@zanii/sentinel 0.1.0

package/LICENSE

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package/README.md

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+# @zanii/sentinel
+
+**Runtime behavioral monitoring for agents — an "antivirus for agents."** The behavioral
+layer between `@zanii/monitor` (log integrity) and `@zanii/policy` (pre-action rules): it
+consumes the receipt stream and scores **drift** — what an agent *actually does* vs what
+it was *made to do* — then feeds back: escalate, prepare a freeze, page.
+
+**The Zanii twist:** findings become `sentinel.alert` **receipts**, recorded by the
+sentinel's own `did:key` (watcher ≠ watched). Detection itself is tamper-evident — and so
+is silence (no alert history is a fact a buyer can check). No generic agent-EDR has that.
+
+```sh
+npm install @zanii/sentinel @zanii/core
+```
+
+```ts
+import { buildBaseline, createWatcher, escalationRule, buildAlertReceipt, baselineHash } from '@zanii/sentinel';
+
+// 1. baseline: declared scopes (from delegation) + learned habits (from history)
+const baseline = buildBaseline(agent.did, { receipts: history, delegation: [cert] });
+
+// 2. watch the live stream; respond on drift (responses are injected — the sentinel holds no keys)
+const w = createWatcher({
+  server: 'https://ledger.zanii.agency',
+  baselines: { [agent.did]: baseline },
+  cursor: loadCursor(),          // resume — otherwise a restart re-alerts on old receipts
+  onFinding: async (f) => {
+    await sentinelAgent.record(buildAlertReceipt(f, { baselineHash: baselineHash(baseline) })); // alert = receipt
+    const rule = escalationRule(f);                 // null when the finding names no targets
+    if (f.severity === 'high' && rule) policy.upsert(rule);   // → require_approval speed bump
+  },
+});
+setInterval(async () => { await w.tick(); saveCursor(w.cursor()); }, 60_000);
+```
+
+The watcher keeps a **rolling window** (`windowMs`, default 2h) so windowed detectors work
+*across polls* — a 3-step exfil arriving one step per 60s poll still fires. Findings are
+de-duplicated, so an already-alerted receipt isn't re-alerted every tick.
+
+**Feed limit:** `/v1/recent` is a *global* feed the server caps at 100. On a busy ledger,
+receipts can be missed between polls (the cursor jumps). For production, drive `scan` from
+`receipt.recorded` webhooks (`@zanii/webhooks`) rather than polling.
+
+## Two modes (forced by the metadata-only ledger)
+- **Ledger mode** — anyone (auditor, customer, you) watches *behavior shape* over the
+  public stream: novel targets, rate spikes, exfil sequences, intent gaps, off-hours,
+  scope-probing (from `receipt.rejected` webhooks). No operator cooperation needed.
+- **Operator mode** — inside the operator's pipeline, inject `payloadOf` + `checkContent`
+  (e.g. `@zanii/walls` `checkOutput` over raw payloads, pre-hash) for content detection.
+
+## Detectors (v1, heuristic ladder — classifier upgrade is the documented path)
+`novel-target`, `scope-edge`, `rate-spike`, `intent-gap`, `sequence` (default: the exfil
+shape read → archive → external-send), `off-hours`, and `wall-crossing` (operator mode).
+Every finding names the receipts behind it — evidence, not vibes.
+
+## Honest limits (read these)
+- **Detection, not prevention** — a sentinel sees what's recorded; an agent acting
+  entirely off-rails is the credential-custody problem, not a sentinel gap.
+- **False positives are structural** — agents legitimately change. Default response is the
+  `require_approval` speed bump (`escalationRule`), **never** auto-revocation; `freeze` is
+  always human-in-the-loop (revocation needs the owner's key, which the sentinel never holds).
+  `escalationRule` returns `null` when a finding names no specific targets (e.g. `scope-edge`) —
+  it will not silently generate a `*` rule that gates the agent's whole surface.
+- **In-scope compromise is the hard case** — a poisoned agent doing plausible actions
+  inside its scopes evades metadata detection; sequences/rates narrow the window, never to zero.
+
+## Changelog
+- **0.1.0** — initial release: `buildBaseline`, `scan` (six detectors + operator content hook), `createWatcher` (rolling window + finding de-dup + resumable cursor), `escalationRule`, `buildAlertReceipt`/`verifyAlert`.
+
+## License
+Apache-2.0.

package/dist/index.d.ts

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+/**
+ * @zanii/sentinel — runtime behavioral monitoring for agents ("antivirus for agents").
+ *
+ * The behavioral layer between `@zanii/monitor` (log integrity) and `@zanii/policy`
+ * (pre-action rules): consume the receipt stream, score **drift** — what an agent
+ * *actually does* vs what it was *made to do* (declared scopes + learned habits) — and
+ * feed back: escalate to `require_approval`, prepare a human-gated freeze, page.
+ *
+ * The Zanii twist: findings become `sentinel.alert` receipts recorded by the sentinel's
+ * OWN did:key (watcher ≠ watched), so detection itself is tamper-evident — and so is
+ * silence (no alert history is a visible fact a buyer can check).
+ *
+ * Two modes, forced by the metadata-only ledger stream (payloads are salted hashes):
+ * **ledger mode** — anyone watches behavior shape (targets, rates, sequences, intent
+ * gaps) with no operator cooperation; **operator mode** — inject `checkContent` (e.g.
+ * `@zanii/walls` `checkOutput` over raw payloads, pre-hash) for content detection.
+ *
+ * Honest limits: detection, not prevention (off-rails action is the credential-custody
+ * problem); false positives are structural — default to the `require_approval` speed
+ * bump, never auto-revoke; in-scope compromise is the hard case — sequences and rates
+ * narrow the window, never to zero.
