agent-sanitizer 2.62.2 → 2.63.1

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package/types/index.d.mts CHANGED
@@ -60,4 +60,4 @@ export function sanitize(text: string, options?: {
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  }>;
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  export { applyLayer1, applyLayer1WellFormed, escapesPreservable, isBenignAnsi, isBenignAnsiKinds, normalizeLoneSurrogates, stripAnsiFully, stripTerminalFully, sgrCarriesPayload, SGR_RUN_THRESHOLD, LONE_SURROGATE_RE } from "./layer1.mjs";
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  export { stripInvisible, stripInvisibleWithReport, isSgrOnly, STRIP, SGR_RE, CHECKS, CATEGORY, CATEGORY_LABELS, LINGUISTIC_SCRIPTS, VS, BLANK_NON_CF, LONG_RUN_RE, LONG_RUN_THRESHOLD, SCATTERED_THRESHOLD, findLongRuns, hasLongRun } from "./invisible.mjs";
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- export { HTML_TAG_PRESENT, MD_LINK_HINT, SECRET_HINT, SECRET_HINT_EXT, matchesSecretHint } from "./gates.mjs";
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+ export { HTML_TAG_PRESENT, isHtmlShaped, MD_LINK_HINT, SECRET_HINT, SECRET_HINT_EXT, matchesSecretHint } from "./gates.mjs";
@@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ export const CATEGORY: Readonly<{
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  HIDDEN_HTML: "hidden-html";
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  EXFIL_URLS: "exfil-urls";
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  CONFUSABLE_HOST: "confusable-host";
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+ UNSCANNABLE: "unscannable";
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  }>;
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  /** @type {Readonly<Record<string, string>>} */
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  export const CATEGORY_LABELS: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ export function deleteVerbatimSpans(text: string, spans: string[]): {
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  * and one that cannot be vetted is WITHHELD (dropped from the array) under the
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  * same doctrine — Layer 4 never saw pre-splice text.
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  *
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- * Every byte mutation goes through {@link applyMutation} and every Layer-4 call
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+ * Every byte mutation goes through {@link mutate} and every Layer-4 call
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  * through {@link runRedact}, so a layer cannot re-establish some of the
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  * post-mutation invariants and forget the rest, and every string in the returned
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  * object has traversed Layer 4.
@@ -118,59 +118,68 @@ export function sanitizeText(text: string, options?: SanitizeTextOptions): Promi
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  */
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  export function isWalkableContainer(value: any): boolean;
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  /**
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- * Sanitize every string leaf of a tool-output value, preserving its shape (a
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- * structured tool output whose shape changes would be ignored by a harness,
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- * leaking the raw value). Non-string leaves pass through; `warnings` and
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- * `notes` accumulate across leaves, split by severity (see ./severity.mjs).
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- * `sgrNote` is the OR across leaves — true when SOME leaf was note-only — so a
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- * caller can still pick the quiet banner when no leaf raised a warning.
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- *
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- * Fails CLOSED on two hostile shapes that would otherwise throw a `RangeError`
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- * as an unhandled async rejection (a DoS that leaves the output un-sanitized):
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- * nesting past {@link MAX_DEPTH}, and a reference cycle. Either replaces the
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- * offending subtree with a placeholder string + a warning, never passing the
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- * raw subtree through. Keys are also screened for hidden chars (see below).
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- *
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- * `reveals` accumulates each string leaf's pre-Layer-2 text (present only when
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- * the HTML splice removed bytes) so a caller can persist what was hidden — the
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- * structured-output analogue of {@link sanitizeText}'s `reveal`. Same
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- * mutated-accumulator contract as `warnings`.
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- *
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- * `splices` accumulates each string leaf's Layer-2 placeholder→original pairs
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- * (each `original` already vetted, withheld entries dropped — see
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- * {@link sanitizeText}) — the per-placeholder twin of `reveals`, so a hook
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- * caller gets them for object-shaped tool output too. Same mutated-accumulator
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- * contract as `reveals`.
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+ * Sanitize every string of a tool-output value with `options` — each string
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+ * leaf AND each object key — preserving its shape. The walk itself, and every
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+ * rule it applies, is {@link sanitizeValueWith}'s; this binds the leaf and key
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+ * sanitizers to {@link sanitizeText}. A key runs every layer a leaf does except
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+ * Layer 5: a span deletion in a NAME can collapse two fields into one, which
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+ * costs both their values (see the collision rule).
