}\n\tconst parentArguments = ancestors.reverse().flatMap((ancestor) => [\"--dir\", ancestor]);\n\treturn kind === \"file\"\n\t\t? [...parentArguments, \"--tmpfs\", directory, \"--perms\", \"0400\", \"--file\", String(descriptor), target]\n\t\t: [...parentArguments, \"--ro-bind\", directory, directory];\n}\n\n/**\n * Where the supervisor's proxy socket lives on each side of the boundary.\n *\n * AF_UNIX caps `sun_path` at 108 bytes, so the socket cannot live under the workspace:\n * a deep-but-ordinary project directory exhausts that budget and the sandbox fails to\n * start at all with `listen EINVAL`. The host side therefore gets a short, unique path\n * under the system temp directory, and it is bind-mounted into the child.\n *\n * The child-side path has to sit under `/home`. That is the one writable mount at the\n * point the mountpoint is created — the sandbox root is a read-only bind, so bwrap\n * cannot create a mountpoint at `/run`, `/tmp`, or anywhere else on it.\n */\nexport function resolveProxySocketPaths(temporaryDirectory: string = tmpdir()): {\n\thostSocketPath: string;\n\tchildSocketPath: string;\n} {\n\tconst name = `apex-${process.pid}-${randomBytes(4).toString(\"hex\")}.sock`;\n\t// An unusually long TMPDIR would reintroduce the very limit this avoids.\n\tconst base = join(temporaryDirectory, name).length + 1 > SUN_PATH_LIMIT ? \"/tmp\" : temporaryDirectory;\n\treturn { hostSocketPath: join(base, name), childSocketPath: `/home/${name}` };\n}\n\n/**\n * Classify an unsuccessful child from what its stderr actually evidences, or return\n * undefined when nothing suggests the boundary refused anything.\n *\n * A non-zero exit is not a violation. An invalid API key, a failing test command, or a\n * script exiting 1 are the child's own business, and recording them as sandbox\n * violations blames the boundary for failures it had no part in — which is worse than\n * silence, because it sends whoever reads the output looking for a refusal that never\n * happened. Only Linux's own refusal wording earns a violation here; the proxy records\n * network refusals itself, before this fallback is consulted.\n */\nfunction classifySandboxFailure(stderr: string): \"filesystem\" | \"network\" | undefined {\n\tif (/Read-only file system|Permission denied|Operation not permitted/i.test(stderr)) return \"filesystem\";\n\tif (/Network is unreachable|ENETUNREACH|EHOSTUNREACH/i.test(stderr)) return \"network\";\n\treturn undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Linux's deliberately small platform adapter. The sandbox starts from a read-only\n * host root and bind-mounts only the canonical workspace as writable. `--unshare-net`\n * removes all direct network interfaces for the child and every descendant.\n */\nexport function createLinuxSandboxBackend(options?: LinuxSandboxBackendOptions): SandboxBackend {\n\tconst platform = options?.platform ?? process.platform;\n\tif (platform !== \"linux\") {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tstatus: { kind: \"unavailable\", reason: \"OS sandbox is supported on Linux only.\" },\n\t\t\tasync launch() {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"Linux sandbox backend is unavailable.\");\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tasync close() {},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\tconst hasCommand = options?.commandExists ?? commandExists;\n\tconst violationStore = options?.violationStore;\n\tlet proxy: SandboxNetworkProxy | undefined;\n\n\tif (!hasCommand(\"bwrap\")) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tstatus: { kind: \"unavailable\", reason: \"Bubblewrap (bwrap) is required for OS sandboxing.\" },\n\t\t\tasync launch() {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"Linux sandbox backend is unavailable.\");\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tasync close() {},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\treturn {\n\t\tstatus: { kind: \"enforced\" },\n\t\tasync launch(launch: SandboxLaunch): Promise<number> {\n\t\t\tconst stateDirectory = join(launch.policy.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-state\");\n\t\t\tmkdirSync(stateDirectory, { recursive: true });\n\n\t\t\tconst violationCountBeforeLaunch = violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0;\n\n\t\t\tconst { hostSocketPath, childSocketPath } = resolveProxySocketPaths();\n\t\t\tproxy = await createSandboxNetworkProxy({\n\t\t\t\tsocketPath: hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\tallowedHosts: launch.policy.allowedHosts,\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t});\n\n\t\t\t// .cjs forces CommonJS regardless of the target workspace's package.json \"type\"\n\t\t\t// field -- a plain .js here would be parsed as ESM under \"type\": \"module\" and\n\t\t\t// crash on `require`, since Node resolves module type from the nearest package.json.\n\t\t\tconst relayScriptPath = join(stateDirectory, \"relay.cjs\");\n\t\t\twriteFileSync(\n\t\t\t\trelayScriptPath,\n\t\t\t\t`\nconst net = require(\"node:net\");\nconst child_process = require(\"node:child_process\");\n\nconst socketPath = process.env.APEX_UDS_PATH;\nconst server = net.createServer((c) => {\n\tconst client = net.connect(socketPath);\n\tc.pipe(client).pipe(c);\n\tc.on(\"error\", () => {});\n\tclient.on(\"error\", () => {});\n});\n\nserver.listen(0, \"127.0.0.1\", () => {\n\tconst port = server.address().port;\n\tconst env = Object.assign({}, process.env, {\n\t\tHTTP_PROXY: \\`http://127.0.0.1:\\${port}\\`,\n\t\tHTTPS_PROXY: \\`http://127.0.0.1:\\${port}\\`\n\t});\n\tconst args = process.argv.slice(2);\n\tconst child = child_process.spawn(args[0], args.slice(1), {\n\t\tstdio: \"inherit\",\n\t\tenv: env,\n\t});\n\tchild.on(\"exit\", (code, signal) => {\n\t\tprocess.exit(code ?? (signal ? 128 : 1));\n\t});\n});\nserver.on(\"error\", (err) => {\n\tconsole.error(\"Relay error:\", err);\n\tprocess.exit(1);\n});\n`.trim(),\n\t\t\t);\n\n\t\t\tconst readOnlyMounts = [process.execPath, launch.command, ...(launch.readOnlyPaths ?? [])].flatMap((path) =>\n\t\t\t\treadOnlyMountArguments(path),\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t\tconst readOnlyFileMounts = (launch.readOnlyFiles ?? []).flatMap((path, index) =>\n\t\t\t\treadOnlyMountArguments(path, \"file\", index + 3),\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t\tconst readOnlyFileDescriptors = (launch.readOnlyFiles ?? []).map((path) => openSync(path, \"r\"));\n\t\t\t// The descriptors above are opened before the child spawns and must be closed\n\t\t\t// on every exit path -- including a spawn/wait rejection -- or a crashed launch\n\t\t\t// leaks an open handle onto a host-owned credential file for the process's life.\n\t\t\t// The workspace is bind-mounted read-write into the sandbox, so a file\n\t\t\t// here is visible at the same absolute path on both sides of it.\n\t\t\tconst terminalSizePath = join(stateDirectory, \"terminal-size\");\n\t\t\tconst stopPublishingTerminalSize = publishTerminalSize(terminalSizePath);\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tconst spawnBwrap = options?.spawnChild ?? spawn;\n\t\t\t\tconst child = spawnBwrap(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"bwrap\",\n\t\t\t\t\t[\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--new-session\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--die-with-parent\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--unshare-user\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--unshare-pid\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--unshare-net\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--ro-bind\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"/\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"/\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--tmpfs\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"/home\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// Immediately after the /home tmpfs: that is the only writable mount at\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// this point, so it is the only place bwrap can create the mountpoint.\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--bind\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\thostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tchildSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// The credential channel socket: same writable-under-/home constraint\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// and same position as the network socket above. Its child-side path\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// is what `APEX_CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PATH` names in the launch environment.\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...