@zanii/pq 0.1.0

package/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
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package/README.md

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+# @zanii/pq
+
+Post-quantum migration rails: **dual-sign today, stay provable after Ed25519.**
+Hybrid Ed25519 + **ML-DSA-65** (FIPS 204) — the boring package that becomes mandatory
+the day a regulator says "post-quantum", and the government/health verticals ask early.
+
+```sh
+npm install @zanii/pq @zanii/core
+```
+
+```ts
+import { generatePqKeypair, bindPqKey, verifyPqBinding, dualSign, verifyDual, transitionPayload, verifyTransition } from '@zanii/pq';
+
+// 1. Bind an ML-DSA-65 key to the agent's did:key — BOTH keys sign the same body,
+//    so possession of both is proven; one key alone cannot forge the binding.
+const pq = generatePqKeypair();
+const binding = bindPqKey({ did: agent.did, pqPublicKey: pq.publicKey, ts: now }, agent.privateKey, pq.secretKey);
+verifyPqBinding(binding);   // { ok, reasons }
+
+// 2. Dual-sign anything — verification requires BOTH signatures.
+const sigs = dualSign(doc, agent.privateKey, pq.secretKey);
+verifyDual(doc, agent.did, binding, sigs);   // missing ML-DSA = failure, never a fallback
+
+// 3. Anchor the binding into the log NOW (unsalted — it's public by design):
+await zanii.record({ target: 'pq.transition', payload: transitionPayload(binding), salt: false });
+// later, prove the binding predates any Ed25519 break:
+verifyTransition(binding, receipt, { sth, index, proof });
+```
+
+Python (`pip install "zanii[pq]"`): `from zanii.pq import bind_pq_key, dual_sign, verify_dual, ...`
+— **cross-language verified**: a Python-signed binding verifies in TypeScript
+(`@noble/post-quantum`) and vice versa; both implement final FIPS 204.
+
+## Why the transition record is the point
+
+The Merkle log is SHA-256, which no known quantum algorithm breaks in any practical
+sense. So anchoring the binding **now** buys the thing that matters later: when
+Ed25519 falls, an Ed25519 signature that was provably included in an anchored tree
+*before* the break is still evidence of when it was made — the same signature made
+*after* the break proves nothing. "This PQ key was this agent's key all along"
+survives the event it defends against.
+
+## The limit, stated up front
+
+Pre-migration receipts are **not re-signed** and never will be — their post-quantum
+protection is the anchored timestamp, not the signature. And hybrid is only hybrid
+when the verifier demands both signatures: `verifyDual` refuses a missing ML-DSA
+signature rather than quietly falling back to Ed25519-only, because a hybrid that
+degrades silently isn't one.

package/dist/index.d.ts

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+import { type Receipt, type SignedTreeHead } from '@zanii/core';
+export declare const PQ_ALG: "ML-DSA-65";
+export interface PqKeypair {
+    publicKey: Uint8Array;
+    secretKey: Uint8Array;
+}
+/** Generate an ML-DSA-65 keypair. Pass a 32-byte seed for deterministic derivation. */
+export declare function generatePqKeypair(seed?: Uint8Array): PqKeypair;
+export interface PqBinding {
+    v: 1;
+    type: 'pq.binding';
+    /** The agent's classical identity — the Ed25519 did:key everything else uses. */
+    did: string;
+    alg: typeof PQ_ALG;
+    /** ML-DSA-65 public key, hex (1952 bytes). */
+    pq_pub: string;
+    ts: string;
+    /** `ed25519:<hex>` by the did's key — the classical key vouches for the PQ key. */
+    sig_ed?: string;
+    /** `mldsa65:<hex>` by the PQ key — proves possession; not just a claimed key. */
+    sig_pq?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Bind a PQ public key to a did:key. BOTH keys sign the same unsigned body — an
+ * attacker holding only the Ed25519 key (or only the PQ key) cannot produce this.
