anhedral 0.11.0 → 0.11.1

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (148) hide show
  1. package/README.md +73 -157
  2. package/assets/patches/LICENSE.braces +21 -0
  3. package/assets/patches/LICENSE.node-forge +50 -0
  4. package/assets/patches/audit-deps.mjs +167 -0
  5. package/assets/patches/braces@3.0.3.patch +127 -0
  6. package/assets/patches/node-forge@1.4.0.patch +41 -0
  7. package/dist/auth-schema.js +3 -3
  8. package/dist/bin.js +15 -11
  9. package/dist/capabilities.d.ts +4 -4
  10. package/dist/capabilities.js +6 -2
  11. package/dist/capability-contract.js +22 -5
  12. package/dist/catalog-model.d.ts +24 -0
  13. package/dist/catalog-model.js +1 -0
  14. package/dist/catalog-registration.d.ts +16 -0
  15. package/dist/catalog-registration.js +22 -0
  16. package/dist/catalog-snapshot.d.ts +5 -0
  17. package/dist/catalog-snapshot.js +97 -0
  18. package/dist/cli-arguments.js +1 -1
  19. package/dist/cli-output.js +27 -2
  20. package/dist/cloudflare.d.ts +7 -1
  21. package/dist/cloudflare.js +36 -6
  22. package/dist/command-schema.js +49 -5
  23. package/dist/delivery.d.ts +10 -3
  24. package/dist/delivery.js +154 -37
  25. package/dist/dependencies.d.ts +24 -0
  26. package/dist/dependencies.js +48 -0
  27. package/dist/dependency-patches.d.ts +7 -0
  28. package/dist/dependency-patches.js +125 -0
  29. package/dist/index.d.ts +3 -0
  30. package/dist/index.js +2 -0
  31. package/dist/inspector-model.d.ts +9 -1
  32. package/dist/integration-service-readers.d.ts +13 -0
  33. package/dist/integration-service-readers.js +173 -0
  34. package/dist/lifecycle.d.ts +0 -1
  35. package/dist/lifecycle.js +0 -1
  36. package/dist/neon-service-data.d.ts +8 -0
  37. package/dist/neon-service-data.js +117 -0
  38. package/dist/pnpm-policy.d.ts +2 -2
  39. package/dist/pnpm-policy.js +19 -45
  40. package/dist/project-catalog.d.ts +41 -0
  41. package/dist/project-catalog.js +288 -0
  42. package/dist/project-config.d.ts +14 -0
  43. package/dist/project-config.js +89 -0
  44. package/dist/project-inspector.js +73 -17
  45. package/dist/project-lifecycle.d.ts +25 -0
  46. package/dist/project-lifecycle.js +57 -0
  47. package/dist/project-state.d.ts +5 -1
  48. package/dist/project-state.js +122 -16
  49. package/dist/provider-auth.js +2 -3
  50. package/dist/provider-readiness.js +27 -10
  51. package/dist/providers/adapters.js +4 -1
  52. package/dist/providers/api.d.ts +1 -0
  53. package/dist/providers/api.js +1 -0
  54. package/dist/providers/config.js +6 -8
  55. package/dist/providers/provision.js +1 -1
  56. package/dist/providers/recovery.d.ts +1 -1
  57. package/dist/providers/runtime.d.ts +1 -1
  58. package/dist/providers/runtime.js +46 -23
  59. package/dist/providers/state.d.ts +1 -2
  60. package/dist/providers/state.js +14 -54
  61. package/dist/provision.d.ts +9 -0
  62. package/dist/provision.js +30 -1
  63. package/dist/r2-service-data.d.ts +2 -0
  64. package/dist/r2-service-data.js +136 -0
  65. package/dist/readiness.js +9 -13
  66. package/dist/registry/add.js +64 -21
  67. package/dist/registry/commands.js +7 -9
  68. package/dist/registry/options.d.ts +1 -1
  69. package/dist/registry/options.js +4 -4
  70. package/dist/registry/receipt.d.ts +1 -0
  71. package/dist/registry/receipt.js +19 -4
  72. package/dist/registry/resolve.js +5 -1
  73. package/dist/registry/usage.js +1 -5
  74. package/dist/render.d.ts +2 -0
  75. package/dist/render.js +6 -0
  76. package/dist/runtime-policy.d.ts +4 -0
  77. package/dist/runtime-policy.js +21 -0
  78. package/dist/scaffold/bootstrap.js +2 -2
  79. package/dist/scaffold/compose.js +9 -3
  80. package/dist/scaffold/database.js +107 -25
  81. package/dist/scaffold/documentation.js +18 -13
  82. package/dist/scaffold/lint.d.ts +4 -0
  83. package/dist/scaffold/lint.js +56 -0
  84. package/dist/scaffold/neon-realtime.d.ts +2 -0
  85. package/dist/scaffold/neon-realtime.js +97 -0
  86. package/dist/scaffold/stack-documentation.js +1 -1
  87. package/dist/scaffold/void.d.ts +4 -0
  88. package/dist/scaffold/void.js +256 -0
  89. package/dist/scaffold/web.js +7 -1
  90. package/dist/scaffold/workspace.js +120 -29
  91. package/dist/service-deletion.d.ts +29 -0
  92. package/dist/service-deletion.js +195 -0
  93. package/dist/service-descriptor.d.ts +10 -0
  94. package/dist/service-descriptor.js +78 -0
  95. package/dist/service-model.d.ts +49 -0
  96. package/dist/service-model.js +8 -0
  97. package/dist/service-operations.d.ts +29 -0
  98. package/dist/service-operations.js +78 -0
  99. package/dist/service-readers.d.ts +8 -0
  100. package/dist/service-readers.js +247 -0
  101. package/dist/services-command.d.ts +39 -0
  102. package/dist/services-command.js +100 -0
  103. package/dist/ship.d.ts +36 -8
  104. package/dist/ship.js +39 -13
  105. package/dist/stack-registry.d.ts +4 -2
  106. package/dist/stack-registry.js +41 -11
  107. package/dist/standard.js +23 -4
  108. package/dist/transaction.d.ts +2 -0
  109. package/dist/transaction.js +10 -0
  110. package/dist/util.js +17 -2
  111. package/dist/vercel.d.ts +2 -0
  112. package/dist/vercel.js +69 -13
  113. package/dist/version.d.ts +1 -1
  114. package/dist/version.js +1 -1
  115. package/dist/vinext.d.ts +1 -0
  116. package/dist/vinext.js +13 -1
  117. package/dist/void-execution.d.ts +10 -0
  118. package/dist/void-execution.js +94 -0
  119. package/dist/void-migrations.d.ts +6 -0
  120. package/dist/void-migrations.js +110 -0
  121. package/dist/void-state.d.ts +16 -0
  122. package/dist/void-state.js +65 -0
  123. package/dist/void.d.ts +3 -0
  124. package/dist/void.js +5 -0
  125. package/docs/cli-design.md +2 -2
  126. package/docs/delivery-workflow.md +8 -7
  127. package/docs/plugin-ui.md +51 -10
  128. package/docs/provider-configuration.md +10 -11
  129. package/docs/stack-standard.md +175 -0
  130. package/docs/void-verification.md +185 -0
  131. package/package.json +22 -20
  132. package/assets/anhedral-mark.svg +0 -4
  133. package/assets/anhedral-stack-technical.svg +0 -322
  134. package/assets/anhedral-stack.svg +0 -322
  135. package/assets/anhedral.svg +0 -4
  136. package/assets/favicon.ico +0 -0
  137. package/assets/security/LICENSES.txt +0 -63
  138. package/assets/security/audit-deps.mjs +0 -300
  139. package/assets/security/braces-regression.mjs +0 -102
  140. package/assets/security/braces@3.0.3.patch +0 -285
  141. package/assets/security/decode-uri-component@0.2.2.patch +0 -149
  142. package/assets/security/decoder-regression.mjs +0 -37
  143. package/assets/security/forge-regression.mjs +0 -46
  144. package/assets/security/manifest.json +0 -53
  145. package/assets/security/node-forge@1.4.0.patch +0 -26
  146. package/dist/security-backports.d.ts +0 -3
  147. package/dist/security-backports.js +0 -26
  148. package/docs/application-stack-standard.md +0 -75
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
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+ # Supported application stack
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+
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+ Anhedral scaffolds ordinary TypeScript applications in a pnpm/Turborepo monorepo. Its bundled registry defines the supported recipes, dependencies, generated files, environment requirements and composition constraints. Application source, repositories, provider accounts and billing remain under the application owner's control.
