agent-security-scanner-mcp 3.8.0 → 3.10.0

package/rules/clawhavoc.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,443 @@
+# ClawHavoc Malware Signature Rules
+# ===================================
+# ClawHavoc is a threat intelligence database for detecting known malicious
+# patterns in OpenClaw skills. These signatures cover reverse shells, crypto
+# miners, info stealers, keyloggers, C2 beacons, and OpenClaw-specific attacks
+# observed in the wild. Each rule maps to a MITRE ATT&CK technique or known
+# malware family. Patterns are JavaScript-compatible regex (used with RegExp).
+#
+# Maintained by the ClawProof security team.
+# Last updated: 2026-02-18
+
+rules:
+  # ==========================================================================
+  # CATEGORY 1: REVERSE SHELLS
+  # ==========================================================================
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.revshell.bash
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "Bash reverse shell detected — opens interactive shell over TCP"
+    patterns:
+      - "bash\\s+-i\\s+>&\\s*/dev/tcp/"
+      - "/dev/tcp/\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+/\\d+"
+      - "bash\\s+.*>\\s*/dev/tcp/.*<&"
+      - "0<&\\d+;\\s*exec\\s+\\d+<>/dev/tcp/"
+    metadata:
+      category: reverse_shell
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: HIGH
+      malware_family: generic
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.revshell.netcat
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "Netcat reverse shell detected — executes shell via nc/ncat"
+    patterns:
+      - "\\bnc\\s+-e\\s+/bin/(ba)?sh"
+      - "\\bncat\\s+-e\\s+/bin/(ba)?sh"
+      - "\\bnetcat\\s+-e\\s+/bin/(ba)?sh"
+      - "\\bnc\\b.*\\|\\s*/bin/(ba)?sh"
+      - "mkfifo\\s+/tmp/.*\\bnc\\b"
+    metadata:
+      category: reverse_shell
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: HIGH
+      malware_family: generic
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.revshell.python
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "Python reverse shell detected — socket connect with dup2/subprocess"
+    patterns:
+      - "socket\\.connect\\s*\\(\\s*\\([\"']\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+[\"']"
+      - "os\\.dup2\\s*\\(\\s*s\\.fileno\\(\\)"
+      - "subprocess\\.call\\s*\\(\\s*\\[.*?/bin/(ba)?sh.*?\\].*?stdin\\s*=\\s*s"
+      - "socket\\.socket\\(.*?SOCK_STREAM\\).*?\\.connect\\(.*?\\).*?os\\.dup2"
+    metadata:
+      category: reverse_shell
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: HIGH
+      malware_family: generic
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.revshell.perl
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "Perl reverse shell detected — socket INET with exec"
+    patterns:
+      - "perl\\s+-e\\s+.*socket\\s*\\(\\s*S.*INET"
+      - "perl\\s+-e\\s+.*exec\\s*\\(.*?/bin/(ba)?sh"
+      - "IO::Socket::INET.*?\\bexec\\b.*?/bin/(ba)?sh"
+      - "perl\\s+.*?socket.*?connect.*?open.*?STDIN"
+    metadata:
+      category: reverse_shell
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: HIGH
+      malware_family: generic
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.revshell.ruby
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "Ruby reverse shell detected — TCPSocket with exec"
+    patterns:
+      - "TCPSocket\\.(new|open)\\s*\\(.*?\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+"
+      - "TCPSocket\\.open.*?exec\\s+.*?/bin/(ba)?sh"
+      - "require\\s+[\"']socket[\"'].*?TCPSocket.*?exec"
+    metadata:
+      category: reverse_shell
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: HIGH
+      malware_family: generic
+
+  # ==========================================================================
+  # CATEGORY 2: CRYPTO MINERS
+  # ==========================================================================
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.miner.xmrig
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "XMRig crypto miner detected — mines Monero using victim resources"
+    patterns:
+      - "\\bxmrig\\b"
+      - "stratum\\+tcp://"
+      - "pool\\.minexmr\\.com"
+      - "pool\\.hashvault\\.pro"
+      - "\\bRandomX\\b.*?--donate-level"
+    metadata:
+      category: crypto_miner
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: HIGH