(launch.credentialChannel\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t? [\"--bind\", launch.credentialChannel.hostSocketPath, launch.credentialChannel.childSocketPath]\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t: []),\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...readOnlyMounts,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...readOnlyFileMounts,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--bind\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// After the workspace bind: these destinations sit inside it, and an\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// earlier mount would be masked when the workspace is bound over them.\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...(launch.readOnlyBinaries ?? []).flatMap(({ source, destination }) => [\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--ro-bind\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tsource,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tdestination,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t]),\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--dev\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"/dev\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--proc\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"/proc\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--chdir\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--setenv\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"HOME\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.environment?.HOME ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--setenv\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"TMPDIR\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.environment?.TMPDIR ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--setenv\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"APEX_UDS_PATH\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tchildSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--setenv\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tTERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tterminalSizePath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tprocess.execPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\trelayScriptPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.command,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...launch.args,\n\t\t\t\t\t],\n\t\t\t\t\t{ env: launch.environment, stdio: [\"inherit\", \"inherit\", \"pipe\", ...readOnlyFileDescriptors] },\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t\tlet stderr = \"\";\n\t\t\t\tchild.stderr?.setEncoding(\"utf8\");\n\t\t\t\tchild.stderr?.on(\"data\", (chunk: string) => {\n\t\t\t\t\tstderr += chunk;\n\t\t\t\t\tprocess.stderr.write(chunk);\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t\tconst exitCode = await waitForExit(child);\n\t\t\t\tawait proxy?.close();\n\t\t\t\tconst proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation = (violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0) > violationCountBeforeLaunch;\n\t\t\t\tconst kind = exitCode !== 0 && !proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation ? classifySandboxFailure(stderr) : undefined;\n\t\t\t\tif (kind) {\n\t\t\t\t\tviolationStore?.add({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tkind,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcommand: [launch.command, ...launch.args].join(\" \"),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdetail: stderr.trim(),\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttimestamp: new Date(),\n\t\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn exitCode;\n\t\t\t} finally {\n\t\t\t\tstopPublishingTerminalSize();\n\t\t\t\tfor (const descriptor of readOnlyFileDescriptors) closeSync(descriptor);\n\t\t\t\t// The socket now lives outside the workspace, so nothing else will ever clean\n\t\t\t\t// it up; leaving it would litter the temp directory once per launch.\n\t\t\t\trmSync(hostSocketPath, { force: true });\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n\t\tasync close() {\n\t\t\tawait proxy?.close();\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/linux-backend.js

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import { closeSync, mkdirSync, openSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
 import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
 import { dirname, join, resolve } from "node:path";
 import { createSandboxNetworkProxy } from "./network-proxy.js";
+import { publishTerminalSize, TERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE } from "./terminal-size.js";
 /** AF_UNIX `sun_path` is 108 bytes on Linux, including the terminating NUL. */
 const SUN_PATH_LIMIT = 108;
 function commandExists(command) {
@@ -148,6 +149,10 @@ server.on("error", (err) => {
             // The descriptors above are opened before the child spawns and must be closed
             // on every exit path -- including a spawn/wait rejection -- or a crashed launch
             // leaks an open handle onto a host-owned credential file for the process's life.
+            // The workspace is bind-mounted read-write into the sandbox, so a file
+            // here is visible at the same absolute path on both sides of it.
+            const terminalSizePath = join(stateDirectory, "terminal-size");
+            const stopPublishingTerminalSize = publishTerminalSize(terminalSizePath);
             try {
                 const spawnBwrap = options?.spawnChild ?? spawn;
                 const child = spawnBwrap("bwrap", [
@@ -166,6 +171,12 @@ server.on("error", (err) => {
                     "--bind",
                     hostSocketPath,
                     childSocketPath,
+                    // The credential channel socket: same writable-under-/home constraint
+                    // and same position as the network socket above. Its child-side path
+                    // is what `APEX_CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PATH` names in the launch environment.
+                    ...(launch.credentialChannel
+                        ? ["--bind", launch.credentialChannel.hostSocketPath, launch.credentialChannel.childSocketPath]
+                        : []),
                     ...readOnlyMounts,
                     ...readOnlyFileMounts,
                     "--bind",
@@ -193,6 +204,9 @@ server.on("error", (err) => {
                     "--setenv",
                     "APEX_UDS_PATH",
                     childSocketPath,
+                    "--setenv",
+                    TERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE,
+                    terminalSizePath,
                     "--",
                     process.execPath,
                     relayScriptPath,
@@ -220,6 +234,7 @@ server.on("error", (err) => {
                 return exitCode;
             }
             finally {
+                stopPublishingTerminalSize();
                 for (const descriptor of readOnlyFileDescriptors)
                     closeSync(descriptor);
                 // The socket now lives outside the workspace, so nothing else will ever clean

package/dist/core/sandbox/linux-backend.js.map

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{ spawn, spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\";\nimport { randomBytes } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport { closeSync, mkdirSync, openSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from \"node:fs\";\nimport { tmpdir } from \"node:os\";\nimport { dirname, join, resolve } from \"node:path\";\nimport { createSandboxNetworkProxy, type SandboxNetworkProxy } from \"./network-proxy.ts\";\nimport type { SandboxBackend, SandboxLaunch } from \"./supervisor.ts\";\nimport type { SandboxViolationStore } from \"./violations.ts\";\n\n/** AF_UNIX `sun_path` is 108 bytes on Linux, including the terminating NUL. */\nconst SUN_PATH_LIMIT = 108;\n\nexport interface LinuxSandboxBackendOptions {\n\t/** Injectable only for preflight tests; production uses the running platform. */\n\tplatform?: NodeJS.Platform;\n\tcommandExists?: (command: string) => boolean;\n\tviolationStore?: SandboxViolationStore;\n\t/** Injectable only to prove crash cleanup in tests; production spawns `bwrap` directly. */\n\tspawnChild?: typeof spawn;\n}\n\nfunction commandExists(command: string): boolean {\n\tconst result = spawnSync(command, [\"--version\"], { stdio: \"ignore\", timeout: 1_000 });\n\treturn result.status === 0;\n}\n\nfunction waitForExit(child: ReturnType<typeof spawn>): Promise<number> {\n\treturn new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n\t\tchild.once(\"error\", reject);\n\t\tchild.once(\"exit\", (code) => resolve(code ?? 1));\n\t});\n}\n\nfunction readOnlyMountArguments(path: string, kind: \"directory\" | \"file\" = \"directory\", descriptor = 3): string[] {\n\tconst target = resolve(path);\n\tconst directory = dirname(target);\n\tconst ancestors: string[] = [];\n\tlet current = directory;\n\twhile (current !== \"/\" && current !