agentaudit 3.12.2 → 3.12.4

package/cli.mjs

@@ -1053,7 +1053,24 @@ function detectPackageInfo(repoPath, files) {
   for (const ef of entryFiles) {
     if (files.some(f => f.path === ef)) { info.entrypoint = ef; break; }
   }
-  
+
+  // Extract package version from manifest files
+  info.version = null;
+  const versionSources = [
+    { file: 'package.json', extract: c => { try { return JSON.parse(c).version; } catch { return null; } } },
+    { file: 'pyproject.toml', extract: c => { const m = c.match(/^\s*version\s*=\s*["']([^"']+)["']/m); return m?.[1] || null; } },
+    { file: 'setup.py', extract: c => { const m = c.match(/version\s*=\s*["']([^"']+)["']/); return m?.[1] || null; } },
+    { file: 'setup.cfg', extract: c => { const m = c.match(/^\s*version\s*=\s*(.+)$/m); return m?.[1]?.trim() || null; } },
+    { file: 'Cargo.toml', extract: c => { const m = c.match(/^\s*version\s*=\s*["']([^"']+)["']/m); return m?.[1] || null; } },
+  ];
+  for (const vs of versionSources) {
+    const f = files.find(f => f.path === vs.file || f.path.endsWith('/' + vs.file));
+    if (f) {
+      const v = vs.extract(f.content);
+      if (v) { info.version = v; break; }
+    }
+  }
+
   return info;
 }
 
@@ -2605,9 +2622,9 @@ async function callLlm(llmConfig, systemPrompt, userMessage) {
         body: JSON.stringify({
           systemInstruction: { parts: [{ text: systemPrompt }] },
           contents: [{ role: 'user', parts: [{ text: userMessage }] }],
-          generationConfig: { maxOutputTokens: 8192 },
+          generationConfig: { maxOutputTokens: 65536, responseMimeType: 'application/json', thinkingConfig: { thinkingBudget: 8192 } },
         }),
-        signal: AbortSignal.timeout(120_000),
+        signal: AbortSignal.timeout(180_000),
       });
       data = await res.json();
       if (data.error) {
@@ -2655,29 +2672,169 @@ async function callLlm(llmConfig, systemPrompt, userMessage) {
   }
 }
 