+ */
+import { type DelegationCert, type Receipt } from '@zanii/core';
+export type FetchLike = (input: string, init?: RequestInit) => Promise<Response>;
+export interface Baseline {
+    v: 1;
+    agent_id: string;
+    /** Declared: effective scopes from the delegation chain — what the agent is FOR. */
+    scopes: string[];
+    /** Learned: target prefixes seen in history (first two segments, e.g. `crm.lookup`). */
+    target_prefixes: string[];
+    /**
+     * Learned: actions-per-hour mean/std in **integer milli-units** (×1000). Protocol
+     * objects are float-free — JCS and JSON can disagree on floats, and a baseline is
+     * hashed into every alert, so it must be byte-identical across languages.
+     */
+    rate: {
+        mean_milli: number;
+        std_milli: number;
+    };
+    /** Learned: share of actions bracketed by `action_intent`, in milli-units (0..1000). */
+    intent_milli: number;
+    /** Learned: UTC-hour activity histogram (24 buckets). */
+    active_hours: number[];
+    sample_size: number;
+}
+export declare function targetPrefix(target: string): string;
+/** Build the drift baseline for one agent from its delegation (declared) + history (learned). */
+export declare function buildBaseline(agentId: string, opts?: {
+    receipts?: Receipt[];
+    delegation?: DelegationCert[];
+}): Baseline;
+/** Canonical hash of a baseline — pinned into every alert ("drift relative to WHAT"). */
+export declare function baselineHash(b: Baseline): string;
+export type Severity = 'low' | 'medium' | 'high';
+export interface Finding {
+    rule: string;
+    severity: Severity;
+    agent_id: string;
+    /** The receipts behind this finding — evidence, not vibes. */
+    receipt_hashes: string[];
+    /** The targets involved (drives `escalationRule`). */
+    targets: string[];
+    observed: string;
+    expected: string;
+    ts: string;
+}
+export interface SequenceRule {
+    name: string;
+    /** Ordered regexes over targets; a match = the steps occur in order within `windowMs`. */
+    steps: RegExp[];
+    windowMs: number;
+}
+/** The exfil shape: read-ish → encode/archive-ish → external-send-ish. */
+export declare const EXFIL_SEQUENCE: SequenceRule;
+export interface ScanOptions {
+    /** Rejected-write events (from `receipt.rejected` webhooks) — scope-probing signal. */
+    rejections?: Array<{
+        agent_id?: string;
+        error?: string;
+        ts?: string;
+    }>;
+    /** Rate-spike threshold in robust z-scores (default 3). */
+    rateZ?: number;
+    /** Sequence rules (default: the exfil shape). */
+    sequences?: SequenceRule[];
+    /** Operator mode: return raw payload text for a receipt (pre-hash). */
+    payloadOf?: (r: Receipt & {
+        hash?: string;
+    }) => string | undefined;
+    /** Operator mode: content detector (e.g. walls' checkOutput). Return violations. */
+    checkContent?: (payloadText: string, r: Receipt) => string[];
+    /** Minimum baseline sample size before statistical rules fire (default 20). */
+    minSample?: number;
+}
+type Scanned = Receipt & {
+    hash?: string;
+};
+/** Scan a window of an agent's receipts against its baseline. Pure — no I/O. */
+export declare function scan(receipts: Scanned[], baseline: Baseline, opts?: ScanOptions): Finding[];
+export interface WatcherOptions {
+    server: string;
+    fetchImpl?: FetchLike;
+    /** Baseline per watched agent DID. */
+    baselines: Record<string, Baseline>;
+    onFinding: (finding: Finding) => void | Promise<void>;
+    scan?: ScanOptions;
+    /** Page size for /v1/recent (server caps at 100). */
+    limit?: number;
+    /** Resume from a persisted cursor — the highest ledger index already processed. */
+    cursor?: number;
+    /**
+     * Rolling window of receipts kept per agent, so **windowed detectors** (`sequence`,
+     * `rate-spike`, `intent-gap`) see across polls. Without this a 3-step exfil arriving
+     * over three 60s polls would never be detected — each poll would see one step.
+     * Default 2h (covers the 30-min exfil window + hourly rate buckets).
+     */
+    windowMs?: number;
+}
+export interface Watcher {
+    /** One poll: fetch new receipts, scan the rolling window, dispatch *new* findings. */
+    tick(): Promise<Finding[]>;
+    /** Highest ledger index processed — **persist this** and pass back as `cursor`. */
+    cursor(): number;
+}
+/**
+ * Ledger-mode watcher over `GET /v1/recent`. Call `tick()` on your own schedule.
+ *
+ * Keeps a rolling per-agent window (see `windowMs`) so windowed detectors work across
+ * polls, and de-duplicates findings so a receipt already alerted on isn't re-alerted.
+ *
+ * **Limit:** `/v1/recent` is a *global* feed capped at 100 by the server. On a busy
+ * ledger, receipts can be missed between polls (the cursor jumps). For production, drive
+ * `scan` from `receipt.recorded` webhooks (`@zanii/webhooks`) instead of polling.
+ */
+export declare function createWatcher(opts: WatcherOptions): Watcher;
+/**
+ * The default response: a `@zanii/policy` rule turning the flagged prefixes into a
+ * `require_approval` speed bump.
+ *
+ * Returns `null` when the finding names no specific targets (e.g. `scope-edge`, which is
+ * driven by rejections, not receipts) — we will **not** silently generate a `*` rule that
+ * gates the agent's entire surface. That call belongs to a human.
+ */
+export declare function escalationRule(f: Finding): {
+    id: string;
+    effect: 'require_approval';
+    targets: string[];
+} | null;
+/** Record with the sentinel's OWN did:key (watcher ≠ watched): `sentinel.alert`. */
+export declare function buildAlertReceipt(f: Finding, opts: {
+    baselineHash: string;
+}): {
+    target: string;
+    payload: Record<string, unknown>;
+};
+export interface AlertCheck {
+    ok: boolean;
+    reasons: string[];
+}
+/** Structurally validate a `sentinel.alert` payload. */
+export declare function verifyAlert(payload: Record<string, unknown> | undefined): AlertCheck;
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map

package/dist/index.d.ts.map

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package/dist/index.js

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+/**
+ * @zanii/sentinel — runtime behavioral monitoring for agents ("antivirus for agents").