== \"/home\") {\n\t\tancestors.push(current);\n\t\tcurrent = dirname(current);\n\t}\n\tconst parentArguments = ancestors.reverse().flatMap((ancestor) => [\"--dir\", ancestor]);\n\treturn kind === \"file\"\n\t\t? [...parentArguments, \"--tmpfs\", directory, \"--perms\", \"0400\", \"--file\", String(descriptor), target]\n\t\t: [...parentArguments, \"--ro-bind\", directory, directory];\n}\n\n/**\n * Where the supervisor's proxy socket lives on each side of the boundary.\n *\n * AF_UNIX caps `sun_path` at 108 bytes, so the socket cannot live under the workspace:\n * a deep-but-ordinary project directory exhausts that budget and the sandbox fails to\n * start at all with `listen EINVAL`. The host side therefore gets a short, unique path\n * under the system temp directory, and it is bind-mounted into the child.\n *\n * The child-side path has to sit under `/home`. That is the one writable mount at the\n * point the mountpoint is created — the sandbox root is a read-only bind, so bwrap\n * cannot create a mountpoint at `/run`, `/tmp`, or anywhere else on it.\n */\nexport function resolveProxySocketPaths(temporaryDirectory: string = tmpdir()): {\n\thostSocketPath: string;\n\tchildSocketPath: string;\n} {\n\tconst name = `apex-${process.pid}-${randomBytes(4).toString(\"hex\")}.sock`;\n\t// An unusually long TMPDIR would reintroduce the very limit this avoids.\n\tconst base = join(temporaryDirectory, name).length + 1 > SUN_PATH_LIMIT ? \"/tmp\" : temporaryDirectory;\n\treturn { hostSocketPath: join(base, name), childSocketPath: `/home/${name}` };\n}\n\n/**\n * Classify an unsuccessful child from what its stderr actually evidences, or return\n * undefined when nothing suggests the boundary refused anything.\n *\n * A non-zero exit is not a violation. An invalid API key, a failing test command, or a\n * script exiting 1 are the child's own business, and recording them as sandbox\n * violations blames the boundary for failures it had no part in — which is worse than\n * silence, because it sends whoever reads the output looking for a refusal that never\n * happened. Only Linux's own refusal wording earns a violation here; the proxy records\n * network refusals itself, before this fallback is consulted.\n */\nfunction classifySandboxFailure(stderr: string): \"filesystem\" | \"network\" | undefined {\n\tif (/Read-only file system|Permission denied|Operation not permitted/i.test(stderr)) return \"filesystem\";\n\tif (/Network is unreachable|ENETUNREACH|EHOSTUNREACH/i.test(stderr)) return \"network\";\n\treturn undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Linux's deliberately small platform adapter. The sandbox starts from a read-only\n * host root and bind-mounts only the canonical workspace as writable. `--unshare-net`\n * removes all direct network interfaces for the child and every descendant.\n */\nexport function createLinuxSandboxBackend(options?: LinuxSandboxBackendOptions): SandboxBackend {\n\tconst platform = options?.platform ?? process.platform;\n\tif (platform !== \"linux\") {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tstatus: { kind: \"unavailable\", reason: \"OS sandbox is supported on Linux only.\" },\n\t\t\tasync launch() {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"Linux sandbox backend is unavailable.\");\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tasync close() {},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\tconst hasCommand = options?.commandExists ?? commandExists;\n\tconst violationStore = options?.violationStore;\n\tlet proxy: SandboxNetworkProxy | undefined;\n\n\tif (!hasCommand(\"bwrap\")) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tstatus: { kind: \"unavailable\", reason: \"Bubblewrap (bwrap) is required for OS sandboxing.\" },\n\t\t\tasync launch() {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"Linux sandbox backend is unavailable.\");\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tasync close() {},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\treturn {\n\t\tstatus: { kind: \"enforced\" },\n\t\tasync launch(launch: SandboxLaunch): Promise<number> {\n\t\t\tconst stateDirectory = join(launch.policy.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-state\");\n\t\t\tmkdirSync(stateDirectory, { recursive: true });\n\n\t\t\tconst violationCountBeforeLaunch = violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0;\n\n\t\t\tconst { hostSocketPath, childSocketPath } = resolveProxySocketPaths();\n\t\t\tproxy = await createSandboxNetworkProxy({\n\t\t\t\tsocketPath: hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\tallowedHosts: launch.policy.allowedHosts,\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t});\n\n\t\t\t// .cjs forces CommonJS regardless of the target workspace's package.json \"type\"\n\t\t\t// field -- a plain .js here would be parsed as ESM under \"type\": \"module\" and\n\t\t\t// crash on `require`, since Node resolves module type from the nearest package.json.\n\t\t\tconst relayScriptPath = join(stateDirectory, \"relay.cjs\");\n\t\t\twriteFileSync(\n\t\t\t\trelayScriptPath,\n\t\t\t\t`\nconst net = require(\"node:net\");\nconst child_process = require(\"node:child_process\");\n\nconst socketPath = process.env.APEX_UDS_PATH;\nconst server = net.createServer((c) => {\n\tconst client = net.connect(socketPath);\n\tc.pipe(client).pipe(c);\n\tc.on(\"error\", () => {});\n\tclient.on(\"error\", () => {});\n});\n\nserver.listen(0, \"127.0.0.1\", () => {\n\tconst port = server.address().port;\n\tconst env = Object.assign({}, process.env, {\n\t\tHTTP_PROXY: \\`http://127.0.0.1:\\${port}\\`,\n\t\tHTTPS_PROXY: \\`http://127.0.0.1:\\${port}\\`\n\t});\n\tconst args = process.argv.slice(2);\n\tconst child = child_process.spawn(args[0], args.slice(1), {\n\t\tstdio: \"inherit\",\n\t\tenv: env,\n\t});\n\tchild.on(\"exit\", (code, signal) => {\n\t\tprocess.exit(code ?? (signal ? 128 : 1));\n\t});\n});\nserver.on(\"error\", (err) => {\n\tconsole.error(\"Relay error:\", err);\n\tprocess.exit(1);\n});\n`.trim(),\n\t\t\t);\n\n\t\t\tconst readOnlyMounts = [process.execPath, launch.command, ...(launch.readOnlyPaths ?? [])].flatMap((path) =>\n\t\t\t\treadOnlyMountArguments(path),\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t\tconst readOnlyFileMounts = (launch.readOnlyFiles ?? []).flatMap((path, index) =>\n\t\t\t\treadOnlyMountArguments(path, \"file\", index + 3),\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t\tconst readOnlyFileDescriptors = (launch.readOnlyFiles ?? []).map((path) => openSync(path, \"r\"));\n\t\t\t// The descriptors above are opened before the child spawns and must be closed\n\t\t\t// on every exit path -- including a spawn/wait rejection -- or a crashed launch\n\t\t\t// leaks an open handle onto a host-owned credential file for the process's life.\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tconst spawnBwrap = options?.spawnChild ?? spawn;\n\t\t\t\tconst child = spawnBwrap(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"bwrap\",\n\t\t\t\t\t[\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--new-session\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--die-with-parent\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--unshare-user\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--unshare-pid\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--unshare-net\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--ro-bind\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"/\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"/\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--tmpfs\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"/home\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// Immediately after the /home tmpfs: that is the only writable mount at\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// this point, so it is the only place bwrap can create the mountpoint.\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--bind\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\thostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tchildSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...readOnlyMounts,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...readOnlyFileMounts,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--bind\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// After the workspace bind: these destinations sit inside it, and an\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// earlier mount would be masked when the workspace is bound over them.\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...