@zanii/mandate-verify-core 0.0.0-stage → 0.3.0

package/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
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package/README.md

@@ -1,3 +1,263 @@
-# Temporary Holding Version
+# verify-core
 
-This version is a temporary placeholder for this package. An operational version to replace this has been submitted for review and is awaiting a staged release.
+Pure verification engine. It receives a signed mandate, an action request, a
+status list, and **server-injected** policy/context; it returns a decision. It
+does no database, HTTP or filesystem access. Supply the server clock explicitly through `now` for deterministic evaluation.
+
+## Usage
+
+```js
+import { verifyMandate } from '#verify-core';
+
+const result = verifyMandate({
+  mandate,
+  request: {
+    ...action,
+    periodCount: usage.count,
+    periodAmount: { value: '125.00', currency: 'AED' },
+  },
+  statusList,
+  issuerPublicKey,
+  pins: {
+    trustedIssuers: configuredTrustedIssuers,
+    maxStatusAgeSeconds: 300,
+    allowPrincipalMismatch: false,
+  },
+  delegationChain: [],
+  approvals: [],
+  now: new Date(),
+});
+```
+
+The production API does not accept `pins`, `now`, usage, a delegation chain, a
+status list, certification status, receipt IDs, or a raw mandate from the caller.
+`Store` loads server state and calls `verifyMandate`; caller attempts to send
+those fields are rejected with `400 UNSUPPORTED_FIELD`. V1 has no certification
+or receipt adapter, so a mandate that requires either fails closed.
+
+## Result
+
+```js
+{
+  verdict: 'allow' | 'deny' | 'review' | 'error',
+  reasons: [{ code, severity, message, details? }],
+  checks: [{ code, ok, severity }],
+  status: { status, listId, version, index },
+  evaluatedAt: '...'
+}
+```
+
+- `deny`: at least one hard failure.
+- `review`: no hard failure, at least one soft failure.
+- `error`: malformed input or an evaluation exception.
+
+`allow` is returned only when every check passes. Soft failures do not authorize. Configure trusted issuer identities independently of the candidate mandate: an empty or missing trusted-root configuration denies authorization. A valid self-contained `did:key` signature establishes key possession, not permission. Use the signature-only primitives when authorization policy is not being evaluated.
+
+## Main checks
+
+Schema and version; issuer key resolution; signature; issuer trust; agent and
+principal binding; validity window; status list presence, issuer, reference,
+signature, freshness, version, index, and bit; actions; resources; amount and
+count limits; data class; jurisdiction; time window; approvals; delegation;
+certification; evidence/receipts.
+
+## Any action, any business
+
+These optional constraint fields are evaluated when present; mandates without
+them decide exactly as before.
+
+| Field | Effect | Reason codes |
+|---|---|---|
+| `deniedActions`, `deniedResources` (patterns), `deniedDataClasses` | A match is always a hard deny, even when `actions`/`resources` allow it. An unknown request data class gives review. | `ACTION_DENIED`, `RESOURCE_DENIED`, `DATA_CLASS_DENIED`, `DATA_CLASS_UNKNOWN` |
+| `maxCount.period: minute \| hour` | UTC calendar windows counted by the server, like `day`/`month`. | `COUNT_LIMIT_EXCEEDED`, `PERIOD_COUNT_UNKNOWN` |
+| `approvalAbove: { amount?, count?, riskTier?, approvals?, approver?, minAcr? }` | Above any limit (an unknown amount, count or vocabulary tier counts as above) the request needs approval through the same flow as `requiredApprovals`: review, or deny when `pins.requireApproval` is true. | `APPROVAL_*`, `SEPARATION_OF_DUTIES` |
+| `revocation.maxStatusAgeSeconds` | The mandate's own status freshness budget; status is then always required. Validity above 7 days is accepted only with it and only up to `pins.maxValidityDays` (1 to 365). | `STATUS_STALE`, `STATUS_MISSING`, `VALIDITY_EXCEEDS_POLICY` |
+| `conditions: [{ type, params? }]` | Checked by condition providers. | `CONDITION_PROVIDER_MISSING`, `CONDITION_NOT_MET`, `CONDITION_ERROR` |
+
+Conditions use async providers, `{ [type]: async ({ mandate, request, condition, now }) => ({ ok, reason?, evidence? }) }`:
+
+```js
+import { verifyMandateAsync } from '#verify-core';
+
+const result = await verifyMandateAsync({ ...options, conditionProviders, conditionTimeoutMs: 2000 });
+// result.conditions: [{ index, type, ok, code?, reason?, evidence? }]
+```
+
+Providers run only after schema and signature checks pass. A missing provider,
+`ok: false`, a throw, a malformed result or a timeout (default 2000 ms) denies.