+// ── Deterministic post-processing for LLM reports ────────────────────────
+// Fills in missing fields that LLMs often omit, using deterministic lookups
+
+const PATTERN_CWE_MAP = {
+  CMD_INJECT: 'CWE-78', CRED_THEFT: 'CWE-522', DATA_EXFIL: 'CWE-200',
+  DESTRUCT: 'CWE-912', OBF: 'CWE-506', SANDBOX_ESC: 'CWE-693',
+  SUPPLY_CHAIN: 'CWE-1357', SOCIAL_ENG: 'CWE-451', PRIV_ESC: 'CWE-269',
+  INFO_LEAK: 'CWE-200', CRYPTO_WEAK: 'CWE-327', DESER: 'CWE-502',
+  PATH_TRAV: 'CWE-22', SEC_BYPASS: 'CWE-693', PERSIST: 'CWE-912',
+  AI_PROMPT: 'CWE-1426', MCP_POISON: 'CWE-1426', MCP_INJECT: 'CWE-94',
+  MCP_TRAVERSAL: 'CWE-22', MCP_SUPPLY: 'CWE-1357', MCP_PERM: 'CWE-269',
+  WORM: 'CWE-912', CICD: 'CWE-912', CORR: 'CWE-829', MANUAL: 'CWE-693',
+};
+
+const SEVERITY_IMPACT = { critical: -25, high: -15, medium: -5, low: -1 };
+
+const REMEDIATION_TEMPLATES = {
+  CMD_INJECT: 'Validate and sanitize input; use allowlists or parameterized execution instead of shell strings',
+  CRED_THEFT: 'Remove hardcoded credentials; use environment variables or a secrets manager',
+  DATA_EXFIL: 'Remove or document the external data transmission; ensure user consent',
+  DESTRUCT: 'Add confirmation prompts and safeguards before destructive operations',
+  OBF: 'Replace obfuscated code with readable equivalents; document the purpose',
+  SANDBOX_ESC: 'Restrict file and process access to configured boundaries',
+  SUPPLY_CHAIN: 'Pin dependency versions; verify package integrity',
+  SOCIAL_ENG: 'Align documentation with actual code behavior',
+  PRIV_ESC: 'Apply principle of least privilege; remove unnecessary elevated permissions',
+  INFO_LEAK: 'Restrict exposed information to what is necessary for operation',
+  CRYPTO_WEAK: 'Use modern cryptographic algorithms (AES-256, SHA-256+)',
+  DESER: 'Use safe deserialization (e.g. yaml.safe_load, JSON) instead of unsafe loaders',
+  PATH_TRAV: 'Sanitize file paths; reject inputs containing .. or absolute paths',
+  SEC_BYPASS: 'Do not disable security controls; use proper certificate validation',
+  PERSIST: 'Remove persistence mechanisms or require explicit user opt-in',
+  AI_PROMPT: 'Remove hidden instructions; ensure tool descriptions are transparent',
+  MCP_POISON: 'Remove injected instructions from tool descriptions and schemas',
+  MCP_INJECT: 'Sanitize tool arguments and descriptions; prevent prompt injection',
+  MCP_TRAVERSAL: 'Validate and sandbox file paths in MCP tool handlers',
+  MCP_SUPPLY: 'Pin MCP package versions; verify transport configurations',
+  MCP_PERM: 'Restrict permissions to minimum required scope; remove wildcard grants',
+};
+
+function enrichFindings(report, files, pkgInfo) {
+  if (!report || !report.findings) return report;
+
+  // Ensure package_version
+  if (!report.package_version || report.package_version === 'unknown') {
+    report.package_version = pkgInfo.version || 'unknown';
+  }
+
+  // Ensure max_severity
+  const severities = ['critical', 'high', 'medium', 'low'];
+  let maxSev = 'none';
+  for (const f of report.findings) {
+    const idx = severities.indexOf((f.severity || '').toLowerCase());
+    if (idx !== -1 && idx < severities.indexOf(maxSev === 'none' ? 'low' : maxSev)) {
+      maxSev = severities[idx];
+    }
+  }
+  // Only override if not set or wrong
+  if (!report.max_severity || report.max_severity === 'none') {
+    report.max_severity = report.findings.length > 0 ? maxSev : 'none';
+  }
+
+  for (const finding of report.findings) {
+    // 1. Fill cwe_id from pattern_id lookup
+    if (!finding.cwe_id || finding.cwe_id === '') {
+      const prefix = (finding.pattern_id || '').replace(/_\d+$/, '');
+      finding.cwe_id = PATTERN_CWE_MAP[prefix] || 'CWE-693';
+    }
+
+    // 2. Fill content (code snippet) from files array
+    if ((!finding.content || finding.content === '' || finding.content === '...') && finding.file && finding.line) {
+      const matchFile = files.find(f => f.path === finding.file || f.path.endsWith('/' + finding.file));
+      if (matchFile) {
+        const lines = matchFile.content.split('\n');
+        const lineIdx = finding.line - 1;
+        if (lineIdx >= 0 && lineIdx < lines.length) {
+          // Extract 1-3 lines around the target