(launch.readOnlyBinaries ?? []).flatMap(({ source, destination }) => [\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--ro-bind\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tsource,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tdestination,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t]),\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--dev\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"/dev\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--proc\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"/proc\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--chdir\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--setenv\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"HOME\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.environment?.HOME ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--setenv\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"TMPDIR\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.environment?.TMPDIR ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--setenv\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"APEX_UDS_PATH\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tchildSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tprocess.execPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\trelayScriptPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.command,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...launch.args,\n\t\t\t\t\t],\n\t\t\t\t\t{ env: launch.environment, stdio: [\"inherit\", \"inherit\", \"pipe\", ...readOnlyFileDescriptors] },\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t\tlet stderr = \"\";\n\t\t\t\tchild.stderr?.setEncoding(\"utf8\");\n\t\t\t\tchild.stderr?.on(\"data\", (chunk: string) => {\n\t\t\t\t\tstderr += chunk;\n\t\t\t\t\tprocess.stderr.write(chunk);\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t\tconst exitCode = await waitForExit(child);\n\t\t\t\tawait proxy?.close();\n\t\t\t\tconst proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation = (violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0) > violationCountBeforeLaunch;\n\t\t\t\tconst kind = exitCode !== 0 && !proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation ? classifySandboxFailure(stderr) : undefined;\n\t\t\t\tif (kind) {\n\t\t\t\t\tviolationStore?.add({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tkind,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcommand: [launch.command, ...launch.args].join(\" \"),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdetail: stderr.trim(),\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttimestamp: new Date(),\n\t\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn exitCode;\n\t\t\t} finally {\n\t\t\t\tfor (const descriptor of readOnlyFileDescriptors) closeSync(descriptor);\n\t\t\t\t// The socket now lives outside the workspace, so nothing else will ever clean\n\t\t\t\t// it up; leaving it would litter the temp directory once per launch.\n\t\t\t\trmSync(hostSocketPath, { force: true });\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n\t\tasync close() {\n\t\t\tawait proxy?.close();\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n"]}
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[...parentArguments, \"--tmpfs\", directory, \"--perms\", \"0400\", \"--file\", String(descriptor), target]\n\t\t: [...parentArguments, \"--ro-bind\", directory, directory];\n}\n\n/**\n * Where the supervisor's proxy socket lives on each side of the boundary.\n *\n * AF_UNIX caps `sun_path` at 108 bytes, so the socket cannot live under the workspace:\n * a deep-but-ordinary project directory exhausts that budget and the sandbox fails to\n * start at all with `listen EINVAL`. The host side therefore gets a short, unique path\n * under the system temp directory, and it is bind-mounted into the child.\n *\n * The child-side path has to sit under `/home`. That is the one writable mount at the\n * point the mountpoint is created — the sandbox root is a read-only bind, so bwrap\n * cannot create a mountpoint at `/run`, `/tmp`, or anywhere else on it.\n */\nexport function resolveProxySocketPaths(temporaryDirectory: string = tmpdir()): {\n\thostSocketPath: string;\n\tchildSocketPath: string;\n} {\n\tconst name = `apex-${process.pid}-${randomBytes(4).toString(\"hex\")}.sock`;\n\t// An unusually long TMPDIR would reintroduce the very limit this avoids.\n\tconst base = join(temporaryDirectory, name).length + 1 > SUN_PATH_LIMIT ? \"/tmp\" : temporaryDirectory;\n\treturn { hostSocketPath: join(base, name), childSocketPath: `/home/${name}` };\n}\n\n/**\n * Classify an unsuccessful child from what its stderr actually evidences, or return\n * undefined when nothing suggests the boundary refused anything.\n *\n * A non-zero exit is not a violation. An invalid API key, a failing test command, or a\n * script exiting 1 are the child's own business, and recording them as sandbox\n * violations blames the boundary for failures it had no part in — which is worse than\n * silence, because it sends whoever reads the output looking for a refusal that never\n * happened. Only Linux's own refusal wording earns a violation here; the proxy records\n * network refusals itself, before this fallback is consulted.\n */\nfunction classifySandboxFailure(stderr: string): \"filesystem\" | \"network\" | undefined {\n\tif (/Read-only file system|Permission denied|Operation not permitted/i.test(stderr)) return \"filesystem\";\n\tif (/Network is unreachable|ENETUNREACH|EHOSTUNREACH/i.test(stderr)) return \"network\";\n\treturn undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Linux's deliberately small platform adapter. The sandbox starts from a read-only\n * host root and bind-mounts only the canonical workspace as writable. `--unshare-net`\n * removes all direct network interfaces for the child and every descendant.\n */\nexport function createLinuxSandboxBackend(options?: LinuxSandboxBackendOptions): SandboxBackend {\n\tconst platform = options?.platform ?? process.platform;\n\tif (platform !== \"linux\") {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tstatus: { kind: \"unavailable\", reason: \"OS sandbox is supported on Linux only.\" },\n\t\t\tasync launch() {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"Linux sandbox backend is unavailable.\");\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tasync close() {},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\tconst hasCommand = options?.commandExists ?? commandExists;\n\tconst violationStore = options?.violationStore;\n\tlet proxy: SandboxNetworkProxy | undefined;\n\n\tif (!hasCommand(\"bwrap\")) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tstatus: { kind: \"unavailable\", reason: \"Bubblewrap (bwrap) is required for OS sandboxing.\" },\n\t\t\tasync launch() {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"Linux sandbox backend is unavailable.\");\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tasync close() {},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\treturn {\n\t\tstatus: { kind: \"enforced\" },\n\t\tasync launch(launch: SandboxLaunch): Promise<number> {\n\t\t\tconst stateDirectory = join(launch.policy.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-state\");\n\t\t\tmkdirSync(stateDirectory, { recursive: true });\n\n\t\t\tconst violationCountBeforeLaunch = violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0;\n\n\t\t\tconst { hostSocketPath, childSocketPath } = resolveProxySocketPaths();\n\t\t\tproxy = await createSandboxNetworkProxy({\n\t\t\t\tsocketPath: hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\tallowedHosts: launch.policy.allowedHosts,\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t});\n\n\t\t\t// .cjs forces CommonJS regardless of the target workspace's package.json \"type\"\n\t\t\t// field -- a plain .js here would be parsed as ESM under \"type\": \"module\" and\n\t\t\t// crash on `require`, since Node resolves module type from the nearest package.json.\n\t\t\tconst relayScriptPath = join(stateDirectory, \"relay.cjs\");\n\t\t\twriteFileSync(\n\t\t\t\trelayScriptPath,\n\t\t\t\t`\nconst net = require(\"node:net\");\nconst child_process = require(\"node:child_process\");\n\nconst socketPath = process.env.APEX_UDS_PATH;\nconst server = net.createServer((c) => {\n\tconst client = net.connect(socketPath);\n\tc.pipe(client).pipe(c);\n\tc.on(\"error\", () => {});\n\tclient.on(\"error\", () => {});\n});\n\nserver.listen(0, \"127.0.0.1\", () => {\n\tconst port = server.address().port;\n\tconst env = Object.assign({}, process.env, {\n\t\tHTTP_PROXY: \\`http://127.0.0.1:\\${port}\\`,\n\t\tHTTPS_PROXY: \\`http://127.0.0.1:\\${port}\\`\n\t});\n\tconst args = process.argv.slice(2);\n\tconst child = child_process.spawn(args[0], args.slice(1), {\n\t\tstdio: \"inherit\",\n\t\tenv: env,\n\t});\n\tchild.on(\"exit\", (code, signal) => {\n\t\tprocess.exit(code ?? (signal ? 128 : 1));\n\t});\n});\nserver.on(\"error\", (err) => {\n\tconsole.error(\"Relay error:\", err);\n\tprocess.exit(1);\n});\n`.trim(),\n\t\t\t);\n\n\t\t\tconst readOnlyMounts = [process.execPath, launch.command, ...