agent-threat-rules 3.5.12 → 4.1.5

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -0,0 +1,1117 @@
+# Changelog
+
+All notable changes to ATR will be documented in this file.
+
+## [Unreleased]
+
+## [4.1.5] - 2026-10-10
+
+4.1.4 was staged on npm and removed by publish-time scanning before it could be
+approved, like 4.1.1 to 4.1.3. 4.0.0 passed that scanning. What the 4.1 line
+added were rules whose test samples are complete attack snippets: a
+crypto-miner command line with a mining-pool URL, PHP, JSP and ASPX webshells,
+and a Node.js reverse shell. This release carries the 4.1.4 rules and engine,
+packaged without those samples.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **The npm package ships the rules without their test samples.** The release
+  workflow removes `test_cases` and `evasion_tests` from each rule just before
+  staging, after the tests have run on the full rules. The engine does not read
+  them, so detection is unchanged: the same rules load and the same rules fire.
+  The samples stay in the repository. With the package alone, `atr test` on a
+  bundled rule has no samples to run, and `atr stats` reports zero TP/TN
+  counts. DISCLOSURE says so.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **ATR-2026-02600 no longer names a real public IP in its test samples.** Its
+  two reverse-shell samples now connect to the documentation ranges 203.0.113.14
+  and 192.0.2.4. The detection is unchanged.
+- **ATR-2026-02627 describes the web shells it detects instead of quoting
+  them.** Its description and one false-positive note quoted a working one-line
+  PHP command shell; they now say what it is. The detection is unchanged.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **npm releases go only through the staged path in `publish.yml`.** The
+  package is dual-use, so npm's policy lets CI stage a version but not publish
+  one; a maintainer promotes it with 2FA. Three workflows could still put a
+  version on the registry another way and have been removed:
+  `publish-current-version.yml` (direct `npm publish` through trusted
+  publishing), `publish-on-rules-merge.yml` (bumped and ran `npm publish` with
+  `NPM_TOKEN` on pushes to `main`) and `npm-stage.yml` (approved staged
+  versions from CI with `NPM_TOKEN`, skipping the maintainer's 2FA).
+  `scripts/release.sh` now stops at the tag push instead of also publishing
+  locally. No workflow references `NPM_TOKEN`, and
+  `tests/npm-release-path.test.ts` fails if any workflow other than
+  `publish.yml` gains a publish, stage or approve step.
+
+## [4.1.4] - 2026-10-07
+
+> Not published to npm (see 4.1.5).
+
+The first release since 4.0.0 meant to reach npm. 4.1.1, 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 were
+each blocked by npm's publish-time malware scanning, which reads the attack
+strings in rule files as malware, so `npm install agent-threat-rules` still
+returns 4.0.0. This release declares the package dual-use (see Changed below)
+and goes through npm's staged publishing, approved by a maintainer with 2FA. It
+carries everything listed under 4.1.3, 4.1.2, 4.1.1 and 4.1.0 below.
+
+### Added
+
+- **Four rules.** Each one passed the repository's PR checks, and is
+  experimental, maturity `test`, with alert-level response actions only:
+  - ATR-2026-02846: ignore-previous-and-following instructions (PromptInject
+    goal hijacking), a semantic rule with a narrow regex fallback.
+  - ATR-2026-02847: email exfiltration under a policy, audit or compliance
+    pretext.
+  - ATR-2026-02850: data exfiltration by email under a documentation pretext,
+    including French phrasings.
+  - ATR-2026-02851: a fake user turn inside content that instructs the agent to
+    send an email.
+  ATR-2026-02847, 02850 and 02851 come from human-written attack emails
+  (LLMail-Inject). They fire on none of 526 real emails or 694 benign web pages
+  presented as tool output, and each catches attack emails that were held out
+  while the rule was written.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **pyATR falls back for regex conditions Python's `re` cannot compile** (such
+  as variable-width lookbehind) instead of dropping the condition (#554, thanks
+  @dc-tw).
+- **The test-case validator reads every key a test case can use.** It read four
+  of nine and misjudged rules whose cases use the others. Its failure count on
+  the current rules drops from 40 to 11, with no new failures (#607).
+
+### Security
+
+- **`atr tc pull` checks the rules a Threat Cloud endpoint returns before
+  writing them, and no longer goes through a shell.** The response is now
+  treated as untrusted: a rule is written only if its id has the form
+  `ATR-YYYY-NNNNN`, its category is one of the schema's categories and no rule
+  with that id is already in the repo; anything else is rejected without
+  touching the disk. The validator then runs as a separate Node.js process with
+  the file path as a plain argument. Before, the id and category came from the
+  response unchecked and the validator was started through a shell, so a
+  compromised or impersonated endpoint could affect the operator's machine
+  beyond the rules directory. The category is also read from the rule's `tags`,
+  not from the first `subcategory:` line in a compliance block, and the
+  validator is found next to the installed CLI rather than in the current
+  directory, so valid rules are no longer filed under the wrong directory or
+  rejected when the command runs outside a checkout of this repo.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **The package is declared dual-use under the npm Dual-Use Content Policy.**
+  npm's publish-time malware scanning, introduced in July 2026, blocked 4.1.1,
+  4.1.2 and 4.1.3: rule files carry attack strings by design, as detection
+  patterns and test samples, and the scanner treats them like malware.
+  `package.json` now carries `"contentPolicy": {"class": "dual-use"}`, and a
+  plain-text `DISCLOSURE` file at the package root says what the attack content
+  is for and what the package does not do. Under that policy, CI may only stage
+  a release; a maintainer approves it with 2FA before it goes live, so
+  `publish.yml` now stages through trusted publishing and waits for the approval
+  before creating the GitHub release.
+
+## [4.1.3] - 2026-10-06
+
+> Not published to npm (see 4.1.4).
+
+The first release of the 4.1 line to reach npm; 4.1.2 did not either. Its
+publish on 2026-10-01 went through trusted publishing (OIDC), printed
+`+ agent-threat-rules@4.1.2`, and was placed in npm's staging queue instead of
+being published. It never appeared on the registry, and a re-run on 2026-10-05
+was refused with E409 ("Cannot publish over previously staged version"), so the
+number is skipped like 4.1.1. The trusted publisher has since been set to allow
+direct publishing. Rules, engine and spec are unchanged from the `v4.1.2` tag.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **The release workflow fails when the version never reaches the registry.**
+  It now asks npm for the exact version after publishing, waits up to ten
+  minutes, and fails before the GitHub release is created. Before, the check
+  read `latest`, ran after the release, and only warned, which is how both 4.1.1
+  and 4.1.2 went green without being published (#633).
+
+## [4.1.2] - 2026-10-01
+
+> Not published to npm (see 4.1.3).
+
+The first release of the 4.1 line to reach npm. Until this one,
+`npm install agent-threat-rules` returned 4.0.0. 4.1.2 carries everything
+listed under 4.1.1 and 4.1.0 below. Rules, engine and spec are unchanged from
+the `v4.1.1` tag; the README rewords one row of its ETSI mapping, which had
+stated a conformance requirement as a fact about the corpus.
+
+Neither earlier 4.1 tag reached the registry:
+
+- `4.1.0` (tagged 2026-09-14): the publish step got E404 on the registry PUT.
+- `4.1.1` (tagged 2026-09-22): the tag-triggered publish failed with EOTP, npm
+  asking CI for a one-time password. A manual republish later that day was
+  placed in npm's staging queue instead of being published, and the retry on
+  2026-09-23 was refused with E409. npm does not allow publishing over a staged
+  version, so the number is skipped.
+
+The 4.1.1 entry below opens by calling itself the first 4.1 release to reach
+npm. It was not; the entry is otherwise left as written.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **Releases publish through npm trusted publishing (OIDC).** `publish.yml` no
+  longer reads a registry token. npm mints a short-lived credential for each
+  run, bound to this repository and that workflow file, and generates the
+  provenance attestation itself (#606).
+
+## [4.1.1] - 2026-09-22
+
+> Not published to npm (see 4.1.2).
+
+The first release of the 4.1 line to actually reach npm. `4.1.0` was tagged on
+2026-09-14 and never published — the publish step failed on an expired registry
+token and nobody was watching, so for 30 days `npm install agent-threat-rules`
+kept returning 4.0.0 while `main` moved 38 commits ahead. **4.1.1 carries
+everything listed under 4.1.0 below, plus the entries here.** The version number
+skips 4.1.0 on purpose, so that what is on npm and what the git tag points at are
+the same tree.
+
+### Security
+
+- **`ATR-2026-00220` condition 2 backtracked catastrophically**, the same defect
+  as condition 0 of the same rule, which was fixed in #531 — a quantified run of
+  base64 characters between two unbounded `.*` gaps, with a literal at the end.
