agor-live 0.17.2 → 0.17.3

package/dist/core/{user-DkNdeFoz.d.cts → user-CpfkcV2C.d.cts}

@@ -69,6 +69,123 @@ interface DefaultAgenticConfig {
     opencode?: DefaultAgenticToolConfig;
     copilot?: DefaultAgenticToolConfig;
 }
+/**
+ * Per-tool credential field shapes.
+ *
+ * Field names equal the env var names exported into the SDK CLI's environment.
+ * Storage values are encrypted at rest; the public DTO (User.agentic_tools)
+ * exposes the same field names with `boolean` presence flags.
+ */
+interface ClaudeCodeConfig {
+    ANTHROPIC_API_KEY?: string;
+    CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN?: string;
+    ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN?: string;
+    ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL?: string;
+}
+interface CodexConfig {
+    OPENAI_API_KEY?: string;
+    OPENAI_BASE_URL?: string;
+}
+interface GeminiConfig {
+    GEMINI_API_KEY?: string;
+}
+interface CopilotConfig {
+    COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Per-tool credential map. Each tool's config is independent and
+ * scoped to its own SDK at session-spawn time.
+ */
+interface AgenticToolsConfig {
+    'claude-code'?: ClaudeCodeConfig;
+    codex?: CodexConfig;
+    gemini?: GeminiConfig;
+    copilot?: CopilotConfig;
+    opencode?: Record<string, never>;
+}
+/** Union of all valid env-var-named fields across all tool configs. */
+type AgenticToolConfigField = keyof ClaudeCodeConfig | keyof CodexConfig | keyof GeminiConfig | keyof CopilotConfig;
+/**
+ * Public DTO shape: per-tool credential presence flags.
+ *
+ * Flips every field of every tool config from `string` (encrypted) to `boolean`
+ * (set/unset). Used by `User.agentic_tools` and the user-facing API responses
+ * — the daemon never returns decrypted credential values to clients.
+ */
+type AgenticToolsStatus = {
+    [Tool in keyof AgenticToolsConfig]?: AgenticToolsConfig[Tool] extends infer Cfg ? {
+        [Field in keyof Cfg]?: boolean;
+    } : never;
+};
+/**
+ * Encrypted-at-rest projection of `AgenticToolsConfig` — the on-disk shape of
+ * `users.data.agentic_tools`. Each field's `string` (plaintext) is replaced
+ * with the encrypted ciphertext bytes (also a string at the storage layer).
+ *
+ * Lives next to `AgenticToolsConfig` so the canonical type, the public DTO,
+ * and the storage projection move together. Imported by the repo (writer/
+ * decryptor), the env resolver (reader), and the daemon users service
+ * (patcher) — keeping the alias single-source avoids the historical drift
+ * across these three call sites.
+ */
+type StoredAgenticTools = {
+    [Tool in keyof AgenticToolsConfig]?: Record<string, string>;
+};
+/**
+ * Project the encrypted-at-rest blob to the boolean presence DTO returned to
+ * clients. Empty buckets are dropped so the API response stays compact.
+ */
+declare function toAgenticToolsStatus(stored: StoredAgenticTools | undefined): AgenticToolsStatus | undefined;
+/**
+ * Update DTO shape: per-tool credential patch payload.
+ *
+ * String values set the field (plaintext, encrypted before storage); `null`
+ * clears the field. Omitted fields are untouched. Used by PATCH /users/:id.
+ */
+type AgenticToolsUpdate = {
+    [Tool in keyof AgenticToolsConfig]?: AgenticToolsConfig[Tool] extends infer Cfg ? {
+        [Field in keyof Cfg]?: string | null;
+    } : never;
+};
+/**
+ * Per-tool whitelist of fields whose plaintext is safe to echo back to the
+ * field's owner.
+ *
+ * Base URLs are config (not credentials) — the user benefits from seeing the
+ * exact value they configured (e.g. distinguishing
+ * `https://gateway.example.com/v1` from `https://gateway.example.com`). API
