agentus 0.0.0-stage → 0.2.0

package/README.md

@@ -1,3 +1,477 @@
-# Temporary Holding Version
+# Agentus
 
-This version is a temporary placeholder for this package. An operational version to replace this has been submitted for review and is awaiting a staged release.
+[English](README.md) | [简体中文](README.zh-CN.md)
+
+**Keep your agents on the track.** A multi-session web cockpit for ACP-speaking coding
+agents: open several sessions in the browser, each one backed by a real
+`hermes acp` / `qodercli --acp` subprocess, and drive them from any device.
+
+> **Red line:** the UI holds *zero* intelligence. No agent loop, no model calls, no
+> prompt engineering. The server does exactly six things — gate access, spawn a child,
+> relay ACP JSON-RPC, stream events to the browser, persist the transcript, surface
+> permission prompts. Reasoning lives in the CLI processes.
+
+```
+[browser React SPA]  ──HTTP + WS──▶  [Agentus server]  ──ACP/JSON-RPC over stdio──▶  [hermes acp | qodercli --acp]
+                                         · session registry (who runs, where, pid)
+                                         · ACP client (ClientSideConnection)
+                                         · event fan-out → WS, commands → ACP
+                                         · SQLite transcript + resume
+```
+
+## Install
+
+```bash
+# public one-liner — the published package (Node >= 22.5; the store is node:sqlite)
+npx agentus                      # …or: npm i -g agentus, then `agentus`
+# open http://localhost:8787 and log in (admin / 123456 — see "Login" below),
+# then "+ new session", pick a backend + a working directory
+```
+
+Or run the installer straight from the repository — same install, plus a Node check and a
+per-user fallback (`sudo` never):
+
+```bash
+curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/agentus-org/agentus/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
+```
+
+Full guide — install, flags, every environment variable, login, TLS, the phone bridge:
+[`docs/installation.md`](docs/installation.md) · [中文](docs/installation.zh-CN.md).
+
+`npx agentus` runs the cockpit in the foreground — Ctrl-C stops it, and it takes its agent
+children with it. Flags: `--port 9000`, `--data <dir>`, `--open` (open the browser once it
+is up), `--where` (print the paths the server actually resolved — data dir, web bundle,
+companion APK — and exit without starting anything).
+
+**The one prerequisite npm cannot install for you is an agent CLI**: `hermes acp` (install
+Hermes on your PATH; `hermes acp --check` self-checks) or `qodercli --acp` (`qodercli login`
+first, else `newSession` fails with `-32000`). Without one the cockpit still runs and still
+logs in — you just have no backend to start a session on.
+
+The first slot you start will use the Hermes home **your own agent already uses**
+(`~/.hermes`) unless the backend row names another one — see "HERMES_HOME" below.
+
+### From a checkout (development)
+
+```bash
+git clone https://github.com/agentus-org/agentus.git
+cd agentus
+npm start                     # installs if needed, builds, serves (scripts/start.sh)
+npm run dev -w @agentus/web   # front-end hot reload (Vite :5173, host: true → reachable over LAN)
+npm run agentus               # the same CLI as `npx agentus`, straight from the checkout
+```
+
+**Working on Agentus itself?** The bootstrapping manual is in
+[`docs/dev/`](docs/dev/README.md): run a dev instance beside live, prove a change with the
+browser sweeps, promote it to live, and what to do when live breaks. Written for a human
+*and* for a coding agent you point at this repo.
+
+`npm start` (→ `scripts/start.sh`) checks the Node version, installs dependencies with
+`NODE_ENV=development` when `node_modules` is missing, builds when the web bundle is
+stale, then serves. Use `AGENTUS_PORT=9000 npm start` to move the port.
+
+### Where your state lives
+
+`~/.agentus` by default — `agentus.sqlite` (sessions and transcript), `credentials.json`,
+`auth.token` (the machine credential), `auth.secret`, `tls/`, `settings.json`. It is
+created 0700 on first boot, and the boot log prints it **and why that directory won**:
+
+| order | rule |
+|---|---|
+| 1 | `AGENTUS_DATA` when it is set — every launcher and dev/QA instance pins this |
+| 2 | `~/.agentus` once it holds something, or when there is no repo-side data yet |
+| 3 | `<repo>/packages/server/.data` — an existing checkout that predates this layout |
+
+Rule 3 is not a nicety: an install that quietly switched directories would come up with an
+empty session list, which reads exactly like "my sessions are gone". To move such a
+checkout over, boot it once with `AGENTUS_DATA=~/.agentus`. `agentus --where` prints what
+the server resolved, rather than making you guess.