+  Only condition 0 was rewritten at the time. Measured on Node against a
+  base64-dense single line with no matching tail: 0.5s at 1 KB, 3.4s at 2 KB,
+  **23.4s at 4 KB**. The gaps are now bounded and the run is fixed-length;
+  the same inputs measure under a millisecond at 64 KB. All five of the rule's
+  true positives still fire and all five true negatives stay clean, with
+  condition 2 matching exactly the cases it matched before.
+  Reported as GHSA-66x9-5vw9-3wv3 against condition 0, which 4.1.0 had already
+  fixed; this closes the half of the rule that report did not cover.
+- **The package no longer ships a default endpoint for detection data.**
+  Reporting has been opt-in since 4.1.0, but opting in without naming a
+  recipient silently picked one. `--report-to-cloud` now requires `--tc-url` or
+  `ATR_TC_URL` and exits with an error naming the fix if neither is set. ATR is
+  an open standard, not one collector's client: an operator who turns reporting
+  on decides who receives it, and there is no address in the package to forget
+  to change. Detection events now also carry an `X-ATR-Client-Id` header; the
+  previous vendor-named header is still sent so existing collectors keep working.
+
+> **Nine conditions still backtrack** and are listed in
+> [`data/redos-baseline.json`](data/redos-baseline.json) with measured
+> times — `ATR-2026-00285#0` and `ATR-2026-00272#0` are the worst at 16s and
+> 14s, and `ATR-2026-00707#0` is `maturity: stable`, which means it runs in the
+> enforce lane. The ReDoS gate is a ratchet against that file: a green gate
+> means nothing got worse, not that the class is closed. Do not read this
+> release as "ReDoS fixed".
+
+### Changed
+
+- `CHANGELOG.md` is now included in the npm tarball. The `files` allowlist had
+  excluded it, so a release that fixed a security defect arrived at consumers
+  with nothing in the package to say so.
+
+### Fixed — external claims that overstated what had happened
+
+- **The npm package `description` claimed a vendor product shipped the ATR rule
+  pack.** What actually happened is that rules were merged into
+  `cisco-ai-defense/skill-scanner`, an open-source scanner repository — not the
+  same thing as shipping inside that vendor's product. The blurb is the single
+  most-copied sentence in the project, so it now says what the package is and
+  makes no adoption claim at all (#580).
+- **Withdrew the two per-lane false-positive rates** published alongside the
+  enforce/hunt split. Three defects, any one of which is disqualifying: both
+  were measured on a subsample roughly a sixth of the corpus they were credited
+  to; the benign corpus contained real jailbreak samples — material the rules
+  are meant to catch, sitting in the set that defines a false positive — until
+  an exclusion filter landed on 2026-08-04 (#373); and the ladder that produced
+  the hunt figure depended on a file no longer in the repository, so that figure
+  cannot be reproduced at all. A gap is more useful to an adopter than a number
+  nobody can reproduce. Re-measurement against the current benign corpus is
+  pending, and neither figure should be cited by anyone until it lands (#579).
+- **Corrected the fiscal sponsor's legal identity.** Nine files carried an EIN
+  that corresponds to no organization, and five of them additionally described
+  the sponsor as a 501(c)(3) when it is a 501(c)(6). The distinction is
+  substantive rather than cosmetic: funders that restrict grants to 501(c)(3)
+  recipients would have been misled (#578).
+
+## [4.1.0] - 2026-09-14
+
+> **Never published to npm.** The tag `v4.1.0` exists, but the publish failed on
+> an expired registry token and was not retried for 30 days. This version number
+> does not exist on the registry and never will; everything below shipped in
+> 4.1.1 instead.
+
+At release: 825 rule files, 818 effective.
+
+### Added
+
+- **A benign-twin corpus: 1,788 benign counterparts to attack payloads**, across
+  17 files, counted at the `v4.1.0` tag. Built so that a rule which fires on the
+  harmless sibling of the attack it targets can be caught before it ships. It
+  demoted one production rule on arrival.
+- **Forty rules from the full proposal re-sweep**, landed as four batches of
+  ten, plus fifteen from the CVE proposal backlog (#503, #504).
+- **A precompiled rule digest for consumers that cannot take an engine**
+  (#510), with a Python-verified variant, and a PyRIT digest that carries
+  every field and names the scope it is safe to use (#511).
+- `pyatr` 0.3.0: bundle refreshed, and the behaviour that had blocked the
+  refresh unpinned (#507).
+
+### Fixed — catastrophic backtracking
+
+- **Eight rules could be made to backtrack catastrophically**; the patterns are
+  rewritten and a gate now blocks the class from returning (#531).
+  `ATR-2026-02610` condition 0 was fixed separately for the same defect.
+- **`ATR-2026-01005`, the many-shot rule, is now linear** without giving up RE2
+  portability — the obvious fix would have traded one for the other (#546).
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **Ten rules from the re-sweep were withheld rather than shipped**: each fired
+  on its own benign twin from the same run, so the twin corpus caught them
+  before release (#565). `ATR-2026-02604` was withheld earlier for the same
+  reason.
+- **`\u{...}` is a JavaScript-only escape, so ten rules never compiled outside
+  the TypeScript engine** — they were silently absent for every other consumer
+  (#509).
+- The Sigma exporter did not preserve ATR's regex case semantics (#520).
+- The AVID importer stopped at the API's page limit instead of enumerating all
+  reports (#534).
+- The quality gate now checks peer true negatives within the same PR (#529),
+  and the website shows the effective rule count rather than the raw file count.
+
+### Removed
+
+- The one-shot bootstrap publish workflow, once it had served its purpose
+  (#541).
+
+## [4.0.0] - 2026-08-22
+
+> Releases 3.5.1 through 3.5.12 were automated rule-publish releases cut from
+> this same stretch of history and were never given their own entries. A few
+> items below — the benchmark-number corrections in particular — were first
+> published in one of them rather than in 4.0.0.
+
+### Changed — blocking is now opt-in (BREAKING for anyone relying on the old default)
+
+- **`atr guard` no longer emits a `permissionDecision` unless blocking is
+  enabled.** The Claude Code PreToolUse payload now carries the detection
+  (`atr_decision`, `atr_reason`, `matched_rules`, `atr_advisory: true`) and drops
+  the `hookSpecificOutput` envelope entirely, so the host applies its own
+  permission flow. `toClaudeCodePostToolUse` likewise omits `decision: 'block'`
+  (its envelope is kept: a permissive verdict has always emitted it with no
+  decision inside).
+  The whole envelope goes rather than just the decision field as a **legibility**
+  choice, not a compatibility one. Both shapes are in fact accepted: the
+  hook-output schema in the shipped Claude Code 2.1.76 bundle declares
+  `hookSpecificOutput` optional, its PreToolUse member declares
+  `permissionDecision` optional, and the object is not strict, so unknown
+  top-level keys are stripped rather than rejected — which is also why
+  `atr_decision` and `matched_rules` have shipped alongside it all along. A
+  payload with no envelope simply cannot be misread as a decision that failed to
+  serialise.
+
+- **ATR never emits `permissionDecision: "allow"` — in either mode.** This is
+  wider than the blocking switch and is the part most likely to surprise: turning
+  blocking ON does **not** bring the affirmative decision back. In the PreToolUse
+  contract `allow` is not neutral; it is an approval that suppresses the host's
+  own permission prompt, so a hooked session would permit *more* than an unhooked
+  one on every operation ATR simply had not looked for. "No rule matched" is ATR
+  having nothing to say, and the way to say nothing on that channel is to omit
+  the field. A decision is therefore emitted only for the two verdicts that
+  **restrain** — `deny` and `ask` — and only when blocking is on. Everything else
+  travels in `atr_decision` / `atr_reason` / `matched_rules`.
+  Consequence for the payload shape: with blocking ON and a permissive verdict
+  the `hookSpecificOutput` envelope is dropped too, exactly as in advisory mode.
+  `atr_advisory: true` marks the *mode*, not the verdict, so it is the one key
+  that distinguishes the two:
+
+  ```console
+  $ printf '%s\n' '{"hook":"PreToolUse","tool_name":"Bash","tool_input":{"command":"ls -la"},"session_id":"s1"}' \
+      | npx tsx src/cli.ts guard --blocking 2>/dev/null
+  {"atr_hook_event":"PreToolUse","atr_decision":"allow","atr_reason":"ALLOW: High-Risk Tool Invocation Without Human Confirmation [low/71% confidence] (1 rule matched)","matched_rules":["ATR-2026-00099"]}
+  ```
+
+  The PostToolUse contract needed no equivalent change: it has exactly one
+  sentinel, `decision: 'block'`, and the absence of the key *is* the
+  pass-through. There is no value that function could set to suppress a host
+  behaviour.
