alexandr 0.2.2 → 0.3.1

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package/src/consent.js ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
1
+ // THE consent ceremony — one implementation, two callers.
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+ //
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+ // Extracted from link.js 2026-09-05 (app-system-stage-1.md §2 WP-E). It was
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+ // written for `alexandr link` (bind this box to an account) and is now also what
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+ // `alexandr app link` runs, asking for a different SCOPE. Copying it would have
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+ // meant two ceremonies drifting apart on the security-critical half of the CLI,
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+ // so it moved here and grew one parameter.
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+ //
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+ // Two grant shapes, one ceremony:
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+ // - DEVICE (RFC 8628 shape) on a headless machine: the CLI mints a grant,
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+ // prints a short code + URL, and polls until a signed-in owner confirms from
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+ // ANY device. No tunnel.
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+ // - LOOPBACK (OAuth authorization-code + PKCE) on a desktop: the browser and
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+ // the CLI share a machine, so the redirect lands instantly.
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+ //
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+ // SCOPE (WP-E). The CLI asks at the START and the owner sees it on the consent
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+ // card; the CP records it on the grant and reads it back at redeem, never from
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+ // the token request — a PKCE verifier (or a device code) proves possession, not
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+ // authorization.
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+ //
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+ // (omitted) -> client "cli-link", 10 minutes. `alexandr link` uses it once.
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+ // "app-dev" -> client "cli", 30 days sliding. `alexandr app link` keeps it.
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+ //
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+ // Zero dependencies. Plain Node, like the rest of this CLI.
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+
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+ import http from "node:http";
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+ import os from "node:os";
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+ import crypto from "node:crypto";
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+ import readline from "node:readline";
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+ import { log, dim, bold, cyan, fail, step, sleep, openURL } from "./util.js";
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+
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+ const b64url = (buf) => buf.toString("base64url");
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+
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+ // The hosted control plane + the WEBSITE (the one web property — the web app
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+ // retired, website-account-surface.md). Override for dev (e.g.
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+ // http://localhost:47400 + http://localhost:47300) via env. The link-consent
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+ // page (/cli-auth) is a website surface.
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+ export const CP_URL = (process.env.ALEXANDR_CP_URL || "https://api.alexandr.so").replace(/\/+$/, "");
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+ export const APP_URL = (process.env.ALEXANDR_APP_URL || "https://alexandr.so").replace(/\/+$/, "");
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+ export const TIMEOUT_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
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+
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+ /**
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+ * Run the ceremony this machine can actually complete and return the session it
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+ * earned: `{ token, expiresAt, client, scope }` (older control planes answer
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+ * with `token` alone, so read the rest defensively).
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+ *
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+ * Throws on any break in the chain — the caller decides between `fail()` and a
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+ * soft skip.
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+ */
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+ export async function consentSession({ host, name, intent = "link", scope, domain } = {}) {
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+ return useDeviceFlow()
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+ ? deviceGrantSession({ host, name, intent, scope })
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+ : loopbackGrantSession({ host, name, intent, scope, domain });
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+ }
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+
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+ /** The DESKTOP grant — authorization-code + PKCE against a loopback redirect. */
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+ export async function loopbackGrantSession({ host, name, intent, scope, domain }) {
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+ const verifier = b64url(crypto.randomBytes(32));
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+ const challenge = b64url(crypto.createHash("sha256").update(verifier).digest());
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+ const state = b64url(crypto.randomBytes(16));
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+
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+ const { port, done } = await startLoopback();
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+ const redirectUri = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/callback`;
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+ const authUrl =
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+ `${APP_URL}/cli-auth?` +
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+ new URLSearchParams({
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+ redirect_uri: redirectUri,
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+ state,
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+ code_challenge: challenge,
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+ code_challenge_method: "S256",
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+ host: host ?? "",
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+ name: name ?? "",
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+ // ⚠ The consent page relays this into POST /cli-auth/authorize. WITHOUT it
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+ // every PKCE `app-dev` link silently gets the 10-minute session instead.
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+ ...(scope ? { scope } : {}),
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+ // Copy-only hint for the consent card ("refresh" renews the image
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+ // credential and registers nothing) — the grant's power is identical.
