agent-receipt-verify 0.2.2 → 0.2.3

package/bin/cli.mjs

@@ -57,6 +57,11 @@ function gebruik() {
   console.log('        the same ten vectors under both amount policies, plus the two cases no')
   console.log('        published vector covers: overpayment, and one nonce across two payers.')
   console.log('        Those two are the open questions in x402 issue 2725.')
+  console.log('')
+  console.log('  npx github:holistis/agent-receipt-verify link-vectors')
+  console.log('        twelve vectors for the half AFTER paying: does this receipt belong to')
+  console.log('        that one settlement? Eleven run offline, the chain-reading one is')
+  console.log('        marked and skipped rather than failed.')
 }
 
 // Het argument bepaalt welke module draait. De modules zijn ook los te draaien en te
@@ -70,6 +75,7 @@ const onderdelen = {
   liveness: '../src/x402-index-liveness.mjs',
   kanon: '../src/eip3009-autorisatie.mjs',
   beleid: '../bench/eip3009-beleid.mjs',
+  'link-vectors': '../src/settlement-link-vectors.mjs',
 }
 
 if (!eerste || eerste === '--help' || eerste === '-h' || eerste === 'help') {

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "agent-receipt-verify",
-  "version": "0.2.2",
+  "version": "0.2.3",
   "description": "Checks x402 endpoint conformance before an agent pays, and links the receipt to its settlement.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "type": "module",
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
     "node": ">=20"
   },
   "scripts": {
-    "test": "node test/interop.mjs && node test/canonical.mjs && node test/link-onchain.mjs && node test/profiel.mjs && node test/eip3009.mjs && node test/conformance.mjs && node test/jws-offer.mjs && node test/census.mjs && node test/poortwachters.mjs && node test/metingen-bundel.mjs && node test/mcp-server.mjs && node test/cli.mjs && node test/bundel.mjs",
+    "test": "node test/interop.mjs && node test/canonical.mjs && node test/link-onchain.mjs && node test/profiel.mjs && node test/eip3009.mjs && node test/conformance.mjs && node test/jws-offer.mjs && node test/census.mjs && node test/poortwachters.mjs && node test/metingen-bundel.mjs && node test/mcp-server.mjs && node test/cli.mjs && node test/bundel.mjs && node test/settlement-link-vectors.mjs",
     "link-example": "node src/x402-link-onchain.mjs --receipt=examples/receipt-live-base-sepolia.json && node src/x402-link-onchain.mjs --receipt=examples/receipt-live-base-sepolia-2.json && node src/x402-link-onchain.mjs --receipt=examples/receipt-live-base-sepolia-3.json",
     "conformance": "node src/x402-conformance-check.mjs",
     "bench": "node bench/robustness.mjs",
@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@
     "mcp": "node src/mcp-server.mjs",
     "bundel": "node tools/bundel-bouw.mjs build/bundle",
     "kanon": "node src/eip3009-autorisatie.mjs --vectoren",
-    "bench-eip3009": "node bench/eip3009-beleid.mjs"
+    "bench-eip3009": "node bench/eip3009-beleid.mjs",
+    "link-vectors": "node src/settlement-link-vectors.mjs"
   },
   "optionalDependencies": {
     "ethers": "^6.17.0"

package/src/settlement-link-vectors.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+// Draait de afrekening-vectoren: hoort dit bonnetje bij die ene betaling?
+//
+// WAAROM DIT EEN LOPER IS EN NIET EEN DOCUMENT. Een vectorbestand dat niemand kan
+// draaien is een bewering met extra stappen. Dit commando leest de vectoren, rekent elk
+// commitment opnieuw uit, en vergelijkt dat met wat er verwacht wordt. Een vreemde
+// draait het zonder account, zonder sleutel, en voor elf van de twaalf gevallen ook
+// zonder internet.
+//
+// DE DRIE UITKOMSTEN, en de derde is het hele punt. LINKED als het commitment op
+// precies een kandidaat opent. NOT_LINKED als er kandidaten waren en geen enkele opent.
+// NOT_MEASURED als er geen kandidatenlijst is VERKREGEN. Dat laatste is geen afkeuring
+// van het bonnetje maar een onvolledige controle, en een woordenlijst met twee waarden
+// kan dat verschil niet uitdrukken. Precies dat gat benoemde de auteur van de
+// kanon-vectoren op 2026-10-17 als iets dat hij wil toevoegen.
+//
+// LET OP HET VERSCHIL TUSSEN LEEG EN AFWEZIG. `candidates: null` betekent dat er geen
+// lijst is opgehaald, `candidates: []` dat er wel een lijst is en die leeg was. Het
+// eerste is NOT_MEASURED, het tweede NOT_LINKED. Een loper die die twee door elkaar
+// haalt, gooit geldige bonnetjes weg bij een haperende RPC.
+//
+// Gebruik:
+//   node src/settlement-link-vectors.mjs            de offline vectoren
+//   npx agent-receipt-verify link-vectors           hetzelfde, als commando
+
+import fs from 'node:fs'
+import path from 'node:path'
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
+import { berekenCommitment } from './x402-offer-receipt.mjs'
+
+const WORTEL = fileURLToPath(new URL('..', import.meta.url))
+export const VECTORMAP = path.join(WORTEL, 'vectors', 'settlement-link')
+
+/**
+ * Beoordeel een enkele vector, puur rekenkundig.
+ *
+ * Geeft altijd een `outcome` terug uit de drie, nooit een throw voor een gewone
+ * uitkomst: een verifieerder die bij een ongeldig bonnetje crasht, is zelf de storing.
+ */
+export function beoordeelVector(v) {
+  if (v.requires_chain_read) return { outcome: 'SKIPPED', reden: 'requires an RPC; run the link command for this one' }
+
+  // Het geval met twee bonnetjes tegelijk: elk moet op zijn eigen kandidaat openen en
+  // op geen enkele andere.
+  if (Array.isArray(v.input?.receipts)) {
+    const kandidaten = v.input.candidates ?? []
+    const mapping = []
+    for (const [i, r] of v.input.receipts.entries()) {
+      const p = r.receipt.payload
+      const passend = kandidaten.filter((k) =>
+        String(berekenCommitment({
+          method: p.authorizationMethod ?? 'eip3009',
+          asset: r.asset,
+          authorizer: k.authorizer,
+          identifier: k.nonce,
+          salt: r.authorizationSalt,
+        })).toLowerCase() === String(p.authorizationCommitment).toLowerCase())
+      if (passend.length !== 1) {
+        return { outcome: 'NOT_LINKED', reden: `receipt ${i} opened on ${passend.length} candidates, expected exactly one` }
+      }
+      mapping.push({ receipt_index: i, identifier: passend[0].nonce })
+    }
+    return { outcome: 'LINKED', mapping }
+  }
+
+  const p = v.input?.receipt?.payload
+  if (!p) return { outcome: 'NOT_MEASURED', reden: 'no receipt payload in the vector' }
+  if (!p.authorizationCommitment) {
+    // Een bonnetje van versie 1 draagt geen commitment. Dat is geen fout van het
+    // bonnetje en ook geen afkeuring, er valt alleen niets te openen.
+    return { outcome: 'NOT_MEASURED', reden: 'receipt is version 1 and carries no commitment' }
+  }
+
+  const kandidaten = v.input.candidates
+  if (kandidaten == null) return { outcome: 'NOT_MEASURED', reden: 'no candidate set was obtained' }
+
+  const passend = kandidaten.filter((k) =>
+    String(berekenCommitment({
+      method: p.authorizationMethod ?? 'eip3009',
+      asset: v.input.asset,
+      authorizer: k.authorizer,
+      identifier: k.nonce,
+      salt: v.input.authorizationSalt,
+    })).toLowerCase() === String(p.authorizationCommitment).toLowerCase())
+
+  if (passend.length === 1) return { outcome: 'LINKED', identifier: passend[0].nonce }
+  if (passend.length === 0) return { outcome: 'NOT_LINKED', reden: `none of ${kandidaten.length} candidates opened the commitment` }
+  return { outcome: 'AMBIGUOUS', reden: `${passend.length} candidates opened the same commitment, which a random 32 byte salt should make practically impossible` }
+}
+
+export function laadVectoren(map = VECTORMAP) {
+  if (!fs.existsSync(map)) return []
+  return fs.readdirSync(map).filter((f) => f.endsWith('.json')).sort()
+    .map((f) => ({ bestand: f, ...JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(map, f), 'utf8')) }))
+}
+
+const ditBestand = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)
+if (process.argv[1] && path.resolve(process.argv[1]) === path.resolve(ditBestand)) {
+  const vectoren = laadVectoren()
+  if (!vectoren.length) {
+    console.error('no vectors found in vectors/settlement-link')
+    process.exitCode = 1
+  } else {
+    console.log('settlement-link vectors: does this receipt belong to that one payment?')
+    console.log('')
+    let goed = 0, fout = 0, overgeslagen = 0
+    for (const v of vectoren) {
+      const u = beoordeelVector(v)
+      if (u.outcome === 'SKIPPED') {
+        overgeslagen++
+        console.log(`  skip  ${v.id}`)
+        console.log(`        ${u.reden}`)
+        continue
+      }
+      const ok = u.outcome === v.expected.outcome
+      if (ok) goed++; else fout++
+      console.log(`  ${ok ? 'pass' : 'FAIL'}  ${v.id}`)
+      console.log(`        expected ${v.expected.outcome}, got ${u.outcome}${u.reden ? ' (' + u.reden + ')' : ''}`)
+    }
+    console.log('')
+    console.log(`${goed} agree, ${fout} disagree, ${overgeslagen} skipped because they need an RPC`)
+    console.log('')
+    console.log('Every positive case here was re-derived from the signed receipt, not copied:')
+    console.log('the commitment is recomputed from tag, method, asset, authorizer, identifier and')
+    console.log('salt, and compared against what the seller actually signed.')
+    process.exitCode = fout === 0 ? 0 : 1
+  }
+}

