agent-threat-rules 4.1.5 → 4.2.1

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,733 @@ All notable changes to ATR will be documented in this file.
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [4.2.1] - 2026-10-24
+
+A patch release of rule fixes and one new rule, plus two release-tooling
+fixes. The rule format, identifier scheme and Match output are unchanged.
+
+Default behaviour that changes:
+
+- ATR-2026-01601 (SQL injection with destructive DDL, maturity `stable`, so it
+  runs in the enforce lane) now also matches when whitespace separates the
+  single quote from the semicolon, as in `1' ; TRUNCATE TABLE accounts; --` and
+  `7' ; DELETE FROM sessions; --`, which it missed before. An integration that
+  blocks on the enforce lane blocks these too. Its benign false positives were
+  re-measured: none over the 14,172 samples of the benign gate (#748, issue
+  #620).
+
+### Added
+
+- **ATR-2026-02870: an invisible control before a directive in a tool
+  description or skill file.** A zero-width, soft-hyphen or bidi control
+  character at the start of a clause that tells the agent to ignore or
+  override instructions, send or read secrets, conversations or credential
+  files, or keep something from the user. Presence of the character alone
+  does not match, so soft hyphens in German, ZWNJ in Persian, LRM/RLM in Hebrew
+  and Arabic, emoji ZWJ sequences and a leading BOM stay clear. It reads
+  `tool_description`, so it runs in a `tools/list` scan, on `mcp_exchange`
+  events and on SKILL.md files. Maturity `test` (hunt and alert lanes). No
+  benign false positives on the gate corpora or on the 710 tool definitions in
+  `data/test-corpora/mcp-tools-list-benign/`, which contain no such characters,
+  so that last figure is weak evidence. A control inside a word, rather than at
+  the start of a clause, is ATR-2026-00276's case and not covered here (#749,
+  from issue #653 by @Paraphern).
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **ATR-2026-00040 and -00064 matched the wrong chmod modes.** Their chmod
+  condition matched the owner digit of `chmod 755 deploy.sh` or `chmod 700
+  ~/.ssh` and missed `chmod -R 777 /`. They now match a world-writable mode or
+  a setuid/setgid/sticky four-digit mode; with options such as `-R` before the
+  mode, only when the target is the root, a system directory or the home
+  directory, since `chmod -R 777` on an application subdirectory is documented
+  practice in the benign corpus. Group-writable modes are not matched. Both
+  rules are maturity `test` (#740, issue #735, from the probe in #658 by
+  @PHM-Audit).
+- **ATR-2026-00500, -00501 and -00505 are grounded in the vendor test cases
+  they cite.** 00500 and 00501 matched 1 and 0 of promptfoo's SSRF and
+  data-exfiltration test cases, and 00505 missed an llm-guard case with a
+  typographic apostrophe. They now match all of them (3 of 3, 3 of 3, 6 of 6),
+  their true positives that did not occur in any vendor repository were
+  replaced by verbatim vendor cases with repository, commit, file and line,
+  and -00503 and -00521 gained the vendor originals behind their shortened
+  samples. On the pinned vendor suites, hunt-lane recall goes from 97 to 100 of
+  126 attack cases; the ablation reference is unchanged (#709, measurement in
+  #750).
+- **ATR-2026-00223's samples use a documentation address** (203.0.113.30)
+  instead of an address from a real dropper. Detection is unchanged (#738).
+- **The release workflow commits the reconciled stats cache with the version
+  bump.** The 4.2.0 bump reached `main` with `data/stats.json` still at 4.1.5,
+  which failed CI on `main`; the published package was not affected (#746).
+- **The Gemara catalogs' first publish reads oras's "not found" as
+  unpublished.** The first publish from v4.2.0 stopped at the
+  already-published check; this release tag is the first that can publish the
+  bundle (#747).
+
+## [4.2.0] - 2026-10-24
+
+The first release since 4.1.5. For an integrator it changes three things at
+runtime: the Claude Code guard reads what a tool returned instead of what it
+was given, rules written for `context_window` and `skill_*` events now run on
+the events their data arrives in, and a match that a model decided is
+reported instead of enforced unless the integrator opts in. `atr scan` now
+scans an MCP config file it used to skip, and an MCP `tools/list` document
+as one event per tool, without running the rules written for a tool being
+called. Many rule conditions that took polynomial time on long input were
+rewritten, and three rules left the enforce
+lane after matching benign samples. Like 4.1.5, the npm package carries the
+rules without their test samples; the repository keeps them.
+
+Default behaviour that changes, and how to keep the old one:
+
+- Model-decided matches are advisory. A match from a semantic rule's judge
+  that its own pattern fallback does not corroborate, from the embedding
+  module or from the semantic layer is listed in `verdict.advisory` and no
+  longer sets the verdict's outcome or dispatches more than observe-tier
+  actions. To keep the old behaviour pass `modelDecisions: 'enforce'` to
+  `ATREngine` or `computeVerdict()`, or use `--model-decisions enforce` or
+  `ATR_MODEL_DECISIONS=enforce` with `atr scan` and `atr mcp`. Integrations
+  that wire no model, including `atr guard` and the bundled adapters, see no
+  change (#720). `verdict.highestSeverity` and `highestConfidence` now
+  describe only the matches the outcome came from (read `advisorySeverity`
+  for the rest), and `atr scan --json` gives every match `decided_by` and
+  `enforced`.
+- More of what an agent sees reaches the rules. A guard registered under
+  Claude Code's PostToolUse now scans the tool's output, where it used to scan
+  the tool's input; registering it under PostToolUseFailure as well also scans
+  failed calls (#715, #721). Rules of type `context_window` and `skill_*` now
+  run on typed runtime events (#701). The OpenShell filter
+  and NemoClaw preflight adapters evaluate in the hunt lane and deny at `high`
+  and above by default (`ATR_MIN_SEVERITY`), so they can now deny on
+  ATR-2026-00070 and -01774 (high, `llm_input`/`llm_output`) and
+  ATR-2026-00157 and -02405 (critical, `tool_call`), where 4.1.5 did not. Both raise matches in
+  the hunt lane, the engine default, including on benign text (measured
+  figures under Fixed below); neither moves the enforce lane. There is no
+  switch back. An integration that blocks on PostToolUse should block on the
+  enforce lane: `atr guard --blocking --lane enforce` (or `ATR_BLOCKING=1
+  ATR_LANE=enforce`), or `lane: 'enforce'` on `ATREngine`. The guard's default
+  lane is hunt, so `--blocking` alone blocks on the hunt-lane matches above.
