agent402-client 0.8.22 → 0.8.24

package/README.md

@@ -254,8 +254,9 @@ minutes, longer than many HTTP clients wait. Their `/api/pricing` row carries
 waiting `Retry-After` seconds between polls, until the job has succeeded or
 failed (it reads the job's `state` and falls back to its `status`, working,
 completed or failed, on a server that sends only that). Payment settles only on
-the delivered answer, so a failed job is a
-failed call and its spend is released.
+the delivered answer, so a failed job is a failed call; the payment it carried
+stays held against the caps (see Spending caps), since only the seller knows
+it was not redeemed.
 
 ```js
 const a = new Agent402({
@@ -287,7 +288,7 @@ that runs as one.
 | `await a.collectJob(jobUrl, { timeoutMs?, onProgress? })` | Collect a job link (from `AsyncJobPendingError.jobUrl`) until it has the answer |
 | `Agent402.solvePow(pow)` | Solve a proof-of-work challenge object → an `X-Pow-Solution` value |
 | `a.guardX402Client(client)` | Enforce this client's caps on every payment the given `@x402/core` client signs (the same as passing `x402Client`); returns the client |
-| `a.spendingSummary()` | Rolling-24h paid spend so far: `{ dailyUsd, calls, byHost, limits }` |
+| `a.spendingSummary()` | Rolling-24h paid spend so far: `{ dailyUsd, calls, byHost, heldUsd, heldCalls, heldByHost, limits }`; `dailyUsd`, `calls` and `byHost` are settled calls, the `held*` fields are payments sent without a delivered answer |
 | `a.clearCache()` | Drop the in-memory result cache |
 
 ## Response size ceiling
@@ -388,11 +389,35 @@ try {
 }
 ```
 
-Only **settled** paid calls count against the rolling window. A call refused or
-failed before settlement never consumes budget. A paid HTTP-success response
-that later fails byte, JSON, or output validation remains settled spend. Free
-proof-of-work calls are never counted. Omit a cap (or leave it `null`) for no
-limit; with none set, behavior is unchanged.
+A call refused before any payment header leaves the process never consumes
+budget. Once a header has been sent, its signed amount counts against the caps
+whatever the seller answers. A delivered answer books it **settled**. Anything
+else (an error status, a refused payment, a dropped connection, a redirect, a
+job still running) books it **held**: the seller holds a signed authorization it
+can still redeem until its `validBefore`, so the error carries `paid: "unknown"`
+and `heldUsd`, and `spendingSummary()` reports it under `heldUsd`. A held
+amount counts for the rolling 24 hours, and longer when the authorization
+stays valid longer (a seven-day Circle Gateway authorization is held until its
+`validBefore` passes). With an `x402Client`, an accept asking to stay valid for
+more than a day (`MAX_VALIDITY_SECONDS`) is refused before anything is signed,
+and a payload signed for longer is refused before it is sent, so no hold
+outlives a day after the send (seven days and an hour for a batched payment). Pass your `x402Client` so the client sees exactly which
+payments were signed; through a pre-wrapped `fetch` alone it cannot tell, so any
+failed paid call is held. A paid HTTP-success response that later fails byte,
+JSON, or output validation remains settled spend. Free proof-of-work calls are
+never counted. Omit a cap (or leave it `null`) for no limit; with none set,
+behavior is unchanged.
+
+**Held payments.** `heldUsd` is money this client sent a signed payment for
+without getting a delivered answer. It is held, not spent: a seller that kept
+the authorization could still redeem it, so the caps count it until it can no
+longer settle. When the authorization expires unused, the held amount is
+released and was never charged. On the built-in default host
+(`https://agent402.tools`, matched by exact origin), an error status (400 or
+above) is never settled, so a hold for one ends at the authorization's
+`validBefore` plus 10 minutes, with no 24-hour floor, or 15 minutes after the
+answer when the client cannot read `validBefore` (no `x402Client`). Every other
+`baseUrl` keeps the rule above.
 
 **Caps are enforced on the payment that is signed.** Pass the `x402Client` your
 `fetch` wraps (or call `a.guardX402Client(client)`) and the client registers a

package/index.js

@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@
 //   const a = new Agent402({ fetch: payFetch });
 import { createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
 import { AsyncLocalStorage } from "node:async_hooks";
-import { quoteOf, guardSigning, networkIdsOf, acceptUsd } from "./known-assets.js";
-export { KNOWN_ASSETS, NETWORK_NAMES, knownAsset, acceptUsd, networkIdsOf } from "./known-assets.js";
+import { quoteOf, guardSigning, networkIdsOf, acceptUsd, signedExpirySeconds, MAX_VALIDITY_SECONDS } from "./known-assets.js";
+export { KNOWN_ASSETS, NETWORK_NAMES, knownAsset, acceptUsd, networkIdsOf, MAX_VALIDITY_SECONDS } from "./known-assets.js";
 import { distrustFetch } from "./tls-distrust.js";
 export { distrustFetch, distrustDispatcher, distrustCheckServerIdentity, DISTRUSTED_SPKI_SHA256 } from "./tls-distrust.js";
 export { resetRetryFetch, isConnectionReset } from "./reset-retry.js";
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ export { AsyncJobPendingError } from "./async-job.js";
 // `User-Agent: agent402-client/<version>` - a standard header, no extra
 // network calls - so a seller can attribute traffic (and settled payments)
 // to this SDK. Product token only; nothing about the caller rides along.
-const VERSION = "0.8.22";
+const VERSION = "0.8.24";
 const USER_AGENT = `agent402-client/${VERSION}`;
 // A package built on this SDK (an adapter) names itself first: its own
 // product token, then this one. Anything that is not one well-formed token
@@ -110,6 +110,64 @@ export const GATEWAY_MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 7 * 24 * 3600 + 3600;
 const GATEWAY_DOCS_URL = "https://github.com/MikeyPetrillo/Agent402/wiki/Circle-Gateway";
 const EVM_ADDR = /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/;
 
