@zuplo/cli 7.8.18 → 7.8.20

package/node_modules/@modelcontextprotocol/client/dist/index.cjs

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 const require_chunk = require('./chunk-Bnu9O96Y.cjs');
-const require_src = require('./src-D0qEN74R.cjs');
+const require_src = require('./src-oZBjf3U1.cjs');
 let _modelcontextprotocol_client__shims = require("@modelcontextprotocol/client/_shims");
 let pkce_challenge = require("pkce-challenge");
 pkce_challenge = require_chunk.__toESM(pkce_challenge);
@@ -115,10 +115,12 @@ var RegistrationRejectedError = class extends OAuthClientFlowError {
 };
 /**
 * Thrown by the token-exchange and refresh paths when the resolved token
-* endpoint is not `https:` and is not a loopback host (SEP-2207). This is a
-* configuration error — re-authorizing cannot fix it — so it intentionally does
-* **not** extend `OAuthError` and `auth()`'s refresh branch rethrows it instead
-* of falling through to a fresh `/authorize` redirect.
+* endpoint is not `https:` and is not a loopback host. The MCP authorization
+* specification requires authorization server endpoints to use HTTPS; loopback
+* hosts are exempt here for local development. This is a configuration error —
+* re-authorizing cannot fix it — so it intentionally does **not** extend
+* `OAuthError` and `auth()`'s refresh branch rethrows it instead of falling
+* through to a fresh `/authorize` redirect.
 */
 var InsecureTokenEndpointError = class extends OAuthClientFlowError {
 	static {
@@ -127,7 +129,7 @@ var InsecureTokenEndpointError = class extends OAuthClientFlowError {
 	/** The token endpoint URL that was rejected. */
 	tokenEndpoint;
 	constructor(tokenEndpoint) {
-		super(`Refusing to send credentials to non-https token endpoint '${tokenEndpoint}'. OAuth token requests MUST use TLS (localhost / 127.0.0.1 / ::1 are exempt).`);
+		super(`Refusing to send credentials to non-https token endpoint '${tokenEndpoint}'. OAuth token requests MUST use TLS (localhost / *.localhost / 127.0.0.1 / ::1 are exempt).`);
 		this.tokenEndpoint = tokenEndpoint;
 	}
 };
@@ -152,21 +154,25 @@ var InsecureTokenEndpointError = class extends OAuthClientFlowError {
 * `requiredScope`, which appears in the error message).
 */
 /**
-* Thrown by `auth()` on the authorization-code callback leg when the
-* authorization server resolved by discovery differs from the one recorded in
-* `discoveryState()` at redirect time. The `authorization_code` and PKCE
-* `code_verifier` are bound to the AS that minted the code (RFC 7636); sending
-* them to a different AS's token endpoint is a credential-exfiltration vector.
-*
-* This is the only runtime check left in the SEP-2352 model — stored tokens and
-* client credentials are protected structurally by the `issuer` stamp instead.
+* Thrown by `auth()` and `fetchToken()` when the authorization server in use differs
+* from the one a credential is bound to and the flow cannot simply start over:
+*
+* - on the authorization-code callback leg, when it differs from the one recorded
+*   in `discoveryState()` at redirect time — the `authorization_code` and PKCE
+*   `code_verifier` are bound to the AS that minted the code (RFC 7636);
+* - for client information whose `issuer` stamp names a different authorization
+*   server on a provider that cannot re-register (no `saveClientInformation()`,
+*   e.g. the bundled static-credential providers); `fetchToken()` throws for any provider.
+*
+* Stored tokens and re-registrable client information are protected structurally
+* by the `issuer` stamp instead (they read back as absent).
 */
 var AuthorizationServerMismatchError = class extends OAuthClientFlowError {
 	static {
 		Object.defineProperty(this, "mcpBrand", { value: "mcp.AuthorizationServerMismatchError" });
 	}
 	constructor(recordedIssuer, currentIssuer) {
-		super(`Authorization server changed between redirect and callback (redirected to ${JSON.stringify(recordedIssuer)}, callback resolved ${JSON.stringify(currentIssuer)}); refusing to send authorization_code/code_verifier to a different token endpoint`);
+		super(`Authorization server mismatch: credentials are bound to ${JSON.stringify(recordedIssuer)} but this call resolved ${JSON.stringify(currentIssuer)}; refusing to present them to a different authorization server`);
 		this.recordedIssuer = recordedIssuer;
 		this.currentIssuer = currentIssuer;
 	}
@@ -210,10 +216,13 @@ var InsufficientScopeError = class extends OAuthClientFlowError {
 *   "binding on first use" claim would be false and would fire on every call.