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+ ...(intent && intent !== "link" ? { intent } : {}),
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+ }).toString();
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+
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+ await presentAuthUrl(authUrl, { port, domain });
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+
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+ const cb = await done;
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+ if (cb.state !== state) throw new Error("state mismatch (possible interception).");
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+
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+ const tok = await postJson(`${CP_URL}/cli-auth/token`, {
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+ code: cb.code,
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+ codeVerifier: verifier,
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+ redirectUri,
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+ });
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+ if (!tok.data?.token) {
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+ throw new Error(
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+ `could not exchange the authorization code (${tok.error ?? "malformed response"}).`,
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+ );
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+ }
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+ return tok.data;
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+ }
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+
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+ /**
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+ * The HEADLESS ceremony — the device-authorization flow, because a remote box
101
+ * can't receive a loopback redirect and making the user build an ssh tunnel for
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+ * a sign-in was backwards. Network blips just keep polling; a real rejection
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+ * throws.
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+ */
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+ export async function deviceGrantSession({ host, name, intent, scope }) {
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+ const mint = await postJson(`${CP_URL}/cli-auth/device`, { host, name, intent, scope });
107
+ if (!mint.data?.deviceCode || !mint.data?.userCode) {
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+ throw new Error(`couldn't start the sign-in (${mint.error ?? "malformed response"}).`);
109
+ }
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+ const { deviceCode, userCode, expiresIn = 600, interval = 3 } = mint.data;
111
+ log("");
112
+ step("Open this link on any device — your computer or your phone — and confirm the code:");
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+ log(` ${cyan(`${APP_URL}/cli-auth?code=${encodeURIComponent(userCode)}`)}`);
114
+ log("");
115
+ log(` Code: ${bold(userCode)}`);
116
+ log("");
117
+ log(dim(` (waiting for the confirmation — ${Math.round(expiresIn / 60)} minutes; this updates by itself)`));
118
+ const deadline = Date.now() + expiresIn * 1000;
119
+ while (Date.now() < deadline) {
120
+ await sleep(interval * 1000);
121
+ const res = await postJson(`${CP_URL}/cli-auth/device/token`, { deviceCode });
122
+ if (res.data?.token) return res.data;
123
+ if (res.data?.status === "pending") continue;
124
+ if (res.error?.startsWith("HTTP")) throw new Error(`the sign-in was rejected (${res.error}).`);
125
+ // Network blip — keep polling until the code's own deadline.
126
+ }
127
+ throw new Error("the code expired before it was confirmed — run the command again.");
128
+ }
129
+
130
+ /** Which ceremony fits this machine. ALEXANDR_DEVICE_FLOW=1|0 overrides. */
131
+ export function useDeviceFlow() {
132
+ if (process.env.ALEXANDR_DEVICE_FLOW === "1") return true;
133
+ if (process.env.ALEXANDR_DEVICE_FLOW === "0") return false;
134
+ return isHeadless();
135
+ }
136
+
137
+ /** No local browser to open — a Linux box with no display server. Pure for tests. */
138
+ export function isHeadless(platform = process.platform, env = process.env) {
139
+ return platform === "linux" && !env.DISPLAY && !env.WAYLAND_DISPLAY;
140
+ }
141
+
142
+ /**
143
+ * Present the consent URL honestly, by what this machine can actually do:
144
+ * - HEADLESS (a server): never pretend a browser opened. Numbered steps, tunnel
145
+ * FIRST (the redirect lands on the desktop's loopback and must reach this box).
146
+ * - DESKTOP + TTY: ask before taking over the browser — the URL is printed
147
+ * either way, so "open it yourself" is always available.
148
+ * - DESKTOP non-TTY (scripts): print + best-effort open, nothing blocks.