+The synchronous `verifyMandate` accepts precomputed `conditionResults` from
+`evaluateConditions`; each result is bound to the exact signed condition (index,
+type and canonical params). Without results a conditioned mandate is denied.
+The request fields `dataSubject`, `counterpartyDid`, `dataRegion`, `destination`
+and `transferSafeguard` (strings, at most 512 characters) pass through to providers.
+
+`approvalAbove.riskTier` triggers for actions whose vocabulary tier ranks above
+the given tier, and for free action names with no tier. The default server
+configuration (`packages/config`) sets `requireApproval: true`, so through
+`POST /v1/verify` a missing approval is a deny; the operation flow holds the
+action for review instead.
+
+Delegation keeps every restriction: a child must cover each parent deny, keep
+each parent condition, keep an `approvalAbove` that is at least as strict, keep
+the same count period, and keep a freshness budget no weaker than the parent's.
+`inheritParentRestrictions` copies parent denies, conditions and the freshness
+budget into child issuance input.
+
+## Delegation
+
+`validateDelegationChain` lives in `src/delegation.js`. It checks that the child
+scope is a subset of the parent: actions, resources, amount/period, count/period,
+jurisdictions, data classes, time window, required approvals, certification
+level/scope, evidence confidence, expiry, depth, and the parent signature. It is
+exported separately for tests and for callers that want to validate a chain
+without a full request.
+
+Supply root-to-nearest-parent entries as `{ mandate, statusList }` with each parent's signed status envelope and independently configured root trust. Every link binds the parent ID, authorized child issuer, validity, depth and exact logical status-list reference. Numeric status claims, per-item key overrides and chains embedded in the action request do not establish authority. Supported references are the logical list ID or its `urn:zanii:status:` encoding; arbitrary URI suffixes do not bind a list. Stable-DID parent/status keys can be resolved through server-owned `resolveMandatePublicKey` and `resolveStatusPublicKey` pin callbacks; request- or artifact-supplied callbacks are not trusted context.
+
+## Root passports
+
+`verifyPassport` checks an agent's mandate all the way up to a root authority (for example a
+free zone), offline. The root signs one passport mandate to the firm's issuer DID. The firm then
+issues its own tree (company, role, release, instance) with ordinary delegation, so it never
+needs the root to sign anything else.
+
+```js
+import { verifyPassport } from '#verify-core';
+
+const result = verifyPassport({
+  passport, // signed by rootDid, agent = the firm's issuer DID, delegation allowed
+  passportStatusList, // the root's signed status list
+  rootDid,
+  mandate, // the agent instance's mandate
+  statusList,
+  delegationChain, // the firm's chain, top first: [{ mandate, statusList }, ...]
+  request: { agentDid, action, resource },
+});
+```
+
+It denies when the passport is not from `rootDid` (`PASSPORT_ROOT_UNTRUSTED`), is not a root
+(`PASSPORT_NOT_ROOT`), names a different issuer (`PASSPORT_ISSUER_MISMATCH`), does not allow
+issuing (`PASSPORT_NOT_DELEGABLE`), or when the firm's top mandate exceeds it
+(`PASSPORT_SCOPE_EXCEEDED`). Then it runs `verifyMandate` twice: the passport against the
+request with the root as the only trusted issuer (reasons tagged `scope: 'passport'`), and the
+firm's chain with the firm's issuer as the only trusted issuer. Revoking any level, from the
+passport down to the instance, denies everything below it. Budgets on the passport cannot be
+counted offline, so they give `review`, not `allow`.