 */
 function discardIfIssuerMismatch(stored, issuer, opts) {
-	if (stored === void 0) return void 0;
-	if (stored.issuer === void 0) {
+	if (!stored) return void 0;
+	if (typeof stored.issuer !== "string") {
 		if (opts?.canPersistStamp !== false) console.warn("[mcp-sdk] SEP-2352: stored OAuth credential has no 'issuer' stamp (pre-upgrade storage or provider not round-tripping the value). SEP-2352 isolation is inactive for this read; ensure your provider round-trips the issuer field.");
-		return stored;
+		return stored.issuer === void 0 ? stored : {
+			...stored,
+			issuer: void 0
+		};
 	}
 	return issuersMatch(stored.issuer, issuer) ? stored : void 0;
 }
@@ -521,13 +530,19 @@ function applyPostAuth(clientId, clientSecret, params) {
 function applyPublicAuth(clientId, params) {
 	params.set("client_id", clientId);
 }
-/** Loopback hosts exempt from the in-transit `https:` requirement (RFC 8252 §7.3). */
+/**
+* Loopback hosts exempt from the in-transit `https:` requirement (RFC 8252 §7.3).
+* Includes bare `localhost` and any name ending in `.localhost` (RFC 6761 §6.3).
+*/
 function isLoopbackHost(hostname) {
-	return hostname === "localhost" || hostname === "127.0.0.1" || hostname === "[::1]" || hostname === "::1";
+	return hostname === "localhost" || hostname.endsWith(".localhost") || hostname === "127.0.0.1" || hostname === "[::1]" || hostname === "::1";
 }
 /**
-* SEP-2207: refuse to send credentials to a non-TLS, non-loopback token endpoint.
-* Throws {@linkcode InsecureTokenEndpointError}. Loopback hosts are exempt.
+* Refuse to send credentials to a non-TLS token endpoint. The MCP authorization
+* specification requires authorization server endpoints to use HTTPS. Loopback
+* hosts are exempt here for local development.
+*
+* @throws {@linkcode InsecureTokenEndpointError} if the endpoint is insecure.
 */
 function assertSecureTokenEndpoint(tokenEndpoint) {
 	const url = new URL(String(tokenEndpoint));
@@ -1268,7 +1283,7 @@ async function executeTokenRequest(authorizationServerUrl, { metadata, tokenRequ
 	if (!response.ok) throw await parseErrorResponse(response);
 	const json = await response.json();
 	try {
-		return _modelcontextprotocol_core_internal.OAuthTokensSchema.parse(json);
+		return _modelcontextprotocol_core_internal.OAuthTokensSchema.parse(require_src.withoutIssuer(json));
 	} catch (parseError) {
 		if (typeof json === "object" && json !== null && "error" in json) throw await parseErrorResponse(JSON.stringify(json));
 		throw parseError;
@@ -1364,6 +1379,14 @@ async function fetchToken(provider, authorizationServerUrl, { metadata, resource
 		expectedIssuer: metadata?.issuer,
 		issParameterSupported: isIssParameterSupported(metadata)
 	});
+	const issuer = metadata?.issuer ?? String(authorizationServerUrl);
+	const readClientInformation = async () => {
+		const rawClientInfo = await provider.clientInformation({ issuer });
+		const checked = discardIfIssuerMismatch(rawClientInfo, issuer, { canPersistStamp: false });
+		if (rawClientInfo && checked === void 0) throw new AuthorizationServerMismatchError(String(rawClientInfo.issuer), issuer);
+		return checked;
+	};
+	let clientInformation = await readClientInformation();
 	const effectiveScope = scope ?? provider.clientMetadata.scope;
 	let tokenRequestParams;
 	if (provider.prepareTokenRequest) tokenRequestParams = await provider.prepareTokenRequest(effectiveScope);
@@ -1372,11 +1395,11 @@ async function fetchToken(provider, authorizationServerUrl, { metadata, resource
 		if (!provider.redirectUrl) throw new Error("redirectUrl is required for authorization_code flow");
 		tokenRequestParams = prepareAuthorizationCodeRequest(authorizationCode, await provider.codeVerifier(), provider.redirectUrl);
 	}
-	const clientInformation = await provider.clientInformation({ issuer: metadata?.issuer ?? String(authorizationServerUrl) });
+	clientInformation ??= await readClientInformation();
 	return executeTokenRequest(authorizationServerUrl, {
 		metadata,
 		tokenRequestParams,
-		clientInformation: clientInformation ?? void 0,
+		clientInformation,
 		addClientAuthentication: provider.addClientAuthentication,
 		resource,
 		dpop: await provider.dpop?.(),
@@ -1392,10 +1415,17 @@ async function fetchToken(provider, authorizationServerUrl, { metadata, resource
 * consistently across both DCR and the subsequent authorization request.
