agentvibes 5.13.0 → 5.14.0

package/src/utils/music-file-validator.js

@@ -1,285 +1,285 @@
-/**
- * Music File Validator - Security-Critical Path and File Validation
- * Story 4.1: Path Validation and Security Hardening
- *
- * CRITICAL: All functions enforce CLAUDE.md security requirements:
- * - Use path.resolve() for all path operations
- * - Verify file ownership before processing external files
- * - Prevent path traversal attacks via traversal patterns, symlinks, etc.
- * - Validate file exists, is readable, and owned by current user
- *
- * @module music-file-validator
- * @requires fs
- * @requires path
- * @requires os
- */
-
-import fs from 'node:fs';
-import path from 'node:path';
-import os from 'node:os';
-
-/**
- * Story 4.1: Validate that a file path is safe and within user's home directory
- *
- * Security checks:
- * 1. Resolves path to absolute form (prevents ../ tricks)
- * 2. Validates path is within home directory
- * 3. Rejects symlinks pointing outside home
- * 4. Verifies file ownership matches current user
- * 5. Checks file is readable
- *
- * @param {string} userPath - Path provided by user (absolute or relative)
- * @param {string} userHomeDir - User's home directory (default: process.env.HOME)
- * @returns {Object} { isValid: boolean, error: string|null, resolvedPath: string|null }
- * @throws {Error} If path validation encounters unexpected errors
- */
-export function isPathSafe(userPath, userHomeDir = null) {
-  try {
-    // Parameter validation
-    if (!userPath || typeof userPath !== 'string') {
-      return {
-        isValid: false,
-        error: 'Path must be a non-empty string',
-        resolvedPath: null
-      };
-    }
-
-    // Use provided home dir or default to environment
-    const homeDir = userHomeDir || (process.env.HOME || process.env.USERPROFILE);
-    if (!homeDir) {
-      return {
-        isValid: false,
-        error: 'Unable to determine home directory',
-        resolvedPath: null
-      };
-    }
-
-    // CRITICAL: Use path.resolve() to get absolute path (CLAUDE.md requirement)
-    // This prevents directory traversal attacks like "../../etc/passwd"
-    const resolvedPath = path.resolve(userPath);
-    const resolvedHome = path.resolve(homeDir);
-
-    // Check if path is within home directory
-    // Must either match exactly OR start with home + separator (prevents /home/user2 bypass)
-    const isWithinHome = resolvedPath === resolvedHome ||
-                        resolvedPath.startsWith(resolvedHome + path.sep);
-
-    if (!isWithinHome) {
-      return {
-        isValid: false,
-        error: `Security validation failed: path must be within home directory (${resolvedHome})`,
-        resolvedPath: null
-      };
-    }
-
-    // SECURITY: Use lstatSync first to detect symlinks before following them (#131)
-    let lstats;
-    try {
-      lstats = fs.lstatSync(resolvedPath);
-    } catch (err) {
-      if (err.code === 'ENOENT') {
-        return { isValid: false, error: `File not found: ${userPath}`, resolvedPath: null };
-      }
-      return { isValid: false, error: `Cannot access file: ${err.message}`, resolvedPath: null };
-    }
-
-    // Check if symlink - if so, verify target is also within home directory
-    if (lstats.isSymbolicLink()) {
-      try {
-        const targetPath = fs.realpathSync(resolvedPath);
-        const isTargetWithinHome = targetPath === resolvedHome ||
-                                  targetPath.startsWith(resolvedHome + path.sep);
-
-        if (!isTargetWithinHome) {
-          return {
-            isValid: false,
-            error: 'Security validation failed: symlink target must be within home directory',
-            resolvedPath: null
-          };
-        }
-      } catch (err) {
-        return {
-          isValid: false,
-          error: `Failed to resolve symlink: ${err.message}`,
-          resolvedPath: null
-        };
-      }
-    }
-
-    // Get file stats (follows symlinks for regular file check)
-    const stats = fs.statSync(resolvedPath);
-
-    // Check if it's a regular file (not directory, special file, etc)
-    if (!stats.isFile()) {
-      return {
-        isValid: false,
-        error: `Path must be a regular file, not a ${stats.isDirectory() ? 'directory' : 'special file'}`,
-        resolvedPath: null
-      };
-    }
-
-    // CRITICAL: Verify file ownership (CLAUDE.md requirement)
-    // Prevent other users from planting malicious files
-    // SECURITY: Fail-secure on platforms where getuid is unavailable (#131)
-    const currentUserId = process.getuid ? process.getuid() : null;
-    if (currentUserId === null) {
-      return {