+// The rolling window the daily and per-host caps count over.
+const SPEND_WINDOW_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+// Added to a held authorization's own expiry (validBefore, or a Permit2
+// deadline) before the hold may end: the chain judges expiry by block time,
+// which can trail this process's clock.
+export const HOLD_SLACK_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000;
+
+/** When a signed payment payload can no longer settle, in ms since the epoch
+ *  plus HOLD_SLACK_MS: an EIP-3009 `authorization.validBefore` or a Permit2
+ *  `deadline`, in seconds, never later than `maxSeconds` after `nowMs` (the
+ *  longest window this client signs: MAX_VALIDITY_SECONDS, or
+ *  GATEWAY_MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS for a batched payment), so no hold outlives
+ *  the ceiling a payload must pass to be sent. null when the payload names no
+ *  expiry this reads (a Solana transaction, an unknown scheme). */
+export function signedValidUntilMs(paymentPayload, { maxSeconds = MAX_VALIDITY_SECONDS, nowMs = Date.now() } = {}) {
+  const v = signedExpirySeconds(paymentPayload);
+  if (v == null || !Number.isFinite(v)) return null;
+  return Math.min(v * 1000, nowMs + maxSeconds * 1000) + HOLD_SLACK_MS;
+}
+
+/** A spend-log entry the caps still count at `now`: anything recorded inside
+ *  the rolling window, and a held payment whose authorization can still
+ *  settle, however long ago it was signed. */
+const countsAt = (e, now) => e.state === "held" && e.ownHost
+  ? e.until > now
+  : e.ts >= now - SPEND_WINDOW_MS || (e.state === "held" && e.until != null && e.until > now);
+
+// The client's built-in seller. It settles a payment only on an answer below
+// 400 (the handler runs first), so a sent payment it answered with an error
+// status was not settled and can be redeemed only until its authorization
+// expires: such a hold ends at that expiry plus HOLD_SLACK_MS, with no 24 h
+// floor, or DEFAULT_HOST_BLIND_HOLD_MS after the answer when the expiry is not
+// readable (its challenges expire in about five minutes). Matched by exact
+// origin; every other seller keeps the rolling-window rule.
+export const DEFAULT_BASE_URL = "https://agent402.tools";
+const DEFAULT_ORIGIN = new URL(DEFAULT_BASE_URL).origin;
+export const DEFAULT_HOST_BLIND_HOLD_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000;
+function isDefaultOrigin(url) { try { return new URL(url).origin === DEFAULT_ORIGIN; } catch { return false; } }
+
+/** Mark an error thrown after a payment header was sent: `paid: "unknown"`
+ *  (the seller holds a signed authorization it may still redeem) and
+ *  `heldUsd`, the amount held against the caps for it. An Agent402 refusal
+ *  also says so in its message. */
+function markOutcomeUnknown(e, slug, heldUsd, { seen = true } = {}) {
+  if (!e || typeof e !== "object") return e;
+  try {
+    const own = e.paid === false && e.slug === slug;
+    e.paid = "unknown";
+    e.heldUsd = heldUsd;
+    if (own && typeof e.message === "string" && !/spending caps/.test(e.message)) {
+      e.message += seen
+        ? `. A payment was sent, so its outcome is unknown: its signed amount stays held against this client's spending caps (spendingSummary().heldUsd).`
+        : `. This client cannot see whether its payment fetch sent a payment (pass x402Client to let it see), so the amount stays held against its spending caps (spendingSummary().heldUsd).`;
+    }
+  } catch { /* a frozen error keeps what it says */ }
+  return e;
+}
+
 // A pre-wrapped payment fetch with no x402Client is the one mode where the caps
 // are checked on an unpaid preflight only, not on the payment that is signed.
 // Said once per process, on the first capped paid call in that mode.
@@ -164,7 +222,7 @@ export class Agent402 {
    * @param {function} [opts.onProgress] called with each job document
    *        ({ status, stage, progress, etaSeconds, ... }) while a job runs
    */
-  constructor({ baseUrl = "https://agent402.tools", fetch: payFetch, cache = true, fetchImpl = undefined, tlsDistrust = true,
+  constructor({ baseUrl = DEFAULT_BASE_URL, fetch: payFetch, cache = true, fetchImpl = undefined, tlsDistrust = true,
     maxPerCallUsd = null, dailyLimitUsd = null, maxPerHostUsd = null, creditsKey = null, x402Client = null, payNetworks = null,
     maxResponseBytes = DEFAULT_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES, outputValidator = null,
     respondAsync = "auto", asyncTimeoutMs = DEFAULT_ASYNC_TIMEOUT_MS, onProgress = null, gateway = null, userAgent = null, retryResets = true } = {}) {
@@ -204,13 +262,16 @@ export class Agent402 {
     // failure mode): optional hard ceilings enforced BEFORE any payment is
     // signed. A malicious or misconfigured 402 that quotes an inflated price is
     // refused instead of paid. null = no limit (default - behavior unchanged).
-    // Amounts commit to the rolling window only on a settled paid call, so a
-    // failed/blocked call never counts against the budget.
+    // A call refused before any payment left this process never counts. Once
+    // a payment header has been sent, its signed amount counts whatever the
+    // seller answers: "settled" on a delivered answer, otherwise "held" (the
+    // authorization can still be redeemed) until it can no longer settle and
+    // the rolling window has passed it.
     this._spend = {
       maxPerCall: numOrNull(maxPerCallUsd),
       daily: numOrNull(dailyLimitUsd),
       perHost: numOrNull(maxPerHostUsd),
-      log: [], // [{ ts, host, usd }] - settled paid calls in the last 24h
+      log: [], // [{ ts, host, usd, state: "reserved"|"held"|"settled", until? }]
     };
     // The paid call being signed right now, so the signing guard can tell this
     // call's own reservation from every other one (see guardX402Client).
@@ -254,6 +315,15 @@ export class Agent402 {
         if (ctx) ctx.refusal = { ...detail, limit: this._signAllowance().limit };
       },
     });
+    // Registered after the guard's own check of the signed amount, so it runs
+    // only for a payload that check let through: the payload the payment
+    // fetch sends next. Each one is recorded with its amount and expiry (a
+    // fetch that retries with a fresh payload sends two).
+    client.onAfterPaymentCreation(async ({ paymentPayload }) => {
+      const ctx = this._signCtx.getStore();
+      if (!ctx || ctx.signedUsd == null) return;
+      ctx.sent.push({ usd: ctx.signedUsd, until: signedValidUntilMs(paymentPayload) });
+    });
     this._guarded = true;
     return client;
   }
@@ -263,15 +333,19 @@ export class Agent402 {
    *  (this call's own one is what is being replaced). */
   _signAllowance() {
     const s = this._spend;
-    const own = this._signCtx.getStore()?.reservation || null;
-    const cutoff = Date.now() - 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
-    const others = s.log.filter((e) => e.ts >= cutoff && e !== own);
+    const ctx = this._signCtx.getStore();
+    const own = ctx?.reservation || null;
+    // A payload this call already sent (a fetch that retries with a fresh
+    // one) is outstanding too, beside every other call's entry.
+    const ownSent = (ctx?.sent || []).reduce((a, p) => a + p.usd, 0);
+    const now = Date.now();
+    const others = s.log.filter((e) => countsAt(e, now) && e !== own);
     const host = hostOf(this.baseUrl);
     let cap = Infinity, limit = null;
     const tighten = (value, name) => { if (value < cap) { cap = value; limit = name; } };
     if (s.maxPerCall != null) tighten(s.maxPerCall, "maxPerCallUsd");
-    if (s.daily != null) tighten(s.daily - others.reduce((a, e) => a + e.usd, 0), "dailyLimitUsd");
-    if (s.perHost != null) tighten(s.perHost - others.filter((e) => e.host === host).reduce((a, e) => a + e.usd, 0), "maxPerHostUsd");
+    if (s.daily != null) tighten(s.daily - ownSent - others.reduce((a, e) => a + e.usd, 0), "dailyLimitUsd");
+    if (s.perHost != null) tighten(s.perHost - ownSent - others.filter((e) => e.host === host).reduce((a, e) => a + e.usd, 0), "maxPerHostUsd");
     return { cap: Math.max(0, cap), limit };
   }
 
