aicodeman 1.45.0 → 1.47.0

package/dist/web/settings-writer.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview The writer of the server's `settings.json` (`SETTINGS_PATH`).
+ *
+ * Every read-modify-write of that file goes through `mutateSettingsFile()`, the same shape as
+ * `mutateRegistryFile()` (config/cli-registry/registry-writer.ts). The one direct writer is
+ * config-backup restore (`restoreConfigBackup()`, as for `clis.json`): it must work on a file that
+ * does not parse, which this writer refuses.
+ *
+ * - **Serialized.** Mutations run one at a time on a single promise chain, each one reading,
+ *   changing and writing before the next starts. The writers used to run unserialized with a
+ *   plain truncate-then-write `fs.writeFile`, and quick-start did not even await its
+ *   `lastUsedCase` write, so a quick-start followed by a settings save could tear the file (one
+ *   write's bytes over the tail of a longer one) or drop the other writer's key.
+ * - **Atomic.** Each write goes to its own temp file beside the target and is renamed over it,
+ *   so a reader never sees a half-written file.
+ * - **Refuses a file it must not trust.** Only a missing (or empty) file starts from `{}`. A file
+ *   that cannot be read or does not parse is left alone and the write throws
+ *   `SettingsWriteRefusedError`: the writers used to read such a file as `{}` and write back only
+ *   their own keys, which erased every other setting.
+ */
+import { type ApiResponse } from '../types.js';
+export type SettingsFile = Record<string, unknown>;
+/** A write refused because the existing `settings.json` must not be overwritten. The message is user-facing. */
+export declare class SettingsWriteRefusedError extends Error {
+    constructor(message: string);
+}
+/**
+ * Run one change to `settings.json`. `fn` receives the current settings and returns the settings
+ * to write, or `undefined` to write nothing. Resolves with the settings before and after the
+ * change (`after` is `undefined` when nothing was written). A refused or failed mutation rejects
+ * its own caller only; the chain keeps going.
+ */
+export declare function mutateSettingsFile(fn: (current: SettingsFile) => SettingsFile | undefined): Promise<{
+    before: SettingsFile;
+    after: SettingsFile | undefined;
+}>;
+/**
+ * Rejects with `SettingsWriteRefusedError` when `mutateSettingsFile()` would refuse a write right
+ * now: the writer's own read-for-write rule, run on its own. For a route that does something it
+ * cannot take back (case rename ends sessions) before its settings write. A check only, outside
+ * the chain (writes are atomic, so it never reads a half-written file); the file can still change
+ * before the write.
+ */
+export declare function assertSettingsWritable(): Promise<void>;
+/** A refused write answers 409 CONFLICT with the fix; any other failure stays OPERATION_FAILED. */
+export declare function settingsWriteErrorResponse(err: unknown): ApiResponse<never>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=settings-writer.d.ts.map

package/dist/web/settings-writer.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/web/settings-writer.js