-        isValid: false,
-        error: 'Security validation failed: unable to verify file ownership on this platform',
-        resolvedPath: null
-      };
-    }
-    if (stats.uid !== currentUserId) {
-      return {
-        isValid: false,
-        error: 'Security validation failed: file not owned by current user',
-        resolvedPath: null
-      };
-    }
-
-    // Check if file is readable
-    try {
-      fs.accessSync(resolvedPath, fs.constants.R_OK);
-    } catch (err) {
-      return {
-        isValid: false,
-        error: `File is not readable: ${err.message}`,
-        resolvedPath: null
-      };
-    }
-
-    // All checks passed
-    return {
-      isValid: true,
-      error: null,
-      resolvedPath
-    };
-
-  } catch (err) {
-    // Unexpected error during validation
-    return {
-      isValid: false,
-      error: `Unexpected validation error: ${err.message}`,
-      resolvedPath: null
-    };
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Verify file size is within acceptable limits for music files
- *
- * @param {string} filePath - Path to file (must already be validated with isPathSafe)
- * @param {number} maxSizeBytes - Maximum file size in bytes (default: 50MB)
- * @returns {Object} { isValid: boolean, error: string|null, sizeBytes: number }
- */
-export function validateFileSize(filePath, maxSizeBytes = 50 * 1024 * 1024) {
-  try {
-    if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) {
-      return {
-        isValid: false,
-        error: 'File does not exist',
-        sizeBytes: 0
-      };
-    }
-
-    const stats = fs.statSync(filePath);
-    const sizeBytes = stats.size;
-
-    if (sizeBytes > maxSizeBytes) {
-      const sizeMB = (sizeBytes / 1024 / 1024).toFixed(2);
-      const maxMB = (maxSizeBytes / 1024 / 1024).toFixed(2);
-      return {
-        isValid: false,
-        error: `File size (${sizeMB}MB) exceeds maximum (${maxMB}MB)`,
-        sizeBytes
-      };
-    }
-
-    if (sizeBytes === 0) {
-      return {
-        isValid: false,
-        error: 'File is empty',
-        sizeBytes
-      };
-    }
-
-    return {
-      isValid: true,
-      error: null,
-      sizeBytes
-    };
-
-  } catch (err) {
-    return {
-      isValid: false,
-      error: `Error checking file size: ${err.message}`,
-      sizeBytes: 0
-    };
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Get secure temp directory for audio file operations
- * Uses XDG_RUNTIME_DIR if available (follows CLAUDE.md requirement)
- * Falls back to user-specific /tmp directory
- *
- * @param {string} prefix - Directory name prefix (default: 'agentvibes-music')
- * @returns {string} Secure temp directory path
- */
-export function getSecureTempDir(prefix = 'agentvibes-music') {
-  const xdgRuntime = process.env.XDG_RUNTIME_DIR;
-
-  if (xdgRuntime && fs.existsSync(xdgRuntime)) {
-    return path.join(xdgRuntime, `${prefix}-${process.pid}`);
-  }
-
-  // Fallback to user-specific /tmp
-  const userTmp = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `${prefix}-${process.env.USER || 'user'}`);
-  return userTmp;
-}
-
-/**
- * Create secure temp directory with restrictive permissions
- *
- * @param {string} dirPath - Directory path to create
- * @returns {Object} { success: boolean, error: string|null, dirPath: string|null }
- */
-export function createSecureTempDir(dirPath) {
-  try {
-    // Create directory if it doesn't exist
-    if (!fs.existsSync(dirPath)) {
-      fs.mkdirSync(dirPath, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-    } else {
-      // If exists, verify permissions are restrictive
-      const stats = fs.statSync(dirPath);
-      // Check if world-readable (mode & 0o077 should be 0 for secure)
-      if ((stats.mode & 0o077) !== 0) {
-        return {
-          success: false,
-          error: 'Temp directory has insecure permissions',
-          dirPath: null
-        };
-      }
-    }
-
-    return {
-      success: true,
-      error: null,
-      dirPath
-    };
-
-  } catch (err) {
-    return {
-      success: false,
-      error: `Failed to create secure temp directory: ${err.message}`,
-      dirPath: null
-    };
-  }
-}
-
-export default {
-  isPathSafe,
-  validateFileSize,
-  getSecureTempDir,
-  createSecureTempDir
-};
+/**
+ * Music File Validator - Security-Critical Path and File Validation
+ * Story 4.1: Path Validation and Security Hardening
+ *
+ * CRITICAL: All functions enforce CLAUDE.md security requirements:
+ * - Use path.resolve() for all path operations
+ * - Verify file ownership before processing external files
+ * - Prevent path traversal attacks via traversal patterns, symlinks, etc.