149
+ */
150
+ export async function presentAuthUrl(authUrl, { port, domain, headless = isHeadless() }) {
151
+ const sshTarget = `${process.env.USER || "root"}@${domain || os.hostname()}`;
152
+ if (headless) {
153
+ log("");
154
+ step("This machine has no browser — finish the sign-in from your computer:");
155
+ log(` 1. Forward the callback port ${dim("(keep this running until you're done)")}:`);
156
+ log(` ${bold(`ssh -L ${port}:127.0.0.1:${port} ${sshTarget}`)}`);
157
+ log(` 2. Open this link in a browser signed in to your alexandr account:`);
158
+ log(` ${cyan(authUrl)}`);
159
+ log(dim(` (waiting for the confirmation — ${TIMEOUT_MS / 60000} minutes)`));
160
+ return;
161
+ }
162
+ log(dim(authUrl));
163
+ if (process.stdin.isTTY && process.stdout.isTTY) {
164
+ await new Promise((resolve) => {
165
+ const rl = readline.createInterface({ input: process.stdin, output: process.stdout });
166
+ rl.question(
167
+ `${cyan("›")} Press Enter to open your browser and confirm ${dim("(or open the link above yourself)")} `,
168
+ () => {
169
+ rl.close();
170
+ resolve();
171
+ },
172
+ );
173
+ });
174
+ }
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+ openURL(authUrl);
176
+ }
177
+
178
+ /** Start a loopback listener for the OAuth redirect. Resolves {code,state} when /callback is hit. */
179
+ export function startLoopback() {
180
+ let resolveFn, rejectFn;
181
+ const done = new Promise((res, rej) => {
182
+ resolveFn = res;
183
+ rejectFn = rej;
184
+ });
185
+ const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
186
+ const u = new URL(req.url, "http://127.0.0.1");
187
+ // Reachability probe for the consent page: /cli-auth pings this before the
188
+ // user clicks, so a missing ssh tunnel becomes a guided notice instead of a
189
+ // dead browser error page after the click. The PNA header answers Chrome's
190
+ // public->loopback preflight; ACAO lets the page read the success.
191
+ if (u.pathname === "/ping") {
192
+ res.writeHead(204, {
193
+ "access-control-allow-origin": "*",
194
+ "access-control-allow-methods": "GET, OPTIONS",
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+ "access-control-allow-headers": "*",
196
+ "access-control-allow-private-network": "true",
197
+ });
198
+ res.end();
199
+ return;
200
+ }
201
+ if (u.pathname !== "/callback") {
202
+ res.writeHead(404);
203
+ res.end();
204
+ return;
205
+ }
206
+ res.writeHead(200, { "content-type": "text/html; charset=utf-8" });
207
+ res.end(
208
+ "<!doctype html><meta charset=utf-8><body style='font:16px system-ui;padding:3rem;text-align:center'>Linked — you can close this tab and return to your terminal.</body>",
209
+ );
210
+ clearTimeout(timer);
211
+ setTimeout(() => server.close(), 200);
212
+ const code = u.searchParams.get("code");
213
+ const st = u.searchParams.get("state");
214
+ if (code && st) resolveFn({ code, state: st });
215
+ else rejectFn(new Error("no authorization code in the redirect"));
216
+ });
217
+ const timer = setTimeout(() => {
218
+ server.close();
219
+ rejectFn(new Error("timed out waiting for the browser confirmation"));
220
+ }, TIMEOUT_MS);
221
+ return new Promise((ready, readyErr) => {
222
+ server.once("error", (e) => {
223
+ rejectFn(e);
224
+ readyErr(e);
225
+ });
226
+ server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => ready({ port: server.address().port, done }));
227
+ });
228
+ }
229
+
230
+ /**
231
+ * POST json -> `{ data }` on success, `{ error }` on failure. The CP writes
232
+ * human-readable `error` strings (e.g. the closed-alpha 403 explains exactly who
233
+ * may register), so failures must carry WHY — a bare null renders as "could not
234
+ * register this runtime" with the real reason swallowed. Callers surface
235
+ * `error` in their fail/skip message.
236
+ */
237
+ export async function postJson(url, body, headers = {}) {
238
+ try {
239
+ const res = await fetch(url, {
240
+ method: "POST",
241
+ headers: { "content-type": "application/json", ...headers },
242
+ body: JSON.stringify(body),
243
+ });
244
+ const data = await res.json().catch(() => null);
245
+ if (!res.ok) {
246
+ const detail = typeof data?.error === "string" && data.error ? ` — ${data.error}` : "";
247
+ return { error: `HTTP ${res.status}${detail}` };
248
+ }
249
+ return data == null ? { error: "malformed response" } : { data };
250
+ } catch (e) {
251
+ return { error: `couldn't reach ${new URL(url).origin}: ${e?.message ?? e}` };
252
+ }
253
+ }
254
+
255
+ /** GET json -> `{ data }` / `{ error }`, the read half of postJson. */
256
+ export async function getJson(url, headers = {}) {
257
+ try {
258
+ const res = await fetch(url, { headers });
259
+ const data = await res.json().catch(() => null);
260
+ if (!res.ok) {
261
+ const detail = typeof data?.error === "string" && data.error ? ` — ${data.error}` : "";
262
+ return { error: `HTTP ${res.status}${detail}`, status: res.status };
263
+ }
264
+ return data == null ? { error: "malformed response" } : { data };
265
+ } catch (e) {
266
+ return { error: `couldn't reach ${new URL(url).origin}: ${e?.message ?? e}` };
267
+ }
268
+ }
269
+
270
+ // `fail` is re-exported so callers that want the process-exiting form don't have
271
+ // to import two modules for one ceremony.
