apex-code 0.0.1-alpha.1 → 0.0.1-alpha.11

package/dist/core/sandbox/cli-launch.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+import type { HostToolBinary } from "../../utils/tools-manager.ts";
+import type { SandboxLaunch } from "./supervisor.ts";
+/**
+ * OS containment is the normal startup path for every command that can construct an
+ * agent session. Commands that only inspect or maintain host configuration do not
+ * create a runtime and therefore remain outside this child boundary.
+ */
+export declare function requiresSandboxedChild(args: readonly string[]): boolean;
+export interface SandboxedCliLaunch extends SandboxLaunch {
+    readonly environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
+}
+export declare function getSandboxSessionDirectory(workspace: string): string;
+/**
+ * Read supervisor policy only from global settings; project settings are untrusted here.
+ *
+ * The built-in provider hosts are added unless explicitly refused, because a deny-all
+ * default made a fresh install unable to reach any model while giving the user no way to
+ * learn which host to permit. Configured hosts are additive on top, and
+ * `allowDefaultHosts: false` restores the strict behaviour for anyone who wants it.
+ */
+export declare function resolveSupervisorAllowedHosts(cwd: string, agentDir: string): readonly string[] | undefined;
+/**
+ * The host's two user-scope skill roots, each present only when it exists on the
+ * host. Kept as two named slots rather than one list because
+ * `core/package-manager.ts` discovers them in different modes -- root `.md` files
+ * count as skills under `agentSkills` ("pi" mode) and are ignored under
+ * `agentsHomeSkills` ("agents" mode), per `docs/skills.md` -- and a flat list of 0-2
+ * paths cannot tell the child which root a lone survivor was.
+ */
+export interface HostSkillPaths {
+    /** Host `<agentDir>/skills`. */
+    readonly agentSkills?: string;
+    /** Host `<home>/.agents/skills`. */
+    readonly agentsHomeSkills?: string;
+}
+/** A candidate skill root that exists but was excluded, and why. */
+export interface HostSkillPathRefusal {
+    readonly root: keyof HostSkillPaths;
+    readonly path: string;
+    readonly reason: string;
+}
+export interface ResolvedHostSkillPaths {
+    readonly paths: HostSkillPaths;
+    readonly refusals: readonly HostSkillPathRefusal[];
+}
+/**
+ * Resolve the host's user-scope skill directories, before the sandbox exists to hide
+ * them. Read only from the runtime environment and the host agent directory --
+ * never from project files -- matching ADR 0016's rule that supervisor policy is
+ * trust-first. Mirrors `core/package-manager.ts`'s own user-scope roots so the two
+ * sides agree on where a skill lives. A candidate that resolves (directly or via a
+ * symlink) onto the host home or an ancestor of it is refused rather than mounted --
+ * see `isHomeOrAncestorOfHome` -- and reported so the caller can surface a startup
+ * diagnostic instead of silently mounting or silently skipping it.
+ */
+export declare function resolveHostSkillPaths(agentDir: string, homeDir: string): ResolvedHostSkillPaths;
+/**
+ * Allocate agent-owned state under the sole writable workspace mount. The child does
+ * not inherit a host home or a host session/config directory, preventing the sandbox
+ * from presenting a write boundary while its own state quietly escapes it.
+ */
+export declare function buildSandboxedCliLaunch(options: {
+    workspace: string;
+    command: string;
+    args: readonly string[];
+    environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
+    allowedHosts?: readonly string[];
+    additionalWritableRoots?: readonly string[];
+    readOnlyPaths?: readonly string[];
+    authPath?: string;
+    /**
+     * A synthesized two-key git config, projected read-only so the child can author a
+     * commit as the user. Absent when the host had no global identity to resolve.
+     */
+    gitConfigPath?: string;
+    toolBinaries?: readonly HostToolBinary[];
+    /**
+     * Host user-scope skill directories, pre-filtered by the caller to those that
+     * exist and pass the host-home escape check (SKILL.4). Mounted read-only at their
+     * original host location -- Seatbelt cannot remap a path, so this must hold for
+     * both backends -- and named to the child via `APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_*` so its
+     * discovery can find them under the sandbox's own repointed `HOME`/agent dir.
+     */
+    skillPaths?: HostSkillPaths;
+    /** The supervisor-owned credential write channel, when one was opened. */
+    credentialChannel?: SandboxLaunch["credentialChannel"];
+}): SandboxedCliLaunch;
+//# sourceMappingURL=cli-launch.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/sandbox/cli-launch.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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Commands that only inspect or maintain host configuration do not\n * create a runtime and therefore remain outside this child boundary.\n */\nexport function requiresSandboxedChild(args: readonly string[]): boolean {\n\tif (NON_SESSION_COMMANDS.has(args[0] ?? \"\")) return false;\n\tif (args.some((argument) => METADATA_FLAGS.has(argument))) return false;\n\tif (args.includes(\"--help\") || args.includes(\"-h\")) return false;\n\treturn true;\n}\n\nexport interface SandboxedCliLaunch extends SandboxLaunch {\n\treadonly environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n}\n\nexport function getSandboxSessionDirectory(workspace: string): string {\n\treturn join(workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-sessions\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Read supervisor policy only from global settings; project settings are untrusted here.\n *\n * The built-in provider hosts are added unless explicitly refused, because a deny-all\n * default made a fresh install unable to reach any model while giving the user no way to\n * learn which host to permit. Configured hosts are additive on top, and\n * `allowDefaultHosts: false` restores the strict behaviour for anyone who wants it.\n */\nexport function resolveSupervisorAllowedHosts(cwd: string, agentDir: string): readonly string[] | undefined {\n\tconst settings = SettingsManager.create(cwd, agentDir, { projectTrusted: false });\n\tconst network = settings.getNetworkSettings();\n\tconst configured = network?.allowedHosts ?? [];\n\tif (network?.allowDefaultHosts === false) return configured;\n\t// The configured `web_search` backend's host, added only when a credential for it\n\t// is present. Without this the tool would be configured and still unreachable,\n\t// which reads as a broken search rather than a missing allowlist entry. Nothing is\n\t// opened for a user who never set the key.\n\tconst webSearchHost = resolveWebSearchHost(settings.getWebSearchSettings());\n\treturn [...new Set([...resolveDefaultAllowedHosts(), ...configured, ...(webSearchHost ? [webSearchHost] : [])])];\n}\n\n/**\n * The host's two user-scope skill roots, each present only when it exists on the\n * host. Kept as two named slots rather than one list because\n * `core/package-manager.ts` discovers them in different modes -- root `.md` files\n * count as skills under `agentSkills` (\"pi\" mode) and are ignored under\n * `agentsHomeSkills` (\"agents\" mode), per `docs/skills.md` -- and a flat list of 0-2\n * paths cannot tell the child which root a lone survivor was.\n */\nexport interface HostSkillPaths {\n\t/** Host `<agentDir>/skills`. */\n\treadonly agentSkills?: string;\n\t/** Host `<home>/.agents/skills`. */\n\treadonly agentsHomeSkills?: string;\n}\n\n/** A candidate skill root that exists but was excluded, and why. */\nexport interface HostSkillPathRefusal {\n\treadonly root: keyof HostSkillPaths;\n\treadonly path: string;\n\treadonly reason: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ResolvedHostSkillPaths {\n\treadonly paths: HostSkillPaths;\n\treadonly refusals: readonly HostSkillPathRefusal[];\n}\n\n/**\n * True when `candidate` is the host home directory itself, or an ancestor of it.