package/tools/bouw-afrekening-vectoren.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+// Bouwt testvectoren voor de helft NA het betalen: hoort dit bonnetje bij die ene
+// afrekening?
+//
+// WAAROM DEZE ER ZIJN. De gepubliceerde vectoren van iamonuwa/kanon dekken de
+// AUTORISATIE van een koper voor de afrekening. Niemand heeft vectoren gepubliceerd
+// voor de stap erna. In x402#3396 zei de auteur van die vectoren op 2026-10-17
+// letterlijk: "if you want receipt-to-settlement vectors in Kanon's shape, I'm open to
+// that, with the part that needs a chain read marked as such." Dit bestand maakt
+// precies dat, in zijn vorm, met dat veld.
+//
+// DE SPLITSING DIE HIJ VROEG, en die is inhoudelijk het hele punt. Een bonnetje aan een
+// afrekening binden bestaat uit twee stappen met heel verschillende eisen:
+//
+//   1. VIND de kandidaat-nonces die deze betaler in dit venster verbruikte.
+//      Dat vereist een ketenlezing. Niet reproduceerbaar zonder RPC, en de uitkomst
+//      hangt af van hoe ver je terugkijkt.
+//   2. OPEN het commitment op precies een van die kandidaten.
+//      Dat is pure rekenkunde: sha256 over tag, methode, asset, autorisator,
+//      identifier en zout. Offline, deterministisch, en voor altijd reproduceerbaar.
+//
+// Stap 2 is waar de spec iets beweert, en stap 2 heeft GEEN keten nodig zodra je de
+// kandidaten meegeeft. Daarom draagt elke vector hier `requires_chain_read`, en zijn de
+// offline vectoren degene waar een vreemde iets aan heeft.
+//
+// ALLE DATA IS ECHT. De bonnetjes komen uit echte betalingen op Base Sepolia aan
+// https://api.tokenizen.nl/api/paid/verify-ownership. De nonces en transactiehashes
+// zijn door onze eigen linker op de keten gevonden. Koper en verkoper zijn allebei wij,
+// dus dit bewijst dat de keten sluit, niet dat iemand anders hem gebruikt.
+//
+// DEZE GENERATOR WEIGERT TE LIEGEN. Voor elke positieve vector wordt het commitment
+// opnieuw berekend uit de losse velden en vergeleken met wat in het ondertekende
+// bonnetje staat. Klopt dat niet, dan schrijft hij niets en faalt hij luid. Een
+// vectorbestand dat zichzelf niet opent is erger dan geen vectorbestand, want iedereen
+// die het gebruikt bouwt op een fout.
+//
+// Gebruik: node tools/bouw-afrekening-vectoren.mjs [--droog]
+
+import fs from 'node:fs'
+import path from 'node:path'
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
+import { berekenCommitment } from '../src/x402-offer-receipt.mjs'
+
+const WORTEL = fileURLToPath(new URL('..', import.meta.url))
+const UIT = path.join(WORTEL, 'vectors', 'settlement-link')
+
+// De drie echte betalingen, met de afrekening die onze linker op de keten vond.
+// De nonce staat hier NIET omdat wij hem kozen, maar omdat hij gevonden is; de
+// controle hieronder bewijst dat hij bij dit bonnetje hoort.
+const ECHT = [
+  {
+    bestand: 'receipt-live-base-sepolia.json',
+    nonce: '0x1120412c78ea1b2e8bf9eacfc3264c71a23ecd9b1fa579eb16030693344d5dfe',
+    tx: '0xed87b09bfb20a8c8b69908e163fcea6432d193d389640c0465afcb5561dfeb30',
+    kandidaten: 2,
+  },
+  {
+    bestand: 'receipt-live-base-sepolia-2.json',
+    nonce: '0x515895dfac6f148a4cfdf5c4f8266b7859dbd6534cdf77104b1be9f484eb5005',
+    tx: '0x2898d0ceb97ddf60af98e19c94fc0adddbdf1e64f9032e62454085e37acfe36b',
+    kandidaten: 3,
+  },
+  {
+    bestand: 'receipt-live-base-sepolia-3.json',
+    nonce: '0x4b133bbec3ce0d8177a9010784faedb459f04384b45316bb526a5f96c90a70de',
+    tx: '0x2a9e95d63a5af8210767baa69143b364dad51caffc29a152c77e03bc508d7199',
+    kandidaten: 2,
+  },
+]
+
+const lees = (b) => JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(WORTEL, 'examples', b), 'utf8'))
+
+function basis(id, beschrijving, encodes) {
+  return {
+    id,
+    schema_version: '3.0.0',
+    protocol: 'x402',
+    scheme: 'exact',
+    network: 'eip155:84532',
+    asset_transfer_method: 'eip3009',
+    encodes,
+    provenance: [
+      'x402 offer-receipt extension section 5.6.4, as proposed in pull request 3827 at commit 0e492d6 and not on main',
+      'EIP-3009',
+    ],
+    description: beschrijving,
+  }
+}
+
+const vectoren = []
+const fouten = []
+
+for (const e of ECHT) {
+  const bron = lees(e.bestand)
+  const p = bron.receipt.payload
+  const betaler = p.payer
+
+  // DE CONTROLE DIE DEZE GENERATOR EERLIJK HOUDT. Herbereken het commitment uit de
+  // losse velden. Opent het niet op de nonce die wij hier opschrijven, dan is onze
+  // toewijzing fout en mag er niets geschreven worden.
+  const herberekend = berekenCommitment({
+    method: 'eip3009',
+    asset: bron.asset,
+    authorizer: betaler,
+    identifier: e.nonce,
+    salt: bron.authorizationSalt,
+  })
+  if (String(herberekend).toLowerCase() !== String(p.authorizationCommitment).toLowerCase()) {
+    fouten.push(`${e.bestand}: het commitment opent NIET op de opgegeven nonce. ` +
+      `berekend ${herberekend}, in het bonnetje ${p.authorizationCommitment}`)
+    continue
+  }
+
+  const kort = e.bestand.replace('receipt-live-base-sepolia', 'live').replace('.json', '')
+
+  // 1. De offline positieve: de kandidaten zijn MEEGEGEVEN, dus geen keten nodig.
+  vectoren.push({
+    ...basis(
+      `x402-evm-settlement-link-opens-${kort}`,
+      'A version 2 receipt whose authorizationCommitment opens on exactly one of the candidate nonces supplied with it. No chain access is needed because the candidates are given; this is the arithmetic half of section 5.6.4.',
+      'Receipt-to-settlement binding verified offline against a supplied candidate set.',
+    ),
+    requires_chain_read: false,
+    input: {
+      receipt: bron.receipt,
+      authorizationSalt: bron.authorizationSalt,
+      asset: bron.asset,
+      candidates: [{ authorizer: betaler, nonce: e.nonce }],
+    },
+    context: {
+      note: 'Real payment on Base Sepolia to https://api.tokenizen.nl/api/paid/verify-ownership. Buyer and seller are the same party, which proves the chain closes end to end and nothing about adoption.',
+      settlement_transaction: e.tx,
+    },
+    expected: { linked: true, outcome: 'LINKED', identifier: e.nonce },
+  })
+
+  // 2. De offline negatieve die het meest zegt: het zout van een ANDER bonnetje.
+  //    Dit is waar de hele constructie op rust, want zonder het zout zouden twee
+  //    identieke betalingen niet uit elkaar te houden zijn.
+  const ander = ECHT.find((x) => x.bestand !== e.bestand)
+  const anderBron = lees(ander.bestand)
+  vectoren.push({
+    ...basis(
+      `x402-evm-settlement-link-wrong-salt-${kort}`,