(launch.readOnlyPaths ?? [])].flatMap((path) =>\n\t\t\t\treadOnlyMountArguments(path),\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t\tconst readOnlyFileMounts = (launch.readOnlyFiles ?? []).flatMap((path, index) =>\n\t\t\t\treadOnlyMountArguments(path, \"file\", index + 3),\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t\tconst readOnlyFileDescriptors = (launch.readOnlyFiles ?? []).map((path) => openSync(path, \"r\"));\n\t\t\t// The descriptors above are opened before the child spawns and must be closed\n\t\t\t// on every exit path -- including a spawn/wait rejection -- or a crashed launch\n\t\t\t// leaks an open handle onto a host-owned credential file for the process's life.\n\t\t\t// The workspace is bind-mounted read-write into the sandbox, so a file\n\t\t\t// here is visible at the same absolute path on both sides of it.\n\t\t\tconst terminalSizePath = join(stateDirectory, \"terminal-size\");\n\t\t\tconst stopPublishingTerminalSize = publishTerminalSize(terminalSizePath);\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tconst spawnBwrap = options?.spawnChild ?? spawn;\n\t\t\t\tconst child = spawnBwrap(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"bwrap\",\n\t\t\t\t\t[\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--new-session\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--die-with-parent\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--unshare-user\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--unshare-pid\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--unshare-net\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--ro-bind\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"/\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"/\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--tmpfs\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"/home\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// Immediately after the /home tmpfs: that is the only writable mount at\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// this point, so it is the only place bwrap can create the mountpoint.\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--bind\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\thostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tchildSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// The credential channel socket: same writable-under-/home constraint\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// and same position as the network socket above. Its child-side path\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// is what `APEX_CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PATH` names in the launch environment.\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...(launch.credentialChannel\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t? [\"--bind\", launch.credentialChannel.hostSocketPath, launch.credentialChannel.childSocketPath]\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t: []),\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...readOnlyMounts,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...readOnlyFileMounts,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--bind\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// After the workspace bind: these destinations sit inside it, and an\n\t\t\t\t\t\t// earlier mount would be masked when the workspace is bound over them.\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...(launch.readOnlyBinaries ?? []).flatMap(({ source, destination }) => [\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--ro-bind\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tsource,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tdestination,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t]),\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--dev\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"/dev\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--proc\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"/proc\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--chdir\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--setenv\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"HOME\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.environment?.HOME ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--setenv\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"TMPDIR\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.environment?.TMPDIR ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--setenv\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"APEX_UDS_PATH\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tchildSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--setenv\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tTERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tterminalSizePath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"--\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tprocess.execPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\trelayScriptPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch.command,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...launch.args,\n\t\t\t\t\t],\n\t\t\t\t\t{ env: launch.environment, stdio: [\"inherit\", \"inherit\", \"pipe\", ...readOnlyFileDescriptors] },\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t\tlet stderr = \"\";\n\t\t\t\tchild.stderr?.setEncoding(\"utf8\");\n\t\t\t\tchild.stderr?.on(\"data\", (chunk: string) => {\n\t\t\t\t\tstderr += chunk;\n\t\t\t\t\tprocess.stderr.write(chunk);\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t\tconst exitCode = await waitForExit(child);\n\t\t\t\tawait proxy?.close();\n\t\t\t\tconst proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation = (violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0) > violationCountBeforeLaunch;\n\t\t\t\tconst kind = exitCode !== 0 && !proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation ? classifySandboxFailure(stderr) : undefined;\n\t\t\t\tif (kind) {\n\t\t\t\t\tviolationStore?.add({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tkind,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcommand: [launch.command, ...launch.args].join(\" \"),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdetail: stderr.trim(),\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttimestamp: new Date(),\n\t\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn exitCode;\n\t\t\t} finally {\n\t\t\t\tstopPublishingTerminalSize();\n\t\t\t\tfor (const descriptor of readOnlyFileDescriptors) closeSync(descriptor);\n\t\t\t\t// The socket now lives outside the workspace, so nothing else will ever clean\n\t\t\t\t// it up; leaving it would litter the temp directory once per launch.\n\t\t\t\trmSync(hostSocketPath, { force: true });\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n\t\tasync close() {\n\t\t\tawait proxy?.close();\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/macos-backend.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"macos-backend.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/core/sandbox/macos-backend.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAa,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAKtD,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,cAAc,EAAiB,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AACrE,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAE7D,MAAM,WAAW,0BAA0B;IAC1C,iFAAiF;IACjF,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;IAC3B,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC;IAC7C,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC;IACvC;;;;OAIG;IACH,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;CAC1B;AA8DD;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,wBAAgB,yBAAyB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,0BAA0B,GAAG,cAAc,CA2I9F","sourcesContent":["import { spawn, spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\";\nimport { mkdirSync, realpathSync, writeFileSync } from \"node:fs\";\nimport { homedir } from \"node:os\";\nimport { dirname, join, resolve } from \"node:path\";\nimport { createSandboxNetworkProxy, type SandboxNetworkProxy } from \"./network-proxy.ts\";\nimport type { SandboxBackend, SandboxLaunch } from \"./supervisor.ts\";\nimport type { SandboxViolationStore } from \"./violations.ts\";\n\nexport interface MacosSandboxBackendOptions {\n\t/** Injectable only for preflight tests; production uses the running platform. */\n\tplatform?: NodeJS.Platform;\n\tcommandExists?: (command: string) => boolean;\n\tviolationStore?: SandboxViolationStore;\n\t/**\n\t * Injectable only so violation attribution can be tested off macOS; production\n\t * spawns `sandbox-exec` directly. Without this the decision about what counts as a\n\t * violation would be verifiable only on a macOS host.\n\t */\n\tspawnChild?: typeof spawn;\n}\n\nfunction sandboxExecExists(command: string): boolean {\n\t// sandbox-exec has no --version flag; a real, minimal profile run is the\n\t// standard existence-and-basic-functionality probe (see the 2b.5 prototype's\n\t// own positive control).