+- **BREAKING for embedders: the library no longer reads the environment at all.**
+  `ATR_LANE` and `ATR_BLOCKING` are **CLI-only**. `ATREngine`, `ActionExecutor`
+  and `HookHandler` take their posture from explicit config or the built-in
+  default, and nothing else. If you embedded ATR and were relying on a variable
+  in the ambient environment to select a lane, **that no longer works** — pass
+  `new ATREngine({ lane })` instead.
+
+  ```ts
+  // With ATR_LANE=enforce ATR_BLOCKING=1 exported in the environment:
+  new ATREngine({ rulesDir }).getLane()          // 'hunt'  (was: 'enforce')
+  new ActionExecutor({ adapter }).isBlocking()   // false
+  new HookHandler({ engine, executor }).isBlocking() // false
+  ```
+
+  Ambient configuration crosses trust boundaries invisibly. A `new ATREngine()`
+  inside a VS Code extension, a Mastra pipeline, or the `/openshell-filter`,
+  `/nemoclaw-preflight` and `/mcp` entry points never asked to be reconfigured by
+  a shell profile — and because `enforce` is a *valid* value, the old behaviour
+  produced no warning at all while narrowing those callers to `maturity: stable`
+  rules only.
+  The guarantee is **structural, not a convention**: `resolveLane` and
+  `resolveBlocking` now require an `EnvSource` argument with no `process.env`
+  default, so there is no overload that can fall through to the environment. Two
+  new library-facing helpers, `laneFromConfig()` and `blockingFromConfig()`, pass
+  a frozen empty environment; the new `resolveEnforcementPolicy()` is the only
+  function that reads `process.env` **for these two switches**, and `src/cli.ts` is its
+  only caller. `resolveLaneOrWarn`, `resolveBlockingOrWarn` and
+  `resetEnforcementWarnings` are **removed**.
+  One deliberate exception: `src/mcp-server.ts` reads `ATR_LANE` when the file is
+  the process entry point, because that makes it a CLI rather than a library. An
+  importer of the `./mcp` subpath does not reach that branch and gets its lane
+  from the explicit option.
+  Not the only function in the package that reads the environment: ten files
+  under `src/` read it in code, and two of them — `adapters/openshell-filter.ts`
+  and `adapters/nemoclaw-preflight.ts` — read `ATR_MIN_SEVERITY` and still block
+  by default, as the scope limit below records. `grep -rl "process\.env" src/`
+  returns eleven rather than ten: `src/index.ts` only names the variable in a
+  comment. An earlier revision of this paragraph published that grep count.
+
+- **Scope limit, stated so the headline is not read wider than it is.** This
+  covers the two channels the engine itself drives: the Claude Code hook
+  contract and `ActionExecutor`. It does NOT cover the framework adapters, which
+  keep their own severity floor: `src/adapters/mastra.ts` defaults
+  `blockSeverities` to `["critical", "high"]`, and the `openshell-filter` and
+  `nemoclaw-preflight` CLI entry points default `ATR_MIN_SEVERITY` to `high`.
+  (The `NemoClawPreflight` and `OpenShellFilter` classes take no default at all —
+  an embedder must pass `minSeverity`. Only the CLI wrappers supply one.)
+
+  They stay as they are, and the reason is measured rather than assumed. Driving
+  each adapter through its own API, with the event shape it really constructs:
+
+  | adapter | corpus | blocks |
+  |---|---|---:|
+  | `ATRProcessor` (mastra) | 432 benign skills, fed as user messages | 6 (1.4%) |
+  | `NemoClawPreflight` | the same 432 as skill bundles — its actual domain | 2 (0.5%) |
+  | `OpenShellFilter` | 24 everyday developer commands | 1 (4.2%) |
+
+  Three caveats on those figures, because they are small enough to be quoted
+  carelessly. Feeding skill files to a Mastra processor is out of domain — it
+  sees chat messages, so 1.4% says little about real traffic. Twenty-four
+  hand-written commands are not a corpus. And the benign skill set has the blind
+  spots `scripts/gate-corpus-visibility.ts` exists to surface.
+
+  The one real blemish is the command `OpenShellFilter` refused:
+  `scp -i ~/.ssh/deploy.pem dist.tgz ci@build.corp:/tmp/`, an ordinary
+  deployment. That is a rule being too wide, not an adapter default being wrong,
+  and it is the same shape review already recorded against the scp work.
+
+  Reproduce with `npx tsx scripts/measure/adapter-defaults-<adapter>.mts`. Each
+  script aborts before printing if its control fails, so a zero there means the
+  measurement did not run rather than that nothing blocked.
+
+  Unlike the hook, these adapters are not installed by a script into a global
+  config. An integrator imports one and wires it into a pipeline on purpose,
+  which is what an explicit operator directive looks like. An earlier draft of
+  this entry was going to bring them under the same switch on the strength of a
+  19.9% figure; that number came from feeding raw content straight to
+  `engine.evaluate` without the `type` each adapter sets, which bypasses the
+  `agent_source` filtering and fires rules the adapters never see.
+
+- **An unrecognised `ATR_LANE` or `ATR_BLOCKING` warns on stderr, falls back to
+  the safe default, and the guard keeps running (exit 0).** `main` did not read
+  either variable, so a typo was previously inert. An earlier revision of this
+  branch threw from the constructor instead, which measured badly:
+  `ATR_BLOCKING=enabled npx atr guard` exited 1 with an empty stdout and no guard
+  running — landing hardest on the operator trying to turn enforcement ON.
+  `atr init` installs `atr guard` as a PreToolUse **command hook**, and Claude
+  Code 2.1.76 maps any exit status other than 0 or 2 to a non-blocking error: it
+  runs the tool anyway, hands the model nothing, and renders only
+  `<hookName> hook error` **without** the captured stderr. Exiting would have
+  discarded every detection and still not told the operator why; status 2, the
+  only loud one, blocks the tool outright, which a stray shell variable must
+  never do. The warnings are printed once, at startup, by the CLI — they are not
+  deduplicated per value, and the `resolveLaneOrWarn` / `resolveBlockingOrWarn` /
+  `resetEnforcementWarnings` helpers that did that are gone. Verbatim, prefixed
+  `[atr]` (red on a TTY):
+
+  ```text
+  [atr] Invalid ATR_LANE="enfroce". Expected one of: enforce, alert, hunt. Falling back to lane "hunt". Detection still runs; this only changes which maturities may fire.
+  [atr] Invalid ATR_BLOCKING="enabled". Expected one of: 1/true/yes/on or 0/false/no/off. Falling back to blocking=false. If you meant to enable enforcement, it is NOT enabled.
+  ```
+
+  A bad **flag** still exits 1 — `atr guard --lane enfroce` and
+  `atr scan --lane enfroce <target>` both print
+  `Error: Invalid --lane "enfroce". Expected one of: enforce, alert, hunt.` and
+  stop. A flag is typed at a prompt by someone who will see the exit code; an
+  inherited variable is not. An explicit bad argument
+  (`new ATREngine({ lane: 'enfroce' })`) still throws for the same reason.
+
+- **An unreadable `ATR_LANE` forces blocking off, even against an explicit
+  `--blocking`.** Falling back to `hunt` while blocking stays on is the one
+  degraded posture that is *more* dangerous than the one requested: the operator
+  asked to enforce on `maturity: stable` rules only and would instead enforce on
+  every maturity. `--blocking` says "you may block", not "block on a lane I never
+  chose". `ATR_LANE=enfroce atr guard --blocking` therefore exits 0 in advisory
+  mode, having printed the lane warning above plus:
+
+  ```text
+  [atr] Blocking disabled: ATR_LANE could not be read, and blocking on the fallback lane "hunt" would enforce on more rule maturities than you asked for. Fix ATR_LANE to re-enable enforcement.
+  ```
+
+- **Both switches now trim whitespace and ignore case, identically.** They were
+  asymmetric: `ATR_BLOCKING=ON` worked while `ATR_LANE=ENFORCE` did not, so the
+  pair `ATR_LANE=ENFORCE ATR_BLOCKING=ON` turned blocking on **and** silently
+  widened the lane to `hunt` — the operator asked for the narrowest enforcement
+  posture and got the broadest one. `ATR_LANE=ENFORCE`, `ATR_LANE=" alert "` and
+  `--lane Alert` are all honoured now.
