agent-threat-rules 2.1.1 → 2.1.3

package/dist/eval/hackaprompt-corpus.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/**
+ * HackAPrompt Corpus Loader
+ *
+ * Reads the HackAPrompt-format sample JSON (text/category/label/source/language)
+ * produced by scripts/hackaprompt-to-corpus.py and converts each row into the
+ * CorpusSample shape used by the ATR eval harness.
+ *
+ * HackAPrompt is an all-adversarial corpus: every sample is an attempt to
+ * subvert the system prompt. We therefore only measure recall against this
+ * dataset; precision/FP rate is undefined here. For combined precision+recall
+ * use this corpus alongside a benign source (PINT, real-traffic).
+ *
+ * @module agent-threat-rules/eval/hackaprompt-corpus
+ */
+import type { CorpusSample } from './corpus.js';
+export declare function loadHackaPromptCorpus(dataPath: string): readonly CorpusSample[];
+export declare function getHackaPromptCorpusStats(corpus: readonly CorpusSample[]): {
+    total: number;
+    attacks: number;
+    benign: number;
+    byCategory: Record<string, number>;
+    byDifficulty: Record<string, number>;
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=hackaprompt-corpus.d.ts.map

package/dist/eval/hackaprompt-corpus.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"hackaprompt-corpus.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/eval/hackaprompt-corpus.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AAGH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAsBhD,wBAAgB,qBAAqB,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,YAAY,EAAE,CAsB/E;AAED,wBAAgB,yBAAyB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,YAAY,EAAE;;;;gBAKnD,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;kBACpB,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;EAS7C"}

package/dist/eval/hackaprompt-corpus.js

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/**
+ * HackAPrompt Corpus Loader
+ *
+ * Reads the HackAPrompt-format sample JSON (text/category/label/source/language)
+ * produced by scripts/hackaprompt-to-corpus.py and converts each row into the
+ * CorpusSample shape used by the ATR eval harness.
+ *
+ * HackAPrompt is an all-adversarial corpus: every sample is an attempt to
+ * subvert the system prompt. We therefore only measure recall against this
+ * dataset; precision/FP rate is undefined here. For combined precision+recall
+ * use this corpus alongside a benign source (PINT, real-traffic).
+ *
+ * @module agent-threat-rules/eval/hackaprompt-corpus
+ */
+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+function assignDifficulty(level) {
+    if (level <= 2)
+        return 'easy';
+    if (level <= 6)
+        return 'medium';
+    return 'hard';
+}
+export function loadHackaPromptCorpus(dataPath) {
+    const raw = JSON.parse(readFileSync(dataPath, 'utf-8'));
+    return raw.map((sample) => {
+        const level = sample.metadata?.level ?? 5;
+        return {
+            id: sample.id,
+            text: sample.text,
+            category: sample.category,
+            expectedDetection: sample.label,
+            eventType: 'llm_input',
+            tier: 'any',
+            difficulty: assignDifficulty(level),
+            fields: {
+                text: sample.text,
+                prompt: sample.text,
+                user_input: sample.text,
+            },
+        };
+    });
+}
+export function getHackaPromptCorpusStats(corpus) {
+    const stats = {
+        total: corpus.length,
+        attacks: 0,
+        benign: 0,
+        byCategory: {},
+        byDifficulty: {},
+    };
+    for (const s of corpus) {
+        if (s.expectedDetection)
+            stats.attacks++;
+        else
+            stats.benign++;
+        stats.byCategory[s.category] = (stats.byCategory[s.category] ?? 0) + 1;
+        stats.byDifficulty[s.difficulty] = (stats.byDifficulty[s.difficulty] ?? 0) + 1;
+    }
+    return stats;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=hackaprompt-corpus.js.map