+          const start = Math.max(0, lineIdx - 1);
+          const end = Math.min(lines.length, lineIdx + 2);
+          finding.content = lines.slice(start, end).map(l => l.trimEnd()).join('\n').trim();
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
+    // 3. Fill remediation from template
+    if (!finding.remediation || finding.remediation === '' || finding.remediation === '...') {
+      const prefix = (finding.pattern_id || '').replace(/_\d+$/, '');
+      finding.remediation = REMEDIATION_TEMPLATES[prefix] || 'Review and address the identified security concern';
+    }
+
+    // 4. Ensure score_impact is set correctly
+    if (finding.score_impact === undefined || finding.score_impact === null) {
+      if (finding.by_design) {
+        finding.score_impact = 0;
+      } else {
+        finding.score_impact = SEVERITY_IMPACT[(finding.severity || '').toLowerCase()] || -5;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // 5. Ensure confidence has valid value
+    if (!['high', 'medium', 'low'].includes(finding.confidence)) {
+      finding.confidence = 'medium';
+    }
+
+    // 6. Ensure by_design is boolean
+    if (typeof finding.by_design !== 'boolean') {
+      finding.by_design = false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Recalculate risk_score from findings
+  const computedRisk = report.findings.reduce((sum, f) => {
+    if (f.by_design) return sum;
+    return sum + Math.abs(f.score_impact || 0);
+  }, 0);
+  report.risk_score = Math.min(100, computedRisk);
+
+  // Ensure result matches risk_score
+  if (report.risk_score <= 25) report.result = 'safe';
+  else if (report.risk_score <= 50) report.result = 'caution';
+  else report.result = 'unsafe';
+
+  // Ensure findings_count
+  report.findings_count = report.findings.length;
+
+  return report;
+}
+
 async function auditRepo(url) {
   const start = Date.now();
-  const slug = slugFromUrl(url);
-  
+
+  // Support local directories
+  const isLocal = fs.existsSync(url) && fs.statSync(url).isDirectory();
+  const slug = isLocal ? path.basename(url) : slugFromUrl(url);
+
   console.log(`${icons.scan}  ${c.bold}Auditing ${slug}${c.reset}  ${c.dim}${url}${c.reset}`);
   console.log(`${icons.pipe}  ${c.dim}Deep LLM-powered analysis (3-pass: UNDERSTAND → DETECT → CLASSIFY)${c.reset}`);
   console.log();
-  
-  // Step 1: Clone
-  process.stdout.write(`  ${stepProgress(1, 4)} Cloning repository...`);
-  const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'agentaudit-'));
-  const repoPath = path.join(tmpDir, 'repo');
-  try {
-    safeGitClone(url, repoPath);
+
+  let repoPath, tmpDir = null;
+
+  if (isLocal) {
+    // Local directory — no cloning needed
+    repoPath = path.resolve(url);
+    process.stdout.write(`  ${stepProgress(1, 4)} Reading local directory...`);
     console.log(` ${c.green}done${c.reset}`);
-  } catch (err) {
-    console.log(` ${c.red}failed${c.reset}`);
-    const msg = err.stderr?.toString().trim() || err.message?.split('\n')[0] || '';
-    if (msg) console.log(`    ${c.dim}${msg}${c.reset}`);
-    console.log(`    ${c.dim}Make sure git is installed and the URL is accessible.${c.reset}`);
-    return null;
+  } else {
+    // Step 1: Clone
+    process.stdout.write(`  ${stepProgress(1, 4)} Cloning repository...`);
+    tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'agentaudit-'));
+    repoPath = path.join(tmpDir, 'repo');
+    try {
+      safeGitClone(url, repoPath);
+      console.log(` ${c.green}done${c.reset}`);
+    } catch (err) {
+      console.log(` ${c.red}failed${c.reset}`);
+      const msg = err.stderr?.toString().trim() || err.message?.split('\n')[0] || '';
+      if (msg) console.log(`    ${c.dim}${msg}${c.reset}`);
+      console.log(`    ${c.dim}Make sure git is installed and the URL is accessible.${c.reset}`);
+      return null;
+    }
   }
-  
+
   // Step 2: Collect files
   process.stdout.write(`  ${stepProgress(2, 4)} Collecting source files...`);
   const files = collectFiles(repoPath);
@@ -2707,20 +2864,22 @@ async function auditRepo(url) {
   if (KNOWN_MCP_LIBS.has(slug)) detectedType = 'library';
   if (KNOWN_CLI.has(slug)) detectedType = 'cli-tool';
 