\n\tconst result = spawnSync(command, [\"-p\", \"(version 1)(allow default)\", \"/usr/bin/true\"], {\n\t\tstdio: \"ignore\",\n\t\ttimeout: 2_000,\n\t});\n\treturn result.status === 0;\n}\n\nfunction waitForExit(child: ReturnType<typeof spawn>): Promise<number> {\n\treturn new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n\t\tchild.once(\"error\", reject);\n\t\tchild.once(\"exit\", (code) => resolve(code ?? 1));\n\t});\n}\n\n/**\n * Unlike Linux's bwrap (which needs each mount ancestor declared for its bind-mount\n * tree), Seatbelt's `subpath` is recursive from a single root, so only the directory\n * containing each path is needed -- no ancestor walk. Each directory is resolved to\n * its real (symlink-free) path: Seatbelt canonicalizes the path it actually checks\n * against a `subpath` rule (confirmed empirically -- a rule built from an\n * unresolved symlinked path, e.g. Homebrew's own layout, silently never matches).\n */\nfunction readOnlyDirectories(paths: readonly string[]): string[] {\n\tconst directories = paths.map((path) => dirname(resolve(path)));\n\tconst canonical = directories.map((directory) => {\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\treturn realpathSync(directory);\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\treturn directory;\n\t\t}\n\t});\n\treturn [...new Set(canonical)];\n}\n\n/** Seatbelt refuses through the blocked call's own errno text, not a wrapper message. */\nconst DENIAL_EVIDENCE = /Operation not permitted|Permission denied|EPERM|EACCES/i;\n\nfunction classifySandboxFailure(stderr: string): \"filesystem\" | \"network\" | \"unknown\" | undefined {\n\t// Confirmed empirically (2b.5 prototype): unlike Linux's bwrap, macOS Seatbelt\n\t// denials surface through the launched command's own generic \"Operation not\n\t// permitted\"/EPERM text for filesystem AND network refusals alike -- there is no\n\t// macOS-specific phrase equivalent to Linux's distinct \"Network is unreachable\".\n\t// Only sandbox-exec's own wrapper-level exec refusal (a sign our own profile\n\t// forgot to allow a binary, not a policy decision) is unambiguous from stderr\n\t// text. Anything else that still shows a refusal stays \"unknown\";\n\t// network-proxy.ts's own precise per-request recording is the reliable \"network\"\n\t// signal on this platform.\n\tif (/execvp\\(\\) of .* failed: Operation not permitted/i.test(stderr)) return \"filesystem\";\n\tif (DENIAL_EVIDENCE.test(stderr)) return \"unknown\";\n\t// No refusal in evidence. The coarseness above is about telling filesystem from\n\t// network, not about telling a denial from an ordinary failure -- a non-zero exit\n\t// on its own says nothing about the boundary, and reporting it as a violation\n\t// sends the reader looking for a refusal that never happened.\n\treturn undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * macOS's platform adapter. Seatbelt (`sandbox-exec`) allows reads broadly except\n * the invoking account's home directory, denies writes outside the workspace, and\n * denies network outside the sandbox proxy's exact loopback port -- narrower than\n * the wildcard `localhost:*` pattern some other sandboxes use. This mirrors Linux's\n * actual posture (`--ro-bind / /` plus a hidden `/home`) rather than the narrower\n * read-allowlist this design started with, which broke ordinary process startup.\n */\nexport function createMacosSandboxBackend(options?: MacosSandboxBackendOptions): SandboxBackend {\n\tconst platform = options?.platform ?? process.platform;\n\tif (platform !== \"darwin\") {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tstatus: { kind: \"unavailable\", reason: \"OS sandbox is supported on macOS only.\" },\n\t\t\tasync launch() {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"macOS sandbox backend is unavailable.\");\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tasync close() {},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\tconst hasCommand = options?.commandExists ?? sandboxExecExists;\n\tconst violationStore = options?.violationStore;\n\tlet proxy: SandboxNetworkProxy | undefined;\n\n\tif (!hasCommand(\"sandbox-exec\")) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tstatus: { kind: \"unavailable\", reason: \"sandbox-exec (Seatbelt) is required for OS sandboxing.\" },\n\t\t\tasync launch() {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"macOS sandbox backend is unavailable.\");\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tasync close() {},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\treturn {\n\t\tstatus: { kind: \"enforced\" },\n\t\tasync launch(launch: SandboxLaunch): Promise<number> {\n\t\t\t// Same reasoning as readOnlyDirectories: on macOS the workspace itself can\n\t\t\t// be reached through a symlink (e.g. os.tmpdir()'s /var -> /private/var),\n\t\t\t// and Seatbelt's subpath match is against the canonical path, not the one\n\t\t\t// the caller happened to spell. Resolve once, use everywhere below.\n\t\t\tconst workspace = realpathSync(launch.policy.workspace);\n\t\t\tconst stateDirectory = join(workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-state\");\n\t\t\tmkdirSync(stateDirectory, { recursive: true });\n\n\t\t\tconst violationCountBeforeLaunch = violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0;\n\n\t\t\tproxy = await createSandboxNetworkProxy({\n\t\t\t\ttcpHost: \"127.0.0.1\",\n\t\t\t\tallowedHosts: launch.policy.allowedHosts,\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tconst proxyPort = proxy.port as number;\n\n\t\t\tconst readOnlyDirs = readOnlyDirectories([process.execPath, launch.command, ...(launch.readOnlyPaths ?? [])]);\n\t\t\tconst readOnlyFiles = (launch.readOnlyFiles ?? []).map((path) => {\n\t\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn realpathSync(path);\n\t\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn resolve(path);\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tlet userHome: string | undefined;\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tuserHome = realpathSync(homedir());\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\tuserHome = homedir();\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tconst profileLines = [\n\t\t\t\t\"(version 1)\",\n\t\t\t\t// bsd.sb's baseline is broader than Linux's opt-in bind-mount model --\n\t\t\t\t// a real gap this design accepts, documented in the spec's fourth\n\t\t\t\t// amendment -- but it is the only combination the 2b.5 prototype found\n\t\t\t\t// that lets a normal Unix child process (dyld, /bin/sh) actually start.\n\t\t\t\t'(import \"bsd.sb\")',\n\t\t\t\t\"(allow process-exec*)\",\n\t\t\t\t// Separate from process-exec* -- confirmed empirically: a shell that\n\t\t\t\t// forks a child shell (e.g. `sh -c 'a' && sh -c 'b'`) failed with\n\t\t\t\t// \"fork: Operation not permitted\" without this, even with exec allowed.\n\t\t\t\t\"(allow process-fork)\",\n\t\t\t\t// Matches Linux's actual posture (bwrap's `--ro-bind / /`): broad read,\n\t\t\t\t// narrow write. A read-only allowlist alone (this design's first cut)\n\t\t\t\t// breaks ordinary process startup -- confirmed empirically, getcwd()\n\t\t\t\t// itself needs to traverse the workspace's ancestor directories, which\n\t\t\t\t// no read rule scoped only to the workspace or runtime paths covers.\n\t\t\t\t\"(allow file-read*)\",\n\t\t\t\t'(deny file-read* (subpath (param \"USER_HOME\")))',\n\t\t\t\t...readOnlyDirs.map((_, index) => `(allow file-read* (subpath (param \"RO_${index}\")))`),\n\t\t\t\t...readOnlyFiles.map((_, index) => `(allow file-read* (subpath (param \"RO_FILE_${index}\")))`),\n\t\t\t\t'(allow file-read* (subpath (param \"WORKSPACE\")))',\n\t\t\t\t\"(deny file-write*)\",\n\t\t\t\t'(allow file-write* (subpath (param \"WORKSPACE\")))',\n\t\t\t\t\"(deny network*)\",\n\t\t\t\t'(allow network-outbound (remote ip (param \"PROXY_ADDR\")))',\n\t\t\t];\n\t\t\tconst profilePath = join(stateDirectory, \"profile.sb\");\n\t\t\twriteFileSync(profilePath, profileLines.join(\"\\n\"));\n\n\t\t\tconst params: string[] = [\"-D\", `USER_HOME=${userHome}`];\n\t\t\treadOnlyDirs.forEach((dir, index) => {\n\t\t\t\tparams.push(\"-D\", `RO_${index}=${dir}`);\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\treadOnlyFiles.forEach((file, index) => {\n\t\t\t\tparams.push(\"-D\", `RO_FILE_${index}=${file}`);\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tparams.push(\"-D\", `WORKSPACE=${workspace}`);\n\t\t\tparams.push(\"-D\", `PROXY_ADDR=localhost:${proxyPort}`);\n\n\t\t\tconst spawnSandboxExec = options?.spawnChild ?? spawn;\n\t\t\tconst child = spawnSandboxExec(\n\t\t\t\t\"sandbox-exec\",\n\t\t\t\t[\"-f\", profilePath, ...params, \"--\", launch.command, ...launch.args],\n\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\tcwd: workspace,\n\t\t\t\t\tenv: {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...launch.environment,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tHOME: launch.environment?.HOME ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tTMPDIR: launch.environment?.TMPDIR ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tHTTP_PROXY: `http://127.0.0.1:${proxyPort}`,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tHTTPS_PROXY: `http://127.0.0.1:${proxyPort}`,\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\tstdio: [\"inherit\", \"inherit\", \"pipe\"],\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t\tlet stderr = \"\";\n\t\t\tchild.stderr?.setEncoding(\"utf8\");\n\t\t\tchild.stderr?.on(\"data\", (chunk: string) => {\n\t\t\t\tstderr += chunk;\n\t\t\t\tprocess.stderr.write(chunk);\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tconst exitCode = await waitForExit(child);\n\t\t\tawait proxy?.close();\n\t\t\tconst proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation = (violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0) > violationCountBeforeLaunch;\n\t\t\tconst kind = exitCode !