package/dist/eval/hackaprompt-corpus.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"hackaprompt-corpus.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/eval/hackaprompt-corpus.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;AAiBvC,SAAS,gBAAgB,CAAC,KAAa;IACrC,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;QAAE,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC;IAC9B,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;QAAE,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC;IAChC,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC;AAChB,CAAC;AAED,MAAM,UAAU,qBAAqB,CAAC,QAAgB;IACpD,MAAM,GAAG,GAAoC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CACrD,YAAY,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAChC,CAAC;IAEF,OAAO,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAgB,EAAE;QACtC,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;QAC1C,OAAO;YACL,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE;YACb,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI;YACjB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ;YACzB,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK;YAC/B,SAAS,EAAE,WAAW;YACtB,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK;YACX,UAAU,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC;YACnC,MAAM,EAAE;gBACN,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI;gBACjB,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI;gBACnB,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI;aACxB;SACF,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACL,CAAC;AAED,MAAM,UAAU,yBAAyB,CAAC,MAA+B;IACvE,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG;QACZ,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM;QACpB,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;QACV,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QACT,UAAU,EAAE,EAA4B;QACxC,YAAY,EAAE,EAA4B;KAC3C,CAAC;IACF,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QACvB,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,iBAAiB;YAAE,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;;YACpC,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QACpB,KAAK,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;QACvE,KAAK,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;IACjF,CAAC;IACD,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AACf,CAAC"}

package/dist/eval/run-hackaprompt-benchmark.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env npx tsx
+/**
+ * HackAPrompt Benchmark Runner
+ *
+ * Loads a sample from the HackAPrompt 600K+ adversarial prompt dataset
+ * (produced by scripts/hackaprompt-to-corpus.py) and runs it through the
+ * ATR evaluation harness to measure recall against real prompt-hacking
+ * attempts collected at competition scale.
+ *
+ * Usage:
+ *   npx tsx src/eval/run-hackaprompt-benchmark.ts
+ *
+ * HackAPrompt is an all-adversarial corpus, so we measure recall, latency,
+ * and tier breakdown. Precision/FP rate require a benign companion source.
+ *
+ * @module agent-threat-rules/eval/run-hackaprompt-benchmark
+ */
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=run-hackaprompt-benchmark.d.ts.map

package/dist/eval/run-hackaprompt-benchmark.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"run-hackaprompt-benchmark.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/eval/run-hackaprompt-benchmark.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";AACA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAeG"}