+ */
+export declare function bindPqKey(fields: {
+    did: string;
+    pqPublicKey: Uint8Array;
+    ts: string;
+}, edPrivateKey: Uint8Array, pqSecretKey: Uint8Array): PqBinding;
+export interface PqCheck {
+    ok: boolean;
+    reasons: string[];
+}
+/** Verify a binding: structure + BOTH signatures over the same body. */
+export declare function verifyPqBinding(binding: PqBinding | undefined): PqCheck;
+/** Canonical hash of the full binding (both sigs included) — its stable id. */
+export declare function bindingHash(binding: PqBinding): string;
+export interface DualSignature {
+    /** `ed25519:<hex>`. */
+    sig_ed: string;
+    /** `mldsa65:<hex>`. */
+    sig_pq: string;
+}
+/** Sign any protocol object with both algorithms over its canonical (JCS) bytes. */
+export declare function dualSign(obj: Record<string, unknown>, edPrivateKey: Uint8Array, pqSecretKey: Uint8Array): DualSignature;
+/**
+ * Verify a dual signature. BOTH must pass, and the PQ public key comes from a
+ * **verified binding for the same did** — never from the message. A missing ML-DSA
+ * signature is a failure, not a fallback: hybrid that degrades silently isn't hybrid.
+ */
+export declare function verifyDual(obj: Record<string, unknown>, did: string, binding: PqBinding, sigs: Partial<DualSignature> | undefined): PqCheck;
+/**
+ * The payload to `record()` UNSALTED (`salt: false` / `salt=False`) as the transition
+ * receipt — a PQ binding is public by design, and the receipt's `payload_hash` must be
+ * recomputable by any verifier. Suggested target: `pq.transition`.
+ */
+export declare function transitionPayload(binding: PqBinding): string;
+export interface TransitionEvidence {
+    sth: SignedTreeHead;
+    index: number;
+    /** Audit path, hex-encoded. */
+    proof: string[];
+}
+/**
+ * Verify the transition: the receipt commits to EXACTLY this binding
+ * (`payload_hash` matches, unsalted) and the receipt is Merkle-proven in the log the
+ * STH commits to. The STH's anchored timestamp then bounds when the binding existed —
+ * the piece that survives a future Ed25519 break.
+ */
+export declare function verifyTransition(binding: PqBinding, receipt: Receipt, evidence: TransitionEvidence | undefined): PqCheck;
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map

package/dist/index.d.ts.map

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package/dist/index.js

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+/**
+ * @zanii/pq — post-quantum migration rails: dual-sign today, stay provable after Ed25519.
+ *
+ * Everything in Zanii signs with Ed25519, which a large quantum computer breaks. The
+ * cheap, correct move is not to wait: it is a **hybrid** that a government or hospital
+ * buyer can adopt now. Three pieces:
+ *
+ * 1. **A PQ key binding** — an agent binds an ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) public key to its
+ *    did:key, signed by **both** keys over the same body. Both signatures prove
+ *    possession of both keys: an attacker holding only one cannot forge the binding.
+ * 2. **Dual-signing** (`dualSign`/`verifyDual`) — any protocol object signed by both
+ *    algorithms, and verification requires **BOTH** to pass. Hybrid security: forging
+ *    needs Ed25519 AND ML-DSA broken at once.
+ * 3. **The transition record** — anchor the binding into the Merkle log NOW. The log
+ *    is SHA-256 (not broken by known quantum algorithms in any practical sense), so
+ *    the anchored, timestamped inclusion of the binding proves it existed BEFORE any
+ *    future Ed25519 break — "this PQ key was this agent's key all along" survives the
+ *    thing it is defending against.
+ *
+ * ## The limit, stated up front
+ *
+ * Pre-migration receipts are **not re-signed** and never will be — their post-quantum
+ * protection is the anchored log timestamp (an Ed25519 signature that was included in
+ * an anchored tree BEFORE the break is evidence of when it was made; the same
+ * signature made AFTER the break proves nothing). Hybrid verification is only hybrid
+ * when the verifier demands both signatures — `verifyDual` refuses a missing
+ * ML-DSA signature rather than quietly falling back to Ed25519-only.
+ */
+import { ed25519 } from '@noble/curves/ed25519';
+import { bytesToHex, hexToBytes } from '@noble/hashes/utils';
+import { ml_dsa65 } from '@noble/post-quantum/ml-dsa.js';
+import { canonicalBytes, hashPayload, jcsHash, leafHash, publicKeyFromDid, verifyInclusion, verifySTH, } from '@zanii/core';
+export const PQ_ALG = 'ML-DSA-65';
+/** Generate an ML-DSA-65 keypair. Pass a 32-byte seed for deterministic derivation. */
+export function generatePqKeypair(seed) {
+    const keys = seed ? ml_dsa65.keygen(seed) : ml_dsa65.keygen();
+    return { publicKey: keys.publicKey, secretKey: keys.secretKey };
+}
+/**
+ * Bind a PQ public key to a did:key. BOTH keys sign the same unsigned body — an
+ * attacker holding only the Ed25519 key (or only the PQ key) cannot produce this.
