@zyphr-dev/node-sdk 0.1.57 → 0.1.58

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -25779,7 +25779,7 @@ interface AuthEmailVerificationApiSendEmailVerificationOperationRequest {
  */
 interface AuthEmailVerificationApiInterface {
     /**
-     * Verify the user\'s email using a token you collected yourself. IMPORTANT: the emailed verification LINK verifies the address server-side **on click** and then redirects to `redirect_url`. So if you take the token off that redirect and post it here, it is already redeemed — and this endpoint treats that as an idempotent **success** (`200` with `already_verified: true`), not an error. Only a genuinely invalid / expired / unknown token returns `400`. `send` / `confirm` / `resend` are NOT a mandatory matched set — `confirm` is for flows where you collect the token directly rather than landing the hosted redirect. Recommended pattern for the redirect landing: call `confirm`, ignore its result, then read the user\'s verified state back and report that — correct whether or not the link already consumed the token.
+     * Verify the user\'s email using the token from the emailed link. Zyphr does NOT host auth pages and never redeems the token itself. The emailed link points at YOUR `redirect_url` with `?token=<raw>`; your app reads that token and posts it here. Nothing is verified until this call. This endpoint is idempotent: re-posting an already-redeemed token returns `200` with `already_verified: true` rather than an error, so a double submit or a link opened twice is safe. Only a genuinely invalid / expired / unknown token returns `400`. Note `redirect_url` is REQUIRED (snake_case) when sending the verification email — there is no hosted fallback page.
      * @summary Confirm email verification
      * @param {ConfirmEmailVerificationRequest} confirmEmailVerificationRequest
      * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -25788,7 +25788,7 @@ interface AuthEmailVerificationApiInterface {
      */
     confirmEmailVerificationRaw(requestParameters: AuthEmailVerificationApiConfirmEmailVerificationOperationRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | InitOverrideFunction): Promise<ApiResponse<ConfirmEmailVerificationResponse>>;
     /**
-     * Verify the user\'s email using a token you collected yourself. IMPORTANT: the emailed verification LINK verifies the address server-side **on click** and then redirects to `redirect_url`. So if you take the token off that redirect and post it here, it is already redeemed — and this endpoint treats that as an idempotent **success** (`200` with `already_verified: true`), not an error. Only a genuinely invalid / expired / unknown token returns `400`. `send` / `confirm` / `resend` are NOT a mandatory matched set — `confirm` is for flows where you collect the token directly rather than landing the hosted redirect. Recommended pattern for the redirect landing: call `confirm`, ignore its result, then read the user\'s verified state back and report that — correct whether or not the link already consumed the token.
+     * Verify the user\'s email using the token from the emailed link. Zyphr does NOT host auth pages and never redeems the token itself. The emailed link points at YOUR `redirect_url` with `?token=<raw>`; your app reads that token and posts it here. Nothing is verified until this call. This endpoint is idempotent: re-posting an already-redeemed token returns `200` with `already_verified: true` rather than an error, so a double submit or a link opened twice is safe. Only a genuinely invalid / expired / unknown token returns `400`. Note `redirect_url` is REQUIRED (snake_case) when sending the verification email — there is no hosted fallback page.
      * Confirm email verification
      */
     confirmEmailVerification(confirmEmailVerificationRequest: ConfirmEmailVerificationRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | InitOverrideFunction): Promise<ConfirmEmailVerificationResponse>;
@@ -25826,12 +25826,12 @@ interface AuthEmailVerificationApiInterface {
  */
 declare class AuthEmailVerificationApi extends BaseAPI implements AuthEmailVerificationApiInterface {
     /**
-     * Verify the user\'s email using a token you collected yourself. IMPORTANT: the emailed verification LINK verifies the address server-side **on click** and then redirects to `redirect_url`. So if you take the token off that redirect and post it here, it is already redeemed — and this endpoint treats that as an idempotent **success** (`200` with `already_verified: true`), not an error. Only a genuinely invalid / expired / unknown token returns `400`. `send` / `confirm` / `resend` are NOT a mandatory matched set — `confirm` is for flows where you collect the token directly rather than landing the hosted redirect. Recommended pattern for the redirect landing: call `confirm`, ignore its result, then read the user\'s verified state back and report that — correct whether or not the link already consumed the token.