package/dist/eval/run-hackaprompt-benchmark.js

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env npx tsx
+/**
+ * HackAPrompt Benchmark Runner
+ *
+ * Loads a sample from the HackAPrompt 600K+ adversarial prompt dataset
+ * (produced by scripts/hackaprompt-to-corpus.py) and runs it through the
+ * ATR evaluation harness to measure recall against real prompt-hacking
+ * attempts collected at competition scale.
+ *
+ * Usage:
+ *   npx tsx src/eval/run-hackaprompt-benchmark.ts
+ *
+ * HackAPrompt is an all-adversarial corpus, so we measure recall, latency,
+ * and tier breakdown. Precision/FP rate require a benign companion source.
+ *
+ * @module agent-threat-rules/eval/run-hackaprompt-benchmark
+ */
+import { resolve, join } from 'node:path';
+import { loadHackaPromptCorpus, getHackaPromptCorpusStats } from './hackaprompt-corpus.js';
+import { runEval } from './eval-harness.js';
+function formatPercent(n) {
+    return `${(n * 100).toFixed(1)}%`;
+}
+function formatMs(n) {
+    return `${n.toFixed(2)}ms`;
+}
+async function main() {
+    const base = resolve(join(import.meta.dirname ?? '.', '..', '..'));
+    const rulesDir = join(base, 'rules');
+    const dataPath = join(base, 'data', 'hackaprompt', 'hackaprompt-corpus.json');
+    const outputPath = join(base, 'data', 'hackaprompt', 'hackaprompt-eval-report.json');
+    console.log('\n=== HackAPrompt Benchmark -- ATR Evaluation ===\n');
+    console.log(`Corpus: ${dataPath}`);
+    console.log(`Rules:  ${rulesDir}\n`);
+    const corpus = loadHackaPromptCorpus(dataPath);
+    const stats = getHackaPromptCorpusStats(corpus);
+    console.log(`Loaded ${stats.total} samples (${stats.attacks} attacks, ${stats.benign} benign)`);
+    console.log(`Categories: ${Object.entries(stats.byCategory).map(([k, v]) => `${k}=${v}`).join(', ')}`);
+    console.log(`Difficulty: ${Object.entries(stats.byDifficulty).map(([k, v]) => `${k}=${v}`).join(', ')}`);
+    // HackAPrompt is an all-adversarial corpus from a public global competition.
+    // It contains heavy paraphrasing, role-play, multilingual, and creative
+    // attacks. Recall is the headline number. FP rate is meaningless here
+    // because there are no benign samples in the corpus.
+    const hackaPromptThresholds = {
+        minRecall: 0.10,
+        maxFpRate: 1.0,
+        minF1: 0.0,
+        maxP95LatencyMs: 200,
+    };
+    const { report, tiersUsed, ruleQuality } = await runEval({
+        rulesDir,
+        corpus,
+        thresholds: hackaPromptThresholds,
+        outputPath,
+    });
+    console.log(`\nTiers: ${tiersUsed.join(' + ')}`);
+    console.log(`\n--- Overall ---`);
+    console.log(`  Recall:     ${formatPercent(report.overall.recall)}`);
+    console.log(`  Precision:  ${formatPercent(report.overall.precision)} (N/A meaning - no benign samples)`);
+    console.log(`  Confusion:  TP=${report.overall.confusion.tp} FN=${report.overall.confusion.fn}`);
+    console.log(`\n--- Latency ---`);
+    console.log(`  P50:  ${formatMs(report.latency.p50)}`);
+    console.log(`  P95:  ${formatMs(report.latency.p95)}`);
+    console.log(`  P99:  ${formatMs(report.latency.p99)}`);
+    console.log(`  Mean: ${formatMs(report.latency.mean)}`);
+    console.log(`\n--- By Category ---`);
+    for (const cat of report.byCategory) {
+        const m = cat.metrics;
+        const tp = m.confusion.tp;
+        const fn = m.confusion.fn;
+        const recall = tp + fn === 0 ? 0 : tp / (tp + fn);
+        console.log(`  ${cat.category}: recall=${formatPercent(recall)} (TP=${tp} FN=${fn})`);
+    }
+    console.log(`\n--- Top Firing Rules (top 15) ---`);
+    const fired = ruleQuality?.topRules ?? [];
+    for (const r of fired.slice(0, 15)) {
+        console.log(`  ${r.ruleId}: matches=${r.matchCount} TP=${r.tpCount} FP=${r.fpCount}`);
+    }
+    console.log(`\nReport saved to: ${outputPath}`);
+    console.log('Done.');
+}
+main().catch((err) => {
+    console.error('Error:', err);
+    process.exit(1);
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=run-hackaprompt-benchmark.js.map

package/dist/eval/run-hackaprompt-benchmark.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ export { loadRuleFile, loadRulesFromDirectory, validateRule } from './loader.js'
 export { SessionTracker } from './session-tracker.js';
 export type { SessionStateSnapshot } from './session-tracker.js';
 export { computeContentHash } from './content-hash.js';
+export { redactMatchedValue, redactMatchedValues } from './redact.js';
+export type { RedactOptions } from './redact.js';
 export { InvariantChecker } from './tier0-invariant.js';
 export type { SkillManifest, InvariantViolation, InvariantViolationType } from './tier0-invariant.js';
 export { InMemoryBlacklist, buildBlacklistMatch } from './tier1-blacklist.js';