+
+### Backends
+
+| id | command | notes |
+|---|---|---|
+| `hermes` | `hermes acp` | needs a Hermes install on PATH (`hermes acp --check`) |
+| `qoder` | `qodercli --acp` | needs `qodercli login` first, else `newSession` fails `-32000` |
+| `mock` | `node packages/server/mock/agent.mjs` | offline dev/QA: fake streaming, permission prompts, crash/plan/tool triggers |
+
+Adding a backend is **one row** in `packages/server/src/acp/backends.ts`. The protocol
+layer never changes.
+
+### Environment
+
+| var | default | meaning |
+|---|---|---|
+| `AGENTUS_PORT` | `8787` | server port (never reads bare `PORT` — that name is polluted on shared hosts) |
+| `AGENTUS_DATA` | `~/.agentus` | where state lives; see "Where your state lives" for the full order (`<repo>/packages/server/.data` on a checkout that already has one) |
+| `AGENTUS_HERMES_CMD` | `hermes` | binary to spawn for the hermes backend |
+| `AGENTUS_QODER_CMD` | `~/.local/bin/qodercli` | ditto for qoder |
+| `AGENTUS_HERMES_HOME` | `~/.hermes` | default `HERMES_HOME` for a row that does not name one (the operator's own home) |
+| `AGENTUS_PERM_TIMEOUT_MS` | `300000` (5 min) | how long a permission prompt waits before auto-cancelling |
+| `AGENTUS_HISTORY_PAGE` | `500` | transcript page size (also set small in tests to exercise paging) |
+| `AGENTUS_TERM_PTY` | unset | `1` = run the workspace terminal through Python's stdlib `pty` (real tty; needs `python3`) instead of pipes |
+| `AGENTUS_TERM_CMD` | unset | override the terminal command line entirely (e.g. `socat …`), space-separated |
+| `AGENTUS_TLS_PORT` | `8443` when a cert exists, else off | **second listener, TLS** — the one a public tunnel points at (`0` disables it) |
+| `AGENTUS_TLS_CERT` / `AGENTUS_TLS_KEY` | `<AGENTUS_DATA>/tls/{cert,key}.pem` | cert material for that listener (see `scripts/make-cert.sh`) |
+| `AGENTUS_TTS_BASE_URL` | unset | OpenAI-compatible base for **server** speech synthesis (`…/v1`). Unset = browser voices only |
+| `AGENTUS_TTS_API_KEY` / `AGENTUS_TTS_MODEL` / `AGENTUS_TTS_VOICE` | – / `tts-1` / `alloy` | ditto |
+| `AGENTUS_STT_BASE_URL` | unset | OpenAI-compatible base for **server** transcription. Unset = browser recognition only |
+| `AGENTUS_STT_API_KEY` / `AGENTUS_STT_MODEL` / `AGENTUS_STT_LANGUAGE` | – / `whisper-1` / – | ditto |
+| `DASHSCOPE_API_KEY` / `DASHSCOPE_BASE_URL` | – | 百炼 (DashScope) credentials. Read from the process env **and** from `~/.hermes/.env`, because the server is usually started from a plain shell |
+
+The voice/theme variables are a **bootstrap only**: the settings page (⚙ in the rail)
+owns the provider, endpoint, key, models, hotword list and the palette, and stores them
+in `<AGENTUS_DATA>/settings.json` (0600, key never sent back to the browser). What the
+page says wins; the env is what makes a fresh checkout work before anyone opens it.
+
+## Login
+
+The cockpit is behind a login by default — this thing spawns processes that write to
+your disk, so an open port is a remote shell waiting to happen.
+
+```
+username: admin
+password: 123456     (default — change it)
+```
+
+Change it **in the app**: Settings → 账号 (the first card) takes a new username and/or a
+new password, applies immediately, and writes `<DATA_DIR>/credentials.json` (0600, scrypt
+hash — no plaintext on disk). Changing the password invalidates every other session; the
+device that made the change is handed a fresh cookie, so it stays signed in. The current
+password is required for any change, including a username-only one.