+      malware_family: xmrig
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.miner.coinhive
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "Browser-based crypto miner detected — mines via WebAssembly in browser"
+    patterns:
+      - "\\bcoinhive\\b"
+      - "CoinHive\\.Anonymous"
+      - "\\bwebminepool\\b"
+      - "coin-hive\\.com/lib"
+      - "\\bCryptoLoot\\b"
+    metadata:
+      category: crypto_miner
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: HIGH
+      malware_family: coinhive
+
+  # ==========================================================================
+  # CATEGORY 3: INFO STEALERS
+  # ==========================================================================
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.stealer.browser-cookies
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "Browser cookie/credential theft detected — reads stored login data"
+    patterns:
+      - "Chrome/User\\s*Data/Default/Cookies"
+      - "Firefox/Profiles/.*?cookies\\.sqlite"
+      - "Chrome/User\\s*Data/Default/Login\\s*Data"
+      - "Google/Chrome.*?(Cookies|Login\\s*Data)"
+      - "Application\\s*Support/(Google/Chrome|Firefox).*?(cookies|login)"
+    metadata:
+      category: info_stealer
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: HIGH
+      malware_family: generic
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.stealer.keychain
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "macOS Keychain theft detected — dumps stored credentials"
+    patterns:
+      - "security\\s+find-generic-password"
+      - "security\\s+find-internet-password"
+      - "security\\s+dump-keychain"
+      - "security\\s+export\\s+-k\\s+.*?keychain"
+    metadata:
+      category: info_stealer
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: HIGH
+      malware_family: generic
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.stealer.atomic
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "Atomic Stealer pattern detected — osascript password prompt"
+    patterns:
+      - "osascript.*?display\\s+dialog.*?password"
+      - "osascript.*?display\\s+dialog.*?with\\s+hidden\\s+answer"
+      - "osascript\\s+-e.*?text\\s+returned.*?password"
+    metadata:
+      category: info_stealer
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: HIGH
+      malware_family: atomic_stealer
+      campaign: macos_atomic
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.stealer.redline
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "RedLine stealer pattern detected — targets browser and system credentials"
+    patterns:
+      - "\\\\Browsers\\\\.*?Login\\s*Data"
+      - "\\bvaultcli\\.dll\\b"
+      - "\\bCredentialManager\\b"
+      - "VaultOpenVault|VaultEnumerateItems"
+      - "\\\\User\\s*Data\\\\.*?(Web\\s*Data|Login\\s*Data)"
+    metadata:
+      category: info_stealer
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: HIGH
+      malware_family: redline
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.stealer.lumma
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "Lumma/wallet stealer pattern detected — targets crypto wallets"
+    patterns:
+      - "\\bwallet\\.dat\\b"
+      - "Exodus.*?passphrase"
+      - "metamask.*?vault"
+      - "\\bsollet\\b.*?keystore"
+      - "Ethereum/keystore"
+    metadata:
+      category: info_stealer
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: MEDIUM
+      malware_family: lumma
+
+  # ==========================================================================
+  # CATEGORY 4: KEYLOGGERS
+  # ==========================================================================
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.keylogger.macos
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "macOS keylogger detected — captures keystrokes via system APIs"
+    patterns:
+      - "\\bCGEventTapCreate\\b"
+      - "\\bkCGEventKeyDown\\b"
+      - "NSEvent\\.addGlobalMonitor"
+      - "CGEventMaskBit\\(.*?kCGEventKeyDown"
+    metadata:
+      category: keylogger
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: HIGH
+      malware_family: generic
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.keylogger.generic
+    severity: HIGH
+    message: "Generic keylogger pattern detected — captures keyboard input"
+    patterns:
+      - "\\bkeylogger\\b"
