@zanii/custody 0.1.0

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package/README.md ADDED
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+ # @zanii/custody
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+
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+ **Supply-chain provenance.** "Where did this actually come from" — verifiable without any
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+ party trusting another's database. Each **handoff** (factory → shipper → customs →
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+ retailer) is a 2-party **co-signed** receipt (giver + receiver sign one neutral statement;
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+ `POST /v1/interactions`); a **multi-party event** (a customs inspection witnessed by N
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+ parties) is an M-of-N swarm receipt (`POST /v1/swarm`). This package adds the item layer:
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+
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+ - **`itemTag(itemId, namespace)`** — pseudonymous item identity. The serial/batch never
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+ appears on-ledger (competitors can't enumerate your volumes), but any holder of the real
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+ id can find and verify the item's full history via `GET /v1/subjects/{tag}`.
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+ - **`buildHandoff` / `buildCustodyEvent`** — co-signable bodies stamped with the item tag
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+ *inside the signed bytes*; sensitive details (weights, values, seals, docs) are
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+ salt-committed, disclosable later via `@zanii/redact` / `verifyPayload`.
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+ - **`verifyCustodyChain(entries, { tag })`** — continuity: the receiver of handoff *n* is
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+ the giver of handoff *n + 1*, timestamps monotonic, every entry valid and tag-bound;
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+ returns the first break. `custodySummary` gives the human answer.
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+
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+ ```sh
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+ npm install @zanii/custody @zanii/core @zanii/swarm
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+ ```
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+
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+ ```ts
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+ import { itemTag, buildHandoff, verifyCustodyChain } from '@zanii/custody';
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+ import { signA2ABody, assembleA2AReceipt } from '@zanii/core';
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+
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+ const draft = buildHandoff({ itemId: 'SN-12345', namespace: 'acme-logistics',
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+ step: 'factory-out', from: factoryStub, to: shipperStub, ts, evidence: { seal: 'S-9', kg: 12.4 } });
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+ const receipt = assembleA2AReceipt(draft.body,
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+ signA2ABody(draft.body, factoryKey), signA2ABody(draft.body, shipperKey));
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+ // POST /v1/interactions — keep draft.nonce to later prove the evidence
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+
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+ verifyCustodyChain(chain, { tag: itemTag('SN-12345', 'acme-logistics') }).ok;
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+ ```
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+
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+ ## Honest limit — the oracle problem, stated plainly
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+ Cryptography verifies **attestations, not atoms**. A custody chain proves *who signed for
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+ the goods at each step, under whose authority, in what order, unalterable after the fact* —
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+ it cannot prove box contents weren't swapped by a party willing to sign falsely. What it
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+ changes: fraud now requires a **specific, identified party to sign a false statement** with
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+ their accountable key. Detection becomes attribution. Bind the physical world (seals,
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+ weights, photos) in the salted `evidence`, disclosable selectively.
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+
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+ ## Changelog
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+ - **0.1.0** — initial release: `itemTag`, `buildHandoff`, `buildCustodyEvent`, `verifyCustodyChain`, `custodySummary`.
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+
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+ ## License
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+ Apache-2.0.
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+ /**
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+ * @zanii/custody — supply-chain provenance: co-signed custody chains for physical goods.
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+ *
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+ * "Where did this actually come from" without any party trusting another's database.
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+ * A **handoff** (factory → shipper → customs → retailer) is a 2-party co-signed a2a
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+ * receipt (live at `POST /v1/interactions`); a **multi-party event** (an inspection
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+ * witnessed by N parties) is a swarm receipt (`POST /v1/swarm`). This package adds the
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+ * *item layer* on top — no new crypto, no new server verification:
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+ *
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+ * - `itemTag(itemId, namespace)` — pseudonymous item identity (the serial/batch never
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+ * appears on-ledger; competitors can't enumerate volumes; any holder of the real id
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+ * can find + verify the item's history via the subject index, `GET /v1/subjects/{tag}`).
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+ * - `buildHandoff` / `buildCustodyEvent` — receipt bodies stamped with the item tag,
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+ * sensitive details (weights, values, docs) salt-committed, disclosable later.