+ * - Validate file exists, is readable, and owned by current user
+ *
+ * @module music-file-validator
+ * @requires fs
+ * @requires path
+ * @requires os
+ */
+
+import fs from 'node:fs';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import os from 'node:os';
+
+/**
+ * Story 4.1: Validate that a file path is safe and within user's home directory
+ *
+ * Security checks:
+ * 1. Resolves path to absolute form (prevents ../ tricks)
+ * 2. Validates path is within home directory
+ * 3. Rejects symlinks pointing outside home
+ * 4. Verifies file ownership matches current user
+ * 5. Checks file is readable
+ *
+ * @param {string} userPath - Path provided by user (absolute or relative)
+ * @param {string} userHomeDir - User's home directory (default: process.env.HOME)
+ * @returns {Object} { isValid: boolean, error: string|null, resolvedPath: string|null }
+ * @throws {Error} If path validation encounters unexpected errors
+ */
+export function isPathSafe(userPath, userHomeDir = null) {
+  try {
+    // Parameter validation
+    if (!userPath || typeof userPath !== 'string') {
+      return {
+        isValid: false,
+        error: 'Path must be a non-empty string',
+        resolvedPath: null
+      };
+    }
+
+    // Use provided home dir or default to environment
+    const homeDir = userHomeDir || (process.env.HOME || process.env.USERPROFILE);
+    if (!homeDir) {
+      return {
+        isValid: false,
+        error: 'Unable to determine home directory',
+        resolvedPath: null
+      };
+    }
+
+    // CRITICAL: Use path.resolve() to get absolute path (CLAUDE.md requirement)
+    // This prevents directory traversal attacks like "../../etc/passwd"
+    const resolvedPath = path.resolve(userPath);
+    const resolvedHome = path.resolve(homeDir);
+
+    // Check if path is within home directory
+    // Must either match exactly OR start with home + separator (prevents /home/user2 bypass)
+    const isWithinHome = resolvedPath === resolvedHome ||
+                        resolvedPath.startsWith(resolvedHome + path.sep);
+
+    if (!isWithinHome) {
+      return {
+        isValid: false,
+        error: `Security validation failed: path must be within home directory (${resolvedHome})`,
+        resolvedPath: null
+      };
+    }
+
+    // SECURITY: Use lstatSync first to detect symlinks before following them (#131)
+    let lstats;
+    try {
+      lstats = fs.lstatSync(resolvedPath);
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (err.code === 'ENOENT') {
+        return { isValid: false, error: `File not found: ${userPath}`, resolvedPath: null };
+      }
+      return { isValid: false, error: `Cannot access file: ${err.message}`, resolvedPath: null };
+    }
+
+    // Check if symlink - if so, verify target is also within home directory
+    if (lstats.isSymbolicLink()) {
+      try {
+        const targetPath = fs.realpathSync(resolvedPath);
+        const isTargetWithinHome = targetPath === resolvedHome ||
+                                  targetPath.startsWith(resolvedHome + path.sep);
+
+        if (!isTargetWithinHome) {
+          return {
+            isValid: false,
+            error: 'Security validation failed: symlink target must be within home directory',
+            resolvedPath: null
+          };
+        }
+      } catch (err) {
+        return {
+          isValid: false,
+          error: `Failed to resolve symlink: ${err.message}`,
+          resolvedPath: null
+        };
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Get file stats (follows symlinks for regular file check)
+    const stats = fs.statSync(resolvedPath);
+
+    // Check if it's a regular file (not directory, special file, etc)
+    if (!stats.isFile()) {
+      return {
+        isValid: false,
+        error: `Path must be a regular file, not a ${stats.isDirectory() ? 'directory' : 'special file'}`,
+        resolvedPath: null
+      };
+    }
+
+    // CRITICAL: Verify file ownership (CLAUDE.md requirement)
+    // Prevent other users from planting malicious files
+    // SECURITY: Fail-secure on platforms where getuid is unavailable (#131)
+    const currentUserId = process.getuid ? process.getuid() : null;
+    if (currentUserId === null) {
+      return {
+        isValid: false,
