@zyphr-dev/node-sdk 0.1.52 → 0.1.54

package/dist/index.js

@@ -871,6 +871,7 @@ function instanceOfApplicationSelf(value) {
   if (!("signingAlgorithm" in value) || value["signingAlgorithm"] === void 0) return false;
   if (!("testRecipients" in value) || value["testRecipients"] === void 0) return false;
   if (!("authEmailMode" in value) || value["authEmailMode"] === void 0) return false;
+  if (!("passwordDisallowBreached" in value) || value["passwordDisallowBreached"] === void 0) return false;
   return true;
 }
 function ApplicationSelfFromJSON(json) {
@@ -886,7 +887,8 @@ function ApplicationSelfFromJSONTyped(json, ignoreDiscriminator) {
     "environment": json["environment"],
     "signingAlgorithm": json["signing_algorithm"],
     "testRecipients": json["test_recipients"],
-    "authEmailMode": json["auth_email_mode"]
+    "authEmailMode": json["auth_email_mode"],
+    "passwordDisallowBreached": json["password_disallow_breached"]
   };
 }
 function ApplicationSelfToJSON(json) {
@@ -902,7 +904,8 @@ function ApplicationSelfToJSONTyped(value, ignoreDiscriminator = false) {
     "environment": value["environment"],
     "signing_algorithm": value["signingAlgorithm"],
     "test_recipients": value["testRecipients"],
-    "auth_email_mode": value["authEmailMode"]
+    "auth_email_mode": value["authEmailMode"],
+    "password_disallow_breached": value["passwordDisallowBreached"]
   };
 }
 
@@ -2374,7 +2377,8 @@ function ConfirmEmailVerificationResponseDataFromJSONTyped(json, ignoreDiscrimin
   }
   return {
     "success": json["success"] == null ? void 0 : json["success"],
-    "email": json["email"] == null ? void 0 : json["email"]
+    "email": json["email"] == null ? void 0 : json["email"],
+    "alreadyVerified": json["already_verified"] == null ? void 0 : json["already_verified"]
   };
 }
 function ConfirmEmailVerificationResponseDataToJSON(json) {
@@ -2386,7 +2390,8 @@ function ConfirmEmailVerificationResponseDataToJSONTyped(value, ignoreDiscrimina
   }
   return {
     "success": value["success"],
-    "email": value["email"]
+    "email": value["email"],
+    "already_verified": value["alreadyVerified"]
   };
 }
 
@@ -10226,6 +10231,33 @@ function ReplayWebhookEventsRequestToJSONTyped(value, ignoreDiscriminator = fals
   };
 }
 
+// src/src/models/ResendEmailVerificationRequest.ts
+function instanceOfResendEmailVerificationRequest(value) {
+  return true;
+}
+function ResendEmailVerificationRequestFromJSON(json) {
+  return ResendEmailVerificationRequestFromJSONTyped(json, false);
+}
+function ResendEmailVerificationRequestFromJSONTyped(json, ignoreDiscriminator) {
+  if (json == null) {
+    return json;
+  }
+  return {
+    "redirectUrl": json["redirect_url"] == null ? void 0 : json["redirect_url"]
+  };
+}
+function ResendEmailVerificationRequestToJSON(json) {
+  return ResendEmailVerificationRequestToJSONTyped(json, false);
+}
+function ResendEmailVerificationRequestToJSONTyped(value, ignoreDiscriminator = false) {
+  if (value == null) {
+    return value;
+  }
+  return {
+    "redirect_url": value["redirectUrl"]
+  };
+}
+
 // src/src/models/ResetPasswordRequest.ts
 function instanceOfResetPasswordRequest(value) {
   if (!("token" in value) || value["token"] === void 0) return false;
@@ -12260,7 +12292,8 @@ function SetSelfApplicationTestRecipientsRequestFromJSONTyped(json, ignoreDiscri
   }
   return {
     "testRecipients": json["test_recipients"] == null ? void 0 : json["test_recipients"],
-    "authEmailMode": json["auth_email_mode"] == null ? void 0 : json["auth_email_mode"]
+    "authEmailMode": json["auth_email_mode"] == null ? void 0 : json["auth_email_mode"],
+    "passwordDisallowBreached": json["password_disallow_breached"] == null ? void 0 : json["password_disallow_breached"]
   };
 }
 function SetSelfApplicationTestRecipientsRequestToJSON(json) {
@@ -12272,7 +12305,8 @@ function SetSelfApplicationTestRecipientsRequestToJSONTyped(value, ignoreDiscrim
   }
   return {
     "test_recipients": value["testRecipients"],
-    "auth_email_mode": value["authEmailMode"]
+    "auth_email_mode": value["authEmailMode"],
+    "password_disallow_breached": value["passwordDisallowBreached"]
   };
 }
 
