@zudojs/http 0.0.6 → 1.0.0

package/dist/httpRedirect/http.redirect.js

@@ -0,0 +1,442 @@
+/**
+ * HTTP redirect utilities.
+ *
+ * Provides redirect status classification, Location header handling,
+ * URL resolution, and redirect policy helpers for the HTTP package.
+ */
+import { assertSafeHeaderValue } from "../httpHeaders/security/index.js";
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* Constants                                                                  */
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+export const DEFAULT_REDIRECT_STATUS = 302;
+export const DEFAULT_MAX_REDIRECTS = 20;
+export const REDIRECT_STATUS_CODES = [301, 302, 303, 307, 308];
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* Redirect Classification                                                    */
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+export function isRedirectStatus(statusCode) {
+    return (REDIRECT_STATUS_CODES.includes(statusCode) ||
+        (statusCode >= 300 && statusCode < 400 && statusCode !== 304));
+}
+export function isPermanentRedirect(statusCode) {
+    return statusCode === 301 || statusCode === 308;
+}
+export function isTemporaryRedirect(statusCode) {
+    return statusCode === 302 || statusCode === 303 || statusCode === 307;
+}
+export function isMethodPreservingRedirect(statusCode) {
+    return statusCode === 307 || statusCode === 308;
+}
+export function isMethodChangingRedirect(statusCode) {
+    return statusCode === 301 || statusCode === 302 || statusCode === 303;
+}
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* Redirect Status                                                            */
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+export function getRedirectStatus(statusCode) {
+    const status = statusCode ?? DEFAULT_REDIRECT_STATUS;
+    if (!isRedirectStatus(status)) {
+        throw new RangeError(`Invalid redirect status code: ${status}`);
+    }
+    return status;
+}
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* Location Validation                                                       */
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+export function isValidLocation(location) {
+    if (location === undefined || location === null) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    const value = location instanceof URL ? location.href : location;
+    if (value.length === 0 || /[\r\n]/.test(value)) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    return true;
+}
+export function validateLocation(location) {
+    if (!isValidLocation(location)) {
+        throw new TypeError("Invalid redirect Location.");
+    }
+    return location instanceof URL ? location.href : location;
+}
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* URL Resolution                                                             */
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+export function resolveRedirectURL(location, currentURL) {
+    const locationValue = validateLocation(location);
+    const base = currentURL instanceof URL ? currentURL : new URL(currentURL);
+    return new URL(locationValue, base);
+}
+export function resolveRedirectLocation(location, currentURL) {
+    return resolveRedirectURL(location, currentURL).href;
+}
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* Location Formatting                                                        */
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+export function formatLocation(location, options = {}) {
+    const value = validateLocation(location);
+    if (!options.absolute) {
+        return value;
+    }
+    if (isAbsoluteURL(value)) {
+        return value;
+    }
+    if (!options.baseURL) {
+        throw new TypeError("A baseURL is required to create an absolute redirect Location.");
+    }
+    return resolveRedirectLocation(value, options.baseURL);
+}
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* Redirect Creation                                                          */
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/**
+ * Creates a redirect result.
+ *
+ * The destination is checked against {@link isSafeRedirectProtocol} — this is
+ * the boundary the safety helper was written for and previously never applied
+ * to. When the destination is user-controlled, pass `allowedOrigins` so an
+ * absolute off-site URL is rejected too; scheme filtering alone still permits
+ * `https://evil.com`.
+ */
+export function createRedirect(location, options = {}) {
+    const statusCode = getRedirectStatus(options.statusCode);
+    const safeLocation = assertSafeRedirect(location);
+    if (options.allowedOrigins && isAbsoluteURL(safeLocation.trim())) {
+        const resolved = resolveSafeRedirectTarget(safeLocation, {
+            allowedOrigins: options.allowedOrigins,
+            fallback: "",
+        });
+        if (resolved.length === 0) {
+            throw new TypeError(`Redirect Location is not in the configured allowlist: ${safeLocation}`);
+        }
+    }
+    const formattedLocation = formatLocation(safeLocation, {
+        absolute: options.absolute ?? false,
+        baseURL: options.baseURL,
+    });
+    return {
+        statusCode,
+        location: formattedLocation,
+        preserveMethod: isMethodPreservingRedirect(statusCode) || options.preserveMethod === true,
+    };
+}
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* Method Semantics                                                           */
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+export function shouldPreserveRedirectMethod(statusCode, method) {
+    const normalized = method.trim().toUpperCase();
+    if (isMethodPreservingRedirect(statusCode)) {
+        return true;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Historically, 301/302 may rewrite POST to GET.