== 0 && !proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation ? classifySandboxFailure(stderr) : undefined;\n\t\t\tif (kind) {\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore?.add({\n\t\t\t\t\tkind,\n\t\t\t\t\tcommand: [launch.command, ...launch.args].join(\" \"),\n\t\t\t\t\tdetail: stderr.trim(),\n\t\t\t\t\ttimestamp: new Date(),\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn exitCode;\n\t\t},\n\t\tasync close() {\n\t\t\tawait proxy?.close();\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"macos-backend.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/core/sandbox/macos-backend.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAa,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAKtD,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,cAAc,EAAiB,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AACrE,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAE7D,MAAM,WAAW,0BAA0B;IAC1C,iFAAiF;IACjF,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;IAC3B,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC;IAC7C,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC;IACvC;;;;OAIG;IACH,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;CAC1B;AA6ED;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,wBAAgB,yBAAyB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,0BAA0B,GAAG,cAAc,CAoJ9F","sourcesContent":["import { spawn, spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\";\nimport { mkdirSync, realpathSync, writeFileSync } from \"node:fs\";\nimport { homedir } from \"node:os\";\nimport { basename, dirname, join, resolve } from \"node:path\";\nimport { createSandboxNetworkProxy, type SandboxNetworkProxy } from \"./network-proxy.ts\";\nimport type { SandboxBackend, SandboxLaunch } from \"./supervisor.ts\";\nimport type { SandboxViolationStore } from \"./violations.ts\";\n\nexport interface MacosSandboxBackendOptions {\n\t/** Injectable only for preflight tests; production uses the running platform. */\n\tplatform?: NodeJS.Platform;\n\tcommandExists?: (command: string) => boolean;\n\tviolationStore?: SandboxViolationStore;\n\t/**\n\t * Injectable only so violation attribution can be tested off macOS; production\n\t * spawns `sandbox-exec` directly. Without this the decision about what counts as a\n\t * violation would be verifiable only on a macOS host.\n\t */\n\tspawnChild?: typeof spawn;\n}\n\nfunction sandboxExecExists(command: string): boolean {\n\t// sandbox-exec has no --version flag; a real, minimal profile run is the\n\t// standard existence-and-basic-functionality probe (see the 2b.5 prototype's\n\t// own positive control).\n\tconst result = spawnSync(command, [\"-p\", \"(version 1)(allow default)\", \"/usr/bin/true\"], {\n\t\tstdio: \"ignore\",\n\t\ttimeout: 2_000,\n\t});\n\treturn result.status === 0;\n}\n\nfunction waitForExit(child: ReturnType<typeof spawn>): Promise<number> {\n\treturn new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n\t\tchild.once(\"error\", reject);\n\t\tchild.once(\"exit\", (code) => resolve(code ?? 1));\n\t});\n}\n\n/**\n * Unlike Linux's bwrap (which needs each mount ancestor declared for its bind-mount\n * tree), Seatbelt's `subpath` is recursive from a single root, so only the directory\n * containing each path is needed -- no ancestor walk. Each directory is resolved to\n * its real (symlink-free) path: Seatbelt canonicalizes the path it actually checks\n * against a `subpath` rule (confirmed empirically -- a rule built from an\n * unresolved symlinked path, e.g. Homebrew's own layout, silently never matches).\n */\nfunction readOnlyDirectories(paths: readonly string[]): string[] {\n\tconst directories = paths.map((path) => dirname(resolve(path)));\n\tconst canonical = directories.map((directory) => {\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\treturn realpathSync(directory);\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\treturn directory;\n\t\t}\n\t});\n\treturn [...new Set(canonical)];\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonicalize a channel socket path for a Seatbelt literal. Only the directory can be\n * resolved -- the socket file need not exist yet when the profile is written -- and the\n * same symlink rule as `readOnlyDirectories` applies: Seatbelt matches the canonical\n * path, so an unresolved one silently never matches.\n */\nfunction canonicalSocketPath(path: string): string {\n\tconst directory = dirname(resolve(path));\n\ttry {\n\t\treturn join(realpathSync(directory), basename(path));\n\t} catch {\n\t\treturn join(directory, basename(path));\n\t}\n}\n\n/** Seatbelt refuses through the blocked call's own errno text, not a wrapper message. */\nconst DENIAL_EVIDENCE = /Operation not permitted|Permission denied|EPERM|EACCES/i;\n\nfunction classifySandboxFailure(stderr: string): \"filesystem\" | \"network\" | \"unknown\" | undefined {\n\t// Confirmed empirically (2b.5 prototype): unlike Linux's bwrap, macOS Seatbelt\n\t// denials surface through the launched command's own generic \"Operation not\n\t// permitted\"/EPERM text for filesystem AND network refusals alike -- there is no\n\t// macOS-specific phrase equivalent to Linux's distinct \"Network is unreachable\".\n\t// Only sandbox-exec's own wrapper-level exec refusal (a sign our own profile\n\t// forgot to allow a binary, not a policy decision) is unambiguous from stderr\n\t// text. Anything else that still shows a refusal stays \"unknown\";\n\t// network-proxy.ts's own precise per-request recording is the reliable \"network\"\n\t// signal on this platform.\n\tif (/execvp\\(\\) of .* failed: Operation not permitted/i.test(stderr)) return \"filesystem\";\n\tif (DENIAL_EVIDENCE.test(stderr)) return \"unknown\";\n\t// No refusal in evidence. The coarseness above is about telling filesystem from\n\t// network, not about telling a denial from an ordinary failure -- a non-zero exit\n\t// on its own says nothing about the boundary, and reporting it as a violation\n\t// sends the reader looking for a refusal that never happened.\n\treturn undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * macOS's platform adapter. Seatbelt (`sandbox-exec`) allows reads broadly except\n * the invoking account's home directory, denies writes outside the workspace, and\n * denies network outside the sandbox proxy's exact loopback port -- narrower than\n * the wildcard `localhost:*` pattern some other sandboxes use. This mirrors Linux's\n * actual posture (`--ro-bind / /` plus a hidden `/home`) rather than the narrower\n * read-allowlist this design started with, which broke ordinary process startup.\n */\nexport function createMacosSandboxBackend(options?: MacosSandboxBackendOptions): SandboxBackend {\n\tconst platform = options?.platform ?? process.platform;\n\tif (platform !== \"darwin\") {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tstatus: { kind: \"unavailable\", reason: \"OS sandbox is supported on macOS only.\" },\n\t\t\tasync launch() {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"macOS sandbox backend is unavailable.\");\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tasync close() {},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\tconst hasCommand = options?.commandExists ?? sandboxExecExists;\n\tconst violationStore = options?.violationStore;\n\tlet proxy: SandboxNetworkProxy | undefined;\n\n\tif (!hasCommand(\"sandbox-exec\")) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tstatus: { kind: \"unavailable\", reason: \"sandbox-exec (Seatbelt) is required for OS sandboxing.\" },\n\t\t\tasync launch() {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"macOS sandbox backend is unavailable.\");\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tasync close() {},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\treturn {\n\t\tstatus: { kind: \"enforced\" },\n\t\tasync launch(launch: SandboxLaunch): Promise<number> {\n\t\t\t// Same reasoning as readOnlyDirectories: on macOS the workspace itself can\n\t\t\t// be reached through a symlink (e.g. os.tmpdir()'s /var -> /private/var),\n\t\t\t// and Seatbelt's subpath match is against the canonical path, not the one\n\t\t\t// the caller happened to spell. Resolve once, use everywhere below.