+- ATR-2026-00080, -00436 and -01606 moved from maturity `stable` to `test`
+  after matching benign samples in the grown corpus (#625). They still alert;
+  an integration that blocks only in the enforce lane no longer blocks on
+  them.
+- ATR-2026-00012 moved from maturity `test` to `experimental` (#683), so it
+  runs in the hunt lane only and no longer in the alert lane. ATR-2026-00233,
+  a duplicate of ATR-2026-00228, is deprecated and runs in no lane (#666).
+- `atr scan` on an MCP config file scans one event per server (#581, by
+  @ciceroyang), and on an MCP `tools/list` document, bare or in a JSON-RPC
+  response, one event per tool (#737). 4.1.5 skipped both and reported them
+  clean. Any JSON file `atr scan` reads in which no event reaches the engine
+  now exits 1, in text, `--json` and `--sarif` output alike; `events_scanned`
+  counts only events that did, beside a new `events_skipped`. A CI step that ran
+  `atr scan` on such a file and always passed may now fail, on the exit code or
+  through `--fail-on`. The GitHub Action ignores the exit code (#575) but counts
+  the new findings toward `fail-on-finding`. Scanning a directory that holds
+  only an MCP config is not fixed yet (#575).
+
+Under SPEC §10 this is a minor release: the rule format, identifier scheme and
+Match output are unchanged (matches gain an optional `decidedBy`, which §7
+allows). SPEC.md moves to 1.0.1, a [Compatible] correction of §6.4 (#699).
+SPEC §10 versions the format, not the package's defaults, and some defaults
+change above. 4.0.0 went major because every `atr guard` user lost a block
+they had by default. Here an integration that wires no model loses no block;
+one that wired a model judge and blocked on its decisions does, and one that
+blocks in the hunt lane, as `atr guard --blocking` does on PostToolUse and the
+OpenShell and NemoClaw adapters do, can gain blocks. If that describes your
+integration, apply the switches above or stay on 4.1.5.
+
+### Added
+
+- **New rules, all at maturity `test`** (hunt and alert lanes, not the
+  enforce lane): ATR-2026-02815, -02817 and -02820 (#612); -02858, -02859 and
+  -02860, technique rules for llm-guard samples lost to earlier FP repairs
+  (#668); -02855, -02861 and -02862 from the FN-mine sweeps (#650, #671);
+  -02864, -02865, -02866, -02867 and -02868 from agent-related CVEs published
+  2026-09-22 to 2026-10-21 (#730, #731).
+
+- **The category registry as Gemara catalogs, generated and published from
+  here.** `spec/category-registry/gemara/` holds a vector, capability, threat
+  and control catalog validated against the Gemara v1.6.0 CUE schemas. The
+  vector catalog is generated from `spec/category-registry/v1.0.yaml` (ids and
+  descriptions verbatim) by `scripts/generate-gemara-catalogs.ts`;
+  `tests/gemara-catalogs.test.ts` fails when the committed catalogs are stale.
+  `.github/workflows/publish-gemara.yml` publishes them as one keyless-signed
+  OCI bundle, `ghcr.io/agent-threat-rule/agent-threat-rules/gemara:<bundle
+  version>`, on release tags only, and pushes nothing when that version is
+  already published with the same catalogs.
+
+- **`atr test` reports a true positive that matches only through a copy the
+  test event makes.** The test event offers a case's input under every alias a
+  rule might read, whatever the event type: as `user_input` and `tool_args`, and
+  its content as `agent_message`. `buildEventFromTestCase` gains a `runtime`
+  field set, which holds what this repository's producers put on an event of the
+  type: content, the fields the case names (taken as given), `user_input` on an
+  `llm_input` event, and on a tool event the `tool_name` and `tool_args`
+  `src/hook-handler.ts` fills. `caseMatchesAtRuntime` runs a case on that set
+  for every event type, the engine's source filter deciding which of them the
+  rule runs on, or as a skill document. `atr test` lists a passing true positive
+  that matches none of them under `harnessOnly` (JSON) and "Harness-only"
+  (text); it still counts as passed. No true positive on main is one.
+  ATR-2026-01610's two cases declared as `user_input` match their `llm_input`
+  event only through the input copied into `tool_args`; the engine also runs
+  `llm_io` rules on `tool_response` events, where the hook fills `tool_args`,
+  and there they match. `tests/testcase-runtime-parity-rules.test.ts` runs every
+  rule's true positives the way `atr test` does, leaving out a type the engine
+  withholds as `atr test` does, and fails on one.
+
+- **Every benchmark measurement records the enforce lane beside its
+  headline.** A measurement's `metrics.recall` is the `hunt` lane (the engine
+  default, every maturity). Each runner the weekly measurement calls now also
+  runs the same samples through its own detection loop on an engine
+  constructed with `lane: 'enforce'` (only `maturity: stable` rules, the lane
+  for blocking) and records the result as `breakdown.enforce_lane`. Where a
+  measurement records it, README's Recall cell cites both lanes and root
+  `stats.json` cites the enforce figure as `enforceLaneRecall`;
+  `scripts/check-benchmark-citations.ts` fails CI when either disagrees with
+  the measurement or leaves the enforce figure out. Before this, the enforce
+  figures in README were one-off replays.
+- **Recall figures outside README are rendered from the measurement files.**
+  `scripts/render-recall-citations.ts` fills the figures between recall
+  markers in `LIMITATIONS.md` and the `docs/owasp-pr/` texts, from the file each
+  source's `latest.json` points at, in both lanes (every rendering is held to
+  the rule README's table is checked by). `scripts/sync-citation-garak.ts`
+  generates the garak sentence in `CITATION.cff` from root `stats.json`, with
+  both lanes and the closed-book caveat. The weekly measurement run re-renders
+  and stages both and lists what it could not render in the rolling PR's body;
+  CI (`eval.yml`) fails on a stale or unrenderable figure.
+- **`scripts/bench-evaluate-latency.ts` times single `ATREngine.evaluate()`
+  calls** in the hunt and enforce lanes on three committed corpora of
+  different input length, so the latency wording in LIMITATIONS.md and
+  THREAT-MODEL.md can be checked on any hardware. The `latency_ms` blocks in
+  `data/measurements/` time whole corpus samples (several event shapes, a
+  skill scan and, when installed, an embedding pass) inside a full benchmark
+  run, and are not comparable.