272
+ export { fail };
package/src/deps.js CHANGED
@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@
2
2
  // LINUX box (the self-host case), it offers to install them right there — Docker's official
3
3
  // convenience script (get.docker.com) + systemd start — instead of failing with a doc link.
4
4
  // Interactive-only (a real TTY, an explicit yes), root or sudo. macOS/Windows stay
5
- // guidance-only: Docker Desktop can't be installed silently, and the product's Mac story
6
- // ("On this Mac") uses the desktop app's own VM, never Docker.
5
+ // guidance-only: Docker Desktop can't be installed silently.
7
6
 
8
7
  import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
9
8
  import { log, ok, warn, step, dim, bold } from "./util.js";
package/src/instance.js CHANGED
@@ -24,7 +24,12 @@ export function resolveInstance(flags = {}) {
24
24
  const cwdProject = path.resolve(process.cwd(), "alexandr");
25
25
  if (flags.dir) {
26
26
  const dir = path.resolve(String(flags.dir));
27
- return { dir, mode: "project", name: path.basename(dir), projectName: `alexandr-${sha8(dir)}` };
27
+ // `--project` pins the compose project NAME beside `--dir`: the updater sidecar runs the
28
+ // recipe from inside a container where the instance dir is mounted at its host path, and
29
+ // the project it must drive is the one the host created — a name re-derived in there
30
+ // (a global instance's is not the dir hash) would make compose start a SECOND copy.
31
+ const pinned = typeof flags.project === "string" && flags.project.trim() ? flags.project.trim() : null;
32
+ return { dir, mode: "project", name: path.basename(dir), projectName: pinned ?? `alexandr-${sha8(dir)}` };
28
33
  }
29
34
  if (fs.existsSync(path.join(cwdProject, "docker-compose.yml"))) {
30
35
  return { dir: cwdProject, mode: "project", name: path.basename(path.dirname(cwdProject)), projectName: `alexandr-${sha8(cwdProject)}` };
@@ -95,6 +100,34 @@ export function unsetEnv(dir, key) {
95
100
  }
96
101
 
97
102
  // The loopback kernel port for this instance (host side), honoring the .env.
103
+ /**
104
+ * Keep the newest `keep` pre-update snapshots in `<dir>/backups` and delete the rest
105
+ * (owner, 2026-09-08: keep 3). Every update — the terminal verb and the sidecar's button —
106
+ * snapshots /data first, and a box that is updated often would otherwise fill its disk with
107
+ * tarballs nobody will restore. Returns the paths removed. Only `pre-update-*.tgz` is touched:
108
+ * a snapshot the operator took with `alexandr backup` is theirs to keep.
109
+ */
110
+ export function pruneSnapshots(dir, keep = 3) {
111
+ const backups = path.join(dir, "backups");
112
+ if (!fs.existsSync(backups)) return [];
113
+ const snaps = fs
114
+ .readdirSync(backups)
115
+ .filter((f) => /^pre-update-.*\.tgz$/.test(f))
116
+ .map((f) => ({ f, at: fs.statSync(path.join(backups, f)).mtimeMs }))
117
+ .sort((a, b) => b.at - a.at);
118
+ const removed = [];
119
+ for (const { f } of snaps.slice(Math.max(0, keep))) {
120
+ const p = path.join(backups, f);
121
+ try {
122
+ fs.unlinkSync(p);
123
+ removed.push(p);
124
+ } catch {
125
+ /* a snapshot that will not go is not worth failing an update over */
126
+ }
127
+ }
128
+ return removed;
129
+ }
130
+
98
131
  export function kernelPort(dir) {
99
132
  const v = readEnv(dir).ALEXANDR_KERNEL_PORT;
100
133
  const n = v ? Number(v) : 3030;
package/src/link.js CHANGED
@@ -10,22 +10,19 @@
10
10
  // step one (an unlinked box refuses to serve), and `alexandr link` remains the explicit
11
11
  // re-link/repair verb.