package/dist/index.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AAGH,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AACxC,YAAY,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AACpG,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AACpD,YAAY,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AACzD,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AACjF,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AACtD,YAAY,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AACjE,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAGvD,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AACxD,YAAY,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAGtG,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAC9E,YAAY,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAG9E,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAChE,YAAY,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAGvE,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AACzD,YAAY,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AACpE,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,6BAA6B,CAAC;AAC7E,YAAY,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,6BAA6B,CAAC;AAC7E,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,6BAA6B,CAAC;AACtF,YAAY,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,6BAA6B,CAAC;AAGlE,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AACpD,YAAY,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AACnF,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AACrD,kDAAkD;AAClD,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AACvD,YAAY,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAClE,kDAAkD;AAClD,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAC/D,YAAY,EACV,gBAAgB,EAChB,eAAe,EACf,sBAAsB,GACvB,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAChC,YAAY,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAGlE,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AACtD,YAAY,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAC3F,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAC1D,YAAY,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAG1E,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AACrE,YAAY,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AACtF,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AACnD,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,yBAAyB,CAAC;AACxD,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAG1D,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AACxD,YAAY,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAChE,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAChD,YAAY,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAKpD,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AACpF,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AACtD,YAAY,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AACjE,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,+BAA+B,CAAC;AAC/D,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,6BAA6B,CAAC;AAC3D,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAChD,YAAY,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAG3D,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAE9C,YAAY,EACV,OAAO,EACP,QAAQ,EACR,UAAU,EACV,cAAc,EACd,SAAS,EACT,WAAW,EACX,WAAW,EACX,SAAS,EACT,aAAa,EACb,aAAa,EACb,YAAY,EACZ,WAAW,EACX,aAAa,EACb,OAAO,EACP,cAAc,EACd,YAAY,EACZ,WAAW,EACX,YAAY,EACZ,WAAW,EACX,mBAAmB,EACnB,sBAAsB,EACtB,oBAAoB,EACpB,eAAe,EACf,cAAc,EACd,UAAU,EACV,YAAY,EACZ,gBAAgB,EAChB,eAAe,EACf,SAAS,EACT,UAAU,EACV,QAAQ,EACR,UAAU,GACX,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AAGH,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AACxC,YAAY,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AACpG,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AACpD,YAAY,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AACzD,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AACjF,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AACtD,YAAY,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AACjE,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AACvD,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AACtE,YAAY,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAGjD,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AACxD,YAAY,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAGtG,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAC9E,YAAY,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAG9E,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAChE,YAAY,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAGvE,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AACzD,YAAY,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AACpE,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,6BAA6B,CAAC;AAC7E,YAAY,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,6BAA6B,CAAC;AAC7E,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,6BAA6B,CAAC;AACtF,YAAY,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,6BAA6B,CAAC;AAGlE,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AACpD,YAAY,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AACnF,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AACrD,kDAAkD;AAClD,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AACvD,YAAY,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAClE,kDAAkD;AAClD,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAC/D,YAAY,EACV,gBAAgB,EAChB,eAAe,EACf,sBAAsB,GACvB,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAChC,YAAY,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAGlE,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AACtD,YAAY,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAC3F,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAC1D,YAAY,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAG1E,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AACrE,YAAY,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AACtF,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AACnD,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,yBAAyB,CAAC;AACxD,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAG1D,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AACxD,YAAY,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAChE,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAChD,YAAY,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAKpD,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AACpF,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AACtD,YAAY,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AACjE,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,+BAA+B,CAAC;AAC/D,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,6BAA6B,CAAC;AAC3D,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAChD,YAAY,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAG3D,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAE9C,YAAY,EACV,OAAO,EACP,QAAQ,EACR,UAAU,EACV,cAAc,EACd,SAAS,EACT,WAAW,EACX,WAAW,EACX,SAAS,EACT,aAAa,EACb,aAAa,EACb,YAAY,EACZ,WAAW,EACX,aAAa,EACb,OAAO,EACP,cAAc,EACd,YAAY,EACZ,WAAW,EACX,YAAY,EACZ,WAAW,EACX,mBAAmB,EACnB,sBAAsB,EACtB,oBAAoB,EACpB,eAAe,EACf,cAAc,EACd,UAAU,EACV,YAAY,EACZ,gBAAgB,EAChB,eAAe,EACf,SAAS,EACT,UAAU,EACV,QAAQ,EACR,UAAU,GACX,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC"}

package/dist/index.js

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ export { createTCReporter } from './tc-reporter.js';
 export { loadRuleFile, loadRulesFromDirectory, validateRule } from './loader.js';
 export { SessionTracker } from './session-tracker.js';
 export { computeContentHash } from './content-hash.js';
+export { redactMatchedValue, redactMatchedValues } from './redact.js';
 // ── Tier 0: Invariant Enforcement (hard boundaries) ──────────────
 export { InvariantChecker } from './tier0-invariant.js';
 // ── Tier 1: Blacklist Provider (known-bad lookup) ────────────────