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+
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+ ## Bundled options
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+
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+ | Layer | Supported options | Generated foundation |
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+ | --- | --- | --- |
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+ | Workspace | pnpm/Turborepo, TypeScript, ESLint, shared UI | Official pinned shadcn monorepo bootstrap, workspace configuration and checks |
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+ | Web | Vinext; Next.js | React, Tailwind, shadcn/ui and Lucide; Vinext on Workers by default, native Next.js on Vercel or explicit OpenNext on Workers |
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+ | API | Hono | OpenAPI Worker application with selected service bindings |
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+ | Cloudflare delivery | Void; explicit Wrangler profiles | Void provisions and publishes; Anhedral composes, controls audience policy and independently verifies |
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+ | Mobile | Expo | React Native Reusables and NativeWind; native builds require platform toolchains |
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+ | Desktop | Electron | React application; packaging, signing and distribution require platform-specific setup |
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+ | Browser extension | WXT | React popup and Chrome side panel; installation and store distribution are separate steps |
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+ | Data | D1, Neon, local data | Drizzle schemas for D1/Neon; direct Neon serverless HTTP; device-local data foundations |
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+ | Live Postgres queries | Neon Realtime (`--neon-realtime`) | Optional server/client factories and Drizzle adapter; branch setup and authorized query flows remain application work |
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+ | Identity | Better Auth, Clerk | Server/client configuration and selected schema or provider middleware |
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+ | Worker services | R2, KV, realtime, Queues, cron, Workflows | Private storage bindings, cache/config bindings, Durable Object WebSocket rooms and job/schedule foundations |
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+ | AI | Workers AI, OpenAI, AI SDK | Server-side inference bindings or SDK factories |
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+ | Email | Resend | Server-side transactional email client |
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+ | Payments | Stripe, RevenueCat | Payment/entitlement integration foundations |
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+ | Monitoring and analytics | Sentry, PostHog, Basin | Runtime SDK factories or analytical ingestion configuration |
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+ | Shared styling | Styling | Tokens and presets for compatible native and extension clients |
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+
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+ Every generated project uses pnpm workspaces (`apps/*` and `packages/*`), one root `pnpm-lock.yaml`, and a registry-pinned Turborepo version. Root commands run the shared task graph; adding a second interface does not introduce a separate installer or lockfile. Application/service entry points live in `apps`, reusable implementation in `packages`. Extract shared code around actual consumers rather than moving every helper into a package.
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+
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+ Database-backed selections create the server-only `@workspace/db` package:
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+
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+ | Path | Responsibility |
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+ | --- | --- |
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+ | `packages/db/src/index.ts` | Database factory; the server supplies a connection string or D1 binding |
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+ | `packages/db/src/schema.ts` | Shared Drizzle schema, including selected auth tables |
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+ | `packages/db/src/migrate.ts` | Explicit migration entry point, separate from runtime exports |
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+ | `packages/db/drizzle/` | Generated SQL, snapshots and migration journal |
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+ | `packages/db/drizzle.config.ts` | Paths resolved relative to the configuration file, not the caller's working directory |
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+
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+ Only server consumers depend on `@workspace/db`; browser, mobile and extension interfaces use API contracts and endpoints. Reusable auth and other selected integrations remain independent packages. Each server is responsible for authentication, resource authorization and its environment. The database factory never loads environment files or migrates during application startup.
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+
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+ Run `pnpm db:generate` to generate SQL and review it before `pnpm db:migrate`. Both tasks disable Turbo caching and are excluded from build/check dependencies. D1 defaults to local migration; `pnpm db:migrate -- --remote` explicitly targets the configured database in the selected server Worker's `anhedral.cloudflare.json` (or `wrangler.jsonc` for Wrangler profiles). The Worker migration directory points to `packages/db/drizzle`. A single database migration owner coordinates all consumers.
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+ Neon runtime queries keep the HTTP adapter and server-supplied `DATABASE_URL`. Migrations use a transactional WebSocket connection and a direct `DATABASE_URL_UNPOOLED`, supplied through the environment or `packages/db/.env.local`/`.env`. Generation does not require credentials; migration does. Test against the intended development branch before applying production changes. Provisioning runtime credentials does not automatically supply migration credentials.
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+ These are scaffolding recipes, not completed application features. Database migrations, authorization, provider resources, webhooks, email domains, product behavior and monitoring initialization require application-specific implementation and verification. Environment examples contain names and placeholders, never provider credentials.
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+
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+ Inspect exact current requirements before generation:
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+
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+ ```sh
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+ anhedral registry list --json
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+ anhedral registry view better-auth --json
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+ anhedral init my-app --hono --d1 --better-auth --r2 --dry-run --json
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+ ```
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+
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+ The default selects only Vinext on Cloudflare Workers, delivered through Void, plus the shared workspace and UI foundation. Add capabilities because the application needs them. The resolver adds required dependencies and rejects incompatible choices, including conflicting web frameworks, databases and identity providers. `--all` is unsupported. Native Next.js selects Vercel unless Cloudflare hosting is explicit. Some services require a Worker application; inspect the plan rather than assuming every selection can run on every client.
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+
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+ ## Neon Realtime
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+
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+ Select `--neon-realtime` when the product needs live Postgres query results. It adds Neon when no database was selected and requires a server runtime; an explicit conflicting database is rejected. `--realtime` continues to mean Cloudflare Durable Object WebSocket rooms, which can be selected independently.
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+ The recipe creates `packages/neon-realtime` with separate `@workspace/neon-realtime/server` and `/client` exports. The server factory receives private `NEON_REALTIME_SECRET` and `DATABASE_URL` and uses the Drizzle adapter; the client factory receives the public `NEON_REALTIME_URL`. Keep database credentials and sealing code out of browser/native bundles. Follow the generated package README for usage and framework-specific public environment mapping.
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+ Manually enable Realtime on the intended Neon branch, allow the exact client origins and configure its secret and URL. The CLI does not automate Realtime provisioning. Authenticate each sealing request, derive user/tenant scope from verified identity and construct bounded, read-only queries on the server. No arbitrary SQL endpoint or complete subscription flow is generated. Clients subscribe with short-lived sealed queries; implement authorized renewal and test denied users and membership changes.
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+ [Neon Realtime](https://neon.com/docs/realtime/overview) is beta and currently has no RLS support. Application authorization must be expressed in the scoped queries you seal. See [query authorization](https://neon.com/docs/realtime/guides/queries#authorization) and [branch setup](https://neon.com/docs/realtime/quickstart). Local recipe checks do not establish live subscription, renewal or cross-tenant acceptance.
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+ ## Source layout and composition
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+
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+ Use `apps/*` for applications and services, and `packages/*` for shared code. Generated `docs/stack.md` lists the resolved options, destinations, environment names and setup requirements. The `setup` section of `anhedral.json` records setup requirements; its `registry` section records recipe versions, generated-file fingerprints and workspace references.