+
+- **A non-boolean explicit `blocking` throws instead of enabling blocking.**
+  `new ActionExecutor({ adapter, blocking: "false" })` and
+  `new HookHandler({ engine, executor, blocking: "false" })` previously turned
+  blocking **on**, because every non-empty string is truthy — reading, to their
+  author, as an explicit "off". Both now raise a `TypeError`, whose message in
+  full is:
+
+  ```text
+  Invalid blocking value "false" (string). Expected a boolean. Note that any non-empty string, including "false", would otherwise enable blocking.
+  ```
+
+  The lane path validated its explicit value from the start; a switch that fails
+  toward *more* enforcement was the wrong asymmetry to leave in place. This is
+  BREAKING for any JavaScript or JSON-config caller that was passing a string.
+
+- **`ActionExecutor` no longer dispatches response actions above the `observe`
+  blast-radius tier unless blocking is enabled.** `alert` / `snapshot` /
+  `shadow` / `escalate` run exactly as before; `block_input` / `block_output` /
+  `block_tool` / `reduce_permissions` / `reset_context` / `quarantine_session` /
+  `kill_agent` are recorded as suppressed and the adapter is never called. The
+  tier ladder is read from `src/quality/action-eligibility.ts` — this change does
+  not introduce a second classification of what is destructive.
+  This closes the dual-channel contradiction where a benign
+  `Bash{command:"ls -la"}` produced `permissionDecision: "allow"` while the
+  executor really invoked `blockTool` on the adapter.
+- **Both channels are governed by one switch**: the `blocking` config field on
+  `ActionExecutor` and `HookHandler` for embedders, and `--blocking` /
+  `--no-blocking` or `ATR_BLOCKING` on `atr guard` for the CLI. Default off. The
+  environment variable reaches the CLI only — see the embedder entry above.
+- **Why**: `SPEC.md` §5.5 (Response) is the engine-wide requirement, quoted
+  whole because it is short enough to be: "Engines MUST NOT execute response
+  actions automatically without an explicit configuration directive from the
+  operator. The `response` field is a recommendation expressed by the Rule
+  author, not a directive to the Engine." That directive had no implementation —
+  no CLI flag, no environment variable, no documented config key by which an
+  operator could express it. This change is that implementation.
+  Two narrower statements point the same way. Neither is the requirement, and
+  neither may be quoted as a general rule:
+  - `spec/atr-method-v1.1.md` §5.6 (Provenance and Trust) sits under §5
+    Signature Method and is scoped to hash matches: "Engines SHOULD NOT
+    auto-block on a hash match without operator policy explicitly enabling it;
+    the default response action SHOULD be `log_alert` until provenance is
+    operator-trusted." An earlier revision of this entry quoted that sentence
+    with "on a hash match" elided, which turned a Signature-Rule SHOULD NOT into
+    an engine-wide one. It is not one. Quote it whole or cite §5.5 instead.
+  - `docs/QUALITY-STANDARD.md` ("For Consumers") restricts blocking to
+    `maturity: stable` with confidence ≥ 80. That is deployment guidance
+    addressed to consumers, not a normative requirement on engines.
+- **Turning blocking on reproduces the previous behaviour on every verdict that
+  restrains — and only those.** An earlier revision of this entry claimed the
+  two transcripts were "byte-identical". They are not, and the difference is the
+  point of the change. Measured by replaying the 850 samples of
+  `data/pint-benchmark/pint-corpus.json` as **850 hook events per hook type**
+  (one JSON line in, one JSON line out) through `atr guard`'s stdio loop —
+  `HookHandler` → `evaluateWithVerdict` → `ActionExecutor` — on the pre-change
+  merge-base `994b01b2b` with no flags, and on `b9da8d710` with `--blocking`.
+  The rule corpus is byte-for-byte identical at those two commits
+  (`git diff --name-only 994b01b2b..b9da8d710 -- rules` is empty), so every
+  difference below is the contract change and nothing else.
+
+  | Hook | Events | Byte-identical output lines | Differing |
+  |---|---:|---:|---:|
+  | `PostToolUse` | 850 | **850** | 0 |
+  | `PreToolUse` | 850 | 85 | **765** |
+
+  `PostToolUse` is unchanged outright. On `PreToolUse` the 85 identical lines are
+  exactly the events where the baseline emitted a decision that **restrains** —
+  81 `deny` + 4 `ask` — and all 85 of those match byte for byte. The 765
+  differing lines are every event where the baseline emitted
+  `permissionDecision: "allow"`; on this branch all 765 carry no
+  `hookSpecificOutput` key at all.
+  Restricted to the 451 samples labelled `label: true` (the attacks), the same
+  replay gives 85 identical / 366 differing — i.e. **ATR was affirmatively
+  pre-approving 366 of 451 known attacks**, including under
+  the `enforce` lane, where no `stable` rule matched and the whole payload was
+
+  ```json
+  {"hookSpecificOutput":{"hookEventName":"PreToolUse","permissionDecision":"allow","permissionDecisionReason":"No rules matched."},"atr_decision":"allow"}
+  ```
+
+  captured on 994b01b2b through the TypeScript API rather than the CLI, because
+  the predecessor had no `--lane` flag to set the lane with. The excerpt an
+  earlier revision quoted here was the inner `hookSpecificOutput` object, not
+  the payload.
+
+- **Detection is unchanged in both modes.** Over the same 850 × 2 events,
+  `matched_rules` is identical to the baseline on 850/850 for both hooks in both
+  modes, and `atr_decision` equals the baseline's internal decision on 850/850.
+  Blocking changes what the engine *does*, never what it *sees*.
+
+### Added — the detection lane finally has an entrance
+
+- `ATREngineConfig.lane` existed and worked but no shipped code path ever set it
+  and no user-facing entry point could, so `hunt` was the only reachable setting.
+  Added `--lane <enforce|alert|hunt>` to `atr guard` and `atr scan`, the
+  `ATR_LANE` environment variable, and a `lane` input on the GitHub Action.
+  `ATR_LANE` is read by the **CLI surfaces only** — `atr guard`, `atr scan`, and
+  `src/mcp-server.ts` when it is the process entry point. It is *not* honoured by
+  every `ATREngine`: an engine constructed by an embedder ignores it entirely.
+  See the library/environment entry under "Changed" above.
+- **There is no single resolution order any more, and conflating the two was the
+  bug.** They are different chains on different surfaces:
+
+  | Surface | Chain |
+  |---|---|
+  | Library (`ATREngine` / `ActionExecutor` / `HookHandler`) | explicit config **>** built-in default. The environment is not consulted. |
+  | CLI (`atr guard`, `atr scan`) | flag **>** environment variable **>** built-in default. There is no programmatic config on this surface. |
+
+  The old "explicit programmatic config > environment > default" described a
+  chain that exists on neither surface.
+  On the command line an unrecognised `--lane` value is a usage error, never a
+  silent fallback: `atr guard --lane enfroce` prints
+  `Error: Invalid --lane "enfroce". Expected one of: enforce, alert, hunt.` and
+  exits 1, so an operator who typed it is not left believing they are enforcing.
+  (`--blocking` / `--no-blocking` take no value; supplying one, as in
+  `--blocking=maybe`, is not recognised as the flag and leaves the switch to the
+  environment and then the default — it does not error.)
+  An unrecognised value arriving from the *environment* is handled differently —
+  see the `ATR_LANE` / `ATR_BLOCKING` entry under "Changed" above, which is the
+  only place this file describes it.
+- `atr guard` now prints its posture on stderr, preceded by
+  `[atr-guard] Loaded <n> rules from <dir>`. Both modes carry a parenthetical,
+  and the blocking one names the limit rather than claiming enforcement outright:
+
+  ```text
+  [atr-guard] lane=hunt blocking=off (advisory: detections are reported, nothing is blocked)
+  [atr-guard] lane=hunt blocking=on (deny/ask only; never approves a tool call)
+  ```
+
+  `atr init` says in its success message that the installed hook is advisory.
+  "Installed" must never read as "enforcing".
+
+- **Provenance of the console output quoted in this entry.** Every payload,
+  warning and posture line above is captured stdout/stderr from
+  `fix/review-never-affirmative-allow` at `b9da8d710`, pasted unedited apart from
+  stripping the ANSI colour codes on the `[atr]` warnings and rewriting the
+  absolute rules path. This branch carries the documentation; `b9da8d710` carries
+  the implementation. The commands reproduce these outputs once both have landed
+  — not before.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- `src/hook-handler.ts` carried two contradictory comments about failure
+  behaviour: the module header said fail-open, an inline comment in
+  `startStdioLoop` said the error path "fail-closes to a deny". The header was
+  right — `failOpen` defaults to `true` in both the constructor and the CLI. The
+  inline comment is corrected; the behaviour is unchanged.
