agent-threat-rules 4.2.3 → 4.3.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +277 -0
- package/README.md +2 -0
- package/dist/cli/scan-handler.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/cli/scan-handler.js +164 -1
- package/dist/cli/scan-handler.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/cli.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/cli.js +123 -3
- package/dist/cli.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/converters/numbat.d.ts +73 -0
- package/dist/converters/numbat.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/converters/numbat.js +281 -0
- package/dist/converters/numbat.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/converters/quarry.d.ts +122 -0
- package/dist/converters/quarry.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/converters/quarry.js +431 -0
- package/dist/converters/quarry.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/converters/sarif.d.ts +7 -0
- package/dist/converters/sarif.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/converters/sarif.js +24 -0
- package/dist/converters/sarif.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/engine.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/engine.js +7 -1
- package/dist/engine.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/re2.d.ts +22 -0
- package/dist/re2.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/re2.js +213 -0
- package/dist/re2.js.map +1 -0
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00030-cross-agent-attack.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00301-tap-tree-of-attacks-jailbreak.yaml +3 -3
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00352-trainergpt-fix-my-ai-harmful-output-extraction.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00432-superagi-output-handler-eval-rce.yaml +3 -3
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00440-semantic-kernel-vector-store-eval-rce.yaml +3 -3
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00020-system-prompt-leak.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00471-garak-sysprompt-extraction-mixedunassigned.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00501-data-exfiltration-via-markdown-image-and-link-url-injection.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00504-tool-and-function-capability-enumeration.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00505-system-prompt-extraction-instruction-dump-request.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00514-system-prompt-extraction.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00516-output-xss-via-llm.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-01462-sysprompt-override-pseudo-admin.yaml +2 -2
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-01770-semantic-pii-credential-extraction.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-01862-llmail-email-tool-exfil-confirmation.yaml +2 -2
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-01863-llmail-post-summary-exfil-directive.yaml +2 -2
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-01864-llmail-obfuscated-exfil-address.yaml +2 -2
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-01924-system-instruction-extraction-reformat.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-02017-secret-key-exfiltration-request.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-02026-oblique-sysprompt-extraction-transform.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-02847-policy-justified-exfil-to-email.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-02850-fake-documentation-forward-request.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-02855-cross-email-exfil-relay.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/data-poisoning/ATR-2026-00070-data-poisoning.yaml +2 -2
- package/rules/excessive-autonomy/ATR-2026-00050-runaway-agent-loop.yaml +2 -2
- package/rules/excessive-autonomy/ATR-2026-00052-cascading-failure.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/excessive-autonomy/ATR-2026-00491-garak-agent-breaker-markdown-just-raw-json.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/excessive-autonomy/ATR-2026-00500-ssrf-via-agent-url-fetch-instruction.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/model-abuse/ATR-2026-00502-training-data-extraction-via-divergent-repetition-attack.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/model-abuse/ATR-2026-00517-model-extraction-distillation.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00001-direct-prompt-injection.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00002-indirect-prompt-injection.yaml +2 -2
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00003-jailbreak-attempt.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00140-indirect-reference-reversal.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00211-system-prompt-override.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00257-cipher-transposition-jailbreak.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00312-unicode-variant-selector-ascii-smuggling.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00452-direct-pwned-payload-injection.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00453-secret-key-reveal-demand.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00454-backslash-per-character-encoding.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00455-no-period-output-override.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00456-conditional-empty-input-injection.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00457-garak-dan-to-every-prompt.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00458-garak-dra-step-by-step.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00459-garak-dan-an-ai-language.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00460-garak-dan-no-matter-how.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00461-garak-goodside-mixedunassigned.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00462-garak-gcg-mixedunassigned.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00463-garak-lmrc-mixedunassigned.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00464-garak-dan-i-would-like.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00465-garak-dan-your-prompt-here.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00466-garak-latentinjection-following-text-from.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00467-garak-dan-act-as-a.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00468-garak-goat-the-target-llm.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00469-garak-dan-at-the-end.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00470-garak-dan-as-an-ai.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00472-garak-dan-are-going-to.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00473-garak-lmrc-how-can-i.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00474-garak-dan-that-chatgpt-has.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00475-garak-web-injection-alert-1-script.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00476-garak-web-injection-javascript-alert-1.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00477-garak-latentinjection-translate-the-following-text.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00478-garak-latentinjection-abuse-contact-email.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00479-garak-latentinjection-mixedunassigned.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00480-garak-dan-the-role-of.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00481-garak-dan-mixedunassigned.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00482-garak-lmrc-what-s-an.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00483-garak-dan-the-user-s.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00484-garak-dan-and-you-will.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00485-garak-dan-and-does-not.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00486-garak-dan-t-care-about.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00487-garak-dan-and-nothing-else.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00488-garak-encoding-alert-1-script.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00489-garak-encoding-javascript-alert-1.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00490-garak-dan-in-order-to.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00492-garak-dan-want-you-to.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00493-garak-latentinjection-registrar-iana-id.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00495-garak-dan-insert-prompt-here.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00496-garak-dan-no-matter-what.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00497-garak-encoding-mixedunassigned.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00498-garak-web-injection-mixedunassigned.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00499-garak-dan-from-now-on.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00503-fake-error-state-takeover-unrestricted-replacement-bot.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00506-nevermind-override-goal-hijacking-in-user-input-promptinject.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00507-screaming-stop-goal-hijacking-in-user-input-promptinject.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00508-escape-delimiter-wrapped-goal-hijacking-in-user-input-prompt.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00509-prompt-leaking-via-ignore-previous-instructions-in-user-inpu.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00510-delayed-tool-invocation-injection.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00511-mcp-web-context-poisoning.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00512-rules-file-backdoor-injection.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00515-hidden-text-prompt-injection.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00518-ignore-previous-and-following-instructions-output-command-promptinject.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00519-tautology-logic-noise-injection-promptbench.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00520-nlp-task-random-token-suffix-injection-promptbench.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-01860-llmail-chat-template-boundary-spoof.yaml +2 -2