+
+## Offline trust bundles
+
+`createOfflineTrustBundle` in `#db` reads an initialized control store and exports
+one root-to-leaf chain. It does not sign a new snapshot or mint an authorization.
+The latest signed status for every artifact must already satisfy the producer's
+freshness bound. `verifyOfflineTrustBundle` is pure: it performs no database,
+filesystem, HTTP, clock mutation, usage, reservation, or approval operation.
+
+```js
+import { createOfflineTrustBundle } from '#db';
+import { verifyOfflineTrustBundle } from '#verify-core';
+
+const bundle = await createOfflineTrustBundle({
+  store: controlStore,
+  mandateId,
+  maxStatusAgeSeconds: 25,
+});
+
+const result = verifyOfflineTrustBundle({
+  bundle,
+  request: { agentDid, action: 'supplier.read', resource: 'supplier:one' },
+  trustAnchors: configuredAnchors,
+  statusCheckpoints: durableCheckpoints,
+  maxStatusAgeSeconds: 25,
+  now: new Date(),
+});
+```
+
+### Version 1 format
+
+The JSON object has `format: "zanii-offline-trust-bundle"`, a manifest, public
+`issuerKeys`, and `mandates`. The manifest binds the root issuer DID,
+`bundleVersion: 1`, `createdAt`, and `contentHash`. The hash is SHA-256 over the
+canonical bundle with `manifest.contentHash` removed. Each `mandates` entry has:
+
+- `artifact`: the exact signed mandate JSON string from the control store;
+- `statusEnvelope`: the exact signed status JSON string, including its proof and
+  `validFrom`/`validUntil` window.
+
+Entries are root-to-leaf and contain the leaf as well as every parent and parent
+status. Public issuer history preserves key ID, DID, purpose, verification
+method, activation, retirement, compromise, and creation timestamps. Private
+JWK parameters and signing keys are never exported. The bundle contains no trust
+anchors, trusted-issuer list, verifier pins, usage, approval, or dispatch policy.
+Its content hash detects modification; it is not a signature and does not make
+bundle metadata or key history trustworthy.
+
+### Caller-owned trust and status checkpoints
+
+`trustAnchors` is mandatory caller configuration, never bundle input:
+
+```js
+const configuredAnchors = [{
+  issuerDid: 'did:example:issuer',
+  keys: [{
+    purpose: 'mandate', // or "status"
+    verificationMethod: 'did:example:issuer#keyhist_...',
+    publicKey: configuredPublicJwk,
+    activatedAt: '...',
+    retiredAt: null,
+    compromisedAt: null,
+  }],
+}];
+```
+
+Every mandate and status proof must match a configured key for its exact issuer,
+purpose, verification method, and artifact-time key-history window. The root
+issuer must be explicitly anchored. A valid signature from an unknown issuer,
+or a key copied from `bundle.issuerKeys`, does not establish trust. Stable-DID
+chains need configured key resolution for each signing issuer; delegation still
+has to prove parent-agent authority from the trusted root.
+
+Optional `statusCheckpoints` are caller-durable high-water records with `issuer`,
+`listId`, `version`, and `hash`. Older snapshots deny with `STATUS_ROLLBACK`;
+different bytes at an accepted version deny with `STATUS_EQUIVOCATION`. Results
+return one checkpoint per issuer/list only for fresh, authenticated snapshots,
+including a fresh revoked snapshot that correctly denies. Persist those records
+atomically outside the verifier. Stale or unauthenticated results return no new
+checkpoint. Deduplication across a chain does not remove any parent's separate
+signature, status, freshness, or delegation checks.
