agent-inspect 6.31.33 → 6.31.35

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Files changed (42) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +12 -0
  2. package/README.md +1 -1
  3. package/docs/LIMITATIONS.md +22 -0
  4. package/docs/SAFE-TRACE-SHARING.md +1 -1
  5. package/package.json +1 -1
  6. package/packages/cli/dist/{chunk-AILSHDEF.mjs → chunk-RLFYFWIZ.mjs} +76 -22
  7. package/packages/cli/dist/chunk-RLFYFWIZ.mjs.map +1 -0
  8. package/packages/cli/dist/index.cjs +136 -37
  9. package/packages/cli/dist/index.cjs.map +1 -1
  10. package/packages/cli/dist/index.mjs +64 -19
  11. package/packages/cli/dist/index.mjs.map +1 -1
  12. package/packages/cli/dist/{src-SP36M4VB.mjs → src-S23RCPL2.mjs} +3 -3
  13. package/packages/cli/dist/{src-SP36M4VB.mjs.map → src-S23RCPL2.mjs.map} +1 -1
  14. package/packages/core/dist/advanced.cjs +47 -7
  15. package/packages/core/dist/advanced.cjs.map +1 -1
  16. package/packages/core/dist/advanced.mjs +9 -9
  17. package/packages/core/dist/checks.cjs +71 -18
  18. package/packages/core/dist/checks.cjs.map +1 -1
  19. package/packages/core/dist/checks.mjs +3 -3
  20. package/packages/core/dist/{chunk-6S666BF4.mjs → chunk-2SKAI5ZN.mjs} +3 -3
  21. package/packages/core/dist/{chunk-6S666BF4.mjs.map → chunk-2SKAI5ZN.mjs.map} +1 -1
  22. package/packages/core/dist/{chunk-EMDJLFRK.mjs → chunk-3OMB34E6.mjs} +74 -21
  23. package/packages/core/dist/chunk-3OMB34E6.mjs.map +1 -0
  24. package/packages/core/dist/{chunk-FBPDF7HO.mjs → chunk-6F6KLGCR.mjs} +3 -3
  25. package/packages/core/dist/{chunk-FBPDF7HO.mjs.map → chunk-6F6KLGCR.mjs.map} +1 -1
  26. package/packages/core/dist/{chunk-RB6WANSW.mjs → chunk-PU3FF5AP.mjs} +5 -4
  27. package/packages/core/dist/chunk-PU3FF5AP.mjs.map +1 -0
  28. package/packages/core/dist/{chunk-VIEJJ5JB.mjs → chunk-X5RP2E2H.mjs} +4 -4
  29. package/packages/core/dist/{chunk-VIEJJ5JB.mjs.map → chunk-X5RP2E2H.mjs.map} +1 -1
  30. package/packages/core/dist/exporters.cjs +33 -9
  31. package/packages/core/dist/exporters.cjs.map +1 -1
  32. package/packages/core/dist/exporters.mjs +33 -10
  33. package/packages/core/dist/exporters.mjs.map +1 -1
  34. package/packages/core/dist/index.cjs +3 -2
  35. package/packages/core/dist/index.cjs.map +1 -1
  36. package/packages/core/dist/index.mjs +4 -4
  37. package/packages/core/dist/writers.cjs +3 -2
  38. package/packages/core/dist/writers.cjs.map +1 -1
  39. package/packages/core/dist/writers.mjs +1 -1
  40. package/packages/cli/dist/chunk-AILSHDEF.mjs.map +0 -1
  41. package/packages/core/dist/chunk-EMDJLFRK.mjs.map +0 -1
  42. package/packages/core/dist/chunk-RB6WANSW.mjs.map +0 -1
package/CHANGELOG.md CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,17 @@
1
1
  # Changelog
2
2
 