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+ The root `anhedral.json` is the single committed Anhedral configuration document. Its envelope has `schemaVersion: 1`; each named section retains its own domain schema version and validation. The CLI updates only the section it owns and preserves the other sections.
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+ | Section | Purpose |
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+ | --- | --- |
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+ | `identity` | Stable local application ID used by the project catalog |
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+ | `setup` | Selected products, hosting, environment requirements and owner setup |
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+ | `standard` | Scaffold conventions and version provenance |
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+ | `registry` | Recipe versions, generated-file fingerprints and workspace references |
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+ | `providers` | Nonsecret integration settings and selected provider resources |
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+ | `cloudflare` | Cloudflare delivery engine, account, audience and targets |
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+ | `vercel` | Vercel repository, project, team and audience |
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+
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+ Only selected hosting sections are present. Keep credentials and delivery history in ignored runtime files and `.anhedral/`; they do not belong in `anhedral.json`. Per-app `anhedral.cloudflare.json`, `void.config.ts`, `void.lock.json` and native tool configuration remain with their owning applications.
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+ The catalog in `src/stack-registry.ts` owns recipe identity and composition rules. Dependencies and the official shadcn bootstrap are pinned in `src/dependencies.ts`. Recipes under `src/scaffold/` compose the resolved selection inside a staging transaction. Workspace names must be unique, references must resolve, and dependency cycles fail before commit.
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+ Incremental `add` uses only the bundled catalog maintained with the CLI. External registries and custom registry payloads are unsupported. Additions preserve edited and untracked source, refresh generated stack documentation and record provenance. Additions require current registry receipts and preserve the selected runtime layout.
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+
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+ ```sh
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+ anhedral --cwd my-app add resend stripe --dry-run --json
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+ anhedral --cwd my-app add resend stripe
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+ anhedral doctor my-app --json
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+ ```
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+ This catalog uses an Anhedral recipe schema; it is not a shadcn registry payload. The plugin's catalog and documentation are generated from the same maintained sources.
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+ ## Provider access and delivery
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+ ### Default Cloudflare delivery: Void
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+ Void is the default Cloudflare delivery engine for new supported projects. Adopting its deployment tooling is separate from adopting its application framework. Preserve Vinext routing/rendering, Hono where a shared API is needed, pnpm/Turborepo, reusable packages, Better Auth and the selected database adapter. Deploy directly to the customer's Cloudflare account.
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+ | Anhedral owns | Void owns |
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+ | --- | --- |
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+ | Stack selection, registry composition and multi-interface architecture | Supported Cloudflare builds and deployment mechanics |
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+ | Customer account selection, authored resource declarations and shared-package contracts | Resource provisioning and resolved resource identities |
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+ | Schema generation, SQL review and designation of one migration owner | Applying the designated reviewed deployment migrations |
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+ | Audience requirements, hosting-policy orchestration and application authorization | Supported readiness and operational deployment primitives |
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+ | Source provenance, independent provider checks and end-to-end product acceptance | Worker publication, deployment diagnostics and supported code rollback |
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+ **Versions and configuration.** Pin `void@0.27.0` in each deployable app and require Node.js `>=24.21.0`. The adapter checks both the dependency pin and installed executable before execution. Record the delivery engine in the `cloudflare` section of `anhedral.json`. Each app keeps canonical declarations in `anhedral.cloudflare.json`, with `void.config.ts`, `env.ts` and `env.example`. Void generates its Cloudflare configuration and records resource identities in `void.lock.json`; generated defaults must not redefine authored capabilities or migration ownership.
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+ **One engine per Cloudflare workspace.** Explicit Next.js/OpenNext on Cloudflare, Queues with dead-letter recovery and Basin selections use Wrangler. Other supported Cloudflare selections use Void. Additive composition refuses choices that require switching the workspace engine. Native Next.js on Vercel uses its independent delivery path. Each Cloudflare target uses its own committed configuration; named Wrangler environments are unsupported by Void delivery.
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+ **Explicit resources and one writer.** Registry composition determines each server's capabilities. Shared packages receive bindings or connections through factories. Resource inference assists development; it does not establish transitive package discovery or capability isolation. Compare resolved/generated bindings against the selected capabilities, including auth- and migration-driven requirements. Anhedral `provision` reports the Void resource plan and defers creation to Void deployment. Deploy targets serially and serialize initial provisioning; never run a parallel Anhedral resource creator. Preserve existing D1/private R2 identities and independently inspect provider state after resolution.
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+ **One migration owner.** Keep authoritative schemas, SQL, snapshots and journals in `packages/db`. Determine ownership from canonical authored configuration, not a resolved lock: Void may add conventional migration directories to database consumers. Exactly one server applies shared D1 migrations; other servers consume the binding without acquiring ownership. The deployment adapter prepares an ignored, ownership-checked, byte-identical app-local validation copy for Void 0.27.0; it refuses edited or unowned copies. The configured apply directory remains `packages/db/drizzle`, and the copy never becomes another source of migrations. Keep custom Drizzle generation and SQL review because Void does not automatically detect drift in `packages/db/src/schema.ts`. Preserve Neon's HTTP runtime adapter and separate transactional migration connection; adopting Void does not select Hyperdrive or `void/db`.
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+ **Credentials and environments.** Provider authentication is separate from account selection, write permissions, Zero Trust setup and visitor identity. The adapter uses an explicitly supplied `CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN`, or retrieves structured Wrangler credentials and passes them only through the Void child process's environment. Credential values never become command arguments, source or deployment evidence. Wrangler login alone does not establish Access permissions. Establish private hosting protection before product publication.
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+ Void reads one `.env` at each deployable app's project root and declares variables in `env.ts`. Use `env.example`; do not introduce unsupported `.env.*` companions or `.dev.vars` into that app. Production server secrets use noninteractive stdin; bulk sync is avoided because the pinned command prompts even in CI. Reject empty values, NUL bytes and terminal newlines rather than silently changing secret bytes. Exclude public `VITE_*`, `NEXT_PUBLIC_*` and `EXPO_PUBLIC_*` values from server-secret uploads. Vite clients expose `VITE_*` values at build time. The pinned Vinext plugin loads the app `.env` for local builds and maps `NEXT_PUBLIC_*` values into client bundles. Supply the selected public values in the production build environment; runtime server-secret uploads do not configure client bundles. Keep Neon migration credentials separate from runtime secrets.
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+ **Activation, locks and verification.** Distinguish provisioned, uploaded, activated, ready and product-verified states. A failed command can leave resources or an active Worker. Initial activation may change only the allowed target `void.lock.json` files. Retain independently confirmed receipts and return `configuration-required`, with `activated: true` and `deployed: false`; review and commit the identities, then ship a clean committed release before product verification. Only recorded lock changes may carry across later targets; unrelated source edits still stop delivery. Commit locks before another checkout or CI deploys.
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+ Require the pinned machine-readable JSONL deployment contract and independently correlate its Worker/version with 100% of active Cloudflare traffic and actual provider URLs. Console prose and a successful exit status are insufficient evidence. Correlate the checked invocation with exact source state before and after deployment; do not claim a provider-signed Git provenance guarantee. Check private-resource and audience policies around activation. Multiple Workers are not an atomic release. Readiness does not replace the application's meaningful live acceptance test.
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+ Rollback delegates to Void and independently checks active versions. It restores code and only triggers covered by retained snapshots; it does not reverse SQL or cross incompatible Durable Object migration boundaries. Fresh-checkout recovery verifies current provider state, flags unsupported binding evidence and cannot reconstruct missing historical source-to-release mappings or product-verification results.