\n * Both paths must already be resolved (`realpathSync`), so a symlink can't disguise\n * either side. Mounting such a candidate read-only would re-expose the entire home\n * tree the sandbox's `--tmpfs /home` (Linux) / `(deny file-read* USER_HOME)` (macOS)\n * deliberately hides -- SSH keys, cloud credentials, other projects -- not just a\n * skills subtree.\n */\nfunction isHomeOrAncestorOfHome(candidate: string, home: string): boolean {\n\tif (candidate === home) return true;\n\tconst prefix = candidate.endsWith(sep) ? candidate : candidate + sep;\n\treturn home.startsWith(prefix);\n}\n\n/** Resolve one candidate root: absent, refused (symlinked onto the host home), or usable. */\nfunction resolveHostSkillRoot(\n\troot: keyof HostSkillPaths,\n\tcandidate: string,\n\thomeDir: string,\n): { path?: string; refusal?: HostSkillPathRefusal } {\n\tif (!existsSync(candidate)) return {};\n\tlet realCandidate: string;\n\tlet realHome: string;\n\ttry {\n\t\trealCandidate = realpathSync(candidate);\n\t\trealHome = realpathSync(homeDir);\n\t} catch (error) {\n\t\tconst message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);\n\t\treturn { refusal: { root, path: candidate, reason: `could not resolve real path: ${message}` } };\n\t}\n\tif (isHomeOrAncestorOfHome(realCandidate, realHome)) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\trefusal: {\n\t\t\t\troot,\n\t\t\t\tpath: candidate,\n\t\t\t\treason: \"resolves to the host home directory or an ancestor of it\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\treturn { path: candidate };\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the host's user-scope skill directories, before the sandbox exists to hide\n * them. Read only from the runtime environment and the host agent directory --\n * never from project files -- matching ADR 0016's rule that supervisor policy is\n * trust-first. Mirrors `core/package-manager.ts`'s own user-scope roots so the two\n * sides agree on where a skill lives. A candidate that resolves (directly or via a\n * symlink) onto the host home or an ancestor of it is refused rather than mounted --\n * see `isHomeOrAncestorOfHome` -- and reported so the caller can surface a startup\n * diagnostic instead of silently mounting or silently skipping it.\n */\nexport function resolveHostSkillPaths(agentDir: string, homeDir: string): ResolvedHostSkillPaths {\n\tconst agentSkills = resolveHostSkillRoot(\"agentSkills\", join(agentDir, \"skills\"), homeDir);\n\tconst agentsHomeSkills = resolveHostSkillRoot(\"agentsHomeSkills\", join(homeDir, \".agents\", \"skills\"), homeDir);\n\treturn {\n\t\tpaths: {\n\t\t\t...(agentSkills.path ? { agentSkills: agentSkills.path } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(agentsHomeSkills.path ? { agentsHomeSkills: agentsHomeSkills.path } : {}),\n\t\t},\n\t\trefusals: [agentSkills.refusal, agentsHomeSkills.refusal].filter(\n\t\t\t(refusal): refusal is HostSkillPathRefusal => refusal !== undefined,\n\t\t),\n\t};\n}\n\nconst SAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS = new Set([\n\t\"PATH\",\n\t\"LANG\",\n\t\"LC_ALL\",\n\t\"LC_CTYPE\",\n\t\"TERM\",\n\t\"COLORTERM\",\n\t\"NO_COLOR\",\n\t\"FORCE_COLOR\",\n\t\"TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_OFFLINE\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_SKIP_VERSION_CHECK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_STARTUP_BENCHMARK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_TIMING\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_CLEAR_ON_SHRINK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_HARDWARE_CURSOR\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_MODEL_CATALOG_URL\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_SHARE_VIEWER_URL\",\n\t\"VISUAL\",\n\t\"EDITOR\",\n]);\n\n// Provider API keys are explicit credential inputs, unlike arbitrary ambient variables.\n// Keep this list in sync with the documented provider environment-variable reference.\nconst SAFE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEYS = new Set([\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN\",\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN\",\n\t\"ANT_LING_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_BASE_URL\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_RESOURCE_NAME\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_API_VERSION\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_DEPLOYMENT_NAME_MAP\",\n\t\"DEEPSEEK_API_KEY\",\n\t\"NVIDIA_API_KEY\",\n\t\"GEMINI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"GROQ_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CEREBRAS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"FIREWORKS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"TOGETHER_API_KEY\",\n\t\"BASETEN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENROUTER_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ZAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ZAI_CODING_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MISTRAL_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MINIMAX_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MOONSHOT_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENCODE_API_KEY\",\n\t\"KIMI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_GATEWAY_ID\",\n\t\"QWEN_TOKEN_PLAN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"QWEN_TOKEN_PLAN_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_AMS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_SGP_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AWS_PROFILE\",\n\t\"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID\",\n\t\"AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\",\n\t\"AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK\",\n\t\"AWS_REGION\",\n]);\n\n// Credentials for tools rather than model providers. Separate from the provider set\n// above so the provider list stays a mirror of the documented provider reference.\nconst SAFE_TOOL_CREDENTIAL_KEYS = new Set([\"EXA_API_KEY\"]);\n\nfunction buildChildEnvironment(environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): NodeJS.ProcessEnv {\n\treturn Object.fromEntries(\n\t\tObject.entries(environment).filter(\n\t\t\t([key]) =>\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS.has(key) ||\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEYS.has(key) ||\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_TOOL_CREDENTIAL_KEYS.has(key),\n\t\t),\n\t);\n}\n\n/**\n * Drop empty files left in the child's tools directory by a previous launch.\n *\n * A projected tool is bind-mounted over a file there, and bwrap materialises that\n * mountpoint as an empty file on the host which outlives the namespace. If the host\n * tool later disappears, nothing is projected over the stub and the child would\n * otherwise find a 0-byte file where its binary should be. A real downloaded binary\n * is never empty, so size is a safe discriminator.\n */\nfunction clearStaleToolMountpoints(toolsDirectory: string): void {\n\tfor (const entry of readdirSync(toolsDirectory, { withFileTypes: true })) {\n\t\tif (!entry.isFile()) continue;\n\t\tconst entryPath = join(toolsDirectory, entry.name);\n\t\tif (statSync(entryPath).size === 0) {\n\t\t\trmSync(entryPath, { force: true });\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Allocate agent-owned state under the sole writable workspace mount. The child does\n * not inherit a host home or a host session/config directory, preventing the sandbox\n * from presenting a write boundary while its own state quietly escapes it.