3
+ ## 6.31.35
4
+
5
+ ### Patch Changes
6
+
7
+ - 3cb8284: Bound and order tool-name diagnostics: cap codepoint annotations, skip pure non-Latin noise, keep bidi/control visible, and sort allowlist causes ahead of missing-tool consequences across rules (#522 follow-up). Add recipe-local refund ceiling/entity/approval (#527) and illustrative RETRIEVER→LLM OpenInference order examples via TraceCheckRule extension.
8
+
9
+ ## 6.31.34
10
+
11
+ ### Patch Changes
12
+
13
+ - c0726d8: Detect underscore-adjacent Stripe keys across redact, credential-value, and verify-safe patterns (#528; thanks Frank). Align `gate --evidence-on` check-results `aggregateStatus` with residual artifact assessment while keeping gate pass/fail separate (#529; thanks Frank). Fail unfinished before-order occurrences even when a finished peer exists, and treat after-start without a terminal as order-relevant. Harden Gary/Nest saved verifiers, refuse ambiguous HTML lifecycle joins, and evaluate Roy UNPROVABLE positive controls.
14
+
3
15
  ## 6.31.33
4
16
 
5
17
  ### Patch Changes
package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ The root package is enough for custom capture, the CLI, checks, and Evidence wor
213
213
 
214
214
  ## Status and documentation
215
215
 
216
- **Current published baseline:** **6.31.33** · persisted schema `1.0` · Node.js `>=20` · MIT.
216
+ **Current published baseline:** **6.31.35** · persisted schema `1.0` · Node.js `>=20` · MIT.
217
217
 
218
218
  Legacy v0.1 and v0.2 traces remain readable. Check the npm badge and [changelog](CHANGELOG.md) for the current published version.
219
219
 
@@ -98,4 +98,26 @@ Visual demos: [SCREENSHOTS.md](./SCREENSHOTS.md) · [CLI.md](./CLI.md)
98
98
 
99
99
  - Designed for **developer machines** and **inner-loop debugging**, not petabyte log warehouses.
100
100
 
101
+ ## Trust boundary (four independent questions)
102
+
103
+ AgentInspect answers local evidence questions. Treat these as **separate**:
104
+
105
+ 1. **Capture / coverage** — What events were recorded under the declared instrumentation boundary? Missing spans, uninstrumented SDK calls, and effects outside that boundary are not inventable from silence.
106
+ 2. **Trajectory contract** — Did a TraceContract / check preset pass on the selected run(s)? Pass/fail is rule evaluation over captured evidence, not proof of business correctness.
107
+ 3. **Residual artifact safety** — Do written share/strict artifacts pass the residual safety policy (`verify-safe` / Evidence assessment)? This is best-effort local policy, not a compliance certification or whole-org DLP guarantee.
108
+ 4. **Independent authorization / effect / origin** — Is there separate evidence of lawful authority, successful side effect, and trusted producer origin? AgentInspect does not supply those by default.
109
+
110
+ Implications:
111
+
112
+ - A recomputed **unsigned** Evidence manifest can verify **internal consistency** (listed files + hashes). It does **not** prove authenticity or producer identity.
113
+ - A **signature** (if supplied externally) can authenticate bytes to a trusted signer. It still does **not** prove completeness, lawful authority, successful business effect, or absence of an uninstrumented side effect.
114
+ - A recorded **approval-before-action** event is evidence that an approval was *recorded*. It is **not** proof that the approver had authority.
115
+ - Signed receipts or durable journals (parked designs) do **not** create exactly-once side effects.
116
+
117
+ Hypothetical approval evidence fields for a future recipe (not a shipped schema): distinct `decisionId`, `policyVersion`, `actorAuthorityRef`, `actionDigest`, `targetScope`, `decisionTime`, `executionId`, and a downstream `receiptId`. These are a proposed evidence set for discussion, not a banking integration.
118
+
119
+ Parked larger designs (coverage registry, cross-run linkage, durable intent journal, signing/sealing, general value comparisons, data-flow causal explanations) stay out of incidental patches — see [implementation/active/PARKED-DESIGNS.md](./implementation/active/PARKED-DESIGNS.md).
120
+
121
+ Related: [EVIDENCE-FORMAT.md](./EVIDENCE-FORMAT.md), [ADR-0012](./decisions/ADR-0012-evidence-contract-binding.md), [SAFE-TRACE-SHARING.md](./SAFE-TRACE-SHARING.md), [NETWORK-BEHAVIOR.md](./NETWORK-BEHAVIOR.md), [NO-EGRESS-POLICY.md](./NO-EGRESS-POLICY.md).
122
+
101
123
  For roadmap intent, see [ROADMAP.md](../ROADMAP.md) (direction only — not a delivery guarantee).
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
4
4
 