-  // Cleanup repo (files in memory, provenance captured)
-  try { fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch {}
+  // Cleanup cloned repo (files in memory, provenance captured); skip for local dirs
+  if (tmpDir) { try { fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch {} }
 
   // Build prompts
   const systemPrompt = auditPrompt || 'You are a security auditor. Analyze the code and report findings as JSON.';
+  const detectedVersion = pkgInfo.version || 'unknown';
   const userMessage = [
     `Audit this package: **${slug}** (${url})`,
+    `Package version detected: ${detectedVersion}`,
+    ``,
+    `Respond with ONLY a valid JSON object. No markdown fences, no explanation, no text before or after.`,
+    ``,
+    `Required top-level fields: skill_slug, source_url, package_type, package_version, risk_score, max_severity, result, findings_count, findings`,
+    `Required finding fields (ALL mandatory): pattern_id, cwe_id, severity, title, description, file, line, content, remediation, confidence, by_design, score_impact`,
     ``,
-    `After analysis, respond with ONLY a valid JSON object. No markdown fences, no explanation, no text before or after. Just the raw JSON:`,
-    `{ "skill_slug": "${slug}", "source_url": "${url}", "package_type": "<mcp-server|agent-skill|library|cli-tool|other>",`,
-    `  "risk_score": <0-100>, "result": "<safe|caution|unsafe>", "max_severity": "<none|low|medium|high|critical>",`,
-    `  "findings_count": <n>, "findings": [{ "pattern_id": "CMD_INJECT_001", "title": "...", "severity": "...", "category": "...",`,
-    `  "cwe_id": "CWE-78", "description": "...", "file": "...", "line": <n>, "content": "...", "remediation": "...",`,
-    `  "confidence": "high|medium|low", "by_design": false, "score_impact": -15 }] }`,
+    `A finding missing cwe_id, content, or remediation is INVALID — do not emit it.`,
     ``,
     `## Source Code`,
     codeBlock,
@@ -2821,6 +2980,7 @@ async function auditRepo(url) {
       const durSec = Math.round((duration || 0) / 1000);
       console.log(`    ${c.green}✓${c.reset} ${name.padEnd(30)} ${c.green}done${c.reset} ${c.dim}(${durSec}s)${c.reset}`);
       enrichReport(report, duration);
+      enrichFindings(report, files, pkgInfo);
       saveHistory(report);
       reports.push({ name, report });
     }
@@ -2992,6 +3152,7 @@ async function auditRepo(url) {
   }
 
   enrichReport(report);
+  enrichFindings(report, files, pkgInfo);
   saveHistory(report);
 
   // Display results

package/index.mjs

@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ async function checkRegistry(slug) {
 // ── MCP Server ───────────────────────────────────────────
 
 const server = new Server(
-  { name: 'agentaudit', version: '3.12.2' },
+  { name: 'agentaudit', version: '3.12.3' },
   { capabilities: { tools: {} } }
 );
 

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "agentaudit",
-  "version": "3.12.2",
+  "version": "3.12.4",
   "description": "Security scanner for AI packages — MCP server + CLI",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {

package/prompts/audit-prompt.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ You are a security auditor analyzing a software package. Follow the three phases
 
 **LANGUAGE REQUIREMENT: Write ALL findings in ENGLISH. This includes `title`, `description`, `remediation` fields in the JSON report.**
 
-**BACKEND ENRICHMENT: The AgentAudit backend automatically extracts version info (package_version, commit_sha, PURL, SWHID) and computes content hashes. Focus on security analysis — the backend handles mechanical tasks.**
+**YOU must extract `package_version` from manifest files (package.json, pyproject.toml, setup.py). The backend enriches `commit_sha`, PURL, SWHID, and content hashes — but `package_version` must come from YOU.**
 
 ---
 
@@ -452,43 +452,70 @@ For every README, package.json description, tool description, and SKILL.md: comp
 ## source_url Rules
 The `source_url` field MUST point to a **source code repository** — never a product website, API endpoint, or marketing page.
 - **Best:** GitHub/GitLab repository URL
-- **OK:** ClaWHub URL (`https://clawhub.ai/skill-slug`)
+- **OK:** AgentAudit package URL (`https://agentaudit.dev/packages/package-slug`)
 - **OK:** npm/PyPI package URL as last resort
 - **NEVER:** Company websites, API URLs, app URLs
 
-To find source_url: check `package.json` → `repository.url`, `_meta.json` → `source`/`repository`, `README.md` → GitHub links. If none found, use `https://clawhub.ai/{slug}`.
+To find source_url: check `package.json` → `repository.url`, `_meta.json` → `source`/`repository`, `README.md` → GitHub links. If none found, use `https://agentaudit.dev/packages/{slug}`.
 