\n */\nexport function buildSandboxedCliLaunch(options: {\n\tworkspace: string;\n\tcommand: string;\n\targs: readonly string[];\n\tenvironment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n\tallowedHosts?: readonly string[];\n\tadditionalWritableRoots?: readonly string[];\n\treadOnlyPaths?: readonly string[];\n\tauthPath?: string;\n\t/**\n\t * A synthesized two-key git config, projected read-only so the child can author a\n\t * commit as the user. Absent when the host had no global identity to resolve.\n\t */\n\tgitConfigPath?: string;\n\ttoolBinaries?: readonly HostToolBinary[];\n\t/**\n\t * Host user-scope skill directories, pre-filtered by the caller to those that\n\t * exist and pass the host-home escape check (SKILL.4). Mounted read-only at their\n\t * original host location -- Seatbelt cannot remap a path, so this must hold for\n\t * both backends -- and named to the child via `APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_*` so its\n\t * discovery can find them under the sandbox's own repointed `HOME`/agent dir.\n\t */\n\tskillPaths?: HostSkillPaths;\n\t/** The supervisor-owned credential write channel, when one was opened. */\n\tcredentialChannel?: SandboxLaunch[\"credentialChannel\"];\n}): SandboxedCliLaunch {\n\tconst stateDirectory = join(options.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-state\");\n\tconst agentDirectory = join(options.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-agent\");\n\tconst sessionDirectory = getSandboxSessionDirectory(options.workspace);\n\t// Mirrors getBinDir() as the child will compute it from APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR,\n\t// so a projected tool lands exactly where the child's own lookup already checks.\n\tconst toolsDirectory = join(agentDirectory, \"bin\");\n\tconst xdgDirectories = {\n\t\tXDG_CONFIG_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"config\"),\n\t\tXDG_CACHE_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"cache\"),\n\t\tXDG_DATA_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"data\"),\n\t\tXDG_STATE_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"state\"),\n\t};\n\tfor (const directory of [\n\t\tstateDirectory,\n\t\tagentDirectory,\n\t\tsessionDirectory,\n\t\ttoolsDirectory,\n\t\t...Object.values(xdgDirectories),\n\t]) {\n\t\tmkdirSync(directory, { recursive: true });\n\t}\n\tclearStaleToolMountpoints(toolsDirectory);\n\tconst childEnvironment = buildChildEnvironment(options.environment);\n\tconst { agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills } = options.skillPaths ?? {};\n\tconst skillMountPaths = [agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills].filter((path): path is string => path !== undefined);\n\tconst readOnlyPaths = [...(options.readOnlyPaths ?? []), ...skillMountPaths];\n\tconst readOnlyFiles = [options.authPath, options.gitConfigPath].filter((path): path is string => path !== undefined);\n\tconst readOnlyBinaries = (options.toolBinaries ?? []).map((binary) => ({\n\t\tsource: binary.path,\n\t\tdestination: join(toolsDirectory, binary.name),\n\t}));\n\treturn {\n\t\tcommand: options.command,\n\t\targs: [...options.args],\n\t\tpolicy: {\n\t\t\tworkspace: options.workspace,\n\t\t\tallowedHosts: options.allowedHosts ?? [],\n\t\t\tadditionalWritableRoots: options.additionalWritableRoots ?? [],\n\t\t},\n\t\treadOnlyPaths,\n\t\treadOnlyFiles,\n\t\treadOnlyBinaries,\n\t\t// Travels on the launch contract so the platform backend projects the socket;\n\t\t// the environment entry above is what tells the child where to find it.\n\t\t...(options.credentialChannel ? { credentialChannel: options.credentialChannel } : {}),\n\t\tenvironment: {\n\t\t\t...childEnvironment,\n\t\t\t...(options.authPath ? { APEX_CODE_AUTH_PATH: options.authPath } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(options.credentialChannel\n\t\t\t\t? { APEX_CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PATH: options.credentialChannel.childSocketPath }\n\t\t\t\t: {}),\n\t\t\t// After childEnvironment: these come only from the supervisor's own\n\t\t\t// resolution, never from the invoking shell, so their value always wins over\n\t\t\t// anything of the same name that childEnvironment's allowlist let through.\n\t\t\t...(options.gitConfigPath ? { GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL: options.gitConfigPath } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(agentSkills ? { APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_AGENT: agentSkills } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(agentsHomeSkills ? { APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_AGENTS_HOME: agentsHomeSkills } : {}),\n\t\t\tAPEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR: agentDirectory,\n\t\t\tAPEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_SESSION_DIR: sessionDirectory,\n\t\t\tHOME: stateDirectory,\n\t\t\tTMPDIR: stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t...xdgDirectories,\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/cli-launch.js

@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
+import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readdirSync, realpathSync, rmSync, statSync } from "node:fs";
+import { join, sep } from "node:path";
+import { SettingsManager } from "../settings-manager.js";
+import { resolveWebSearchHost } from "../web-search-provider.js";
+import { resolveDefaultAllowedHosts } from "./default-hosts.js";
+const NON_SESSION_COMMANDS = new Set(["auth", "config", "install", "remove", "uninstall", "update", "list"]);
+const METADATA_FLAGS = new Set(["--version", "-v", "--export", "--list-models"]);
+/**
+ * OS containment is the normal startup path for every command that can construct an
+ * agent session. Commands that only inspect or maintain host configuration do not
+ * create a runtime and therefore remain outside this child boundary.
+ */
+export function requiresSandboxedChild(args) {
+    if (NON_SESSION_COMMANDS.has(args[0] ?? ""))
+        return false;
+    if (args.some((argument) => METADATA_FLAGS.has(argument)))
+        return false;
+    if (args.includes("--help") || args.includes("-h"))
+        return false;
+    return true;
+}
+export function getSandboxSessionDirectory(workspace) {
+    return join(workspace, ".apex-code", "sandbox-sessions");
+}
+/**
+ * Read supervisor policy only from global settings; project settings are untrusted here.
+ *
+ * The built-in provider hosts are added unless explicitly refused, because a deny-all
+ * default made a fresh install unable to reach any model while giving the user no way to
+ * learn which host to permit. Configured hosts are additive on top, and
+ * `allowDefaultHosts: false` restores the strict behaviour for anyone who wants it.
+ */
+export function resolveSupervisorAllowedHosts(cwd, agentDir) {
+    const settings = SettingsManager.create(cwd, agentDir, { projectTrusted: false });
+    const network = settings.getNetworkSettings();
+    const configured = network?.allowedHosts ?? [];
+    if (network?.allowDefaultHosts === false)
+        return configured;
+    // The configured `web_search` backend's host, added only when a credential for it
+    // is present. Without this the tool would be configured and still unreachable,
+    // which reads as a broken search rather than a missing allowlist entry. Nothing is
+    // opened for a user who never set the key.
+    const webSearchHost = resolveWebSearchHost(settings.getWebSearchSettings());
+    return [...new Set([...resolveDefaultAllowedHosts(), ...configured, ...(webSearchHost ? [webSearchHost] : [])])];
+}
+/**
+ * True when `candidate` is the host home directory itself, or an ancestor of it.
+ * Both paths must already be resolved (`realpathSync`), so a symlink can't disguise
+ * either side. Mounting such a candidate read-only would re-expose the entire home
+ * tree the sandbox's `--tmpfs /home` (Linux) / `(deny file-read* USER_HOME)` (macOS)
+ * deliberately hides -- SSH keys, cloud credentials, other projects -- not just a
+ * skills subtree.