12
12
 
13
- import http from "node:http";
14
- import os from "node:os";
15
- import crypto from "node:crypto";
16
- import readline from "node:readline";
17
- import { log, dim, bold, cyan, fail, step, ok, warn, openURL, sleep } from "./util.js";
13
+ import { log, dim, fail, step, ok, warn } from "./util.js";
18
14
  import { resolveInstance, isMaterialized, readEnv, kernelPort, setEnv, unsetEnv } from "./instance.js";
19
15
  import { kernelUrl, health, waitPosture } from "./probe.js";
20
16
  import { compose, exec } from "./docker.js";
17
+ // ⚠ THE CEREMONY MOVED to ./consent.js 2026-09-05 (app-system-stage-1.md §2 WP-E)
18
+ // so `alexandr app link` could run the same one with a different SCOPE. Copying
19
+ // it would have left two drifting implementations of the security-critical half
20
+ // of this CLI. Nothing about the verbs below changed: they ask for no scope, so
21
+ // they still get today's 10-minute `cli-link` session.
22
+ import { APP_URL, CP_URL, consentSession, isHeadless, postJson, presentAuthUrl, startLoopback } from "./consent.js";
21
23
 
22
- const b64url = (buf) => buf.toString("base64url");
23
- // Default to the hosted control plane + the WEBSITE (the one web property — the web app retired,
24
- // website-account-surface.md); override for dev (e.g. http://localhost:4000 + http://localhost:3000)
25
- // via env. The link-consent page (/cli-auth) + the account page are website surfaces now.
26
- const CP_URL = (process.env.ALEXANDR_CP_URL || "https://api.alexandr.so").replace(/\/+$/, "");
27
- const APP_URL = (process.env.ALEXANDR_APP_URL || "https://alexandr.so").replace(/\/+$/, "");
28
- const TIMEOUT_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
24
+ // Re-exported: these were this module's public surface before the extraction.
25
+ export { isHeadless, presentAuthUrl, startLoopback };
29
26
 
30
27
  /** Whether this instance's .env already carries the connected credential trio. */
31
28
  export function isLinked(dir) {
@@ -103,14 +100,11 @@ export async function runLinkCeremony(inst, flags) {
103
100
 
104
101
  step(`Link ${boxUrl} to your alexandr account`);
105
102
  let sessionToken;
106
- if (useDeviceFlow()) {
107
- try {
108
- sessionToken = await deviceGrantToken(boxUrl, name, "link");
109
- } catch (e) {
110
- fail(`Link aborted: ${e.message}`);
111
- }
112
- } else {
113
- sessionToken = await loopbackGrantToken({ boxUrl, name, domain });
103
+ try {
104
+ // No scope: this ceremony wants today's short single-use `cli-link` session.
105
+ sessionToken = (await consentSession({ host: boxUrl, name, intent: "link", domain })).token;
106
+ } catch (e) {
107
+ fail(`Link aborted: ${e.message}`);
114
108
  }
115
109
  await registerAndPersist(inst, { boxUrl, name, sessionToken });
116
110
  }
@@ -126,93 +120,6 @@ function instanceCoords(inst, flags) {
126
120
  return { domain, boxUrl };
127
121
  }
128
122
 
129
- /** The DESKTOP grant — OAuth authorization-code + PKCE against a loopback redirect the
130
- * browser on THIS machine can reach. Returns the short-lived session token. */
131
- async function loopbackGrantToken({ boxUrl, name, domain, intent }) {
132
- // PKCE (S256) + a CSRF state for the loopback redirect.
133
- const verifier = b64url(crypto.randomBytes(32));
134
- const challenge = b64url(crypto.createHash("sha256").update(verifier).digest());
135
- const state = b64url(crypto.randomBytes(16));
136
-
137
- const { port, done } = await startLoopback();
138
- const redirectUri = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/callback`;
139
- const authUrl =
140
- `${APP_URL}/cli-auth?` +
141
- new URLSearchParams({
142
- redirect_uri: redirectUri,
143
- state,
144
- code_challenge: challenge,
145
- code_challenge_method: "S256",
146
- host: boxUrl,
147
- name,
148
- // Copy-only hint for the consent card ("refresh" renews the image credential and
149
- // registers nothing) — the grant's power is identical either way.