package/dist/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AAEH,mEAAmE;AACnE,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAExC,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAEpD,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AACjF,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAEtD,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AACvD,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAGtE,oEAAoE;AACpE,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAGxD,oEAAoE;AACpE,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAG9E,oEAAoE;AACpE,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAGhE,oEAAoE;AACpE,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAEzD,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,6BAA6B,CAAC;AAE7E,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,6BAA6B,CAAC;AAGtF,mEAAmE;AACnE,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAEpD,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AACrD,kDAAkD;AAClD,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAEvD,kDAAkD;AAClD,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAQ/D,mEAAmE;AACnE,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAEtD,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAG1D,mEAAmE;AACnE,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAErE,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AACnD,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,yBAAyB,CAAC;AACxD,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAE1D,oEAAoE;AACpE,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAExD,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAGhD,mEAAmE;AACnE,qDAAqD;AACrD,qDAAqD;AACrD,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AACpF,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAEtD,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,+BAA+B,CAAC;AAC/D,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,6BAA6B,CAAC;AAC3D,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAGhD,sDAAsD;AACtD,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC"}

package/dist/redact.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/**
+ * Match-value redaction utility.
+ *
+ * The engine's `ATRMatch.matchedPatterns` field can contain the raw text that
+ * triggered a rule. Downstream integrations that include matched values in
+ * log lines, error messages, or telemetry payloads risk re-exposing the very
+ * secrets that the rule fired on (e.g., AWS access keys, OAuth tokens,
+ * cookies, prompt-injection payloads containing user PII).
+ *
+ * Pass each entry of `match.matchedPatterns` through `redactMatchedValue()`
+ * before logging or surfacing it externally. The function preserves enough
+ * context for triage (rule shape, length, leading marker bytes) without
+ * keeping the secret bytes themselves.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   import { redactMatchedValue } from "agent-threat-rules/redact";
+ *   for (const match of engine.evaluate(event)) {
+ *     logger.warn({
+ *       rule: match.rule.id,
+ *       redacted_patterns: match.matchedPatterns.map(redactMatchedValue),
+ *     });
+ *   }
+ */
+/**
+ * Options for `redactMatchedValue`.
+ */
+export interface RedactOptions {
+    /**
+     * Number of leading bytes to keep visible as a triage hint. Defaults to 4.
+     * Set to 0 to keep no prefix at all.
+     */
+    headBytes?: number;
+    /**
+     * Maximum length of the returned redacted string. Defaults to 80.
+     */
+    maxLength?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Replace a raw matched value with a triage-safe summary.
+ *
+ * The output never contains more than `headBytes` (default 4) of the original
+ * value. The remainder is replaced with a structured placeholder that records
+ * the recognised secret class (when known), the original length, and an
+ * elision marker. Whitespace and surrounding punctuation are preserved so the
+ * summary still reads as a token in log lines.
+ *
+ * Returns a string of at most `maxLength` characters (default 80).
+ */
+export declare function redactMatchedValue(value: string, options?: RedactOptions): string;
+/**
+ * Convenience helper: apply `redactMatchedValue` to every entry of an array.
+ */
+export declare function redactMatchedValues(values: ReadonlyArray<string>, options?: RedactOptions): string[];
+//# sourceMappingURL=redact.d.ts.map

package/dist/redact.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"redact.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/redact.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAsBG;AAuBH;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,aAAa;IAC5B;;;OAGG;IACH,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACnB;;OAEG;IACH,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACpB;AAED;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,wBAAgB,kBAAkB,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,GAAE,aAAkB,GAAG,MAAM,CA2BrF;AAED;;GAEG;AACH,wBAAgB,mBAAmB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,aAAa,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,CAEpG"}