+ */
+function isHomeOrAncestorOfHome(candidate, home) {
+    if (candidate === home)
+        return true;
+    const prefix = candidate.endsWith(sep) ? candidate : candidate + sep;
+    return home.startsWith(prefix);
+}
+/** Resolve one candidate root: absent, refused (symlinked onto the host home), or usable. */
+function resolveHostSkillRoot(root, candidate, homeDir) {
+    if (!existsSync(candidate))
+        return {};
+    let realCandidate;
+    let realHome;
+    try {
+        realCandidate = realpathSync(candidate);
+        realHome = realpathSync(homeDir);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
+        return { refusal: { root, path: candidate, reason: `could not resolve real path: ${message}` } };
+    }
+    if (isHomeOrAncestorOfHome(realCandidate, realHome)) {
+        return {
+            refusal: {
+                root,
+                path: candidate,
+                reason: "resolves to the host home directory or an ancestor of it",
+            },
+        };
+    }
+    return { path: candidate };
+}
+/**
+ * Resolve the host's user-scope skill directories, before the sandbox exists to hide
+ * them. Read only from the runtime environment and the host agent directory --
+ * never from project files -- matching ADR 0016's rule that supervisor policy is
+ * trust-first. Mirrors `core/package-manager.ts`'s own user-scope roots so the two
+ * sides agree on where a skill lives. A candidate that resolves (directly or via a
+ * symlink) onto the host home or an ancestor of it is refused rather than mounted --
+ * see `isHomeOrAncestorOfHome` -- and reported so the caller can surface a startup
+ * diagnostic instead of silently mounting or silently skipping it.
+ */
+export function resolveHostSkillPaths(agentDir, homeDir) {
+    const agentSkills = resolveHostSkillRoot("agentSkills", join(agentDir, "skills"), homeDir);
+    const agentsHomeSkills = resolveHostSkillRoot("agentsHomeSkills", join(homeDir, ".agents", "skills"), homeDir);
+    return {
+        paths: {
+            ...(agentSkills.path ? { agentSkills: agentSkills.path } : {}),
+            ...(agentsHomeSkills.path ? { agentsHomeSkills: agentsHomeSkills.path } : {}),
+        },
+        refusals: [agentSkills.refusal, agentsHomeSkills.refusal].filter((refusal) => refusal !== undefined),
+    };
+}
+const SAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS = new Set([
+    "PATH",
+    "LANG",
+    "LC_ALL",
+    "LC_CTYPE",
+    "TERM",
+    "COLORTERM",
+    "NO_COLOR",
+    "FORCE_COLOR",
+    "TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH",
+    "APEX_CODE_OFFLINE",
+    "APEX_CODE_SKIP_VERSION_CHECK",
+    "APEX_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL",
+    "APEX_CODE_STARTUP_BENCHMARK",
+    "APEX_CODE_TIMING",
+    "APEX_CODE_CLEAR_ON_SHRINK",
+    "APEX_CODE_HARDWARE_CURSOR",
+    "APEX_CODE_MODEL_CATALOG_URL",
+    "APEX_CODE_SHARE_VIEWER_URL",
+    "VISUAL",
+    "EDITOR",
+]);
+// Provider API keys are explicit credential inputs, unlike arbitrary ambient variables.
+// Keep this list in sync with the documented provider environment-variable reference.
+const SAFE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEYS = new Set([
+    "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY",
+    "ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN",
+    "ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN",
+    "ANT_LING_API_KEY",
+    "OPENAI_API_KEY",
+    "AZURE_OPENAI_API_KEY",
+    "AZURE_OPENAI_BASE_URL",
+    "AZURE_OPENAI_RESOURCE_NAME",
+    "AZURE_OPENAI_API_VERSION",
+    "AZURE_OPENAI_DEPLOYMENT_NAME_MAP",
+    "DEEPSEEK_API_KEY",
+    "NVIDIA_API_KEY",
+    "GEMINI_API_KEY",
+    "GROQ_API_KEY",
+    "CEREBRAS_API_KEY",
+    "XAI_API_KEY",
+    "FIREWORKS_API_KEY",
+    "TOGETHER_API_KEY",
+    "BASETEN_API_KEY",
+    "OPENROUTER_API_KEY",
+    "AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY",
+    "ZAI_API_KEY",
+    "ZAI_CODING_CN_API_KEY",
+    "MISTRAL_API_KEY",
+    "MINIMAX_API_KEY",
+    "MOONSHOT_API_KEY",
+    "OPENCODE_API_KEY",
+    "KIMI_API_KEY",
+    "CLOUDFLARE_API_KEY",
+    "CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID",
+    "CLOUDFLARE_GATEWAY_ID",
+    "QWEN_TOKEN_PLAN_API_KEY",
+    "QWEN_TOKEN_PLAN_CN_API_KEY",
+    "XIAOMI_API_KEY",
+    "XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_CN_API_KEY",
+    "XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_AMS_API_KEY",
+    "XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_SGP_API_KEY",
+    "AWS_PROFILE",
+    "AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID",
+    "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY",
+    "AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK",
+    "AWS_REGION",
+]);
+// Credentials for tools rather than model providers. Separate from the provider set
+// above so the provider list stays a mirror of the documented provider reference.
+const SAFE_TOOL_CREDENTIAL_KEYS = new Set(["EXA_API_KEY"]);
+function buildChildEnvironment(environment) {
+    return Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(environment).filter(([key]) => SAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS.has(key) ||
+        SAFE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEYS.has(key) ||
+        SAFE_TOOL_CREDENTIAL_KEYS.has(key)));
+}
+/**
+ * Drop empty files left in the child's tools directory by a previous launch.
+ *
+ * A projected tool is bind-mounted over a file there, and bwrap materialises that
+ * mountpoint as an empty file on the host which outlives the namespace. If the host
+ * tool later disappears, nothing is projected over the stub and the child would
+ * otherwise find a 0-byte file where its binary should be. A real downloaded binary
+ * is never empty, so size is a safe discriminator.
+ */
+function clearStaleToolMountpoints(toolsDirectory) {
+    for (const entry of readdirSync(toolsDirectory, { withFileTypes: true })) {
+        if (!entry.isFile())
+            continue;
+        const entryPath = join(toolsDirectory, entry.name);
+        if (statSync(entryPath).size === 0) {
+            rmSync(entryPath, { force: true });
+        }
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Allocate agent-owned state under the sole writable workspace mount. The child does
+ * not inherit a host home or a host session/config directory, preventing the sandbox
+ * from presenting a write boundary while its own state quietly escapes it.
+ */
+export function buildSandboxedCliLaunch(options) {
+    const stateDirectory = join(options.workspace, ".apex-code", "sandbox-state");
+    const agentDirectory = join(options.workspace, ".apex-code", "sandbox-agent");
+    const sessionDirectory = getSandboxSessionDirectory(options.workspace);
+    // Mirrors getBinDir() as the child will compute it from APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR,
+    // so a projected tool lands exactly where the child's own lookup already checks.