 ## JSON Report Format
 
+**EVERY field shown below is REQUIRED. A finding missing ANY field (especially `cwe_id`, `content`, `remediation`) is INVALID — do not emit it.**
+
 ```json
 {
   "skill_slug": "package-name",
   "source_url": "https://github.com/owner/repo",
-  "risk_score": 8,
+  "package_type": "mcp-server",
+  "package_version": "1.2.3",
+  "risk_score": 23,
+  "max_severity": "high",
   "result": "safe",
   "findings_count": 2,
   "findings": [
     {
-      "severity": "high",
       "pattern_id": "CMD_INJECT_001",
       "cwe_id": "CWE-78",
+      "severity": "high",
       "title": "Unescaped user input passed to exec()",
-      "description": "User-controlled input from HTTP body is passed directly to exec() without sanitization.",
+      "description": "User-controlled input from the 'command' tool argument is passed directly to child_process.exec() without sanitization at runner.js:42. An attacker can inject arbitrary shell commands via the MCP tool call.",
       "file": "src/runner.js",
-      "file_hash": "e3b0c442...",
       "line": 42,
       "content": "exec(req.body.command)",
+      "remediation": "Validate input against an allowlist of permitted commands; use execFile() with explicit argument array instead of exec()",
       "confidence": "high",
-      "remediation": "Validate and sanitize input; use allowlist of permitted commands",
       "by_design": false,
       "score_impact": -15
+    },
+    {
+      "pattern_id": "INFO_LEAK_001",
+      "cwe_id": "CWE-200",
+      "severity": "medium",
+      "title": "Stack trace exposed in error response",
+      "description": "Unhandled errors in the /api/query endpoint return the full stack trace to the client at handler.js:87, potentially revealing internal file paths and dependency versions.",
+      "file": "src/handler.js",
+      "line": 87,
+      "content": "res.status(500).json({ error: err.stack })",
+      "remediation": "Return a generic error message to the client; log the full stack trace server-side only",
+      "confidence": "high",
+      "by_design": false,
+      "score_impact": -5
     }
   ]
 }
 ```
 
 ### Required Top-Level Fields
-`skill_slug`, `risk_score`, `result`, `findings_count`, `findings`. Do NOT nest `risk_score` or `result` inside a summary object.
+`skill_slug`, `source_url`, `package_type`, `risk_score`, `max_severity`, `result`, `findings_count`, `findings`.
+- `package_version`: Extract from `package.json` → `version`, `pyproject.toml` → `[project] version`, `setup.py` → `version=`. Use `"unknown"` only if no version file exists.
+- `max_severity`: Highest severity across all findings. Use `"none"` if no findings.
+- Do NOT nest `risk_score` or `result` inside a summary object.
+
+### Required Finding Fields (ALL mandatory)
+Every finding MUST include ALL of these fields:
+`pattern_id`, `cwe_id`, `severity`, `title`, `description`, `file`, `line`, `content`, `remediation`, `confidence`, `by_design`, `score_impact`
+
+**A finding without `cwe_id` or `content` or `remediation` is INVALID. Do not emit incomplete findings.**
 
 ### Field Defaults
 - `by_design`: default `false` (set `true` only when all 4 criteria in §3.9 met)
@@ -504,21 +531,32 @@ To find source_url: check `package.json` → `repository.url`, `_meta.json` →
 