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+ **Separate framework and platform decisions.** Native Void Pages, managed auth, typed WebSockets, Durable State, inbound-email handlers, the self-hosted Void Platform and connected-builder artifact publishing require separate recipes and acceptance. Deploying Vinext through Void does not make native-framework-only features available. Keep the self-hosted platform optional: its control plane, credentials, quotas and recovery are a separate operational commitment. Use the exact installed package's bundled Markdown documentation when assessing these paths.
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+ **Acceptance status.** Actual generated Vinext/Hono builds, local workerd routing/assets/readiness, shared Better Auth/D1 flows and the read-only Wrangler-to-Void credential bridge have been exercised. Unit coverage checks ownership, secret transport, lock checkpoints and evidence rejection paths. These results do not establish complete remote compatibility. The current validation account still requires Zero Trust onboarding and usable Access authorization. Private first deployment, fresh-checkout resource reuse, full live user flows, failure recovery and remote rollback remain acceptance gates. Do not switch to public hosting to bypass private acceptance. Record results and reproducible checks in [Void verification](void-verification.md).
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+ Upstream contracts: [Cloudflare deployment](https://void.cloud/integrations/cloudflare), [configuration](https://void.cloud/reference/config), [deployment CLI](https://void.cloud/reference/cli/deploy), and [package requirements](https://www.npmjs.com/package/void).
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+ `anhedral auth <app>` derives required providers from the selected stack. `--status` checks access without opening login; noninteractive and JSON calls report blockers. A provider session or accessible API endpoint is not proof of all resource permissions or completed integration setup. Provider administration credentials remain separate from application runtime secrets.
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+ `ship` coordinates selected integration provisioning, private runtime configuration and supported hosting delivery. [Provider configuration](provider-configuration.md) documents the eight API adapters, required management credentials and owner prerequisites. Authentication checks alone do not establish every write permission. If resolved bindings change tracked configuration, review and commit them before repeating the command. Expo delivery verifies the selected account/project/source and returns a build-page link while queued or a download link when complete; store submission remains separate.
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+ The CLI provides the foundation and delivery workflow. Product features, design, custom integrations and maintenance remain development work; Anhedral offers these services to businesses.
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+ ## Application requirements
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+ - Keep server credentials out of client bundles and version control. Configure separate environments and review database migrations.
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+ - Select one database and one identity provider. Implement resource and tenant authorization in the application; hosting access protection does not replace product identity.
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+ - Keep R2 private and authorize file operations. KV is eventually consistent and should not hold authoritative transactional state.
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+ - Implement webhooks and jobs idempotently. Bound retries, concurrency and paid usage; verify recovery and data compatibility before rollback.
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+ - Verify the actual runtime: Vinext/Vite on Workers, Next.js/OpenNext on Workers, or native Next.js on Vercel. Generated native clients need device, packaging and signing checks appropriate to their target.
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+ - Run generated checks and exercise product flows. Initialization, installed SDKs and successful builds do not prove provider configuration or production acceptance.
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+ Follow the [delivery workflow](delivery-workflow.md) for the supported customer-account deployment, verification and recovery commands.
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+ ## Maintenance and verification
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+ Update the catalog, recipe and relevant documentation together when supported behavior changes. Regenerate plugin references with `pnpm build`; do not edit generated copies independently. Verify supported selection combinations and packaged output before release.
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+ When installing a capability addition, Anhedral regenerates the root `node_modules` cache from the resolved frozen lockfile while retaining the separate package store. This prevents pnpm 10 from retaining skipped optional dependencies after they become required. Customer source and patch files remain outside that cache; a frozen installation that changes the planned lockfile fails. `--skip-install` leaves dependency installation to the owner.
156
+
157
+ Framework-specific lint dependencies belong to the consuming application. The shared `packages/eslint-config` retains generic TypeScript, React, Hooks and Turbo rules; web applications declare their own Next API lint plugin and configuration. API and native-only workspaces must not inherit Next-specific tooling solely because the bootstrap started from a Next template.
158
+
159
+ Security overrides retain reviewed compatible `brace-expansion` 1.x, 2.x and 5.x releases. There is no blanket 3.x pin: [GHSA-3jxr-9vmj-r5cp](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3jxr-9vmj-r5cp) lists no repaired 3.x release, and the reviewed generated lockfiles do not consume that major. A future consumer on an affected line must be resolved through its compatible upstream dependency path; it receives no audit exception or additional local patch.
160
+
161
+ Generated `pnpm audit:deps` runs the standard pnpm audit through a narrow patch policy and preserves its unmodified JSON in `.anhedral-audit-report.json`. High and critical findings fail except for the two reviewed, exact-version mitigations below. The gate permits `GHSA-vfj7-8cjw-p6xm` for configured reviewed `braces@3.0.3` and `GHSA-86w9-cpqp-85rv` for configured reviewed `node-forge@1.4.0`; it preserves both upstream findings and blocks unrelated advisories. Review the resolved lockfile for each generated profile: a clean CLI lockfile or direct-version catalog audit does not establish that a generated application’s transitive dependencies are clean. Removing an unused dependency path does not resolve other paths to the same vulnerable package.
162
+
163
+ ### Temporary braces mitigation
164
+
165
+ When the resolved graph contains `braces@3.0.3`, new generation and actual additions copy the bundled `assets/patches/braces@3.0.3.patch` into `patches/`, merge an exact `patchedDependencies` mapping into `pnpm-workspace.yaml`, and resolve the lock again before frozen installation. Existing customer patch maps and files are preserved; conflicts require deliberate maintenance. Other versions do not receive this patch. Commit both the patch and updated workspace/lock files.
166
+
167
+ This is a local mitigation for [CVE-2026-93687](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vfj7-8cjw-p6xm): nested brace/parenthesis parsing and direct AST traversal are limited to depth 100, and cyclic child/expansion-parent paths are rejected. It does not add expansion-width/range limits or replace the upstream glob API. The policy retains the affected upstream advisory and permits it only with the exact reviewed patch checksum and effective pnpm patch mapping. Frozen pnpm installation owns patch application and lockfile consistency. Depth/cycle runtime regressions run in this repository’s tests, rather than in generated applications. Outside the two reviewed exact-version mitigations, high and critical advisories remain blocking.
168
+
169
+ Review the mitigation on every release. Remove it when a verified supported upstream fix or compatible consumer migration makes it unnecessary; test existing application patterns before changing the limit. `pnpm test:patch` exercises real frozen installations, runtime regressions, normal glob/watch behavior and changed-patch rejection. Focused unit tests cover exact-advisory handling. The upstream MIT notice is distributed alongside the patch.
170
+
171
+ ### Temporary node-forge mitigation
172
+
173
+ The same conditional staging and conflict checks apply to `node-forge@1.4.0`. Its patch rejects extra nested DigestAlgorithm elements and nonempty DER NULL parameters in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 verification, covering `lib/rsa.js` and both shipped minified browser bundles. It preserves the published APIs and includes the upstream BSD license notice.
174
+
175
+ The policy permits the exact advisory only with the reviewed patch checksum and effective pnpm patch mapping. Repository installation tests exercise valid and malformed signatures through all three entrypoints with pure JavaScript RSA verification. Generated audits do not scan installed dependency trees or execute dependency runtime probes. The upstream advisory still has no official patched release; this is a tested local mitigation and must be retired when a compatible verified upstream fix becomes available. Commit the generated patch, attributes, workspace policy and resolved lockfile.