+      - "pynput\\.keyboard\\.Listener"
+      - "addEventListener\\s*\\(\\s*[\"']keydown[\"']"
+      - "on_press.*?keyboard.*?listener"
+      - "SetWindowsHookEx.*?WH_KEYBOARD"
+    metadata:
+      category: keylogger
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: MEDIUM
+      malware_family: generic
+
+  # ==========================================================================
+  # CATEGORY 5: SCREEN CAPTURE
+  # ==========================================================================
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.screencap.capture-upload
+    severity: HIGH
+    message: "Screenshot capture with upload detected — exfiltrates screen content"
+    patterns:
+      - "screenshot.*?upload"
+      - "screencapture.*?curl"
+      - "ImageGrab.*?(send|post|upload|requests)"
+      - "pyautogui\\.screenshot.*?(requests|urllib|http)"
+      - "screen\\s*capture.*?(webhook|http|curl)"
+    metadata:
+      category: screen_capture
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: MEDIUM
+      malware_family: generic
+
+  # ==========================================================================
+  # CATEGORY 6: DNS EXFILTRATION
+  # ==========================================================================
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.exfil.dns
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "DNS exfiltration detected — encodes data in DNS queries"
+    patterns:
+      - "nslookup\\s+\\$\\("
+      - "dig\\s+\\$\\("
+      - "base64.*?nslookup"
+      - "nslookup.*?base64"
+      - "\\$\\(.*?\\)\\..*?\\.\\w{2,6}\\b"
+    metadata:
+      category: dns_exfiltration
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: HIGH
+      malware_family: generic
+
+  # ==========================================================================
+  # CATEGORY 7: C2 BEACONS
+  # ==========================================================================
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.c2.periodic-http
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "C2 beacon detected — periodic HTTP callbacks for command and control"
+    patterns:
+      - "setInterval\\s*\\(.*?fetch\\s*\\("
+      - "while\\s+(True|true|1).*?requests\\.(get|post).*?sleep"
+      - "setInterval\\s*\\(.*?(axios|http|XMLHttpRequest)"
+      - "schedule\\.every\\(.*?\\)\\.(get|post|fetch)"
+    metadata:
+      category: c2_beacon
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: HIGH
+      malware_family: generic
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.c2.encoded-payload
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "Encoded payload execution detected — decodes and executes hidden code"
+    patterns:
+      - "eval\\s*\\(\\s*atob\\s*\\("
+      - "exec\\s*\\(\\s*base64\\.b64decode\\s*\\("
+      - "eval\\s*\\(\\s*Buffer\\.from\\s*\\(.*?[\"']base64[\"']"
+      - "new\\s+Function\\s*\\(\\s*atob\\s*\\("
+      - "exec\\s*\\(\\s*codecs\\.decode\\s*\\("
+    metadata:
+      category: c2_beacon
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: HIGH
+      malware_family: generic
+
+  # ==========================================================================
+  # CATEGORY 8: OPENCLAW-SPECIFIC ATTACKS
+  # ==========================================================================
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.openclaw.soul-tampering
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "SOUL.md tampering detected — modifies the agent's core identity/instructions"
+    patterns:
+      - "(write|echo|cat|tee)\\s+.*?>\\s*SOUL\\.md"
+      - "modify\\s+.*?SOUL\\.md"
+      - "sed\\s+-i.*?SOUL\\.md"
+      - "echo\\s+.*?>>\\s*SOUL\\.md"
+      - "(open|fs\\.writeFile).*?SOUL\\.md"
+    metadata:
+      category: openclaw_attack
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: HIGH
+      malware_family: openclaw_specific
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.openclaw.config-theft
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "OpenClaw config theft detected — reads private agent configuration"
+    patterns:
+      - "~/\\.openclaw/"
+      - "\\$HOME/\\.openclaw"
+      - "cat\\s+.*?\\.openclaw"
+      - "read.*?\\.openclaw/config"
+      - "\\.openclaw/(credentials|tokens?|auth)"
+    metadata:
+      category: openclaw_attack