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview The writer of the server's `settings.json` (`SETTINGS_PATH`).
+ *
+ * Every read-modify-write of that file goes through `mutateSettingsFile()`, the same shape as
+ * `mutateRegistryFile()` (config/cli-registry/registry-writer.ts). The one direct writer is
+ * config-backup restore (`restoreConfigBackup()`, as for `clis.json`): it must work on a file that
+ * does not parse, which this writer refuses.
+ *
+ * - **Serialized.** Mutations run one at a time on a single promise chain, each one reading,
+ *   changing and writing before the next starts. The writers used to run unserialized with a
+ *   plain truncate-then-write `fs.writeFile`, and quick-start did not even await its
+ *   `lastUsedCase` write, so a quick-start followed by a settings save could tear the file (one
+ *   write's bytes over the tail of a longer one) or drop the other writer's key.
+ * - **Atomic.** Each write goes to its own temp file beside the target and is renamed over it,
+ *   so a reader never sees a half-written file.
+ * - **Refuses a file it must not trust.** Only a missing (or empty) file starts from `{}`. A file
+ *   that cannot be read or does not parse is left alone and the write throws
+ *   `SettingsWriteRefusedError`: the writers used to read such a file as `{}` and write back only
+ *   their own keys, which erased every other setting.
+ */
+import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
+import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
+import { dirname } from 'node:path';
+import { ApiErrorCode, createErrorResponse, getErrorMessage } from '../types.js';
+import { SETTINGS_PATH } from './route-helpers.js';
+/** A write refused because the existing `settings.json` must not be overwritten. The message is user-facing. */
+export class SettingsWriteRefusedError extends Error {
+    constructor(message) {
+        super(message);
+        this.name = 'SettingsWriteRefusedError';
+    }
+}
+async function readSettingsForWrite(path) {
+    let raw;
+    try {
+        raw = await fs.readFile(path, 'utf-8');
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        if (err.code === 'ENOENT')
+            return {};
+        throw new SettingsWriteRefusedError(`Cannot read ${path} (${err.message}), so this change was not saved.`);
+    }
+    // An empty file holds no settings to lose.
+    if (raw.trim() === '')
+        return {};
+    let parsed;
+    try {
+        parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
+    }
+    catch {
+        parsed = undefined;
+    }
+    // The parser's own message is not repeated: it can quote the file, which may hold an API key.
+    if (typeof parsed !== 'object' || parsed === null || Array.isArray(parsed)) {
+        throw new SettingsWriteRefusedError(`${path} is not a valid JSON object, so this change was not saved (saving would have replaced every other setting in it). Fix or delete the file, or restore it from a config backup, then try again.`);
+    }
+    return parsed;
+}
+async function writeSettingsFile(path, settings) {
+    // Through a symlink, as the plain writeFile this replaces did: the rename lands on the real file.
+    const target = await fs.realpath(path).catch(() => path);
+    await fs.mkdir(dirname(target), { recursive: true });
+    const tmp = `${target}.${process.pid}.${randomUUID()}.tmp`;
+    try {
+        await fs.writeFile(tmp, JSON.stringify(settings, null, 2), { mode: 0o600 });
+        await fs.rename(tmp, target);
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        await fs.rm(tmp, { force: true }).catch(() => { });
+        throw err;
+    }
+}
+let mutationChain = Promise.resolve();
+/**
+ * Run one change to `settings.json`. `fn` receives the current settings and returns the settings
+ * to write, or `undefined` to write nothing. Resolves with the settings before and after the
+ * change (`after` is `undefined` when nothing was written). A refused or failed mutation rejects
+ * its own caller only; the chain keeps going.
+ */
+export function mutateSettingsFile(fn) {
+    const run = mutationChain.then(async () => {
+        const before = await readSettingsForWrite(SETTINGS_PATH).catch((err) => {
+            console.warn(`[settings] write refused: ${getErrorMessage(err)}`);
+            throw err;
+        });
+        const after = fn({ ...before });
+        if (after)
+            await writeSettingsFile(SETTINGS_PATH, after);
+        return { before, after };
+    });
+    mutationChain = run.catch(() => { });
+    return run;
+}
+/**
+ * Rejects with `SettingsWriteRefusedError` when `mutateSettingsFile()` would refuse a write right
+ * now: the writer's own read-for-write rule, run on its own. For a route that does something it
+ * cannot take back (case rename ends sessions) before its settings write. A check only, outside
+ * the chain (writes are atomic, so it never reads a half-written file); the file can still change
+ * before the write.
+ */
+export async function assertSettingsWritable() {
+    await readSettingsForWrite(SETTINGS_PATH);
+}
+/** A refused write answers 409 CONFLICT with the fix; any other failure stays OPERATION_FAILED. */
+export function settingsWriteErrorResponse(err) {
+    if (err instanceof SettingsWriteRefusedError)
+        return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.CONFLICT, err.message);
+    return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.OPERATION_FAILED, getErrorMessage(err));
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=settings-writer.js.map

package/dist/web/settings-writer.js.map

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package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "aicodeman",
-  "version": "1.45.0",
+  "version": "1.47.0",
   "description": "Self-hosted mission control for AI coding agents: run Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, Gemini, DeepSeek, Grok and more 24/7 in tmux, from any device.",
   "mcpName": "io.github.Ark0N/codeman",
   "type": "module",

package/skills/codeman/SKILL.md

@@ -8,12 +8,19 @@ description: >-
   read their output, and clean up; where available, message claude workers directly
   (Claude Code cross-session messaging). Use when asked to orchestrate or parallelize
   work across Codeman sessions, get a second opinion from another CLI or model, watch
-  another session, or start and manage workers. Only usable inside a Codeman-managed
-  session (CODEMAN_MUX=1); refuse to act otherwise.
+  another session, start and manage workers, or retrieve saved local Codex history
+  by file/native ID or root and descendants with topic/date filters. Live API
+  operations require a Codeman-managed session (CODEMAN_MUX=1). Offline history
+  reads do not require a server or managed session.
 ---
 