+ */
+export function bindPqKey(fields, edPrivateKey, pqSecretKey) {
+    if (!fields.did)
+        throw new Error('did is required');
+    if (Number.isNaN(Date.parse(fields.ts)))
+        throw new Error('ts must be an ISO timestamp');
+    const unsigned = {
+        v: 1,
+        type: 'pq.binding',
+        did: fields.did,
+        alg: PQ_ALG,
+        pq_pub: bytesToHex(fields.pqPublicKey),
+        ts: fields.ts,
+    };
+    const bytes = canonicalBytes(unsigned);
+    return {
+        ...unsigned,
+        sig_ed: `ed25519:${bytesToHex(ed25519.sign(bytes, edPrivateKey))}`,
+        sig_pq: `mldsa65:${bytesToHex(ml_dsa65.sign(bytes, pqSecretKey))}`,
+    };
+}
+/** Verify a binding: structure + BOTH signatures over the same body. */
+export function verifyPqBinding(binding) {
+    const reasons = [];
+    const b = binding ?? {};
+    if (b.v !== 1 || b.type !== 'pq.binding')
+        reasons.push('not a pq.binding (v1)');
+    if (b.alg !== PQ_ALG)
+        reasons.push(`unsupported alg '${b.alg}'`);
+    if (!b.did)
+        reasons.push('missing did');
+    if (typeof b.pq_pub !== 'string' || !/^[0-9a-f]+$/.test(b.pq_pub))
+        reasons.push('missing/invalid pq_pub');
+    if (typeof b.ts !== 'string' || Number.isNaN(Date.parse(b.ts)))
+        reasons.push('missing/invalid ts');
+    if (reasons.length > 0)
+        return { ok: false, reasons };
+    const { sig_ed, sig_pq, ...unsigned } = b;
+    const bytes = canonicalBytes(unsigned);
+    const pub = publicKeyFromDid(b.did);
+    const edHex = typeof sig_ed === 'string' && sig_ed.startsWith('ed25519:') ? sig_ed.slice(8) : '';
+    let edOk = false;
+    if (pub && /^[0-9a-f]{128}$/.test(edHex)) {
+        try {
+            edOk = ed25519.verify(hexToBytes(edHex), bytes, pub);
+        }
+        catch {
+            edOk = false;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!edOk)
+        reasons.push('Ed25519 signature does not verify against the did');
+    const pqHex = typeof sig_pq === 'string' && sig_pq.startsWith('mldsa65:') ? sig_pq.slice(8) : '';
+    let pqOk = false;
+    if (/^[0-9a-f]+$/.test(pqHex) && pqHex.length > 0) {
+        try {
+            pqOk = ml_dsa65.verify(hexToBytes(pqHex), bytes, hexToBytes(b.pq_pub));
+        }
+        catch {
+            pqOk = false;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!pqOk)
+        reasons.push('ML-DSA signature does not verify against pq_pub (possession not proven)');
+    return { ok: reasons.length === 0, reasons };
+}
+/** Canonical hash of the full binding (both sigs included) — its stable id. */
+export function bindingHash(binding) {
+    return jcsHash(binding);
+}
+/** Sign any protocol object with both algorithms over its canonical (JCS) bytes. */
+export function dualSign(obj, edPrivateKey, pqSecretKey) {
+    const bytes = canonicalBytes(obj);
+    return {
+        sig_ed: `ed25519:${bytesToHex(ed25519.sign(bytes, edPrivateKey))}`,
+        sig_pq: `mldsa65:${bytesToHex(ml_dsa65.sign(bytes, pqSecretKey))}`,
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Verify a dual signature. BOTH must pass, and the PQ public key comes from a
+ * **verified binding for the same did** — never from the message. A missing ML-DSA
+ * signature is a failure, not a fallback: hybrid that degrades silently isn't hybrid.
