agent-bober 0.18.0 → 0.19.0

package/skills/bober.security-payments/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: bober.security-payments
+description: "Payments/PSP backend security signature library. Not a workflow skill -- a data file of discrete vulnerable/safe code signature blocks read by SecuritySignatureParser. Covers webhook HMAC verification, non-constant-time signature comparison, idempotency keys, duplicate-credit on webhook replay, refund/chargeback abuse, float money, withdrawal-to-different-method, withdrawal approval thresholds, client-supplied amounts, and unvalidated refund amounts."
+---
+
+# bober.security-payments — Payments/PSP Backend Security Signature Library
+
+This skill is a **signature-library** file, not a workflow skill. It is read (as raw
+markdown text) by `SecuritySignatureParser.parse()`
+(`src/orchestrator/security-knowledge/parser.ts`) and turned into typed
+`SecuritySignature[]` records used by the security-audit agent team. Do not confuse this
+with `bober.security-audit`, which is the audit *workflow* skill.
+
+## Signature Block Format
+
+Each signature is a level-3 heading (three `#` characters, a space, then the
+`signatureId`) followed by labelled fields and two fenced code examples. This file and
+`SecuritySignatureParser` are one executable spec — keep them in sync.
+
+Required fields per block:
+- The heading text itself is the `signatureId` (must be non-empty).
+- `- **Title:** <human-readable title>`
+- `- **CWE:** CWE-xx` (optional — omit the line entirely for `cwe: null`)
+- `- **Severity:** critical|high|medium|low|info`
+- `- **VulnClass:** <a VulnClass union member, verbatim — see security-audit-types.ts>`
+- `- **Invariant:** <the safety invariant this signature protects>`
+- `- **Keywords:** comma, separated, keywords`
+
+Then two labelled fenced code examples:
+- `**Unsafe:**` followed by a fenced `ts` block with the vulnerable example.
+- `**Safe:**` followed by a fenced `ts` block with the fixed example.
+
+A block missing `Title`, a valid `VulnClass`, a valid `Severity`, or a non-empty
+unsafe/safe example is dropped by the parser — never a fatal error.
+
+## Signatures
+
+### payments.webhook-missing-hmac
+- **Title:** PSP webhook processed without HMAC signature verification
+- **CWE:** CWE-345
+- **Severity:** critical
+- **VulnClass:** authn-authz
+- **Invariant:** A PSP webhook payload is only processed after its HMAC signature over the raw request body is verified — an unsigned or unverified webhook body is never trusted.
+- **Keywords:** webhook, HMAC, PSP, raw-body, signature, verify
+
+**Unsafe:**
+```ts
+app.post("/psp/webhook", (req, res) => { applyPayment(req.body); }); // no signature check
+```
+
+**Safe:**
+```ts
+app.post("/psp/webhook", (req, res) => {
+  const expected = crypto.createHmac("sha256", secret).update(req.rawBody).digest("hex");
+  if (!verifySignature(expected, req.headers["x-psp-signature"])) return res.status(401).end();
+  applyPayment(req.body);
+});
+```
+
+### payments.webhook-nonconstant-compare
+- **Title:** Webhook signature compared non-constant-time / no replay timestamp
+- **CWE:** CWE-208
+- **Severity:** high
+- **VulnClass:** crypto-weakness
+- **Invariant:** A webhook signature comparison always uses a constant-time comparison and rejects payloads whose signed timestamp falls outside an acceptable replay window.