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: HIGH
+      malware_family: openclaw_specific
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.openclaw.session-hijack
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "OpenClaw session hijack detected — steals authentication tokens"
+    patterns:
+      - "openclaw\\s+session\\s+token"
+      - "openclaw.*?auth\\s*cookie"
+      - "OPENCLAW_SESSION"
+      - "openclaw.*?bearer\\s+token"
+      - "steal.*?openclaw.*?(session|token|auth)"
+    metadata:
+      category: openclaw_attack
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: HIGH
+      malware_family: openclaw_specific
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.openclaw.skill-mutation
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "SKILL.md self-mutation detected — skill modifies its own definition"
+    patterns:
+      - "(write|echo|cat|tee)\\s+.*?>\\s*SKILL\\.md"
+      - "echo\\s+.*?>>\\s*SKILL\\.md"
+      - "sed\\s+-i.*?SKILL\\.md"
+      - "modify\\s+.*?SKILL\\.md"
+      - "(open|fs\\.writeFile).*?SKILL\\.md"
+    metadata:
+      category: openclaw_attack
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: HIGH
+      malware_family: openclaw_specific
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.openclaw.gateway-token
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "OpenClaw gateway token theft detected — targets API authentication"
+    patterns:
+      - "OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN"
+      - "OPENCLAW_API_KEY"
+      - "OPENCLAW_SECRET"
+      - "openclaw.*?gateway.*?token"
+      - "export\\s+OPENCLAW_(GATEWAY_TOKEN|API_KEY)"
+    metadata:
+      category: openclaw_attack
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: HIGH
+      malware_family: openclaw_specific
+
+  # ==========================================================================
+  # CATEGORY 9: CAMPAIGN PATTERNS
+  # ==========================================================================
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.campaign.osascript-dialog
+    severity: HIGH
+    message: "osascript dialog social engineering — tricks user into entering credentials"
+    patterns:
+      - "osascript.*?display\\s+dialog"
+      - "osascript\\s+-e\\s+.*?display\\s+alert"
+      - "osascript.*?text\\s+returned"
+    metadata:
+      category: campaign
+      action: WARN
+      confidence: MEDIUM
+      campaign: macos_social_engineering
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.campaign.xattr-quarantine
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "Quarantine bypass detected — removes macOS Gatekeeper protection"
+    patterns:
+      - "xattr\\s+-d\\s+com\\.apple\\.quarantine"
+      - "xattr\\s+-c\\s+com\\.apple\\.quarantine"
+      - "xattr\\s+-r\\s+-d.*?quarantine"
+      - "spctl\\s+--master-disable"
+    metadata:
+      category: campaign
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: HIGH
+      campaign: macos_gatekeeper_bypass
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.campaign.clickfix
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "ClickFix social engineering detected — instructs user to paste commands"
+    patterns:
+      - "press\\s+(Win|Windows|Cmd|Command)\\s*\\+\\s*R.*?paste"
+      - "open\\s+(terminal|cmd|powershell).*?paste\\s+(the\\s+)?following"
+      - "copy\\s+and\\s+paste\\s+(this|the\\s+following)\\s+(into|in)\\s+(terminal|cmd|powershell|shell)"
+      - "run\\s+this\\s+(in|from)\\s+(your\\s+)?(terminal|command\\s+prompt)"
+    metadata:
+      category: campaign
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: HIGH
+      campaign: clickfix
+
+  # ==========================================================================
+  # CATEGORY 10: EXFIL ENDPOINTS
+  # ==========================================================================
+
+  - id: clawhavoc.campaign.webhook-exfil
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    message: "Known exfiltration endpoint detected — data sent to attacker-controlled webhook"
+    patterns:
+      - "webhook\\.site"
+      - "discord\\.com/api/webhooks"
+      - "hooks\\.slack\\.com"
+      - "pipedream\\.net"
+      - "requestbin\\.(com|net)"
+    metadata:
+      category: exfil_endpoint
+      action: BLOCK
+      confidence: HIGH
+      malware_family: generic