+ */
+export function verifyDual(obj, did, binding, sigs) {
+    const reasons = [];
+    const bind = verifyPqBinding(binding);
+    if (!bind.ok)
+        return { ok: false, reasons: bind.reasons.map((r) => `binding: ${r}`) };
+    if (binding.did !== did)
+        return { ok: false, reasons: [`binding is for ${binding.did}, not ${did}`] };
+    const bytes = canonicalBytes(obj);
+    const s = sigs ?? {};
+    const pub = publicKeyFromDid(did);
+    const edHex = typeof s.sig_ed === 'string' && s.sig_ed.startsWith('ed25519:') ? s.sig_ed.slice(8) : '';
+    let edOk = false;
+    if (pub && /^[0-9a-f]{128}$/.test(edHex)) {
+        try {
+            edOk = ed25519.verify(hexToBytes(edHex), bytes, pub);
+        }
+        catch {
+            edOk = false;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!edOk)
+        reasons.push('Ed25519 signature missing or invalid');
+    const pqHex = typeof s.sig_pq === 'string' && s.sig_pq.startsWith('mldsa65:') ? s.sig_pq.slice(8) : '';
+    let pqOk = false;
+    if (/^[0-9a-f]+$/.test(pqHex) && pqHex.length > 0) {
+        try {
+            pqOk = ml_dsa65.verify(hexToBytes(pqHex), bytes, hexToBytes(binding.pq_pub));
+        }
+        catch {
+            pqOk = false;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!pqOk)
+        reasons.push('ML-DSA signature missing or invalid — refusing Ed25519-only fallback');
+    return { ok: reasons.length === 0, reasons };
+}
+/**
+ * The payload to `record()` UNSALTED (`salt: false` / `salt=False`) as the transition
+ * receipt — a PQ binding is public by design, and the receipt's `payload_hash` must be
+ * recomputable by any verifier. Suggested target: `pq.transition`.
+ */
+export function transitionPayload(binding) {
+    const check = verifyPqBinding(binding);
+    if (!check.ok)
+        throw new Error(`refusing to anchor an invalid binding: ${check.reasons.join('; ')}`);
+    return JSON.stringify(binding);
+}
+/**
+ * Verify the transition: the receipt commits to EXACTLY this binding
+ * (`payload_hash` matches, unsalted) and the receipt is Merkle-proven in the log the
+ * STH commits to. The STH's anchored timestamp then bounds when the binding existed —
+ * the piece that survives a future Ed25519 break.
+ */
+export function verifyTransition(binding, receipt, evidence) {
+    const reasons = [];
+    const bind = verifyPqBinding(binding);
+    if (!bind.ok)
+        return { ok: false, reasons: bind.reasons.map((r) => `binding: ${r}`) };
+    if (receipt.agent_id !== binding.did)
+        reasons.push(`transition receipt by ${receipt.agent_id}, but the binding is for ${binding.did}`);
+    if (receipt.payload_hash !== hashPayload(transitionPayload(binding))) {
+        reasons.push('receipt payload_hash does not commit to this binding (was it recorded salted?)');
+    }
+    if (!evidence) {
+        reasons.push('no inclusion evidence — an unanchored binding proves nothing about when it existed');
+    }
+    else if (!verifySTH(evidence.sth)) {
+        reasons.push('inclusion evidence STH signature is invalid');
+    }
+    else {
+        const root = hexToBytes(evidence.sth.root.replace('sha256:', ''));
+        const ok = verifyInclusion(leafHash(canonicalBytes(receipt)), evidence.index, evidence.sth.size, evidence.proof.map((h) => hexToBytes(h)), root);
+        if (!ok)
+            reasons.push('inclusion proof FAILED — the transition is not in the log the STH commits to');
+    }
+    return { ok: reasons.length === 0, reasons };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/index.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+{
+  "name": "@zanii/pq",
+  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "description": "Post-quantum migration rails - hybrid dual-signing (Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65, both must verify), a PQ key binding signed by BOTH keys (proves possession of each), and a transition record anchored into the Merkle log so the binding provably predates any future break of Ed25519. Old receipts are not re-signed: their post-quantum protection is the anchored timestamp, and we say so.",
+  "license": "Apache-2.0",
+  "homepage": "https://ledger.zanii.agency",
+  "type": "module",
+  "main": "./dist/index.js",
+  "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
+  "exports": {
+    ".": {
+      "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
+      "import": "./dist/index.js"
+    }
+  },
+  "files": [
+    "dist",
+    "src",
+    "README.md",
+    "LICENSE"
+  ],
+  "publishConfig": {
+    "access": "public"
+  },
+  "engines": {
+    "node": ">=18"
+  },
+  "devDependencies": {
+    "@types/node": "^26.1.0",
+    "typescript": "^5.8.2",
+    "vitest": "^3.0.9"
+  },
+  "dependencies": {
+    "@noble/post-quantum": "^0.7.0",
+    "@noble/curves": "^1.8.1",
+    "@noble/hashes": "^1.7.1",
+    "@zanii/core": "0.4.0"
+  },
+  "scripts": {
+    "build": "tsc -p tsconfig.build.json",
+    "test": "vitest run",
+    "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit"
+  }
+}

package/src/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+/**
+ * @zanii/pq — post-quantum migration rails: dual-sign today, stay provable after Ed25519.