+ *
+ * The behavioral layer between `@zanii/monitor` (log integrity) and `@zanii/policy`
+ * (pre-action rules): consume the receipt stream, score **drift** — what an agent
+ * *actually does* vs what it was *made to do* (declared scopes + learned habits) — and
+ * feed back: escalate to `require_approval`, prepare a human-gated freeze, page.
+ *
+ * The Zanii twist: findings become `sentinel.alert` receipts recorded by the sentinel's
+ * OWN did:key (watcher ≠ watched), so detection itself is tamper-evident — and so is
+ * silence (no alert history is a visible fact a buyer can check).
+ *
+ * Two modes, forced by the metadata-only ledger stream (payloads are salted hashes):
+ * **ledger mode** — anyone watches behavior shape (targets, rates, sequences, intent
+ * gaps) with no operator cooperation; **operator mode** — inject `checkContent` (e.g.
+ * `@zanii/walls` `checkOutput` over raw payloads, pre-hash) for content detection.
+ *
+ * Honest limits: detection, not prevention (off-rails action is the credential-custody
+ * problem); false positives are structural — default to the `require_approval` speed
+ * bump, never auto-revoke; in-scope compromise is the hard case — sequences and rates
+ * narrow the window, never to zero.
+ */
+import { jcsHash, scopesAllow, verifyChain } from '@zanii/core';
+export function targetPrefix(target) {
+    return target.split('.').slice(0, 2).join('.');
+}
+function hourOf(ts) {
+    return new Date(ts).getUTCHours();
+}
+/** Build the drift baseline for one agent from its delegation (declared) + history (learned). */
+export function buildBaseline(agentId, opts = {}) {
+    const history = (opts.receipts ?? []).filter((r) => r.agent_id === agentId);
+    const scopes = opts.delegation
+        ? verifyChain(opts.delegation, { agentId }).effectiveScopes ?? []
+        : [];
+    const prefixes = new Set();
+    const hours = new Array(24).fill(0);
+    const perHourCounts = new Map();
+    let intents = 0;
+    let actions = 0;
+    for (const r of history) {
+        prefixes.add(targetPrefix(r.target));
+        hours[hourOf(r.ts)] = (hours[hourOf(r.ts)] ?? 0) + 1;
+        const bucket = r.ts.slice(0, 13); // YYYY-MM-DDTHH
+        perHourCounts.set(bucket, (perHourCounts.get(bucket) ?? 0) + 1);
+        if (r.action === 'action_intent')
+            intents += 1;
+        else
+            actions += 1;
+    }
+    const counts = [...perHourCounts.values()];
+    const mean = counts.length ? counts.reduce((a, b) => a + b, 0) / counts.length : 0;
+    const variance = counts.length ? counts.reduce((a, b) => a + (b - mean) ** 2, 0) / counts.length : 0;
+    return {
+        v: 1,
+        agent_id: agentId,
+        scopes,
+        target_prefixes: [...prefixes].sort(),
+        rate: { mean_milli: Math.round(mean * 1000), std_milli: Math.round(Math.sqrt(variance) * 1000) },
+        intent_milli: actions > 0 ? Math.round((intents / actions) * 1000) : 0,
+        active_hours: hours,
+        sample_size: history.length,
+    };
+}
+/** Canonical hash of a baseline — pinned into every alert ("drift relative to WHAT"). */
+export function baselineHash(b) {
+    return jcsHash(b);
+}
+/** The exfil shape: read-ish → encode/archive-ish → external-send-ish. */
+export const EXFIL_SEQUENCE = {
+    name: 'exfil-shape',
+    steps: [/\.(read|list|export|fetch|get|search)/i, /\.(encode|archive|zip|compress|bundle)/i, /(send|post|upload|publish|external)/i],
+    windowMs: 30 * 60_000,
+};
+function finding(rule, severity, agentId, evidence, observed, expected) {
+    return {
+        rule,
+        severity,
+        agent_id: agentId,
+        receipt_hashes: evidence.map((r) => r.hash ?? jcsHash(r)),
+        targets: [...new Set(evidence.map((r) => r.target))],
+        observed,
+        expected,
+        ts: evidence[evidence.length - 1]?.ts ?? new Date(0).toISOString(),
+    };
+}
+/** Scan a window of an agent's receipts against its baseline. Pure — no I/O. */
+export function scan(receipts, baseline, opts = {}) {
+    const findings = [];
+    const mine = receipts
+        .filter((r) => r.agent_id === baseline.agent_id)
+        .sort((a, b) => a.ts.localeCompare(b.ts));
+    const minSample = opts.minSample ?? 20;
+    const known = new Set(baseline.target_prefixes);
+    // 1. novel-target — prefix outside the learned set; high severity if also outside declared scopes
+    const novel = new Map();
+    for (const r of mine) {
+        const p = targetPrefix(r.target);
+        if (baseline.sample_size >= minSample && !known.has(p)) {
+            novel.set(p, [...(novel.get(p) ?? []), r]);
+        }
+    }
+    for (const [prefix, evidence] of novel) {
+        const inScope = baseline.scopes.length === 0 || scopesAllow(baseline.scopes, evidence[0].target);
+        findings.push(finding('novel-target', inScope ? 'medium' : 'high', baseline.agent_id, evidence, `target prefix ${prefix} never seen in baseline`, `one of [${baseline.target_prefixes.join(', ')}]`));
+    }
+    // 2. scope-edge — rejected writes are the probing signal (from receipt.rejected webhooks)
+    const probes = (opts.rejections ?? []).filter((e) => !e.agent_id || e.agent_id === baseline.agent_id);
+    if (probes.length > 0) {
+        findings.push({
+            rule: 'scope-edge', severity: probes.length > 2 ? 'high' : 'medium', agent_id: baseline.agent_id,
+            receipt_hashes: [], targets: [],
+            observed: `${probes.length} rejected write(s): ${probes.map((p) => p.error).filter(Boolean).slice(0, 3).join('; ')}`,
+            expected: 'no rejected writes', ts: probes[probes.length - 1]?.ts ?? new Date(0).toISOString(),