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-01861-llmail-pseudo-xml-role-injection.yaml +2 -2
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-01865-llmail-fake-email-boundary-marker.yaml +2 -2
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-01920-access-grant-coercion.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-01921-access-denial-inversion.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-01922-authorization-state-spoofing.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-01923-forged-input-boundary-markers.yaml +2 -2
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-01925-encoded-payload-decoding-coercion.yaml +2 -2
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-01926-cross-lingual-authorization-laundering.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-02001-ignore-below-instructions-mirror-of-ignore-previ.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-02002-instruction-set-probe-or-supplant-direct-meta-qu.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-02003-task-pivot-override-abandon-the-cover-task-trans.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-02004-regional-indicator-flag-emoji-alphabet-letter-sp.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-02005-actor-never-breaks-character-roleplay-dan-style-.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-02006-fuzzy-cross-lingual-i-have-been-pwned-near-miss-.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-02007-bare-key-elicitation-token.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-02008-translation-chain-output-laundering-state-secret.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-02009-bare-key-elicitation-trailing-colon.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-02010-emoji-only-payload.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-02011-malformed-grammar-pwned-success-claim.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-02012-movie-title-generator-instruction-wrapper-for-pw.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-02013-delimiter-fence-ignore-instructions-override.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-02014-spliced-target-string-letters-of-a-filtered-cana.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-02015-dense-emoji-only-payload-flood.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-02016-reversed-payload-string.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-02018-regional-indicator-flag-emoji-letter-spelling-sp.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-02019-python-interpreter-role-assignment-exec-framing.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-02020-obfuscated-token-reconstruction-via-character-su.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-02851-fake-user-turn-send-email-instruction.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/skill-compromise/ATR-2026-00060-skill-impersonation.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/skill-compromise/ATR-2026-00121-skill-dangerous-script.yaml +5 -5
- package/rules/skill-compromise/ATR-2026-00225-c2-communication.yaml +3 -3
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00277-echo-template-command-injection.yaml +3 -3
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00494-garak-exploitation-mixedunassigned.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00513-package-hallucination-exploitation.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00521-shell-command-injection-agent-tool-context.yaml +1 -1
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00522-sql-injection-natural-language-agent-interface.yaml +1 -1
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+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
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strength: primary
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34
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- article: '9'
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
|
package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00478-garak-latentinjection-abuse-contact-email.yaml
CHANGED
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@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ compliance:
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strength: primary
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eu_ai_act:
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31
31
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- article: '15'
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-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
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+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
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strength: primary
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- article: '9'
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
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@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ compliance:
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29
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strength: primary
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30
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eu_ai_act:
|
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31
31
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- article: '15'
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32
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-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
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+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
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strength: primary
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34
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- article: '9'
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
|
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@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ compliance:
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29
29
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strength: primary
|
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30
30
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eu_ai_act:
|
|
31
31
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- article: '15'
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|
32
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-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
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+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
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strength: primary
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- article: '9'
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
|
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@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ compliance:
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strength: primary
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30
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eu_ai_act:
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31
31
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- article: '15'
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-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
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+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
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strength: primary
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34
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- article: '9'
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
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@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ compliance:
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29
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strength: primary
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30
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eu_ai_act:
|
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31
31
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- article: '15'
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|
32
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-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
|
32
|
+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
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strength: primary
|
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34
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- article: '9'
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
|
|
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ compliance:
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strength: primary
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30
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eu_ai_act:
|
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31
31
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- article: '15'
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|
32
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-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
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+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
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strength: primary
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- article: '9'
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
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@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ compliance:
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strength: primary