@@ -586,34 +660,42 @@ export class Agent402 {
         const usd = await this._quotedUsd(paidSend, listUsd, { slug, mode: guarded ? "guarded" : "wallet" });
         // Reserve the amount synchronously (before the await) so concurrent calls
         // can't each observe the pre-commit total and collectively blow a rolling
-        // cap; release the reservation if the call doesn't settle. With the
-        // signing guard on, the reservation is replaced by the amount actually
-        // signed, and a call that signed nothing spends nothing.
+        // cap. With the signing guard on, the reservation is replaced by the
+        // amount actually signed, and each payload the guard let through is
+        // recorded as sent (ctx.sent). Without it the payment fetch is opaque:
+        // any request it made may have carried a signature.
         const reservation = this._spendReserve(host, usd, slug, listUsd, { always: guarded });
-        const ctx = { reservation, signedUsd: null, refusal: null };
-        const signedNothing = () => guarded && ctx.signedUsd == null;
+        const ctx = { reservation, signedUsd: null, refusal: null, sent: [] };
+        const sentPayment = () => !guarded || ctx.sent.length > 0;
         let settled = false;
         try {
           const r = await collect(await this._signCtx.run(ctx, () => paidSend(asyncHeaders, this.payFetch)));
           if (!r.ok) throw this._fail(slug, r, await this._failureDetail(slug, r));
-          if (signedNothing()) this._spendRelease(reservation);
-          else this._spendSettle(reservation); // confirm the reservation as settled spend
+          if (!sentPayment()) this._spendRelease(reservation);
+          else this._spendHold(reservation, guarded ? ctx.sent : null, { settleLast: true });
           settled = true;
           return this._deliverResponse(slug, r, cacheKey, cache, validator, { maxResponseBytes, paid: true });
         } catch (e) {
           // An invalid or oversized paid HTTP-success body is failed delivery,
-          // not a rollback of money that already moved. A job still running
-          // past the wait may yet settle, so its reservation stands.
-          // A redirect after a signature was sent leaves that payment's outcome
-          // unknown, so it counts against the caps, like a job still running.
-          if ((e instanceof AsyncJobPendingError || e instanceof PaymentRedirectError) && !signedNothing()) this._spendSettle(reservation);
-          else if (!settled) this._spendRelease(reservation);
+          // not a rollback of money that already moved. Any other failure once
+          // a payment header was sent (an error status, a dropped connection,
+          // a redirect, a job still running) leaves an authorization the seller
+          // can still redeem, so its signed amount is held, not released. Only
+          // a call that sent no payment releases its reservation.
+          if (!settled) {
+            if (sentPayment()) markOutcomeUnknown(e, slug, this._spendHold(reservation, guarded ? ctx.sent : null, { ownHost: this._unsettledAnswer(e) }), { seen: guarded });
+            else this._spendRelease(reservation);
+          }
           if (ctx.refusal) {
             const d = ctx.refusal;
             throw new SpendingLimitError(d.reason === "unknown-asset"
               ? `refusing to pay for "${slug}" - no payment option it asked to sign is in a known asset, so none can be priced`
+              : d.reason === "signed-amount" || d.reason === "signed-validity"
+              ? `refusing to pay for "${slug}" - ${d.detail}, so the payment was not sent`
+              : d.reason === "validity"
+              ? `refusing to pay for "${slug}" - ${d.detail}, so nothing was signed`
               : `refusing to pay $${d.priceUsd} for "${slug}" - the payment it asked to sign is over ${d.limit || "the cap"} ($${d.allowanceUsd} left to sign)`,
-            { limit: d.limit || "signing", slug, priceUsd: d.priceUsd, cap: d.allowanceUsd, atSigning: true, cause: e });
+            { limit: d.limit || "signing", slug, priceUsd: d.priceUsd, cap: d.allowanceUsd, atSigning: true, cause: e, ...(e?.paid === "unknown" ? { paid: "unknown", heldUsd: e.heldUsd } : {}) });
           }
           throw e;
         }
@@ -642,7 +724,8 @@ export class Agent402 {
           settled = true;
           return this._deliverResponse(slug, r, cacheKey, cache, validator, { maxResponseBytes, paid: true });
         } catch (e) {
-          if (e instanceof AsyncJobPendingError) this._spendSettle(reservation);
+          // A job still running may yet be debited, so its amount is held.
+          if (e instanceof AsyncJobPendingError) markOutcomeUnknown(e, slug, this._spendHold(reservation));
           else if (!settled) this._spendRelease(reservation);
           throw e;
         }
@@ -689,8 +772,10 @@ export class Agent402 {
    * which would sign the plain accept). Returns NO_GATEWAY_ACCEPT, with
    * nothing reserved or signed, when the answer is not a 402 or offers no
    * batched accept this signer may pay, so the caller falls back. Once the
-   * signed header has been sent the amount is spent for the caps whatever
-   * comes back; only a signer that throws releases the reservation.
+   * signed header has been sent its amount is held against the caps until a
+   * delivered answer settles it, or until the authorization can no longer
+   * settle and the rolling window has passed it; only a signer that throws
+   * releases the reservation.
    */
   async _gatewayCall(slug, tool, { paidSend, asyncHeaders, collect, cacheKey, cache, validator, maxResponseBytes }) {
     const pre = await paidSend();
@@ -700,14 +785,17 @@ export class Agent402 {
     if (!accept) return NO_GATEWAY_ACCEPT;
     const host = hostOf(this.baseUrl);
     const listUsd = parseUsd(tool.price);
-    // The amount the accept asks for, priced from the known-asset table
-    // (gatewayAcceptOf keeps only an accept that table can price); the
-    // catalog's figure never lowers what the caps are checked against.
-    const usd = Math.max(listUsd, acceptUsd(accept));
+    // The amount the accept asks for, read from the field the challenge's
+    // version names and priced from the known-asset table; an accept that
+    // version does not price is not paid here. The catalog's figure never
+    // lowers what the caps are checked against.
+    const acceptedUsd = acceptUsd(accept, Number(env?.x402Version));
+    if (acceptedUsd == null) return NO_GATEWAY_ACCEPT;
+    const usd = Math.max(listUsd, acceptedUsd);
     const reservation = this._spendReserve(host, usd, slug, listUsd);
-    let header;
+    let header, payload;
     try {
-      ({ header } = await signGatewayPayment(accept, { signer: this.gateway.signer, resource: env?.resource }));
+      ({ header, payload } = await signGatewayPayment(accept, { signer: this.gateway.signer, resource: env?.resource }));
     } catch (e) {
       // Nothing signed: the reservation is the only thing to undo.
       this._spendRelease(reservation);
@@ -715,26 +803,35 @@ export class Agent402 {
     }
     // From here the signed authorization leaves this process. It is a bearer
     // claim on the deposit until its validBefore whatever the seller answers
-    // (a refusal, a failure, a redirect, a job still running), so it counts
-    // as spent against the caps from the first send.
-    this._spendSettle(reservation);
+    // (a refusal, a failure, a redirect, a job still running), so its signed
+    // amount is held against the caps from the first send.
+    const sent = [{ usd: acceptedUsd, until: signedValidUntilMs(payload, { maxSeconds: GATEWAY_MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS }) }];
+    const heldUsd = this._spendHold(reservation, sent);
     const paidHeaders = { "PAYMENT-SIGNATURE": header, ...asyncHeaders };
-    let r = await collect(await paidSend(paidHeaders));
-    let body = null;
-    for (let resend = 0; ; resend++) {
-      if (r.status !== 402) break;
-      body = await readJsonQuietly(r);
-      const pending = body && typeof body === "object" && (body.reason === "settlement-pending" || body.retry === "same-payment");
-      if (!pending) break;
-      // Gateway may yet settle it: the header is handed back so the same
-      // payment can be resent later.
-      if (resend >= GATEWAY_PENDING_RESENDS) throw new GatewayPendingError(slug, header, body);
-      const retryAfterSec = Number(r.headers?.get?.("retry-after")) || Number(body.retryAfterSeconds) || 10;
-      await this._sleep(Math.min(Math.max(0, retryAfterSec) * 1000, GATEWAY_PENDING_MAX_WAIT_MS));
+    let r;
+    try {
       r = await collect(await paidSend(paidHeaders));
+      let body = null;
+      for (let resend = 0; ; resend++) {
+        if (r.status !== 402) break;
+        body = await readJsonQuietly(r);
+        const pending = body && typeof body === "object" && (body.reason === "settlement-pending" || body.retry === "same-payment");
+        if (!pending) break;
+        // Gateway may yet settle it: the header is handed back so the same
+        // payment can be resent later.
+        if (resend >= GATEWAY_PENDING_RESENDS) throw new GatewayPendingError(slug, header, body);
+        const retryAfterSec = Number(r.headers?.get?.("retry-after")) || Number(body.retryAfterSeconds) || 10;
+        await this._sleep(Math.min(Math.max(0, retryAfterSec) * 1000, GATEWAY_PENDING_MAX_WAIT_MS));
+        r = await collect(await paidSend(paidHeaders));
+      }
+      if (r.status === 402) throw this._fail(slug, r, gatewayRefusalMessage(slug, body, accept, this.gateway.signer.address));
+      if (!r.ok) throw this._fail(slug, r, await this._failureDetail(slug, r));
+    } catch (e) {
+      if (this._unsettledAnswer(e)) this._spendHold(reservation, sent, { ownHost: true });
+      markOutcomeUnknown(e, slug, heldUsd);
+      throw e;
     }
-    if (r.status === 402) throw this._fail(slug, r, gatewayRefusalMessage(slug, body, accept, this.gateway.signer.address));
-    if (!r.ok) throw this._fail(slug, r, await this._failureDetail(slug, r));
+    this._spendSettle(reservation);
     return this._deliverResponse(slug, r, cacheKey, cache, validator, { maxResponseBytes, paid: true });
   }
 