package/src/cli/audit.js

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+// src/cli/audit.js — OpenClaw configuration security audit (stub)
+
+export async function runAudit(args) {
+  console.log('\n  Security Audit [EXPERIMENTAL STUB]\n');
+  console.log('  This command will check your OpenClaw configuration for security issues.');
+  console.log('  Full implementation coming in Sprint 3.\n');
+  console.log('  WARNING: This is an experimental stub. No actual checks are performed.\n');
+  console.log('  Planned checks (60+):');
+  console.log('    - Gateway: bind mode, auth, token strength, HTTPS, CORS');
+  console.log('    - Permissions: config files, credentials, session transcripts');
+  console.log('    - Tool Policy: allowlist, sandbox, elevated tools');
+  console.log('    - DM/Group: open access, pairing bypass, mention gating');
+  console.log('    - Hooks: weak tokens, unsafe external content');
+  console.log('    - mDNS: exposure, metadata leaks');
+  console.log('    - Plugins: unsigned, permissive, outdated');
+  console.log('    - Credentials: plaintext secrets, exposed API keys\n');
+  console.log('  OWASP ASI Top 10 mapping for all findings.\n');
+}

package/src/cli/harden.js

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+// src/cli/harden.js — OpenClaw auto-hardening (stub)
+
+export async function runHarden(args) {
+  console.log('\n  Auto-Hardening [EXPERIMENTAL STUB]\n');
+  console.log('  This command will automatically fix security issues in your OpenClaw config.');
+  console.log('  Full implementation coming in Sprint 3.\n');
+  console.log('  WARNING: This is an experimental stub. No actions are performed.\n');
+  console.log('  Planned actions:');
+  console.log('    - Bind gateway to 127.0.0.1');
+  console.log('    - Enable token authentication');
+  console.log('    - Set config file permissions to 600');
+  console.log('    - Disable mDNS discovery');
+  console.log('    - Remove plaintext credentials\n');
+  console.log('  Usage: agent-security-scanner-mcp harden --fix [--dry-run]\n');
+}

package/src/context.js

@@ -163,7 +163,11 @@ const TEST_FILE_PATTERNS = [
   /[._](?:test|spec)\.[^.]+$/i,
   /[/\\]test[-_]?files?[/\\]/i,
   /[/\\]fixtures?[/\\]/i,
+  /[/\\]__fixtures__[/\\]/i,
+  /[/\\]__mocks__[/\\]/i,
+  /[/\\]mocks?[/\\]/i,
   /[/\\]demo[/\\]/i,
+  /[/\\]test[-_][^/\\]+\.[^.]+$/i,
 ];
 
 // Check if a file path looks like a test file

package/src/daemon-client.js

@@ -204,6 +204,16 @@ class DaemonClient {
     return resp.result;
   }
 
+  async preWarm() {
+    if (this._dead) return;
+    try {
+      await this.ensureRunning();
+      await this.health();
+    } catch {
+      // Pre-warm failure is non-fatal
+    }
+  }
+
   async shutdown() {
     if (!this._proc || this._proc.killed || this._proc.exitCode !== null) return;
     try {