+- **Keywords:** timingSafeEqual, timing attack, ===, timestamp, replay
+
+**Unsafe:**
+```ts
+if (req.headers["x-psp-signature"] === expected) applyPayment(req.body);
+```
+
+**Safe:**
+```ts
+const inWindow = Date.now() - Number(req.headers["x-psp-timestamp"]) <= MAX_SKEW_MS;
+if (inWindow && crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(expected), Buffer.from(req.headers["x-psp-signature"]))) {
+  applyPayment(req.body);
+}
+```
+
+### payments.missing-idempotency-key
+- **Title:** Missing/non-atomic idempotency key on a money endpoint
+- **CWE:** CWE-362
+- **Severity:** critical
+- **VulnClass:** race-condition
+- **Invariant:** A charge request is applied at most once per idempotency key, enforced by a unique constraint at the database layer via an atomic insert — never by an application-level check-then-insert.
+- **Keywords:** idempotency, idempotency-key, atomic, unique, upsert
+
+**Unsafe:**
+```ts
+const existing = await db.query("SELECT id FROM charges WHERE key = $1", [idempotencyKey]);
+if (!existing) await db.query("INSERT INTO charges (key, amount) VALUES ($1, $2)", [idempotencyKey, amount]);
+```
+
+**Safe:**
+```ts
+await db.query(
+  "INSERT INTO charges (key, amount) VALUES ($1, $2) ON CONFLICT (key) DO NOTHING", // key is UNIQUE
+  [idempotencyKey, amount],
+);
+```
+
+### payments.duplicate-credit-webhook-replay
+- **Title:** Duplicate credit on PSP webhook replay (no event dedup)
+- **CWE:** CWE-799
+- **Severity:** critical
+- **VulnClass:** money-integrity
+- **Invariant:** Each provider webhook event is applied at most once, keyed by the provider's unique event id enforced with a database uniqueness constraint — a retried event never credits the account twice.
+- **Keywords:** webhook, replay, dedup, provider-event, double-credit
+
+**Unsafe:**
+```ts
+app.post("/webhook", async (req, res) => { await creditAccount(req.body); }); // "payment_intent.succeeded" retried by PSP credits twice
+```
+
+**Safe:**
+```ts
+app.post("/webhook", async (req, res) => {
+  const inserted = await db.query(
+    "INSERT INTO webhook_events (event_id) VALUES ($1) ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING RETURNING event_id",
+    [req.body.id],
+  );
+  if (inserted.rowCount === 0) return res.status(200).end(); // already processed
+  await creditAccount(req.body);
+});
+```
+
+### payments.refund-chargeback-abuse
+- **Title:** Refund/chargeback abuse (over-refund, double refund, post-chargeback)
+- **CWE:** CWE-840
+- **Severity:** critical
+- **VulnClass:** money-integrity
+- **Invariant:** A refund amount never exceeds the captured amount minus amounts already refunded, and no further refund is issued once a charge has been disputed/charged back.
+- **Keywords:** refund, chargeback, over-refund, double refund, dispute
+
+**Unsafe:**
+```ts
+await refund(chargeId, req.body.amount); // no cap against captured-minus-already-refunded
+```
+
+**Safe:**
+```ts
+const charge = await getCharge(chargeId);
+if (charge.disputed) throw new Error("charge is disputed");
+const remaining = charge.capturedAmount - charge.refundedAmount;
+if (req.body.amount > remaining) throw new Error("refund exceeds remaining captured amount");
+await refund(chargeId, req.body.amount);
+```
+
+### payments.float-money-currency-mismatch
+- **Title:** Float money / currency-conversion mismatch
+- **CWE:** CWE-681
+- **Severity:** high
+- **VulnClass:** money-integrity
+- **Invariant:** Monetary amounts are represented as integer minor units with an explicit currency code end-to-end — amounts in different currencies are never added directly, and amounts are never stored or summed as IEEE-754 floats.
+- **Keywords:** float, minor units, currency, Decimal, rounding, cents
+
+**Unsafe:**
+```ts
+totalUsd += lineItem.price * 1.1; // float drift; also silently adds a EUR line item's price
+```
+
+**Safe:**
+```ts
+if (lineItem.currency !== "USD") throw new Error("currency mismatch");
+totalCents += Math.round(lineItem.priceCents * 1.1); // integer minor units
+```
+
+### payments.withdraw-different-method
+- **Title:** Withdrawal to a method different from the funding source
+- **CWE:** CWE-840
+- **Severity:** critical
+- **VulnClass:** money-integrity
+- **Invariant:** A withdrawal payout is only permitted to the same verified instrument the funds were originally deposited from — an arbitrary attacker-supplied destination account is never accepted.