+
+### What an offline verdict proves, and does not prove
+
+The verifier checks the manifest hash, every mandate/status signature against
+caller anchors, schema and expiry, full chain IDs, parent-agent authority,
+cycles, maximum depth, scope attenuation, each parent's fresh signed status,
+leaf status, action/resource scope, and static request constraints. Verdicts are
+`allow`, `deny`, or `review` with machine-readable reasons. Malformed input and
+core evaluation errors fail closed as `deny`.
+
+Every result has `offline: true` and `dispatchPermit: false`. `notEstablished`
+always reports that later revocation and operation-bound dispatch authorization
+were not established. An offline `allow` is a static evaluation under fresh
+signed status at `evaluatedAt`; it is not a reusable permit, a reservation, an
+approval release, a spend, or evidence of an external outcome.
+
+Count quotas, day/month amount quotas, and applicable required approvals add
+`DYNAMIC_STATE_UNAVAILABLE` and prevent `allow` (normally producing `review`
+when all static checks pass). Certification and required-receipt state are also
+unavailable offline. Caller-supplied period usage, approval IDs, and receipt IDs
+are ignored rather than treated as authoritative. `dynamicState` identifies the
+missing requirements. Transaction-scoped static amount checks and mandates with
+no dynamic requirements can still produce offline `allow`. Current quotas,
+approvals, reservations, and dispatch require the authoritative service inside
+the connected deployment boundary.
+
+## Test
+
+```powershell
+node --test "tests/verify.test.js" "tests/delegation.test.js" "tests/passport.test.js"
+```
+
+## Releases
+
+- **0.3.0**: `verifyPassport` checks an agent's mandate offline through the firm's own tree up to a
+  root authority (see "Root passports"). Additive; every 0.2.0 export is unchanged.
+- **0.2.0**: first public release.

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,25 @@
 {
   "name": "@zanii/mandate-verify-core",
-  "version": "0.0.0-stage",
-  "stub": true,
-  "description": "Temporary package placeholder for staged publishing"
-}
+  "version": "0.3.0",
+  "type": "module",
+  "exports": "./src/index.js",
+  "files": [
+    "src",
+    "LICENSE",
+    "README.md"
+  ],
+  "dependencies": {
+    "@zanii/mandate-core": "0.2.0",
+    "@zanii/mandate-policy-engine": "0.2.0",
+    "@zanii/mandate-status-list": "0.2.0"
+  },
+  "engines": {
+    "node": ">=24"
+  },
+  "license": "Apache-2.0",
+  "author": "Zanii AI <info@zanii.agency>",
+  "homepage": "https://zanii.agency",
+  "publishConfig": {
+    "access": "public"
+  }
+}

package/src/conditions.js

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+import { isPlainObject } from '@zanii/mandate-core';
+import { verifyMandate } from './index.js';
+
+export const DEFAULT_CONDITION_TIMEOUT_MS = 2000;
+const MAX_EVIDENCE_BYTES = 4096;
+const MAX_REASON_LENGTH = 500;
+
+/**
+ * Evaluate `constraints.conditions` through registered providers.
+ *
+ * Providers are `{ [type]: async ({ mandate, request, condition, now }) =>
+ * ({ ok, reason?, evidence? }) }`. A missing provider, a provider that says
+ * no, throws, times out or returns a malformed result never yields `ok`.
+ * Results are passed to `verifyMandate` as `conditionResults`.