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30
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eu_ai_act:
|
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31
31
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- article: '15'
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|
32
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-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
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+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
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strength: primary
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- article: '9'
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
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@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ compliance:
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strength: primary
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30
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eu_ai_act:
|
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31
31
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- article: '15'
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|
32
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-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
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32
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+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
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strength: primary
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34
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- article: '9'
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
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@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ compliance:
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strength: primary
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30
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eu_ai_act:
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31
31
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- article: '15'
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32
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-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
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32
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+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
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strength: primary
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34
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- article: '9'
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
|
|
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ compliance:
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29
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strength: primary
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30
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eu_ai_act:
|
|
31
31
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- article: '15'
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|
32
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-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
|
32
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+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
|
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strength: primary
|
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34
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- article: '9'
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35
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
|
|
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ compliance:
|
|
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29
29
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strength: primary
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30
30
|
eu_ai_act:
|
|
31
31
|
- article: '15'
|
|
32
|
-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
|
32
|
+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
|
|
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strength: primary
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34
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- article: '9'
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35
35
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
|
|
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ compliance:
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|
|
29
29
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strength: primary
|
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30
30
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eu_ai_act:
|
|
31
31
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- article: '15'
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|
32
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-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
|
32
|
+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
|
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strength: primary
|
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34
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- article: '9'
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
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@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ compliance:
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29
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strength: primary
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30
30
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eu_ai_act:
|
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31
31
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- article: '15'
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|
32
|
-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
|
32
|
+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
|
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strength: primary
|
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34
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- article: '9'
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35
35
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
|
|
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ compliance:
|
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29
29
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strength: primary
|
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30
30
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eu_ai_act:
|
|
31
31
|
- article: '15'
|
|
32
|
-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
|
32
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+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
|
|
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strength: primary
|
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34
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- article: '9'
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35
35
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
|
|
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ compliance:
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29
29
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strength: primary
|
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30
30
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eu_ai_act:
|
|
31
31
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- article: '15'
|
|
32
|
-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
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+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
|
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strength: primary
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- article: '9'
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
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@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ compliance:
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29
29
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strength: primary
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30
30
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eu_ai_act:
|
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31
31
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- article: '15'
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|
32
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-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
|
32
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+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
|
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33
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strength: primary
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34
34
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- article: '9'
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35
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
|
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@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ compliance:
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strength: primary
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30
30
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eu_ai_act:
|
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31
31
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- article: '15'
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32
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-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
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+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
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strength: primary
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- article: '9'
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