+- **CI re-checks the /red-team page's links against GitHub.** The page's list
+  of offensive tools and corpora moved out of the page into
+  `website/data/red-team-tools.json`. `scripts/verify-red-team-links.mjs`, run
+  by `verify-red-team-links.yml` when the list or the checker changes and
+  weekly, fails when an in-review entry's PR or issue is no longer open, an
+  in-production entry's PR is not merged, a corpus entry's link is neither a
+  merged PR nor a commit on the default branch, or the `stillPresent` file an
+  in-production or corpus entry must name no longer holds its text. It
+  reports drift, links that are gone, and lookups GitHub could not answer
+  separately, and counts none of them as a pass; a failure on main or on the schedule opens a tracking issue.
+  It would have flagged NVIDIA/garak#1676 within a week of its withdrawal on
+  2026-08-04, instead of the ten weeks it stayed listed before #688. It cannot
+  flag an open proposal nobody answers, which is why the page calls that group
+  "Open proposals". The three corpus entries linked to ATR PRs #51, #52 and
+  #53, which do not contain the rules they named; they now link to the commits
+  that added ATR-2026-00452..00456, 00500..00505 and 00510..00517, the second
+  no longer names NeMo-Guardrails as a rule source, and every figure they and
+  the page's 2026-05-12 sprint section quote now comes from a measurement file
+  or a committed re-run record. HackAPrompt is quoted per lane on its pinned
+  4,780-prompt subset, followed by its ablation reference (the same prompts
+  without the rules whose YAML names HackAPrompt), read from
+  `breakdown.in_sample_ablation` of the measurement file and called what it is,
+  an approximation of out-of-sample recall rather than an out-of-sample result;
+  the vendor-suite entry is followed by its own. The sprint's 28.6% to 66.2%
+  becomes the re-measured 28.6% to 66.0%: 66.2% could not be reproduced at the
+  sprint commits `e9efefdd` and `92c0d0fe` (66.0% at best), and the 28.6% is
+  itself in-sample. The paper is described as listed under Best Paper Awards at
+  EMNLP 2023, on gpt-3.5-turbo, FlanT5-XXL and text-davinci-003 (not
+  GPT/Claude/PaLM). The 2026-05-12 import is described as 79 of 94 samples
+  occurring verbatim in the vendor file they name. The sprint added 71 rule
+  files, not 75 (the 2.2.0 entry also counted four earlier CVE rules), and the
+  claims that the sprint's and the 2026-06 mega-scan's rules all passed the
+  quality gate with 0 benign FP are replaced by the gate re-run on 2026-10-19
+  and again on 2026-10-22 (`data/gate-reruns/2026-10-19_red-team-rule-batches.json`):
+  at 92c0d0fe, 10 of the 71 failed (own true positives) and none flagged a benign
+  SKILL.md file; at main b9d16840 on 2026-10-22, 33 of 71 and 4 of 29 fail, and
+  26 and 3 flag at least one benign sample, none of them in the enforce lane,
+  the same as at 9d74fc50 on 2026-10-19 although nine of the recorded rules
+  changed in between. Each corpus entry links its
+  measurement file.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **Three rules left the enforce lane.** ATR-2026-00080, -00436 and -01606
+  each matched benign samples in the grown corpus and were demoted from
+  maturity `stable` to `test` (#625). ATR-2026-00233, a duplicate of another
+  rule, is deprecated (#666).
+- **Six rules follow MITRE ATLAS v2026.07.** AML.T0019 and AML.T0104, retired
+  into AML.T0115 as sub-techniques, are replaced by AML.T0115.000 and
+  AML.T0115.002 in the rules' `references.mitre_atlas` (#543).
+
+- **A match a model decided is reported, not enforced, unless the integrator
+  opts in.** Three engine paths turn a model's output into a match: a semantic
+  rule's `semanticJudge`, the `embeddingModule` similarity signal (which in the
+  hunt and alert lanes could produce a critical `block_input` match), and the
+  `semanticModule` layer. No evidence a response tier is earned from measures
+  them: the benign-corpus evidence runs the synchronous engine, where a semantic
+  rule is its pattern fallback, and neither the embedding module nor the
+  semantic layer. Every match now carries `decidedBy`, and
+  `computeVerdict()` keeps a model-decided one out of the outcome and dispatches
+  only its observe-tier actions; it is listed in the new `verdict.advisory`
+  (with `verdict.advisorySeverity`), and `highestSeverity` and
+  `highestConfidence` now describe the matches the outcome came from. A
+  semantic rule whose judge matches is enforced when the rule's own pattern
+  fallback matches the same input (reported as the fallback's match); a judge
+  match the fallback does not corroborate is advisory. Rule, invariant,
+  blacklist and fingerprint matches decide as before. `modelDecisions:
+  'enforce'` on the engine (or on `computeVerdict`) restores the previous
+  behaviour; any other value throws. `computeVerdict` now sorts the matches it
+  is given instead of trusting their order.
+- **`atr scan` and the MCP server follow the same default.** `atr scan
+  --semantic` lists a judge-only match but leaves it out of `--fail-on`, and
+  writes it to SARIF at level `note` with `properties.enforced: false`, which the
+  GitHub Action no longer counts toward `fail-on-finding`. JSON and SARIF output
+  name what decided each match (`decided_by`). The MCP scan tool reports a
+  judge-only match with outcome `allow`, `enforced: false` and observe-tier
+  recommended actions. `--model-decisions enforce` or
+  `ATR_MODEL_DECISIONS=enforce` restores counting for `atr scan` and `atr mcp`.
+  `atr guard` and the bundled adapters wire no model, so nothing they do
+  changes.
+
+- **The ReDoS gate now times long inputs, every branch of an alternation
+  and input tiled with a pattern's own openers, and its baseline grew from 9
+  to 439 conditions because of it.** Nothing got slower; the gate started
+  looking. Two integrations packaging the corpus found conditions that took
+  seconds to minutes on 8,000- and 50,000-character inputs while
+  `scripts/gate-redos.py` reported them clean: its inputs were 1,500 to
+  3,000 characters, where a quadratic condition costs about a tenth of a
+  second, and only the first branch of an alternation was ever pumped. Each
+  condition is now also run on 20,000-character inputs built per quantifier
+  -- the text that reaches the quantifier, through whichever branch,
+  lookbehind or back-reference leads there, followed by a long run of its
+  own body -- and on its openers and pumped near-match tiled to length
+  (#601). Each worker calibrates per chunk and times are reported in
+  reference-machine seconds, which reduces, but does not remove, the effect
+  of load that changes during a run. `data/redos-baseline.json` now lists
+  439 conditions in 259 rules: 350 over the budget when it was written (201
+  of them did not return within the wall even timed alone) and 89 under the
+  budget but over a third of it, recorded too because one condition's
+  readings spread by more than 2x across runs and machines. 41 are in the
+  enforce lane and 412 are high or critical.