5
5
  AgentInspect traces, log-ingest outputs, and exports are local files. They may still contain sensitive metadata that you attached manually, collected from logs, or included through optional preview settings. Use this checklist before sharing an artifact in a GitHub issue, Discussion, PR, support thread, or public post.
6
6
 
7
- This guide is practical sharing guidance, not a guarantee that any artifact is safe to publish. Redaction profiles are **best-effort transformation**, not compliance-grade DLP or a safety certification. Always finish with `verify-safe` before sharing.
7
+ This guide is practical sharing guidance, not a guarantee that any artifact is safe to publish. Redaction profiles are **best-effort transformation**, not compliance-grade DLP or a safety certification. Always finish with `verify-safe` before sharing. Passing residual safety is still only one of the [four trust-boundary questions](./LIMITATIONS.md#trust-boundary-four-independent-questions) — it does not prove capture completeness, contract truth, or independent authorization.
8
8
 
9
9
  Built-in profiles redact high-confidence credential forms (provider keys, JWTs, bearer tokens, and bounded `token=` / `api_key=` / `internal_token=` style key/value secrets). Broad or context-sensitive findings—such as private filesystem paths—may still appear under `verify-safe` and as residual status after `redact`. Org-specific patterns can use a local CLI `--policy` JSON file (`extraKeys` plus bounded literal/prefix patterns; no user regex) or programmatic custom detectors.
10
10
 