+     * For methods other than POST, the original method is normally retained.
+     */
+    if ((statusCode === 301 || statusCode === 302) && normalized === "POST") {
+        return false;
+    }
+    if (statusCode === 303) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    return true;
+}
+export function getRedirectMethod(statusCode, method) {
+    const normalized = method.trim().toUpperCase();
+    if (statusCode === 303) {
+        return "GET";
+    }
+    if ((statusCode === 301 || statusCode === 302) && normalized === "POST") {
+        return "GET";
+    }
+    return normalized;
+}
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* Redirect Policy                                                            */
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+export function createRedirectPolicy(options = {}) {
+    const maxRedirects = options.maxRedirects ?? DEFAULT_MAX_REDIRECTS;
+    if (!Number.isInteger(maxRedirects) || maxRedirects < 0) {
+        throw new RangeError("maxRedirects must be a non-negative integer.");
+    }
+    return {
+        maxRedirects,
+        preserveMethod: options.preserveMethod ?? false,
+        allowCrossOrigin: options.allowCrossOrigin ?? true,
+        allowDowngrade: options.allowDowngrade ?? false,
+    };
+}
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* Redirect Policy Evaluation                                                 */
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+export function canFollowRedirect(fromURL, toURL, policy) {
+    const from = normalizeURL(fromURL);
+    const to = normalizeURL(toURL);
+    if (!policy.allowCrossOrigin && !isSameOrigin(from, to)) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    if (!policy.allowDowngrade && isHTTPS(from) && !isHTTPS(to)) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    return true;
+}
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* Redirect Chain                                                             */
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+export function resolveRedirectChain(initialURL, locations, policy = {}) {
+    const redirectPolicy = createRedirectPolicy(policy);
+    if (locations.length > redirectPolicy.maxRedirects) {
+        throw new RangeError(`Redirect chain exceeds the maximum of ${redirectPolicy.maxRedirects} redirects.`);
+    }
+    const chain = [];
+    let current = normalizeURL(initialURL);
+    for (const location of locations) {
+        const next = resolveRedirectURL(location, current);
+        if (!canFollowRedirect(current, next, redirectPolicy)) {
+            throw new Error("Redirect is blocked by the configured redirect policy.");
+        }
+        chain.push(next);
+        current = next;
+    }
+    return chain;
+}
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* Redirect Loop Detection                                                    */
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+export function hasRedirectLoop(locations) {
+    const seen = new Set();
+    for (const location of locations) {
+        const normalized = normalizeURL(location).href;
+        if (seen.has(normalized)) {
+            return true;
+        }
+        seen.add(normalized);
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+export function assertNoRedirectLoop(locations) {
+    if (hasRedirectLoop(locations)) {
+        throw new Error("Redirect loop detected.");
+    }
+}
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* Origin Helpers                                                             */
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+export function isSameOrigin(left, right) {
+    const leftURL = normalizeURL(left);
+    const rightURL = normalizeURL(right);
+    return (leftURL.protocol === rightURL.protocol &&
+        leftURL.hostname === rightURL.hostname &&
+        getEffectivePort(leftURL) === getEffectivePort(rightURL));
+}
+export function isCrossOrigin(left, right) {
+    return !isSameOrigin(left, right);
+}
+export function isHTTPS(value) {
+    return normalizeURL(value).protocol === "https:";
+}
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* Relative Redirects                                                         */
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/**
+ * Matches any RFC 3986 scheme prefix, including opaque ones (`javascript:`,
+ * `data:`, `vbscript:`) that carry no hostname.
+ */
+const SCHEME_PREFIX = /^[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+.-]*:/;
+/**
+ * True when the value carries its own scheme.
+ *
+ * This deliberately does **not** require a hostname. `new URL("javascript:x")`
+ * parses with `protocol === "javascript:"` and `hostname === ""`, so the old
+ * `hostname.length > 0` requirement classified every opaque scheme as
+ * "relative", which is what made `isSafeRedirectProtocol("javascript:…")`
+ * return true.
+ */
+export function isAbsoluteURL(value) {
+    return SCHEME_PREFIX.test(value.trim());
+}
+/**
+ * True for a scheme-relative reference such as `//evil.com` or its backslash
+ * and mixed variants (`\\evil.com`, `/\evil.com`, `\/evil.com`).