+     * Verify the user\'s email using the token from the emailed link. Zyphr does NOT host auth pages and never redeems the token itself. The emailed link points at YOUR `redirect_url` with `?token=<raw>`; your app reads that token and posts it here. Nothing is verified until this call. This endpoint is idempotent: re-posting an already-redeemed token returns `200` with `already_verified: true` rather than an error, so a double submit or a link opened twice is safe. Only a genuinely invalid / expired / unknown token returns `400`. Note `redirect_url` is REQUIRED (snake_case) when sending the verification email — there is no hosted fallback page.
      * Confirm email verification
      */
     confirmEmailVerificationRaw(requestParameters: AuthEmailVerificationApiConfirmEmailVerificationOperationRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | InitOverrideFunction): Promise<ApiResponse<ConfirmEmailVerificationResponse>>;
     /**
-     * Verify the user\'s email using a token you collected yourself. IMPORTANT: the emailed verification LINK verifies the address server-side **on click** and then redirects to `redirect_url`. So if you take the token off that redirect and post it here, it is already redeemed — and this endpoint treats that as an idempotent **success** (`200` with `already_verified: true`), not an error. Only a genuinely invalid / expired / unknown token returns `400`. `send` / `confirm` / `resend` are NOT a mandatory matched set — `confirm` is for flows where you collect the token directly rather than landing the hosted redirect. Recommended pattern for the redirect landing: call `confirm`, ignore its result, then read the user\'s verified state back and report that — correct whether or not the link already consumed the token.
+     * Verify the user\'s email using the token from the emailed link. Zyphr does NOT host auth pages and never redeems the token itself. The emailed link points at YOUR `redirect_url` with `?token=<raw>`; your app reads that token and posts it here. Nothing is verified until this call. This endpoint is idempotent: re-posting an already-redeemed token returns `200` with `already_verified: true` rather than an error, so a double submit or a link opened twice is safe. Only a genuinely invalid / expired / unknown token returns `400`. Note `redirect_url` is REQUIRED (snake_case) when sending the verification email — there is no hosted fallback page.
      * Confirm email verification
      */
     confirmEmailVerification(confirmEmailVerificationRequest: ConfirmEmailVerificationRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | InitOverrideFunction): Promise<ConfirmEmailVerificationResponse>;

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -25779,7 +25779,7 @@ interface AuthEmailVerificationApiSendEmailVerificationOperationRequest {
  */
 interface AuthEmailVerificationApiInterface {
     /**
-     * Verify the user\'s email using a token you collected yourself. IMPORTANT: the emailed verification LINK verifies the address server-side **on click** and then redirects to `redirect_url`. So if you take the token off that redirect and post it here, it is already redeemed — and this endpoint treats that as an idempotent **success** (`200` with `already_verified: true`), not an error. Only a genuinely invalid / expired / unknown token returns `400`. `send` / `confirm` / `resend` are NOT a mandatory matched set — `confirm` is for flows where you collect the token directly rather than landing the hosted redirect. Recommended pattern for the redirect landing: call `confirm`, ignore its result, then read the user\'s verified state back and report that — correct whether or not the link already consumed the token.
+     * Verify the user\'s email using the token from the emailed link. Zyphr does NOT host auth pages and never redeems the token itself. The emailed link points at YOUR `redirect_url` with `?token=<raw>`; your app reads that token and posts it here. Nothing is verified until this call. This endpoint is idempotent: re-posting an already-redeemed token returns `200` with `already_verified: true` rather than an error, so a double submit or a link opened twice is safe. Only a genuinely invalid / expired / unknown token returns `400`. Note `redirect_url` is REQUIRED (snake_case) when sending the verification email — there is no hosted fallback page.