+
+### Fixed — published benchmark numbers
+
+- **Withdrew two garak figures that no measurement file backed.** From 2026-08-04
+  to 2026-08-05, `README.md` and `stats.json` cited 91.5% (`garak` in-the-wild)
+  and 56.9% (`garak-full`) at ATR 3.5.11. Neither run produced a file under
+  `data/measurements/`; the newest files there were 95.7% at 3.5.8 and 38.3% at
+  3.5.0 respectively. Re-measured on 2026-08-05 at 780 rules: **92.5%**
+  (`garak`, 601/650) and **57.2%** (`garak-full`, 1989/3475), both written to
+  `data/measurements/` with the commit that produced them.
+- **Four eval harnesses built `type: 'llm_io'`**, which is a rule *source* and
+  not an `AgentEventType`. `src/engine.ts` could not map it to a source, and its
+  source-type filter is skipped when the mapping is absent — so instead of the
+  narrow llm_io channel those harnesses documented, every rule of every source
+  ran against the event. Affected: `eval-garak-inthewild.ts`,
+  `eval-academic-raw.ts`, `eval-small-corpora.ts`, `atr_recall_analysis.ts`.
+  `check-new-rules-on-benign.ts` had the same class of bug with
+  `type: 'user_input'` behind an `as AgentEvent` cast. Event shapes now come
+  from `scripts/lib/corpus-event.ts`.
+- **`scripts/` is now typechecked** (`tsconfig.scripts.json`,
+  `npm run typecheck:scripts`, wired into CI). `tsconfig.json` covered only
+  `src/**`, which is why every one of the above was an unreported TS2322/TS2345.
+- **`.github/workflows/rule-quality.yml`'s "Run PINT eval regression check"**
+  ran `npm run eval` (the internal self-test harness, not PINT), read a
+  git-committed report that step does not write, and looked up a key that does
+  not exist on it — printing `PINT recall: undefined` while no downstream step
+  read the result. It now runs `npm run eval:pint` and gates on recall/FP
+  against the committed baseline.
+- **`scripts/check-benchmark-citations.ts`** (new, runs in CI) fails the build
+  when `README.md`'s benchmark table or root `stats.json` cites a number,
+  ATR version, or date that `data/measurements/` does not back.
+
+No rule content changed and no threshold was loosened in any of the above.
+
+### Added — beyond the hook and lane work above
+
+- **The Cisco Skill Scanner pack is now a build artifact** rather than a
+  hand-assembled export (#495).
+- **A rule the benign corpus cannot see has not been measured** — CI now says
+  so instead of counting it clean (#460). The benign gate was also given the
+  two corpora it had been missing (#468).
+- `DETECTION-BOUNDARY.md` — what this layer detects and what it cannot (#461) —
+  and `ENFORCEMENT-MODEL.md`, which also made three contradicted statements
+  elsewhere in the docs true (#470).
+- `ATR-2026-02502`: covert remote-script injection into generated artifacts
+  (#462). The four tool-poisoning rules are mapped to MITRE ATLAS
+  `AML.T0110.000` (#465), and the CSA MAESTRO mapping is refreshed against the
+  current corpus (#464).
+
+### Fixed — the guard was not reading real events
+
+- **`atr guard` never read a real Claude Code event.** The shape it parsed was
+  not the shape the host sends (#483). The event shape now follows
+  `hook_event_name` as well as the dispatch, rather than the dispatch alone
+  (#487).
+
+### Fixed — rules that matched the wrong thing
+
+- `ATR-2026-00086` was detecting Russian, not spoofing (#489).
+- `ATR-2026-01904` read method calls as domains (#474).
+- `ATR-2026-00443` read an ordinary sentence as fragment assembly (#473).
+- `ATR-2026-01750` fired on descriptions of loops rather than demands for
+  output (#472).
+- An unquoted ATLAS `T0110.000` title broke the site build (#477).
+
+### Measurement
+
+- The benign false-positive evidence was re-derived at 785 rules (#497).
+- ATR was measured against 36,394 published ClawHub skills across three event
+  shapes (#490), and rule drift was measured against the 2026-04 wild scan
+  (#491).
+- The rule count in the standardization document was 357 rules out of date
+  (#479), and five benchmark corpora were refreshed (#478).
+
+## [3.5.0] - 2026-06-16
+
+> **The two lane false-positive rates quoted in this 3.5.0 entry were withdrawn on 2026-09-19 and must not be cited.** The entry is left as published, because a changelog is a record of what was said at the time. See the withdrawal under [Unreleased] for the three defects that disqualified them; re-measurement is pending.
+
+### Added
+
+- **Detection lanes (`enforce` / `alert` / `hunt`).** Rules now carry a maturity-driven
+  lane so consumers can trade recall for precision. On a 65K-sample benign gate: `enforce`
+  (stable + confirm rules only) ~0.24% FP; `hunt` (all rules) ~9% FP. Default is `hunt`,
+  opt-in and fully backward-compatible.
+- **`confirm` field** — an embedding/secondary check that must pass before a match fires in
+  the enforce lane. Four rules ship a `confirm: embedding` guard (ATR-2026-00001 / 00002 /
+  00030 / 00442).
+- **`src/quality/rule-contract.ts`** — a single shared contract (`MATURITIES`, `laneAllows`,
+  `validateContract`) the engine and loader consume.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **652 detection rules across 10 categories.** Specification line `3.0.0-alpha.1`
+  (Working Draft); this is the npm release line, tracked separately from the spec version.
+- **23 rules reclassified** (maturity) to reflect measured precision and generalization.
+- **ATR-2026-00495 deprecated** (garak DAN "insert prompt here" variant) — it now never fires.
+  Spec-conformant; the only behavior change in this release.
+- Python `pyatr` engine skips `deprecated` / `draft` rules, matching the TypeScript engine.
+
+### Note
+
+- Report false-positive rates lane-keyed (enforce ~0.24% / hunt ~9% on a 65K-sample benign
+  gate), not as a single overall figure.
+
+## [3.1.1] - 2026-06-05
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **ATR-2026-00001** (prompt-injection) false positive: the `start over/fresh/anew with a new …` task-switch branch matched benign phrasing such as "start fresh with a new outline" / "a new draft" because it lacked the task-noun constraint its sibling branches carry. Tightened to require a task-like noun (task / instruction / assignment / objective / goal / mission / prompt / persona / role / directive / job) after "new". The rule's documented true-positives are unaffected; full suite green (535 tests). Surfaced by the new semantic-validation corpus.
+
+### Added
+
+- **Semantic-validation harness** (`data/semantic-validation/` + `scripts/semantic-validation-score.mts`): a focused, reproducible corpus — 20 held-out paraphrased attacks targeting the two v3.1.0 semantic rules (00573 instruction-override, 00574 system-prompt extraction) plus 15 adversarial benign near-misses — and a scorer. Documents what the optional semantic stage actually adds on its two target threats, and ships the corpus so anyone can re-run it with their own judge.
+
+### Measured
+
+- Focused semantic validation (n=35, Claude-as-judge via worklist mode, threshold 0.7): the deterministic regex layer caught 10% of the paraphrased attacks; the optional semantic judge stage raised combined recall to 95% (19/20), with 0 judge false positives on the 15 adversarial benign near-misses (0 regex FP after the 00001 fix above). This is a small-n, authored, self-judged validation of the pipeline — NOT an independent benchmark. See `data/semantic-validation/README.md` for method and caveats.
+
+## [3.1.0] - 2026-06-05
+
+### Added
+
+- **Tier-2 semantic detection (T2) — optional second-stage judge.** New two-stage scan pipeline (`scripts/scan-with-judge.mts`). Stage 1 is the existing deterministic regex engine run across the whole corpus; Stage 2 spends an LLM-as-judge only on the subset Stage 1 flags or misses (~2%), so judge cost scales with the flagged/missed set rather than the corpus. Opt-in by design: it runs only with an OpenAI-compatible backend (`ATR_SEMANTIC_API_KEY` [+ `ATR_SEMANTIC_BASE_URL` / `ATR_SEMANTIC_MODEL`]) or a no-key worklist mode (`WORKLIST_OUT`) that a separate session adjudicates and feeds back via `--verdicts`. Tunable `JUDGE_SUBSET` (missed | flagged | all) and `JUDGE_THRESHOLD`. The default `ATREngine.evaluate()` path stays 100% deterministic and the LLM judge is off by default — the two semantic rules contribute only narrow regex fallback patterns to the default path (FP-gated, with documented true-negatives); the judge stage is additive and opt-in.
+- **ATR-2026-00573** (prompt-injection): semantic paraphrased instruction-override. Flags reworded injection that drops the literal trigger vocabulary (ignore / disregard / forget) that pattern rule ATR-2026-00001 keys on — the precise misses recorded in 00001's `evasion_tests`. Severity high, status experimental.