+- **Keywords:** withdrawal, payout, funding source, cash-out, method
+
+**Unsafe:**
+```ts
+await payout(userId, req.body.destinationAccount, req.body.amount); // any destination accepted
+```
+
+**Safe:**
+```ts
+const fundingInstrument = await getVerifiedFundingInstrument(userId);
+if (req.body.destinationAccount !== fundingInstrument.id) throw new Error("destination must match funding source");
+await payout(userId, fundingInstrument.id, req.body.amount);
+```
+
+### payments.missing-withdrawal-approval-threshold
+- **Title:** Large withdrawal with no approval threshold / dual control
+- **CWE:** CWE-862
+- **Severity:** high
+- **VulnClass:** authn-authz
+- **Invariant:** A withdrawal above a configured threshold requires a second approver (dual control) before funds move — no withdrawal amount is auto-approved unconditionally.
+- **Keywords:** withdrawal, approval, threshold, dual control, four-eyes
+
+**Unsafe:**
+```ts
+await processWithdrawal(userId, req.body.amount); // any size auto-approved
+```
+
+**Safe:**
+```ts
+if (req.body.amount > WITHDRAWAL_APPROVAL_THRESHOLD_CENTS) {
+  await queueForDualControlApproval(userId, req.body.amount);
+} else {
+  await processWithdrawal(userId, req.body.amount);
+}
+```
+
+### payments.client-supplied-amount
+- **Title:** Trusting client-supplied price/amount at charge time
+- **CWE:** CWE-602
+- **Severity:** critical
+- **VulnClass:** money-integrity
+- **Invariant:** The amount charged is always computed from the server-side order/catalog at charge time — a price or amount value submitted by the client is never used directly.
+- **Keywords:** amount, price, tampering, client-supplied, server-side
+
+**Unsafe:**
+```ts
+await charge(userId, req.body.amount); // client controls the charged amount directly
+```
+
+**Safe:**
+```ts
+const order = await getOrder(req.body.orderId); // server-resolved amount from the catalog/order record
+await charge(userId, order.totalCents);
+```
+
+### payments.unvalidated-refund-amount
+- **Title:** Negative/oversized refund amount not validated
+- **CWE:** CWE-20
+- **Severity:** high
+- **VulnClass:** money-integrity
+- **Invariant:** A refund amount is validated as a positive integer no greater than the captured amount before any refund is issued — a negative, zero, or oversized value is rejected.
+- **Keywords:** refund, negative, validation, amount, bound
+
+**Unsafe:**
+```ts
+await refund(chargeId, req.body.amount); // negative amount inverts refund into a charge
+```
+
+**Safe:**
+```ts
+if (!Number.isInteger(req.body.amount) || req.body.amount <= 0 || req.body.amount > charge.capturedAmount) {
+  throw new Error("invalid refund amount");
+}
+await refund(chargeId, req.body.amount);
+```

package/skills/bober.security-react/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: bober.security-react
+description: "React client-side security signature library. Not a workflow skill -- a data file of discrete vulnerable/safe code signature blocks read by SecuritySignatureParser. Covers XSS via dangerouslySetInnerHTML/innerHTML/document.write, secrets committed into the client bundle, client-side-only trust of security decisions, unsafe href/redirect, postMessage without origin checks, and prototype pollution via client-side deep merge of untrusted input."