 # Driving Codeman from inside a session
 
+For **saved Codex conversation history**, use `codeman history read` and
+[reference/history.md](reference/history.md). This is a read-only local command:
+route to it **before §0**, including outside a managed session. It needs no API
+URL, credentials or running server. All live API operations below retain §0.
+
 You are an agent running inside a Codeman-managed terminal session. Codeman is the
 server that spawned you; its HTTP API can start, prompt, watch, and delete other
 sessions.
@@ -30,21 +37,33 @@ through: the verbs in detail (the old §5) in [reference/verbs.md](reference/ver
 worked multi-worker flows in [reference/recipes.md](reference/recipes.md), endpoint
 tables and a symptom gallery in [reference/endpoints.md](reference/endpoints.md), and
 direct messaging to claude workers in [reference/messaging.md](reference/messaging.md).
+Experimental bounded inspection and guarded stage/submit load only when needed from
+[reference/inspection-and-staging.md](reference/inspection-and-staging.md).
 
 This skill works the same whichever CLI you are: Codeman puts it where each CLI looks
 for skills (`.claude/skills/` for Claude Code, `.agents/skills/` for Codex, Gemini CLI,
 OpenCode, Antigravity, Grok, DeepSeek and OMP). A **pi** or **shell** worker never gets
 it, but has the same environment: tell it *"other sessions: `codeman agent --help`"*.
-That bundled CLI (`ls`, `spawn`, `send`, `wait`, `read`, `interrupt`, `rm`, and the inbox
-verbs `post`, `inbox`, `ack`) is the same
+That bundled CLI (`ls`, `spawn`, `send`, `wait`, `read`, `inspect`, `stage`, `submit`,
+`interrupt`, `rm`, and the inbox verbs `post`, `inbox`, `ack`) is the same
 verbs over the same endpoints, with the guards below (no control bytes, no self-delete,
 no guessed URL) enforced in code, and it is also your own way through when this
 machine has no `jq` for the preamble below.
 
+For an existing project, use one command:
+`codeman agent spawn --working-dir /path/to/project --mode codex`. With no case and
+no `--working-dir`, `spawn` uses cwd. Give editing workers separate worktrees. A
+positional case keeps quick-start behavior and cannot be combined with
+`--working-dir`; an empty `--working-dir` (`"$WT"` unset) refuses with exit 4
+rather than falling back to cwd, and a cwd that is HOME refuses too (hooks would
+land in `~/.claude`; pass `--working-dir ~` to mean it). Directory launches keep parent lineage and never
+mark the project as agent scratch. If startup fails or is ambiguous, the CLI
+reports the exact created ID: inspect it before retrying or cleaning up.
+
 ## 0. Guard and bootstrap
 
-If `CODEMAN_MUX` is not `1`, **stop and say so**. Do not guess an API URL; a server
-you are not part of is not yours to drive.
+For live API operations, if `CODEMAN_MUX` is not `1`, **stop and say so**.
+Do not guess an API URL; a server you are not part of is not yours to drive.
 
 Two failures come from your CLI, not from Codeman: name them to the user instead of
 retrying.