+    const toolsDirectory = join(agentDirectory, "bin");
+    const xdgDirectories = {
+        XDG_CONFIG_HOME: join(stateDirectory, "config"),
+        XDG_CACHE_HOME: join(stateDirectory, "cache"),
+        XDG_DATA_HOME: join(stateDirectory, "data"),
+        XDG_STATE_HOME: join(stateDirectory, "state"),
+    };
+    for (const directory of [
+        stateDirectory,
+        agentDirectory,
+        sessionDirectory,
+        toolsDirectory,
+        ...Object.values(xdgDirectories),
+    ]) {
+        mkdirSync(directory, { recursive: true });
+    }
+    clearStaleToolMountpoints(toolsDirectory);
+    const childEnvironment = buildChildEnvironment(options.environment);
+    const { agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills } = options.skillPaths ?? {};
+    const skillMountPaths = [agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills].filter((path) => path !== undefined);
+    const readOnlyPaths = [...(options.readOnlyPaths ?? []), ...skillMountPaths];
+    const readOnlyFiles = [options.authPath, options.gitConfigPath].filter((path) => path !== undefined);
+    const readOnlyBinaries = (options.toolBinaries ?? []).map((binary) => ({
+        source: binary.path,
+        destination: join(toolsDirectory, binary.name),
+    }));
+    return {
+        command: options.command,
+        args: [...options.args],
+        policy: {
+            workspace: options.workspace,
+            allowedHosts: options.allowedHosts ?? [],
+            additionalWritableRoots: options.additionalWritableRoots ?? [],
+        },
+        readOnlyPaths,
+        readOnlyFiles,
+        readOnlyBinaries,
+        // Travels on the launch contract so the platform backend projects the socket;
+        // the environment entry above is what tells the child where to find it.
+        ...(options.credentialChannel ? { credentialChannel: options.credentialChannel } : {}),
+        environment: {
+            ...childEnvironment,
+            ...(options.authPath ? { APEX_CODE_AUTH_PATH: options.authPath } : {}),
+            ...(options.credentialChannel
+                ? { APEX_CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PATH: options.credentialChannel.childSocketPath }
+                : {}),
+            // After childEnvironment: these come only from the supervisor's own
+            // resolution, never from the invoking shell, so their value always wins over
+            // anything of the same name that childEnvironment's allowlist let through.
+            ...(options.gitConfigPath ? { GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL: options.gitConfigPath } : {}),
+            ...(agentSkills ? { APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_AGENT: agentSkills } : {}),
+            ...(agentsHomeSkills ? { APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_AGENTS_HOME: agentsHomeSkills } : {}),
+            APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR: agentDirectory,
+            APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_SESSION_DIR: sessionDirectory,
+            HOME: stateDirectory,
+            TMPDIR: stateDirectory,
+            ...xdgDirectories,
+        },
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=cli-launch.js.map

package/dist/core/sandbox/cli-launch.js.map

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Commands that only inspect or maintain host configuration do not\n * create a runtime and therefore remain outside this child boundary.\n */\nexport function requiresSandboxedChild(args: readonly string[]): boolean {\n\tif (NON_SESSION_COMMANDS.has(args[0] ?? \"\")) return false;\n\tif (args.some((argument) => METADATA_FLAGS.has(argument))) return false;\n\tif (args.includes(\"--help\") || args.includes(\"-h\")) return false;\n\treturn true;\n}\n\nexport interface SandboxedCliLaunch extends SandboxLaunch {\n\treadonly environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n}\n\nexport function getSandboxSessionDirectory(workspace: string): string {\n\treturn join(workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-sessions\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Read supervisor policy only from global settings; project settings are untrusted here.\n *\n * The built-in provider hosts are added unless explicitly refused, because a deny-all\n * default made a fresh install unable to reach any model while giving the user no way to\n * learn which host to permit. Configured hosts are additive on top, and\n * `allowDefaultHosts: false` restores the strict behaviour for anyone who wants it.\n */\nexport function resolveSupervisorAllowedHosts(cwd: string, agentDir: string): readonly string[] | undefined {\n\tconst settings = SettingsManager.create(cwd, agentDir, { projectTrusted: false });\n\tconst network = settings.getNetworkSettings();\n\tconst configured = network?.allowedHosts ?? [];\n\tif (network?.allowDefaultHosts === false) return configured;\n\t// The configured `web_search` backend's host, added only when a credential for it\n\t// is present. Without this the tool would be configured and still unreachable,\n\t// which reads as a broken search rather than a missing allowlist entry. Nothing is\n\t// opened for a user who never set the key.\n\tconst webSearchHost = resolveWebSearchHost(settings.getWebSearchSettings());\n\treturn [...new Set([...resolveDefaultAllowedHosts(), ...configured, ...(webSearchHost ? [webSearchHost] : [])])];\n}\n\n/**\n * The host's two user-scope skill roots, each present only when it exists on the\n * host. Kept as two named slots rather than one list because\n * `core/package-manager.ts` discovers them in different modes -- root `.md` files\n * count as skills under `agentSkills` (\"pi\" mode) and are ignored under\n * `agentsHomeSkills` (\"agents\" mode), per `docs/skills.md` -- and a flat list of 0-2\n * paths cannot tell the child which root a lone survivor was.\n */\nexport interface HostSkillPaths {\n\t/** Host `<agentDir>/skills`. */\n\treadonly agentSkills?: string;\n\t/** Host `<home>/.agents/skills`. */\n\treadonly agentsHomeSkills?: string;\n}\n\n/** A candidate skill root that exists but was excluded, and why. */\nexport interface HostSkillPathRefusal {\n\treadonly root: keyof HostSkillPaths;\n\treadonly path: string;\n\treadonly reason: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ResolvedHostSkillPaths {\n\treadonly paths: HostSkillPaths;\n\treadonly refusals: readonly HostSkillPathRefusal[];\n}\n\n/**\n * True when `candidate` is the host home directory itself, or an ancestor of it.\n * Both paths must already be resolved (`realpathSync`), so a symlink can't disguise\n * either side. Mounting such a candidate read-only would re-expose the entire home\n * tree the sandbox's `--tmpfs /home` (Linux) / `(deny file-read* USER_HOME)` (macOS)\n * deliberately hides -- SSH keys, cloud credentials, other projects -- not just a\n * skills subtree.\n */\nfunction isHomeOrAncestorOfHome(candidate: string, home: string): boolean {\n\tif (candidate === home) return true;\n\tconst prefix = candidate.endsWith(sep) ? candidate : candidate + sep;\n\treturn home.startsWith(prefix);\n}\n\n/** Resolve one candidate root: absent, refused (symlinked onto the host home), or usable. */\nfunction resolveHostSkillRoot(\n\troot: keyof HostSkillPaths,\n\tcandidate: string,\n\thomeDir: string,\n): { path?: string; refusal?: HostSkillPathRefusal } {\n\tif (!existsSync(candidate)) return {};\n\tlet realCandidate: string;\n\tlet realHome: string;\n\ttry {\n\t\trealCandidate = realpathSync(candidate);\n\t\trealHome = realpathSync(homeDir);\n\t} catch (error) {\n\t\tconst message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);\n\t\treturn { refusal: { root, path: candidate, reason: `could not resolve real path: ${message}` } };\n\t}\n\tif (isHomeOrAncestorOfHome(realCandidate, realHome)) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\trefusal: {\n\t\t\t\troot,\n\t\t\t\tpath: candidate,\n\t\t\t\treason: \"resolves to the host home directory or an ancestor of it\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\treturn { path: candidate };\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the host's user-scope skill directories, before the sandbox exists to hide\n * them. Read only from the runtime environment and the host agent directory --\n * never from project files -- matching ADR 0016's rule that supervisor policy is\n * trust-first. Mirrors `core/package-manager.ts`'s own user-scope roots so the two\n * sides agree on where a skill lives. A candidate that resolves (directly or via a\n * symlink) onto the host home or an ancestor of it is refused rather than mounted --\n * see `isHomeOrAncestorOfHome` -- and reported so the caller can surface a startup\n * diagnostic instead of silently mounting or silently skipping it.