+ *
+ * Everything in Zanii signs with Ed25519, which a large quantum computer breaks. The
+ * cheap, correct move is not to wait: it is a **hybrid** that a government or hospital
+ * buyer can adopt now. Three pieces:
+ *
+ * 1. **A PQ key binding** — an agent binds an ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) public key to its
+ *    did:key, signed by **both** keys over the same body. Both signatures prove
+ *    possession of both keys: an attacker holding only one cannot forge the binding.
+ * 2. **Dual-signing** (`dualSign`/`verifyDual`) — any protocol object signed by both
+ *    algorithms, and verification requires **BOTH** to pass. Hybrid security: forging
+ *    needs Ed25519 AND ML-DSA broken at once.
+ * 3. **The transition record** — anchor the binding into the Merkle log NOW. The log
+ *    is SHA-256 (not broken by known quantum algorithms in any practical sense), so
+ *    the anchored, timestamped inclusion of the binding proves it existed BEFORE any
+ *    future Ed25519 break — "this PQ key was this agent's key all along" survives the
+ *    thing it is defending against.
+ *
+ * ## The limit, stated up front
+ *
+ * Pre-migration receipts are **not re-signed** and never will be — their post-quantum
+ * protection is the anchored log timestamp (an Ed25519 signature that was included in
+ * an anchored tree BEFORE the break is evidence of when it was made; the same
+ * signature made AFTER the break proves nothing). Hybrid verification is only hybrid
+ * when the verifier demands both signatures — `verifyDual` refuses a missing
+ * ML-DSA signature rather than quietly falling back to Ed25519-only.
+ */
+import { ed25519 } from '@noble/curves/ed25519';
+import { bytesToHex, hexToBytes } from '@noble/hashes/utils';
+import { ml_dsa65 } from '@noble/post-quantum/ml-dsa.js';
+import {
+  canonicalBytes,
+  hashPayload,
+  jcsHash,
+  leafHash,
+  publicKeyFromDid,
+  verifyInclusion,
+  verifySTH,
+  type Receipt,
+  type SignedTreeHead,
+} from '@zanii/core';
+
+export const PQ_ALG = 'ML-DSA-65' as const;
+
+export interface PqKeypair {
+  publicKey: Uint8Array;
+  secretKey: Uint8Array;
+}
+
+/** Generate an ML-DSA-65 keypair. Pass a 32-byte seed for deterministic derivation. */
+export function generatePqKeypair(seed?: Uint8Array): PqKeypair {
+  const keys = seed ? ml_dsa65.keygen(seed) : ml_dsa65.keygen();
+  return { publicKey: keys.publicKey, secretKey: keys.secretKey };
+}
+
+export interface PqBinding {
+  v: 1;
+  type: 'pq.binding';
+  /** The agent's classical identity — the Ed25519 did:key everything else uses. */
+  did: string;
+  alg: typeof PQ_ALG;
+  /** ML-DSA-65 public key, hex (1952 bytes). */
+  pq_pub: string;
+  ts: string;
+  /** `ed25519:<hex>` by the did's key — the classical key vouches for the PQ key. */
+  sig_ed?: string;
+  /** `mldsa65:<hex>` by the PQ key — proves possession; not just a claimed key. */
+  sig_pq?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Bind a PQ public key to a did:key. BOTH keys sign the same unsigned body — an
+ * attacker holding only the Ed25519 key (or only the PQ key) cannot produce this.