+        });
+    }
+    // 3. rate-spike — actions per hour vs baseline (milli-units; +1000 keeps std=0 from firing on +1)
+    if (baseline.sample_size >= minSample) {
+        const buckets = new Map();
+        for (const r of mine)
+            buckets.set(r.ts.slice(0, 13), [...(buckets.get(r.ts.slice(0, 13)) ?? []), r]);
+        const z = opts.rateZ ?? 3;
+        for (const [hour, rs] of buckets) {
+            if (rs.length * 1000 > baseline.rate.mean_milli + z * (baseline.rate.std_milli + 1000)) {
+                findings.push(finding('rate-spike', 'high', baseline.agent_id, rs, `${rs.length} actions in hour ${hour}`, `~${(baseline.rate.mean_milli / 1000).toFixed(1)}/h (σ ${(baseline.rate.std_milli / 1000).toFixed(1)})`));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    // 4. intent-gap — the agent normally brackets actions with intents, this window doesn't
+    if (baseline.intent_milli >= 800 && mine.length >= 5) {
+        const intents = mine.filter((r) => r.action === 'action_intent').length;
+        const actions = mine.length - intents;
+        const ratioMilli = actions > 0 ? Math.round((intents / actions) * 1000) : 1000;
+        if (ratioMilli < baseline.intent_milli / 2) {
+            findings.push(finding('intent-gap', 'high', baseline.agent_id, mine.filter((r) => r.action !== 'action_intent'), `intent ratio ${(ratioMilli / 1000).toFixed(2)} this window`, `~${(baseline.intent_milli / 1000).toFixed(2)} (agent normally declares intent)`));
+        }
+    }
+    // 5. sequence — ordered target patterns within a window (default: the exfil shape)
+    for (const rule of opts.sequences ?? [EXFIL_SEQUENCE]) {
+        let step = 0;
+        let startMs = 0;
+        const evidence = [];
+        for (const r of mine) {
+            if (rule.steps[step].test(r.target)) {
+                if (step === 0)
+                    startMs = Date.parse(r.ts);
+                if (Date.parse(r.ts) - startMs <= rule.windowMs) {
+                    evidence.push(r);
+                    step += 1;
+                    if (step === rule.steps.length) {
+                        findings.push(finding(`sequence:${rule.name}`, 'high', baseline.agent_id, [...evidence], evidence.map((e) => e.target).join(' → '), `no ${rule.name} sequence`));
+                        step = 0;
+                        evidence.length = 0;
+                    }
+                }
+                else {
+                    step = 0;
+                    evidence.length = 0;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    // 6. off-hours — activity in hours the baseline says are silent
+    if (baseline.sample_size >= minSample) {
+        const silent = mine.filter((r) => (baseline.active_hours[hourOf(r.ts)] ?? 0) === 0);
+        if (silent.length > 0) {
+            findings.push(finding('off-hours', 'medium', baseline.agent_id, silent, `${silent.length} action(s) at UTC hour(s) [${[...new Set(silent.map((r) => hourOf(r.ts)))].join(',')}]`, 'activity only in learned active hours'));
+        }
+    }
+    // 7. wall-crossing — operator mode only (raw payloads pre-hash)
+    if (opts.payloadOf && opts.checkContent) {
+        for (const r of mine) {
+            const text = opts.payloadOf(r);
+            if (text === undefined)
+                continue;
+            const violations = opts.checkContent(text, r);
+            if (violations.length > 0) {
+                findings.push(finding('wall-crossing', 'high', baseline.agent_id, [r], `content violations: ${violations.join(', ')}`, 'no boundary-crossing content'));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return findings;
+}
+/** Stable identity of a finding, so the same one isn't re-alerted on every poll. */
+function fingerprint(f) {
+    return `${f.rule}|${[...f.receipt_hashes].sort().join(',')}|${f.ts}`;
+}
+/**
+ * Ledger-mode watcher over `GET /v1/recent`. Call `tick()` on your own schedule.
+ *
+ * Keeps a rolling per-agent window (see `windowMs`) so windowed detectors work across
+ * polls, and de-duplicates findings so a receipt already alerted on isn't re-alerted.
+ *
+ * **Limit:** `/v1/recent` is a *global* feed capped at 100 by the server. On a busy
+ * ledger, receipts can be missed between polls (the cursor jumps). For production, drive
+ * `scan` from `receipt.recorded` webhooks (`@zanii/webhooks`) instead of polling.
+ */
+export function createWatcher(opts) {
+    const fetchImpl = opts.fetchImpl ?? ((u, i) => fetch(u, i));
+    const server = opts.server.replace(/\/$/, '');
+    const windowMs = opts.windowMs ?? 2 * 60 * 60_000;
+    let cursor = opts.cursor ?? -1;
+    const buffers = {};
+    const seen = new Set();
+    return {
+        cursor: () => cursor,
+        async tick() {
+            const res = await fetchImpl(`${server}/v1/recent?limit=${opts.limit ?? 100}`);
+            if (!res.ok)
+                throw new Error(`recent fetch failed: HTTP ${res.status}`);
+            const body = (await res.json());
+            const fresh = body.receipts.filter((r) => r.index > cursor);
+            for (const r of fresh)
+                cursor = Math.max(cursor, r.index);
+            const all = [];
+            for (const [did, baseline] of Object.entries(opts.baselines)) {
+                const mine = fresh.filter((r) => r.receipt.agent_id === did).map((r) => ({ ...r.receipt, hash: r.hash }));
+                if (mine.length === 0)
+                    continue;
+                // Rolling window: append, then trim to `windowMs` behind the newest receipt.