+---
+
+# bober.security-react — React Client-Side Security Signature Library
+
+This skill is a **signature-library** file, not a workflow skill. It is read (as raw
+markdown text) by `SecuritySignatureParser.parse()`
+(`src/orchestrator/security-knowledge/parser.ts`) and turned into typed
+`SecuritySignature[]` records used by the security-audit agent team. Do not confuse this
+with `bober.security-audit`, which is the audit *workflow* skill, or with
+`skills/bober.react/SKILL.md`, which is the unrelated React *framework* skill.
+
+## Signature Block Format
+
+Each signature is a level-3 heading (three `#` characters, a space, then the
+`signatureId`) followed by labelled fields and two fenced code examples. This file and
+`SecuritySignatureParser` are one executable spec — keep them in sync.
+
+Required fields per block:
+- The heading text itself is the `signatureId` (must be non-empty).
+- `- **Title:** <human-readable title>`
+- `- **CWE:** CWE-xx` (optional — omit the line entirely for `cwe: null`)
+- `- **Severity:** critical|high|medium|low|info`
+- `- **VulnClass:** <a VulnClass union member, verbatim — see security-audit-types.ts>`
+- `- **Invariant:** <the safety invariant this signature protects>`
+- `- **Keywords:** comma, separated, keywords`
+
+Then two labelled fenced code examples:
+- `**Unsafe:**` followed by a fenced `ts` block with the vulnerable example.
+- `**Safe:**` followed by a fenced `ts` block with the fixed example.
+
+A block missing `Title`, a valid `VulnClass`, a valid `Severity`, or a non-empty
+unsafe/safe example is dropped by the parser — never a fatal error.
+
+## Signatures
+
+### react.dangerously-set-inner-html
+- **Title:** XSS via dangerouslySetInnerHTML with variable input
+- **CWE:** CWE-79
+- **Severity:** critical
+- **VulnClass:** xss
+- **Invariant:** `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` is never given HTML built from unsanitized user-controlled data — either the content is rendered as text or it is passed through a sanitizer first.
+- **Keywords:** dangerouslySetInnerHTML, XSS, __html, DOMPurify, sanitize
+
+**Unsafe:**
+```tsx
+<div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: userBio }} />
+```
+
+**Safe:**
+```tsx
+<div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: DOMPurify.sanitize(userBio) }} />
+```
+
+### react.raw-innerhtml-documentwrite
+- **Title:** XSS via innerHTML / document.write with variable input
+- **CWE:** CWE-79
+- **Severity:** critical
+- **VulnClass:** xss
+- **Invariant:** DOM content derived from user-controlled data is assigned via `textContent` or a sanitized render path — `innerHTML` and `document.write` are never given unsanitized user input.
+- **Keywords:** innerHTML, document.write, XSS, textContent, DOM
+
+**Unsafe:**
+```ts
+el.innerHTML = new URLSearchParams(location.search).get("q");
+```
+
+**Safe:**
+```ts
+el.textContent = new URLSearchParams(location.search).get("q");
+```
+
+### react.secret-in-client-bundle
+- **Title:** Secret / API key committed into the client bundle
+- **CWE:** CWE-798
+- **Severity:** critical
+- **VulnClass:** secret-handling
+- **Invariant:** A secret credential is never referenced from client-side code or a `REACT_APP_`/build-time env var that ships in the bundle — secret-gated calls are proxied through a server that holds the credential.
+- **Keywords:** API key, client bundle, secret, process.env, REACT_APP
+
+**Unsafe:**
+```ts
+const stripeSecretKey = process.env.REACT_APP_STRIPE_SECRET_KEY; // bundled into client JS, extractable
+```
+
+**Safe:**
+```ts
+// client never holds the secret key; it calls a server endpoint that holds it
+const res = await fetch("/api/create-payment-intent", { method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify(order) });
+```
+
+### react.client-trusted-authz
+- **Title:** Security decision trusted client-side (must be enforced server-side)
+- **CWE:** CWE-602
+- **Severity:** critical
+- **VulnClass:** authn-authz
+- **Invariant:** A UI element being conditionally rendered based on a client-held flag is never the sole enforcement of an authorization decision — the server independently re-checks authorization on every request the action triggers.