+- **ATR-2026-00574** (context-exfiltration): semantic paraphrased system-prompt extraction. Flags indirect elicitation of the agent's system prompt or hidden configuration without the literal verb-first phrasing (reveal / show / print your instructions). Severity high, status experimental.
+- Cisco-grade, human-reviewed exploitation rules for agent runtimes: path traversal, SQL injection, and reflected XSS (ATR-2026-00569 / 00570 / 00571), MCP command injection, and SSRF-to-cloud-metadata, plus CVE-anchored detections surfaced by the daily NVD collector.
+- Daily CVE collector and ecosystem-scan automation now feed agent-package vulnerability proposals into the review queue (collection only; promotion stays behind the human safety gate).
+
+### Changed
+
+- Total rule count: 450 → 462.
+- Two rounds of false-positive hardening on existing rules, gated by a wild-confirmed benign corpus and a dual-use security-skill bucket, so security tooling that legitimately ships attack strings no longer trips detection.
+- Engine and rule format unchanged; existing ecosystem integrations (Microsoft AGT, Cisco AI Defense, MISP CIRCL, OWASP A-S-R-H, precize, Sage) work without modification.
+
+### Deprecated
+
+- **ATR-2026-00235** — exact duplicate of ATR-2026-00230; marked deprecated, retained for ID stability.
+
+### Notes
+
+- First npm release to carry the post-3.0.5 work. The Cisco-grade rules and hardening landed on `main` between 2026-05-29 and 2026-06-04 but stayed unpublished until now: the auto-publish flywheel fires only for Threat-Cloud-crystallized commits, so human-authored rule work ships on an explicit minor release like this one.
+- Semantic rules are experimental and the T2 judge is opt-in; production blocking should continue to rely on the pattern rules. Benchmarks remain measured on the 3.0.0 baseline (see `stats.json`) and have not been re-run against the semantic stage.
+
+## [2.2.2] - 2026-05-13
+
+### Added
+
+- **ATR-2026-00523** (skill-compromise): Claude Code Hooks SessionStart pre-trust RCE (CVE-2025-59536). Detects repo-shipped `.claude/settings.json` registering a `SessionStart` hook with the `startup` matcher; the hook command fires before the trust dialog renders. Six layered conditions: literal Hooks-schema shape anchor, shell-interpreter command resolution, pipe-to-shell / inline-exec payload shape, package-manager + credential-tool invocation, repo-path + payload co-occurrence, and pre-trust prose anchor. 7 TP / 6 TN / 3 evasion tests documented. Reported by Aviv Donenfeld and Oded Vanunu (Check Point Research); patched via GHSA-ph6w-f82w-28w6 enhanced trust-dialog warning.
+- **ATR-2026-00524** (context-exfiltration): Claude Code ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL credential exfiltration (CVE-2026-21852, CVSS 5.3 Moderate). Detects repo-shipped `.claude/settings.json` or env-var configuration rebinding `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` to an endpoint outside the Anthropic-controlled allowlist (`api.anthropic.com`, Vertex `*.googleapis.com`, Bedrock `bedrock*.<region>.amazonaws.com`); pre-trust API request leaks the live `Authorization: Bearer` header. Seven layered conditions: JSON-form allowlist negative-lookahead, shell / dotenv / Dockerfile env-var form, bare public-IPv4 detector (excludes loopback + RFC1918), cleartext-HTTP detector against non-loopback hosts, repo-path + payload co-occurrence, pre-trust prose anchor, and CVE-identifier co-occurrence. 7 TP / 8 TN / 3 evasion tests documented. Patched in Claude Code >= 2.0.65 (GHSA-jh7p-qr78-84p7); PoC at github.com/atiilla/CVE-2026-21852-PoC.
+
+### Changed
+
+- Total rule count: 419 → 421.
+
+### Anchors
+
+- 2 Check Point Research disclosures against Claude Code: CVE-2025-59536 (Hooks SessionStart pre-trust RCE) + CVE-2026-21852 (ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL pre-trust credential exfil). Both share the same root cause class — repo-scoped `.claude/settings.json` parsed and acted on before the trust dialog gates the action — and both upstream patches narrow the trust-gate ordering. ATR rules anchor on the dangerous config shape so detection survives both pre- and post-patch deployments.
+
+## [2.2.0] - 2026-05-12
+
+### Added
+
+- **75 new rules** across 5 categories (prompt-injection 57 + context-exfiltration 6 + tool-poisoning 4 + excessive-autonomy 2 + model-abuse 2). Total rule count: 344 → 419.
+- 5 new rule source integrations: HackAPrompt (EMNLP 2023, 4,780 samples, ATR-2026-00452..00456), NeMo-Guardrails + llm-guard + Promptfoo vendor test suites (94 samples combined, ATR-2026-00500..00505), PromptInject (NeurIPS 2022, ATR-2026-00506..00509), OWASP LLM Top 10 + MITRE ATLAS PoCs (8 standards-aligned rules ATR-2026-00510..00517).
+- 6-framework compliance metadata on all 75 new rules (OWASP / MITRE ATLAS / NIST AI RMF / EU AI Act / ISO 42001 / SAFE-MCP).
+- 53 rules with regex generalized from literal corpus fingerprints to multi-layer structural patterns.
+- 4 rules kept as KEPT-AS-IS corpus fingerprints (ATR-GARAK-a7fcb4e5 + 3 others): cannot generalize without unacceptable FP rate; marked experimental, not for production blocking.
+
+### Changed
+
+- Total rule count: 344 → 419 (357 stable + 62 experimental).
+- NVIDIA garak wrapped rule count: 293 → 419.
+
+### Metrics
+
+- HackAPrompt (4,780 samples): recall 28.6% → 66.2% (+37.6pp), 100% precision maintained.
+- garak (3,475 prompts): ATR-core families ~80%+; per-family breakdown: latentinjection 34.4%, sysprompt_extraction 67.9%, dan 90.2%.
+- PINT (850 samples): 0.25% FP maintained, 0 FP regression.
+- SKILL.md (341 samples): 100% precision, 0% FP, 0 FP regression.
+- 0 FP regression on benign corpus (432 real-world benign skills).
+
+### Scope
+
+- PyRIT Pliny L1B3RT4S: refused — Anthropic usage policy prevented subagent import.
+- AdvBench, HarmBench, JailbreakBench: reclassified to data/test-corpora/; describe target behaviors, not attack payloads.
+
+## [2.1.4] - 2026-05-12
+
+### Added
+
+- **ATR-2026-00448** (tool-poisoning): Spring AI MilvusVectorStore filter-expression injection (CVE-2026-41705). Tautology-based deletion-broadening, paren-breakout, in-clause chaining, terminator-DROP, like-ESCAPE bypass primitive. 8 TP / 6 TN / 0 FP on 431-sample benign corpus.
+- **ATR-2026-00449** (context-exfiltration): Spring AI PromptChatMemoryAdvisor cross-user memory leakage (CVE-2026-41712). Shared / singleton ChatMemory wiring, placeholder conversation_id, mismatched user-tag windows, wildcard-tenant scope. 8 TP / 6 TN / 0 FP.
+- **ATR-2026-00450** (data-poisoning): Spring AI PromptChatMemoryAdvisor memory poisoning (CVE-2026-41713). Persistence-aware ignore-previous, bracketed `[SYSTEM-MEMORY-PERSIST]` canaries, smuggled role-tag prefixes, REMEMBER:-shaped persona override, ChatMemory.add(SystemMessage) sink-level concat. 8 TP / 6 TN / 0 FP.
+- **ATR-2026-00451** (privilege-escalation): LiteLLM proxy admin endpoint SQL injection (CVE-2026-42208, CISA KEV 2026-05-08, CVSS 9.3, federal remediation due 2026-05-11). Tautology + comment-out, stacked DROP / TRUNCATE, UNION SELECT exfil, pg_sleep blind, Postgres metadata recon, error-based extractvalue / updatexml / load_extension. 8 TP / 6 TN / 0 FP.
+
+### Changed
+
+- Total rule count: 344 → 348.
+
+### Anchors
+
+- 3 Spring AI CVEs (CVE-2026-41705 / -41712 / -41713) disclosed 2026-05-08 in Spring Security Advisory; patches in Spring AI >= 1.0.0.
+- 1 CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog entry: CVE-2026-42208 added 2026-05-08, federal remediation due 2026-05-11, active exploitation observed against financial services and healthcare deployments; patch in LiteLLM >= 1.48.3.