+  Each entry carries a fingerprint of its pattern, so editing a baselined
+  condition makes it new again instead of inheriting the exemption; an
+  unchanged baselined hang is not re-run. The gate stays a ratchet: it fails
+  on a slow condition outside that file. `scripts/verify_rule_redos.py` now
+  uses the gate's own inputs and timing -- it had reported PASS on
+  ATR-2026-02372 with both conditions hanging -- and with `--base REF` also
+  times a changed condition on the inputs derived from its previous pattern.
+  Twelve conditions that Python `re` cannot compile, and that the gate
+  skipped without saying so, are now listed by key. pyatr runs eleven of
+  them through its `regex` fallback and the TypeScript engine compiles all
+  twelve, so they run in production and are still untimed here; the twelfth,
+  ATR-2026-00290#3, back-references a group that does not exist, which pyatr
+  refuses and JavaScript reads as the character U+0001 (#331). The semantic
+  lane's per-draft ReDoS precheck now allows 300 s instead of 120 s.
+
+- **Every recall figure the site, LIMITATIONS.md, CITATION.cff and the docs
+  above take from the measurement files now names its lane** and gives the
+  enforce figure wherever the measurement records one. Figures no measurement
+  file records are labelled instead: the about page's historical garak figure
+  as taken with every rule loaded, the neutral-benchmarks post's runs as having
+  no recorded lane. The website reads `breakdown.enforce_lane` from the measurement
+  files (home, coverage, research, red-team, garak integration, ATD and
+  sovereign-AI pages, the PINT blog post); it no longer reads recall
+  from the old eval report files or their typed fallbacks, and no longer
+  hydrates recall in the browser. The garak figures carry the closed-book
+  caveat, and so now do the PINT-format and HackAPrompt figures, which have
+  rules mined from them too. The SKILL.md benchmark is described as the
+  internal, labelled corpus it is, with the harness's layer names. An erratum
+  (`e-2026-10-16-recall-lanes`) records the change on the site.
+- `sync-stats.ts` now fails when CITATION.cff has no garak sentence to
+  rewrite, instead of leaving an old figure in place.
+- **`scripts/check-rules-safety.ts` checks that a modified rule still matches
+  its own true positives, and checks renamed rules.** A new rule's true
+  positives had to match; a modified rule only had to add no benign false
+  positive, and a rule that matches nothing adds none. `npm run
+  gate:generalization` covers pattern rules only, so a semantic rule whose
+  `fallback_method` was set to `none` passed every check. The new own-TP check
+  runs each true positive on both paths `atr test` tries, replaying every case
+  to the changed rule as the event the base rule would receive: a case the
+  base rule matched on a path (`evaluate()`, `scanSkill()`) must still match
+  there, one the change adds must match, and the changed rule must still match
+  one of the cases the base rule matched. That also catches re-routing a rule
+  away from its cases. A rule of a type the engine withholds from typed events
+  (`WITHHELD_SOURCE_TYPES`), which `atr test` reports as unevaluable, is
+  skipped while it stays that type. A renamed rule file was on neither the new
+  nor the modified list and skipped both checks; it is now compared with the
+  file it was at the base, and a changed file whose rule id differs is checked
+  as a new rule. `npm run validate` also checks a semantic rule's
+  `fallback_method` (`pattern` or `none`, compared exactly, as the engine
+  does), its `threshold` (a number from 0 to 1), and that a pattern fallback
+  has a condition to match.
+- **`scripts/check-rules-safety.ts` runs a new rule's true positives the way
+  `atr test` does (Check 2).** It read only a case's `input` and ran it as the
+  text of the benign corpus shapes. On main, as if each rule past Check 1 were
+  new, 250 true positives in 54 rules carry their payload elsewhere
+  (`tool_response`, `tool_args`, `tool_description`, a `user_input` key, an
+  object `input`, ...) and were never read; 47 of those rules had none read
+  and passed with nothing run. The routing a rule declares was never
+  exercised. Each case now runs as the event built from it for the rule's own
+  `agent_source.type`, and through `scanSkill()`, with the code the own-TP
+  check for modified rules uses (`scripts/lib/own-true-positives.ts`), and its
+  text must still match on the corpus shapes, so a case that fires only
+  through a tool name, which no benign sample exercises, fails. The semantic
+  lane's pre-gate runs the same code. A case that cannot be run fails, and so
+  does a rule of a type the engine withholds from typed events
+  (`memory_access`), whose cases `atr test` reports as unevaluable. A new rule
+  the benign checks cannot run at all (deprecated, or a trace, behavioral or
+  signature method) is refused with the reason; Check 2 used to fail most of
+  them only because it could not match their cases either, and one whose cases
+  carried no `input` passed the whole gate.
+- **README §8 discloses that the `garak` and `garak-full` figures are partly
+  closed-book.** A replay without the rules whose own YAML shows they were
+  written from the in-the-wild corpus is given in the new `[^garakcorpus]`
+  footnote, and the paragraph on the two `garak` rows no longer calls them
+  independent: `garak-full` contains that corpus twice.
+- `data/stats.json` no longer carries the orphaned `benchmark.pintRecall`
+  block, a 3.5.11 figure nothing has written since #600 and nothing reads.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **`atr scan` scans an MCP config file instead of skipping it.** The file was
+  parsed, wrapped as one event without `content` and skipped, while the
+  summary counted it as scanned, so a config that sets `NODE_OPTIONS` to a
+  `require` payload came back as no threats. Each server in the document is
+  now its own event, `events_scanned` counts what reached the engine beside
+  `events_skipped`, and a file with nothing scannable exits non-zero (#581,
+  by @ciceroyang; issue #575, where directory scans and the Action's exit
+  handling remain open).
+
+- **Rule conditions that took polynomial time on long input were
+  rewritten.** 86 conditions in 48 rules found by the extended ReDoS gate
+  (#704), eight conditions quadratic in a long run of one character (#723),
+  and ATR-2026-00063 and -00228 (#666). The rewrites keep the language of
+  each condition, except four deliberate changes in #704:
+  ATR-2026-00446 condition 0 widens, and ATR-2026-01005 condition 1 and
+  ATR-2026-01307 conditions 0 and 1 narrow. ATR-2026-02261 condition 0
+  narrows on purpose in #723 (its back-reference no longer ties two different
+  variables), and ATR-2026-00228 condition 1 in #666 (on JSON-encoded content
+  the two labels must be on one line). Conditions still over the gate's
+  budget stay listed in `data/redos-baseline.json`.