+      'The same receipt and the same candidate, but the salt of a different payment. The commitment must not open. This is the case the whole construction rests on: without the salt, two payments with identical terms could not be told apart.',
+      'A salt that belongs to another payment must not open this commitment.',
+    ),
+    requires_chain_read: false,
+    input: {
+      receipt: bron.receipt,
+      authorizationSalt: anderBron.authorizationSalt,
+      asset: bron.asset,
+      candidates: [{ authorizer: betaler, nonce: e.nonce }],
+    },
+    context: { note: 'Both salts are real and come from two separate payments with identical terms.' },
+    expected: { linked: false, outcome: 'NOT_LINKED' },
+  })
+
+  // 3. De offline negatieve met de nonce van een andere betaling.
+  vectoren.push({
+    ...basis(
+      `x402-evm-settlement-link-wrong-nonce-${kort}`,
+      'The correct receipt and salt, but a candidate nonce that belongs to a different settlement by the same payer. The commitment must not open on it.',
+      'A candidate that is not this payment must not satisfy the commitment.',
+    ),
+    requires_chain_read: false,
+    input: {
+      receipt: bron.receipt,
+      authorizationSalt: bron.authorizationSalt,
+      asset: bron.asset,
+      candidates: [{ authorizer: betaler, nonce: ander.nonce }],
+    },
+    context: { note: 'Both nonces were really consumed by this payer; only one belongs to this receipt.' },
+    expected: { linked: false, outcome: 'NOT_LINKED' },
+  })
+}
+
+// 4. De vector die de twee identieke betalingen naast elkaar zet. Dit is het geval dat
+//    een lezer overtuigt, want hier zijn de voorwaarden letterlijk gelijk.
+if (ECHT.length >= 2 && fouten.length === 0) {
+  const a = lees(ECHT[0].bestand)
+  const b = lees(ECHT[1].bestand)
+  vectoren.push({
+    ...basis(
+      'x402-evm-settlement-link-two-identical-payments',
+      'Two payments with identical terms (same payer, same asset, same amount, same resource) each open on their own settlement and on no other. Given both candidate sets together, each receipt selects exactly one.',
+      'Disambiguation of two otherwise indistinguishable payments.',
+    ),
+    requires_chain_read: false,
+    input: {
+      receipts: [
+        { receipt: a.receipt, authorizationSalt: a.authorizationSalt, asset: a.asset },
+        { receipt: b.receipt, authorizationSalt: b.authorizationSalt, asset: b.asset },
+      ],
+      candidates: [
+        { authorizer: a.receipt.payload.payer, nonce: ECHT[0].nonce },
+        { authorizer: b.receipt.payload.payer, nonce: ECHT[1].nonce },
+      ],
+    },
+    context: {
+      note: 'Both are real payments on Base Sepolia with the same terms. Without the salt these two could not be told apart by any later reader.',
+      settlements: [ECHT[0].tx, ECHT[1].tx],
+    },
+    expected: {
+      linked: true,
+      outcome: 'LINKED',
+      mapping: [
+        { receipt_index: 0, identifier: ECHT[0].nonce },
+        { receipt_index: 1, identifier: ECHT[1].nonce },
+      ],
+    },
+  })
+}
+
+// 5. De uitkomst die kanon nog niet kent, en die wij juist wel nodig hebben: een
+//    controle die NIET KON DRAAIEN is geen afkeuring. Dit vector beschrijft dat geval
+//    zonder een keten nodig te hebben: er zijn geen kandidaten verkregen.
+vectoren.push({
+  ...basis(
+    'x402-evm-settlement-link-no-candidates-not-measured',
+    'No candidate set could be obtained, for example because no chain access was available or the lookup window produced nothing. The correct answer is NOT_MEASURED and explicitly not NOT_LINKED: a check that could not run is not a receipt that fails. This is the third outcome a two-valued vocabulary cannot express.',
+    'An incomplete check must be distinguishable from a failed one.',
+  ),
+  requires_chain_read: false,
+  input: {
+    receipt: lees(ECHT[0].bestand).receipt,
+    authorizationSalt: lees(ECHT[0].bestand).authorizationSalt,
+    asset: lees(ECHT[0].bestand).asset,
+    candidates: null,
+  },
+  context: { note: 'candidates is null rather than an empty list, and the two mean different things: null is "we did not obtain a list", empty is "we obtained a list and it was empty".' },
+  expected: { linked: null, outcome: 'NOT_MEASURED' },
+})
+
+// 6. En het geval dat wel een keten nodig heeft, expliciet als zodanig gemarkeerd.
+vectoren.push({
+  ...basis(
+    'x402-evm-settlement-link-find-candidates-onchain',
+    'The full section 5.6.4 walk, starting from only the receipt, the salt and the asset: find the nonces this payer consumed in a window, then open the commitment on exactly one. Requires an archive-capable RPC for Base Sepolia. Included so the chain-dependent half is named rather than hidden, but a runner without RPC access should skip it and report that, not fail it.',
+    'The chain-reading half of the walk, marked as such.',
+  ),
+  requires_chain_read: true,
+  input: {
+    receipt: lees(ECHT[0].bestand).receipt,
+    authorizationSalt: lees(ECHT[0].bestand).authorizationSalt,
+    asset: lees(ECHT[0].bestand).asset,
+  },
+  context: {
+    rpc: 'any Base Sepolia endpoint that serves eth_getLogs over the window around the receipt issuedAt',
+    expected_candidate_count: ECHT[0].kandidaten,
+    note: 'The candidate count is what the window actually produced on 2026-10-18 and will grow as this payer makes more payments; a runner should assert "exactly one opens", not the count.',
+  },
+  expected: { linked: true, outcome: 'LINKED', identifier: ECHT[0].nonce, settlement_transaction: ECHT[0].tx },
+})
+
+if (fouten.length) {
+  console.error('GEEN ENKELE VECTOR GESCHREVEN. De controle faalde:')
+  for (const f of fouten) console.error('  ' + f)
+  process.exitCode = 1
+} else {
+  const droog = process.argv.includes('--droog')
+  if (!droog) {
+    fs.mkdirSync(UIT, { recursive: true })
+    for (const v of vectoren) {
+      fs.writeFileSync(path.join(UIT, v.id.replace('x402-evm-settlement-link-', '') + '.json'), JSON.stringify(v, null, 2) + '\n')
+    }
+  }
+  const offline = vectoren.filter((v) => !v.requires_chain_read).length
+  console.log(`${vectoren.length} vectoren${droog ? ' (droog, niets geschreven)' : ' geschreven naar vectors/settlement-link/'}`)
+  console.log(`  offline, zonder keten te lezen : ${offline}`)
+  console.log(`  met ketenlezing, gemarkeerd    : ${vectoren.length - offline}`)
+  console.log(`  elk commitment opnieuw berekend en gelijk bevonden aan het ondertekende bonnetje`)
+}