@@ -835,6 +932,8 @@ export class Agent402 {
    *  a caller can see the quote is not the number they budgeted from. */
   _spendCheck(host, usd, slug, listUsd = null) {
     const s = this._spend;
+    const now = Date.now();
+    s.log = s.log.filter((e) => countsAt(e, now));
     if (s.maxPerCall == null && s.daily == null && s.perHost == null) return;
     const quotedNote = listUsd != null && listUsd !== usd
       ? ` (this request is quoted $${usd}; the catalog lists $${listUsd})` : "";
@@ -843,22 +942,27 @@ export class Agent402 {
         `refusing to pay $${usd} for "${slug}" - exceeds maxPerCallUsd $${s.maxPerCall}${quotedNote}`,
         { limit: "maxPerCallUsd", slug, priceUsd: usd, cap: s.maxPerCall, ...(listUsd != null ? { listPriceUsd: listUsd } : {}) });
     }
-    const cutoff = Date.now() - 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
-    s.log = s.log.filter((e) => e.ts >= cutoff);
+    // Held payments count: each is a signed authorization that was sent and
+    // may still be redeemed. The refusal says how much of the total they are.
+    const heldOf = (entries) => entries.filter((e) => e.state === "held").reduce((a, e) => a + e.usd, 0);
+    const heldNote = (held) => held > 0 ? ` (including $${Number(held.toFixed(6))} held for sent payments whose outcome is unknown)` : "";
     if (s.daily != null) {
       const spent = s.log.reduce((a, e) => a + e.usd, 0);
       if (spent + usd > s.daily) {
+        const held = heldOf(s.log);
         throw new SpendingLimitError(
-          `refusing to pay $${usd} for "${slug}" - would bring 24h spend to $${(spent + usd).toFixed(6)}, over dailyLimitUsd $${s.daily}`,
-          { limit: "dailyLimitUsd", slug, priceUsd: usd, spent, cap: s.daily });
+          `refusing to pay $${usd} for "${slug}" - would bring 24h spend to $${(spent + usd).toFixed(6)}${heldNote(held)}, over dailyLimitUsd $${s.daily}`,
+          { limit: "dailyLimitUsd", slug, priceUsd: usd, spent, heldUsd: Number(held.toFixed(6)), cap: s.daily });
       }
     }
     if (s.perHost != null) {
-      const spentHost = s.log.filter((e) => e.host === host).reduce((a, e) => a + e.usd, 0);
+      const onHost = s.log.filter((e) => e.host === host);
+      const spentHost = onHost.reduce((a, e) => a + e.usd, 0);
       if (spentHost + usd > s.perHost) {
+        const held = heldOf(onHost);
         throw new SpendingLimitError(
-          `refusing to pay $${usd} for "${slug}" - would bring 24h spend to ${host} to $${(spentHost + usd).toFixed(6)}, over maxPerHostUsd $${s.perHost}`,
-          { limit: "maxPerHostUsd", slug, host, priceUsd: usd, spent: spentHost, cap: s.perHost });
+          `refusing to pay $${usd} for "${slug}" - would bring 24h spend to ${host} to $${(spentHost + usd).toFixed(6)}${heldNote(held)}, over maxPerHostUsd $${s.perHost}`,
+          { limit: "maxPerHostUsd", slug, host, priceUsd: usd, spent: spentHost, heldUsd: Number(held.toFixed(6)), cap: s.perHost });
       }
     }
   }
@@ -874,8 +978,9 @@ export class Agent402 {
    *  protected nothing and lost the part of the message an agent needs to
    *  act on. A body that is not JSON contributes nothing but its status. */
   /** A refusal a caller can branch on: `status` (the HTTP status), `slug` and
-   *  `paid: false` ride on the Error, so a 402 is not something to regex out of
-   *  the message. Nothing was spent on any path that reaches this. */
+   *  `paid` ride on the Error, so a 402 is not something to regex out of the
+   *  message. `paid: false` here; a failure after a payment header was sent
+   *  is re-marked `paid: "unknown"` (markOutcomeUnknown) by the paid path. */
   _fail(slug, r, message) {
     return Object.assign(new Error(message), { status: r?.status, slug, paid: false });
   }
@@ -907,29 +1012,74 @@ export class Agent402 {
   _spendReserve(host, usd, slug, listUsd = null, { always = false } = {}) {
     this._spendCheck(host, usd, slug, listUsd);
     if (!(usd > 0) && !always) return null;
-    const entry = { ts: Date.now(), host, usd, pending: true };
+    const entry = { ts: Date.now(), host, usd, state: "reserved" };
     this._spend.log.push(entry);
     return entry;
   }
-  /** Confirm a reservation as settled spend. */
-  _spendSettle(entry) { if (entry) entry.pending = false; }
-  /** Roll back a reservation whose call did not settle (failed / errored). */
+  /** Confirm a reservation (or a hold) as settled spend. */
+  _spendSettle(entry) { if (entry) { entry.state = "settled"; entry.until = null; entry.ownHost = false; } }
+  /** True when a paid call failed on an answer the built-in seller does not
+   *  settle: an error status (400 or above) from DEFAULT_BASE_URL's exact
+   *  origin. A Gateway payment still pending, a job still running, a redirect
+   *  or a dropped connection may have settled, so none of them counts. */
+  _unsettledAnswer(e) {
+    return isDefaultOrigin(this.baseUrl) && e instanceof Error && e.paid === false
+      && Number.isInteger(e.status) && e.status >= 400 && !(e instanceof GatewayPendingError);
+  }
+  /** Hold a reservation whose payment header was sent: it counts against the
+   *  caps until its authorization can no longer settle (`until`) and the
+   *  rolling window has passed it. `sent` lists each payload that left the
+   *  process ({ usd, until }); the reservation holds the first, and each
+   *  further one gets its own entry. With `settleLast`, the last payload is
+   *  the one a delivered answer settled, so it is booked settled instead.
+   *  null `sent` holds the reservation at its own amount, expiry unknown.
+   *  Returns the total now held. */
+  _spendHold(entry, sent = null, { settleLast = false, ownHost = false } = {}) {
+    if (!entry) return 0;
+    const list = sent && sent.length ? sent : [{ usd: entry.usd, until: null }];
+    const blindUntil = Date.now() + DEFAULT_HOST_BLIND_HOLD_MS;
+    const book = (e, p, state) => {
+      e.usd = p.usd; e.state = state;
+      e.ownHost = state === "held" && ownHost;
+      e.until = state !== "held" ? null : p.until ?? (e.ownHost ? blindUntil : null);
+    };
+    let held = 0;
+    list.forEach((p, i) => {
+      const state = settleLast && i === list.length - 1 ? "settled" : "held";
+      if (state === "held") held += p.usd;
+      if (i === 0) book(entry, p, state);
+      else { const e = { ts: entry.ts, host: entry.host }; book(e, p, state); this._spend.log.push(e); }
+    });
+    return Number(held.toFixed(6));
+  }
+  /** Roll back a reservation whose call sent no payment. */
   _spendRelease(entry) {
     if (!entry) return;
     const i = this._spend.log.indexOf(entry);
     if (i >= 0) this._spend.log.splice(i, 1);
   }
 