+                const buf = [...(buffers[did] ?? []), ...mine].sort((a, b) => a.ts.localeCompare(b.ts));
+                const newest = Date.parse(buf[buf.length - 1].ts);
+                buffers[did] = buf.filter((r) => newest - Date.parse(r.ts) <= windowMs);
+                for (const f of scan(buffers[did], baseline, opts.scan)) {
+                    const fp = fingerprint(f);
+                    if (seen.has(fp))
+                        continue; // already alerted — don't re-fire every poll
+                    seen.add(fp);
+                    all.push(f);
+                    await opts.onFinding(f);
+                }
+            }
+            if (seen.size > 5000)
+                seen.clear(); // bounded; worst case a stale finding re-fires once
+            return all;
+        },
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * The default response: a `@zanii/policy` rule turning the flagged prefixes into a
+ * `require_approval` speed bump.
+ *
+ * Returns `null` when the finding names no specific targets (e.g. `scope-edge`, which is
+ * driven by rejections, not receipts) — we will **not** silently generate a `*` rule that
+ * gates the agent's entire surface. That call belongs to a human.
+ */
+export function escalationRule(f) {
+    const prefixes = [...new Set(f.targets.map((t) => `${targetPrefix(t)}.*`))];
+    if (prefixes.length === 0)
+        return null;
+    return {
+        id: `sentinel-${f.rule.replace(/[^a-z0-9-]/gi, '-')}-${f.agent_id.slice(-8)}`,
+        effect: 'require_approval',
+        targets: prefixes,
+    };
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Alerts are receipts — detection itself is tamper-evident
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/** Record with the sentinel's OWN did:key (watcher ≠ watched): `sentinel.alert`. */
+export function buildAlertReceipt(f, opts) {
+    return {
+        target: 'sentinel.alert',
+        payload: {
+            _zr_kind: 'sentinel',
+            v: 1,
+            rule: f.rule,
+            severity: f.severity,
+            watched_agent: f.agent_id,
+            evidence: f.receipt_hashes,
+            observed: f.observed,
+            expected: f.expected,
+            baseline_hash: opts.baselineHash,
+            ts: f.ts,
+        },
+    };
+}
+/** Structurally validate a `sentinel.alert` payload. */
+export function verifyAlert(payload) {
+    const reasons = [];
+    const p = payload ?? {};
+    if (p._zr_kind !== 'sentinel' || p.v !== 1)
+        reasons.push('not a sentinel alert (v1)');
+    if (!p.rule)
+        reasons.push('missing rule');
+    if (!['low', 'medium', 'high'].includes(p.severity))
+        reasons.push('missing/invalid severity');
+    if (!p.watched_agent)
+        reasons.push('missing watched_agent');
+    if (!Array.isArray(p.evidence))
+        reasons.push('missing evidence array');
+    if (typeof p.baseline_hash !== 'string' || !p.baseline_hash.startsWith('sha256:'))
+        reasons.push('missing/invalid baseline_hash');
+    return { ok: reasons.length === 0, reasons };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/index.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+{
+  "name": "@zanii/sentinel",
+  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "description": "Runtime behavioral monitoring for agents ('antivirus for agents'): score drift between what an agent actually does and what it was made to do, from the receipt stream — and the alerts themselves are tamper-evident receipts.",
+  "license": "Apache-2.0",
+  "homepage": "https://ledger.zanii.agency",
+  "type": "module",
+  "main": "./dist/index.js",
+  "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
+  "exports": {
+    ".": {
+      "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
+      "import": "./dist/index.js"
+    }
+  },
+  "files": [
+    "dist",
+    "src",
+    "README.md",
+    "LICENSE"
+  ],
+  "publishConfig": {
+    "access": "public"
+  },
+  "engines": {
+    "node": ">=18"
+  },
+  "devDependencies": {
+    "@types/node": "^26.1.0",
+    "typescript": "^5.8.2",
+    "vitest": "^3.0.9"
+  },
+  "dependencies": {
+    "@zanii/core": "0.4.0"
+  },
+  "scripts": {
+    "build": "tsc -p tsconfig.build.json",
+    "test": "vitest run",
+    "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit"
+  }
+}

package/src/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,419 @@
+/**
+ * @zanii/sentinel — runtime behavioral monitoring for agents ("antivirus for agents").
+ *
+ * The behavioral layer between `@zanii/monitor` (log integrity) and `@zanii/policy`
+ * (pre-action rules): consume the receipt stream, score **drift** — what an agent
+ * *actually does* vs what it was *made to do* (declared scopes + learned habits) — and
+ * feed back: escalate to `require_approval`, prepare a human-gated freeze, page.
+ *
+ * The Zanii twist: findings become `sentinel.alert` receipts recorded by the sentinel's
+ * OWN did:key (watcher ≠ watched), so detection itself is tamper-evident — and so is
+ * silence (no alert history is a visible fact a buyer can check).
+ *
+ * Two modes, forced by the metadata-only ledger stream (payloads are salted hashes):
+ * **ledger mode** — anyone watches behavior shape (targets, rates, sequences, intent
+ * gaps) with no operator cooperation; **operator mode** — inject `checkContent` (e.g.
+ * `@zanii/walls` `checkOutput` over raw payloads, pre-hash) for content detection.
+ *
+ * Honest limits: detection, not prevention (off-rails action is the credential-custody
+ * problem); false positives are structural — default to the `require_approval` speed
+ * bump, never auto-revoke; in-scope compromise is the hard case — sequences and rates
+ * narrow the window, never to zero.