+ * keys, OAuth tokens, and auth tokens are NEVER on this list and never
+ * decrypted on read.
+ *
+ * Even for whitelisted fields, the daemon only returns the plaintext to the
+ * field's *owner* — never to other users (base URLs can leak internal
+ * hostnames) and never to admins viewing someone else's profile.
+ */
+declare const AGENTIC_TOOLS_PUBLIC_FIELDS: {
+    readonly [Tool in keyof AgenticToolsConfig]?: ReadonlyArray<keyof NonNullable<AgenticToolsConfig[Tool]> & string>;
+};
+/**
+ * Owner-visible plaintext values for the fields listed in
+ * `AGENTIC_TOOLS_PUBLIC_FIELDS`. Sibling map to `AgenticToolsStatus` —
+ * presence remains the source of truth; this just lets the UI render the
+ * saved value back without forcing a clear-and-retype.
+ *
+ * Always undefined / partial when the requester is not the field's owner.
+ */
+type AgenticToolsPublicValues = {
+    [Tool in keyof AgenticToolsConfig]?: AgenticToolsConfig[Tool] extends infer Cfg ? {
+        [Field in keyof Cfg]?: string;
+    } : never;
+};
+/**
+ * Decrypt the whitelisted public fields from the on-disk encrypted blob.
+ * Returns undefined when no public fields are populated, so the API response
+ * stays compact.
+ *
+ * The caller is responsible for the self-only authorization check — this
+ * helper assumes the requester is already authorized to see the values.
+ */
+declare function extractAgenticToolsPublicValues(stored: StoredAgenticTools | undefined, decrypt: (ciphertext: string) => string): AgenticToolsPublicValues | undefined;
 /**
  * Available task completion chime sounds
  */
@@ -137,12 +254,20 @@ interface User extends BaseUserFields {
     created_at: Date;
     updated_at?: Date;
     unix_username?: string;
-    api_keys?: {
-        ANTHROPIC_API_KEY?: boolean;
-        OPENAI_API_KEY?: boolean;
-        GEMINI_API_KEY?: boolean;
-        COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN?: boolean;
-    };
+    /**
+     * Per-tool credential & auth status (boolean only, never exposes actual values).
+     *
+     * Mirrors `AgenticToolsConfig` field-for-field with each value flipped from
+     * encrypted-string to `boolean` for presence checking.
+     */
+    agentic_tools?: AgenticToolsStatus;
+    /**
+     * Plaintext values for fields listed in `AGENTIC_TOOLS_PUBLIC_FIELDS` —
+     * only populated when the requester is the field's owner. Lets the UI
+     * render the saved value (e.g. the user's custom `OPENAI_BASE_URL`) back
+     * without forcing a clear-and-retype. Never contains API keys or tokens.
+     */
+    agentic_tools_public_values?: AgenticToolsPublicValues;
     env_vars?: Record<string, EnvVarMetadata>;
     default_agentic_config?: DefaultAgenticConfig;
 }
@@ -200,12 +325,13 @@ interface UpdateUserInput extends Partial<BaseUserFields> {
     unix_username?: string;
     /** Force user to change password on next login (admin-only) */
     must_change_password?: boolean;
-    api_keys?: {
-        ANTHROPIC_API_KEY?: string | null;
-        OPENAI_API_KEY?: string | null;
-        GEMINI_API_KEY?: string | null;
-        COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN?: string | null;
-    };
+    /**
+     * Per-tool credential updates (accepts plaintext, encrypted before storage).
+     *
+     * Each tool's sub-object is a partial patch — only fields you include are
+     * touched; `null` clears the field, a string sets it. Field names = env var names.
+     */
+    agentic_tools?: AgenticToolsUpdate;
     env_vars?: Record<string, string | null>;
     /**
      * Per-var scope updates, applied on top of any `env_vars` changes in the same PATCH.
@@ -229,4 +355,4 @@ interface SessionEnvSelection {
     created_at: Date;
 }
 