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
1
+ # Void delivery verification
2
+
3
+ This records the implementation's evidence and remaining acceptance work. It is not a release certificate. Update the live results when an operation completes; retain sanitized target/version identifiers and actual acceptance results rather than diagnostic output.
4
+
5
+ ## Version contract
6
+
7
+ - Anhedral development checkout: `anhedral@0.11.1`.
8
+ - Direct Cloudflare delivery: exact `void@0.27.0`.
9
+ - Void runtime requirement: Node `>=24.21.0` (checked before execution).
10
+ - Workspace package manager: `pnpm@10.34.5`.
11
+ - The published Void package distribution and its bundled documentation were inspected. Installed executable version and app dependency pin must agree.
12
+
13
+ Current Cloudflare configuration requires an explicit `deliveryEngine` in the `cloudflare` section of `anhedral.json`. Supported Void profiles select `void`; explicit OpenNext, Queues/DLQ and Basin profiles select `wrangler`. Missing or unsupported markers are rejected. No existing-project migration workflow is provided.
14
+
15
+ ## Historical local evidence: initial Void integration
16
+
17
+ These results describe the earlier integration snapshot. They do not certify the current uncommitted candidate; subsequent local reviews are recorded in the repository’s `docs/verification.md` and `docs/codebase-review.md`.
18
+
19
+ The initial Void/coherence local CLI suite passed **608 of 608 tests**, with zero failures. The inspector suite passed **60 of 60 tests**. Build, typecheck, formatting, source hygiene, static security policy, packed CLI smoke and package allowlist checks passed. The corrected OSV audit passed for **85 unique locked and direct-catalog package versions**; the inspector dependency audit also reported no known vulnerabilities. This does not audit every generated application’s transitive dependency graph.
20
+
21
+ The normal generated combined workspace installed **395 packages** without extra harness dependency pins. Actual fresh builds passed for **Vinext 1.1.0 with Void 0.27.0** and **Hono**. Workerd returned HTTP 200 for rendered HTML, its client asset, API health and OpenAPI. A separate services profile covered D1/R2/KV/AI plus cron build/preview gates; the compiled scheduled handler was preserved and invoked successfully. Readiness responses contained an actual Worker version UUID.
22
+
23
+ Wrangler applied the generated local D1 migration `0000_better_auth` (10 commands). The shared Better Auth/D1 runtime passed signup, login, cookie/session lookup, incorrect-password HTTP 401, logout and session revocation through `tests/test-void-local-auth.mjs`. These are actual local runtime checks rather than mocked provider tests. They do not prove Cloudflare provisioning, production secrets, visitor Access policy enforcement or remote rollback.
24
+
25
+ The earlier generated dependency audit passed with a local `braces` backport and `fflate@0.7.5`; its raw advisory report still contained one high finding. The bundled backport system has since been removed at the owner’s request. A subsequent owner-approved change adds one narrowly scoped standard pnpm patch for `braces@3.0.3`, while retaining the upstream pnpm audit report and all advisory findings. The owner subsequently approved a verification gate for the one exact patched advisory, described below. The earlier backport audit gate remains removed; its result does not establish a passing audit for newly generated applications.
26
+
27
+ Additional regression coverage includes non-object JSONL records, canonical configuration/lock merging, and resolved bindings with authored placeholders. The final integrated count above includes this regression coverage.
28
+
29
+ The automated checks cover the pinned JSONL receipt format, rejection of stale/foreign/incomplete/ambiguous receipts, independent provider version confirmation, source cleanliness, explicit current engine validation, private policy reconciliation, and the lock-review checkpoint. Mocked Cloudflare responses establish control flow; they do not establish provider/runtime compatibility.
30
+
31
+ ## Deployment evidence contract
32
+
33
+ Void 0.27.0 writes a new `~/.void/logs/deploy-*.jsonl` per invocation. Anhedral requires exactly one new matching log with:
34
+
35
+ 1. A `deploy_start` record identifying the exact target working directory and a timestamp after invocation began.
36
+ 2. One `cloudflare_deploy_end` record with `ok: true`, the expected Worker name and a complete version ID.
37
+ 3. A final `deploy_end` record with `ok: true`.
38
+
39
+ This contract was inspected in the published distribution, rather than inferred from console prose. The recorded version must independently own 100% of current Cloudflare traffic. Application source and configuration are checked before and after deployment. Void's direct Cloudflare log does not contain a Git commit annotation; Anhedral correlates the checked invocation and its receipt with the clean source commit. Missing or ambiguous logs stop acceptance even when provider changes may have occurred.
40
+
41
+ Application URLs require provider evidence: enabled Workers subdomain plus account subdomain, or a matching custom-domain assignment. Private Access policies are checked before and after activation. Selected resource identities and private R2 exposure are independently inspected after Void resolves resources.
42
+
43
+ Void lock changes are expected on initial provisioning. If only the allowed target `void.lock.json` files change, activated version receipts are retained with release state `configuration-required`. Review and commit those files, then ship the clean configuration. Such a checkpoint cannot pass `verify` or serve as a complete rollback release. Arbitrary source changes still fail delivery. Database migrations remain applied during code rollback.
44
+
45
+ ## Reproduce local checks
46
+
47
+ From the CLI repository:
48
+
49
+ ```sh
50
+ pnpm build
51
+ pnpm typecheck
52
+ node --test tests/test-void-state.test.mjs tests/test-void-execution.test.mjs tests/test-void-migrations.test.mjs tests/test-delivery.test.mjs tests/test-delivery-lock.test.mjs tests/test-ship.test.mjs
53
+ pnpm test:unit
54
+ ```
55
+
56
+ Use the repository's installed Node/pnpm versions. Avoid concurrent builds because the build script replaces shared `dist/` output.
57
+
58
+ ## Live acceptance
59
+
60
+ Customer Cloudflare authentication succeeded using workspace-scoped Wrangler state. No credential contents belong in this document. A reproducible authentication pattern is:
61
+
62
+ ```sh
63
+ XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$PWD/.anhedral/cloudflare-auth" pnpm exec wrangler login
64
+ XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$PWD/.anhedral/cloudflare-auth" pnpm exec wrangler whoami --json
65
+ ```
66
+
67
+ The actual Void authentication bridge also succeeded against the customer account with `accountConfirmed: true`. Credentials were supplied through the child-process environment, and no credential was persisted by the bridge. This is read-only authentication evidence, not deployment evidence.
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+
69
+ The source-coherence review removed obsolete release helpers, diagram assets, stale plugin wrappers and duplicate dependencies; fixed bounded inspection of resolved Void locks; and brought CI runtimes and delivery documentation in line with the implementation. Browser UI acceptance was attempted but could not launch Chromium because the host denied its macOS Mach-port registration. The browser suite remains unverified in this environment. Hosted CI on commit `06bce77173cd8a122a35c3e04a7e210e4fd9d78c` subsequently passed the dashboard browser suite, both plugin checks, four CLI test lanes, eight macOS/Windows portability jobs and CodeQL. That evidence applies to that commit; subsequent changes require their own checks.
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+
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+ The executable read-only live preflight was also run using the workspace-scoped login. It exited with status 1 and structured `providerMutations: false`, `ready: false` before any cloud writes. Reproduce against the intended customer account and an existing generated fixture:
72
+
73
+ ```sh
74
+ XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$PWD/.anhedral/cloudflare-auth" \
75
+ WRANGLER_LOG_PATH=/tmp/anhedral-void-live-preflight.log \
76
+ node tests/test-live-void.mjs --account <customer-account-id> --fixture /absolute/generated-workspace
77
+ ```
78
+
79
+ The preflight can prepare an isolated local fixture with `--prepare-only /absolute/new-unused-path`; this scaffolds and builds locally and does not perform remote acceptance or publication.