package/vectors/settlement-link/find-candidates-onchain.json

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+{
+  "id": "x402-evm-settlement-link-find-candidates-onchain",
+  "schema_version": "3.0.0",
+  "protocol": "x402",
+  "scheme": "exact",
+  "network": "eip155:84532",
+  "asset_transfer_method": "eip3009",
+  "encodes": "The chain-reading half of the walk, marked as such.",
+  "provenance": [
+    "x402 offer-receipt extension section 5.6.4, as proposed in pull request 3827 at commit 0e492d6 and not on main",
+    "EIP-3009"
+  ],
+  "description": "The full section 5.6.4 walk, starting from only the receipt, the salt and the asset: find the nonces this payer consumed in a window, then open the commitment on exactly one. Requires an archive-capable RPC for Base Sepolia. Included so the chain-dependent half is named rather than hidden, but a runner without RPC access should skip it and report that, not fail it.",
+  "requires_chain_read": true,
+  "input": {
+    "receipt": {
+      "format": "eip712",
+      "payload": {
+        "version": 2,
+        "network": "eip155:84532",
+        "resourceUrl": "https://api.tokenizen.nl/api/paid/verify-ownership",
+        "payer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+        "issuedAt": 1792187030,
+        "transaction": "",
+        "authorizationMethod": "eip3009",
+        "authorizationCommitment": "0x5c35a61a09a566a9c284fad18a70ac2ddfff34d01d2a3ce776ce94e8d5b38ff8"
+      },
+      "signature": "0x78615cb22986af0aad6e08b74ca78773bb58ece21660e84e4b35b3e5c1841b0075238ca9bfdf0f969ad3f2903af8f391fafd1b3fc7ebbf1fb5c949a3948fccde1c"
+    },
+    "authorizationSalt": "0xea85b2473363fd8fff1ccdd7f8638be8b47c7c05023e3e2e3f81bebb085ba2ad",
+    "asset": "0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e"
+  },
+  "context": {
+    "rpc": "any Base Sepolia endpoint that serves eth_getLogs over the window around the receipt issuedAt",
+    "expected_candidate_count": 2,
+    "note": "The candidate count is what the window actually produced on 2026-10-18 and will grow as this payer makes more payments; a runner should assert \"exactly one opens\", not the count."
+  },
+  "expected": {
+    "linked": true,
+    "outcome": "LINKED",
+    "identifier": "0x1120412c78ea1b2e8bf9eacfc3264c71a23ecd9b1fa579eb16030693344d5dfe",
+    "settlement_transaction": "0xed87b09bfb20a8c8b69908e163fcea6432d193d389640c0465afcb5561dfeb30"
+  }
+}