package/skills/codeman/reference/history.md

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+# Saved Codex history (offline)
+
+Use `codeman history read` for retained local Codex JSONL transcripts. This command
+works outside a managed session and never calls the HTTP API. Do not bootstrap
+API credentials or require `CODEMAN_MUX` for this read-only job.
+
+Choose exactly one selector:
+
+```bash
+codeman history read --file /path/to/rollout.jsonl
+codeman history read --session-id aaaaaaaa --sessions-root /path/to/sessions
+codeman history read --root-session-id aaaaaaaa-1111-4111-8111-111111111111 \
+  --topic 'authentication' --after 2026-10-01 --before 2026-10-24 \
+  --max-bytes 65536
+```
+
+`--session-id` accepts a native conversation UUID or unique prefix of at least
+8 characters; identity comes from metadata, not filenames. `--root-session-id`
+requires a full native UUID and includes transitive descendants found in metadata
+(spawned sub-agents and forks). The default store is `$CODEX_HOME/sessions`, or
+`~/.codex/sessions` when unset; a store directory that is itself a symlink is
+followed, links inside it are skipped. `--file` selects one file and does not
+search for its ancestors or children.
+
+Topic matching is a case-insensitive literal substring. Dates are inclusive
+`YYYY-MM-DD` bounds compared as UTC calendar dates. Each filter selects whole
+user/assistant turns; a turn is retained if it has a date match and a topic match,
+which may be different messages in that turn. Tool calls/results and injected
+context (rows Codex adds that start with `#` or `<`, such as AGENTS.md and
+`<environment_context>`) are omitted. Adjacent duplicate native representations
+are collapsed; repeated messages from the same representation are retained.
+
+A forked or spawned thread's file starts with a copy of its parent's history. That
+copy is dropped (it is in the parent's own file), so each record belongs to the
+thread that wrote it. A later `session_meta` for any thread that is not a declared
+ancestor still refuses the file.
+
+JSON is the default (`--json` or `--format json`); `--format text` prints one block
+per record. `--json` together with `--format text` is an error.
+Results identify source paths, native session/root IDs, timestamps, roles and phases,
+plus scan counters and `complete`. `phase` is Codex's own (`commentary` or
+`final_answer`) on assistant records and `null` on user records or when none was
+recorded. A root ID is `null` when ancestry cannot be proven.
+Report that uncertainty; never relabel the queried child as its own root.
+`complete: false` reports malformed or partial records (a running Codex may be
+mid-write), skipped links, unattributed files, compressed rollouts, unreadable
+directories, missing ancestors, or an inherited copy whose end could not be found
+or proven (including when the parent's file is present but cannot be read). It
+does not prove the store includes every conversation ever created, and a filtered
+result is only evidence for its selected scope.
+
+Reads require regular UTF8 files and reject final-component symlinks, conflicting
+metadata, ambiguous IDs, cyclic ancestry and invalid selectors. A store file that
+cannot be attributed (invalid UTF8 in its head, no metadata in its first 128 KiB,
+changing while its head is read) is counted in `unattributedFiles` instead of
+failing the lookup. Codex's optional rollout compression rewrites cold rollouts to
+`*.jsonl.zst`; those are not read. Each is counted in `compressedFiles` (one whose
+plain `.jsonl` sibling exists is skipped, as Codex skips it), and a lookup that
+misses names them. A compressed file passed to `--file` is refused; read a
+decompressed copy instead (`zstd -dc <file> > copy.jsonl`). A selected rollout
+that a running Codex is appending to is read as a snapshot up to its last complete
+line; one that was replaced or truncated fails. Parent directories of an explicitly supplied path must be trusted; this is
+not a filesystem sandbox.
+
+Budgets, each failing with an error rather than a partial answer. Every flag is
+validated before the first file is read, and only plain decimal integers are
+accepted:
+
+| Flag | Bounds | Default | Maximum |
+| ---- | ------ | ------- | ------- |
+| `--metadata-bytes` | head reads attributing every rollout in the store | 1 GiB | 16 GiB |
+| `--max-entries` | directory entries visited | 65536 | 1048576 |
+| `--scan-bytes` | the selected transcripts, plus any parent file read to prove where a copy ends (each file charged once) | 16 MiB | 256 MiB |
+| `--max-bytes` | output, including the final newline | 8192 | 1048576 |
+
+Each rollout's `session_meta` carries Codex's base instructions (about 20 KiB), so
+attributing a store costs about that much per rollout, charged to
+`--metadata-bytes`, never to `--scan-bytes`. Directory depth is capped at 8 (Codex
+writes `YYYY/MM/DD`). Output is never silently truncated or split into partial
+JSON or turns. Narrow the store/filters or explicitly raise the relevant budget.
+Missing evidence is an error, not an empty success.
+
+This command does not inspect live panes, stage prompts, submit input or manage
+sessions. For live operations return to the managed-session guard in the skill.