150
- ...(intent && intent !== "link" ? { intent } : {}),
151
- }).toString();
152
-
153
- await presentAuthUrl(authUrl, { port, domain });
154
-
155
- let cb;
156
- try {
157
- cb = await done;
158
- } catch (e) {
159
- fail(`Link aborted: ${e.message}`);
160
- }
161
- if (cb.state !== state) fail("Link aborted: state mismatch (possible interception).");
162
-
163
- // Exchange the code (+ PKCE verifier) for a short-lived session, then register this runtime.
164
- const tok = await postJson(`${CP_URL}/cli-auth/token`, {
165
- code: cb.code,
166
- codeVerifier: verifier,
167
- redirectUri,
168
- });
169
- if (!tok.data?.token) {
170
- fail(`Link failed: could not exchange the authorization code (${tok.error ?? "malformed response"}).`);
171
- }
172
- return tok.data.token;
173
- }
174
-
175
- /**
176
- * The HEADLESS ceremony — the device-authorization flow (RFC 8628 shape), because a remote
177
- * box can't receive a loopback redirect and making the user build an ssh tunnel for a
178
- * sign-in was backwards. The CLI mints a grant, shows a short code + URL (any browser on
179
- * any device), and polls until the signed-in owner confirms. Throws on fatal (the caller
180
- * decides between fail() and best-effort skip); network blips just keep polling.
181
- */
182
- async function deviceGrantToken(host, name, intent) {
183
- const mint = await postJson(`${CP_URL}/cli-auth/device`, { host, name, intent });
184
- if (!mint.data?.deviceCode || !mint.data?.userCode) {
185
- throw new Error(`couldn't start the sign-in (${mint.error ?? "malformed response"}).`);
186
- }
187
- const { deviceCode, userCode, expiresIn = 600, interval = 3 } = mint.data;
188
- log("");
189
- step("Open this link on any device — your computer or your phone — and confirm the code:");
190
- log(` ${cyan(`${APP_URL}/cli-auth?code=${encodeURIComponent(userCode)}`)}`);
191
- log("");
192
- log(` Code: ${bold(userCode)}`);
193
- log("");
194
- log(dim(` (waiting for the confirmation — ${Math.round(expiresIn / 60)} minutes; this updates by itself)`));
195
- const deadline = Date.now() + expiresIn * 1000;
196
- while (Date.now() < deadline) {
197
- await sleep(interval * 1000);
198
- const res = await postJson(`${CP_URL}/cli-auth/device/token`, { deviceCode });
199
- if (res.data?.token) return res.data.token;
200
- if (res.data?.status === "pending") continue;
201
- if (res.error?.startsWith("HTTP")) throw new Error(`the sign-in was rejected (${res.error}).`);
202
- // Network blip — keep polling until the code's own deadline.
203
- }
204
- throw new Error("the code expired before it was confirmed — run the command again.");
205
- }
206
-
207
- /** Which ceremony fits this machine: the device flow wherever a local browser can't
208
- * receive the redirect (headless servers), the instant loopback redirect elsewhere.