\n */\nexport function resolveHostSkillPaths(agentDir: string, homeDir: string): ResolvedHostSkillPaths {\n\tconst agentSkills = resolveHostSkillRoot(\"agentSkills\", join(agentDir, \"skills\"), homeDir);\n\tconst agentsHomeSkills = resolveHostSkillRoot(\"agentsHomeSkills\", join(homeDir, \".agents\", \"skills\"), homeDir);\n\treturn {\n\t\tpaths: {\n\t\t\t...(agentSkills.path ? { agentSkills: agentSkills.path } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(agentsHomeSkills.path ? { agentsHomeSkills: agentsHomeSkills.path } : {}),\n\t\t},\n\t\trefusals: [agentSkills.refusal, agentsHomeSkills.refusal].filter(\n\t\t\t(refusal): refusal is HostSkillPathRefusal => refusal !== undefined,\n\t\t),\n\t};\n}\n\nconst SAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS = new Set([\n\t\"PATH\",\n\t\"LANG\",\n\t\"LC_ALL\",\n\t\"LC_CTYPE\",\n\t\"TERM\",\n\t\"COLORTERM\",\n\t\"NO_COLOR\",\n\t\"FORCE_COLOR\",\n\t\"TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_OFFLINE\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_SKIP_VERSION_CHECK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_STARTUP_BENCHMARK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_TIMING\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_CLEAR_ON_SHRINK\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_HARDWARE_CURSOR\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_MODEL_CATALOG_URL\",\n\t\"APEX_CODE_SHARE_VIEWER_URL\",\n\t\"VISUAL\",\n\t\"EDITOR\",\n]);\n\n// Provider API keys are explicit credential inputs, unlike arbitrary ambient variables.\n// Keep this list in sync with the documented provider environment-variable reference.\nconst SAFE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEYS = new Set([\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN\",\n\t\"ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN\",\n\t\"ANT_LING_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_BASE_URL\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_RESOURCE_NAME\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_API_VERSION\",\n\t\"AZURE_OPENAI_DEPLOYMENT_NAME_MAP\",\n\t\"DEEPSEEK_API_KEY\",\n\t\"NVIDIA_API_KEY\",\n\t\"GEMINI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"GROQ_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CEREBRAS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"FIREWORKS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"TOGETHER_API_KEY\",\n\t\"BASETEN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENROUTER_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ZAI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"ZAI_CODING_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MISTRAL_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MINIMAX_API_KEY\",\n\t\"MOONSHOT_API_KEY\",\n\t\"OPENCODE_API_KEY\",\n\t\"KIMI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_API_KEY\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID\",\n\t\"CLOUDFLARE_GATEWAY_ID\",\n\t\"QWEN_TOKEN_PLAN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"QWEN_TOKEN_PLAN_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_CN_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_AMS_API_KEY\",\n\t\"XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_SGP_API_KEY\",\n\t\"AWS_PROFILE\",\n\t\"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID\",\n\t\"AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\",\n\t\"AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK\",\n\t\"AWS_REGION\",\n]);\n\n// Credentials for tools rather than model providers. Separate from the provider set\n// above so the provider list stays a mirror of the documented provider reference.\nconst SAFE_TOOL_CREDENTIAL_KEYS = new Set([\"EXA_API_KEY\"]);\n\nfunction buildChildEnvironment(environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): NodeJS.ProcessEnv {\n\treturn Object.fromEntries(\n\t\tObject.entries(environment).filter(\n\t\t\t([key]) =>\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_CHILD_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS.has(key) ||\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEYS.has(key) ||\n\t\t\t\tSAFE_TOOL_CREDENTIAL_KEYS.has(key),\n\t\t),\n\t);\n}\n\n/**\n * Drop empty files left in the child's tools directory by a previous launch.\n *\n * A projected tool is bind-mounted over a file there, and bwrap materialises that\n * mountpoint as an empty file on the host which outlives the namespace. If the host\n * tool later disappears, nothing is projected over the stub and the child would\n * otherwise find a 0-byte file where its binary should be. A real downloaded binary\n * is never empty, so size is a safe discriminator.\n */\nfunction clearStaleToolMountpoints(toolsDirectory: string): void {\n\tfor (const entry of readdirSync(toolsDirectory, { withFileTypes: true })) {\n\t\tif (!entry.isFile()) continue;\n\t\tconst entryPath = join(toolsDirectory, entry.name);\n\t\tif (statSync(entryPath).size === 0) {\n\t\t\trmSync(entryPath, { force: true });\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Allocate agent-owned state under the sole writable workspace mount. The child does\n * not inherit a host home or a host session/config directory, preventing the sandbox\n * from presenting a write boundary while its own state quietly escapes it.\n */\nexport function buildSandboxedCliLaunch(options: {\n\tworkspace: string;\n\tcommand: string;\n\targs: readonly string[];\n\tenvironment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n\tallowedHosts?: readonly string[];\n\tadditionalWritableRoots?: readonly string[];\n\treadOnlyPaths?: readonly string[];\n\tauthPath?: string;\n\t/**\n\t * A synthesized two-key git config, projected read-only so the child can author a\n\t * commit as the user. Absent when the host had no global identity to resolve.\n\t */\n\tgitConfigPath?: string;\n\ttoolBinaries?: readonly HostToolBinary[];\n\t/**\n\t * Host user-scope skill directories, pre-filtered by the caller to those that\n\t * exist and pass the host-home escape check (SKILL.4). Mounted read-only at their\n\t * original host location -- Seatbelt cannot remap a path, so this must hold for\n\t * both backends -- and named to the child via `APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_*` so its\n\t * discovery can find them under the sandbox's own repointed `HOME`/agent dir.\n\t */\n\tskillPaths?: HostSkillPaths;\n\t/** The supervisor-owned credential write channel, when one was opened. */\n\tcredentialChannel?: SandboxLaunch[\"credentialChannel\"];\n}): SandboxedCliLaunch {\n\tconst stateDirectory = join(options.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-state\");\n\tconst agentDirectory = join(options.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-agent\");\n\tconst sessionDirectory = getSandboxSessionDirectory(options.workspace);\n\t// Mirrors getBinDir() as the child will compute it from APEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR,\n\t// so a projected tool lands exactly where the child's own lookup already checks.\n\tconst toolsDirectory = join(agentDirectory, \"bin\");\n\tconst xdgDirectories = {\n\t\tXDG_CONFIG_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"config\"),\n\t\tXDG_CACHE_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"cache\"),\n\t\tXDG_DATA_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"data\"),\n\t\tXDG_STATE_HOME: join(stateDirectory, \"state\"),\n\t};\n\tfor (const directory of [\n\t\tstateDirectory,\n\t\tagentDirectory,\n\t\tsessionDirectory,\n\t\ttoolsDirectory,\n\t\t...Object.values(xdgDirectories),\n\t]) {\n\t\tmkdirSync(directory, { recursive: true });\n\t}\n\tclearStaleToolMountpoints(toolsDirectory);\n\tconst childEnvironment = buildChildEnvironment(options.environment);\n\tconst { agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills } = options.skillPaths ?? {};\n\tconst skillMountPaths = [agentSkills, agentsHomeSkills].filter((path): path is string => path !