 *
 * @deprecated Dynamic Client Registration is deprecated as of protocol version
-* 2026-07-28 (SEP-2577) in favor of Client ID Metadata Documents (SEP-991).
-* Remains functional during the deprecation window (at least twelve months).
-* Prefer a CIMD URL `client_id` when the authorization server advertises
-* `client_id_metadata_document_supported`; the SDK already gates on this for you.
+* 2026-07-28 in favor of Client ID Metadata Documents (SEP-991); the deprecation
+* landed via spec PR
+* {@link https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/2858 | modelcontextprotocol#2858}
+* (SEP-2577 is the separate roots/sampling/logging deprecation). Remains
+* functional during the deprecation window — at least twelve months under the
+* feature lifecycle policy (SEP-2596), so 2027-07-28 is the earliest possible
+* removal date. Prefer a CIMD URL `client_id` when the authorization server
+* advertises `client_id_metadata_document_supported`: the built-in `auth()` flow
+* skips registration for you when that capability is advertised AND your
+* provider supplies `clientMetadataUrl`, but `registerClient` itself does not
+* gate — calling it directly always sends the registration request.
 */
 async function registerClient(authorizationServerUrl, { metadata, clientMetadata, scope, fetchFn }) {
 	let registrationUrl;
@@ -1417,7 +1447,7 @@ async function registerClient(authorizationServerUrl, { metadata, clientMetadata
 		body: await response.text(),
 		submittedMetadata
 	});
-	return _modelcontextprotocol_core_internal.OAuthClientInformationFullSchema.parse(await response.json());
+	return _modelcontextprotocol_core_internal.OAuthClientInformationFullSchema.parse(require_src.withoutIssuer(await response.json()));
 }
 
 //#endregion
@@ -1472,6 +1502,15 @@ function createPrivateKeyJwtAuth(options) {
 	};
 }
 /**
+* The `issuer` stamp for constructor-supplied client information. Omitting `expectedIssuer` is
+* deprecated: nothing else says which authorization server such credentials belong to.
+*/
+function checkedExpectedIssuer(expectedIssuer) {
+	if (expectedIssuer === void 0) console.warn("[mcp-sdk] Omitting `expectedIssuer` is deprecated. Without it, the MCP server decides which authorization server receives this client's credentials; pass your authorization server's issuer URL as `expectedIssuer` so they are only sent there.");
+	else if (typeof expectedIssuer !== "string" || !expectedIssuer) throw new Error("expectedIssuer must be the authorization server's issuer URL");
+	return expectedIssuer;
+}
+/**
 * OAuth provider for `client_credentials` grant with `client_secret_basic` authentication.