209
- * ALEXANDR_DEVICE_FLOW=1|0 overrides either way. */
210
- function useDeviceFlow() {
211
- if (process.env.ALEXANDR_DEVICE_FLOW === "1") return true;
212
- if (process.env.ALEXANDR_DEVICE_FLOW === "0") return false;
213
- return isHeadless();
214
- }
215
-
216
123
  /** Register the runtime with a freshly-granted session and persist the credential trio. */
217
124
  async function registerAndPersist(inst, { boxUrl, name, sessionToken }) {
218
125
  const reg = await postJson(
@@ -310,9 +217,7 @@ export async function refreshRegistryLogin(inst, flags) {
310
217
  const { domain, boxUrl } = instanceCoords(inst, flags);
311
218
  const name = (readEnv(inst.dir).ALEXANDR_WORKSPACE_NAME || "").trim() || "Self-hosted runtime";
312
219
  step("Sign in to refresh this runtime's image credential…");
313
- const token = useDeviceFlow()
314
- ? await deviceGrantToken(boxUrl, name, "refresh")
315
- : await loopbackGrantToken({ boxUrl, name, domain, intent: "refresh" });
220
+ const { token } = await consentSession({ host: boxUrl, name, intent: "refresh", domain });
316
221
  return (await registryLogin(token)) === "done";
317
222
  }
318
223
 
@@ -329,62 +234,23 @@ export async function unlinkFromAccount(inst, flags) {
329
234
  return false;
330
235
  }
331
236
  step("Sign in to remove this runtime from your account…");
332
- if (useDeviceFlow()) {
333
- let token;
334
- try {
335
- token = await deviceGrantToken(kernelUrl(kernelPort(inst.dir)), "Unlink this runtime", "unlink");
336
- } catch (e) {
337
- log(dim(` (unlink skipped: ${e.message})`));
338
- return false;
339
- }
340
- try {
341
- const res = await fetch(`${CP_URL}/instances/${encodeURIComponent(workspaceId)}`, {
342
- method: "DELETE",
343
- headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
344
- });
345
- if (res.ok) scrubCredentials(inst.dir);
346
- return res.ok;
347
- } catch {
348
- return false;
349
- }
350
- }
351
- const verifier = b64url(crypto.randomBytes(32));
352
- const challenge = b64url(crypto.createHash("sha256").update(verifier).digest());
353
- const state = b64url(crypto.randomBytes(16));
354
- const { port, done } = await startLoopback();
355
- const redirectUri = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/callback`;
356
- const authUrl =
357
- `${APP_URL}/cli-auth?` +
358
- new URLSearchParams({
359
- redirect_uri: redirectUri,
360
- state,
361
- code_challenge: challenge,
362
- code_challenge_method: "S256",
237
+ let token;
238
+ try {
239
+ // No scope — a one-shot `cli-link` session is exactly what a DELETE needs.
240
+ ({ token } = await consentSession({
363
241
  host: kernelUrl(kernelPort(inst.dir)),
364
242
  name: "Unlink this runtime",
365
- }).toString();
366
- await presentAuthUrl(authUrl, { port, domain: (env.ALEXANDR_DOMAIN || "").trim() || undefined });
367
- let cb;
368
- try {
369
- cb = await done;
243
+ intent: "unlink",
244
+ domain: (env.ALEXANDR_DOMAIN || "").trim() || undefined,
245
+ }));
370
246
  } catch (e) {
371
247
  log(dim(` (unlink skipped: ${e.message})`));
372
248
  return false;
373
249
  }
374
- if (cb.state !== state) return false;
375
- const tok = await postJson(`${CP_URL}/cli-auth/token`, {
376
- code: cb.code,
377
- codeVerifier: verifier,
378
- redirectUri,
379
- });
380
- if (!tok.data?.token) {
381
- log(dim(` (unlink skipped: ${tok.error ?? "malformed response"})`));
382
- return false;
383
- }
384
250
  try {
385
251
  const res = await fetch(`${CP_URL}/instances/${encodeURIComponent(workspaceId)}`, {
386
252
  method: "DELETE",
387
- headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${tok.data.token}` },
253
+ headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
388
254
  });
389
255
  if (res.ok) scrubCredentials(inst.dir);
390
256
  return res.ok;
@@ -402,119 +268,6 @@ function scrubCredentials(dir) {
402
268
  unsetEnv(dir, "ALEXANDR_WORKSPACE_ID");
403
269
  }
404
270
 
405
- /** No local browser to open — a Linux box with no display server. The PRIMARY self-host
406
- * case, so it must be first-class, not a dim afterthought. Pure for tests. */
407
- export function isHeadless(platform = process.platform, env = process.env) {
408
- return platform === "linux" && !env.DISPLAY && !env.WAYLAND_DISPLAY;
409
- }
410
-
411
- /**
412
- * Present the consent URL honestly, by what this machine can actually do:
413
- * - HEADLESS (a server): never pretend a browser opened. Numbered steps, tunnel FIRST
414
- * (the redirect lands on the desktop's loopback and must reach this box), URL bright.
415
- * - DESKTOP + TTY: ask before taking over the browser — the URL is printed either way,
416
- * so "open it yourself" is always available.
417
- * - DESKTOP non-TTY (scripts): old behavior — print + best-effort open, nothing blocks.