+ */
+import { jcsHash, scopesAllow, verifyChain, type DelegationCert, type Receipt } from '@zanii/core';
+
+export type FetchLike = (input: string, init?: RequestInit) => Promise<Response>;
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Baseline — declared (cryptographic) + learned (statistical)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+export interface Baseline {
+  v: 1;
+  agent_id: string;
+  /** Declared: effective scopes from the delegation chain — what the agent is FOR. */
+  scopes: string[];
+  /** Learned: target prefixes seen in history (first two segments, e.g. `crm.lookup`). */
+  target_prefixes: string[];
+  /**
+   * Learned: actions-per-hour mean/std in **integer milli-units** (×1000). Protocol
+   * objects are float-free — JCS and JSON can disagree on floats, and a baseline is
+   * hashed into every alert, so it must be byte-identical across languages.
+   */
+  rate: { mean_milli: number; std_milli: number };
+  /** Learned: share of actions bracketed by `action_intent`, in milli-units (0..1000). */
+  intent_milli: number;
+  /** Learned: UTC-hour activity histogram (24 buckets). */
+  active_hours: number[];
+  sample_size: number;
+}
+
+export function targetPrefix(target: string): string {
+  return target.split('.').slice(0, 2).join('.');
+}
+
+function hourOf(ts: string): number {
+  return new Date(ts).getUTCHours();
+}
+
+/** Build the drift baseline for one agent from its delegation (declared) + history (learned). */
+export function buildBaseline(
+  agentId: string,
+  opts: { receipts?: Receipt[]; delegation?: DelegationCert[] } = {},
+): Baseline {
+  const history = (opts.receipts ?? []).filter((r) => r.agent_id === agentId);
+  const scopes = opts.delegation
+    ? verifyChain(opts.delegation, { agentId }).effectiveScopes ?? []
+    : [];
+  const prefixes = new Set<string>();
+  const hours = new Array<number>(24).fill(0);
+  const perHourCounts = new Map<string, number>();
+  let intents = 0;
+  let actions = 0;
+  for (const r of history) {
+    prefixes.add(targetPrefix(r.target));
+    hours[hourOf(r.ts)] = (hours[hourOf(r.ts)] ?? 0) + 1;
+    const bucket = r.ts.slice(0, 13); // YYYY-MM-DDTHH
+    perHourCounts.set(bucket, (perHourCounts.get(bucket) ?? 0) + 1);
+    if (r.action === 'action_intent') intents += 1;
+    else actions += 1;
+  }
+  const counts = [...perHourCounts.values()];
+  const mean = counts.length ? counts.reduce((a, b) => a + b, 0) / counts.length : 0;
+  const variance = counts.length ? counts.reduce((a, b) => a + (b - mean) ** 2, 0) / counts.length : 0;
+  return {
+    v: 1,
+    agent_id: agentId,
+    scopes,
+    target_prefixes: [...prefixes].sort(),
+    rate: { mean_milli: Math.round(mean * 1000), std_milli: Math.round(Math.sqrt(variance) * 1000) },
+    intent_milli: actions > 0 ? Math.round((intents / actions) * 1000) : 0,
+    active_hours: hours,
+    sample_size: history.length,
+  };
+}
+
+/** Canonical hash of a baseline — pinned into every alert ("drift relative to WHAT"). */
+export function baselineHash(b: Baseline): string {
+  return jcsHash(b as unknown as Record<string, unknown>);
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Detectors — a heuristic ladder; every finding names its evidence receipts
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+export type Severity = 'low' | 'medium' | 'high';
+
+export interface Finding {
+  rule: string;
+  severity: Severity;
+  agent_id: string;
+  /** The receipts behind this finding — evidence, not vibes. */
+  receipt_hashes: string[];
+  /** The targets involved (drives `escalationRule`). */
+  targets: string[];
+  observed: string;
+  expected: string;
+  ts: string;
+}
+
+export interface SequenceRule {
+  name: string;
+  /** Ordered regexes over targets; a match = the steps occur in order within `windowMs`. */
+  steps: RegExp[];
+  windowMs: number;
+}
+
+/** The exfil shape: read-ish → encode/archive-ish → external-send-ish. */
+export const EXFIL_SEQUENCE: SequenceRule = {
+  name: 'exfil-shape',
+  steps: [/\.(read|list|export|fetch|get|search)/i, /\.(encode|archive|zip|compress|bundle)/i, /(send|post|upload|publish|external)/i],
+  windowMs: 30 * 60_000,
+};
+
+export interface ScanOptions {
+  /** Rejected-write events (from `receipt.rejected` webhooks) — scope-probing signal. */
+  rejections?: Array<{ agent_id?: string; error?: string; ts?: string }>;
+  /** Rate-spike threshold in robust z-scores (default 3). */
+  rateZ?: number;
+  /** Sequence rules (default: the exfil shape). */
+  sequences?: SequenceRule[];
+  /** Operator mode: return raw payload text for a receipt (pre-hash). */
+  payloadOf?: (r: Receipt & { hash?: string }) => string | undefined;
+  /** Operator mode: content detector (e.g. walls' checkOutput). Return violations. */
+  checkContent?: (payloadText: string, r: Receipt) => string[];
+  /** Minimum baseline sample size before statistical rules fire (default 20). */
+  minSample?: number;
+}
+
+type Scanned = Receipt & { hash?: string };
+
+function finding(rule: string, severity: Severity, agentId: string, evidence: Scanned[], observed: string, expected: string): Finding {
+  return {
+    rule,
+    severity,
+    agent_id: agentId,
+    receipt_hashes: evidence.map((r) => r.hash ?? jcsHash(r)),
+    targets: [...new Set(evidence.map((r) => r.target))],
+    observed,
+    expected,
+    ts: evidence[evidence.length - 1]?.ts ?? new Date(0).toISOString(),
+  };
+}
+
+/** Scan a window of an agent's receipts against its baseline. Pure — no I/O. */
+export function scan(receipts: Scanned[], baseline: Baseline, opts: ScanOptions = {}): Finding[] {
+  const findings: Finding[] = [];
+  const mine = receipts
+    .filter((r) => r.agent_id === baseline.agent_id)
+    .sort((a, b) => a.ts.localeCompare(b.ts));