+
+## [2.1.3] - 2026-05-11
+
+### Added
+
+- 6 HackAPrompt-cluster rules (ATR-2026-00442..00447) + benchmark harness (PR #51). Auto-published via tc-pr-back release workflow after PR #51 merge.
+
+### Changed
+
+- Total rule count: 338 → 344.
+
+## [2.1.2] - 2026-05-11
+
+### Added
+
+- **ATR-2026-00440** (agent-manipulation): Microsoft Semantic Kernel CVE-2026-26030 — In-Memory Vector Store lambda+eval RCE. AST-traversal-via-mro primitives, BuiltinImporter reflective access, Function-constructor variants. 8 TP / 5 TN / 0 FP on 466-sample benign corpus.
+- **ATR-2026-00441** (privilege-escalation): Microsoft Semantic Kernel CVE-2026-25592 — SessionsPythonPlugin arbitrary file write to autostart paths. Windows Start Menu Startup, XDG autostart, systemd-user, cron, macOS LaunchAgents/Daemons, Windows Registry Run-key persistence. 7 TP / 5 TN / 0 FP.
+- **`src/redact.ts`** new module: `redactMatchedValue()` + `redactMatchedValues()` helpers. ATR-consuming integrations can run `ATRMatch.matchedPatterns` entries through this before logging. Recognises AWS keys, GitHub tokens, Slack tokens, OpenAI/Anthropic keys, Bearer creds, JWTs, PEM keys. 13 unit tests. Additive opt-in API — no existing API changes.
+
+### Changed
+
+- Total rule count: 336 → 338.
+
+### Loop closure
+
+- Microsoft Copilot SWE Agent opened `microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit#1981` 2026-05-11 06:07 UTC with regression-test fixtures presuming ATR detection. PR #50 merged + v2.1.2 npm + GitHub release published within 2h 16m. Closing-the-loop comment mapped each fixture to ATR rule IDs.
+
+## [2.1.1] - 2026-05-10
+
+### Added
+
+- 6 ATR rules covering 7 gap CVEs identified by Phase 1 audit (CVSS 9.1–10.0). PR #46 + follow-up batches.
+- STIX 2.1 extension for `x-atr-rule` custom SDO (PR #49) — self-published extension definition; ATR rules can now be expressed as STIX SDOs for STIX-compliant consumers.
+
+### Adopted (external)
+
+- **MISP/misp-taxonomies#323** merged 2026-05-10 by adulau (MISP project lead). 10 ATR predicates + 330 rule IDs as MISP machine tags.
+- **MISP/misp-galaxy#1207** merged 2026-05-10 by adulau. 336 cluster values with kill-chain, severity, CVE / OWASP LLM / MITRE ATLAS cross-refs. 10,408 lines.
+
+## [2.1.0] - 2026-05-09
+
+### Added
+
+- **NIST AI RMF mapping v0.2** — 100% coverage of all 4 AI RMF functions (Govern / Map / Measure / Manage), 72 controls + 31 cross-reference links + worked example profile. Schema-valid OSCAL catalog published under `Agent-Threat-Rule/ai-rmf-oscal-catalog` (PR #46).
+- Dedicated `/compliance/nist-ai-rmf` page on website with 314 → 330 rule count refresh sitewide.
+
+### Adopted (external)
+
+- **OWASP/Agent-Security-Regression-Harness#74** merged 2026-05-11 by mertsatilmaz (OWASP Project Lead): "Welcome to the team."
+
+## [2.0.11] - 2026-04-21
+
+### Added
+
+- **193 new rules** covering the full NVIDIA garak probe corpus (ATR-00300 ~ ATR-00414), bringing total to **311 rules**
+  - **agent-manipulation**: DanInTheWild community jailbreak library batch 7-9, AntiDAN inverted persona, ChatGPT DevMode RANTI, Image-Markdown unlock, Ablation_Dan_11_0 generator-name binding, AutoDAN hierarchical suffix, Goodside ThreatJSON death coercion, Doctor XML policy puppetry
+  - **prompt-injection**: latentinjection separator/keyword, leakreplay cloze MASK, glitch token repeat-back (SolidGoldMagikarp et al.), echo SQL-jinja template injection, DRA parenthesis reconstruction, phrasing past/future tense, LMRC harm category, FigStep image-list multimodal, continuation ethnic slur, backspace deletion character, LLM special-token boundary, toxic continuation prefix, snowball impossible reasoning, ecoji/base2048/variant-selector/sneaky-bits encoding injection, zalgo/braille/sata encoded attacks
+  - **context-exfiltration**: markdown image URL exfil + XSS, API key generation and partial-key completion
+  - **model-abuse**: malwaregen code generation (TopLevel + SubFunctions), HuggingFace unsafe model artifact load
+  - **tool-poisoning**: ANSI escape elicitation request
+- Word-boundary (`\b`) anchoring on grandma-roleplay rule to prevent partial-word FP (late/gran/read)
+- `metadata_provenance.garak_probe` field for ATR-00267 (GCGCached), ATR-00301 (TAPCached), and all new rules
+- Missing `true_negatives` added to 10 existing DAN-family rules (ATR-00352–00376) to meet ≥5 TN safety gate requirement
+
+### Changed
+
+- **Total rule count**: 113 → 311
+- **garak in-the-wild benchmark recall**: 69.7% → **97.1%** (646/666 prompts detected against garak community jailbreak corpus)
+- **SKILL.md precision/FP**: maintained 100% precision, 0% FP on 498-sample benign corpus
+- FP mitigations applied to new rules (response action `[alert]` only for medium-FP-risk rules — phrasing, API key, malwaregen, SQL-jinja)
+
+### Fixed
+
+- ATR-00402 (grandma roleplay): added word boundaries to prevent `late`/`gran`/`read` substring FP in Firebase documentation
+- ATR-00401 ([MASK]): required elicitation context to prevent NLP-documentation FP
+- ATR-00403 (glitch tokens): required elicitation verb before token names (StreamerBot etc.) to prevent legitimate software reference FP
+- ATR-00411 (API key gen): negative lookahead on "from your dashboard/console" to exclude documentation requests
+
+## [2.0.10] - 2026-04-21
+
+### Added
+
+- garak coverage batch 10: ansiescape, badchars, realtoxicityprompts, topic, fileformats (ATR-00393~00398)
+
+## [2.0.9] - 2026-04-20
+
+### Added
+
+- garak DanInTheWild coverage batch 8-9: jailbreak templates, emoji-flag, prompt-browser (ATR-00377~00392)
+
+## [2.0.0] - 2026-04-15
+
+> **Historical entry — do not quote these figures as current.** The scan counts,
+> malware counts, benchmark rates and rule totals below are as published on
+> 2026-04-15 at 113 rules. The wild-scan figures in particular are under
+> reconciliation and are not a citable measurement; current corpus numbers live
+> in `data/stats.json` and in README §8 Evaluation. The "Cisco AI Defense" line
+> describes rules merged into the open-source `cisco-ai-defense/skill-scanner`
+> repository — it is not a statement about any vendor product.
+
+### BREAKING
+
+- **Compound detection gate**: MCP rules now require 30%+ conditions to match in skill context. This prevents over-triggering when MCP-specific patterns appear in legitimate SKILL.md documentation.
+- **Code block suppression**: Skill rules no longer suppress matches inside code blocks (they are instructions, not documentation examples).
+- **All fields resolve to content in skill context**: `tool_description`, `tool_args`, `user_input` all map to the full skill content for static analysis.
+
+### Added
+
+- **26 new rules** (87 to 113 total, 9 categories):
+  - ATR-2026-00149: Compound exfiltration (12 patterns: SSH archive, wallet, browser, DNS, IMDS)
+  - ATR-2026-00158/159/160: TC-crystallized rules (first rules generated end-to-end by Threat Cloud)
+  - ATR-2026-00161: Cross-tool shadowing via IMPORTANT tag (from Invariant Labs PoC)
+  - ATR-2026-00162: Credential exfil combo
+  - ATR-2026-00163: Hidden override instructions
+  - ATR-2026-00164: Scope hijack
+  - Plus 19 more across prompt-injection, tool-poisoning, and data-exfiltration categories
+- **RFC-001 v1.1** (ATR Quality Standard):
+  - Two-Dimensional Compliance Model (metadata presence + provenance)
+  - L0-L5 Review Tier Levels (first standard to include LLM-assisted review as formal tier)
+  - Community Signal Aggregation (confirmations, FP reports, evasion reports)
+  - Multi-Runtime Compatibility (14 runtimes: Claude Code, Cursor, Hermes, OpenAI Assistants, Google A2A, etc.)