+
+`AGENTUS_USERNAME` / `AGENTUS_PASSWORD` / `AGENTUS_PASSWORD_HASH` still work as the
+bootstrap: they are what the app starts from, and once you save something in the 账号 card
+the file wins from then on (the same "settings file > env" order voice and theme use). A
+password-only change pins today's password as a hash, so an env value can never quietly
+come back into play. Delete `credentials.json` to fall back to the environment.
+
+Account management lives in Settings → 账号 (the same shape as hermes-studio's
+AccountSettings, minus the multi-user parts — this cockpit is one operator):
+
+| card | what it does |
+|---|---|
+| **账号** | change the username or the password (each in a small modal, current password required) |
+| **登录会话** | every browser and script holding a session: client, IP, last seen, expiry. Revoke one, or log out everywhere else. Changing the password does the same for the others at once. |
+| **登录失败锁定** | the login limiter, visible: which IPs are locked, for how long, with unlock / unlock all — so locking yourself out of your own cockpit is a 1-click problem, not a restart |
+
+Sessions are stateless cookies, so the server keeps an index of them at
+`<DATA_DIR>/sessions.json` (0600). It is advisory for display but authoritative for
+existence: a cookie that is not in the index, or that was revoked, is refused — that is what
+makes revocation and "log out everywhere" real, and it survives a restart. An upgrade from
+an older build adopts the cookies that already exist once instead of logging every device
+out.
+
+Endpoints behind the login: `POST /api/auth/credentials`, `GET /api/auth/sessions`,
+`POST /api/auth/sessions/revoke`, `POST /api/auth/sessions/revoke-others`,
+`GET|DELETE /api/auth/locked-ips`.
+
+Two credentials exist, deliberately:
+
+| credential | how it travels | who uses it |
+|---|---|---|
+| **session cookie** | `HttpOnly` + `SameSite=Lax`, HMAC-SHA256 signed, 7d | the browser (issued by `POST /api/auth/login`) |
+| **machine token** | `Authorization: Bearer <t>` or `?token=<t>` | scripts, CI, launchers — read it from `<DATA_DIR>/auth.token` (0600) |
+
+The cookie is `HttpOnly` rather than a token in `localStorage`, and it rides along on
+the WebSocket handshake for free. Everything under `/api` is closed to anonymous
+callers; the app shell, its assets, `/healthz` and `/api/auth/*` stay open so the
+login page itself can load. `scripts/*.mjs` read the machine token automatically
+(`scripts/lib/auth.mjs`).
+
+Auth environment:
+
+| var | default | meaning |
+|---|---|---|
+| `AGENTUS_AUTH` | `on` | `off` = no login at all (local hacking; the boot log will scold you) |
+| `AGENTUS_USERNAME` | `admin` | operator name |
+| `AGENTUS_PASSWORD` | `123456` | operator password (plaintext in env) |
+| `AGENTUS_PASSWORD_HASH` | — | `scrypt:<salt>:<hex>`; wins over `AGENTUS_PASSWORD` if set |
+| `AGENTUS_SESSION_TTL_MS` | 604800000 (7d) | session lifetime |
+| `AGENTUS_AUTH_SECRET` | `<DATA_DIR>/auth.secret` | cookie signing key (0600, auto-minted) |
+| `AGENTUS_AUTH_TOKEN` | `<DATA_DIR>/auth.token` | machine token (0600, auto-minted) |
+| `AGENTUS_LOGIN_MAX_FAILS` / `AGENTUS_LOGIN_LOCK_MS` | `5` / `30000` | per-IP brute-force lockout |
+| `AGENTUS_BASIC_AUTH` | — | an HTTP Basic challenge in front of **everything** (including `/healthz` and the WS upgrade). `user:pass` checks both; `:pass` (or a bare `pass`) checks **only the password** and accepts any username. This is the outer lock you want before exposing a tunnel; see "Exposing it publicly". |
+
+### Exposing it publicly (tunnel / reverse proxy)
+
+Put `AGENTUS_BASIC_AUTH=:pass` in the server's environment, then point the tunnel at
+`<lan-ip>:8787`. That gives you two independent locks — Basic at the edge of the app, the
+operator login inside it — and scripts can still get in (`curl -u :pass` plus the machine
+token).