package/skills/codeman/reference/inspection-and-staging.md

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+# Experimental bounded inspection and guarded submission
+
+**Experimental:** `codeman agent inspect`, `stage` and `submit`, and their
+`/api/v1/sessions/:id/inspect|stage|submit` routes (including `/api` aliases),
+are labeled experimental and so are not part of the stable CLI/HTTP contract. Their commands, flags, paths,
+payloads and behavior may change or be removed in a minor or patch release.
+Pin a compatible Codeman version when automating them. Authentication and
+session ownership checks still apply.
+
+They are also opt-in: until the user turns on **Experimental agent coordination**
+in App Settings (`agentCoordinationEnabled`, off by default), every one of them
+fails with `FORBIDDEN: ... (HTTP 403)` naming that setting. That is not something
+to retry or work around: tell the user, or use `send`/`read` instead.
+
+Use these commands inside a Codeman session. They use its authenticated HTTP API.
+They supplement `send`, `wait` and `read` over the same HTTP transport; no direct
+tmux access is required.
+
+## Inspect recent evidence
+
+```bash
+codeman agent inspect "$SID" --max-bytes 8192 --json
+codeman agent inspect "$SID" --max-bytes 8192 --since "$CURSOR" --json
+```
+
+Read `source`, `identity`, `activity`, `evidence`, `truncated` and `cursor` before
+interpreting the result. `maxBytes` bounds UTF8 evidence bytes, excluding the JSON
+metadata/envelope. The default is 8192, maximum 65536.
+
+- `codex-jsonl`: strictly attributed local Codex JSONL records. The first call
+  selects recent complete records within a bounded tail window;
+  `omittedBeforeBytes` labels older bytes deliberately omitted. A cursor continues
+  after the last consumed complete record. Partial final records remain pending.
+- `pane-snapshot`: UTF8-safe tail of a visible frame or the session's buffered
+  output. It has `incremental:false` and `cursor:null`. This is the fallback for
+  other modes, remote/container sessions, ambiguous attribution, and exhausted
+  attribution budgets. Repeating a snapshot can repeat evidence.
+
+Attribution proves which file supplied the evidence, not which thread is now
+active in the TUI. A launch resume that conflicts with a newly owned rollout
+falls back to a snapshot. An in-CLI `/resume` of an existing foreign-originator
+thread may leave launch metadata unchanged. Check `identity.conversationId`;
+these reads do not provide authoritative current-thread tracking.
+
+Terminal resizes preserve inspection cursors. Cursors are opaque, scoped to the
+requesting identity, session, pane lifecycle generation
+and attributed transcript, expire after 15 minutes, and disappear on server
+restart. Each caller and session keeps its newest 8 (so retrying the last call
+works), at most 1024 in all; an older cursor can be retired. A replaced/truncated/rewritten source, reassociated session, foreign cursor
+or unavailable native source returns `409 CONFLICT`. Inspect again without
+`--since` to establish a new tail baseline; this may omit older evidence.
+
+`blockedReason` explains an unfinished or oversized record. Incremental reads
+never split or silently skip one. Increase the byte budget for
+`record-exceeds-output-budget`; when the record exceeds the maximum or scan cap,
+use `read --tail` for a labeled terminal view or start a fresh tail baseline.
+Inspect scans at most 256 KiB of record data plus bounded generation anchors.
+Attribution separately caps directory entries (8192), depth (8), negative-filter
+prefix reads (8 MiB) and candidate metadata including final verification (1 MiB). Evidence and
+activity are observations, not proof of task completion or authorization.
+
+## Stage, inspect, then submit once
+
+```bash
+printf '%s' 'Review src/ and report the failing tests' > /tmp/codeman-message.txt
+codeman agent stage "$SID" --message-file /tmp/codeman-message.txt --json
+# Review the returned stageId, sha256, expiresAt; inspect the target if needed.
+codeman agent submit "$SID" --stage-id "$STAGE_ID" --confirm-sha "$SHA256" --json
+```
+
+Stage types the file contents **without Enter**. The file must be regular, UTF8,
+one printable line, at most 8192 bytes, with no control characters or trailing
+whitespace/newline. It initially supports a local Codex composer with a recognized
+footer and an exact, unwrapped line/caret capture. Before typing, stage checks
+the actual captured width and composer indentation; a message that would reach
+the right edge or wrap is refused without writing anything. Unknown, working, modal,
+wrapped, remote/container and shell composers are refused. A customized footer or
+unsupported character-width rendering can also make verification unavailable.