+        error: 'Security validation failed: unable to verify file ownership on this platform',
+        resolvedPath: null
+      };
+    }
+    if (stats.uid !== currentUserId) {
+      return {
+        isValid: false,
+        error: 'Security validation failed: file not owned by current user',
+        resolvedPath: null
+      };
+    }
+
+    // Check if file is readable
+    try {
+      fs.accessSync(resolvedPath, fs.constants.R_OK);
+    } catch (err) {
+      return {
+        isValid: false,
+        error: `File is not readable: ${err.message}`,
+        resolvedPath: null
+      };
+    }
+
+    // All checks passed
+    return {
+      isValid: true,
+      error: null,
+      resolvedPath
+    };
+
+  } catch (err) {
+    // Unexpected error during validation
+    return {
+      isValid: false,
+      error: `Unexpected validation error: ${err.message}`,
+      resolvedPath: null
+    };
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify file size is within acceptable limits for music files
+ *
+ * @param {string} filePath - Path to file (must already be validated with isPathSafe)
+ * @param {number} maxSizeBytes - Maximum file size in bytes (default: 50MB)
+ * @returns {Object} { isValid: boolean, error: string|null, sizeBytes: number }
+ */
+export function validateFileSize(filePath, maxSizeBytes = 50 * 1024 * 1024) {
+  try {
+    if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) {
+      return {
+        isValid: false,
+        error: 'File does not exist',
+        sizeBytes: 0
+      };
+    }
+
+    const stats = fs.statSync(filePath);
+    const sizeBytes = stats.size;
+
+    if (sizeBytes > maxSizeBytes) {
+      const sizeMB = (sizeBytes / 1024 / 1024).toFixed(2);
+      const maxMB = (maxSizeBytes / 1024 / 1024).toFixed(2);
+      return {
+        isValid: false,
+        error: `File size (${sizeMB}MB) exceeds maximum (${maxMB}MB)`,
+        sizeBytes
+      };
+    }
+
+    if (sizeBytes === 0) {
+      return {
+        isValid: false,
+        error: 'File is empty',
+        sizeBytes
+      };
+    }
+
+    return {
+      isValid: true,
+      error: null,
+      sizeBytes
+    };
+
+  } catch (err) {
+    return {
+      isValid: false,
+      error: `Error checking file size: ${err.message}`,
+      sizeBytes: 0
+    };
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get secure temp directory for audio file operations
+ * Uses XDG_RUNTIME_DIR if available (follows CLAUDE.md requirement)
+ * Falls back to user-specific /tmp directory
+ *
+ * @param {string} prefix - Directory name prefix (default: 'agentvibes-music')
+ * @returns {string} Secure temp directory path
+ */
+export function getSecureTempDir(prefix = 'agentvibes-music') {
+  const xdgRuntime = process.env.XDG_RUNTIME_DIR;
+
+  if (xdgRuntime && fs.existsSync(xdgRuntime)) {
+    return path.join(xdgRuntime, `${prefix}-${process.pid}`);
+  }
+
+  // Fallback to user-specific /tmp
+  const userTmp = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `${prefix}-${process.env.USER || 'user'}`);
+  return userTmp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Create secure temp directory with restrictive permissions
+ *
+ * @param {string} dirPath - Directory path to create
+ * @returns {Object} { success: boolean, error: string|null, dirPath: string|null }
+ */
+export function createSecureTempDir(dirPath) {
+  try {
+    // Create directory if it doesn't exist
+    if (!fs.existsSync(dirPath)) {
+      fs.mkdirSync(dirPath, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+    } else {
+      // If exists, verify permissions are restrictive
+      const stats = fs.statSync(dirPath);
+      // Check if world-readable (mode & 0o077 should be 0 for secure)
+      if ((stats.mode & 0o077) !== 0) {
+        return {
+          success: false,
+          error: 'Temp directory has insecure permissions',
+          dirPath: null
+        };
+      }
+    }
+
+    return {
+      success: true,
+      error: null,
+      dirPath
+    };
+
+  } catch (err) {
+    return {
+      success: false,
+      error: `Failed to create secure temp directory: ${err.message}`,
+      dirPath: null
+    };
+  }
+}
+
+export default {
+  isPathSafe,
+  validateFileSize,
+  getSecureTempDir,
+  createSecureTempDir
+};