+
+Password-only (`:pass`, or a bare `pass`) is the recommended form here: HTTP Basic always
+asks the browser for a username (RFC 7617 carries `user:pass`), but a single-operator
+service gains nothing from one — typing any name, or leaving it blank, works. If you do
+configure a username, it is checked too.
+
+Pick one outer lock, not both:
+
+- **The tunnel's own gate**, if it has one. SakuraFrp's `auth_pass` is an IP-level
+  authorisation: the first visit shows a small page asking for the access password, the
+  IP is remembered after that, and the WebSocket keeps working through it (both measured
+  end to end). Zero config on this side; the cost is that machines cannot get in without
+  the extra authorisation dance (`POST /v4/tunnel/auth`).
+- **`AGENTUS_BASIC_AUTH`**, when the tunnel has no gate, is a plain TCP forward, or you
+  want scriptable access (`curl -u :pass`). A real 401 challenge is understood by every
+  browser, proxy and HTTP client — unlike some tunnel "access auth" flavours, which answer
+  HTTP **200** with an authorise-your-IP page and are invisible to `curl`.
+
+Turning both on means three password prompts in a row, so pick one.
+
+Two things to know about a tunnel in front of this app:
+
+- **WebSockets must pass through.** The cockpit's live stream rides on `/ws`; an HTTP/1.1
+  tunnel that drops `Upgrade` gives you a page that loads and then says "reconnecting"
+  forever. Verified working through SakuraFrp's TCP+auto-HTTPS tunnels.
+- **Terminate TLS at the edge.** When the request arrives with `X-Forwarded-Proto: https`
+  the session cookie is issued `Secure` automatically (verified through that same tunnel),
+  so no config needed. The last hop inside your LAN stays plain HTTP.
+
+#### TLS: a second listener, on purpose
+
+A plain TCP tunnel (SakuraFrp, safe-nat, `ssh -L`, most frp setups) forwards bytes — it
+does **not** terminate TLS for you. Point one at `:8787` and the operator's password and
+session cookie cross the internet in clear text. So the server can speak TLS itself:
+
+```bash
+scripts/make-cert.sh                    # self-signed, SAN = the name you actually type
+# -> $AGENTUS_DATA/tls/{cert.pem,key.pem} (0600, git-ignored) — ~/.agentus/tls by default
+# boot log then says: https://0.0.0.0:8443 (self-signed …) ; point a tunnel at THIS port
+```
+
+| port | speaks | for |
+|---|---|---|
+| `AGENTUS_PORT` (8787) | plain HTTP | LAN, loopback, `curl`, scripts — no cert warning, CI unchanged |
+| `AGENTUS_TLS_PORT` (8443) | HTTPS (self-signed) | **the tunnel** — encrypts the public hop |
+
+Same handler, same routes, same auth; only the socket differs. Two listeners beat both
+alternatives: turning the single port into HTTPS would put a cert warning in front of your
+own LAN usage (and break `curl` scripts), while sniffing the first byte on one port to
+serve both hides whether a given visit was really encrypted.
+
+**Retiring the warning on your devices.** With TLS on, the listener serves its own
+certificate at `/cert.crt`:
+
+```bash
+https://<your-name>:<tls-port>/cert.crt     # iOS: opens the profile installer directly
+                                            # Android: downloads it → Settings → Security → CA certificate
+curl --cacert <AGENTUS_DATA>/tls/cert.pem https://<your-name>:<tls-port>/healthz   # scripts, no -k
+```
+
+Installed as a trusted root (iOS also needs *About → Certificate Trust Settings → enable*),
+the browser stops asking and the address bar is clean. It is public material — the private
+key never leaves `<AGENTUS_DATA>/tls/`.
+
+The cert is **self-signed on purpose** — no CA issues for an unregistered domain or a bare
+IP, so the browser shows "not private → proceed" once per device, and installing the issuer
+(`/cert.crt`, above) retires even that. Keep the SAN to the name you type (**the DDNS name**,
+not the public IP: a dynamic IP would need re-issuing, and a mismatch adds a second warning).
+
+`make-cert.sh` issues **two** certs on purpose: a 10-year root (`ca.pem`, what devices
+install) and a 390-day leaf (`cert.pem`, what the listener serves). Apple caps *server
+certificate* validity at 398 days — a 10-year self-signed leaf is precisely what iOS refuses
+*after* the user has been through the install dance. A root is not a server cert, so it can
+live long; rotating the leaf (`--leaf-only`) never touches an installed device.