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+
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+ Authentication alone does not prove provisioning, runtime builds, private access or deployment. Authenticated read-only preflight succeeded for the Workers account subdomain. The same login received HTTP 403 from Access organizations (provider code `10000`) and Access applications (provider code `9999`). No deployment or other provider mutation was performed. Private live acceptance is blocked until the authorized account has usable Access organization/application/policy permissions. Public deployment is not a substitute for the requested private acceptance. Separately, the Cloudflare dashboard explicitly shows that Zero Trust onboarding must be completed for this account. The dashboard observation and API permission errors are distinct evidence; the 403 responses alone do not establish their cause. In particular, do not infer that the complete Vinext plus Hono/shared database/auth combination works from local unit tests.
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+
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+ The acceptance workspace must exercise:
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+
85
+ - Fresh-checkout installation and build using pinned versions.
86
+ - Vinext and Hono Workers with reusable shared packages.
87
+ - Existing D1/private R2 identity reuse, one migration owner, serialized resource creation and committed lock reuse across a new checkout.
88
+ - Environment validation, production secret stdin upload and public build variables.
89
+ - Private Access protection before activation, anonymous rejection, allowed user login and denied user behavior.
90
+ - Actual routing, assets, authentication and streaming responses.
91
+ - Initial lock review checkpoint followed by a clean provider-confirmed release and meaningful `test:live`.
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+ - Failed build/deployment recovery and rollback without claiming migration reversal.
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+
94
+ Watch the interaction between private Access's pre-created empty Worker and Void's existing-Worker checks, and between the first target's lock changes and later targets' secret upload guards. Validate both rather than weakening privacy or source checks.
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+
96
+ For an authorized disposable application, use the built CLI's `connect`, `ship --dry-run`, `ship`, `status --refresh`, `verify`, and reviewed `rollback` commands. Preserve resource ownership and inspect partial operations before retrying. This document does not authorize additional provider resources or expenses.
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+
98
+ ## Handoff
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+
100
+ Keep the customer-owned account, committed application manifest, `anhedral.cloudflare.json`, `void.config.ts`, `env.ts`, reviewed SQL and each app's `void.lock.json`. Keep secrets out of source. Local `.anhedral/` history and Void diagnostic logs are separate operational evidence; a fresh checkout cannot reconstruct historical source-to-version mappings from current provider versions. `recover` reports a current snapshot and does not fabricate historical verification.
101
+
102
+ ## Generated dependency review (2026-10-15)
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+
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+ Hosted generated-profile checks on `d117f402faa6d899f972152f242b18026a45053b` failed. They are distinct from the passing CLI/plugin checks. Root-cause analysis found several independent paths to `braces`, including:
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+
106
+ | Consumer | Dependency path | Required structural remediation |
107
+ | --- | --- | --- |
108
+ | Every inherited starter | Shared ESLint config → Next ESLint plugin → fast-glob → micromatch → braces | Declare framework lint tooling only in the web application; retain generic shared lint coverage |
109
+ | Vinext | vite-plugin-commonjs → vite-plugin-dynamic-import → fast-glob → micromatch → braces | Upstream consumer migration with CommonJS, development and SSR/RSC behavior verified |
110
+ | WXT styling | Tailwind CSS 3 → chokidar → braces | Supported Tailwind/toolchain migration, including generated styles and builds |
111
+ | Expo | React Native Metro config → Metro tooling → glob matching dependencies → braces | Compatible Metro/Expo dependency migration |
112
+
113
+ The current [CVE-2026-93687 advisory](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vfj7-8cjw-p6xm) affects `braces <=3.0.3` and lists no patched version. npm’s latest is still `3.0.3`. [Proposed fix #72](https://github.com/micromatch/braces/pull/72) is closed without merging. The maintainer disputes the advisory’s security interpretation in [issue #70](https://github.com/micromatch/braces/issues/70); the advisory remains active. The separate [CVE-2024-4068](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-grv7-fg5c-xmjg) was fixed by `3.0.3`, which does not resolve the newer advisory.
114
+
115
+ The failure is recursive AST processing of deeply nested glob patterns. Remote exploitability depends on whether an application passes attacker-controlled patterns to those operations; the presence of a development dependency alone does not establish an exploitable deployed endpoint. No complete reachability review has been performed for every generated profile.
116
+
117
+ An unqualified `fast-glob` → `tinyglobby` package alias is incompatible: consumers use different exports and directory expansion defaults. Removing the global starter dependency is an Anhedral composition fix, not proof that every supported framework is free of `braces`. Do not clear the audit gate or claim production acceptance until the resolved graphs and relevant runtime checks pass. The same generated CI also reports a separate `node-forge` advisory in Expo/WXT tooling, which is outside the `braces` remediation.
118
+
119
+ The shared-lint ownership change was checked against the actual upstream template manifest: a newly resolved pnpm graph contained 169 packages and none of `@next/eslint-plugin-next`, `fast-glob`, `micromatch` or `braces`; its standard pnpm audit reported no known vulnerabilities. This is evidence for the shared lint foundation only, not the entire generated application matrix. App-local web linting explicitly selects JavaScript/TypeScript/JSX/TSX files rather than relying on ESLint’s default JavaScript selection.
120
+
121
+ Validation of the scoped composition change passed 613 CLI unit tests with the real lint probe enabled, 60 inspector tests, builds, lint, static security policy, OSV checks for 86 root/catalog versions, and the package allowlist. The five lint tests include actual Next Image/Link and React Hooks diagnostics, full recommended/Core Web Vitals rule configuration, TypeScript/JSX parsing and adding web after an API-only scaffold. A helper now exercises installed rules in generated web CI profiles. A fresh local upstream shadcn initialization was attempted but its `ui.shadcn.com` request was refused by the network proxy; no fresh full generated-app matrix success is claimed.
122
+
123
+ ## Temporary braces patch verification
124
+
125
+ The depth-only mitigation is based on official `braces@3.0.3`, tarball integrity `sha512-yQbXgO/OSZVD2IsiLlro+7Hf6Q18EJrKSEsdoMzKePKXct3gvD8oLcOQdIzGupr5Fj+EDe8gO/lxc1BzfMpxvA==`. Both the unmodified baseline and patched package passed all 764 tests from the published release source (`74b2db2938fad48a2ea54a9c8bf27a37a62c350d`). The bounded verifier passed 360 differential compile/expand/stringify comparisons, depth 100/101 and mixed/literal boundaries, deep direct ASTs, child cycles and expansion-parent cycles. Expansion width/range behavior and stringify parent handling remain unchanged.
126
+
127
+ This establishes the tested library mitigation, not a complete application exposure analysis or an upstream fixed release. The upstream registry report remains unmodified. The owner-approved gate accepts only the exact patched braces advisory after verifying installed bytes and regressions. Separate Expo/WXT findings and the remaining private Cloudflare acceptance gaps remain independent.
128
+
129
+ A real pnpm fixture resolved `braces@3.0.3` with micromatch, fast-glob and chokidar consumers, merged the exact patch, resolved the new lock and installed with `--frozen-lockfile --ignore-scripts`. The installed bytes passed the depth verifier and normal filesystem glob/watch checks. Changing the patch after resolution made a frozen install fail; restoring its bytes restored successful installation. The untouched pnpm audit JSON still reported `GHSA-vfj7-8cjw-p6xm` for `3.0.3` and was retained locally as test evidence. Both the patch and MIT notice are recorded in generated source fingerprints; customer artifacts and YAML patch entries are preserved or rejected on conflict.