+Self-targets are refused by the CLI.
+
+Stage also refuses, before typing, a message that would change what Enter does:
+one starting with `/` (a Codex slash command; with its command list open, Enter
+would run the highlighted command instead) or `!` (a shell command), and one whose
+**last** word starts with `@` (file/mention search) or `$` (skills). Those popups
+follow the caret, which stage leaves at the end, so `look at @src/app.ts please`
+is fine. Send slash and shell commands with `codeman agent send`, and end a
+message with an ordinary word when it mentions a file. A frame showing a
+suggestion popup above the composer is refused at stage and submit too.
+
+The receipt stores a hash and ephemeral identities, never prompt content. It
+expires after two minutes; capacity is 1024 live receipts. After typing, stage
+re-reads the pane (every 50 ms, up to one second, since Codex repaints a little
+after the keys) and issues a receipt only for a frame that shows exactly the
+message with the caret after it. Any refusal after the keys went out (typing
+failed or was ambiguous, the pane or input changed, or no frame verified in time)
+says the message may already be in the composer: no receipt was issued. Do not
+stage again on top of it; follow [Recover a stranded draft](#recover-a-stranded-draft) below first.
+
+While a submit's Enter is in flight (milliseconds, plus the moment it takes to
+write input held behind it), TAGGED input to that session (`clientId` and `seq`,
+which `codeman agent send` and `interrupt` always carry) answers `409 CONFLICT`
+with nothing written; retry it. Untagged input, terminal keystrokes, `send-key`
+and Codeman's own managed writes are held instead and written in arrival order
+once the Enter is out.
+
+Submit checks the caller, session, hash, expiry, pane lifecycle, input revision,
+geometry, exact composer and caret, then sends one conditional Enter at the session's input
+boundary. It first waits until 250 ms have passed since stage typed (Codex turns an
+Enter that follows typed text within 120 ms into a newline), so submitting right
+after stage is fine. Competing Codeman writes are held during dispatch and written
+after it, except tagged input, which is refused with `409`. Browser/API/key
+input and managed restarts invalidate receipts even when the visible text or pid
+is restored. Direct tmux edits are outside that input serialization; captures
+remain evidence at the time observed, rather than terminal isolation.
+
+Every owned submit attempt consumes its receipt, including hash mismatch,
+verification failure and delivery failure. Concurrent/repeated submits cannot
+replay Enter, and there is no autonomous retry. A successful response means one
+Enter was delivered; use inspection or a suitable wait signal to observe native
+acceptance. A `409` or broken connection means inspect first. Do not automatically
+stage/submit again or send an unguarded Enter to recover.
+
+## Recover a stranded draft
+
+A consumed receipt cannot be reused, and a stage refused after typing issued
+none. First observe whether the prompt is still in the composer or was accepted: use transcript evidence/wait signals and a fresh terminal capture
+(`GET /api/v1/sessions/:id/terminal?tail=8192`). If the target is working, has
+accepted the prompt, shows a dialog, or delivery is ambiguous, keep observing;
+do not clear or resend anything. A transcript prompt row alone is not proof
+that text remains unsent in the current composer.
+
+Only recover an unambiguously unsent draft in an input-ready local Codex
+composer: verify the complete draft, recognized footer and caret at its end in
+the current frame, and ensure no other writer can edit this target during
+recovery. If the frame is wrapped, incomplete or unclear, ask the user to clear
+it in the terminal instead of guessing keys. Never use `send` to overwrite a
+draft: that appends and submits both prompts together.
+
+After those checks, the known Codex line-clear chord may be sent once through
+the existing raw input route, with **no Enter**. This conditional example uses
+the authenticated `CURL`/`API` values loaded by §0 and the exact target id:
+
+```bash
+"${CURL[@]}" -X POST "$API/api/v1/sessions/$SID/input" \
+  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"input":"\u0015","useMux":false}'
+```
+
+Do not retry a failed/ambiguous clear blindly. Read a fresh terminal frame and
+verify the composer is empty and input-ready. Only then create a **fresh** stage
+receipt for the intended prompt and submit that receipt once. If the draft did
+not clear, the target began working, or verification remains uncertain, stop and
+ask the user; do not send an unguarded Enter or replay the old prompt.