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "agent-inspect",
3
- "version": "6.31.33",
3
+ "version": "6.31.35",
4
4
  "license": "MIT",
5
5
  "type": "module",
6
6
  "description": "Local evidence debugger and trajectory-test toolkit for TypeScript AI agents — execution trees, TraceContract checks, Evidence v2, and read-only MCP",
@@ -938,8 +938,9 @@ var HIGH_CONFIDENCE_CREDENTIAL_PATTERNS = [
938
938
  /\beyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{8,}\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{8,}\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{8,}\b/,
939
939
  /\b(?:sk-(?:proj-)?[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{16,}|sk-ant-[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{16,}|AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{20,})\b/,
940
940
  // Stripe secret / restricted keys use underscores (not sk-). Keep in sync with
941
- // packages/redact/src/index.ts + packages/core/src/checks DEFAULT_SECRET_PATTERNS (#520).
942
- /\b(?:sk|rk)_(?:live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}\b/,
941
+ // packages/redact/src/index.ts + packages/core/src/checks DEFAULT_SECRET_PATTERNS (#520/#528).
942
+ // Use non-alnum lookarounds so underscore-adjacent forms (acct_sk_live_…, …_eu) match.
943
+ /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])(?:sk|rk)_(?:live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/,
943
944
  /\bxox[abposr]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\b/,
944
945
  /\b(?:ghp|gho|ghu|ghs|ghr)_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}\b/,
945
946
  /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}\b/,
@@ -7832,10 +7833,11 @@ var SAFE_USAGE_LEAF_KEYS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
7832
7833
  var DEFAULT_SECRET_PATTERNS = [
7833
7834
  { id: "bearer-token", pattern: /Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/-]{12,}=*/ },
7834
7835
  { id: "openai-key", pattern: /sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/ },
7835
- // Stripe + Slack: keep in sync with packages/redact + credential-value-patterns (#520).
7836
+ // Stripe + Slack: keep in sync with packages/redact + credential-value-patterns (#520/#528).
7837
+ // Non-alnum lookarounds so underscore-adjacent forms (acct_sk_live_…, …_eu) match.
7836
7838
  {
7837
7839
  id: "stripe-key",
7838
- pattern: /\b(?:sk|rk)_(?:live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}\b/
7840
+ pattern: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])(?:sk|rk)_(?:live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/
7839
7841
  },
7840
7842
  { id: "slack-token", pattern: /\bxox[abposr]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\b/ },
7841
7843
  { id: "aws-access-key", pattern: /AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}/ },
@@ -8009,11 +8011,27 @@ function eventTimestamp(finding, eventById) {
8009
8011
  const eventId = finding.evidence[0]?.eventId;
8010
8012
  return eventId ? eventById.get(eventId)?.timestamp ?? "" : "";
8011
8013
  }
8014
+ function isObservedToolPolicyFinding(finding) {
8015
+ return finding.ruleId === "tool.usage" && finding.evidence[0]?.eventId !== void 0;
8016
+ }
8017
+ function isMissingToolConsequenceFinding(finding) {
8018
+ if (finding.evidence[0]?.eventId !== void 0) return false;
8019
+ if (finding.ruleId === "tool.usage" && /did not appear/.test(finding.message)) {
8020
+ return true;
8021
+ }
8022
+ return finding.ruleId.startsWith("contract.tool.arguments") && /^No finished tool named /.test(finding.message);
8023
+ }
8012
8024
  function compareFindings(eventById) {
8013
8025
  return (a, b) => {
8014
8026
  if (SEVERITY_RANK[a.severity] !== SEVERITY_RANK[b.severity]) {
8015
8027
  return SEVERITY_RANK[a.severity] - SEVERITY_RANK[b.severity];
8016
8028
  }
8029
+ const aPolicy = isObservedToolPolicyFinding(a);
8030
+ const bPolicy = isObservedToolPolicyFinding(b);