+ */
+export function bindPqKey(
+  fields: { did: string; pqPublicKey: Uint8Array; ts: string },
+  edPrivateKey: Uint8Array,
+  pqSecretKey: Uint8Array,
+): PqBinding {
+  if (!fields.did) throw new Error('did is required');
+  if (Number.isNaN(Date.parse(fields.ts))) throw new Error('ts must be an ISO timestamp');
+  const unsigned = {
+    v: 1 as const,
+    type: 'pq.binding' as const,
+    did: fields.did,
+    alg: PQ_ALG,
+    pq_pub: bytesToHex(fields.pqPublicKey),
+    ts: fields.ts,
+  };
+  const bytes = canonicalBytes(unsigned);
+  return {
+    ...unsigned,
+    sig_ed: `ed25519:${bytesToHex(ed25519.sign(bytes, edPrivateKey))}`,
+    sig_pq: `mldsa65:${bytesToHex(ml_dsa65.sign(bytes, pqSecretKey))}`,
+  };
+}
+
+export interface PqCheck {
+  ok: boolean;
+  reasons: string[];
+}
+
+/** Verify a binding: structure + BOTH signatures over the same body. */
+export function verifyPqBinding(binding: PqBinding | undefined): PqCheck {
+  const reasons: string[] = [];
+  const b = binding ?? ({} as PqBinding);
+  if (b.v !== 1 || b.type !== 'pq.binding') reasons.push('not a pq.binding (v1)');
+  if (b.alg !== PQ_ALG) reasons.push(`unsupported alg '${b.alg}'`);
+  if (!b.did) reasons.push('missing did');
+  if (typeof b.pq_pub !== 'string' || !/^[0-9a-f]+$/.test(b.pq_pub)) reasons.push('missing/invalid pq_pub');
+  if (typeof b.ts !== 'string' || Number.isNaN(Date.parse(b.ts))) reasons.push('missing/invalid ts');
+  if (reasons.length > 0) return { ok: false, reasons };
+
+  const { sig_ed, sig_pq, ...unsigned } = b;
+  const bytes = canonicalBytes(unsigned as unknown as Record<string, unknown>);
+
+  const pub = publicKeyFromDid(b.did);
+  const edHex = typeof sig_ed === 'string' && sig_ed.startsWith('ed25519:') ? sig_ed.slice(8) : '';
+  let edOk = false;
+  if (pub && /^[0-9a-f]{128}$/.test(edHex)) {
+    try {
+      edOk = ed25519.verify(hexToBytes(edHex), bytes, pub);
+    } catch {
+      edOk = false;
+    }
+  }
+  if (!edOk) reasons.push('Ed25519 signature does not verify against the did');
+
+  const pqHex = typeof sig_pq === 'string' && sig_pq.startsWith('mldsa65:') ? sig_pq.slice(8) : '';
+  let pqOk = false;
+  if (/^[0-9a-f]+$/.test(pqHex) && pqHex.length > 0) {
+    try {
+      pqOk = ml_dsa65.verify(hexToBytes(pqHex), bytes, hexToBytes(b.pq_pub));
+    } catch {
+      pqOk = false;
+    }
+  }
+  if (!pqOk) reasons.push('ML-DSA signature does not verify against pq_pub (possession not proven)');
+
+  return { ok: reasons.length === 0, reasons };
+}
+
+/** Canonical hash of the full binding (both sigs included) — its stable id. */
+export function bindingHash(binding: PqBinding): string {
+  return jcsHash(binding as unknown as Record<string, unknown>);
+}
+
+export interface DualSignature {
+  /** `ed25519:<hex>`. */
+  sig_ed: string;
+  /** `mldsa65:<hex>`. */
+  sig_pq: string;
+}
+
+/** Sign any protocol object with both algorithms over its canonical (JCS) bytes. */
+export function dualSign(obj: Record<string, unknown>, edPrivateKey: Uint8Array, pqSecretKey: Uint8Array): DualSignature {
+  const bytes = canonicalBytes(obj);
+  return {
+    sig_ed: `ed25519:${bytesToHex(ed25519.sign(bytes, edPrivateKey))}`,
+    sig_pq: `mldsa65:${bytesToHex(ml_dsa65.sign(bytes, pqSecretKey))}`,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify a dual signature. BOTH must pass, and the PQ public key comes from a
+ * **verified binding for the same did** — never from the message. A missing ML-DSA
+ * signature is a failure, not a fallback: hybrid that degrades silently isn't hybrid.