+- **Rule false positives.** ATR-2026-00012 matched 1,817 of 14,157 benign
+  samples and now matches 150, with every match of the new version also a
+  match of the old one (#683). ATR-2026-02010 no longer matches blank or
+  whitespace-only input (#704). ATR-2026-00013 also flags apex
+  loopback-wildcard domains (CVE-2026-55096) and its IPv6 condition matches
+  IPv4-mapped obfuscation only (#732, #733).
+- **`atr scan` scans an MCP `tools/list` document, one event per tool.** A file
+  holding `{"tools": [...]}`, or the JSON-RPC response `{"jsonrpc": "2.0",
+  "result": {"tools": [...]}}`, was wrapped as one event with no content,
+  skipped, and reported as "nothing was scanned", so the usual input for a
+  tool-poisoning check reached no rule. Each tool is now an `mcp_exchange`
+  event (`src/cli/mcp-tools-document.ts`): the content is the tool definition as
+  JSON, input schema and per-parameter descriptions included, and
+  `tool_name` / `tool_description` are set from the definition. A JSON array of
+  such responses is accepted too. A document that lists no tools fails with
+  "nothing was scanned" rather than reporting clean. `mcpServers` documents and
+  event files are read as before. Tests: `tests/cli-mcp-tools-list-scan.test.ts`.
+- **A tools/list scan does not run the rules written for a tool being called.**
+  A definition defines a tool and calls none, but an `mcp_exchange` event admits
+  every rule, so call rules (ATR-2026-00099 and others, which read the called
+  tool's name and arguments) flagged every definition named `delete_*`,
+  `*_reset` or `exec*`. New engine option `toolDefinitions` (`ATREngineConfig`,
+  default false), which `atr scan` sets only for a tools/list document: a rule
+  with `agent_source.type: tool_call` then runs only if one of its conditions
+  reads `tool_description` (the test is per rule: such a rule runs with all its
+  conditions), or if its subject is the tool's identity (`TOOL_IDENTITY_RULES`
+  in `src/tool-definition-scope.ts`: ATR-2026-00060, impersonation); every other
+  rule runs as before. No rule file changes; hooks, adapters, config documents
+  and event files are unaffected. `atr scan --json` reports
+  `tool_definition_scope`, `rules_evaluated` and `rules_skipped_by_scope` (SARIF:
+  run properties) and the `tool_name` of each result, so a rule that was not run
+  does not read as a clean result. An event that also carries a `tools` array
+  is still scanned as an event. Documented in `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` §3.2,
+  `docs/schema-spec.md` (agent_source.type) and `docs/rule-writing-guide.md`.
+  On 710 benign tool definitions from 45 official and vendor MCP servers,
+  flagged definitions go from 58 to 6 (hunt) and 57 to 5 (alert); enforce is 0
+  before and after, which says nothing here, since none of the rules involved is
+  stable. The true positives of the rules that read `tool_description` give the
+  same result with and without the scope: of 41, 39 fire (35 description texts,
+  and 4 ATR-2026-00441 code snippets through its content conditions) and 2 do
+  not (ATR-2026-00441 tool calls given as JSON with arguments, which are not
+  definitions). The 6 remaining hunt-lane false positives come from rules this
+  change does not touch: ATR-2026-01987, -00225, -00217, -00161 and -00569 (over-
+  broad conditions) and a form match of ATR-2026-00579 (experimental); see
+  `data/measurements/mcp-tools-list-benign/README.md`. The scope also costs
+  detection: a poisoned definition that only a call rule catches (for example
+  ATR-2026-00114) is missed in a tools/list scan; no malicious tool-definition
+  corpus measures this yet. Tests:
+  `tests/tool-definition-scope.test.ts`, `tests/cli-mcp-tools-list-scan.test.ts`.
+
+- **On Claude Code, the guard scans what a tool returned on PostToolUse.**
+  Claude Code sends a tool's output at the top level of the PostToolUse hook
+  input, as `tool_response` (checked against the shipped 2.1.280 binary).
+  `src/hook-handler.ts` read an output only from `tool_input.output` or
+  `tool_input.response`, where Claude Code never puts one, so the event's content
+  was the tool's input, and a prompt injection in a command's output, a file or a
+  fetched page reached no rule. The event's content and `tool_response` are now
+  the text of the output: `src/hook-tool-output.ts` keeps every string in it, as
+  written, and leaves out binary data, what Claude Code keeps from the model,
+  and labels and strings the tool only repeats from its input. A tool that edits
+  a file returns the edit it made, so its event is still built from its input.
+  `tool_args` stays the JSON of the input, and `tool_input.output` and
+  `.response` are still read for a host that sends the output there, now as raw
+  text in content too. Measured through the hook in the default hunt lane, each
+  sample as a Bash command's output: the own true positives of the 746 rules the
+  engine runs on a tool response (`llm_io`, `mcp_exchange` and `context_window`)
+  match 3,852 of 3,890 times (0 before, and the same as a Read or MCP output);
+  289 of PINT's 451 attacks match (0 before) and none of its 399 benign samples;
+  1,246 of the 14,157 benign-corpus samples match a rule (0 before), most of them
+  through rules at maturity `test`. In the alert lane 1,183 match, in the enforce
+  lane none. Not covered: an output whose text exceeds 100,000 characters
+  taken together (`MAX_EVAL_LENGTH`); and some rules take time quadratic in a
+  long run of one character. `atr init` registers the guard on
+  PreToolUse only, so this reaches an installation that added it under
+  PostToolUse.
+
+- **The guard also scans a failed tool call's output (PostToolUseFailure).**
+  When a tool call fails, a Bash command whose exit code Claude Code counts as
+  a failure among them (most non-zero codes; `grep`'s exit 1 is not one),
+  Claude Code sends `PostToolUseFailure` instead of `PostToolUse`. Its input
+  carries `tool_name`, `tool_input`, `tool_use_id`, `error`, `is_interrupt`
+  and `duration_ms`, and no `tool_response` (checked against the shipped
+  2.1.280 binary). The guard answered it "Unknown hook type" and allowed it,
+  so ending a command with `; exit 1` kept its output from every rule. It now
+  builds the event from `error`, the failure as the model sees it: for a shell
+  command, its stderr and stdout after Claude Code's `Exit code N` line and
+  abort note, which are left out. A command that printed nothing leaves no
+  text, and its event is built from the input, as an output-less PostToolUse
+  is. It answers in the PostToolUse contract under the `PostToolUseFailure`
+  name, which Claude Code accepts, and with blocking on its `decision:
+  "block"` reaches the model as a blocking error. Measured through the hook in
+  the default hunt lane, each sample as a failed Bash command's error: the own
+  true positives of the 746 rules the engine runs on a tool response match
+  3,852 of 3,890 times (0 before); 289 of PINT's 451 attacks match (0 before)
+  and none of its 399 benign samples; 1,246 of the 14,157 benign-corpus
+  samples match a rule (0 before). On every sample the verdict and the rules
+  matched are those of the same text as a Bash command's output on
+  PostToolUse. Claude Code cuts a failed call's error to about 10,000
+  characters; 1,117 of the benign samples are longer and were sent whole. To
+  use it, register the guard under `PostToolUseFailure` too.