+
+`npm run tls-smoke` (in CI, real sockets) guards all of it: a verifying client must be
+*rejected* (that is what proves the port is actually TLS), the leaf must chain to the root
+`/cert.crt` hands out and stay under the 398-day cap, the API login and `wss://…/ws` handshake
+must work over TLS (the upgrade handler is bound to both listeners — the easy thing to
+forget), and the LAN port must stay plain.
+
+Logout revokes the session id server-side, so "sign out" ends the session instead of
+just hiding the UI — the cookie stops working immediately.
+
+## HERMES_HOME (which data directory a slot reads and writes)
+
+A spawned agent CLI inherits the server's environment, so the server **always sets
+`HERMES_HOME` explicitly**: the row's own home if it names one, otherwise the default —
+**your real `~/.hermes`**, the same `state.db` your gateway and Studio have open. That is
+the intended production setting: a slot drives your actual agent, with your config,
+credentials, memory and session list.
+
+An *inherited* `HERMES_HOME` is ignored (a Hermes-launched shell leaks its own down), so
+where a slot writes is always something you chose — on the row, or in
+`AGENTUS_HERMES_HOME`.
+
+To keep one slot's data separate (a clean session list, a different profile, a throwaway
+experiment), name a directory in that row's HERMES_HOME — no permission needed. The
+early-dev **isolation guard** is gone: it refused the real home outright because Hermes'
+bundled SQLite 3.50.4 (inside the WAL-reset range) corrupted a real `state.db` when two
+writers shared one WAL file (2026-10-02). The runtime now links SQLite 3.53.1, and sharing
+one home is what Hermes itself already does all day (gateway + Studio bridge), so the
+cockpit no longer gets in the way.
+
+A row that points at its own home needs no permission — only a name. One trap survives when
+a row points elsewhere: a fresh home whose `hindsight/config.json` keeps the default profile
+name `"hermes"` would attach to your production memory daemon, so the row warns when it would.
+
+## What it does today (M0 → M4)
+
+- multi-session rail, **grouped by working directory** — running sessions and **closed
+  cases** (transcripts whose process exited;
+  click to respawn + `loadSession` resume, re-applying the stored permission mode/effort),
+  with search across both by title / backend / cwd
+- **sessions name themselves**: the agent's own title (ACP `session_info_update` — Hermes
+  generates one in the turn prologue) is adopted as-is, and a backend that never sends one
+  still gets a name derived from the first prompt (first line, markdown stripped, ≤50 chars);
+  the menu's **重新生成会话名** asks the agent to name the conversation from its CURRENT
+  content, on a throwaway `session/fork`, so the session's own transcript is untouched
+- streaming render of `agent_message_chunk` / `agent_thought_chunk`, tool calls
+  (upserted by `toolCallId`, never appended), plan updates, usage. A tool call is one
+  compact line — status dot, truncated title, chevron — and shows the full name, kind,
+  status, input and output only when expanded (a transcript of twenty calls stays
+  readable)
+- **context-window gauge** per session from ACP `usage_update` (warns at 65% / 85%; degrades
+  to used-only when the agent reports no window size) and a per-turn trace chip showing the
+  effort/mode a turn actually runs with
+- **slash-command palette** driven by the agent's own `available_commands_update`
+  (filter, ↑/↓, Tab to accept, Esc) — never an invented command list
+- **fork a session** (ACP `session/fork`, an unstable capability Hermes does offer): the
+  agent copies the parent's context into a new session, which comes up here as a session
+  of its own — same workspace, same modes, independent from then on
+- permission cards (allow / always allow / reject / dismiss) wired to ACP's
+  server→client `requestPermission`, with a pending-count chip and a timeout so a session
+  can't wedge
+- permission mode + reasoning-effort switches (`setSessionMode` / `setSessionConfigOption`),
+  persisted per session
+- SQLite transcript with monotonic per-session `seq`; reconnect replays only the tail;
+  long transcripts **page** backwards ("load earlier") instead of truncating
+- orphan reaping: every child is spawned detached and its pid recorded, so a crashed
+  server's leftovers are killed on next boot
+- offline-tolerant: WS reconnect with an outbox (taps while disconnected are queued,
+  not swallowed), offline app shell via service worker
+- PWA + phone layout: drawer rail, thumb-sized controls, safe-area padding,
+  16px inputs (no iOS zoom), no horizontal overflow at 390px
+- a head with **two** controls: which directory this session works in, and the workspace
+  panel. Everything that was up there moved next to the prompt where it belongs
+- **workspace panel** (head ▤): a read-only file browser (breadcrumb, sizes, text
+  preview) and a shell rooted in the session's workspace, both killed with the socket.