418
- */
419
- export async function presentAuthUrl(authUrl, { port, domain, headless = isHeadless() }) {
420
- const sshTarget = `${process.env.USER || "root"}@${domain || os.hostname()}`;
421
- if (headless) {
422
- log("");
423
- step("This machine has no browser — finish the sign-in from your computer:");
424
- log(` 1. Forward the callback port ${dim("(keep this running until you're done)")}:`);
425
- log(` ${bold(`ssh -L ${port}:127.0.0.1:${port} ${sshTarget}`)}`);
426
- log(` 2. Open this link in a browser signed in to your alexandr account:`);
427
- log(` ${cyan(authUrl)}`);
428
- log(dim(` (waiting for the confirmation — ${TIMEOUT_MS / 60000} minutes)`));
429
- return;
430
- }
431
- log(dim(authUrl));
432
- if (process.stdin.isTTY && process.stdout.isTTY) {
433
- await new Promise((resolve) => {
434
- const rl = readline.createInterface({ input: process.stdin, output: process.stdout });
435
- rl.question(`${cyan("›")} Press Enter to open your browser and confirm ${dim("(or open the link above yourself)")} `, () => {
436
- rl.close();
437
- resolve();
438
- });
439
- });
440
- }
441
- openURL(authUrl);
442
- }
443
-
444
- /** Start a loopback listener for the OAuth redirect. Resolves {code,state} when /callback is hit. */
445
- export function startLoopback() {
446
- let resolveFn, rejectFn;
447
- const done = new Promise((res, rej) => {
448
- resolveFn = res;
449
- rejectFn = rej;
450
- });
451
- const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
452
- const u = new URL(req.url, "http://127.0.0.1");
453
- // Reachability probe for the consent page: /cli-auth pings this before the user
454
- // clicks Link, so a missing ssh tunnel becomes a guided "start the tunnel" notice
455
- // instead of a dead browser error page after the click. The PNA header answers
456
- // Chrome's public→loopback preflight; ACAO lets the page read the success.
457
- if (u.pathname === "/ping") {
458
- res.writeHead(204, {
459
- "access-control-allow-origin": "*",
460
- "access-control-allow-methods": "GET, OPTIONS",
461
- "access-control-allow-headers": "*",
462
- "access-control-allow-private-network": "true",
463
- });
464
- res.end();
465
- return;
466
- }
467
- if (u.pathname !== "/callback") {
468
- res.writeHead(404);
469
- res.end();
470
- return;
471
- }
472
- res.writeHead(200, { "content-type": "text/html; charset=utf-8" });
473
- res.end(
474
- "<!doctype html><meta charset=utf-8><body style='font:16px system-ui;padding:3rem;text-align:center'>Linked — you can close this tab and return to your terminal.</body>",
475
- );
476
- clearTimeout(timer);
477
- setTimeout(() => server.close(), 200);
478
- const code = u.searchParams.get("code");
479
- const st = u.searchParams.get("state");
480
- if (code && st) resolveFn({ code, state: st });
481
- else rejectFn(new Error("no authorization code in the redirect"));
482
- });
483
- const timer = setTimeout(() => {
484
- server.close();
485
- rejectFn(new Error("timed out waiting for the browser confirmation"));
486
- }, TIMEOUT_MS);
487
- return new Promise((ready, readyErr) => {
488
- server.once("error", (e) => {
489
- rejectFn(e);
490
- readyErr(e);
491
- });
492
- server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => ready({ port: server.address().port, done }));
493
- });
494
- }
495
-
496
- /** POST json → `{ data }` on success, `{ error }` on failure. The CP writes human-readable
497
- * `error` strings (e.g. the closed-alpha 403 explains exactly who may register), so failures
498
- * must carry WHY — a bare null renders as "could not register this runtime" with the real
499
- * reason swallowed. Callers surface `error` in their fail/skip message. */
500
- async function postJson(url, body, headers = {}) {
501
- try {
502
- const res = await fetch(url, {
503
- method: "POST",
504
- headers: { "content-type": "application/json", ...headers },
505
- body: JSON.stringify(body),
506
- });
507
- const data = await res.json().catch(() => null);
508
- if (!res.ok) {
509
- const detail = typeof data?.error === "string" && data.error ? ` — ${data.error}` : "";
510
- return { error: `HTTP ${res.status}${detail}` };
511
- }
512
- return data == null ? { error: "malformed response" } : { data };
513
- } catch (e) {
514
- return { error: `couldn't reach ${new URL(url).origin}: ${e?.message ?? e}` };
515
- }
516
- }
517
-
518
271
  async function isRunning(dir) {
519
272
  try {
520
273
  return !!(await health(kernelUrl(kernelPort(dir))));