+  const minSample = opts.minSample ?? 20;
+  const known = new Set(baseline.target_prefixes);
+
+  // 1. novel-target — prefix outside the learned set; high severity if also outside declared scopes
+  const novel = new Map<string, Scanned[]>();
+  for (const r of mine) {
+    const p = targetPrefix(r.target);
+    if (baseline.sample_size >= minSample && !known.has(p)) {
+      novel.set(p, [...(novel.get(p) ?? []), r]);
+    }
+  }
+  for (const [prefix, evidence] of novel) {
+    const inScope = baseline.scopes.length === 0 || scopesAllow(baseline.scopes, evidence[0]!.target);
+    findings.push(finding('novel-target', inScope ? 'medium' : 'high', baseline.agent_id, evidence,
+      `target prefix ${prefix} never seen in baseline`, `one of [${baseline.target_prefixes.join(', ')}]`));
+  }
+
+  // 2. scope-edge — rejected writes are the probing signal (from receipt.rejected webhooks)
+  const probes = (opts.rejections ?? []).filter((e) => !e.agent_id || e.agent_id === baseline.agent_id);
+  if (probes.length > 0) {
+    findings.push({
+      rule: 'scope-edge', severity: probes.length > 2 ? 'high' : 'medium', agent_id: baseline.agent_id,
+      receipt_hashes: [], targets: [],
+      observed: `${probes.length} rejected write(s): ${probes.map((p) => p.error).filter(Boolean).slice(0, 3).join('; ')}`,
+      expected: 'no rejected writes', ts: probes[probes.length - 1]?.ts ?? new Date(0).toISOString(),
+    });
+  }
+
+  // 3. rate-spike — actions per hour vs baseline (milli-units; +1000 keeps std=0 from firing on +1)
+  if (baseline.sample_size >= minSample) {
+    const buckets = new Map<string, Scanned[]>();
+    for (const r of mine) buckets.set(r.ts.slice(0, 13), [...(buckets.get(r.ts.slice(0, 13)) ?? []), r]);
+    const z = opts.rateZ ?? 3;
+    for (const [hour, rs] of buckets) {
+      if (rs.length * 1000 > baseline.rate.mean_milli + z * (baseline.rate.std_milli + 1000)) {
+        findings.push(finding('rate-spike', 'high', baseline.agent_id, rs,
+          `${rs.length} actions in hour ${hour}`,
+          `~${(baseline.rate.mean_milli / 1000).toFixed(1)}/h (σ ${(baseline.rate.std_milli / 1000).toFixed(1)})`));
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 4. intent-gap — the agent normally brackets actions with intents, this window doesn't
+  if (baseline.intent_milli >= 800 && mine.length >= 5) {
+    const intents = mine.filter((r) => r.action === 'action_intent').length;
+    const actions = mine.length - intents;
+    const ratioMilli = actions > 0 ? Math.round((intents / actions) * 1000) : 1000;
+    if (ratioMilli < baseline.intent_milli / 2) {
+      findings.push(finding('intent-gap', 'high', baseline.agent_id, mine.filter((r) => r.action !== 'action_intent'),
+        `intent ratio ${(ratioMilli / 1000).toFixed(2)} this window`,
+        `~${(baseline.intent_milli / 1000).toFixed(2)} (agent normally declares intent)`));
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 5. sequence — ordered target patterns within a window (default: the exfil shape)
+  for (const rule of opts.sequences ?? [EXFIL_SEQUENCE]) {
+    let step = 0;
+    let startMs = 0;
+    const evidence: Scanned[] = [];
+    for (const r of mine) {
+      if (rule.steps[step]!.test(r.target)) {
+        if (step === 0) startMs = Date.parse(r.ts);
+        if (Date.parse(r.ts) - startMs <= rule.windowMs) {
+          evidence.push(r);
+          step += 1;
+          if (step === rule.steps.length) {
+            findings.push(finding(`sequence:${rule.name}`, 'high', baseline.agent_id, [...evidence],
+              evidence.map((e) => e.target).join(' → '), `no ${rule.name} sequence`));
+            step = 0;
+            evidence.length = 0;
+          }
+        } else {
+          step = 0;
+          evidence.length = 0;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 6. off-hours — activity in hours the baseline says are silent
+  if (baseline.sample_size >= minSample) {
+    const silent = mine.filter((r) => (baseline.active_hours[hourOf(r.ts)] ?? 0) === 0);
+    if (silent.length > 0) {
+      findings.push(finding('off-hours', 'medium', baseline.agent_id, silent,
+        `${silent.length} action(s) at UTC hour(s) [${[...new Set(silent.map((r) => hourOf(r.ts)))].join(',')}]`,
+        'activity only in learned active hours'));
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 7. wall-crossing — operator mode only (raw payloads pre-hash)
+  if (opts.payloadOf && opts.checkContent) {
+    for (const r of mine) {
+      const text = opts.payloadOf(r);
+      if (text === undefined) continue;
+      const violations = opts.checkContent(text, r);
+      if (violations.length > 0) {
+        findings.push(finding('wall-crossing', 'high', baseline.agent_id, [r],
+          `content violations: ${violations.join(', ')}`, 'no boundary-crossing content'));
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return findings;
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// The loop — feed + injected responses. The sentinel NEVER holds authority keys.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+export interface WatcherOptions {
+  server: string;
+  fetchImpl?: FetchLike;
+  /** Baseline per watched agent DID. */
+  baselines: Record<string, Baseline>;
+  onFinding: (finding: Finding) => void | Promise<void>;
+  scan?: ScanOptions;
+  /** Page size for /v1/recent (server caps at 100). */
+  limit?: number;
+  /** Resume from a persisted cursor — the highest ledger index already processed. */
+  cursor?: number;
+  /**
+   * Rolling window of receipts kept per agent, so **windowed detectors** (`sequence`,
+   * `rate-spike`, `intent-gap`) see across polls. Without this a 3-step exfil arriving
+   * over three 60s polls would never be detected — each poll would see one step.