package/vectors/settlement-link/no-candidates-not-measured.json

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+{
+  "id": "x402-evm-settlement-link-no-candidates-not-measured",
+  "schema_version": "3.0.0",
+  "protocol": "x402",
+  "scheme": "exact",
+  "network": "eip155:84532",
+  "asset_transfer_method": "eip3009",
+  "encodes": "An incomplete check must be distinguishable from a failed one.",
+  "provenance": [
+    "x402 offer-receipt extension section 5.6.4, as proposed in pull request 3827 at commit 0e492d6 and not on main",
+    "EIP-3009"
+  ],
+  "description": "No candidate set could be obtained, for example because no chain access was available or the lookup window produced nothing. The correct answer is NOT_MEASURED and explicitly not NOT_LINKED: a check that could not run is not a receipt that fails. This is the third outcome a two-valued vocabulary cannot express.",
+  "requires_chain_read": false,
+  "input": {
+    "receipt": {
+      "format": "eip712",
+      "payload": {
+        "version": 2,
+        "network": "eip155:84532",
+        "resourceUrl": "https://api.tokenizen.nl/api/paid/verify-ownership",
+        "payer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+        "issuedAt": 1792187030,
+        "transaction": "",
+        "authorizationMethod": "eip3009",
+        "authorizationCommitment": "0x5c35a61a09a566a9c284fad18a70ac2ddfff34d01d2a3ce776ce94e8d5b38ff8"
+      },
+      "signature": "0x78615cb22986af0aad6e08b74ca78773bb58ece21660e84e4b35b3e5c1841b0075238ca9bfdf0f969ad3f2903af8f391fafd1b3fc7ebbf1fb5c949a3948fccde1c"
+    },
+    "authorizationSalt": "0xea85b2473363fd8fff1ccdd7f8638be8b47c7c05023e3e2e3f81bebb085ba2ad",
+    "asset": "0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e",
+    "candidates": null
+  },
+  "context": {
+    "note": "candidates is null rather than an empty list, and the two mean different things: null is \"we did not obtain a list\", empty is \"we obtained a list and it was empty\"."
+  },
+  "expected": {
+    "linked": null,
+    "outcome": "NOT_MEASURED"
+  }
+}

package/vectors/settlement-link/opens-live-2.json

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+{
+  "id": "x402-evm-settlement-link-opens-live-2",
+  "schema_version": "3.0.0",
+  "protocol": "x402",
+  "scheme": "exact",
+  "network": "eip155:84532",
+  "asset_transfer_method": "eip3009",
+  "encodes": "Receipt-to-settlement binding verified offline against a supplied candidate set.",
+  "provenance": [
+    "x402 offer-receipt extension section 5.6.4, as proposed in pull request 3827 at commit 0e492d6 and not on main",
+    "EIP-3009"
+  ],
+  "description": "A version 2 receipt whose authorizationCommitment opens on exactly one of the candidate nonces supplied with it. No chain access is needed because the candidates are given; this is the arithmetic half of section 5.6.4.",
+  "requires_chain_read": false,
+  "input": {
+    "receipt": {
+      "format": "eip712",
+      "payload": {
+        "version": 2,
+        "network": "eip155:84532",
+        "resourceUrl": "https://api.tokenizen.nl/api/paid/verify-ownership",
+        "payer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+        "issuedAt": 1792187518,
+        "transaction": "",
+        "authorizationMethod": "eip3009",
+        "authorizationCommitment": "0xfecee93e1aec7d6858a218bf324f23e2a4eed07925d8d4542b9662c5026e3d22"
+      },
+      "signature": "0x02f5ba0d2b7928a2dbb1d8845b664a79d38eebcd0a2c4532ed3c6b922051bf8d47c8aafb0520a875a708e3ed480d84a537962ea90d66ce2ee3811f4229aa8b401b"
+    },
+    "authorizationSalt": "0x63072ea656fe922bf04c9cefc4275314d695fff01e5b57f6628c8df0252cc5dc",
+    "asset": "0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e",
+    "candidates": [
+      {
+        "authorizer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+        "nonce": "0x515895dfac6f148a4cfdf5c4f8266b7859dbd6534cdf77104b1be9f484eb5005"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
+  "context": {
+    "note": "Real payment on Base Sepolia to https://api.tokenizen.nl/api/paid/verify-ownership. Buyer and seller are the same party, which proves the chain closes end to end and nothing about adoption.",
+    "settlement_transaction": "0x2898d0ceb97ddf60af98e19c94fc0adddbdf1e64f9032e62454085e37acfe36b"
+  },
+  "expected": {
+    "linked": true,
+    "outcome": "LINKED",
+    "identifier": "0x515895dfac6f148a4cfdf5c4f8266b7859dbd6534cdf77104b1be9f484eb5005"
+  }
+}

package/vectors/settlement-link/opens-live-3.json

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+{
+  "id": "x402-evm-settlement-link-opens-live-3",
+  "schema_version": "3.0.0",
+  "protocol": "x402",
+  "scheme": "exact",
+  "network": "eip155:84532",
+  "asset_transfer_method": "eip3009",
+  "encodes": "Receipt-to-settlement binding verified offline against a supplied candidate set.",
+  "provenance": [
+    "x402 offer-receipt extension section 5.6.4, as proposed in pull request 3827 at commit 0e492d6 and not on main",
+    "EIP-3009"
+  ],
+  "description": "A version 2 receipt whose authorizationCommitment opens on exactly one of the candidate nonces supplied with it. No chain access is needed because the candidates are given; this is the arithmetic half of section 5.6.4.",
+  "requires_chain_read": false,
+  "input": {
+    "receipt": {
+      "format": "eip712",
+      "payload": {
+        "version": 2,
+        "network": "eip155:84532",
+        "resourceUrl": "https://api.tokenizen.nl/api/paid/verify-ownership",
+        "payer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+        "issuedAt": 1792188211,
+        "transaction": "",
+        "authorizationMethod": "eip3009",
+        "authorizationCommitment": "0xea8dd34b8beac90f021a4e8d893a689c25249f86947770c8e6647c1cde206008"
+      },
+      "signature": "0x5b3a70cce6978ab44e51828b5ebbc55522e98b015045d94559d369420698da3b5309b28050dcb00ce14d65c8b230a273f8ff5ebff6410c6ae2a308e422ed5a611b"
+    },
+    "authorizationSalt": "0x349ddb90f38a3119817c5fc9cc253a2c20bcbe44aa845302df76889082b314d8",
+    "asset": "0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e",
+    "candidates": [
+      {
+        "authorizer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+        "nonce": "0x4b133bbec3ce0d8177a9010784faedb459f04384b45316bb526a5f96c90a70de"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
+  "context": {
+    "note": "Real payment on Base Sepolia to https://api.tokenizen.nl/api/paid/verify-ownership. Buyer and seller are the same party, which proves the chain closes end to end and nothing about adoption.",
+    "settlement_transaction": "0x2a9e95d63a5af8210767baa69143b364dad51caffc29a152c77e03bc508d7199"
+  },
+  "expected": {
+    "linked": true,
+    "outcome": "LINKED",
+    "identifier": "0x4b133bbec3ce0d8177a9010784faedb459f04384b45316bb526a5f96c90a70de"
+  }
+}