-  /** Rolling-24h spend summary (settled paid calls only) - for observability. */
+  /** Rolling-24h spend summary, for observability. `dailyUsd`, `calls` and
+   *  `byHost` are settled paid calls; `heldUsd`, `heldCalls` and `heldByHost`
+   *  are payments that were sent without a delivered answer, still counted
+   *  against the caps because their authorizations may yet be redeemed. */
   spendingSummary() {
-    const cutoff = Date.now() - 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
-    const log = this._spend.log.filter((e) => e.ts >= cutoff && !e.pending);
-    const byHost = {};
-    for (const e of log) byHost[e.host] = Number(((byHost[e.host] || 0) + e.usd).toFixed(6));
+    const now = Date.now();
+    const live = this._spend.log.filter((e) => countsAt(e, now));
+    const tally = (entries) => {
+      const byHost = {};
+      for (const e of entries) byHost[e.host] = Number(((byHost[e.host] || 0) + e.usd).toFixed(6));
+      return { usd: Number(entries.reduce((a, e) => a + e.usd, 0).toFixed(6)), calls: entries.length, byHost };
+    };
+    const settled = tally(live.filter((e) => e.state === "settled"));
+    const held = tally(live.filter((e) => e.state === "held"));
     return {
-      dailyUsd: Number(log.reduce((a, e) => a + e.usd, 0).toFixed(6)),
-      calls: log.length,
-      byHost,
+      dailyUsd: settled.usd,
+      calls: settled.calls,
+      byHost: settled.byHost,
+      heldUsd: held.usd,
+      heldCalls: held.calls,
+      heldByHost: held.byHost,
       limits: { maxPerCallUsd: this._spend.maxPerCall, dailyLimitUsd: this._spend.daily, maxPerHostUsd: this._spend.perHost },
     };
   }
@@ -997,7 +1147,7 @@ export class GatewayPendingError extends Error {
     this.slug = slug;
     this.paymentHeader = paymentHeader;
     this.status = 402;
-    this.paid = null;
+    this.paid = "unknown";
     this.retryAfterSeconds = Number(body?.retryAfterSeconds) || null;
   }
 }
@@ -1035,7 +1185,7 @@ export function gatewayAcceptOf(accepts, networks = null) {
     && EVM_ADDR.test(String(a.payTo || "")) && EVM_ADDR.test(String(a.extra.verifyingContract || ""))
     && typeof a.extra.version === "string" && /^[0-9]{1,4}$/.test(a.extra.version)
     && /^[0-9]{1,78}$/.test(String(a.amount ?? "")) && Number(a.maxTimeoutSeconds) > 0 && Number(a.maxTimeoutSeconds) <= GATEWAY_MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
-    && acceptUsd(a) != null) || null;
+    && acceptUsd(a, 2) != null) || null;
 }
 