+- **Keywords:** client-side, isAdmin, authorization, trust boundary, server
+
+**Unsafe:**
+```tsx
+{user.isAdmin && <AdminPanel />} // server trusts any request that reaches the admin API
+```
+
+**Safe:**
+```tsx
+{user.isAdmin && <AdminPanel />} // UI hint only; server middleware independently requires an admin role
+```
+
+### react.unsafe-href-redirect
+- **Title:** Unsafe href / open redirect (javascript: scheme / attacker-controlled target)
+- **CWE:** CWE-601
+- **Severity:** high
+- **VulnClass:** input-validation
+- **Invariant:** A URL used as a link target or redirect destination is validated against an allowed scheme and, for redirects, an allowlist of same-origin/known paths before use — an attacker-controlled `javascript:` URI or arbitrary external redirect target is never followed.
+- **Keywords:** href, javascript:, open redirect, location, next, allowlist
+
+**Unsafe:**
+```tsx
+<a href={userSuppliedUrl}>Visit</a>
+```
+
+**Safe:**
+```tsx
+const safeUrl = /^https?:\/\//.test(userSuppliedUrl) ? userSuppliedUrl : "#";
+<a href={safeUrl}>Visit</a>
+```
+
+### react.postmessage-no-origin
+- **Title:** postMessage handler without origin check
+- **CWE:** CWE-346
+- **Severity:** high
+- **VulnClass:** input-validation
+- **Invariant:** A `message` event listener always verifies `event.origin` against an allowlist before acting on `event.data` — a message from an unexpected origin is never processed.
+- **Keywords:** postMessage, message event, origin, onmessage, allowlist
+
+**Unsafe:**
+```ts
+window.addEventListener("message", (event) => { runCommand(event.data); });
+```
+
+**Safe:**
+```ts
+window.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
+  if (!ALLOWED_ORIGINS.includes(event.origin)) return;
+  runCommand(event.data);
+});
+```
+
+### react.prototype-pollution-deepmerge
+- **Title:** Prototype pollution via client-side deep merge of untrusted input
+- **CWE:** CWE-1321
+- **Severity:** high
+- **VulnClass:** input-validation
+- **Invariant:** A deep-merge of parsed untrusted JSON always rejects or strips `__proto__`, `constructor`, and `prototype` keys before merging — object state derived from untrusted input never reaches `Object.prototype`.
+- **Keywords:** prototype pollution, __proto__, deep merge, constructor, JSON.parse
+
+**Unsafe:**
+```ts
+const merged = deepMerge(state, JSON.parse(untrustedResponse)); // "__proto__" key pollutes Object.prototype
+```
+
+**Safe:**
+```ts
+function safeDeepMerge(target, source) {
+  for (const key of Object.keys(source)) {
+    if (key === "__proto__" || key === "constructor" || key === "prototype") continue;
+    target[key] = source[key];
+  }
+  return target;
+}
+const merged = safeDeepMerge(state, JSON.parse(untrustedResponse));
+```
+
+### react.token-in-localstorage
+- **Title:** Auth token stored in localStorage (XSS-exfiltratable)
+- **CWE:** CWE-922
+- **Severity:** high
+- **VulnClass:** secret-handling
+- **Invariant:** An authentication token is stored in an httpOnly cookie inaccessible to JavaScript — it is never written to `localStorage`/`sessionStorage`, where any XSS on the page can read and exfiltrate it.
+- **Keywords:** localStorage, JWT, token, httpOnly, XSS exfiltration
+
+**Unsafe:**
+```ts
+localStorage.setItem("jwt", token); // any injected script can read this
+```
+
+**Safe:**
+```ts
+// server sets the token as an httpOnly, Secure, SameSite cookie on login;
+// the client never touches the token value directly
+```