+
+- **Flywheel shadow rules can match.** `ShadowEvaluator` compiled each
+  condition with `new RegExp(value, 'i')`. A value that starts with `(?i)` is
+  a SyntaxError in JavaScript, the error was swallowed, and the condition
+  never matched. `RuleScaffolder` starts every pattern it writes with `(?i)`,
+  so no rule the flywheel generated could match in shadow mode or reach
+  promotion. Shadow conditions now go through the engine's own
+  `compileRegexCondition()` (leading flag group removed per SPEC §6.4, `u`
+  when needed, ReDoS gate) and `safeRegexTest()` (the engine's input-length
+  limit), and a condition whose value is not a string is skipped instead of
+  throwing. Shadow evaluation still differs from `ATREngine` in field
+  resolution, operators, `condition: all`, Unicode normalisation and
+  `agent_source` routing; those differences are unchanged.
+- **Flywheel promotion needs a reviewed true positive, and promotes a rule
+  once.** `ShadowEvaluator.getPromotionCandidates()` divided confirmed false
+  positives by all matches, so a rule with no recorded feedback had an FP rate
+  of 0 and became a candidate after its first match. Once shadow rules could
+  match (above), `FlywheelManager.promoteReady()` would have handed such rules
+  to `onPromote` with status `stable`, and the same rule again on every call.
+  A rule is now a candidate only after at least `minReviewedMatches` (new
+  `FlywheelConfig` option, default 1) matches with recorded feedback including
+  a confirmed true positive; the FP rate is computed over reviewed matches; and
+  `promoteReady()` hands each rule to `onPromote` once. A promoted rule keeps
+  `maturity: draft`.
+- **`RuleScaffolder` no longer writes a pattern that misses its own example
+  payload.** An attack indicator is chosen by a broad test and writes a
+  narrower pattern: "Ignore all previous instructions", "please ignore the
+  rules above" and "disregard everything you were told" all selected the
+  instruction-override indicator, whose pattern did not match them. An
+  indicator now counts only when its pattern matches the payload, and the
+  exact payload is used if nothing else does. Keyword patterns are now tried
+  only at line starts, `(?:^|[\n\r\u2028\u2029])(?=[^\n\r\u2028\u2029]*word)...`,
+  and exact patterns are the escaped payload without a surrounding `.*`. Both
+  match the same inputs as before, but neither is quadratic on a long
+  single-line input any more (about 7-12 seconds per pattern on 100,000
+  characters before, about a millisecond now). An empty or whitespace-only
+  example payload, which produced a pattern that matched everything, is now
+  rejected. Output of `atr scaffold` and the `atr_submit_proposal` MCP tool
+  changes accordingly.
+
+- **SPEC §6.4 corrected: SPEC.md 1.0.1 [Compatible].** A `regex` pattern
+  condition matches case-insensitively whether or not it begins with `(?i)`,
+  and `m`, `s` and `x` in a leading flag group have no effect. The 1.0.0 text,
+  added on 2026-07-19 (#340), said an engine applies the flags named in that
+  group, which made a pattern without `(?i)` case-sensitive and gave `(?s)`
+  and `(?m)` their dotAll and multiline meaning. Compatible: an engine that
+  passes the conformance suite needs no change, because its true-positive
+  fixtures already require case-insensitive matching; an implementation built
+  to the 1.0.0 wording does. 1.0.1 also admits `x` in the group, which both
+  engines already removed, says when the `u` flag applies, advises against
+  modifier groups such as `(?-i:...)`, and adds a revision history (Appendix
+  D). Issue #698 has the evidence; erratum `e-2026-10-19-regex-dialect`
+  records the error. `tests/spec-regex-dialect.test.ts` and pyATR's
+  `TestRegexDialectSpec64` pin the statements. `scripts/generate-sigma.py` no
+  longer copies `m` and `s` from that group into exported Sigma patterns,
+  where a backend would honour them; of the three rules on main that carry
+  such a group, only ATR-2026-00450's `(?im)^...` condition matched
+  differently because of it. Other exports that still follow the 1.0.0
+  wording are listed in #698.
+- **Rules with a `context_window` or `skill_*` `agent_source.type` run on the
+  events their data arrives in.** `src/engine.ts` maps an event type to one of
+  five source types and skipped every rule whose type differed, so a rule of an
+  extended type never ran on a typed event: on the `tool_call` and
+  `tool_response` events `src/hook-handler.ts` builds, ATR-2026-00070, -00075,
+  -01155, -01774, -00134, -00157 and -02405 never fired, while `atr test` mapped
+  their types to a base type and passed every case. The engine now does that
+  mapping itself (`RUNTIME_SOURCE_TYPE`): `context_window` runs where `llm_io`
+  rules run, the `skill_*` types where `tool_call` rules run, and a rule without
+  `agent_source` no longer throws a `TypeError` that aborted the whole
+  evaluation of a typed event. `memory_access` is withheld
+  (`WITHHELD_SOURCE_TYPES`): ATR-2026-00075 also matches standing instructions
+  in an ordinary chat turn ("From now on, always answer in French."), which the
+  Mastra processor and the OpenShell filter, both blocking by default, would
+  refuse; -00075 and -01155 still run only on an untyped event and in a skill
+  scan, and a new `memory_access` rule fails the test suite until the type is
+  mapped. `atr test` no longer maps anything, so what passes there is what the
+  engine runs, and it reports a withheld type's cases as unevaluable, with the
+  reason. The rule-latency gate profiles the five rules instead of listing them
+  as unexercised. The benign-corpus measurement does not change, because its
+  untyped shape already ran these rules; what changes is that their matches now
+  surface at runtime in the hunt lane, the default: ATR-2026-00070 (high)
+  matches 20 of the 14,157 benign samples. On the weekly benchmark suite three
+  hunt-lane recalls rise: garak 601 to 602 of 650 and garak-full 1,989 to 1,991
+  of 3,475 (one prompt, which -00070 catches on the tool-response channel and
+  garak-full holds twice), and atr-self-test 310 to 312 of 321 (-00070's own
+  true positives). No precision or false-positive figure moves (the new matches
+  fall on attack samples), and no enforce-lane figure moves (none of the five
+  rules is stable).