130
+
131
+ Release-exception assessment: the evidence supports the tested depth mitigation for the exact patched version. It does not support a blanket advisory waiver, other versions, unrelated findings or a claim that every generated installation has been exercised. Any later exception must be constrained to the advisory/version and independently verified installed bytes, reviewed for the intended release, and retired with the patch. The owner subsequently approved and restored the exact verified exception below; other findings remain blocking.
132
+
133
+ The generated exact-path Git attributes preserve LF bytes with `core.autocrlf=true`; a real index/checkout round trip verifies the patch and license remain identical. The patch’s SHA-256 is `69bd65a37da4569ba0be8a044aa732ad7c2ebd5494d6076f966eb6df8a12756e`.
134
+
135
+ Final local validation of the mitigation passed 628 CLI tests without skips, 60 inspector tests, build/typecheck/lint, static secret/security scans, OSV checks for 87 root/catalog versions, package allowlist and packed CLI smoke. The packed installation test invokes the installed patch helper and compares generated patch/license bytes with the shipped assets. These results establish the tested mitigation, not completion of all generated-profile or live acceptance requirements.
136
+
137
+ ## Restored verified advisory handling
138
+
139
+ The owner approved restoring the earlier verification-aware behavior for one package/advisory. `pnpm audit:deps` now invokes the bundled gate, preserving raw pnpm JSON in `.anhedral-audit-report.json` and printing the known upstream finding. Only `GHSA-vfj7-8cjw-p6xm` for `braces@3.0.3` can pass through this exception. Verification requires the pinned patch checksum, every discovered installed copy matching the reviewed full-package hash, and bounded depth/cycle regression checks. Unpatched/tampered copies, unknown versions, malformed or incomplete reports, command failures, and unrelated high/critical findings fail.
140
+
141
+ This restores the working patch-plus-verification behavior without the removed multi-package backport framework. It does not claim an upstream fixed release or waive the independent Expo/WXT findings or private Cloudflare acceptance work.
142
+
143
+ Validation of the restored gate passed 634 CLI tests without skips and 60 inspector tests, build/typecheck/lint, static security policy, package allowlist and packed CLI smoke. The real frozen pnpm fixture covered an npm dependency alias, accepted the exact verified mitigation, preserved the upstream audit JSON, rejected both patch-file and installed-package tampering, and passed again after restoration. The packed CLI writes the audit gate from its distributed asset.
144
+
145
+ ## Hosted release follow-through (2026-10-16)
146
+
147
+ Hosted CI on `83e83e476fba8a052fb3c73aaa0e3b59659231bc` passed the Linux braces installation gate, all four CLI Node-version checks, portable macOS/Windows checks, inspector checks, plain Vercel, Next.js/Cloudflare (including Better Auth), desktop on Linux/macOS, Worker services and Vercel services. Other generated profiles exposed Void entrypoint discovery and duplicated database configuration, corrected in the subsequent source changes. These results are profile-specific, not a successful full matrix or live deployment.
148
+
149
+ The same hosted run independently confirmed that extension and combined-client profiles fail on `GHSA-86w9-cpqp-85rv` in `node-forge`. The [current advisory](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-86w9-cpqp-85rv) covers versions through 1.4.0 and has no patched release; [upstream PR 1152](https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/pull/1152) remains unmerged. Current Expo CLI and extension-runner dependency paths still require this package. A framework version upgrade alone does not establish remediation.
150
+
151
+ The prior Node-main patch was evaluated separately against the official 1.4.0 release source (`fa385f92440879601240020f158bed68e444e83a`): baseline and patched versions each passed 828 tests with four upstream pending cases; the malformed-signature regression failed before and passed after patching. The aggregate harness neutralized an upstream `describe.only` so the complete suite actually ran. At that checkpoint the source-only patch did not update the package's prebuilt browser bundles and was not accepted. The completed bundle remediation and verification below supersede that earlier candidate.
152
+
153
+ Fresh pnpm resolution confirmed that Void's `^1.63.1` Cloudflare Vite dependency could select 1.64.0, whose Wrangler peer requirement exceeds Anhedral's validated pin. The Void recipe now pins that transitive edge to 1.63.1, sharing the existing version source, preserving customer override entries and leaving unrelated recipes untouched. The exact 1.63.1/4.149.0 pair passed fresh resolution and an actual Vinext/Void Vite build. Generated Worker acceptance reads the emitted Vite Worker configuration and verifies its actual entry artifact, instead of expecting the legacy Wrangler output path.
154
+
155
+ ## Completed node-forge remediation
156
+
157
+ The final exact-version mitigation covers `lib/rsa.js`, `dist/forge.min.js` and `dist/forge.all.min.js` from official `node-forge@1.4.0`, rather than accepting an unpatched distribution path. The patch is 1,177,827 bytes because unified diffs include complete minified lines; the actual guard changes are limited to nested DigestAlgorithm cardinality and strict DER NULL contents. The minified predicates implement the same source guard, and their trivial one-line source maps remain valid. The upstream BSD attribution is retained.
158
+
159
+ Patch SHA-256: `2cbbff9183d2896f13da8c8655b8f598b0f24c9b7477e8230f9a313f806c239f`. Reviewed full installed-tree SHA-256: `2e3a4c3aa2e8f3235d9dd9b3f21698c7aa88983ba9623f1502029386316380e4`. The official tarball integrity is `sha512-LarFH0+6VfriEhqMMcLX2F7SwSXeWwnEAJEsYm5QKWchiVYVvJyV9v7UDvUv+w5HO23ZpQTXDv/GxdDdMyOuoQ==`.
160
+
161
+ For each of the three published entrypoints, forced pure-JavaScript RSA verification preserved 11 valid cases and rejected all 30 malformed cases across six digest algorithms. The official unpatched package accepted 23 malformed cases, so the regression distinguishes the fix. The complete official Node suite passed 828 tests with four upstream pending cases against the final source patch. Exact Node 24.21/pnpm 10.34.5 frozen installation with direct and aliased dependencies passed and reproduced the reviewed bytes and all-entrypoint behavior.
162
+
163
+ The audit gate extends its fixed policy to the one additional exact advisory/version only after patch checksum, every installed package tree and bounded runtime probes pass. It retains the raw upstream advisory and rejects unrelated high/critical findings. It is a verified local mitigation, not an official upstream fixed release. The removed open-ended multi-package manifest/backport framework remains absent.
164
+
165
+ CI now prepares a reviewable Linux release candidate on Node 24.21 after its checks, verifying artifact integrity, scanning for secrets and executing the exact packed CLI. It uploads the candidate with one-day retention; this step cannot publish and does not change required reviews or main-commit release checks.
166
+
167
+ Consolidated local validation passed 649 CLI tests without skips, 60 inspector tests, build/typecheck/lint, static security policy, package allowlist and packed CLI smoke. Both real frozen-install fixtures passed, including original braces glob/watch behavior and node-forge source/browser-bundle tamper rejection. The packed CLI carries and stages both exact patches and upstream notices. The combined candidate still requires the full hosted matrix and the repository’s existing code-owner review before publication.
168
+
169
+ Installed-graph verification recognizes explicitly optional peer dependencies as well as ordinary optional dependencies. A missing peer is skippable only when the parent declares the peer and marks it optional, with no competing required dependency declaration; present dangling links, outside paths and missing required packages still fail. Missing required-package diagnostics include an escaped project-relative path. All 650 CLI tests passed after this change.
170
+
171
+ ## Incremental dependency installation repair
172
+
173
+ The remaining existing-project acceptance case exposed a real pnpm 10.34.5 installation defect. In an API/Neon project, `tslib@2.8.1` was initially skipped through optional `@emnapi/runtime`. Adding WXT introduced required `async-mutex -> tslib`, and the newly resolved lock recorded it as required, but the incremental frozen installation retained the old skipped state and omitted the package. The original verifier correctly rejected this missing required dependency. Optional-peer support is independently valid and does not hide this defect.