package/src/plugin-config.js

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+// src/plugin-config.js — Plugin configuration loader
+// Loads config from ~/.openclaw/scanner-config.json, .scannerrc.json, or .clawproofrc.json
+
+import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'fs';
+import { join } from 'path';
+import { homedir } from 'os';
+
+const DEFAULT_PLUGIN_CONFIG = {
+  version: 1,
+  features: {
+    scan_on_write: true,
+    scan_on_skill_install: true,
+    prompt_firewall: true,
+    package_hallucination: true,
+    config_audit: true,
+  },
+  severity_threshold: 'warning',
+  auto_block: true,
+  output_format: 'json',
+  daemon: {
+    prewarm: true,
+    cache_size: 200,
+  },
+};
+
+export function loadPluginConfig() {
+  const paths = [
+    join(homedir(), '.openclaw', 'scanner-config.json'),
+    join(process.cwd(), '.clawproofrc.json'),
+    join(process.cwd(), '.scannerrc.json'),
+  ];
+
+  for (const configPath of paths) {
+    if (existsSync(configPath)) {
+      try {
+        const raw = readFileSync(configPath, 'utf-8');
+        const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
+
+        if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== 'object') {
+          continue;
+        }
+
+        const parsedFeatures = parsed.features && typeof parsed.features === 'object' ? parsed.features : {};
+        const parsedDaemon = parsed.daemon && typeof parsed.daemon === 'object' ? parsed.daemon : {};
+
+        return {
+          version: typeof parsed.version === 'number' ? parsed.version : DEFAULT_PLUGIN_CONFIG.version,
+          features: {
+            scan_on_write: parsedFeatures.scan_on_write ?? DEFAULT_PLUGIN_CONFIG.features.scan_on_write,
+            scan_on_skill_install: parsedFeatures.scan_on_skill_install ?? DEFAULT_PLUGIN_CONFIG.features.scan_on_skill_install,
+            prompt_firewall: parsedFeatures.prompt_firewall ?? DEFAULT_PLUGIN_CONFIG.features.prompt_firewall,
+            package_hallucination: parsedFeatures.package_hallucination ?? DEFAULT_PLUGIN_CONFIG.features.package_hallucination,
+            config_audit: parsedFeatures.config_audit ?? DEFAULT_PLUGIN_CONFIG.features.config_audit,
+          },
+          severity_threshold: ['info', 'warning', 'error'].includes(parsed.severity_threshold)
+            ? parsed.severity_threshold : DEFAULT_PLUGIN_CONFIG.severity_threshold,
+          auto_block: typeof parsed.auto_block === 'boolean' ? parsed.auto_block : DEFAULT_PLUGIN_CONFIG.auto_block,
+          output_format: ['json', 'text'].includes(parsed.output_format)
+            ? parsed.output_format : DEFAULT_PLUGIN_CONFIG.output_format,
+          daemon: {
+            prewarm: parsedDaemon.prewarm ?? DEFAULT_PLUGIN_CONFIG.daemon.prewarm,
+            cache_size: typeof parsedDaemon.cache_size === 'number' ? parsedDaemon.cache_size : DEFAULT_PLUGIN_CONFIG.daemon.cache_size,
+          },
+          _source: configPath,
+        };
+      } catch {
+        // Malformed config, fall through
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return { ...DEFAULT_PLUGIN_CONFIG, _source: null };
+}
+
+export function getDefaultPluginConfig() {
+  return { ...DEFAULT_PLUGIN_CONFIG };
+}

package/src/plugin-health.js

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+// src/plugin-health.js — Plugin health check endpoint
+
+import { getDaemonClient } from './daemon-client.js';
+import { readFileSync } from 'fs';
+import { join, dirname } from 'path';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'url';
+
+let __dirname;
+try {
+  __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
+} catch {
+  __dirname = process.cwd();
+}
+
+export async function getHealthStatus() {
+  let version = '0.0.0';
+  try {
+    const pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(__dirname, '..', 'package.json'), 'utf-8'));
+    version = pkg.version || '0.0.0';
+  } catch { /* ignore */ }
+
+  let daemonHealth = null;
+  try {
+    const client = getDaemonClient();
+    if (client.isAvailable) {
+      daemonHealth = await client.health();
+    }
+  } catch { /* daemon not available */ }
+
+  // Try to get package stats without failing
+  let packageStats = null;
+  try {
+    const { getPackageStats } = await import('./tools/check-package.js');
+    packageStats = getPackageStats();
+  } catch { /* packages not loaded */ }
+
+  return {
+    name: 'agent-security-scanner-mcp',
+    version,
+    daemon: daemonHealth ? {
+      status: 'running',
+      pid: daemonHealth.pid,
+      cache_size: daemonHealth.cache_size,
+      uptime_seconds: Math.round(daemonHealth.uptime),
+    } : { status: 'not running' },
+    packages: packageStats,
+    timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
+  };
+}