      * @summary Confirm email verification
      * @param {ConfirmEmailVerificationRequest} confirmEmailVerificationRequest
      * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -25788,7 +25788,7 @@ interface AuthEmailVerificationApiInterface {
      */
     confirmEmailVerificationRaw(requestParameters: AuthEmailVerificationApiConfirmEmailVerificationOperationRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | InitOverrideFunction): Promise<ApiResponse<ConfirmEmailVerificationResponse>>;
     /**
-     * Verify the user\'s email using a token you collected yourself. IMPORTANT: the emailed verification LINK verifies the address server-side **on click** and then redirects to `redirect_url`. So if you take the token off that redirect and post it here, it is already redeemed — and this endpoint treats that as an idempotent **success** (`200` with `already_verified: true`), not an error. Only a genuinely invalid / expired / unknown token returns `400`. `send` / `confirm` / `resend` are NOT a mandatory matched set — `confirm` is for flows where you collect the token directly rather than landing the hosted redirect. Recommended pattern for the redirect landing: call `confirm`, ignore its result, then read the user\'s verified state back and report that — correct whether or not the link already consumed the token.
+     * Verify the user\'s email using the token from the emailed link. Zyphr does NOT host auth pages and never redeems the token itself. The emailed link points at YOUR `redirect_url` with `?token=<raw>`; your app reads that token and posts it here. Nothing is verified until this call. This endpoint is idempotent: re-posting an already-redeemed token returns `200` with `already_verified: true` rather than an error, so a double submit or a link opened twice is safe. Only a genuinely invalid / expired / unknown token returns `400`. Note `redirect_url` is REQUIRED (snake_case) when sending the verification email — there is no hosted fallback page.
      * Confirm email verification
      */
     confirmEmailVerification(confirmEmailVerificationRequest: ConfirmEmailVerificationRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | InitOverrideFunction): Promise<ConfirmEmailVerificationResponse>;
@@ -25826,12 +25826,12 @@ interface AuthEmailVerificationApiInterface {
  */
 declare class AuthEmailVerificationApi extends BaseAPI implements AuthEmailVerificationApiInterface {
     /**
-     * Verify the user\'s email using a token you collected yourself. IMPORTANT: the emailed verification LINK verifies the address server-side **on click** and then redirects to `redirect_url`. So if you take the token off that redirect and post it here, it is already redeemed — and this endpoint treats that as an idempotent **success** (`200` with `already_verified: true`), not an error. Only a genuinely invalid / expired / unknown token returns `400`. `send` / `confirm` / `resend` are NOT a mandatory matched set — `confirm` is for flows where you collect the token directly rather than landing the hosted redirect. Recommended pattern for the redirect landing: call `confirm`, ignore its result, then read the user\'s verified state back and report that — correct whether or not the link already consumed the token.
+     * Verify the user\'s email using the token from the emailed link. Zyphr does NOT host auth pages and never redeems the token itself. The emailed link points at YOUR `redirect_url` with `?token=<raw>`; your app reads that token and posts it here. Nothing is verified until this call. This endpoint is idempotent: re-posting an already-redeemed token returns `200` with `already_verified: true` rather than an error, so a double submit or a link opened twice is safe. Only a genuinely invalid / expired / unknown token returns `400`. Note `redirect_url` is REQUIRED (snake_case) when sending the verification email — there is no hosted fallback page.
      * Confirm email verification
      */
     confirmEmailVerificationRaw(requestParameters: AuthEmailVerificationApiConfirmEmailVerificationOperationRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | InitOverrideFunction): Promise<ApiResponse<ConfirmEmailVerificationResponse>>;
     /**
-     * Verify the user\'s email using a token you collected yourself. IMPORTANT: the emailed verification LINK verifies the address server-side **on click** and then redirects to `redirect_url`. So if you take the token off that redirect and post it here, it is already redeemed — and this endpoint treats that as an idempotent **success** (`200` with `already_verified: true`), not an error. Only a genuinely invalid / expired / unknown token returns `400`. `send` / `confirm` / `resend` are NOT a mandatory matched set — `confirm` is for flows where you collect the token directly rather than landing the hosted redirect. Recommended pattern for the redirect landing: call `confirm`, ignore its result, then read the user\'s verified state back and report that — correct whether or not the link already consumed the token.