8031
+ const aMissing = isMissingToolConsequenceFinding(a);
8032
+ const bMissing = isMissingToolConsequenceFinding(b);
8033
+ if (aPolicy && bMissing) return -1;
8034
+ if (bPolicy && aMissing) return 1;
8017
8035
  const byRule = a.ruleId.localeCompare(b.ruleId);
8018
8036
  if (byRule !== 0) return byRule;
8019
8037
  if (STATUS_RANK[a.status] !== STATUS_RANK[b.status]) {
@@ -8149,20 +8167,43 @@ function failFinding(ruleId, message, evidence, expected, actual, meta) {
8149
8167
  function toolName(event) {
8150
8168
  return resolveCanonicalToolName(event);
8151
8169
  }
8170
+ var MAX_TOOL_NAME_CODEPOINT_DETAILS = 3;
8171
+ function isAsciiLetterCodePoint(codePoint) {
8172
+ return codePoint >= 65 && codePoint <= 90 || codePoint >= 97 && codePoint <= 122;
8173
+ }
8174
+ function isRiskyToolNameCodePoint(codePoint) {
8175
+ if (codePoint <= 31 || codePoint >= 127 && codePoint <= 159) return true;
8176
+ return codePoint === 1564 || codePoint === 8203 || codePoint === 8204 || codePoint === 8205 || codePoint === 8206 || codePoint === 8207 || codePoint >= 8234 && codePoint <= 8238 || codePoint >= 8294 && codePoint <= 8297 || codePoint === 65279;
8177
+ }
8178
+ function formatCodePointDetail(codePoint, index) {
8179
+ return `U+${codePoint.toString(16).toUpperCase().padStart(4, "0")} at index ${index}`;
8180
+ }
8152
8181
  function formatToolNameForMessage(name) {
8182
+ let hasAsciiLetter = false;
8183
+ let hasNonAscii = false;
8184
+ let hasRisky = false;
8153
8185
  const details = [];
8154
8186
  for (let index = 0; index < name.length; ) {
8155
8187
  const codePoint = name.codePointAt(index);
8156
8188
  const width = codePoint > 65535 ? 2 : 1;
8189
+ if (isAsciiLetterCodePoint(codePoint)) hasAsciiLetter = true;
8190
+ const risky = isRiskyToolNameCodePoint(codePoint);
8191
+ if (risky) hasRisky = true;
8157
8192
  if (codePoint > 127) {
8158
- details.push(
8159
- `U+${codePoint.toString(16).toUpperCase().padStart(4, "0")} at index ${index}`
8160
- );
8193
+ hasNonAscii = true;
8194
+ details.push(formatCodePointDetail(codePoint, index));
8195
+ } else if (risky) {
8196
+ details.push(formatCodePointDetail(codePoint, index));
8161
8197
  }
8162
8198
  index += width;
8163
8199
  }
8164
- if (details.length === 0) return name;
8165
- return `"${name}" (contains ${details.join("; ")})`;
8200
+ if (!hasRisky && !(hasAsciiLetter && hasNonAscii) || details.length === 0) {
8201
+ return name;
8202
+ }
8203
+ const shown = details.slice(0, MAX_TOOL_NAME_CODEPOINT_DETAILS);
8204
+ const remaining = details.length - shown.length;
8205
+ const detailText = remaining > 0 ? `${shown.join("; ")}; and ${remaining} more` : shown.join("; ");
8206
+ return `"${name}" (contains ${detailText})`;
8166
8207
  }
8167
8208
  function describeRunningEvent(event) {
8168
8209
  if (event.kind === "TOOL") {
@@ -8786,7 +8827,12 @@ function createStepOrderingRule(options) {
8786
8827
  const beforeRunning = semanticEvents(context).filter(
8787
8828
  (event) => event.kind === options.before.kind && event.status === "running" && stepEndpointName(event, options.before.kind) === options.before.name
8788
8829
  );
8789
- if (beforeEvents.length === 0 && afterEvents.length > 0 && beforeRunning.length > 0) {
8830
+ const afterRunning = semanticEvents(context).filter(
8831
+ (event) => event.kind === options.after.kind && event.status === "running" && stepEndpointName(event, options.after.kind) === options.after.name
8832
+ );
8833
+ const afterStarted = afterEvents.length > 0 || afterRunning.length > 0;
8834
+ const afterEvidenceEvent = afterEvents[0] ?? afterRunning[0];
8835
+ if (beforeRunning.length > 0 && afterStarted && afterEvidenceEvent !== void 0) {
8790
8836
  const endpointExpected2 = bothTools ? { before: options.before.name, after: options.after.name } : { before: options.before, after: options.after };
8791
8837
  return [
8792
8838