+  Cwd is a per-session field: a *running* agent keeps the directory it was started in,
+  the panels and the next resume follow the one you pick
+- **replies rendered as markdown** (markdown-it + highlight.js, sanitised with DOMPurify
+  and `html: false`, so an agent's `<script>` stays visible text): headings, lists,
+  tables, quotes, fenced code with a language label, copy button and syntax colouring
+- **the agent's own knobs, placed the way ACP intends**: the model button prints the
+  model alone ("qwen3.8-flash"); its list is grouped by provider and collapsible (Hermes
+  offers 501 models — a flat list is unusable); thinking depth shows nothing but a small scale
+  (seven ticks, filled to the level, coloured grey→red), so a phone-width row still fits
+  the send button: a thinking-depth button and a
+  model button, each reading the agent's advertised options (`configOptions[].category`,
+  falling back to the option id) — and hidden when the agent offers none. Model switching
+  uses ACP `session/set_model`, which Hermes implements (the SDK in use does not type it,
+  so it goes through the generic request() overload)
+- **the context window is yours to declare**: click the usage line to set the window the
+  gauge measures against, per session, persisted. ACP has no method to change a model's
+  window (it is the provider's property — that is what `usage_update.size` reports), so
+  this number only drives the gauge; switching models is the real lever
+- composer that reads like a chat box, not a toolbar: attachments (`+`), settings
+  (permission mode · thinking depth · voice) and dictation live on one row under the
+  input, the context/spend line is small type *above* it, and send turns into stop
+  while a turn runs
+- **attachments** as real ACP content blocks: images (`type: "image"`), text files
+  inlined with a filename header, links as `resource_link`. Only file names are
+  persisted — never the bytes
+- **voice, both directions, browser-first**: read any reply aloud (per-message button
+  plus an auto-read toggle, voice picker, speed), dictate a prompt (live interim words).
+  A server endpoint is optional and only a proxy (`AGENTUS_TTS_BASE_URL` /
+  `AGENTUS_STT_BASE_URL`); with nothing configured, the browser does the work and the
+  UI says so
+- **voice call mode** (📞 in the chat header): a full-screen call with the session — a canvas
+  orb that rides real audio, one colour per phase (listening / thinking / speaking / error,
+  announced to a screen reader), the reply read sentence by sentence as it streams, and
+  **barge-in that actually takes the floor**: talking over the reply stops our playback,
+  *cancels the agent's turn* and hands the microphone back. Its thresholds are knobs on the
+  call itself (⚙ in the corner): 抢话灵敏度 (0-100 %, higher = easier to interrupt, 60 % by
+  default), 抢话持续时间, 说完停顿 and 最少字数 (3 by default) — a phone on a table leaks its
+  own loudspeaker into its own microphone, a headset does not, so these are per-installation
+  settings (stored server-side, shared across devices) rather than constants. `最少字数` gates
+  only the automatic send; a tap on the orb always sends. While a call is open it owns the
+  voice: the auto-read of the same reply stands down, and a call reads **this turn's** answer
+  only — never the answer to the question before it
+- **settings page** (⚙ in the rail): theme (light / dark / follow-the-OS, plus an accent
+  colour that retints the whole cockpit), the speech provider, endpoint and key, the
+  models (picked from the endpoint's own list), the hotword list, and a test button for
+  each direction. Everything the operator chooses — theme, speech endpoint, the call's
+  thresholds, and the talk-to-agent preferences (read replies aloud, voice, speed,
+  language, recogniser, server-side synthesis) — is a **row in the store's `settings`
+  table** (`voice` / `theme` / `call` / `prefs`, one row per section), not a file beside it
+  and not a browser's localStorage: settings follow the operator from the phone to the
+  laptop, and two tabs of one instance cannot disagree. A pre-store `settings.json` is
+  imported once and kept as `.imported`; the browser keeps a copy of each section only so
+  the first frame is already right
+- **百炼 (DashScope) speech, first-class**: streaming recognition over its inference
+  WebSocket (`qwen-audio-3.1-asr-flash-streaming` — words appear as they are spoken),
+  batch recognition over the OpenAI-compatible chat route (`qwen3-asr-flash`), synthesis
+  via `SpeechSynthesizer` (`qwen-audio-3.0-tts-flash`, voices such as `longanhuan_v3.6`).