== undefined);\n\tconst readOnlyPaths = [...(options.readOnlyPaths ?? []), ...skillMountPaths];\n\tconst readOnlyFiles = [options.authPath, options.gitConfigPath].filter((path): path is string => path !== undefined);\n\tconst readOnlyBinaries = (options.toolBinaries ?? []).map((binary) => ({\n\t\tsource: binary.path,\n\t\tdestination: join(toolsDirectory, binary.name),\n\t}));\n\treturn {\n\t\tcommand: options.command,\n\t\targs: [...options.args],\n\t\tpolicy: {\n\t\t\tworkspace: options.workspace,\n\t\t\tallowedHosts: options.allowedHosts ?? [],\n\t\t\tadditionalWritableRoots: options.additionalWritableRoots ?? [],\n\t\t},\n\t\treadOnlyPaths,\n\t\treadOnlyFiles,\n\t\treadOnlyBinaries,\n\t\t// Travels on the launch contract so the platform backend projects the socket;\n\t\t// the environment entry above is what tells the child where to find it.\n\t\t...(options.credentialChannel ? { credentialChannel: options.credentialChannel } : {}),\n\t\tenvironment: {\n\t\t\t...childEnvironment,\n\t\t\t...(options.authPath ? { APEX_CODE_AUTH_PATH: options.authPath } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(options.credentialChannel\n\t\t\t\t? { APEX_CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PATH: options.credentialChannel.childSocketPath }\n\t\t\t\t: {}),\n\t\t\t// After childEnvironment: these come only from the supervisor's own\n\t\t\t// resolution, never from the invoking shell, so their value always wins over\n\t\t\t// anything of the same name that childEnvironment's allowlist let through.\n\t\t\t...(options.gitConfigPath ? { GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL: options.gitConfigPath } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(agentSkills ? { APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_AGENT: agentSkills } : {}),\n\t\t\t...(agentsHomeSkills ? { APEX_CODE_SKILL_PATH_AGENTS_HOME: agentsHomeSkills } : {}),\n\t\t\tAPEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_DIR: agentDirectory,\n\t\t\tAPEX_CODE_CODING_AGENT_SESSION_DIR: sessionDirectory,\n\t\t\tHOME: stateDirectory,\n\t\t\tTMPDIR: stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t...xdgDirectories,\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/cli-supervisor.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+import type { HostToolBinary } from "../../utils/tools-manager.ts";
+import { type HostSkillPaths } from "./cli-launch.ts";
+import { type SandboxBackend } from "./supervisor.ts";
+import { SandboxViolationStore } from "./violations.ts";
+export interface CliSandboxDependencies {
+    createBackend: (options: {
+        violationStore: SandboxViolationStore;
+    }) => SandboxBackend;
+    stderr: {
+        write(message: string): boolean;
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Start a normal CLI runtime beneath the whole-process boundary. The caller returns
+ * the result directly so the outer process never continues into `main()` afterward.
+ */
+export declare function launchSandboxedCli(options: {
+    command: string;
+    args: readonly string[];
+    environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
+    workspace: string;
+    allowedHosts?: readonly string[];
+    additionalWritableRoots?: readonly string[];
+    readOnlyPaths?: readonly string[];
+    authPath?: string;
+    toolBinaries?: readonly HostToolBinary[];
+    skillPaths?: HostSkillPaths;
+    dependencies?: Partial<CliSandboxDependencies>;
+}): Promise<number>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=cli-supervisor.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/sandbox/cli-supervisor.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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The caller returns\n * the result directly so the outer process never continues into `main()` afterward.\n */\nexport async function launchSandboxedCli(options: {\n\tcommand: string;\n\targs: readonly string[];\n\tenvironment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n\tworkspace: string;\n\tallowedHosts?: readonly string[];\n\tadditionalWritableRoots?: readonly string[];\n\treadOnlyPaths?: readonly string[];\n\tauthPath?: string;\n\ttoolBinaries?: readonly HostToolBinary[];\n\tskillPaths?: HostSkillPaths;\n\tdependencies?: Partial<CliSandboxDependencies>;\n}): Promise<number> {\n\tconst dependencies = { ...defaultDependencies, ...options.dependencies };\n\tconst policyResult = createSandboxPolicy({\n\t\tworkspace: options.workspace,\n\t\tallowedHosts: options.allowedHosts,\n\t\tadditionalWritableRoots: options.additionalWritableRoots,\n\t});\n\tif (policyResult.kind === \"invalid\") {\n\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(`Error: OS sandbox is not enforcing this agent session: ${policyResult.reason}\\n`);\n\t\treturn 1;\n\t}\n\tconst violationStore = new SandboxViolationStore();\n\tconst backend = dependencies.createBackend({ violationStore });\n\n\tconst supervisor = createSandboxSupervisor({ backend, policy: policyResult.policy });\n\tlet credentialProxy: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof createCredentialProxy>> | undefined;\n\tlet lease: ReturnType<typeof acquireSessionLease> | undefined;\n\tlet projectedGitConfig: ReturnType<typeof createProjectedGitConfig> | undefined;\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst parsed = parseArgs(options.args);\n\t\tconst wantsPersistentSession = !parsed.noSession && !parsed.help && parsed.listModels === undefined;\n\t\tconst sessionDirectory = getSandboxSessionDirectory(policyResult.policy.workspace);\n\t\tif (wantsPersistentSession && !parsed.allowConcurrent) {\n\t\t\tconst liveSessions = readLiveSessionLeases(sessionDirectory, policyResult.policy.workspace);\n\t\t\tif (liveSessions.length > 0) {\n\t\t\t\treportConcurrentSessionRefusal(liveSessions, policyResult.policy.workspace);\n\t\t\t\treturn 1;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tlease = wantsPersistentSession\n\t\t\t? acquireSessionLease(sessionDirectory, policyResult.policy.workspace, `supervisor-${process.pid}`)\n\t\t\t: undefined;\n\n\t\t// Open the host-owned credential channel only after startup checks that can\n\t\t// return early. AuthStorage creates a missing canonical file as 0600, so a\n\t\t// first-run credential writes get the same channel and read-only projection as later runs.\n\t\tlet credentialChannel: SandboxLaunch[\"credentialChannel\"];\n\t\tif (options.authPath && backend.status.kind === \"enforced\") {\n\t\t\tconst paths = resolveCredentialChannelPaths();\n\t\t\tcredentialProxy = await createCredentialProxy({\n\t\t\t\tauthPath: options.authPath,\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t\tsocketPath: paths.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\tcleanupDirectory: paths.hostSocketDirectory,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tcredentialChannel = paths;\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Resolved here rather than in the caller because this function owns the teardown\n\t\t// that removes the directory again. The supervisor is unsandboxed, so the host home\n\t\t// is still visible at this point; inside the child it is not.\n\t\tconst identity = resolveHostGitIdentity({ environment: options.environment });\n\t\t// The helper command is derived from the state directory rather than handed back by\n\t\t// the backend, because the config has to name it before any backend exists. Both\n\t\t// sides derive the same path, so the config never names a file nothing created.\n\t\tprojectedGitConfig = identity\n\t\t\t? createProjectedGitConfig(identity, {\n\t\t\t\t\tcredentialHelper: gitCredentialHelperCommand(\n\t\t\t\t\t\tjoin(policyResult.policy.