  failFinding(
@@ -8794,18 +8840,20 @@ function createStepOrderingRule(options) {
8794
8840
  `${subject} ${beforeLabel} started but never finished before ${afterLabel} ran.`,
8795
8841
  [
8796
8842
  ...beforeRunning.map((event) => eventEvidence3(event)),
8797
- eventEvidence3(afterEvents[0])
8843
+ eventEvidence3(afterEvidenceEvent)
8798
8844
  ],
8799
8845
  { ...endpointExpected2, mode },
8800
8846
  {
8801
8847
  code: bothTools ? "tool.order.interval-unresolved" : "step.order.interval-unresolved",
8802
8848
  unfinishedBefore: true,
8803
- beforeStatus: "running"
8849
+ beforeStatus: "running",
8850
+ ...beforeEvents.length > 0 ? { finishedBeforeMasked: true } : {},
8851
+ ...afterEvents.length === 0 ? { afterStatus: "running" } : {}
8804
8852
  }
8805
8853
  )
8806
8854
  ];
8807
8855
  }
8808
- if (beforeEvents.length === 0 || afterEvents.length === 0) {
8856
+ if (beforeEvents.length === 0 || !afterStarted) {
8809
8857
  if (!requireEndpoints) return [];
8810
8858
  const findings = [];
8811
8859
  if (beforeEvents.length === 0) {
@@ -8829,7 +8877,7 @@ function createStepOrderingRule(options) {
8829
8877
  )
8830
8878
  );
8831
8879
  }
8832
- if (afterEvents.length === 0) {
8880
+ if (!afterStarted) {
8833
8881
  const otherKinds = otherKindsForStepName(
8834
8882
  context,
8835
8883
  options.after.kind,
@@ -8852,9 +8900,15 @@ function createStepOrderingRule(options) {
8852
8900
  }
8853
8901
  return findings;
8854
8902
  }
8855
- const encounter = finishedEvents(context).filter(
8856
- (event) => event.kind === options.before.kind && stepEndpointName(event, options.before.kind) === options.before.name || event.kind === options.after.kind && stepEndpointName(event, options.after.kind) === options.after.name
8857
- );
8903
+ const afterForOrder = afterEvents.length > 0 ? afterEvents : afterRunning;
8904
+ const encounter = [
8905
+ ...finishedEvents(context).filter(
8906
+ (event) => event.kind === options.before.kind && stepEndpointName(event, options.before.kind) === options.before.name || event.kind === options.after.kind && stepEndpointName(event, options.after.kind) === options.after.name
8907
+ ),
8908
+ ...afterEvents.length === 0 ? afterRunning.filter(
8909
+ (event) => !finishedEvents(context).some((finished) => finished.eventId === event.eventId)
8910
+ ) : []
8911
+ ];
8858
8912
  let beforeIndex;
8859
8913
  let afterIndex;
8860
8914
  for (const [position, event] of encounter.entries()) {
@@ -8885,7 +8939,7 @@ function createStepOrderingRule(options) {
8885
8939
  ];
8886
8940
  }
8887
8941
  const beforeEvent = beforeEvents[0];
8888
- const afterEvent = afterEvents[0];
8942
+ const afterEvent = afterForOrder[0];
8889
8943
  const beforeEnd = eventEndMs(beforeEvent);
8890
8944
  const afterStart = eventStartMs(afterEvent);
8891
8945
  const endpointExpected = bothTools ? { before: options.before.name, after: options.after.name } : { before: options.before, after: options.after };
@@ -8971,7 +9025,7 @@ function createStepOrderingRule(options) {
8971
9025
  latestBefore = { event, end };
8972
9026
  }
8973
9027
  }
8974
- for (const event of afterEvents) {
9028
+ for (const event of afterForOrder) {
8975
9029
  const start = eventStartMs(event);
8976
9030
  if (start === void 0) {
8977
9031
  missingAfterStarts += 1;
@@ -9000,7 +9054,7 @@ function createStepOrderingRule(options) {
9000
9054
  const tie = tiedEnd === tiedStart ? recordedTieOrder(
9001
9055
  context,
9002
9056
  beforeEvents.filter((event) => eventEndMs(event) === tiedEnd),
9003
- afterEvents.filter((event) => eventStartMs(event) === tiedStart)
9057
+ afterForOrder.filter((event) => eventStartMs(event) === tiedStart)
9004
9058
  ) : void 0;
9005
9059
  if (latestBefore.end > earliestAfter.start || tie !== void 0 && tie.inOrder !== true) {
9006
9060
  return [
@@ -16171,5 +16225,5 @@ function renderGateReport(result, options = {}) {
16171
16225
  }
16172
16226
 