package/dist/redact.js

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+/**
+ * Match-value redaction utility.
+ *
+ * The engine's `ATRMatch.matchedPatterns` field can contain the raw text that
+ * triggered a rule. Downstream integrations that include matched values in
+ * log lines, error messages, or telemetry payloads risk re-exposing the very
+ * secrets that the rule fired on (e.g., AWS access keys, OAuth tokens,
+ * cookies, prompt-injection payloads containing user PII).
+ *
+ * Pass each entry of `match.matchedPatterns` through `redactMatchedValue()`
+ * before logging or surfacing it externally. The function preserves enough
+ * context for triage (rule shape, length, leading marker bytes) without
+ * keeping the secret bytes themselves.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   import { redactMatchedValue } from "agent-threat-rules/redact";
+ *   for (const match of engine.evaluate(event)) {
+ *     logger.warn({
+ *       rule: match.rule.id,
+ *       redacted_patterns: match.matchedPatterns.map(redactMatchedValue),
+ *     });
+ *   }
+ */
+const SECRET_PREFIXES = [
+    [/^AKIA[A-Z0-9]/, "aws_access_key_id"],
+    [/^ASIA[A-Z0-9]/, "aws_session_credential"],
+    [/^AGPA[A-Z0-9]/, "aws_user_identity"],
+    [/^ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]/, "github_personal_token"],
+    [/^gho_[A-Za-z0-9]/, "github_oauth_token"],
+    [/^ghs_[A-Za-z0-9]/, "github_server_token"],
+    [/^ghu_[A-Za-z0-9]/, "github_user_token"],
+    [/^ghr_[A-Za-z0-9]/, "github_refresh_token"],
+    [/^xox[abprs]-/, "slack_token"],
+    [/^xoxe-/, "slack_external_token"],
+    [/^sk-[A-Za-z0-9_]/, "openai_or_compatible_secret"],
+    [/^sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_]/, "anthropic_secret"],
+    [/^Bearer\s+/i, "bearer_credential"],
+    [/^-----BEGIN [A-Z ]+PRIVATE KEY-----/, "pem_private_key"],
+    [/^eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]/, "jwt_or_jose"],
+];
+const DEFAULT_HEAD_BYTES = 4;
+const MAX_REDACTED_OUTPUT = 80;
+/**
+ * Replace a raw matched value with a triage-safe summary.
+ *
+ * The output never contains more than `headBytes` (default 4) of the original
+ * value. The remainder is replaced with a structured placeholder that records
+ * the recognised secret class (when known), the original length, and an
+ * elision marker. Whitespace and surrounding punctuation are preserved so the
+ * summary still reads as a token in log lines.
+ *
+ * Returns a string of at most `maxLength` characters (default 80).
+ */
+export function redactMatchedValue(value, options = {}) {
+    if (typeof value !== "string")
+        return "[redacted:non-string]";
+    if (value.length === 0)
+        return "[redacted:empty]";
+    const headBytes = Math.max(0, options.headBytes ?? DEFAULT_HEAD_BYTES);
+    const maxLength = Math.max(8, options.maxLength ?? MAX_REDACTED_OUTPUT);
+    // Strip leading / trailing whitespace for class detection, but keep the
+    // visible head from the original (so context is preserved).
+    const trimmed = value.trim();
+    let secretClass = null;
+    for (const [pattern, label] of SECRET_PREFIXES) {
+        if (pattern.test(trimmed)) {
+            secretClass = label;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    const head = value.slice(0, headBytes);
+    const length = value.length;
+    const summary = secretClass !== null
+        ? `[redacted:${secretClass} head=${JSON.stringify(head)} len=${length}]`
+        : `[redacted head=${JSON.stringify(head)} len=${length}]`;
+    if (summary.length <= maxLength)
+        return summary;
+    return summary.slice(0, maxLength - 1) + "]";
+}
+/**
+ * Convenience helper: apply `redactMatchedValue` to every entry of an array.
+ */
+export function redactMatchedValues(values, options) {
+    return values.map((v) => redactMatchedValue(v, options));
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=redact.js.map

package/dist/redact.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "agent-threat-rules",
-  "version": "2.1.1",
+  "version": "2.1.3",
   "type": "module",
   "description": "Open detection standard -- like Sigma, but for AI agents. 311 rules for prompt injection, tool poisoning, context exfiltration, and MCP attacks. Shipped in Cisco AI Defense. 97.1% recall on NVIDIA garak.",
   "main": "./dist/index.js",