+
+- **A tool event built from a test case always names a tool.**
+  `buildEventFromTestCase` (`src/testcase-event.ts`, behind `atr test`,
+  `scripts/validate-rule-testcases.ts` and the case-sensitivity gate) gave a case
+  that names no tool the `tool_name` `""`, meant to keep the case's text out of
+  `tool_name`. `src/engine.ts` reads a field only when it is truthy and, on a
+  `tool_call` event, then falls back to the event's content, so a `tool_name`
+  condition read the payload as the tool's name and a rule keyed on the tool
+  could pass its cases without naming one. A tool event now carries
+  `atr-test-tool` (`UNNAMED_TOOL`) when the case names no tool, as
+  `src/hook-handler.ts` fills it from the host's tool call, and the
+  case-sensitivity gate leaves that name out of the text it checks a condition
+  against. No rule on main relied on the old behaviour: every true positive and
+  true negative of every rule tests the same.
+
+- **A test case's own `agent_message` is no longer replaced by its content.**
+  `buildEventFromTestCase` set the field from the case and then copied the
+  event's content over it, so a case that names an `agent_message` beside its
+  input was run on the input there. No case on main names one.
+
+- **A `medium` confidence label no longer depends on float rounding to stay
+  out of `deny`.** A pattern match scored `0.7 + 0.1 * coverage`, and a
+  `high`-severity match denies at `>= 0.8`. At full coverage that sum is
+  `0.7999999999999999` in IEEE doubles, so the verdict was `ask` only because
+  of the rounding direction; the same quantity as an integer percentage is
+  `0.8`. Label-derived confidence is now computed in one place
+  (`src/rule-confidence.ts`) on a basis-point scale, and a label below the
+  deny threshold is capped one basis point under it. No verdict or
+  auto-response decision changes. The raw `confidence` of a `medium` match at
+  full coverage is `0.7999` instead of `0.7999999999999999`, and other
+  partial-coverage values lose trailing float noise (`0.9500000000000001`
+  becomes `0.95`). One displayed percentage moves as a result: a
+  named-condition rule labelled `medium` at 3/4 coverage shows 78% (`0.775`)
+  where the noise used to show 77%. No shipped rule reaches that cell.
+
+- **A semantic rule without a pattern fallback is no longer recorded as
+  measured clean.** The benign-corpus measurement
+  (`scripts/gate-promotion-fp.ts`, and `scripts/remeasure-benign-fp.ts`
+  through it) drives the synchronous engine, which returns null for
+  `method: semantic` unless `detection.semantic.fallback_method` is exactly
+  `pattern`; the judge runs only in `evaluateAsync()`. `fieldCoverage()`
+  named trace, behavioral and signature as methods it cannot run, but not
+  this one, and it skipped a rule with no condition field, such as a pattern
+  fallback with nothing in it. Either was written down as `fp_count: 0,
+  partial_measurement: false`, which `scripts/gate-action-eligibility.ts`
+  graded `terminate` at maturity `stable` and `degrade` at `test`. Both are
+  now recorded partial and capped at `observe`. No rule on main is in either
+  state, so the committed evidence is unchanged. The skill-path check uses
+  the same predicate; it used to read `fallback_method: Pattern` as
+  `pattern`, which the engine does not, and it exempted a
+  `scan_target: both` rule with no conditions.
+- **NIST-related statements corrected across the docs and the website.**
+  Pages described a NIST CAISI dialogue and position paper that did not
+  happen, an RFI response ATR never filed, an OSCAL "Path 1" acceptance,
+  and a quote NIST never published; they listed NIST among adopters and
+  in a trust bar, and showed "100%" or "4/4 functions" for an AI RMF
+  mapping that covers a subset of subcategories. usnistgov/oscal-content#338
+  is described as what it is: open, reworked against NIST's AI RMF catalog,
+  awaiting NIST review. The website changelog page now shows the notes on
+  historical entries, which it used to drop.
+- **Integration status, provenance, evasion and latency claims corrected.**
+  The red-team page listed seven proposals as under review that their ATR
+  author had withdrawn unmerged (NVIDIA/garak#1676 on 2026-08-04; HarmBench,
+  AgentDojo, JailbreakBench, Counterfit, PromptInject and Damn Vulnerable MCP
+  Server on 2026-10-14 and 15, six of them never answered). They are removed,
+  along with the lapsed "On deck" schedule, and the garak, sovereign-AI,
+  responsible-use, integrate and STANDARDIZATION-STATUS surfaces no longer
+  call the garak integration or any OWASP PR open. The garak page and the
+  contributor docs (QUALITY-GATE.md, TSC-ONBOARDING.md, REVIEWER-GUIDE.md,
+  RULE-PRODUCTION.md, the issue-to-proposal PR text) no longer describe
+  auto-merge, which has been off since 2026-06-03. The red-team and governance
+  pages no longer promise a `metadata_provenance.discovered_by` field no rule
+  has, and the home, red-team, about and quality-standard pages no longer
+  credit daily auto-crystallization for growth that came from CVE sweeps,
+  benchmark-miss mining and contributors. The sovereign-AI page no longer says
+  ATR detects intent and cannot be evaded; LIMITATIONS.md and the
+  responsible-use, integrate and research pages no longer say every rule
+  carries evasion tests or that there are 64; LIMITATIONS.md and
+  THREAT-MODEL.md now agree that the optional judge and embedding modules ship
+  but are off by default. "Sub-millisecond", "< 5ms", "5ms pattern match" and
+  "Done in 47ms" are replaced by how evaluation cost scales; the OpenShell
+  example is marked as a sketch of a proposal OpenShell closed, and its
+  timeouts now exceed a one-shot cold start. CITATION.cff no longer calls the
+  rules hand-authored and says what the safety gate checks for added and
+  changed rules; the OWASP PR text drops its 76-rule count and notes the PR
+  was withdrawn. Errata `e-2026-10-16-integration-status`,
+  `e-2026-10-16-evasion`, `e-2026-10-16-latency` and `e-2026-10-16-provenance`
+  record the site changes.