+  The browser cannot open that socket (the handshake needs an auth header) and the key
+  must not leave the server, so the cockpit owns the upstream connection and the browser
+  relays PCM through `/ws/asr`
+- **hotwords, fixed and dynamic**: a fixed list (`词=权重`, `50` = super-hotword) that goes
+  into the recogniser's instant vocabulary, plus entity terms mined from this session's
+  own transcript and its neighbours — merged, deduped, capped, and previewable on the
+  settings page
+- a session's dictation carries **that session's context** (its last few turns) as the
+  recogniser's bias, which is what keeps product names and identifiers intact
+- streaming that does not fight the reader: a wheel/touch gesture detaches instantly,
+  new output is announced by a "jump to newest" button instead of yanking the viewport
+- workspace picker: browse the server's directories (`GET /api/fs/dirs`, one level at a
+  time) or pick from the working directories you used before; the same picker re-points
+  an existing session
+
+## Naming
+
+The UI says **session** everywhere (the rail, the empty state, the dialogs). "Slot" is
+only the project's name — the concept an operator works with is a session, and the
+product may well be renamed; nothing in the interface leans on the metaphor.
+
+Names have two layers: `title` is what the rail shows, `auto_title` is the generated name it
+falls back to. A generated name (the agent's, or ours derived from the first prompt) never
+overwrites a hand-written one; clearing a rename restores it; and an explicit
+**重新生成会话名** replaces it on purpose. Regeneration goes through the agent, not through a
+model of our own: we fork the session, the fork summarises the copied history, and the fork is
+discarded — our layer still holds no intelligence (red line D).
+
+Session actions live on a per-session menu (⋯ / right-click / phone long-press):
+rename (in place, reversible — clearing it restores the generated name), **regenerate the
+name from the current conversation**, fork, workspace, **export**
+(`GET /api/sessions/:id/export?format=md|json` — rendered from our own persisted
+transcript, so an archived session exports without waking the agent; ACP itself has
+no export concept), copy id, archive (= close: process exits, record kept) and,
+for archived slots, resume or delete.
+
+## Tests
+
+```bash
+npm run typecheck
+npm run auth-smoke                        # 48 assertions: the lock, both credentials
+npm run backend-smoke                     # 42: the backend registry, spawn env, health evidence
+npm run workspace-smoke                   # 85: workspace field, file API, shell, attachments
+npm run voice-smoke                       # 47: settings/theme guards, voice router, 百炼 shapes
+npm run tls-smoke                         # the second listener, real sockets + real certs
+npm run package-smoke                     # packs, installs into a throwaway prefix + HOME, boots
+                                          # that install, drives a mock turn, checks ~/.agentus
+node scripts/smoke.mjs mock "hello"       # end-to-end against the mock agent
+```
+
+Every suite boots its own server on a scratch port with a throwaway data dir, so they run
+anywhere (CI included):
+
+- `auth-smoke` — anonymous REST/WS refusal, brute-force lockout, cookie signing and tamper
+  detection, expiry, WS-via-cookie, the machine token, logout revocation, `AGENTUS_AUTH=off`.
+- `workspace-smoke` — the per-session workspace, the read-only file API, the PTY shell,
+  attachments on a prompt, the voice endpoint guards.
+- `voice-smoke` — the settings/theme contract (validation, masking, 0600 file), the voice
+  router against a stand-in endpoint (OpenAI-compatible **and** 百炼's native shapes),
+  hotword merging and capping, and the `.env` bootstrap with an empty `$HOME`.
+
+Browser QA evidence (63 rounds, each with repro → root cause → fix → regression)
+lives in [`m1-qa-log.md`](./m1-qa-log.md). The `mock` backend triggers extra paths on
+demand: `[tool]` (permission flow), `[think]`, `[plan]`, `[slow]` (reconnect drills),
+`[sink]` (mid-turn child crash).
+
+## License
+
+Apache-2.0. See [NOTICE](./NOTICE) for the AionUi inspiration credit (ideas only —
+no code copied).