package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00440-semantic-kernel-vector-store-eval-rce.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+title: "Microsoft Semantic Kernel In-Memory Vector Store eval() RCE (CVE-2026-26030)"
+id: ATR-2026-00440
+rule_version: 1
+status: experimental
+description: >
+  Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-26030 (Critical), remote code execution
+  in Microsoft Semantic Kernel via unsafe string interpolation in
+  In-Memory Vector Store filter functions. The vulnerable sink interpolates
+  a user/LLM-controlled filter expression and evaluates it as a lambda;
+  attacker constructs a lambda body that traverses Python's class hierarchy
+  via `tuple()` to reach `BuiltinImporter` and execute `os.system()`,
+  achieving unauthenticated RCE on the Semantic Kernel host. This rule
+  detects the LLM-output / user-input payload patterns that reach the
+  filter sink: lambda definitions combined with eval / __import__ /
+  AST-traversal-via-mro patterns inside content or user_input fields a
+  Semantic Kernel agent is likely to interpolate. CWE-94, CWE-95.
+  Patches available in Python semantic-kernel >= 1.39.4 and
+  .NET semantic-kernel >= 1.71.0; this rule detects exploit attempts
+  against unpatched deployments and provides defence-in-depth post-patch.
+author: "ATR Community"
+date: "2026/05/11"
+schema_version: "0.1"
+detection_tier: pattern
+maturity: test
+severity: critical
+
+references:
+  owasp_llm:
+    - "LLM05:2025 - Improper Output Handling"
+    - "LLM06:2025 - Excessive Agency"
+  owasp_agentic:
+    - "ASI05:2026 - Unexpected Code Execution"
+    - "ASI06:2026 - Sandbox Escape"
+  mitre_atlas:
+    - "AML.T0050 - Command and Scripting Interpreter"
+    - "AML.T0051 - LLM Prompt Injection"
+  mitre_attack:
+    - "T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter"
+    - "T1059.006 - Python"
+  cve:
+    - "CVE-2026-26030"
+
+metadata_provenance:
+  mitre_atlas: human-reviewed
+  owasp_llm: human-reviewed
+  owasp_agentic: human-reviewed
+  cve: human-reviewed
+
+compliance:
+  eu_ai_act:
+    - article: "15"
+      context: "CVE-2026-26030 lets unfiltered LLM output drive lambda/eval interpolation in Semantic Kernel's vector-store filter; Article 15 cybersecurity requirements mandate that high-risk AI systems neutralise interpreter sinks reachable from model or user input."
+      strength: primary
+    - article: "9"
+      context: "Article 9 risk management must enumerate lambda-with-eval and AST-traversal payloads from LLM output as a high-risk vector — particularly in vector-store filter paths, which are typically considered low-risk infrastructure."
+      strength: primary
+  nist_ai_rmf:
+    - subcategory: "MP.5.1"
+      context: "Adversarial inputs that drive an LLM to emit lambda bodies invoking eval / __import__ / mro-traversal must be tracked as a primary input-attack class affecting framework-level integrations."
+      strength: primary
+    - subcategory: "MG.2.3"
+      context: "Risk treatment plans under MG.2.3 must require static and runtime detection of dynamic-evaluation primitives in any code path that consumes LLM output, including filter / search / ranking sinks."
+      strength: primary
+  iso_42001:
+    - clause: "8.6"
+      context: "Operational controls under clause 8.6 must prohibit dynamic-evaluation primitives (eval, exec, lambda-with-eval, Function constructor) being reached by any LLM-generated or user-supplied content path."
+      strength: primary
+
+tags:
+  category: agent-manipulation
+  subcategory: framework-eval-rce
+  scan_target: both
+  confidence: high
+
+agent_source:
+  type: llm_io
+  framework:
+    - semantic-kernel
+    - any
+  provider:
+    - any
+
+detection:
+  condition: any
+  false_positives:
+    - "Legitimate Python educational content discussing lambda safety or eval() risks."
+    - "Static analysis tooling output documenting CVE-2026-26030 attack patterns for defensive purposes."
+    - "Patched Semantic Kernel filter expressions that use AST allowlisting and reject lambda bodies before evaluation."
+  conditions:
+    - field: content
+      operator: regex
+      value: '(?i)lambda\s+\w*\s*:\s*[^,)]*\beval\s*\('
+      description: "Lambda body invoking eval() — primary CVE-2026-26030 exploit shape (`lambda row: eval(filter_expr)`)"
+
+    - field: content
+      operator: regex
+      value: '(?i)lambda\s+\w*\s*:\s*[^,)]*\b__import__\s*\(\s*["\x27](?:os|subprocess|socket|builtins|importlib)["\x27]'