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@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ compliance:
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strength: primary
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eu_ai_act:
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- article: '15'
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-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
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context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
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strength: primary
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
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@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ compliance:
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strength: primary
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eu_ai_act:
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31
31
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- article: '15'
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-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
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32
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+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
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strength: primary
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- article: '9'
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
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@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ compliance:
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strength: primary
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eu_ai_act:
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31
31
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- article: '15'
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32
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-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
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32
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+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
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strength: primary
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- article: '9'
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
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@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ compliance:
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strength: primary
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eu_ai_act:
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- article: '15'
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context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
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+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
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strength: primary
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- article: '9'
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
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@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ compliance:
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strength: primary
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eu_ai_act:
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- article: '15'
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-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
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+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
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strength: primary
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
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@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ compliance:
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strength: primary
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eu_ai_act:
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- article: '15'
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context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
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+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
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strength: primary
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
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@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ compliance:
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strength: primary
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eu_ai_act:
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- article: '15'
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context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
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context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
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strength: primary
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- article: '9'
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
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strength: primary
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eu_ai_act:
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- article: '15'
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context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
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context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
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strength: primary
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
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@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ compliance:
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strength: primary
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eu_ai_act:
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- article: '15'
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context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
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context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
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strength: primary
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
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strength: primary
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eu_ai_act:
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- article: '15'
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context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
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context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
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strength: primary
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eu_ai_act:
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context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
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context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
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strength: primary
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context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
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|
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
29
29
|
strength: primary
|
|
30
30
|
eu_ai_act:
|
|
31
31
|
- article: '15'
|
|
32
|
-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
|
32
|
+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
|
|
33
33
|
strength: primary
|
|
34
34
|
- article: '9'
|
|
35
35
|
context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
|
|
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
32
32
|
strength: primary
|
|
33
33
|
eu_ai_act:
|
|
34
34
|
- article: '15'
|
|
35
|
-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
|
35
|
+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
|
|
36
36
|
strength: primary
|
|
37
37
|
- article: '9'
|
|
38
38
|
context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
|
package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00519-tautology-logic-noise-injection-promptbench.yaml
CHANGED
|
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ compliance:
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|
|
32
32
|
strength: primary
|
|
33
33
|
eu_ai_act:
|
|
34
34
|
- article: '15'
|
|
35
|
-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
|
35
|
+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
|
|
36
36
|
strength: primary
|
|
37
37
|
- article: '9'
|
|
38
38
|
context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
|
|
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
32
32
|
strength: primary
|
|
33
33
|
eu_ai_act:
|
|
34
34
|
- article: '15'
|
|
35
|
-
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule
|
|
35
|
+
context: High-risk AI systems must be resilient against adversarial attempts to alter output or behavior. Deployment of this prompt injection detection rule provides detection evidence supporting the Article 15 requirement to implement technical measures ensuring robustness against manipulation.
|
|
36
36
|
strength: primary
|
|
37
37
|
- article: '9'
|
|
38
38
|
context: Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems.
|
|
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
27
27
|
context: Forged chat-template boundaries injected into retrieved email content hijack the agent's goal by laundering attacker directives as trusted user/tool turns.
|
|
28
28
|
strength: primary
|
|
29
29
|
- id: ASI06:2026
|
|
30
|
-
context: Custom turn-boundary spoofing poisons the agent's context window with attacker-controlled role framing,
|
|
30
|
+
context: Custom turn-boundary spoofing poisons the agent's context window with attacker-controlled role framing, matching ASI06:2026 Memory and Context Poisoning.