+ */
+export function verifyDual(
+  obj: Record<string, unknown>,
+  did: string,
+  binding: PqBinding,
+  sigs: Partial<DualSignature> | undefined,
+): PqCheck {
+  const reasons: string[] = [];
+  const bind = verifyPqBinding(binding);
+  if (!bind.ok) return { ok: false, reasons: bind.reasons.map((r) => `binding: ${r}`) };
+  if (binding.did !== did) return { ok: false, reasons: [`binding is for ${binding.did}, not ${did}`] };
+
+  const bytes = canonicalBytes(obj);
+  const s = sigs ?? {};
+
+  const pub = publicKeyFromDid(did);
+  const edHex = typeof s.sig_ed === 'string' && s.sig_ed.startsWith('ed25519:') ? s.sig_ed.slice(8) : '';
+  let edOk = false;
+  if (pub && /^[0-9a-f]{128}$/.test(edHex)) {
+    try {
+      edOk = ed25519.verify(hexToBytes(edHex), bytes, pub);
+    } catch {
+      edOk = false;
+    }
+  }
+  if (!edOk) reasons.push('Ed25519 signature missing or invalid');
+
+  const pqHex = typeof s.sig_pq === 'string' && s.sig_pq.startsWith('mldsa65:') ? s.sig_pq.slice(8) : '';
+  let pqOk = false;
+  if (/^[0-9a-f]+$/.test(pqHex) && pqHex.length > 0) {
+    try {
+      pqOk = ml_dsa65.verify(hexToBytes(pqHex), bytes, hexToBytes(binding.pq_pub));
+    } catch {
+      pqOk = false;
+    }
+  }
+  if (!pqOk) reasons.push('ML-DSA signature missing or invalid — refusing Ed25519-only fallback');
+
+  return { ok: reasons.length === 0, reasons };
+}
+
+/**
+ * The payload to `record()` UNSALTED (`salt: false` / `salt=False`) as the transition
+ * receipt — a PQ binding is public by design, and the receipt's `payload_hash` must be
+ * recomputable by any verifier. Suggested target: `pq.transition`.
+ */
+export function transitionPayload(binding: PqBinding): string {
+  const check = verifyPqBinding(binding);
+  if (!check.ok) throw new Error(`refusing to anchor an invalid binding: ${check.reasons.join('; ')}`);
+  return JSON.stringify(binding);
+}
+
+export interface TransitionEvidence {
+  sth: SignedTreeHead;
+  index: number;
+  /** Audit path, hex-encoded. */
+  proof: string[];
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify the transition: the receipt commits to EXACTLY this binding
+ * (`payload_hash` matches, unsalted) and the receipt is Merkle-proven in the log the
+ * STH commits to. The STH's anchored timestamp then bounds when the binding existed —
+ * the piece that survives a future Ed25519 break.
+ */
+export function verifyTransition(binding: PqBinding, receipt: Receipt, evidence: TransitionEvidence | undefined): PqCheck {
+  const reasons: string[] = [];
+  const bind = verifyPqBinding(binding);
+  if (!bind.ok) return { ok: false, reasons: bind.reasons.map((r) => `binding: ${r}`) };
+  if (receipt.agent_id !== binding.did) reasons.push(`transition receipt by ${receipt.agent_id}, but the binding is for ${binding.did}`);
+  if (receipt.payload_hash !== hashPayload(transitionPayload(binding))) {
+    reasons.push('receipt payload_hash does not commit to this binding (was it recorded salted?)');
+  }
+  if (!evidence) {
+    reasons.push('no inclusion evidence — an unanchored binding proves nothing about when it existed');
+  } else if (!verifySTH(evidence.sth)) {
+    reasons.push('inclusion evidence STH signature is invalid');
+  } else {
+    const root = hexToBytes(evidence.sth.root.replace('sha256:', ''));
+    const ok = verifyInclusion(
+      leafHash(canonicalBytes(receipt as unknown as Record<string, unknown>)),
+      evidence.index,
+      evidence.sth.size,
+      evidence.proof.map((h) => hexToBytes(h)),
+      root,
+    );
+    if (!ok) reasons.push('inclusion proof FAILED — the transition is not in the log the STH commits to');
+  }
+  return { ok: reasons.length === 0, reasons };
+}