+   * Default 2h (covers the 30-min exfil window + hourly rate buckets).
+   */
+  windowMs?: number;
+}
+
+export interface Watcher {
+  /** One poll: fetch new receipts, scan the rolling window, dispatch *new* findings. */
+  tick(): Promise<Finding[]>;
+  /** Highest ledger index processed — **persist this** and pass back as `cursor`. */
+  cursor(): number;
+}
+
+/** Stable identity of a finding, so the same one isn't re-alerted on every poll. */
+function fingerprint(f: Finding): string {
+  return `${f.rule}|${[...f.receipt_hashes].sort().join(',')}|${f.ts}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Ledger-mode watcher over `GET /v1/recent`. Call `tick()` on your own schedule.
+ *
+ * Keeps a rolling per-agent window (see `windowMs`) so windowed detectors work across
+ * polls, and de-duplicates findings so a receipt already alerted on isn't re-alerted.
+ *
+ * **Limit:** `/v1/recent` is a *global* feed capped at 100 by the server. On a busy
+ * ledger, receipts can be missed between polls (the cursor jumps). For production, drive
+ * `scan` from `receipt.recorded` webhooks (`@zanii/webhooks`) instead of polling.
+ */
+export function createWatcher(opts: WatcherOptions): Watcher {
+  const fetchImpl = opts.fetchImpl ?? ((u: string, i?: RequestInit) => fetch(u, i));
+  const server = opts.server.replace(/\/$/, '');
+  const windowMs = opts.windowMs ?? 2 * 60 * 60_000;
+  let cursor = opts.cursor ?? -1;
+  const buffers: Record<string, Scanned[]> = {};
+  const seen = new Set<string>();
+
+  return {
+    cursor: () => cursor,
+    async tick(): Promise<Finding[]> {
+      const res = await fetchImpl(`${server}/v1/recent?limit=${opts.limit ?? 100}`);
+      if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`recent fetch failed: HTTP ${res.status}`);
+      const body = (await res.json()) as { receipts: Array<{ receipt: Receipt; hash: string; index: number }> };
+      const fresh = body.receipts.filter((r) => r.index > cursor);
+      for (const r of fresh) cursor = Math.max(cursor, r.index);
+
+      const all: Finding[] = [];
+      for (const [did, baseline] of Object.entries(opts.baselines)) {
+        const mine = fresh.filter((r) => r.receipt.agent_id === did).map((r) => ({ ...r.receipt, hash: r.hash }));
+        if (mine.length === 0) continue;
+
+        // Rolling window: append, then trim to `windowMs` behind the newest receipt.
+        const buf = [...(buffers[did] ?? []), ...mine].sort((a, b) => a.ts.localeCompare(b.ts));
+        const newest = Date.parse(buf[buf.length - 1]!.ts);
+        buffers[did] = buf.filter((r) => newest - Date.parse(r.ts) <= windowMs);
+
+        for (const f of scan(buffers[did]!, baseline, opts.scan)) {
+          const fp = fingerprint(f);
+          if (seen.has(fp)) continue; // already alerted — don't re-fire every poll
+          seen.add(fp);
+          all.push(f);
+          await opts.onFinding(f);
+        }
+      }
+      if (seen.size > 5000) seen.clear(); // bounded; worst case a stale finding re-fires once
+      return all;
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * The default response: a `@zanii/policy` rule turning the flagged prefixes into a
+ * `require_approval` speed bump.
+ *
+ * Returns `null` when the finding names no specific targets (e.g. `scope-edge`, which is
+ * driven by rejections, not receipts) — we will **not** silently generate a `*` rule that
+ * gates the agent's entire surface. That call belongs to a human.
+ */
+export function escalationRule(f: Finding): { id: string; effect: 'require_approval'; targets: string[] } | null {
+  const prefixes = [...new Set(f.targets.map((t) => `${targetPrefix(t)}.*`))];
+  if (prefixes.length === 0) return null;
+  return {
+    id: `sentinel-${f.rule.replace(/[^a-z0-9-]/gi, '-')}-${f.agent_id.slice(-8)}`,
+    effect: 'require_approval',
+    targets: prefixes,
+  };
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Alerts are receipts — detection itself is tamper-evident
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/** Record with the sentinel's OWN did:key (watcher ≠ watched): `sentinel.alert`. */
+export function buildAlertReceipt(f: Finding, opts: { baselineHash: string }): { target: string; payload: Record<string, unknown> } {
+  return {
+    target: 'sentinel.alert',
+    payload: {
+      _zr_kind: 'sentinel',
+      v: 1,
+      rule: f.rule,
+      severity: f.severity,
+      watched_agent: f.agent_id,
+      evidence: f.receipt_hashes,
+      observed: f.observed,
+      expected: f.expected,
+      baseline_hash: opts.baselineHash,
+      ts: f.ts,
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+export interface AlertCheck {
+  ok: boolean;
+  reasons: string[];
+}
+
+/** Structurally validate a `sentinel.alert` payload. */
+export function verifyAlert(payload: Record<string, unknown> | undefined): AlertCheck {
+  const reasons: string[] = [];
+  const p = payload ?? {};
+  if (p._zr_kind !== 'sentinel' || p.v !== 1) reasons.push('not a sentinel alert (v1)');
+  if (!p.rule) reasons.push('missing rule');
+  if (!['low', 'medium', 'high'].includes(p.severity as string)) reasons.push('missing/invalid severity');
+  if (!p.watched_agent) reasons.push('missing watched_agent');
+  if (!Array.isArray(p.evidence)) reasons.push('missing evidence array');
+  if (typeof p.baseline_hash !== 'string' || !p.baseline_hash.startsWith('sha256:')) reasons.push('missing/invalid baseline_hash');
+  return { ok: reasons.length === 0, reasons };
+}