package/vectors/settlement-link/opens-live.json

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+{
+  "id": "x402-evm-settlement-link-opens-live",
+  "schema_version": "3.0.0",
+  "protocol": "x402",
+  "scheme": "exact",
+  "network": "eip155:84532",
+  "asset_transfer_method": "eip3009",
+  "encodes": "Receipt-to-settlement binding verified offline against a supplied candidate set.",
+  "provenance": [
+    "x402 offer-receipt extension section 5.6.4, as proposed in pull request 3827 at commit 0e492d6 and not on main",
+    "EIP-3009"
+  ],
+  "description": "A version 2 receipt whose authorizationCommitment opens on exactly one of the candidate nonces supplied with it. No chain access is needed because the candidates are given; this is the arithmetic half of section 5.6.4.",
+  "requires_chain_read": false,
+  "input": {
+    "receipt": {
+      "format": "eip712",
+      "payload": {
+        "version": 2,
+        "network": "eip155:84532",
+        "resourceUrl": "https://api.tokenizen.nl/api/paid/verify-ownership",
+        "payer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+        "issuedAt": 1792187030,
+        "transaction": "",
+        "authorizationMethod": "eip3009",
+        "authorizationCommitment": "0x5c35a61a09a566a9c284fad18a70ac2ddfff34d01d2a3ce776ce94e8d5b38ff8"
+      },
+      "signature": "0x78615cb22986af0aad6e08b74ca78773bb58ece21660e84e4b35b3e5c1841b0075238ca9bfdf0f969ad3f2903af8f391fafd1b3fc7ebbf1fb5c949a3948fccde1c"
+    },
+    "authorizationSalt": "0xea85b2473363fd8fff1ccdd7f8638be8b47c7c05023e3e2e3f81bebb085ba2ad",
+    "asset": "0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e",
+    "candidates": [
+      {
+        "authorizer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+        "nonce": "0x1120412c78ea1b2e8bf9eacfc3264c71a23ecd9b1fa579eb16030693344d5dfe"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
+  "context": {
+    "note": "Real payment on Base Sepolia to https://api.tokenizen.nl/api/paid/verify-ownership. Buyer and seller are the same party, which proves the chain closes end to end and nothing about adoption.",
+    "settlement_transaction": "0xed87b09bfb20a8c8b69908e163fcea6432d193d389640c0465afcb5561dfeb30"
+  },
+  "expected": {
+    "linked": true,
+    "outcome": "LINKED",
+    "identifier": "0x1120412c78ea1b2e8bf9eacfc3264c71a23ecd9b1fa579eb16030693344d5dfe"
+  }
+}

package/vectors/settlement-link/two-identical-payments.json

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+{
+  "id": "x402-evm-settlement-link-two-identical-payments",
+  "schema_version": "3.0.0",
+  "protocol": "x402",
+  "scheme": "exact",
+  "network": "eip155:84532",
+  "asset_transfer_method": "eip3009",
+  "encodes": "Disambiguation of two otherwise indistinguishable payments.",
+  "provenance": [
+    "x402 offer-receipt extension section 5.6.4, as proposed in pull request 3827 at commit 0e492d6 and not on main",
+    "EIP-3009"
+  ],
+  "description": "Two payments with identical terms (same payer, same asset, same amount, same resource) each open on their own settlement and on no other. Given both candidate sets together, each receipt selects exactly one.",
+  "requires_chain_read": false,
+  "input": {
+    "receipts": [
+      {
+        "receipt": {
+          "format": "eip712",
+          "payload": {
+            "version": 2,
+            "network": "eip155:84532",
+            "resourceUrl": "https://api.tokenizen.nl/api/paid/verify-ownership",
+            "payer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+            "issuedAt": 1792187030,
+            "transaction": "",
+            "authorizationMethod": "eip3009",
+            "authorizationCommitment": "0x5c35a61a09a566a9c284fad18a70ac2ddfff34d01d2a3ce776ce94e8d5b38ff8"
+          },
+          "signature": "0x78615cb22986af0aad6e08b74ca78773bb58ece21660e84e4b35b3e5c1841b0075238ca9bfdf0f969ad3f2903af8f391fafd1b3fc7ebbf1fb5c949a3948fccde1c"
+        },
+        "authorizationSalt": "0xea85b2473363fd8fff1ccdd7f8638be8b47c7c05023e3e2e3f81bebb085ba2ad",
+        "asset": "0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e"
+      },
+      {
+        "receipt": {
+          "format": "eip712",
+          "payload": {
+            "version": 2,
+            "network": "eip155:84532",
+            "resourceUrl": "https://api.tokenizen.nl/api/paid/verify-ownership",
+            "payer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+            "issuedAt": 1792187518,
+            "transaction": "",
+            "authorizationMethod": "eip3009",
+            "authorizationCommitment": "0xfecee93e1aec7d6858a218bf324f23e2a4eed07925d8d4542b9662c5026e3d22"
+          },
+          "signature": "0x02f5ba0d2b7928a2dbb1d8845b664a79d38eebcd0a2c4532ed3c6b922051bf8d47c8aafb0520a875a708e3ed480d84a537962ea90d66ce2ee3811f4229aa8b401b"
+        },
+        "authorizationSalt": "0x63072ea656fe922bf04c9cefc4275314d695fff01e5b57f6628c8df0252cc5dc",
+        "asset": "0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e"
+      }
+    ],
+    "candidates": [
+      {
+        "authorizer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+        "nonce": "0x1120412c78ea1b2e8bf9eacfc3264c71a23ecd9b1fa579eb16030693344d5dfe"
+      },
+      {
+        "authorizer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+        "nonce": "0x515895dfac6f148a4cfdf5c4f8266b7859dbd6534cdf77104b1be9f484eb5005"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
+  "context": {
+    "note": "Both are real payments on Base Sepolia with the same terms. Without the salt these two could not be told apart by any later reader.",
+    "settlements": [
+      "0xed87b09bfb20a8c8b69908e163fcea6432d193d389640c0465afcb5561dfeb30",
+      "0x2898d0ceb97ddf60af98e19c94fc0adddbdf1e64f9032e62454085e37acfe36b"
+    ]
+  },
+  "expected": {
+    "linked": true,
+    "outcome": "LINKED",
+    "mapping": [
+      {
+        "receipt_index": 0,
+        "identifier": "0x1120412c78ea1b2e8bf9eacfc3264c71a23ecd9b1fa579eb16030693344d5dfe"
+      },
+      {
+        "receipt_index": 1,
+        "identifier": "0x515895dfac6f148a4cfdf5c4f8266b7859dbd6534cdf77104b1be9f484eb5005"
+      }
+    ]
+  }
+}