+ */
+export async function evaluateConditions({
+  mandate,
+  request,
+  providers = {},
+  now = new Date(),
+  timeoutMs = DEFAULT_CONDITION_TIMEOUT_MS,
+} = {}) {
+  const conditions = mandate?.credentialSubject?.constraints?.conditions;
+  if (!Array.isArray(conditions) || conditions.length === 0) return [];
+  const budget =
+    Number.isFinite(timeoutMs) && timeoutMs > 0 ? timeoutMs : DEFAULT_CONDITION_TIMEOUT_MS;
+  return Promise.all(
+    conditions.map((condition, index) =>
+      evaluateOne({ mandate, request, providers, now, timeoutMs: budget }, condition, index),
+    ),
+  );
+}
+
+async function evaluateOne(context, condition, index) {
+  const base = { index, type: condition?.type, condition: structuredClone(condition) };
+  const provider =
+    isPlainObject(context.providers) && Object.hasOwn(context.providers, condition?.type)
+      ? context.providers[condition.type]
+      : undefined;
+  if (typeof provider !== 'function') {
+    return {
+      ...base,
+      ok: false,
+      code: 'CONDITION_PROVIDER_MISSING',
+      reason: `No condition provider is registered for ${condition?.type}`,
+    };
+  }
+
+  let timer;
+  try {
+    const outcome = await Promise.race([
+      Promise.resolve().then(() =>
+        provider({
+          mandate: structuredClone(context.mandate),
+          request: structuredClone(context.request),
+          condition: structuredClone(condition),
+          now: new Date(context.now),
+        }),
+      ),
+      new Promise((_, reject) => {
+        timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new ConditionTimeout()), context.timeoutMs);
+      }),
+    ]);
+    if (!isPlainObject(outcome) || typeof outcome.ok !== 'boolean') {
+      return {
+        ...base,
+        ok: false,
+        code: 'CONDITION_ERROR',
+        reason: 'Condition provider returned a malformed result',
+      };
+    }
+    const evidence = safeEvidence(outcome.evidence);
+    if (outcome.ok) return { ...base, ok: true, ...(evidence ? { evidence } : {}) };
+    return {
+      ...base,
+      ok: false,
+      code: 'CONDITION_NOT_MET',
+      reason:
+        typeof outcome.reason === 'string' && outcome.reason
+          ? outcome.reason.slice(0, MAX_REASON_LENGTH)
+          : 'Condition is not met',
+      ...(evidence ? { evidence } : {}),
+    };
+  } catch (error) {
+    return {
+      ...base,
+      ok: false,
+      code: 'CONDITION_ERROR',
+      reason:
+        error instanceof ConditionTimeout
+          ? `Condition provider timed out after ${context.timeoutMs} ms`
+          : 'Condition provider failed',
+    };
+  } finally {
+    clearTimeout(timer);
+  }
+}
+
+class ConditionTimeout extends Error {}
+
+// Evidence is recorded in decisions and audit events: JSON data only, bounded.
+function safeEvidence(evidence) {
+  if (evidence === undefined || evidence === null) return null;
+  if (!isPlainObject(evidence)) return { invalid: true };
+  try {
+    const text = JSON.stringify(evidence);
+    if (Buffer.byteLength(text, 'utf8') > MAX_EVIDENCE_BYTES) return { truncated: true };
+    return JSON.parse(text);
+  } catch {
+    return { invalid: true };
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * `verifyMandate` plus condition providers (option `conditionProviders`,
+ * timeout `conditionTimeoutMs`). Providers run only after the signature and
+ * schema checks pass, so an unauthenticated artifact never triggers a lookup.
+ */
+export async function verifyMandateAsync(options = {}) {
+  const conditions = options.mandate?.credentialSubject?.constraints?.conditions;
+  if (!Array.isArray(conditions) || conditions.length === 0) return verifyMandate(options);
+  const now = options.now ?? new Date();
+  const preliminary = verifyMandate({ ...options, now });
+  const signed = preliminary.checks.some((check) => check.code === 'SIGNATURE_VALID' && check.ok);
+  if (!signed || preliminary.verdict === 'error') return preliminary;
+  const conditionResults = await evaluateConditions({
+    mandate: options.mandate,
+    request: options.request,
+    providers: options.conditionProviders,
+    now,
+    timeoutMs: options.conditionTimeoutMs,
+  });
+  return verifyMandate({ ...options, now, conditionResults });
+}