+     * Verify the user\'s email using the token from the emailed link. Zyphr does NOT host auth pages and never redeems the token itself. The emailed link points at YOUR `redirect_url` with `?token=<raw>`; your app reads that token and posts it here. Nothing is verified until this call. This endpoint is idempotent: re-posting an already-redeemed token returns `200` with `already_verified: true` rather than an error, so a double submit or a link opened twice is safe. Only a genuinely invalid / expired / unknown token returns `400`. Note `redirect_url` is REQUIRED (snake_case) when sending the verification email — there is no hosted fallback page.
      * Confirm email verification
      */
     confirmEmailVerification(confirmEmailVerificationRequest: ConfirmEmailVerificationRequest, initOverrides?: RequestInit | InitOverrideFunction): Promise<ConfirmEmailVerificationResponse>;

package/dist/index.js

@@ -17842,7 +17842,7 @@ var AuthEmailTemplatesApi = class extends BaseAPI {
 // src/src/apis/AuthEmailVerificationApi.ts
 var AuthEmailVerificationApi = class extends BaseAPI {
   /**
-   * Verify the user\'s email using a token you collected yourself. IMPORTANT: the emailed verification LINK verifies the address server-side **on click** and then redirects to `redirect_url`. So if you take the token off that redirect and post it here, it is already redeemed — and this endpoint treats that as an idempotent **success** (`200` with `already_verified: true`), not an error. Only a genuinely invalid / expired / unknown token returns `400`. `send` / `confirm` / `resend` are NOT a mandatory matched set — `confirm` is for flows where you collect the token directly rather than landing the hosted redirect. Recommended pattern for the redirect landing: call `confirm`, ignore its result, then read the user\'s verified state back and report that — correct whether or not the link already consumed the token.
+   * Verify the user\'s email using the token from the emailed link. Zyphr does NOT host auth pages and never redeems the token itself. The emailed link points at YOUR `redirect_url` with `?token=<raw>`; your app reads that token and posts it here. Nothing is verified until this call. This endpoint is idempotent: re-posting an already-redeemed token returns `200` with `already_verified: true` rather than an error, so a double submit or a link opened twice is safe. Only a genuinely invalid / expired / unknown token returns `400`. Note `redirect_url` is REQUIRED (snake_case) when sending the verification email — there is no hosted fallback page.
    * Confirm email verification
    */
   async confirmEmailVerificationRaw(requestParameters, initOverrides) {
@@ -17881,7 +17881,7 @@ var AuthEmailVerificationApi = class extends BaseAPI {
     return new JSONApiResponse(response, (jsonValue) => ConfirmEmailVerificationResponseFromJSON(jsonValue));
   }
   /**
-   * Verify the user\'s email using a token you collected yourself. IMPORTANT: the emailed verification LINK verifies the address server-side **on click** and then redirects to `redirect_url`. So if you take the token off that redirect and post it here, it is already redeemed — and this endpoint treats that as an idempotent **success** (`200` with `already_verified: true`), not an error. Only a genuinely invalid / expired / unknown token returns `400`. `send` / `confirm` / `resend` are NOT a mandatory matched set — `confirm` is for flows where you collect the token directly rather than landing the hosted redirect. Recommended pattern for the redirect landing: call `confirm`, ignore its result, then read the user\'s verified state back and report that — correct whether or not the link already consumed the token.
+   * Verify the user\'s email using the token from the emailed link. Zyphr does NOT host auth pages and never redeems the token itself. The emailed link points at YOUR `redirect_url` with `?token=<raw>`; your app reads that token and posts it here. Nothing is verified until this call. This endpoint is idempotent: re-posting an already-redeemed token returns `200` with `already_verified: true` rather than an error, so a double submit or a link opened twice is safe. Only a genuinely invalid / expired / unknown token returns `400`. Note `redirect_url` is REQUIRED (snake_case) when sending the verification email — there is no hosted fallback page.
    * Confirm email verification
    */
   async confirmEmailVerification(confirmEmailVerificationRequest, initOverrides) {