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-state\"),\n\t\t\t\t\t),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t: undefined;\n\n\t\tconst launch = buildSandboxedCliLaunch({\n\t\t\tworkspace: policyResult.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\tcommand: options.command,\n\t\t\targs: options.args,\n\t\t\tenvironment: options.environment,\n\t\t\tallowedHosts: options.allowedHosts,\n\t\t\treadOnlyPaths: options.readOnlyPaths,\n\t\t\tauthPath: options.authPath,\n\t\t\tgitConfigPath: projectedGitConfig?.path,\n\t\t\ttoolBinaries: options.toolBinaries,\n\t\t\tskillPaths: options.skillPaths,\n\t\t\tcredentialChannel,\n\t\t});\n\t\treturn await supervisor.launch(launch);\n\t} catch (error: unknown) {\n\t\tconst message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : \"Failed to start OS sandbox.\";\n\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(`Error: ${message}\\n`);\n\t\treturn 1;\n\t} finally {\n\t\tlease?.release();\n\t\tif (projectedGitConfig) rmSync(projectedGitConfig.directory, { force: true, recursive: true });\n\t\tconst cleanupResults = await Promise.allSettled([supervisor.close(), credentialProxy?.close()]);\n\t\tfor (const violation of violationStore.list()) {\n\t\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(\n\t\t\t\t`Sandbox violation (${violation.kind}): ${violation.command} — ${violation.detail}\\n`,\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor (const result of cleanupResults) {\n\t\t\tif (result.status === \"rejected\") {\n\t\t\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(\"Warning: sandbox cleanup did not complete cleanly.\\n\");\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/cli-supervisor.js

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+import { rmSync } from "node:fs";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import { parseArgs } from "../../cli/args.js";
+import { reportConcurrentSessionRefusal } from "../../cli/concurrent-session.js";
+import { acquireSessionLease, readLiveSessionLeases } from "../session-lease.js";
+import { buildSandboxedCliLaunch, getSandboxSessionDirectory } from "./cli-launch.js";
+import { createProjectedGitConfig, resolveHostGitIdentity } from "./git-identity.js";
+import { createLinuxSandboxBackend } from "./linux-backend.js";
+import { createMacosSandboxBackend } from "./macos-backend.js";
+import { createSandboxPolicy } from "./policy.js";
+import { createCredentialProxy, resolveCredentialChannelPaths } from "./rpc/credential-proxy.js";
+import { gitCredentialHelperCommand } from "./rpc/git-credential-helper.js";
+import { createSandboxSupervisor } from "./supervisor.js";
+import { SandboxViolationStore } from "./violations.js";
+/** Routes to the platform adapter for the running OS; each adapter self-reports
+ * `unavailable` on any other platform, so this only needs to pick the one whose
+ * enforcement is actually reachable here. */
+function createDefaultSandboxBackend(options) {
+    if (process.platform === "darwin")
+        return createMacosSandboxBackend(options);
+    return createLinuxSandboxBackend(options);
+}
+const defaultDependencies = {
+    createBackend: createDefaultSandboxBackend,
+    stderr: process.stderr,
+};
+/**
+ * Start a normal CLI runtime beneath the whole-process boundary. The caller returns
+ * the result directly so the outer process never continues into `main()` afterward.
+ */
+export async function launchSandboxedCli(options) {
+    const dependencies = { ...defaultDependencies, ...options.dependencies };
+    const policyResult = createSandboxPolicy({
+        workspace: options.workspace,
+        allowedHosts: options.allowedHosts,
+        additionalWritableRoots: options.additionalWritableRoots,
+    });
+    if (policyResult.kind === "invalid") {
+        dependencies.stderr.write(`Error: OS sandbox is not enforcing this agent session: ${policyResult.reason}\n`);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    const violationStore = new SandboxViolationStore();
+    const backend = dependencies.createBackend({ violationStore });
+    const supervisor = createSandboxSupervisor({ backend, policy: policyResult.policy });
+    let credentialProxy;
+    let lease;
+    let projectedGitConfig;
+    try {
+        const parsed = parseArgs(options.args);
+        const wantsPersistentSession = !parsed.noSession && !parsed.help && parsed.listModels === undefined;
+        const sessionDirectory = getSandboxSessionDirectory(policyResult.policy.workspace);
+        if (wantsPersistentSession && !parsed.allowConcurrent) {
+            const liveSessions = readLiveSessionLeases(sessionDirectory, policyResult.policy.workspace);
+            if (liveSessions.length > 0) {
+                reportConcurrentSessionRefusal(liveSessions, policyResult.policy.workspace);
+                return 1;
+            }
+        }
+        lease = wantsPersistentSession
+            ? acquireSessionLease(sessionDirectory, policyResult.policy.workspace, `supervisor-${process.pid}`)
+            : undefined;
+        // Open the host-owned credential channel only after startup checks that can
+        // return early. AuthStorage creates a missing canonical file as 0600, so a
+        // first-run credential writes get the same channel and read-only projection as later runs.
+        let credentialChannel;
+        if (options.authPath && backend.status.kind === "enforced") {
+            const paths = resolveCredentialChannelPaths();
+            credentialProxy = await createCredentialProxy({
+                authPath: options.authPath,
+                violationStore,
+                socketPath: paths.hostSocketPath,
+                cleanupDirectory: paths.hostSocketDirectory,
+            });
+            credentialChannel = paths;
+        }
+        // Resolved here rather than in the caller because this function owns the teardown
+        // that removes the directory again. The supervisor is unsandboxed, so the host home
+        // is still visible at this point; inside the child it is not.
+        const identity = resolveHostGitIdentity({ environment: options.environment });
+        // The helper command is derived from the state directory rather than handed back by
+        // the backend, because the config has to name it before any backend exists. Both
+        // sides derive the same path, so the config never names a file nothing created.
+        projectedGitConfig = identity
+            ? createProjectedGitConfig(identity, {
+                credentialHelper: gitCredentialHelperCommand(join(policyResult.policy.workspace, ".apex-code", "sandbox-state")),
+            })
+            : undefined;
+        const launch = buildSandboxedCliLaunch({
+            workspace: policyResult.policy.workspace,
+            command: options.command,
+            args: options.args,
+            environment: options.environment,
+            allowedHosts: options.allowedHosts,
+            readOnlyPaths: options.readOnlyPaths,
+            authPath: options.authPath,
+            gitConfigPath: projectedGitConfig?.path,
+            toolBinaries: options.toolBinaries,
+            skillPaths: options.skillPaths,
+            credentialChannel,
+        });
+        return await supervisor.launch(launch);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : "Failed to start OS sandbox.";
+        dependencies.stderr.write(`Error: ${message}\n`);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    finally {
+        lease?.release();
+        if (projectedGitConfig)
+            rmSync(projectedGitConfig.directory, { force: true, recursive: true });
+        const cleanupResults = await Promise.allSettled([supervisor.close(), credentialProxy?.close()]);
+        for (const violation of violationStore.list()) {
+            dependencies.stderr.write(`Sandbox violation (${violation.kind}): ${violation.command} — ${violation.detail}\n`);
+        }
+        for (const result of cleanupResults) {
+            if (result.status === "rejected") {
+                dependencies.stderr.write("Warning: sandbox cleanup did not complete cleanly.\n");
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=cli-supervisor.js.map