+- **A rule the engine does not evaluate no longer gets a false-positive
+  record.** `scripts/gate-promotion-fp.ts --emit-measurement` wrote
+  `fp_count: 0` for draft and deprecated rules, which the engine skips, so
+  nothing was counted for them. `detection_fingerprint` does not cover
+  `status`, so a one-line revival handed the rule that 0, and
+  `scripts/gate-action-eligibility.ts` trusted it: at maturity `test`, enough
+  for `block_tool`. Seven records in `data/benign-fp-measurement.json` were of
+  this kind. The measurement now asks the engine (`ATREngine.evaluates`) and
+  lists such a rule, or an id two loaded files share, under NOT MEASURED
+  instead. Without `--filter-mode` that fails the gate: promoting a rule the
+  engine does not evaluate no longer passes as clean.
+  `scripts/remeasure-benign-fp.ts` leaves the same rules out, and measures in
+  full, rather than extends, a record for a rule that was inert at its base
+  commit. `scripts/promote-to-stable.ts` no longer counts a draft rule at
+  maturity `test` as FP-clean.
+- **The action gate refuses evidence that holds a record for a rule that is
+  not live** (inert, or its file gone): exit 2, as for evidence taken on
+  another corpus. A record carries no status, so the gate cannot tell a count
+  taken while the rule was live from a 0 nothing measured, and left in place
+  either is trusted the day the rule is revived or restored. Deprecating or
+  deleting a rule now means re-emitting the evidence in the same change. The
+  gate also reads a status that is not a string (`status: [draft]`) as live,
+  as the engine does; it used to skip such a rule while the engine ran it.
+- **Two rule files with the same name are both measured.** The measurement
+  copied rule files into its scratch directory by file name, so of two
+  same-named files in different directories only the last was read, and the
+  other was reported clean.
+- **`scripts/promote-to-stable.ts` no longer promotes on a 0 it did not
+  measure.** A `maturity: test` rule whose conditions the benign corpus cannot
+  fully exercise (a field no sample fills, such as `tool_name`, or a method the
+  synchronous engine cannot run, such as `trace`) scored 0 false positives
+  without being read, and `--write` promoted it to `stable`. Such a rule is now
+  reported as not promotable; one that did false-positive stays with the rules
+  that have false positives. No `maturity: test` rule on main is affected today.
+- **verify-adopters.yml no longer fails when other commits land on main during
+  a run, and its failures get noticed.** The job commits the refreshed
+  `data/adopters-verification.json` straight to main with a plain push, which
+  was rejected whenever another commit landed first, failing the run with
+  nothing wrong in ADOPTERS.md (2026-10-07, 2026-10-15). It now rebases its
+  one-file commit onto the moved main and retries, at most three times; runs
+  one verification at a time per branch; and checks out the branch tip rather
+  than the triggering commit, so a run that waited behind another starts from
+  the data the other pushed instead of conflicting with it (the 2026-10-07
+  shape: two adopter merges, each run writing the same file). A conflict with
+  a hand edit of the generated file still fails the run. Four red runs in a
+  row (2026-10-12 to 10-15) went unnoticed for days; a failure on main now
+  opens one tracking issue, or rewrites the open one, and the next green run
+  closes it. The issue lists drift only from a verification that finished.
+
 ## [4.1.5] - 2026-10-10
 
 4.1.4 was staged on npm and removed by publish-time scanning before it could be
@@ -788,6 +1515,14 @@ No rule content changed and no threshold was loosened in any of the above.
 ### Metrics
 
 - HackAPrompt (4,780 samples): recall 28.6% → 66.2% (+37.6pp), 100% precision maintained.
+  - Erratum (2026-10-19): re-run on the same 4,780 samples at the sprint commits,
+    recall was 28.6% (1,368, at `3a6145b7`) → 65.0% (3,108, at `e9efefdd`) and
+    66.0% (3,154, at `92c0d0fe`); 66.2% could not be reproduced at either. The
+    28.6% starting point was itself in-sample (ATR-2026-00442..00447 were mined
+    from this subset). "100% precision" was not a measurement: the corpus has
+    no benign samples, so precision is undefined on it. Procedure and figures:
+    `data/hackaprompt/METHOD.md`; current measurement, with the ablation
+    reference: `data/measurements/hackaprompt/`.
 - garak (3,475 prompts): ATR-core families ~80%+; per-family breakdown: latentinjection 34.4%, sysprompt_extraction 67.9%, dan 90.2%.
 - PINT (850 samples): 0.25% FP maintained, 0 FP regression.
 - SKILL.md (341 samples): 100% precision, 0% FP, 0 FP regression.
@@ -856,6 +1591,13 @@ No rule content changed and no threshold was loosened in any of the above.
 
 ## [2.1.0] - 2026-05-09
 
+> **Historical entry — the AI RMF line below overstated coverage.**
+> "100% coverage of all 4 AI RMF functions" described the community OSCAL
+> catalog, which encodes all 72 AI RMF subcategories as controls. ATR's
+> rules map to a subset of those subcategories. The catalog is a community
+> contribution and is not endorsed by NIST. Do not quote the line as a
+> coverage claim. (Note added 2026-10-16.)
+
 ### Added
 
 - **NIST AI RMF mapping v0.2** — 100% coverage of all 4 AI RMF functions (Govern / Map / Measure / Manage), 72 controls + 31 cross-reference links + worked example profile. Schema-valid OSCAL catalog published under `Agent-Threat-Rule/ai-rmf-oscal-catalog` (PR #46).
@@ -867,6 +1609,14 @@ No rule content changed and no threshold was loosened in any of the above.
 
 ## [2.0.11] - 2026-04-21
 
+> **Historical entry — do not quote the garak or SKILL.md figures below.**
+> The 97.1% in-the-wild recall was measured on a garak corpus that many of
+> this release's new rules were written from, so it is not an out-of-sample
+> result. The SKILL.md precision and FP figures are in-sample: the benign
+> set is the one the rules were tuned against. Current figures, reported
+> per lane and with their closed-book share, are in README §8 Evaluation.
+> (Note added 2026-10-16.)
+
 ### Added
 
 - **193 new rules** covering the full NVIDIA garak probe corpus (ATR-00300 ~ ATR-00414), bringing total to **311 rules**
@@ -966,7 +1716,7 @@ No rule content changed and no threshold was loosened in any of the above.
 - Wild scan (96K): 1.35% flag rate, 751 confirmed malware
 - OWASP Agentic Top 10: 10/10 coverage
 - MITRE ATLAS: 100/113 rules mapped
-- SAFE-MCP: 91.8% technique coverage
+- SAFE-MCP: technique coverage figure (withdrawn 2026-10: it was not backed by rule-level data; see docs/SAFE-MCP-MAPPING.md)
 - Avg scan latency: 14ms per file
 
 ### Ecosystem