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  export { ATTRIBUTION_CONFIDENCES, COHORT_METRIC_IDS, DEFAULT_REDACT_KEYS, DEFAULT_SUITE_ARTIFACTS_DIR, DELIVERY_CONFLICT_ATTR, DELIVERY_EVENT_BASE_ATTR, EVIDENCE_FORMAT_VERSION, EVIDENCE_HTML_FILENAME, EVIDENCE_MANIFEST_FILENAME, IDENTITY_CONFLICT_ATTR, Redactor, TraceDirectory, TraceReadError, TreeBuilder, aggregateBundleSafeStatus, aggregateSessionCheckResults, analyzeCohort, applyProfileMetadataCaps, assertBundlePathContained, assertEvidenceRelativePath, buildActivitySummary, buildBundleMetadata, buildBundleSummaryMarkdown, buildEvidenceCausalFailureViewHtml, buildEvidenceCiPackage, buildEvidenceCircuitViewHtml, buildEvidenceContractsViewHtml, buildEvidenceDiffViewHtml, buildEvidenceHtmlShell, buildEvidenceManifest, buildEvidenceOutcomesViewHtml, buildEvidenceProvenanceViewHtml, buildEvidenceSafetyViewHtml, buildEvidenceTimelineViewHtml, buildEvidenceToolsLlmViewHtml, buildEvidenceTreeViewHtml, buildLocalExplanation, buildPlaceholderArtifact, buildRunSummary, buildRunTimeline, buildRunWhatSummary, buildSessionIndex, buildTraceStats, buildZipArchive, bundleFailsOnSafety, bundleRunAssetRelativePath, collectTraceSchemaVersions, compactAttributes, createBaselineRegressionRule, createLlmUsageRule, createMaxStepDurationRule, createObservedOutcomeRule, createRequireCompletedRule, createRunDepthRule, createRunDurationRule, createRunStatusRule, createSafetyOversizedAttributeRule, createSafetyRawContentRule, createSafetyRedactionRule, createSafetySecretPatternRule, createStallDetectionRule, createStructureCycleRule, createStructureOrphanRule, createStructureParallelWidthRule, createStructureRelationshipRule, createToolUsageRule, defaultBundleOutputPath, defaultSuiteConfigTemplate, defineTraceContract, diffRuns, diffTraceEvents, enrichSessionRunRecord, escapeHtml, escapeMarkdown, evaluateTraceContract, extractMetadata, extractOutcomesFromTraceEvents, filterMetasBySessionScope, filterTraces, flattenTree, formatDuration2 as formatDuration, formatStepLabel, formatTimestamp, gateHasThresholds, getIndent, getTraceFilePath, inferEvidenceFileRole, isAgentInspectTrace, isAttributionConfidence, isCredentialSensitiveKey, isPersistedInspectEvent, loadSessionRunRecords, loadSuiteConfig, loadTraceMetadataList, manualTraceEventsToComparableRun, nanoid, normalizeBundleOutputPath, openTrace, parseCohortMetricList, parseDuration, parseDurationFilter, parseGateList, parseTraceJsonl, persistedInspectEventsToRunTrees, persistedInspectEventsToTraceEvents, projectLogicalEvents, renderActivitySummaryHuman, renderCohortReport, renderErrorLine, renderGateReport, renderObservedOutcomesHtml, renderObservedOutcomesMarkdown, renderRunDiff, renderRunWhat, renderStepLine, renderSuiteReport, renderTimeline, renderTraceStats, resolveBundleRunIds, resolveRedactionProfile, resolveSuiteTemplate, resolveTraceDir, runGate, runSuite, runTraceChecks, safeString, sanitizeBundleRunId, searchTraces, serializeEvidenceManifest, sha256Hex, stableJson, stringContainsHighConfidenceCredential, summarizeObservedOutcomes, summarizeSemanticParity, traceEventToPersistedInspectEvent, truncateName, truncateStringForProfile, validateEvent, validateSuiteConfig, verifyEvidenceDirectory, zeroKinds };
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- //# sourceMappingURL=chunk-AILSHDEF.mjs.map
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- //# sourceMappingURL=chunk-AILSHDEF.mjs.map
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+ //# sourceMappingURL=chunk-RLFYFWIZ.mjs.map
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+ //# sourceMappingURL=chunk-RLFYFWIZ.mjs.map