 *
 * This provider is designed for machine-to-machine authentication where
@@ -1481,7 +1520,8 @@ function createPrivateKeyJwtAuth(options) {
 * ```ts source="./authExtensions.examples.ts#ClientCredentialsProvider_basicUsage"
 * const provider = new ClientCredentialsProvider({
 *     clientId: 'my-client',
-*     clientSecret: 'my-secret'
+*     clientSecret: 'my-secret',
+*     expectedIssuer: 'https://auth.example.com'
 * });
 *
 * const transport = new StreamableHTTPClientTransport(serverUrl, {
@@ -1497,7 +1537,7 @@ var ClientCredentialsProvider = class {
 		this._clientInfo = {
 			client_id: options.clientId,
 			client_secret: options.clientSecret,
-			issuer: options.expectedIssuer
+			issuer: checkedExpectedIssuer(options.expectedIssuer)
 		};
 		this._clientMetadata = {
 			client_name: options.clientName ?? "client-credentials-client",
@@ -1545,7 +1585,8 @@ var ClientCredentialsProvider = class {
 * const provider = new PrivateKeyJwtProvider({
 *     clientId: 'my-client',
 *     privateKey: pemEncodedPrivateKey,
-*     algorithm: 'RS256'
+*     algorithm: 'RS256',
+*     expectedIssuer: 'https://auth.example.com'
 * });
 *
 * const transport = new StreamableHTTPClientTransport(serverUrl, {
@@ -1561,7 +1602,7 @@ var PrivateKeyJwtProvider = class {
 	constructor(options) {
 		this._clientInfo = {
 			client_id: options.clientId,
-			issuer: options.expectedIssuer
+			issuer: checkedExpectedIssuer(options.expectedIssuer)
 		};
 		this._clientMetadata = {
 			client_name: options.clientName ?? "private-key-jwt-client",
@@ -1620,7 +1661,7 @@ var StaticPrivateKeyJwtProvider = class {
 	constructor(options) {
 		this._clientInfo = {
 			client_id: options.clientId,
-			issuer: options.expectedIssuer
+			issuer: checkedExpectedIssuer(options.expectedIssuer)
 		};
 		this._clientMetadata = {
 			client_name: options.clientName ?? "static-private-key-jwt-client",
@@ -1692,7 +1733,8 @@ var StaticPrivateKeyJwtProvider = class {
 *         return result.jwtAuthGrant;
 *     },
 *     clientId: 'my-mcp-client',
-*     clientSecret: 'my-mcp-secret'
+*     clientSecret: 'my-mcp-secret',
+*     expectedIssuer: 'https://auth.example.com'
 * });
 *
 * const transport = new StreamableHTTPClientTransport(serverUrl, {
@@ -1713,7 +1755,7 @@ var CrossAppAccessProvider = class {
 		this._clientInfo = {
 			client_id: options.clientId,
 			client_secret: options.clientSecret,
-			issuer: options.expectedIssuer
+			issuer: checkedExpectedIssuer(options.expectedIssuer)
 		};
 		this._clientMetadata = {
 			client_name: options.clientName ?? "cross-app-access-client",
@@ -3635,7 +3677,7 @@ var Client = class extends require_src.Protocol {
 		}, options);
 		const hit = await this._serveFromCache("prompts/list", void 0, options);
 		if (hit !== void 0) return hit;
-		return this._listAllPages("prompts/list", params, options, (acc, page) => acc.prompts.push(...page.prompts));
+		return this._listAllPages("prompts/list", params, options, (r) => r.prompts);
 	}
 	/**
 	* Lists available resources.
@@ -3674,7 +3716,7 @@ var Client = class extends require_src.Protocol {
 		}, options);
 		const hit = await this._serveFromCache("resources/list", void 0, options);
 		if (hit !== void 0) return hit;
-		return this._listAllPages("resources/list", params, options, (acc, page) => acc.resources.push(...page.resources));
+		return this._listAllPages("resources/list", params, options, (r) => r.resources);
 	}
 	/**
 	* Lists available resource URI templates for dynamic resources.
@@ -3699,7 +3741,7 @@ var Client = class extends require_src.Protocol {
 		}, options);
 		const hit = await this._serveFromCache("resources/templates/list", void 0, options);
 		if (hit !== void 0) return hit;
-		return this._listAllPages("resources/templates/list", params, options, (acc, page) => acc.resourceTemplates.push(...page.resourceTemplates));
+		return this._listAllPages("resources/templates/list", params, options, (r) => r.resourceTemplates);
 	}
 	/**
 	* Walk every page of a paginated list verb, aggregate, and write ONE
@@ -3707,8 +3749,7 @@ var Client = class extends require_src.Protocol {
 	* methods' no-`cursor` auto-aggregate path. Page 1's result object is
 	* mutated in place (its items array is extended; `nextCursor` is
 	* cleared); page-1 metadata (`ttlMs`, `cacheScope`, `_meta`) is preserved.