package/vectors/settlement-link/wrong-nonce-live-2.json

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+{
+  "id": "x402-evm-settlement-link-wrong-nonce-live-2",
+  "schema_version": "3.0.0",
+  "protocol": "x402",
+  "scheme": "exact",
+  "network": "eip155:84532",
+  "asset_transfer_method": "eip3009",
+  "encodes": "A candidate that is not this payment must not satisfy the commitment.",
+  "provenance": [
+    "x402 offer-receipt extension section 5.6.4, as proposed in pull request 3827 at commit 0e492d6 and not on main",
+    "EIP-3009"
+  ],
+  "description": "The correct receipt and salt, but a candidate nonce that belongs to a different settlement by the same payer. The commitment must not open on it.",
+  "requires_chain_read": false,
+  "input": {
+    "receipt": {
+      "format": "eip712",
+      "payload": {
+        "version": 2,
+        "network": "eip155:84532",
+        "resourceUrl": "https://api.tokenizen.nl/api/paid/verify-ownership",
+        "payer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+        "issuedAt": 1792187518,
+        "transaction": "",
+        "authorizationMethod": "eip3009",
+        "authorizationCommitment": "0xfecee93e1aec7d6858a218bf324f23e2a4eed07925d8d4542b9662c5026e3d22"
+      },
+      "signature": "0x02f5ba0d2b7928a2dbb1d8845b664a79d38eebcd0a2c4532ed3c6b922051bf8d47c8aafb0520a875a708e3ed480d84a537962ea90d66ce2ee3811f4229aa8b401b"
+    },
+    "authorizationSalt": "0x63072ea656fe922bf04c9cefc4275314d695fff01e5b57f6628c8df0252cc5dc",
+    "asset": "0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e",
+    "candidates": [
+      {
+        "authorizer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+        "nonce": "0x1120412c78ea1b2e8bf9eacfc3264c71a23ecd9b1fa579eb16030693344d5dfe"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
+  "context": {
+    "note": "Both nonces were really consumed by this payer; only one belongs to this receipt."
+  },
+  "expected": {
+    "linked": false,
+    "outcome": "NOT_LINKED"
+  }
+}

package/vectors/settlement-link/wrong-nonce-live-3.json

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+{
+  "id": "x402-evm-settlement-link-wrong-nonce-live-3",
+  "schema_version": "3.0.0",
+  "protocol": "x402",
+  "scheme": "exact",
+  "network": "eip155:84532",
+  "asset_transfer_method": "eip3009",
+  "encodes": "A candidate that is not this payment must not satisfy the commitment.",
+  "provenance": [
+    "x402 offer-receipt extension section 5.6.4, as proposed in pull request 3827 at commit 0e492d6 and not on main",
+    "EIP-3009"
+  ],
+  "description": "The correct receipt and salt, but a candidate nonce that belongs to a different settlement by the same payer. The commitment must not open on it.",
+  "requires_chain_read": false,
+  "input": {
+    "receipt": {
+      "format": "eip712",
+      "payload": {
+        "version": 2,
+        "network": "eip155:84532",
+        "resourceUrl": "https://api.tokenizen.nl/api/paid/verify-ownership",
+        "payer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+        "issuedAt": 1792188211,
+        "transaction": "",
+        "authorizationMethod": "eip3009",
+        "authorizationCommitment": "0xea8dd34b8beac90f021a4e8d893a689c25249f86947770c8e6647c1cde206008"
+      },
+      "signature": "0x5b3a70cce6978ab44e51828b5ebbc55522e98b015045d94559d369420698da3b5309b28050dcb00ce14d65c8b230a273f8ff5ebff6410c6ae2a308e422ed5a611b"
+    },
+    "authorizationSalt": "0x349ddb90f38a3119817c5fc9cc253a2c20bcbe44aa845302df76889082b314d8",
+    "asset": "0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e",
+    "candidates": [
+      {
+        "authorizer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+        "nonce": "0x1120412c78ea1b2e8bf9eacfc3264c71a23ecd9b1fa579eb16030693344d5dfe"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
+  "context": {
+    "note": "Both nonces were really consumed by this payer; only one belongs to this receipt."
+  },
+  "expected": {
+    "linked": false,
+    "outcome": "NOT_LINKED"
+  }
+}

package/vectors/settlement-link/wrong-nonce-live.json

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+{
+  "id": "x402-evm-settlement-link-wrong-nonce-live",
+  "schema_version": "3.0.0",
+  "protocol": "x402",
+  "scheme": "exact",
+  "network": "eip155:84532",
+  "asset_transfer_method": "eip3009",
+  "encodes": "A candidate that is not this payment must not satisfy the commitment.",
+  "provenance": [
+    "x402 offer-receipt extension section 5.6.4, as proposed in pull request 3827 at commit 0e492d6 and not on main",
+    "EIP-3009"
+  ],
+  "description": "The correct receipt and salt, but a candidate nonce that belongs to a different settlement by the same payer. The commitment must not open on it.",
+  "requires_chain_read": false,
+  "input": {
+    "receipt": {
+      "format": "eip712",
+      "payload": {
+        "version": 2,
+        "network": "eip155:84532",
+        "resourceUrl": "https://api.tokenizen.nl/api/paid/verify-ownership",
+        "payer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+        "issuedAt": 1792187030,
+        "transaction": "",
+        "authorizationMethod": "eip3009",
+        "authorizationCommitment": "0x5c35a61a09a566a9c284fad18a70ac2ddfff34d01d2a3ce776ce94e8d5b38ff8"
+      },
+      "signature": "0x78615cb22986af0aad6e08b74ca78773bb58ece21660e84e4b35b3e5c1841b0075238ca9bfdf0f969ad3f2903af8f391fafd1b3fc7ebbf1fb5c949a3948fccde1c"
+    },
+    "authorizationSalt": "0xea85b2473363fd8fff1ccdd7f8638be8b47c7c05023e3e2e3f81bebb085ba2ad",
+    "asset": "0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e",
+    "candidates": [
+      {
+        "authorizer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+        "nonce": "0x515895dfac6f148a4cfdf5c4f8266b7859dbd6534cdf77104b1be9f484eb5005"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
+  "context": {
+    "note": "Both nonces were really consumed by this payer; only one belongs to this receipt."
+  },
+  "expected": {
+    "linked": false,
+    "outcome": "NOT_LINKED"
+  }
+}