+ *
+ * `new URL("//evil.com")` throws, so these look "relative" to a naive check —
+ * but a browser resolves `Location: //evil.com` against the current scheme and
+ * navigates off-site. Browsers also normalise `\` to `/` in this position.
+ */
+export function isProtocolRelativeURL(value) {
+    const trimmed = value.trim();
+    if (trimmed.length < 2) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    const first = trimmed.charAt(0);
+    const second = trimmed.charAt(1);
+    return ((first === "/" || first === "\\") && (second === "/" || second === "\\"));
+}
+export function isRelativeURL(value) {
+    if (/[\r\n]/.test(value)) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    return !isAbsoluteURL(value);
+}
+export function toRelativeLocation(target, base) {
+    const targetURL = normalizeURL(target);
+    const baseURL = normalizeURL(base);
+    if (!isSameOrigin(targetURL, baseURL)) {
+        return targetURL.href;
+    }
+    const targetPath = `${targetURL.pathname}${targetURL.search}${targetURL.hash}`;
+    return targetPath || "/";
+}
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* Security Helpers                                                           */
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/**
+ * True when the destination cannot change the scheme to something dangerous
+ * and cannot silently leave the current origin without an explicit scheme.
+ *
+ * Rejects, in order:
+ * - anything with a scheme that is not `http` or `https` — `javascript:`,
+ *   `data:`, `vbscript:`, `file:`, `blob:`;
+ * - scheme-relative references (`//evil.com`, `\\evil.com`, `/\evil.com`),
+ *   which a browser resolves off-site;
+ * - values containing a control character, a raw newline, or an encoded one.
+ *
+ * A plain path reference (`/account`, `account?x=1`) is safe: the browser
+ * resolves it against the current origin.
+ */
+export function isSafeRedirectProtocol(location) {
+    try {
+        const value = validateLocation(location);
+        const trimmed = value.trim();
+        if (trimmed.length === 0) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        /*
+         * A tab, newline or NUL anywhere in the scheme is stripped by browsers
+         * before the scheme is resolved, so `java\tscript:` runs as `javascript:`.
+         */
+        if (/[\u0000-\u0020\u007f]/.test(trimmed)) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        if (isProtocolRelativeURL(trimmed)) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        if (!isAbsoluteURL(trimmed)) {
+            return true;
+        }
+        const scheme = trimmed.slice(0, trimmed.indexOf(":")).toLowerCase();
+        return scheme === "http" || scheme === "https";
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+export function isPotentiallyUnsafeRedirect(location) {
+    return !isSafeRedirectProtocol(location);
+}
+/**
+ * Throws unless the destination passes {@link isSafeRedirectProtocol}.
+ */
+export function assertSafeRedirect(location) {
+    const value = validateLocation(location);
+    if (!isSafeRedirectProtocol(value)) {
+        throw new TypeError(`Unsafe redirect Location: ${value}. Only http(s) and same-origin path references are permitted.`);
+    }
+    return value;
+}
+/**
+ * Resolves a caller-supplied (i.e. potentially user-controlled) destination
+ * against an allowlist and returns a safe `Location` value.
+ *
+ * A destination that arrives in a query parameter, a form field or a cookie is
+ * attacker input. Scheme filtering alone is not enough — `https://evil.com` is
+ * a perfectly well-formed https URL — so an absolute destination is accepted
+ * only when its origin is in `allowedOrigins`. Relative path references are
+ * accepted because they cannot leave the current origin, once the
+ * scheme-relative forms above are excluded.
+ *
+ * Returns `fallback` (default `"/"`) when the destination is missing or fails
+ * any check, so a caller can use the result unconditionally.
+ */
+export function resolveSafeRedirectTarget(destination, options = {}) {
+    const fallback = options.fallback ?? "/";
+    if (destination === undefined || destination === null) {
+        return fallback;
+    }
+    const raw = destination instanceof URL ? destination.href : destination;
+    if (!isValidLocation(raw) || !isSafeRedirectProtocol(raw)) {
+        return fallback;
+    }
+    const value = raw.trim();
+    if (!isAbsoluteURL(value)) {
+        return value;
+    }
+    const allowed = options.allowedOrigins ?? [];
+    if (allowed.length === 0) {
+        return fallback;
+    }
+    let target;
+    try {
+        target = new URL(value);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return fallback;
+    }
+    const permitted = allowed.some((origin) => {
+        try {
+            return isSameOrigin(target, origin);
+        }
+        catch {
+            return false;
+        }
+    });
+    return permitted ? target.href : fallback;
+}
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* Redirect Header Helpers                                                    */
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/**
+ * Builds the `Location` header for a redirect.