package/skills/codeman/reference/messaging.md

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ own head: the worker enforcing the cap is the one who has to be told about it.
 
 | Job | Channel |
 | --- | --- |
-| spawn a worker, create its case | HTTP `quick-start` (the only path) |
+| spawn a worker, create its case | HTTP `quick-start` (the only path that creates a case); an existing directory is `POST sessions` + `interactive` (`codeman agent spawn --working-dir`) |
 | readiness, incl. the trust dialog | HTTP, Flow 1 (a message cannot answer a dialog) |
 | deliver a task to a READY claude worker | **messaging** (preferred) or HTTP input |
 | steer a BUSY claude worker mid-turn | **messaging** (read between the worker's tool calls; the HTTP path can only type into the composer, where text waits for the turn to end) |

package/skills/codeman/reference/verbs.md

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ wrong directory.** `quick-start` with a new `caseName` does not find your repo:
 |-------------------|------|------------------------------|
 | a fresh scratch dir (throwaway experiments) | `POST /api/v1/quick-start {"caseName":"scratch-1","mode":"claude"}` with a **new** case name | Codeman creates the directory and **writes hooks**: `stop` and `blocked` fire, send-and-wait is trustworthy |
 | a linked case (a real repo in the linked-cases registry) | same call with the linked name | **hooks installed at session create**, so `stop` fires here too. Not guaranteed: the operator can turn it off. Check |
-| any other absolute path, e.g. a git worktree you made | `POST /api/v1/sessions {"workingDir":"/abs/path","mode":"claude"}` then `POST /api/v1/sessions/:id/interactive` | same: **hooks installed at session create**, subject to the same setting. Check |
+| any other absolute path, e.g. a git worktree you made | `POST /api/v1/sessions {"workingDir":"/abs/path","mode":"claude"}` then `POST /api/v1/sessions/:id/interactive` (what `codeman agent spawn --working-dir /abs/path` sends) | same: **hooks installed at session create**, subject to the same setting. Check |
 
 Read `.data.casePath` back from the `quick-start` response and check it is where you
 meant. `caseName` accepts letters, digits, `-` and `_` only, and it resolves through
@@ -550,8 +550,10 @@ this (`src/web/routes/approval-routes.ts:43`). ESC is then claude's own interrup
 that half is the CLI's behavior, not something this API guarantees.
 
 - **This is not the composer-clearing tool.** Esc (and Ctrl+U) do **not** clear a
-  typed-but-unsubmitted prompt, verified live. The only recovery there is to submit it
-  with `{"input":"\r"}` and let the worker read the junk line.
+  typed-but-unsubmitted Claude prompt, verified live. Do not submit an unverified
+  draft merely to clear it. For a refused guarded local Codex stage or submit, use the
+  verified-unsent recovery in [inspection and staging](inspection-and-staging.md#recover-a-stranded-draft);
+  when the composer is unclear, ask the user to clear it in the terminal.
 - The interrupted turn already burned its tokens. Interrupting early saves the rest.
 - `POST /api/sessions/:id/send-key` is a different endpoint and cannot do this: its
   allowlist is S-Enter / C-Enter only.
@@ -811,3 +813,16 @@ Rules that matter:
   not parked, `send` it one line ("read your inbox: `codeman agent inbox`").
 - **Lifetime.** An inbox goes with its session on delete. A server restart empties all
   inboxes unless the user turned on *Keep agent inbox across restarts* in Settings.
+
+## Experimental bounded inspection and guarded submission
+
+These three commands and their HTTP routes are labeled experimental, so they may
+change or be removed in minor or patch releases. They are also opt-in
+(`agentCoordinationEnabled`, off by default: a 403 naming it until the user turns
+it on). Use `codeman agent inspect` for bounded evidence and incremental local
+Codex cursors.
+Use `codeman agent stage --message-file` followed by one hash-confirmed
+`codeman agent submit --stage-id --confirm-sha` when the exact local Codex
+composer and caret can be verified. Other targets provide labeled snapshots or
+refuse guarded input. See [inspection and staging](inspection-and-staging.md)
+for budgets, receipt expiry, conflict handling and supported composers.