|
|
31
31
|
strength: secondary
|
|
32
32
|
owasp_llm:
|
|
33
33
|
- id: LLM01:2025
|
|
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
35
35
|
strength: primary
|
|
36
36
|
eu_ai_act:
|
|
37
37
|
- article: '15'
|
|
38
|
-
context: Article 15 robustness requires high-risk AI systems to resist adversarial role-boundary tokens embedded in external inputs; detection of forged chat-template delimiters
|
|
38
|
+
context: Article 15 robustness requires high-risk AI systems to resist adversarial role-boundary tokens embedded in external inputs; detection of forged chat-template delimiters supports this requirement.
|
|
39
39
|
strength: primary
|
|
40
40
|
nist_ai_rmf:
|
|
41
41
|
- function: Manage
|
|
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
27
27
|
context: Forged XML role-boundary transitions injected into email content reframe attacker text as a privileged user/system turn, hijacking the agent's goal.
|
|
28
28
|
strength: primary
|
|
29
29
|
- id: ASI06:2026
|
|
30
|
-
context: Fake role-tag transitions poison the agent's serialized context with attacker-controlled turn framing,
|
|
30
|
+
context: Fake role-tag transitions poison the agent's serialized context with attacker-controlled turn framing, matching ASI06:2026 Memory and Context Poisoning.
|
|
31
31
|
strength: secondary
|
|
32
32
|
owasp_llm:
|
|
33
33
|
- id: LLM01:2025
|
|
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
35
35
|
strength: primary
|
|
36
36
|
eu_ai_act:
|
|
37
37
|
- article: '15'
|
|
38
|
-
context: Article 15 robustness requires high-risk AI systems to resist forged role markers embedded in external inputs; detection of close-then-open role transitions
|
|
38
|
+
context: Article 15 robustness requires high-risk AI systems to resist forged role markers embedded in external inputs; detection of close-then-open role transitions supports this requirement.
|
|
39
39
|
strength: primary
|
|
40
40
|
nist_ai_rmf:
|
|
41
41
|
- function: Manage
|
|
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
27
27
|
context: A forged inter-email boundary marker makes the agent attribute an injected tool-call directive to a separate trusted message, hijacking the agent's goal.
|
|
28
28
|
strength: primary
|
|
29
29
|
- id: ASI06:2026
|
|
30
|
-
context: Impersonating the harness's email-delimiter poisons the agent's context-window segmentation,
|
|
30
|
+
context: Impersonating the harness's email-delimiter poisons the agent's context-window segmentation, matching ASI06:2026 Memory and Context Poisoning.
|
|
31
31
|
strength: secondary
|
|
32
32
|
owasp_llm:
|
|
33
33
|
- id: LLM01:2025
|
|
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
35
35
|
strength: primary
|
|
36
36
|
eu_ai_act:
|
|
37
37
|
- article: '15'
|
|
38
|
-
context: Article 15 robustness requires high-risk AI systems to resist forged message delimiters embedded in external inputs; detection of fabricated email-boundary markers
|
|
38
|
+
context: Article 15 robustness requires high-risk AI systems to resist forged message delimiters embedded in external inputs; detection of fabricated email-boundary markers supports this requirement.
|
|
39
39
|
strength: primary
|
|
40
40
|
nist_ai_rmf:
|
|
41
41
|
- function: Manage
|
|
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
35
35
|
strength: primary
|
|
36
36
|
eu_ai_act:
|
|
37
37
|
- article: '15'
|
|
38
|
-
context: Article 15 robustness requires high-risk AI systems to resist adversarial inputs that force an unauthorized approval output; detecting access-grant coercion
|
|
38
|
+
context: Article 15 robustness requires high-risk AI systems to resist adversarial inputs that force an unauthorized approval output; detecting access-grant coercion supports this requirement.