+      description: "Lambda body using __import__ to reach OS / process / builtin modules — eval-friendly RCE chain"
+
+    - field: content
+      operator: regex
+      value: "(?i)\\(\\s*\\)\\.__class__\\.__mro__|tuple\\s*\\(\\s*\\)\\.__class__|\\(\\s*\\)\\.__class__\\.__bases__|__subclasses__\\s*\\(\\s*\\)"
+      description: "Python class-hierarchy traversal primitives (tuple().__class__.__mro__, __subclasses__()) — AST-bypass building block used to reach BuiltinImporter"
+
+    - field: content
+      operator: regex
+      value: '(?i)BuiltinImporter|FunctionType|getattr\s*\(\s*(?:object|type|__builtins__)'
+      description: "Direct reference to BuiltinImporter or reflective getattr on built-in roots — second stage of the AST-bypass chain"
+
+    - field: content
+      operator: regex
+      value: '(?i)\bFunction\s*\(\s*["\x27].{0,200}?(?:return\s+(?:eval|new\s+Function|require|process)|os\.system|child_process)["\x27]'
+      description: ".NET / JavaScript Function() constructor with body invoking eval / process — cross-runtime variant"
+
+    - field: user_input
+      operator: regex
+      value: '(?i)lambda\s+\w*\s*:\s*[^,)]*\b(?:eval|exec|__import__)\s*\('
+      description: "User-supplied filter expression containing lambda + dynamic-evaluation primitive — the original CVE-2026-26030 injection surface"
+
+response:
+  actions:
+    - block_input
+    - alert
+    - escalate
+  notify:
+    - security_team
+
+remediation: >
+  Upgrade Python semantic-kernel to >= 1.39.4 or .NET semantic-kernel to
+  >= 1.71.0. Reject filter expressions containing lambda bodies via AST
+  allowlisting before evaluation. Never pass LLM-generated content to any
+  dynamic-evaluation primitive (eval, exec, lambda-with-eval, Function
+  constructor) regardless of perceived sanitisation. Treat LLM output as
+  untrusted input from a security perspective.
+
+test_cases:
+  true_positives:
+    - input: 'lambda row: eval(filter_expr)'
+      expected: triggered
+      description: "Microsoft Copilot fixture: lambda body invoking eval — primary CVE-2026-26030 exploit shape"
+    - input: 'lambda row: __import__("os").system("id")'
+      expected: triggered
+      description: "Lambda body using __import__ on os module — eval-friendly RCE chain"
+    - input: 'lambda x: __import__("subprocess").run(["sh","-c","whoami"])'
+      expected: triggered
+      description: "Lambda invoking subprocess.run via __import__"
+    - input: '().__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()'
+      expected: triggered
+      description: "AST-bypass primitive — empty-tuple class-hierarchy traversal to reach BuiltinImporter"
+    - input: 'tuple().__class__.__bases__[0].__subclasses__()'
+      expected: triggered
+      description: "tuple()-based class-hierarchy traversal (variant)"
+    - input: 'lambda r: eval(r.metadata.get("filter", "0"))'
+      expected: triggered
+      description: "Filter-context lambda calling eval on a derived attribute — exploit chain via vector-store filter"
+    - input: 'Filter expression: lambda row: eval(input_query) — please apply to ranking'
+      expected: triggered
+      description: "LLM-emitted filter expression containing lambda + eval — typical content-field path"
+    - input: 'getattr(__builtins__, "eval")("os.system(\"id\")")'
+      expected: triggered
+      description: "Reflective getattr on __builtins__ to reach eval — second-stage AST-bypass shape"
+  true_negatives:
+    - input: "The semantic-kernel changelog notes that lambda-with-eval filter expressions are blocked after the 1.39.4 patch."
+      expected: not_triggered
+      description: "Documentation discussing the patch should not trigger"
+    - input: "Best practice: use AST allowlisting in vector store filter pipelines."
+      expected: not_triggered
+      description: "Defensive guidance discussing the mitigation"
+    - input: "I tested the in-memory vector store with a simple lambda function returning row.score > 0.5."
+      expected: not_triggered
+      description: "Benign lambda not invoking eval / __import__ / mro traversal"
+    - input: "Reviewing this rule against CVE-2026-26030 to ensure regex coverage is correct."
+      expected: not_triggered
+      description: "Discussion of CVE in defensive context"
+    - input: "The filter argument accepts a callable; users typically pass operator.attrgetter."
+      expected: not_triggered
+      description: "Reference to alternative safe callable forms"