-	* A `nextCursor` that repeats stops the walk (defence against a
-	* non-converging server, mcp.d's `drainList` guard);
+	* A page with the same items and `nextCursor` as the previous page ends the walk;
 	* {@linkcode ClientOptions.listMaxPages} is a hard cap — hitting it
 	* throws, so a partial aggregate is never cached. The
 	* captured-generation guard skips the write when a `list_changed` landed
@@ -3723,7 +3764,7 @@ var Client = class extends require_src.Protocol {
 	* trace context) supplied to the public `list*()` reaches every wire
 	* request the walk issues.
 	*/
-	async _listAllPages(method, baseParams, options, append, finalize) {
+	async _listAllPages(method, baseParams, options, items, finalize) {
 		const bypass = options?.cacheMode === "bypass";
 		const generation = this._cache.captureGeneration(method);
 		const acc = await this.request({
@@ -3731,14 +3772,13 @@ var Client = class extends require_src.Protocol {
 			...baseParams && { params: { ...baseParams } }
 		}, options);
 		let cursor = acc.nextCursor;
-		const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+		let previous = acc;
 		let pages = 1;
-		while (cursor !== void 0 && !seen.has(cursor)) {
+		while (cursor !== void 0) {
 			if (this._listMaxPages !== 0 && pages >= this._listMaxPages) throw new require_src.SdkError(require_src.SdkErrorCode.ListPaginationExceeded, `${method}: exceeded listMaxPages (${this._listMaxPages}); server pagination did not terminate`, {
 				method,
 				listMaxPages: this._listMaxPages
 			});
-			seen.add(cursor);
 			const page = await this.request({
 				method,
 				params: {
@@ -3746,7 +3786,9 @@ var Client = class extends require_src.Protocol {
 					cursor
 				}
 			}, options);
-			append(acc, page);
+			if (page.nextCursor === cursor && JSON.stringify(items(page)) === JSON.stringify(items(previous))) break;
+			items(acc).push(...items(page));
+			previous = page;
 			cursor = page.nextCursor;
 			pages++;
 		}
@@ -4007,19 +4049,22 @@ var Client = class extends require_src.Protocol {
 				notifications: filter
 			}
 		};
+		const routeSendFailure = (error) => {
+			settle({
+				cause: "remote",
+				error: error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error))
+			});
+		};
 		try {
-			await this.transport.send(jsonrpcRequest, {
+			this.transport.send(jsonrpcRequest, {
 				requestSignal: requestAbort.signal,
 				onRequestStreamEnd: () => settle({
 					cause: "remote",
 					error: /* @__PURE__ */ new Error("subscriptions/listen: stream ended")
 				})
-			});
+			}).catch(routeSendFailure);
 		} catch (error) {
-			settle({
-				cause: "remote",
-				error: error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error))
-			});
+			routeSendFailure(error);
 		}
 		return {
 			honoredFilter: await opening,
@@ -4271,7 +4316,7 @@ var Client = class extends require_src.Protocol {
 		}
 		const hit = await this._serveFromCache("tools/list", void 0, options);
 		if (hit !== void 0) return hit;
-		return this._listAllPages("tools/list", params, options, (acc, page) => acc.tools.push(...page.tools), (acc) => this._excludeInvalidXMcpHeaderTools(acc));
+		return this._listAllPages("tools/list", params, options, (r) => r.tools, (acc) => this._excludeInvalidXMcpHeaderTools(acc));
 	}
 	/**
 	* SEP-2243 (protocol revision 2026-07-28): a Streamable HTTP client MUST
@@ -4492,7 +4537,7 @@ async function exchangeJwtAuthGrant(options) {
 		throw new Error(`JWT grant exchange failed with status ${response.status}: ${JSON.stringify(errorBody)}`);
 	}
 	const responseBody = await response.json();
-	const parseResult = _modelcontextprotocol_core_internal.OAuthTokensSchema.safeParse(responseBody);
+	const parseResult = _modelcontextprotocol_core_internal.OAuthTokensSchema.safeParse(require_src.withoutIssuer(responseBody));
 	if (!parseResult.success) throw new Error(`Invalid token response: ${parseResult.error.message}`);
 	return parseResult.data;
 }