-export { type AudioPreferences as A, type BaseUserFields as B, type ChimeSound as C, type DefaultAgenticConfig as D, ENV_VAR_SCOPES_V05 as E, type OnboardingState as O, ROLES as R, type SessionEnvSelection as S, type UpdateUserInput as U, type CreateUserInput as a, type DefaultAgenticToolConfig as b, type DefaultModelConfig as c, type EnvVarMetadata as d, type EnvVarScope as e, type EventStreamPreferences as f, type User as g, type UserApiKey as h, type UserPreferences as i, type UserRole as j, hasMinimumRole as k, normalizeRole as n };
+export { AGENTIC_TOOLS_PUBLIC_FIELDS as A, type BaseUserFields as B, type ChimeSound as C, type DefaultAgenticConfig as D, ENV_VAR_SCOPES_V05 as E, type GeminiConfig as G, type OnboardingState as O, ROLES as R, type SessionEnvSelection as S, type UpdateUserInput as U, type AgenticToolConfigField as a, type AgenticToolsConfig as b, type AgenticToolsPublicValues as c, type AgenticToolsStatus as d, type AgenticToolsUpdate as e, type AudioPreferences as f, type ClaudeCodeConfig as g, type CodexConfig as h, type CopilotConfig as i, type CreateUserInput as j, type DefaultAgenticToolConfig as k, type DefaultModelConfig as l, type EnvVarMetadata as m, type EnvVarScope as n, type EventStreamPreferences as o, type StoredAgenticTools as p, type User as q, type UserApiKey as r, type UserPreferences as s, type UserRole as t, extractAgenticToolsPublicValues as u, hasMinimumRole as v, normalizeRole as w, toAgenticToolsStatus as x };