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  * @param {any} value
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  * @param {SanitizeTextOptions} options
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  * @param {string[]} warnings
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  * @param {string[]} [reveals]
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- * @param {string[]} [notes] the NOTE-severity counterpart of `warnings`;
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- * appended last so an existing positional caller keeps working (it simply
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- * discards the notes, which is exactly as loud as before the split)
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- * @param {Array<{ placeholder: string, original: string }>} [splices] appended
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- * after `notes` for the same positional-compatibility reason
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- * @returns {Promise<{ value: any, modified: boolean, sgrNote: boolean }>}
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+ * @param {string[]} [notes] the NOTE-severity counterpart of `warnings`
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+ * @param {Array<{ placeholder: string, original: string }>} [splices]
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+ * @returns {Promise<WalkResult>}
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  */
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  export function sanitizeValue(value: any, options: SanitizeTextOptions, warnings: string[], reveals?: string[], notes?: string[], splices?: Array<{
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  placeholder: string;
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  original: string;
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- }>): Promise<{
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- value: any;
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- modified: boolean;
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- sgrNote: boolean;
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- }>;
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+ }>): Promise<WalkResult>;
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+ /**
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+ * THE structured-output walk, shared by {@link sanitizeValue} and the output
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+ * hook so the two cannot disagree about a value's strings. Runs `leaf` on every
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+ * string leaf and `key` on every object key (a field name is as
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+ * attacker-controlled as a leaf) and rebuilds the same shape (a harness ignores
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+ * a reshaped output and shows the RAW one). Each string's findings, `reveal` and
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+ * `splices` fold into `sinks`, whose caller owns dedup.
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+ *
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+ * Keys that sanitize to the same name fail closed: every value under that name
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+ * becomes {@link COLLISION_WITHHELD_MESSAGE}, the later ones under a
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+ * disambiguated key so the field count holds. Nesting past {@link MAX_DEPTH}
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+ * and a reference cycle become a placeholder plus a warning, not a `RangeError`.
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+ * `sgrNote` holds only when the walk added no warning.
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+ * @param {any} value
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+ * @param {StringSanitizers} sanitizers
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+ * @param {WalkSinks} sinks
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+ * @returns {Promise<WalkResult>}
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+ */
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+ export function sanitizeValueWith(value: any, sanitizers: StringSanitizers, sinks: WalkSinks): Promise<WalkResult>;
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+ /**
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+ * The warning for a post-sanitization key collision, naming where it sits.
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+ * Exported so tests assert by reference rather than re-typing the prose.
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+ * @param {string} name the collapsed-to name
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+ * @param {string} path dotted location of the owning object ("" = top level)
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+ * @returns {string}
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+ */
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+ export function collisionWarning(name: string, path: string): string;
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  /**
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  * Compose the model-facing context line for a sanitized/flagged tool output.
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  * `injectionAlert` is the caller's optional trailing alert (e.g. appended only
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  * for untrusted-ingress tools where a semantic-injection filter actually ran).
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+ *
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+ * `notes` follow the WARNING text: a note can carry the instruction a
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+ * detect-only finding rests on ("do not fetch them"), which an unrelated
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+ * warning does not make redundant. {@link INERT_ANSI_NOTE} alone is dropped
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+ * beside a warning (matched by the constant, not its wording).
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  * @param {boolean} modified output bytes were changed (vs. flagged only)
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  * @param {string[]} warnings
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- * @param {{ injectionAlert?: string }} [options]
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+ * @param {{ injectionAlert?: string, notes?: string[] }} [options]
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  * @returns {string}
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  */
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- export function composeContext(modified: boolean, warnings: string[], { injectionAlert }?: {
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+ export function composeContext(modified: boolean, warnings: string[], { injectionAlert, notes }?: {
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  injectionAlert?: string;
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+ notes?: string[];
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  }): string;
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  /**
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  * Replace every string leaf of `value` with `message`, preserving shape so a
@@ -233,6 +242,8 @@ export { needsMarkdownPipeline };
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  * caller still emits a sanitized, flagged result instead of crashing.