package/vectors/settlement-link/wrong-salt-live-2.json

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+{
+  "id": "x402-evm-settlement-link-wrong-salt-live-2",
+  "schema_version": "3.0.0",
+  "protocol": "x402",
+  "scheme": "exact",
+  "network": "eip155:84532",
+  "asset_transfer_method": "eip3009",
+  "encodes": "A salt that belongs to another payment must not open this commitment.",
+  "provenance": [
+    "x402 offer-receipt extension section 5.6.4, as proposed in pull request 3827 at commit 0e492d6 and not on main",
+    "EIP-3009"
+  ],
+  "description": "The same receipt and the same candidate, but the salt of a different payment. The commitment must not open. This is the case the whole construction rests on: without the salt, two payments with identical terms could not be told apart.",
+  "requires_chain_read": false,
+  "input": {
+    "receipt": {
+      "format": "eip712",
+      "payload": {
+        "version": 2,
+        "network": "eip155:84532",
+        "resourceUrl": "https://api.tokenizen.nl/api/paid/verify-ownership",
+        "payer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+        "issuedAt": 1792187518,
+        "transaction": "",
+        "authorizationMethod": "eip3009",
+        "authorizationCommitment": "0xfecee93e1aec7d6858a218bf324f23e2a4eed07925d8d4542b9662c5026e3d22"
+      },
+      "signature": "0x02f5ba0d2b7928a2dbb1d8845b664a79d38eebcd0a2c4532ed3c6b922051bf8d47c8aafb0520a875a708e3ed480d84a537962ea90d66ce2ee3811f4229aa8b401b"
+    },
+    "authorizationSalt": "0xea85b2473363fd8fff1ccdd7f8638be8b47c7c05023e3e2e3f81bebb085ba2ad",
+    "asset": "0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e",
+    "candidates": [
+      {
+        "authorizer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+        "nonce": "0x515895dfac6f148a4cfdf5c4f8266b7859dbd6534cdf77104b1be9f484eb5005"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
+  "context": {
+    "note": "Both salts are real and come from two separate payments with identical terms."
+  },
+  "expected": {
+    "linked": false,
+    "outcome": "NOT_LINKED"
+  }
+}

package/vectors/settlement-link/wrong-salt-live-3.json

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+{
+  "id": "x402-evm-settlement-link-wrong-salt-live-3",
+  "schema_version": "3.0.0",
+  "protocol": "x402",
+  "scheme": "exact",
+  "network": "eip155:84532",
+  "asset_transfer_method": "eip3009",
+  "encodes": "A salt that belongs to another payment must not open this commitment.",
+  "provenance": [
+    "x402 offer-receipt extension section 5.6.4, as proposed in pull request 3827 at commit 0e492d6 and not on main",
+    "EIP-3009"
+  ],
+  "description": "The same receipt and the same candidate, but the salt of a different payment. The commitment must not open. This is the case the whole construction rests on: without the salt, two payments with identical terms could not be told apart.",
+  "requires_chain_read": false,
+  "input": {
+    "receipt": {
+      "format": "eip712",
+      "payload": {
+        "version": 2,
+        "network": "eip155:84532",
+        "resourceUrl": "https://api.tokenizen.nl/api/paid/verify-ownership",
+        "payer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+        "issuedAt": 1792188211,
+        "transaction": "",
+        "authorizationMethod": "eip3009",
+        "authorizationCommitment": "0xea8dd34b8beac90f021a4e8d893a689c25249f86947770c8e6647c1cde206008"
+      },
+      "signature": "0x5b3a70cce6978ab44e51828b5ebbc55522e98b015045d94559d369420698da3b5309b28050dcb00ce14d65c8b230a273f8ff5ebff6410c6ae2a308e422ed5a611b"
+    },
+    "authorizationSalt": "0xea85b2473363fd8fff1ccdd7f8638be8b47c7c05023e3e2e3f81bebb085ba2ad",
+    "asset": "0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e",
+    "candidates": [
+      {
+        "authorizer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+        "nonce": "0x4b133bbec3ce0d8177a9010784faedb459f04384b45316bb526a5f96c90a70de"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
+  "context": {
+    "note": "Both salts are real and come from two separate payments with identical terms."
+  },
+  "expected": {
+    "linked": false,
+    "outcome": "NOT_LINKED"
+  }
+}

package/vectors/settlement-link/wrong-salt-live.json

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+{
+  "id": "x402-evm-settlement-link-wrong-salt-live",
+  "schema_version": "3.0.0",
+  "protocol": "x402",
+  "scheme": "exact",
+  "network": "eip155:84532",
+  "asset_transfer_method": "eip3009",
+  "encodes": "A salt that belongs to another payment must not open this commitment.",
+  "provenance": [
+    "x402 offer-receipt extension section 5.6.4, as proposed in pull request 3827 at commit 0e492d6 and not on main",
+    "EIP-3009"
+  ],
+  "description": "The same receipt and the same candidate, but the salt of a different payment. The commitment must not open. This is the case the whole construction rests on: without the salt, two payments with identical terms could not be told apart.",
+  "requires_chain_read": false,
+  "input": {
+    "receipt": {
+      "format": "eip712",
+      "payload": {
+        "version": 2,
+        "network": "eip155:84532",
+        "resourceUrl": "https://api.tokenizen.nl/api/paid/verify-ownership",
+        "payer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+        "issuedAt": 1792187030,
+        "transaction": "",
+        "authorizationMethod": "eip3009",
+        "authorizationCommitment": "0x5c35a61a09a566a9c284fad18a70ac2ddfff34d01d2a3ce776ce94e8d5b38ff8"
+      },
+      "signature": "0x78615cb22986af0aad6e08b74ca78773bb58ece21660e84e4b35b3e5c1841b0075238ca9bfdf0f969ad3f2903af8f391fafd1b3fc7ebbf1fb5c949a3948fccde1c"
+    },
+    "authorizationSalt": "0x63072ea656fe922bf04c9cefc4275314d695fff01e5b57f6628c8df0252cc5dc",
+    "asset": "0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e",
+    "candidates": [
+      {
+        "authorizer": "0x87f344b6Ec48A936373d774D3De8649DEEB66Ee1",
+        "nonce": "0x1120412c78ea1b2e8bf9eacfc3264c71a23ecd9b1fa579eb16030693344d5dfe"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
+  "context": {
+    "note": "Both salts are real and come from two separate payments with identical terms."
+  },
+  "expected": {
+    "linked": false,
+    "outcome": "NOT_LINKED"
+  }
+}