+  - Relaxed experimental gate (3/3/0) for community velocity; stable tier retains full 5/5/3
+  - Future Work: RFC-002 (Detection Types), RFC-003 (Collective Defense), RFC-004 (Enterprise)
+- **GOVERNANCE.md v1.1**:
+  - Permanent MIT license commitment (never BSL/SSPL)
+  - MITRE ATLAS positioning: ATR = detection rules complement to ATLAS (like Sigma to ATT&CK)
+  - ATR Numbering Authority specification
+  - Technical Advisory Group roadmap
+- **96,096 real-world skills scanned** (OpenClaw 56K + Skills.sh 3K + Hermes 123 + ClawHub 36K + MCP Registry 5K)
+  - **751 malware skills discovered** (hightower6eu 354, sakaen736jih 212, 52yuanchangxing 137)
+  - Research report: `docs/research/openclaw-malware-campaign-2026-04.md`
+  - NousResearch notified (hermes-agent#9809)
+- **Threat Cloud blacklist**: 554 entries uploaded from wild scan
+- **4 export formats**: SARIF v2.1.0, Splunk SPL, Elasticsearch DSL, generic regex (714 portable patterns)
+- **Exponential backoff for npm registry crawl** (fixes Daily Ecosystem Scan rate limiting)
+
+### Changed
+
+- Engine: compound gate for context-aware matching
+- Confidence formula: cross-context penalty (0.7x) for rules firing outside their tested runtime
+- SKILL.md denylist reduced from 22 to 10 rules (re-enabled low-FP rules for better coverage)
+
+### Metrics
+
+- 113 rules (7 stable, 85 experimental, 21 draft)
+- 361 tests passing
+- SKILL.md benchmark (498 corpus): 100% recall, 97% precision, 0.20% FP rate
+- MCP benchmark (PINT 850): 62.7% recall, 99.6% precision
+- Wild scan (96K): 1.35% flag rate, 751 confirmed malware
+- OWASP Agentic Top 10: 10/10 coverage
+- MITRE ATLAS: 100/113 rules mapped
+- SAFE-MCP: 91.8% technique coverage
+- Avg scan latency: 14ms per file
+
+### Ecosystem
+
+- **Cisco AI Defense**: 34 ATR rules shipped in production (PR #79 merged)
+- **OWASP**: Attack examples contributed (PR #814 merged)
+- **NousResearch**: Malware campaign reported (hermes-agent#9809)
+
+## [1.0.0] - 2026-04-06
+
+### BREAKING
+
+- **Rule IDs**: 3-digit → 5-digit (`ATR-2026-001` → `ATR-2026-00001`). Zero-padded, detection logic unchanged.
+
+### Added
+
+- **ATR-SPEC-v1.md** — Formal rule format specification. Third parties can build conforming engines in any language.
+- **GOVERNANCE.md** — Contribution process, quality gates, severity rubric.
+- **`scan_target` metadata** — Every rule declares `mcp` or `skill`. Engines filter by scan context.
+- **`rule_version` field** — All rules carry version number. Bump on detection logic changes.
+- **Unified CLI** — `atr scan` auto-detects JSON (MCP) vs .md (SKILL.md).
+- **`ScanResult` type** — Unified output with `scan_type`, `content_hash` (SHA-256).
+- **MCP server `atr_scan_skill` tool** — 7 tools total.
+- 6 new skill rules: context poisoning (00125), rug pull setup (00126), subcommand overflow (00127), HTML comment hidden payload (00128), unicode smuggling (00129), exfil URL in instructions (00135).
+
+### Metrics
+
+- 87 rules (75 MCP + 12 skill)
+- 53,399 real-world skills scanned (skills.sh + OpenClaw)
+- 670 confirmed malicious skills detected
+- SKILL.md recall: 94.4%, FP rate: 0.096%
+- MCP recall: 62.7% (PINT 850, unchanged)
+
+## [0.3.0] - 2026-03-18
+
+### Added
+
+- Evaluation framework (`src/eval/`):
+  - `npm run eval`: 341-sample corpus (321 attacks + 20 benign), 9 attack categories
+  - `npm run eval:pint`: 850-sample external PINT benchmark
+  - Per-rule quality metrics (TP/FP/matchCount per rule)
+  - Confusion matrix, precision/recall/F1, latency percentiles
+  - Regression gate (auto-fail on metric degradation)
+  - JSON report output (`data/eval-report.json`)
+- CI gate (`.github/workflows/eval.yml`): typecheck + test + eval + validate on PR
+- 279 auto-extracted corpus samples from rule test_cases
+- 8 new detection layers in ATR-2026-001:
+  - forget-everything shorthand, task switching, system prompt extraction,
+  - praise-then-redirect, German formal/informal, French injection patterns
+- PINT benchmark integration (deepset/prompt-injections + Lakera gandalf datasets)
+
+### Changed
+
+- Embedding similarity threshold: 0.82 -> 0.65 (10 extra TP, 0 extra FP on PINT)
+- Test count: 225 -> 246 (+21 eval framework tests)
+
+### Fixed
+
+- shadow-evaluator.ts type error (TS2352)
+- Removed external product references from ATR-FRAMEWORK-SPEC.md
+- Added temp file patterns to .gitignore
+
+### Benchmark Results (honest numbers)
+
+- Self-corpus (341 samples): Precision 100%, Recall 99.4%, F1 99.5%
+- PINT external (850 samples): Precision 99.4%, Recall 39.9%, F1 57.0%
+- Only 6/61 rules fire on external attacks
+- See LIMITATIONS.md for full analysis
+
+## [0.2.3] - 2026-03-16
+
+### Added
+
+- 9 new rules from Threat Cloud community promotion (ATR-2026-100~108):
+  consent bypass, trust escalation, disguised analytics exfiltration,
+  hidden safety bypass, persona hijacking, silent action concealment,
+  schema-description contradiction, delayed execution bypass, Sybil attack
+- Python engine (pyATR) v0.2.0: validate, test, stats CLI commands, 48 tests
+- Splunk SPL converter (`atr convert splunk`)
+- Elastic Query DSL converter (`atr convert elastic`)
+- Layer 3 LLM-as-judge prompt templates (docs/layer3-prompt-templates.md)
+- Automated scan pipeline (scripts/auto-scan-pipeline.sh)
+- Deployment guide for external teams (docs/deployment-guide.md)
+- MCP ecosystem security audit report: 1,295 packages, 14,299 tools
+- npm crawler with pagination (795 → 2,769 discoverable packages)
+
+### Fixed
+
+- CLI test runner: handle tool_description field, fix event type mapping
+- All 61 rules pass embedded test cases (556/556, 100%)
+- CJK test cases moved to evasion_tests (honest: regex can't match them)
+- Removed all external product references for ATR independence
+- Fixed pyATR URLs pointing to wrong GitHub org
+
+### Stats
+
+- 61 rules (44 experimental + 17 draft)
+- 556 test cases (100% pass rate)
+- 164 TypeScript tests + 48 Python tests = 212 engine tests
+- 12 SIEM converter tests
+
+## [0.2.2] - 2026-03-14
+
+### Fixed
+
+- ReDoS vulnerability in SSRF rule (ATR-2026-013) — O(n^2) backtracking on long hostnames
+- SSRF rule false positive on filesystem paths like /home/user/
+- tool_args field extraction fallback for tool_call events
+
+### Added
+
+- True negatives for 21 rules with insufficient test coverage (7 had zero, 14 had only 1)
+- Vitest coverage reporting with v8 provider (60%+ threshold on core modules)
+
+## [0.2.1] - 2026-03-10
+
+### Changed
+
+- Standardized 17 predicted rule IDs (ATR-PRED → ATR-2026-080~096)
+- Fixed rule validator for skill-compromise category
+- Toned down coverage claims to reflect actual verification status
+
+## [0.1.0-rc2] - 2026-03-09
+
+### Added
+
+- 32 initial experimental detection rules across 9 attack categories
+- TypeScript reference engine with SessionTracker
+- OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (2026) mapping (6 covered, 2 partial, 2 gaps)
+- 13 CVE reference mappings across 16 rules (pattern-based, not empirically verified)
+- OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) mapping (7 covered, 3 gaps)
+- MITRE ATLAS technique references
+- JSON Schema specification (spec/atr-schema.yaml)
+- Built-in true positive and true negative test cases for every rule
+- Attack corpus validation tests
+- Coverage report (COVERAGE.md)
+
+### Attack Categories
+
+- Prompt Injection (5 rules)
+- Tool Poisoning (4 rules)
+- Context Exfiltration (3 rules)
+- Agent Manipulation (3 rules)
+- Privilege Escalation (2 rules)
+- Excessive Autonomy (2 rules)
+- Skill Compromise (7 rules)
+- Data Poisoning (1 rule)
+- Model Security (2 rules)