 **Only use:** `safe`, `caution`, or `unsafe`.
 
-### Version Tracking (Optional — Backend Auto-Enrichment)
-Backend auto-extracts: `commit_sha`, `content_hash`, `package_version`. Per-finding `file_hash` (SHA-256) is recommended for staleness detection.
-
-### CWE ID (Required)
-Every finding MUST include a `cwe_id` field with the most specific applicable CWE identifier.
-Common CWEs for MCP/package security:
-- `CWE-78` Command Injection, `CWE-79` XSS, `CWE-89` SQL Injection, `CWE-94` Code Injection
-- `CWE-22` Path Traversal, `CWE-918` SSRF, `CWE-502` Deserialization
-- `CWE-798` Hardcoded Credentials, `CWE-321` Hardcoded Crypto Key
-- `CWE-862` Missing Authorization (IDOR), `CWE-915` Mass Assignment
-- `CWE-200`/`CWE-209` Information Exposure, `CWE-532` Log Injection
-- `CWE-362` Race Condition, `CWE-601` Open Redirect, `CWE-434` Unrestricted Upload
-- `CWE-444` HTTP Smuggling, `CWE-1321` Prototype Pollution
-- `CWE-327` Weak Crypto, `CWE-338` Weak PRNG, `CWE-1333` ReDoS
-If unsure, use the closest parent CWE. Never omit this field.
+### Version & Provenance
+- `package_version`: YOU must extract this from `package.json` → `version`, `pyproject.toml` → `[project] version`, `setup.py` → `version=`, or `Cargo.toml` → `version`. Use `"unknown"` only if no version file exists.
+- `commit_sha`, `content_hash`: Auto-enriched by backend. Do not include unless available.
+- Per-finding `file_hash` (SHA-256) is optional but recommended for staleness detection.
+
+### CWE ID (REQUIRED — findings without cwe_id are INVALID)
+Every finding MUST include `cwe_id`. Use the most specific CWE. If unsure, use the closest parent.
+
+**Pattern ID → CWE mapping (use as default, override if more specific CWE applies):**
+| Pattern | Default CWE | Pattern | Default CWE |
+|---------|------------|---------|------------|
+| CMD_INJECT | CWE-78 | CRED_THEFT | CWE-522 |
+| DATA_EXFIL | CWE-200 | DESTRUCT | CWE-912 |
+| OBF | CWE-506 | SANDBOX_ESC | CWE-693 |
+| SUPPLY_CHAIN | CWE-1357 | SOCIAL_ENG | CWE-451 |
+| PRIV_ESC | CWE-269 | INFO_LEAK | CWE-200 |
+| CRYPTO_WEAK | CWE-327 | DESER | CWE-502 |
+| PATH_TRAV | CWE-22 | SEC_BYPASS | CWE-693 |
+| PERSIST | CWE-912 | AI_PROMPT | CWE-1426 |
+| MCP_POISON | CWE-1426 | MCP_INJECT | CWE-94 |
+| MCP_TRAVERSAL | CWE-22 | MCP_SUPPLY | CWE-1357 |
+| MCP_PERM | CWE-269 | WORM | CWE-912 |
+| CICD | CWE-912 | CORR | CWE-829 |
+
+**More specific CWEs (use when applicable):**
+`CWE-79` XSS, `CWE-89` SQL Injection, `CWE-94` Code Injection, `CWE-918` SSRF, `CWE-798` Hardcoded Credentials, `CWE-321` Hardcoded Crypto Key, `CWE-862` Missing Authorization, `CWE-532` Log Injection, `CWE-362` Race Condition, `CWE-601` Open Redirect, `CWE-434` Unrestricted Upload, `CWE-1321` Prototype Pollution, `CWE-338` Weak PRNG, `CWE-1333` ReDoS
 
 ### Pattern ID Prefixes
 Use: `CMD_INJECT`, `CRED_THEFT`, `DATA_EXFIL`, `DESTRUCT`, `OBF`, `SANDBOX_ESC`, `SUPPLY_CHAIN`, `SOCIAL_ENG`, `PRIV_ESC`, `INFO_LEAK`, `CRYPTO_WEAK`, `DESER`, `PATH_TRAV`, `SEC_BYPASS`, `PERSIST`, `AI_PROMPT`, `CORR`, `MCP_POISON`, `MCP_INJECT`, `MCP_TRAVERSAL`, `MCP_SUPPLY`, `MCP_PERM`, `WORM`, `CICD`, `MANUAL`.
@@ -526,12 +564,12 @@ Use: `CMD_INJECT`, `CRED_THEFT`, `DATA_EXFIL`, `DESTRUCT`, `OBF`, `SANDBOX_ESC`,
 ---
 
 # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════
-# SAVE AND UPLOAD
+# OUTPUT
 # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════
 
-Save JSON and upload: `bash scripts/upload.sh report.json`
+Respond with ONLY the JSON report. No markdown fences, no explanation, no text before or after. The CLI handles upload automatically.
 
-If no findings: still submit with empty `findings` array and `result: "safe"` — clean scans are valuable too.
+If no findings: still output the report with empty `findings` array, `result: "safe"`, `risk_score: 0`, `max_severity: "none"` — clean audits are valuable data.
 
 ---