package/dist/core/{user-BfVWBmXA.d.ts → user-DP-XZMIM.d.ts}

@@ -69,6 +69,123 @@ interface DefaultAgenticConfig {
     opencode?: DefaultAgenticToolConfig;
     copilot?: DefaultAgenticToolConfig;
 }
+/**
+ * Per-tool credential field shapes.
+ *
+ * Field names equal the env var names exported into the SDK CLI's environment.
+ * Storage values are encrypted at rest; the public DTO (User.agentic_tools)
+ * exposes the same field names with `boolean` presence flags.
+ */
+interface ClaudeCodeConfig {
+    ANTHROPIC_API_KEY?: string;
+    CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN?: string;
+    ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN?: string;
+    ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL?: string;
+}
+interface CodexConfig {
+    OPENAI_API_KEY?: string;
+    OPENAI_BASE_URL?: string;
+}
+interface GeminiConfig {
+    GEMINI_API_KEY?: string;
+}
+interface CopilotConfig {
+    COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Per-tool credential map. Each tool's config is independent and
+ * scoped to its own SDK at session-spawn time.
+ */
+interface AgenticToolsConfig {
+    'claude-code'?: ClaudeCodeConfig;
+    codex?: CodexConfig;
+    gemini?: GeminiConfig;
+    copilot?: CopilotConfig;
+    opencode?: Record<string, never>;
+}
+/** Union of all valid env-var-named fields across all tool configs. */
+type AgenticToolConfigField = keyof ClaudeCodeConfig | keyof CodexConfig | keyof GeminiConfig | keyof CopilotConfig;
+/**
+ * Public DTO shape: per-tool credential presence flags.
+ *
+ * Flips every field of every tool config from `string` (encrypted) to `boolean`
+ * (set/unset). Used by `User.agentic_tools` and the user-facing API responses
+ * — the daemon never returns decrypted credential values to clients.
+ */
+type AgenticToolsStatus = {
+    [Tool in keyof AgenticToolsConfig]?: AgenticToolsConfig[Tool] extends infer Cfg ? {
+        [Field in keyof Cfg]?: boolean;
+    } : never;
+};
+/**
+ * Encrypted-at-rest projection of `AgenticToolsConfig` — the on-disk shape of
+ * `users.data.agentic_tools`. Each field's `string` (plaintext) is replaced
+ * with the encrypted ciphertext bytes (also a string at the storage layer).
+ *
+ * Lives next to `AgenticToolsConfig` so the canonical type, the public DTO,
+ * and the storage projection move together. Imported by the repo (writer/
+ * decryptor), the env resolver (reader), and the daemon users service
+ * (patcher) — keeping the alias single-source avoids the historical drift
+ * across these three call sites.
+ */
+type StoredAgenticTools = {
+    [Tool in keyof AgenticToolsConfig]?: Record<string, string>;
+};
+/**
+ * Project the encrypted-at-rest blob to the boolean presence DTO returned to
+ * clients. Empty buckets are dropped so the API response stays compact.
+ */
+declare function toAgenticToolsStatus(stored: StoredAgenticTools | undefined): AgenticToolsStatus | undefined;
+/**
+ * Update DTO shape: per-tool credential patch payload.
+ *
+ * String values set the field (plaintext, encrypted before storage); `null`
+ * clears the field. Omitted fields are untouched. Used by PATCH /users/:id.
+ */
+type AgenticToolsUpdate = {
+    [Tool in keyof AgenticToolsConfig]?: AgenticToolsConfig[Tool] extends infer Cfg ? {
+        [Field in keyof Cfg]?: string | null;
+    } : never;
+};
+/**
+ * Per-tool whitelist of fields whose plaintext is safe to echo back to the
+ * field's owner.
+ *
+ * Base URLs are config (not credentials) — the user benefits from seeing the
+ * exact value they configured (e.g. distinguishing
+ * `https://gateway.example.com/v1` from `https://gateway.example.com`). API
+ * keys, OAuth tokens, and auth tokens are NEVER on this list and never
+ * decrypted on read.
+ *
+ * Even for whitelisted fields, the daemon only returns the plaintext to the
+ * field's *owner* — never to other users (base URLs can leak internal
+ * hostnames) and never to admins viewing someone else's profile.
+ */
+declare const AGENTIC_TOOLS_PUBLIC_FIELDS: {
+    readonly [Tool in keyof AgenticToolsConfig]?: ReadonlyArray<keyof NonNullable<AgenticToolsConfig[Tool]> & string>;
+};
+/**
+ * Owner-visible plaintext values for the fields listed in
+ * `AGENTIC_TOOLS_PUBLIC_FIELDS`. Sibling map to `AgenticToolsStatus` —
+ * presence remains the source of truth; this just lets the UI render the
+ * saved value back without forcing a clear-and-retype.
+ *
+ * Always undefined / partial when the requester is not the field's owner.
+ */
+type AgenticToolsPublicValues = {
+    [Tool in keyof AgenticToolsConfig]?: AgenticToolsConfig[Tool] extends infer Cfg ? {
+        [Field in keyof Cfg]?: string;
+    } : never;
+};
+/**
+ * Decrypt the whitelisted public fields from the on-disk encrypted blob.
+ * Returns undefined when no public fields are populated, so the API response
+ * stays compact.
+ *
+ * The caller is responsible for the self-only authorization check — this
+ * helper assumes the requester is already authorized to see the values.
+ */
+declare function extractAgenticToolsPublicValues(stored: StoredAgenticTools | undefined, decrypt: (ciphertext: string) => string): AgenticToolsPublicValues | undefined;
 /**
  * Available task completion chime sounds
  */
@@ -137,12 +254,20 @@ interface User extends BaseUserFields {
     created_at: Date;
     updated_at?: Date;
     unix_username?: string;
-    api_keys?: {
-        ANTHROPIC_API_KEY?: boolean;
-        OPENAI_API_KEY?: boolean;
-        GEMINI_API_KEY?: boolean;
-        COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN?: boolean;
-    };
+    /**
+     * Per-tool credential & auth status (boolean only, never exposes actual values).
+     *
+     * Mirrors `AgenticToolsConfig` field-for-field with each value flipped from
+     * encrypted-string to `boolean` for presence checking.
+     */
+    agentic_tools?: AgenticToolsStatus;
+    /**
+     * Plaintext values for fields listed in `AGENTIC_TOOLS_PUBLIC_FIELDS` —
+     * only populated when the requester is the field's owner. Lets the UI
+     * render the saved value (e.g. the user's custom `OPENAI_BASE_URL`) back
+     * without forcing a clear-and-retype. Never contains API keys or tokens.
+     */
+    agentic_tools_public_values?: AgenticToolsPublicValues;
     env_vars?: Record<string, EnvVarMetadata>;
     default_agentic_config?: DefaultAgenticConfig;
 }
@@ -200,12 +325,13 @@ interface UpdateUserInput extends Partial<BaseUserFields> {
     unix_username?: string;
     /** Force user to change password on next login (admin-only) */
     must_change_password?: boolean;
-    api_keys?: {
-        ANTHROPIC_API_KEY?: string | null;
-        OPENAI_API_KEY?: string | null;
-        GEMINI_API_KEY?: string | null;
-        COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN?: string | null;
-    };
+    /**
+     * Per-tool credential updates (accepts plaintext, encrypted before storage).
+     *
+     * Each tool's sub-object is a partial patch — only fields you include are
+     * touched; `null` clears the field, a string sets it. Field names = env var names.
+     */
+    agentic_tools?: AgenticToolsUpdate;
     env_vars?: Record<string, string | null>;
     /**
      * Per-var scope updates, applied on top of any `env_vars` changes in the same PATCH.
@@ -229,4 +355,4 @@ interface SessionEnvSelection {
     created_at: Date;
 }
 