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  */
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  export const MAX_DEPTH: 200;
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+ /** A colliding field's WHOLE value, so no scalar passes under a legitimate name (the JSON type change is accepted). */
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+ export const COLLISION_WITHHELD_MESSAGE: "[WITHHELD \u2014 this field's name collided with another after sanitization]";
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  /**
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  * Layer-4 result: the redacted text, the category labels redacted, and an
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  * optional caller-supplied annotation appended to the warning.
@@ -258,7 +269,7 @@ export type Layer5Result = {
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  };
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  /**
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  * The running state of one {@link sanitizeText} call. Layers read `text` and
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- * mutate it ONLY through {@link applyMutation}. Findings carry their own
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+ * mutate it ONLY through {@link mutate}. Findings carry their own
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  * severity (see ./severity.mjs) and are split into `warnings`/`notes` at the
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  * single exit, so no layer can push into the wrong list. `found` is the
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  * machine-readable twin, unaffected by the split: the {@link CATEGORY} codes
@@ -269,7 +280,6 @@ export type PipelineState = {
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  found: string[];
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  findings: import("./severity.mjs").Finding[];
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  modified: boolean;
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- unreportedChange: boolean;
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  };
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  export type SanitizeTextOptions = {
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  html?: boolean;
@@ -290,6 +300,47 @@ export type SanitizeTextOptions = {
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  export type Deadline = {
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  remainingMs: () => number;
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  };
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+ export type WalkResult = {
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+ value: any;
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+ modified: boolean;
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+ sgrNote: boolean;
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+ };
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+ export type StringVerdict = {
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+ cleaned: string;
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+ warnings: string[];
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+ notes: string[];
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+ modified: boolean;
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+ sgrNote: boolean;
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+ reveal?: string;
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+ splices?: Array<{
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+ placeholder: string;
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+ original: string;
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+ }>;
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+ };
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+ export type StringSanitizers = {
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+ leaf: (text: string) => Promise<StringVerdict>;
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+ key: (text: string) => Promise<StringVerdict>;
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+ };
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+ export type WalkSinks = {
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+ warnings: string[];
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+ notes: string[];
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+ reveals: string[];
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+ splices: Array<{
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+ placeholder: string;
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+ original: string;
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+ }>;
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+ };
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+ /**
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+ * `seen` holds the ancestors on the active path only (a value shared across
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+ * sibling branches is not a cycle). `memo` caches each FULLY-PROCESSED result
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+ * by `(node, depth)` (see {@link depthMemo}); without it a shared-substructure
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+ * DAG is re-sanitized once per PATH — a ~25-object diamond measured 68 s.
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+ * Skipping a cached node's duplicate findings is harmless: callers dedup.
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+ */
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+ export type WalkContext = WalkSinks & StringSanitizers & {
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+ seen: WeakSet<object>;
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+ memo: ReturnType<typeof depthMemo<WalkResult>>;
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+ };
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  /**
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  * a content-block field's value test
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  */
@@ -299,4 +350,45 @@ export type BlockSchema = {
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  optional: Record<string, FieldShape>;
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  };
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  import { needsMarkdownPipeline } from "./gates.mjs";
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+ /**
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+ * Cache of a walked subtree keyed by `(node, depth)` — the pair the walk's
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+ * result actually depends on. Both walkers below truncate past
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+ * {@link MAX_DEPTH}, so the SAME node yields different output at different
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+ * depths: withheld on a long path, walked on a short one. Keying by node
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+ * identity alone therefore caches a path-dependent answer, and a shared node
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+ * first reached deep withholds real content everywhere it is reached later —
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+ * the module's own "a node withheld for depth on a long path must still be
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+ * walked on a shorter one" rule, silently violated.
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+ *
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+ * Taking `depth` as a mandatory argument is the point: there is no API here that
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+ * can key by identity alone. Refusing to cache truncated subtrees instead would
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+ * NOT work — truncation propagates to every ancestor, so a hostile diamond DAG
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+ * with a deep tail would go uncached and re-walk once per path, re-opening the
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+ * exponential blow-up the memo exists to prevent. Work stays bounded at
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+ * O(nodes × distinct depths), i.e. at most {@link MAX_DEPTH} entries per node.