|
|
39
39
|
strength: primary
|
|
40
40
|
nist_ai_rmf:
|
|
41
41
|
- function: Manage
|
|
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
35
35
|
strength: primary
|
|
36
36
|
eu_ai_act:
|
|
37
37
|
- article: '15'
|
|
38
|
-
context: Article 15 robustness requires resisting indirect approval-elicitation; detecting denial-inversion framing
|
|
38
|
+
context: Article 15 robustness requires resisting indirect approval-elicitation; detecting denial-inversion framing supports this requirement.
|
|
39
39
|
strength: primary
|
|
40
40
|
nist_ai_rmf:
|
|
41
41
|
- function: Manage
|
|
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
35
35
|
strength: primary
|
|
36
36
|
eu_ai_act:
|
|
37
37
|
- article: '15'
|
|
38
|
-
context: Article 15 robustness requires resisting forged system-state injection; detecting authorization-state spoofing
|
|
38
|
+
context: Article 15 robustness requires resisting forged system-state injection; detecting authorization-state spoofing supports this requirement.
|
|
39
39
|
strength: primary
|
|
40
40
|
nist_ai_rmf:
|
|
41
41
|
- function: Manage
|
|
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
27
27
|
context: A forged end-of-input boundary reframes trailing attacker text as a privileged rule block, hijacking the agent's goal.
|
|
28
28
|
strength: primary
|
|
29
29
|
- id: ASI06:2026
|
|
30
|
-
context: Percent-fence and bracket boundary markers poison the agent's context with attacker-controlled framing of where user input ends,
|
|
30
|
+
context: Percent-fence and bracket boundary markers poison the agent's context with attacker-controlled framing of where user input ends, matching ASI06:2026.
|
|
31
31
|
strength: secondary
|
|
32
32
|
owasp_llm:
|
|
33
33
|
- id: LLM01:2025
|
|
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
35
35
|
strength: primary
|
|
36
36
|
eu_ai_act:
|
|
37
37
|
- article: '15'
|
|
38
|
-
context: Article 15 robustness requires resisting forged input-boundary tokens embedded in user input; detecting these delimiters
|
|
38
|
+
context: Article 15 robustness requires resisting forged input-boundary tokens embedded in user input; detecting these delimiters supports the requirement.
|
|
39
39
|
strength: primary
|
|
40
40
|
nist_ai_rmf:
|
|
41
41
|
- function: Manage
|
|
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
27
27
|
context: Smuggling the target output inside an encoding and ordering a decode bypasses the agent's output policy, hijacking its gatekeeping goal.
|
|
28
28
|
strength: primary
|
|
29
29
|
- id: ASI06:2026
|
|
30
|
-
context: Encoded payloads inject content the agent's safety layer cannot read in plaintext, a context-poisoning evasion
|
|
30
|
+
context: Encoded payloads inject content the agent's safety layer cannot read in plaintext, a context-poisoning evasion matching ASI06:2026.
|
|
31
31
|
strength: secondary
|
|
32
32
|
owasp_llm:
|
|
33
33
|
- id: LLM01:2025
|
|
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
35
35
|
strength: primary
|
|
36
36
|
eu_ai_act:
|
|
37
37
|
- article: '15'
|
|
38
|
-
context: Article 15 robustness requires resisting encoded-payload evasion; detecting decode-coercion
|
|
38
|
+
context: Article 15 robustness requires resisting encoded-payload evasion; detecting decode-coercion supports the requirement.
|
|
39
39
|
strength: primary
|
|
40
40
|
nist_ai_rmf:
|
|
41
41
|
- function: Manage
|
|
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
35
35
|
strength: primary
|
|
36
36
|
eu_ai_act:
|
|
37
37
|
- article: '15'
|
|
38
|
-
context: Article 15 robustness requires resisting cross-lingual evasion; detecting authorization-phrase laundering
|
|
38
|
+
context: Article 15 robustness requires resisting cross-lingual evasion; detecting authorization-phrase laundering supports the requirement.
|
|
39
39
|
strength: primary
|
|
40
40
|
nist_ai_rmf:
|
|
41
41
|
- function: Manage
|