 /**

package/known-assets.js

@@ -1,13 +1,16 @@
 // Known payment assets, and the USD value of an x402 accept priced from them.
 //
-// An x402 "exact" signer signs the accept's raw base-unit `amount` for the
-// accept's `asset`. A spending cap therefore has to price that amount with the
-// asset's real decimals, and a decimals hint the seller sends beside it (for
-// example `extra.decimals`) is not evidence of anything. So the price of an
-// accept comes from this table alone: the stablecoins each network settles on
-// the Agent402 rails, with their on-chain decimals. An accept whose
-// (network, asset) pair is not in the table cannot be priced, and a buyer with
-// a cap does not sign it.
+// An x402 "exact" signer signs the accept's raw base-unit amount for the
+// accept's `asset`: `amount` under x402 v2, `maxAmountRequired` under v1. A
+// spending cap therefore has to price the field the signer of that version
+// reads, with the asset's real decimals, and a decimals hint the seller sends
+// beside it (for example `extra.decimals`) is not evidence of anything. So the
+// price of an accept comes from its challenge's version and this table alone:
+// the stablecoins each network settles on the Agent402 rails, with their
+// on-chain decimals. An accept whose (network, asset) pair is not in the table,
+// or that carries both amount fields with different values, cannot be priced,
+// and a buyer with a cap does not sign it. The table is keyed by CAIP-2 ids
+// only: a bare v1 network name (for example "base") is not priced.
 //
 // The same file ships in agent402-client, agent402-mcp and agent402-openclaw;
 // the parent repo's scripts/test-known-assets.js keeps the copies identical and
@@ -85,13 +88,33 @@ export function knownAsset(network, asset) {
   return list.find((e) => sameAsset(e.asset, asset)) || null;
 }
 
-/** The USD value of one accept: its base-unit amount (`amount` in x402 v2,
- *  `maxAmountRequired` in v1) over the KNOWN decimals of its asset. null when
- *  the asset is not known or the amount is not a whole number of base units. */
-export function acceptUsd(accept) {
+/** The base-unit amount the signer of `x402Version` signs for one accept, as
+ *  a string of digits: `maxAmountRequired` under v1, `amount` under v2. With
+ *  no version, the one field present (or both, when they agree). null when
+ *  the field that version signs is missing or not a whole number, when the
+ *  version is neither 1 nor 2, and whenever the accept carries both fields
+ *  with different values: such an accept means one price to one reader and
+ *  another to the next, so it is not priced at all. */
+export function acceptAmount(accept, x402Version = undefined) {
   if (!accept || typeof accept !== "object") return null;
-  const raw = accept.amount ?? accept.maxAmountRequired;
-  if (raw == null || !/^\d+$/.test(String(raw))) return null;
+  const has = (x) => x != null && x !== "";
+  const v2 = accept.amount, v1 = accept.maxAmountRequired;
+  if (has(v2) && has(v1) && String(v2) !== String(v1)) return null;
+  let raw;
+  if (x402Version === 1) raw = v1;
+  else if (x402Version === 2) raw = v2;
+  else if (x402Version == null) raw = has(v2) ? v2 : v1;
+  else return null;
+  if (!has(raw) || !/^\d+$/.test(String(raw))) return null;
+  return String(raw);
+}
+
+/** The USD value of one accept: the base-unit amount its version's signer
+ *  signs (acceptAmount) over the KNOWN decimals of its asset. null when the
+ *  asset is not known or the amount cannot be read. */
+export function acceptUsd(accept, x402Version = undefined) {
+  const raw = acceptAmount(accept, x402Version);
+  if (raw == null) return null;
   const entry = knownAsset(accept.network, accept.asset);
   if (!entry) return null;
   return Number(raw) / 10 ** entry.decimals;
@@ -99,11 +122,11 @@ export function acceptUsd(accept) {
 
 /** The USD values of a 402's accepts: `max` and `min` over the accepts that can
  *  be priced, and `unknown`, the count that cannot. null when there are none. */
-export function quoteOf(accepts) {
+export function quoteOf(accepts, x402Version = undefined) {
   if (!Array.isArray(accepts) || !accepts.length) return null;
   let max = null, min = null, unknown = 0;
   for (const a of accepts) {
-    const usd = acceptUsd(a);
+    const usd = acceptUsd(a, x402Version);
     if (usd == null) { unknown++; continue; }
     if (max == null || usd > max) max = usd;
     if (min == null || usd < min) min = usd;
@@ -111,6 +134,51 @@ export function quoteOf(accepts) {
   return { max, min, unknown, total: accepts.length };
 }
 