174
+
175
+ Removing only generated root `node_modules` and running an ordinary frozen installation completed in 5.6 seconds on the original failing graph. The reviewed lock remained exactly `b412f3758702f52968e564a99fcac618ea6be89697a05e301e4bad4807a04906`; the dependency was installed, its skipped state cleared, and both the original collector and full verified audit gate passed. Workspace links and the separate content-addressed package store were retained.
176
+
177
+ Actual additions now rematerialize that generated cache before frozen installation and check that the lock bytes remain unchanged. Linked or non-directory cache paths are rejected before cleanup. Source, reviewed patches and lock ownership remain intact. The alternate `--fix-lockfile` command was rejected because it rewrote the reviewed lock despite `--frozen-lockfile`; `--force` is not used.
178
+
179
+ The final cache-regression run passed all 652 CLI tests without skips, 60 inspector tests, lint and static security policy. Focused cases cover stale generated cache removal with package-store preservation, linked-cache refusal and frozen-lock byte drift.
180
+
181
+ ## Simplified dependency patch policy (2026-10-16)
182
+
183
+ This supersedes the installed-tree and runtime audit-gate design described in the historical checkpoints above. `src/dependency-patches.ts` installs both exact-version patches and notices while preserving customer policy and source files. Generated audits retain the raw pnpm report and accept only the two reviewed advisory/version pairs, with the effective pnpm patch mapping and bundled patch checksum. Frozen pnpm installation applies the patches and checks lockfile consistency. The audit no longer traverses installed dependencies, hashes package trees, or executes package code.
184
+
185
+ Runtime coverage lives in this repository: the braces fixture checks depth/cycle guards and normal glob/watch consumers; the forge fixture checks valid and malformed signatures through Node and both browser bundles. Both fixtures check frozen installation and changed-patch rejection. Audit-policy tests use deterministic reports to cover unknown advisories, other versions, critical findings, malformed reports, command errors, missing/wrong mappings, and changed patch bytes. Live advisory-service availability is independent of these regression tests; generated `pnpm audit:deps` still queries the actual service.
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "anhedral",
3
- "version": "0.11.0",
3
+ "version": "0.11.1",
4
4
  "description": "Build and deliver applications with Cloudflare-first Vinext, selected services, optional Next.js on Vercel, and verified release evidence.",
5
5
  "type": "module",
6
6
  "exports": {
@@ -16,18 +16,18 @@
16
16
  },
17
17
  "files": [
18
18
  "dist",
19
- "assets/anhedral-stack.svg",
20
- "assets/anhedral-stack-technical.svg",
21
- "assets/anhedral-mark.svg",
19
+ "assets/patches/braces@3.0.3.patch",
20
+ "assets/patches/LICENSE.braces",
21
+ "assets/patches/node-forge@1.4.0.patch",
22
+ "assets/patches/LICENSE.node-forge",
23
+ "assets/patches/audit-deps.mjs",
22
24
  "LICENSE",
23
25
  "README.md",
24
- "assets/anhedral.svg",
25
- "assets/favicon.ico",
26
- "docs/application-stack-standard.md",
26
+ "docs/stack-standard.md",
27
27
  "docs/delivery-workflow.md",
28
+ "docs/void-verification.md",
28
29
  "docs/provider-configuration.md",
29
30
  "docs/cli-design.md",
30
- "assets/security",
31
31
  "docs/plugin-ui.md"
32
32
  ],
33
33
  "homepage": "https://github.com/anhedral/anhedral-cli#readme",
@@ -65,25 +65,25 @@
65
65
  "test:pack:exact": "node tests/test-packed-cli.js .artifacts/release/metadata.json",
66
66
  "test:packlist": "pnpm build && node tests/test-packlist.js",
67
67
  "test:release-tooling": "node tests/test-release-tooling.test.mjs",
68
- "test:all": "pnpm build && pnpm lint && pnpm check:security && pnpm audit:osv && pnpm test:unit && node tests/test-packed-cli.js && node tests/test-packlist.js",
68
+ "test:all": "pnpm build && pnpm lint && pnpm check:security && pnpm audit:osv && pnpm test:unit && pnpm test:patch && node tests/test-packed-cli.js && node tests/test-packlist.js",
69
69
  "release:check": "pnpm test:all",
70
70
  "release:pack": "pnpm build && pnpm plugin:build && node scripts/create-release-artifact.mjs && node scripts/check-release-secrets.mjs .artifacts/release/metadata.json",
71
71
  "release:artifact:verify": "node scripts/verify-release-artifact.mjs .artifacts/release/metadata.json && node scripts/check-release-secrets.mjs .artifacts/release/metadata.json",
72
72
  "release:artifact:smoke": "node tests/test-packed-cli.js .artifacts/release/metadata.json",
73
- "docs:stack-map": "node scripts/render-master-stack-map.mjs",
74
- "docs:technical-stack-map": "node scripts/render-master-stack-map.mjs --technical",
75
- "docs:stack-maps": "pnpm docs:stack-map && pnpm docs:technical-stack-map",
76
73
  "test:standard": "pnpm build && node --test tests/test-standard.test.mjs",
77
- "test:unit": "node --test --test-concurrency=4 --test-reporter=spec tests/*.test.mjs",
74
+ "test:unit": "node scripts/prepare-test-runtime.mjs && node --test --test-concurrency=4 --test-reporter=spec tests/*.test.mjs",
78
75
  "test:integration": "pnpm build && node tests/test-generated-apps.mjs",
76
+ "test:runtime:void": "node tests/test-void-runtime.mjs",
77
+ "test:runtime:void:generated": "node tests/test-void-runtime-generated.mjs",
79
78
  "test:live:delivery": "pnpm build && node tests/test-live-delivery.mjs",
80
79
  "test:live:vercel": "pnpm build && node tests/test-live-vercel.mjs",
81
80
  "test:live:vercel:git": "pnpm build && node tests/test-live-vercel-git.mjs",
82
- "format": "prettier --write src scripts tests plugin-app",
83
- "format:check": "prettier --check src scripts tests plugin-app",
84
- "plugin:build": "pnpm --dir plugin-app build",
85
- "plugin:check": "pnpm --dir plugin-app check",
86
- "plugin:preview": "pnpm --dir plugin-app start"
81
+ "format": "prettier --write src scripts tests plugins/codex/inspector \"assets/patches/*.mjs\"",
82
+ "format:check": "prettier --check src scripts tests plugins/codex/inspector \"assets/patches/*.mjs\"",
83
+ "plugin:build": "pnpm --dir plugins/codex/inspector build",
84
+ "plugin:check": "pnpm --dir plugins/codex/inspector check",
85
+ "plugin:preview": "pnpm --dir plugins/codex/inspector start",
86
+ "test:patch": "node tests/test-braces-install.mjs && node tests/test-forge-install.mjs"
87
87
  },
88
88
  "keywords": [
89
89
  "cli",
@@ -107,10 +107,12 @@
107
107
  "devDependencies": {
108
108
  "@types/node": "20.19.43",
109
109
  "prettier": "3.9.10",
110
- "simple-icons": "16.27.0",
111
110
  "typescript": "5.9.3"
112
111
  },
113
112
  "dependencies": {
114
- "jsonc-parser": "3.3.1"
113
+ "@neondatabase/serverless": "1.2.0",
114
+ "jsonc-parser": "3.3.1",
115
+ "zod": "4.6.6",
116
+ "yaml": "2.9.1"
115
117
  }
116
118
  }
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
1
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2
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4
- </svg>