@@ -17700,7 +17734,7 @@ var AuthEmailTemplatesApi = class extends BaseAPI {
 // src/src/apis/AuthEmailVerificationApi.ts
 var AuthEmailVerificationApi = class extends BaseAPI {
   /**
-   * Verify the user\'s email using the token from the verification email.
+   * Verify the user\'s email using a token you collected yourself. IMPORTANT: the emailed verification LINK verifies the address server-side **on click** and then redirects to `redirect_url`. So if you take the token off that redirect and post it here, it is already redeemed — and this endpoint treats that as an idempotent **success** (`200` with `already_verified: true`), not an error. Only a genuinely invalid / expired / unknown token returns `400`. `send` / `confirm` / `resend` are NOT a mandatory matched set — `confirm` is for flows where you collect the token directly rather than landing the hosted redirect. Recommended pattern for the redirect landing: call `confirm`, ignore its result, then read the user\'s verified state back and report that — correct whether or not the link already consumed the token.
    * Confirm email verification
    */
   async confirmEmailVerificationRaw(requestParameters, initOverrides) {
@@ -17729,7 +17763,7 @@ var AuthEmailVerificationApi = class extends BaseAPI {
     return new JSONApiResponse(response, (jsonValue) => ConfirmEmailVerificationResponseFromJSON(jsonValue));
   }
   /**
-   * Verify the user\'s email using the token from the verification email.
+   * Verify the user\'s email using a token you collected yourself. IMPORTANT: the emailed verification LINK verifies the address server-side **on click** and then redirects to `redirect_url`. So if you take the token off that redirect and post it here, it is already redeemed — and this endpoint treats that as an idempotent **success** (`200` with `already_verified: true`), not an error. Only a genuinely invalid / expired / unknown token returns `400`. `send` / `confirm` / `resend` are NOT a mandatory matched set — `confirm` is for flows where you collect the token directly rather than landing the hosted redirect. Recommended pattern for the redirect landing: call `confirm`, ignore its result, then read the user\'s verified state back and report that — correct whether or not the link already consumed the token.
    * Confirm email verification
    */
   async confirmEmailVerification(confirmEmailVerificationRequest, initOverrides) {
@@ -17762,7 +17796,7 @@ var AuthEmailVerificationApi = class extends BaseAPI {
       method: "POST",
       headers: headerParameters,
       query: queryParameters,
-      body: SendEmailVerificationRequestToJSON(requestParameters["sendEmailVerificationRequest"])
+      body: ResendEmailVerificationRequestToJSON(requestParameters["resendEmailVerificationRequest"])
     }, initOverrides);
     return new JSONApiResponse(response, (jsonValue) => SuccessResultFromJSON(jsonValue));
   }
@@ -17770,12 +17804,12 @@ var AuthEmailVerificationApi = class extends BaseAPI {
    * Resend the verification email to the authenticated user. Rate limited to once per 60 seconds.
    * Resend email verification
    */
-  async resendEmailVerification(sendEmailVerificationRequest, initOverrides) {
-    const response = await this.resendEmailVerificationRaw({ sendEmailVerificationRequest }, initOverrides);
+  async resendEmailVerification(resendEmailVerificationRequest, initOverrides) {
+    const response = await this.resendEmailVerificationRaw({ resendEmailVerificationRequest }, initOverrides);
     return await response.value();
   }
   /**
-   * Send an email verification link to the authenticated user.
+   * Send an email verification link to the authenticated user. Requires all three credentials simultaneously: the application key (`X-Application-Key`), the application secret (`X-Application-Secret`), and the end user\'s `Authorization: Bearer` token. If the recipient is blocked by the application\'s `auth_email_mode=allowlist` gate, the request is still **accepted with 200** (mirroring `POST /auth/forgot-password`): no email is sent, and the suppression is recorded as a `messages` row (`status=suppressed`, `status_reason=recipient_not_allowlisted`) and an `email.suppressed` webhook. It is NOT a 500.
    * Send email verification
    */
   async sendEmailVerificationRaw(requestParameters, initOverrides) {
@@ -17805,7 +17839,7 @@ var AuthEmailVerificationApi = class extends BaseAPI {
     return new JSONApiResponse(response, (jsonValue) => SuccessResultFromJSON(jsonValue));
   }
   /**
-   * Send an email verification link to the authenticated user.
+   * Send an email verification link to the authenticated user. Requires all three credentials simultaneously: the application key (`X-Application-Key`), the application secret (`X-Application-Secret`), and the end user\'s `Authorization: Bearer` token. If the recipient is blocked by the application\'s `auth_email_mode=allowlist` gate, the request is still **accepted with 200** (mirroring `POST /auth/forgot-password`): no email is sent, and the suppression is recorded as a `messages` row (`status=suppressed`, `status_reason=recipient_not_allowlisted`) and an `email.suppressed` webhook. It is NOT a 500.
    * Send email verification
    */
   async sendEmailVerification(sendEmailVerificationRequest, initOverrides) {
@@ -27997,6 +28031,10 @@ export {
   RequestMetaToJSON,
   RequestMetaToJSONTyped,
   RequiredError,
+  ResendEmailVerificationRequestFromJSON,
+  ResendEmailVerificationRequestFromJSONTyped,
+  ResendEmailVerificationRequestToJSON,
+  ResendEmailVerificationRequestToJSONTyped,
   ResetPasswordRequestFromJSON,
   ResetPasswordRequestFromJSONTyped,
   ResetPasswordRequestToJSON,
@@ -29249,6 +29287,7 @@ export {
   instanceOfReorderWorkflowStepsRequest,
   instanceOfReplayWebhookEventsRequest,
   instanceOfRequestMeta,
+  instanceOfResendEmailVerificationRequest,
   instanceOfResetPasswordRequest,
   instanceOfResetPasswordResponse,
   instanceOfResubscribeRequest,