+// The longest a signed payment may stay redeemable. An EVM "exact" signer
+// sets validBefore (EIP-3009) or deadline (Permit2) to the moment of signing
+// plus the accept's maxTimeoutSeconds, and the signed payload is a bearer
+// claim until then, so a seller that quotes years gets an authorization it
+// could redeem for years and a held amount that never stops counting. Honest
+// accepts ask for minutes (Agent402's own ask 300 s); a day admits every
+// one of them. An accept that asks for longer is dropped before selection,
+// and a payload signed past it is refused before it is sent.
+export const MAX_VALIDITY_SECONDS = 24 * 3600;
+// Signing reads the clock a moment before the check after it does.
+const VALIDITY_CLOCK_SLACK_SECONDS = 60;
+
+/** True when an accept asks for a validity window past MAX_VALIDITY_SECONDS.
+ *  An accept with no readable maxTimeoutSeconds is left to the check of what
+ *  was signed (signedValidityProblem). */
+export function acceptValidityTooLong(accept, maxSeconds = MAX_VALIDITY_SECONDS) {
+  const raw = accept?.maxTimeoutSeconds;
+  if (raw == null || raw === "") return false;
+  const n = Number(raw);
+  return !Number.isFinite(n) || n > maxSeconds;
+}
+
+/** The expiry a signed payload carries, in unix seconds: an EIP-3009
+ *  `authorization.validBefore` or a Permit2 `deadline`. null when the payload
+ *  names none (a Solana transaction, an unknown scheme). NaN when it names
+ *  one that is not a whole number of seconds. */
+export function signedExpirySeconds(paymentPayload) {
+  const p = paymentPayload?.payload;
+  const v = p?.authorization?.validBefore ?? p?.permit2Authorization?.deadline;
+  if (v == null) return null;
+  return /^\d{1,15}$/.test(String(v)) ? Number(v) : NaN;
+}
+
+/** Why a created payment payload stays redeemable for too long, or null: its
+ *  expiry is past `nowMs` plus `maxSeconds` (and a minute of clock slack), or
+ *  it names an expiry that cannot be read. */
+export function signedValidityProblem(paymentPayload, { maxSeconds = MAX_VALIDITY_SECONDS, nowMs = Date.now() } = {}) {
+  const exp = signedExpirySeconds(paymentPayload);
+  if (exp == null) return null;
+  if (!Number.isFinite(exp)) return "the signed authorization's expiry cannot be read";
+  const left = exp - Math.floor(nowMs / 1000);
+  if (left > maxSeconds + VALIDITY_CLOCK_SLACK_SECONDS) return `the signed authorization stays valid for ${left} seconds, past the ${maxSeconds}-second ceiling`;
+  return null;
+}
+
 /** Enforce a USD allowance at signing on an @x402/core x402Client.
  *
  *  `allowance()` is the most this buyer may sign for the payment being built
@@ -118,8 +186,10 @@ export function quoteOf(accepts) {
  *  for none). A registered policy drops every accept that cannot be priced or
  *  is over the allowance, so the client selects among the ones that fit, and a
  *  hook before payload creation checks the selected accept again and passes
- *  its USD value to `onSign`. A refusal throws (from the policy) or aborts
- *  (from the hook) before any signature exists; `onRefuse` hears why first. */
+ *  its USD value to `onSign`. An accept asking for a validity window past
+ *  MAX_VALIDITY_SECONDS is dropped and refused the same way. A refusal throws
+ *  (from the policy) or aborts (from the hook) before any signature exists;
+ *  `onRefuse` hears why first. */
 export function guardSigning(client, { allowance, onSign = null, onRefuse = null }) {
   if (!client || typeof client.registerPolicy !== "function" || typeof client.onBeforePaymentCreation !== "function") {
     throw new TypeError("guardSigning needs an @x402/core x402Client (registerPolicy and onBeforePaymentCreation)");
@@ -128,9 +198,14 @@ export function guardSigning(client, { allowance, onSign = null, onRefuse = null
   const refuse = (detail) => { try { onRefuse?.(detail); } catch { /* the refusal stands */ } return detail; };
   client.registerPolicy((version, accepts) => {
     const cap = allowance();
-    const kept = accepts.filter((a) => { const usd = acceptUsd(a); return usd != null && usd <= cap; });
+    const priced = accepts.filter((a) => { const usd = acceptUsd(a, version); return usd != null && usd <= cap; });
+    const kept = priced.filter((a) => !acceptValidityTooLong(a));
+    if (!kept.length && priced.length) {
+      const d = refuse({ reason: "validity", priceUsd: null, allowanceUsd: cap, detail: `every payment option it may sign asks to stay valid for more than ${MAX_VALIDITY_SECONDS} seconds` });
+      throw new Error(`spending guard: ${d.detail}; nothing was signed`);
+    }
     if (!kept.length) {
-      const q = quoteOf(accepts);
+      const q = quoteOf(accepts, version);
       const d = refuse({ reason: q && q.min != null ? "over-allowance" : "unknown-asset", priceUsd: q ? q.min : null, allowanceUsd: cap });
       throw new Error(d.reason === "unknown-asset"
         ? "spending guard: no payment option is in a known asset, so none can be priced; nothing was signed"
@@ -138,8 +213,8 @@ export function guardSigning(client, { allowance, onSign = null, onRefuse = null
     }
     return kept;
   });
-  client.onBeforePaymentCreation(async ({ selectedRequirements: r }) => {
-    const usd = acceptUsd(r);
+  client.onBeforePaymentCreation(async ({ paymentRequired, selectedRequirements: r }) => {
+    const usd = acceptUsd(r, paymentRequired?.x402Version);
     const cap = allowance();
     if (usd == null) {
       refuse({ reason: "unknown-asset", priceUsd: null, allowanceUsd: cap });
@@ -149,8 +224,106 @@ export function guardSigning(client, { allowance, onSign = null, onRefuse = null
       refuse({ reason: "over-allowance", priceUsd: usd, allowanceUsd: cap });
       return { abort: true, reason: `spending guard: the selected payment option asks $${usd}, above the $${cap} this buyer may sign; nothing was signed` };
     }
+    if (acceptValidityTooLong(r)) {
+      const d = refuse({ reason: "validity", priceUsd: usd, allowanceUsd: cap, detail: `the selected payment option asks to stay valid for ${r.maxTimeoutSeconds} seconds, past the ${MAX_VALIDITY_SECONDS}-second ceiling` });
+      return { abort: true, reason: `spending guard: ${d.detail}; nothing was signed` };
+    }
     onSign?.(usd, r);