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+ *
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+ * Residual, unchanged from before: the CYCLE placeholder also depends on the
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+ * ancestor `seen` set, which is not part of the key. Two paths reaching a node
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+ * at the same depth with different ancestors can therefore share a cached
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+ * result. Encoding `seen` in the key means storing every node a subtree walked
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+ * and re-checking it on lookup — the memo's cost becomes the walk it replaces —
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+ * and refusing to cache cyclic subtrees hits the same exponential wall as
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+ * above. A cycle is already a fail-closed pathological shape, so this trades a
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+ * placeholder's exact placement for a hard work bound.
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+ * @template T
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+ */
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+ declare function depthMemo<T>(): {
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+ /**
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+ * @param {object} value
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+ * @param {number} depth
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+ * @returns {T | undefined}
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+ */
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+ get(value: object, depth: number): T | undefined;
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+ /**
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+ * @param {object} value
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+ * @param {number} depth
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+ * @param {T} result
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+ */
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+ set(value: object, depth: number, result: T): void;
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+ };
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  export { describeExfil, describeRemoved, describeWarned } from "./warnings.mjs";
@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
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- /**
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- * @typedef {{ severity: string, message: string }} Finding
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- * A single reportable outcome and how loudly to report it.
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- */
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  /**
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  * A WARNING-severity finding: injection-shaped, worth the banner.
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  * @param {string} message
@@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ export const CATEGORY: Readonly<{
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  HIDDEN_HTML: "hidden-html";
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  EXFIL_URLS: "exfil-urls";
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  CONFUSABLE_HOST: "confusable-host";
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+ UNSCANNABLE: "unscannable";
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  }>;
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  /** @type {Readonly<Record<string, string>>} */
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  export const CATEGORY_LABELS: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;
@@ -27,3 +27,5 @@ export const UNIFIED_IDEOGRAPH: ReadonlyArray<readonly [number, number]>;
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  export const SCRIPT_BRAILLE: ReadonlyArray<readonly [number, number]>;
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  /** @type {ReadonlyArray<readonly [number, number]>} */
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  export const SCRIPT_HANGUL: ReadonlyArray<readonly [number, number]>;
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+ /** @type {ReadonlyArray<readonly [number, number]>} */
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+ export const GENERAL_CATEGORY_MARK: ReadonlyArray<readonly [number, number]>;
@@ -27,3 +27,5 @@ export const UNIFIED_IDEOGRAPH: ReadonlyArray<readonly [number, number]>;
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  export const SCRIPT_BRAILLE: ReadonlyArray<readonly [number, number]>;
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  /** @type {ReadonlyArray<readonly [number, number]>} */
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  export const SCRIPT_HANGUL: ReadonlyArray<readonly [number, number]>;
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+ /** @type {ReadonlyArray<readonly [number, number]>} */
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+ export const GENERAL_CATEGORY_MARK: ReadonlyArray<readonly [number, number]>;
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ export function overlapAwareCount(haystack: string, needle: string): number;
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  * The character runs Layer 1 deleted, located by greedy subsequence alignment
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  * (stripping only deletes, so `cleaned` is always a subsequence of `content`).
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  * Throws if the subsequence property does not hold — the caller fails closed.
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+ * Aligned per CODE POINT (Layer 1 deletes whole ones): a code-unit walk matches
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+ * U+1D173's high surrogate against U+1D11E's and splits both. Offsets stay UTF-16.
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  * @param {string} content disk bytes
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  * @param {string} cleaned Layer-1 view of the same bytes
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  * @returns {{start: number, deleted: string}[]}
@@ -74,3 +74,8 @@ export const LONE_SURROGATE_WARNING: "Normalized lone UTF-16 surrogates";
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  * be false.
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  */
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  export const HTML_UNPARSEABLE_WARNING: "HTML unparseable \u2014 the entire output was withheld behind a placeholder; nothing was spliced";
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+ /**
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+ * The Layer-3 warning when the URL scan overflowed the stack. It names no URL
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+ * (none was found), yet stays a warning: unread is not vetted.
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+ */
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+ export const UNSCANNABLE_WARNING: "Input too deeply nested to scan for exfil URLs or look-alike hosts \u2014 any URL in it is unvetted; do not fetch, relay, or embed it";