\n\t\t\tconst workspace = realpathSync(launch.policy.workspace);\n\t\t\tconst stateDirectory = join(workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-state\");\n\t\t\tmkdirSync(stateDirectory, { recursive: true });\n\n\t\t\tconst violationCountBeforeLaunch = violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0;\n\n\t\t\tproxy = await createSandboxNetworkProxy({\n\t\t\t\ttcpHost: \"127.0.0.1\",\n\t\t\t\tallowedHosts: launch.policy.allowedHosts,\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tconst proxyPort = proxy.port as number;\n\n\t\t\t// Seatbelt cannot remap a path, so the child connects to the channel socket at\n\t\t\t// its host path, and the profile allows outbound to exactly that one socket.\n\t\t\tconst credentialChannelSocket = launch.credentialChannel\n\t\t\t\t? canonicalSocketPath(launch.credentialChannel.hostSocketPath)\n\t\t\t\t: undefined;\n\n\t\t\tconst readOnlyDirs = readOnlyDirectories([process.execPath, launch.command, ...(launch.readOnlyPaths ?? [])]);\n\t\t\tconst readOnlyFiles = (launch.readOnlyFiles ?? []).map((path) => {\n\t\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn realpathSync(path);\n\t\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn resolve(path);\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tlet userHome: string | undefined;\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tuserHome = realpathSync(homedir());\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\tuserHome = homedir();\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tconst profileLines = [\n\t\t\t\t\"(version 1)\",\n\t\t\t\t// bsd.sb's baseline is broader than Linux's opt-in bind-mount model --\n\t\t\t\t// a real gap this design accepts, documented in the spec's fourth\n\t\t\t\t// amendment -- but it is the only combination the 2b.5 prototype found\n\t\t\t\t// that lets a normal Unix child process (dyld, /bin/sh) actually start.\n\t\t\t\t'(import \"bsd.sb\")',\n\t\t\t\t\"(allow process-exec*)\",\n\t\t\t\t// Separate from process-exec* -- confirmed empirically: a shell that\n\t\t\t\t// forks a child shell (e.g. `sh -c 'a' && sh -c 'b'`) failed with\n\t\t\t\t// \"fork: Operation not permitted\" without this, even with exec allowed.\n\t\t\t\t\"(allow process-fork)\",\n\t\t\t\t// Matches Linux's actual posture (bwrap's `--ro-bind / /`): broad read,\n\t\t\t\t// narrow write. A read-only allowlist alone (this design's first cut)\n\t\t\t\t// breaks ordinary process startup -- confirmed empirically, getcwd()\n\t\t\t\t// itself needs to traverse the workspace's ancestor directories, which\n\t\t\t\t// no read rule scoped only to the workspace or runtime paths covers.\n\t\t\t\t\"(allow file-read*)\",\n\t\t\t\t'(deny file-read* (subpath (param \"USER_HOME\")))',\n\t\t\t\t...readOnlyDirs.map((_, index) => `(allow file-read* (subpath (param \"RO_${index}\")))`),\n\t\t\t\t...readOnlyFiles.map((_, index) => `(allow file-read* (subpath (param \"RO_FILE_${index}\")))`),\n\t\t\t\t'(allow file-read* (subpath (param \"WORKSPACE\")))',\n\t\t\t\t\"(deny file-write*)\",\n\t\t\t\t'(allow file-write* (subpath (param \"WORKSPACE\")))',\n\t\t\t\t\"(deny network*)\",\n\t\t\t\t'(allow network-outbound (remote ip (param \"PROXY_ADDR\")))',\n\t\t\t\t...(credentialChannelSocket\n\t\t\t\t\t? [`(allow network-outbound (remote unix-socket (literal \"${credentialChannelSocket}\")))`]\n\t\t\t\t\t: []),\n\t\t\t];\n\t\t\tconst profilePath = join(stateDirectory, \"profile.sb\");\n\t\t\twriteFileSync(profilePath, profileLines.join(\"\\n\"));\n\n\t\t\tconst params: string[] = [\"-D\", `USER_HOME=${userHome}`];\n\t\t\treadOnlyDirs.forEach((dir, index) => {\n\t\t\t\tparams.push(\"-D\", `RO_${index}=${dir}`);\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\treadOnlyFiles.forEach((file, index) => {\n\t\t\t\tparams.push(\"-D\", `RO_FILE_${index}=${file}`);\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tparams.push(\"-D\", `WORKSPACE=${workspace}`);\n\t\t\tparams.push(\"-D\", `PROXY_ADDR=localhost:${proxyPort}`);\n\n\t\t\tconst spawnSandboxExec = options?.spawnChild ?? spawn;\n\t\t\tconst child = spawnSandboxExec(\n\t\t\t\t\"sandbox-exec\",\n\t\t\t\t[\"-f\", profilePath, ...params, \"--\", launch.command, ...launch.args],\n\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\tcwd: workspace,\n\t\t\t\t\tenv: {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...launch.environment,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tHOME: launch.environment?.HOME ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tTMPDIR: launch.environment?.TMPDIR ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tHTTP_PROXY: `http://127.0.0.1:${proxyPort}`,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tHTTPS_PROXY: `http://127.0.0.1:${proxyPort}`,\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\tstdio: [\"inherit\", \"inherit\", \"pipe\"],\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t\tlet stderr = \"\";\n\t\t\tchild.stderr?.setEncoding(\"utf8\");\n\t\t\tchild.stderr?.on(\"data\", (chunk: string) => {\n\t\t\t\tstderr += chunk;\n\t\t\t\tprocess.stderr.write(chunk);\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tconst exitCode = await waitForExit(child);\n\t\t\tawait proxy?.close();\n\t\t\tconst proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation = (violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0) > violationCountBeforeLaunch;\n\t\t\tconst kind = exitCode !== 0 && !proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation ? classifySandboxFailure(stderr) : undefined;\n\t\t\tif (kind) {\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore?.add({\n\t\t\t\t\tkind,\n\t\t\t\t\tcommand: [launch.command, ...launch.args].join(\" \"),\n\t\t\t\t\tdetail: stderr.trim(),\n\t\t\t\t\ttimestamp: new Date(),\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn exitCode;\n\t\t},\n\t\tasync close() {\n\t\t\tawait proxy?.close();\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/macos-backend.js

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
 import { mkdirSync, realpathSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
 import { homedir } from "node:os";
-import { dirname, join, resolve } from "node:path";
+import { basename, dirname, join, resolve } from "node:path";
 import { createSandboxNetworkProxy } from "./network-proxy.js";
 function sandboxExecExists(command) {
     // sandbox-exec has no --version flag; a real, minimal profile run is the
@@ -39,6 +39,21 @@ function readOnlyDirectories(paths) {
     });
     return [...new Set(canonical)];
 }
+/**
+ * Canonicalize a channel socket path for a Seatbelt literal. Only the directory can be
+ * resolved -- the socket file need not exist yet when the profile is written -- and the
+ * same symlink rule as `readOnlyDirectories` applies: Seatbelt matches the canonical
+ * path, so an unresolved one silently never matches.
+ */
+function canonicalSocketPath(path) {
+    const directory = dirname(resolve(path));
+    try {
+        return join(realpathSync(directory), basename(path));
+    }
+    catch {
+        return join(directory, basename(path));
+    }
+}
 /** Seatbelt refuses through the blocked call's own errno text, not a wrapper message. */
 const DENIAL_EVIDENCE = /Operation not permitted|Permission denied|EPERM|EACCES/i;
 function classifySandboxFailure(stderr) {
@@ -109,6 +124,11 @@ export function createMacosSandboxBackend(options) {
                 violationStore,
             });
             const proxyPort = proxy.port;
+            // Seatbelt cannot remap a path, so the child connects to the channel socket at
+            // its host path, and the profile allows outbound to exactly that one socket.
+            const credentialChannelSocket = launch.credentialChannel
+                ? canonicalSocketPath(launch.credentialChannel.hostSocketPath)
+                : undefined;
             const readOnlyDirs = readOnlyDirectories([process.execPath, launch.command, ...(launch.readOnlyPaths ?? [])]);
             const readOnlyFiles = (launch.readOnlyFiles ?? []).map((path) => {
                 try {
@@ -151,6 +171,9 @@ export function createMacosSandboxBackend(options) {
                 '(allow file-write* (subpath (param "WORKSPACE")))',
                 "(deny network*)",
                 '(allow network-outbound (remote ip (param "PROXY_ADDR")))',
+                ...(credentialChannelSocket
+                    ? [`(allow network-outbound (remote unix-socket (literal "${credentialChannelSocket}")))`]
+                    : []),
             ];
             const profilePath = join(stateDirectory, "profile.sb");
             writeFileSync(profilePath, profileLines.join("\n"));