     return undefined;
   });
+  guardSignedAmount(client, { allowance, onRefuse: refuse });
+  return client;
+}
+
+// The token programs a Solana "exact" payment moves its asset through, and
+// the TransferChecked instruction's tag.
+const SOLANA_TOKEN_PROGRAMS = new Set(["TokenkegQfeZyiNwAJbNbGKPFXCWuBvf9Ss623VQ5DA", "TokenzQdBNbLqP5VEhdkAS6EPFLC1PHnBqCXEpPxuEb"]);
+const TRANSFER_CHECKED = 12;
+
+/** The amount a Solana payment transaction moves: its one token-program
+ *  instruction, which must be a TransferChecked, read as base units and
+ *  decimals. Decoded with @solana/kit, the peer every Solana x402 signer
+ *  already loads. null when the transaction cannot be read or does not hold
+ *  exactly that one transfer. */
+async function solanaTransferOf(transaction) {
+  if (typeof transaction !== "string" || !transaction) return null;
+  try {
+    const kit = await import("@solana/kit");
+    const tx = kit.getTransactionDecoder().decode(kit.getBase64Encoder().encode(transaction));
+    const msg = kit.getCompiledTransactionMessageDecoder().decode(tx.messageBytes);
+    const keys = msg.staticAccounts || [];
+    const ixs = msg.version === 1
+      ? (msg.instructionHeaders || []).map((h, i) => ({ program: keys[h.programAccountIndex], data: msg.instructionPayloads?.[i]?.instructionData }))
+      : (msg.instructions || []).map((ix) => ({ program: keys[ix.programAddressIndex], data: ix.data }));
+    const token = ixs.filter((ix) => SOLANA_TOKEN_PROGRAMS.has(String(ix.program)));
+    if (token.length !== 1) return null;
+    const d = token[0].data;
+    if (!d || d.length !== 10 || d[0] !== TRANSFER_CHECKED) return null;
+    let amount = 0n;
+    for (let i = 8; i >= 1; i--) amount = (amount << 8n) | BigInt(d[i]);
+    return { amount: amount.toString(), decimals: d[9] };
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/** The base-unit amount a created x402 payment payload commits the buyer to,
+ *  read from what was signed: an EVM EIP-3009 `authorization.value`, an EVM
+ *  Permit2 `permitted.amount`, or a Solana transaction's transfer. Returns
+ *  `{ amount, decimals? }`, `{ unchecked: true }` for a network whose payload
+ *  this reader does not decode (neither EVM nor Solana), or null when an EVM or
+ *  Solana payload holds no amount it can read. */
+export async function signedAmountOf(paymentPayload, network) {
+  const p = paymentPayload?.payload;
+  const net = String(network || "");
+  if (net.startsWith("eip155:")) {
+    const vals = [p?.authorization?.value, p?.permit2Authorization?.permitted?.amount].filter((x) => x != null);
+    if (vals.length !== 1 || !/^\d+$/.test(String(vals[0]))) return null;
+    return { amount: BigInt(String(vals[0])).toString() };
+  }
+  if (net.startsWith("solana:")) return solanaTransferOf(p?.transaction);
+  return { unchecked: true };
+}
+
+/** Check a created payment payload against the accept it was built for,
+ *  before it is sent: the amount that was signed must be the amount the
+ *  allowance was checked against (acceptAmount under the challenge's
+ *  version), in the known asset's decimals, and within `cap`. Returns null
+ *  when it holds, else why not. */
+export async function signedPaymentProblem(paymentPayload, requirements, x402Version, cap = Infinity) {
+  const expected = acceptAmount(requirements, x402Version);
+  const entry = knownAsset(requirements?.network, requirements?.asset);
+  if (expected == null) return "the selected payment option's amount cannot be read";
+  const signed = await signedAmountOf(paymentPayload, requirements?.network);
+  if (signed == null) return "the signed payment's amount cannot be read";
+  if (signed.unchecked) return null;
+  if (signed.amount !== BigInt(expected).toString()) return `the signed amount (${signed.amount}) differs from the priced amount (${expected})`;
+  if (signed.decimals != null && entry && signed.decimals !== entry.decimals) return "the signed transfer's decimals differ from the known asset's";
+  if (Number.isFinite(cap)) {
+    if (!entry) return "the selected payment option is not in a known asset";
+    const usd = Number(signed.amount) / 10 ** entry.decimals;
+    if (usd > cap) return `the signed amount asks ${usd}, above the ${cap} this buyer may sign`;
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+/** Refuse to send a payment payload whose signed amount is not the one the
+ *  allowance passed, or whose expiry is past MAX_VALIDITY_SECONDS from now
+ *  (signedValidityProblem): registered after payload creation, so the check
+ *  reads what was actually signed, and a throw here stops the payment-aware
+ *  fetch before the payload leaves the process. guardSigning registers it; a
+ *  client with its own selector (and no guardSigning) can register it alone. */
+export function guardSignedAmount(client, { allowance = () => Infinity, onRefuse = null } = {}) {
+  if (!client || typeof client.onAfterPaymentCreation !== "function") {
+    throw new TypeError("guardSignedAmount needs an @x402/core x402Client (onAfterPaymentCreation)");
+  }
+  client.onAfterPaymentCreation(async ({ paymentRequired, selectedRequirements: r, paymentPayload }) => {
+    const cap = allowance();
+    const amountProblem = await signedPaymentProblem(paymentPayload, r, paymentRequired?.x402Version, cap);
+    const problem = amountProblem || signedValidityProblem(paymentPayload);
+    if (!problem) return;
+    try { onRefuse?.({ reason: amountProblem ? "signed-amount" : "signed-validity", priceUsd: null, allowanceUsd: cap, detail: problem }); } catch { /* the refusal stands */ }
+    throw new Error(`spending guard: ${problem}; the payment was not sent`);
+  });
   return client;
 }

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "agent402-client",
-  "version": "0.8.22",
+  "version": "0.8.24",
   "description": "Agent402 buyer SDK: resolve a task to a tool across 500+ pay-per-call endpoints and call it with payment handled - free via proof-of-work, or over x402 or MPP (a stock mppx fetch works) with a wallet you keep; the buy side of Agentic Finance. Caching, idempotent retries (Idempotency-Key), non-custodial, zero dependencies.",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "index.js",