-export { type AudioPreferences as A, type BaseUserFields as B, type ChimeSound as C, type DefaultAgenticConfig as D, ENV_VAR_SCOPES_V05 as E, type OnboardingState as O, ROLES as R, type SessionEnvSelection as S, type UpdateUserInput as U, type CreateUserInput as a, type DefaultAgenticToolConfig as b, type DefaultModelConfig as c, type EnvVarMetadata as d, type EnvVarScope as e, type EventStreamPreferences as f, type User as g, type UserApiKey as h, type UserPreferences as i, type UserRole as j, hasMinimumRole as k, normalizeRole as n };
+export { AGENTIC_TOOLS_PUBLIC_FIELDS as A, type BaseUserFields as B, type ChimeSound as C, type DefaultAgenticConfig as D, ENV_VAR_SCOPES_V05 as E, type GeminiConfig as G, type OnboardingState as O, ROLES as R, type SessionEnvSelection as S, type UpdateUserInput as U, type AgenticToolConfigField as a, type AgenticToolsConfig as b, type AgenticToolsPublicValues as c, type AgenticToolsStatus as d, type AgenticToolsUpdate as e, type AudioPreferences as f, type ClaudeCodeConfig as g, type CodexConfig as h, type CopilotConfig as i, type CreateUserInput as j, type DefaultAgenticToolConfig as k, type DefaultModelConfig as l, type EnvVarMetadata as m, type EnvVarScope as n, type EventStreamPreferences as o, type StoredAgenticTools as p, type User as q, type UserApiKey as r, type UserPreferences as s, type UserRole as t, extractAgenticToolsPublicValues as u, hasMinimumRole as v, normalizeRole as w, toAgenticToolsStatus as x };

package/dist/core/utils/permission-mode-mapper.d.cts

@@ -14,8 +14,6 @@ import '../context-BpkCELpO.cjs';
  * - Claude Code: default, acceptEdits, bypassPermissions, plan, dontAsk
  * - Gemini: default, autoEdit, yolo
  * - Codex: ask, auto, on-failure, allow-all
- *
- * See: context/explorations/mcp-session-management.md for full specification
  */
 
 /**

package/dist/core/utils/permission-mode-mapper.d.ts

@@ -14,8 +14,6 @@ import '../context-BpkCELpO.js';
  * - Claude Code: default, acceptEdits, bypassPermissions, plan, dontAsk
  * - Gemini: default, autoEdit, yolo
  * - Codex: ask, auto, on-failure, allow-all
- *
- * See: context/explorations/mcp-session-management.md for full specification
  */
 
 /**