+ *
+ * Enforces {@link isSafeRedirectProtocol} — a `javascript:` or `data:`
+ * destination, or a scheme-relative `//evil.com`, throws rather than being
+ * emitted — and runs the value through the package's single hardened header
+ * validator.
+ */
+export function createLocationHeader(location) {
+    const value = assertSafeRedirect(location);
+    assertSafeHeaderValue(value);
+    return {
+        name: "Location",
+        value,
+    };
+}
+export function getLocationHeader(headers) {
+    if (typeof Headers !== "undefined" && headers instanceof Headers) {
+        return headers.get("location") ?? undefined;
+    }
+    const record = headers;
+    const key = Object.keys(record).find((name) => name.toLowerCase() === "location");
+    return key ? record[key] : undefined;
+}
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* URL Normalization                                                          */
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+function normalizeURL(value) {
+    if (value instanceof URL) {
+        return new URL(value.href);
+    }
+    return new URL(value);
+}
+function getEffectivePort(url) {
+    if (url.port) {
+        return url.port;
+    }
+    if (url.protocol === "https:") {
+        return "443";
+    }
+    if (url.protocol === "http:") {
+        return "80";
+    }
+    return "";
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=http.redirect.js.map

package/dist/httpRequest/http.request.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+import type { IncomingHttpHeaders, IncomingMessage } from "node:http";
+import type { HTTPHeaders, HTTPMethod, HTTPParams, HTTPQuery, HTTPRequest } from "../httpTypes/http.types.js";
+export declare class NodeHTTPHeaders implements HTTPHeaders {
+    private readonly headers;
+    constructor(source?: IncomingHttpHeaders | Headers);
+    get(name: string): string | null;
+    set(name: string, value: string): void;
+    append(name: string, value: string): void;
+    has(name: string): boolean;
+    delete(name: string): void;
+    entries(): IterableIterator<[string, string]>;
+    keys(): IterableIterator<string>;
+    values(): IterableIterator<string>;
+}
+export interface HTTPRequestOptions {
+    readonly params?: HTTPParams;
+    readonly query?: HTTPQuery;
+    readonly rawBody?: Uint8Array;
+    readonly body?: unknown;
+    readonly ip?: string;
+    readonly ips?: readonly string[];
+    readonly signal?: AbortSignal;
+}
+export declare class NodeHTTPRequest implements HTTPRequest {
+    readonly method: HTTPMethod;
+    readonly url: string;
+    readonly path: string;
+    readonly originalUrl: string;
+    readonly headers: HTTPHeaders;
+    readonly query: HTTPQuery;
+    readonly params: HTTPParams;
+    readonly protocol: string;
+    readonly hostname: string;
+    readonly ip?: string;
+    readonly ips?: readonly string[];
+    readonly secure: boolean;
+    readonly rawBody?: Uint8Array;
+    readonly body: unknown;
+    private readonly signal?;
+    private cachedText?;
+    private cachedJSON?;
+    private jsonParsed;
+    constructor(request: IncomingMessage, options?: HTTPRequestOptions);
+    getHeader(name: string): string | undefined;
+    get(name: string): string | undefined;
+    accepts(...types: readonly string[]): string | false;
+    is(...types: readonly string[]): string | false;
+    json<T = unknown>(): Promise<T>;
+    text(): Promise<string>;
+    buffer(): Promise<Uint8Array>;
+    get signalAborted(): boolean;
+    get abortedBySignal(): boolean;
+    /**
+     * Whether the request has been aborted.
+     *
+     * This was previously a declared-but-never-assigned field, so it read as
+     * `undefined` on every instance and no abort check against it ever fired.
+     */
+    get aborted(): boolean;
+}
+export declare function createHTTPRequest(request: IncomingMessage, options?: HTTPRequestOptions): NodeHTTPRequest;
+export declare function getRequestPath(request: IncomingMessage): string;
+export declare function getRequestHost(request: IncomingMessage): string;
+export declare function getHostname(host: string): string;
+export declare function getRequestProtocol(request: IncomingMessage): string;
+export declare function getRequestIP(request: IncomingMessage): string | undefined;
+export declare function parseQueryString(url: string): HTTPQuery;
+export declare function normalizeHTTPMethod(method: string | undefined): HTTPMethod;
+export declare function parseAcceptHeader(value: string): string[];
+export declare function mediaTypeMatches(candidate: string, requested: string): boolean;
+//# sourceMappingURL=http.request.d.ts.map