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+ * - `verifyCustodyChain` — the custody-specific check on top of receipt validity:
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+ * **continuity** — the receiver of handoff *n* is the giver of handoff *n+1*,
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+ * timestamps monotonic; returns the first break.
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+ *
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+ * Honest limit (the oracle problem, stated plainly): cryptography verifies
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+ * **attestations, not atoms**. A chain proves who signed for the goods at each step,
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+ * under whose authority, in what order, unalterable after the fact — it cannot prove
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+ * box contents weren't swapped by a party willing to sign falsely. What changes: fraud
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+ * now requires a specific, identified party to sign a false statement with their
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+ * accountable key. Detection becomes attribution. Bind the physical world (seals,
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+ * weights, photos) in the salted `evidence` payload, disclosable via `@zanii/redact`.
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+ */
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+ import { type A2AReceipt, type DelegationCert } from '@zanii/core';
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+ import { type SwarmBody, type SwarmLedgerReceipt } from '@zanii/swarm';
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+ /** Pseudonymous, namespace-scoped item identity. Deterministic (RFC 8785), cross-language. */
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+ export declare function itemTag(itemId: string, namespace: string): string;
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+ export interface HandoffInput {
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+ /** The raw item id (serial/batch/EPC — opaque string, caller normalizes)… */
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+ itemId?: string;
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+ namespace?: string;
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+ /** …or a precomputed `itemTag`. */
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+ tag?: string;
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+ /** Custody step, e.g. `factory-out`, `customs-in`. Becomes `custody.handoff.<step>`. */
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+ step: string;
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+ /** Giver / receiver party stubs: `{ agent_id, delegation, prev }` (no sig yet). */
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+ from: {
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+ agent_id: string;
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+ delegation: DelegationCert[];
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+ prev: string | null;
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+ };
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+ to: {
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+ agent_id: string;
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+ delegation: DelegationCert[];
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+ prev: string | null;
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+ };
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+ ts: string;
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+ /** Sensitive details (location, weights, seals, docs) — salt-committed, never raw on-ledger. */
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+ evidence?: Record<string, unknown>;
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+ }
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+ export interface HandoffDraft {
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+ /** The a2a body both parties sign (stamped with the item tag; sign with `signA2ABody`). */
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+ body: Record<string, unknown>;
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+ tag: string;
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+ /** Keep to later prove the evidence with `verifyPayload` (evidence is always salt-committed). */
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+ nonce: string;
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+ }
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+ /** Build the co-signable handoff body. Giver + receiver sign it; submit via `POST /v1/interactions`. */
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+ export declare function buildHandoff(input: HandoffInput): HandoffDraft;
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+ export interface CustodyEventInput {
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+ itemId?: string;
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+ namespace?: string;
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+ tag?: string;
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+ /** e.g. `customs-inspection`. Becomes task `custody.event.<kind>`. */
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+ kind: string;
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+ target: string;
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+ participants: string[];
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+ threshold: number;
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+ ts: string;
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+ evidence?: Record<string, unknown>;
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+ }
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+ /** Build the N-party event body (swarm). Participants sign it; submit via `POST /v1/swarm`. */
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+ export declare function buildCustodyEvent(input: CustodyEventInput): {
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+ body: SwarmBody & {
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+ subject_tag?: string;
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+ };
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+ tag: string;
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+ nonce: string;
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+ };
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+ export interface CustodyCheck {
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+ ok: boolean;
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+ reasons: string[];
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+ /** Ordered custodian DIDs (giver of the first handoff, then each receiver). */
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+ custodians: string[];
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+ handoffs: number;
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+ events: number;
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+ }
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+ type Entry = A2AReceipt | SwarmLedgerReceipt | Record<string, unknown>;
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+ /**
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+ * Verify an item's custody chain: every entry cryptographically valid AND stamped with
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+ * this item's tag, handoffs continuous (receiver of *n* = giver of *n+1*), timestamps
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+ * monotonic. Events are validated + tag-matched but don't transfer custody.
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+ */
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+ export declare function verifyCustodyChain(entries: Entry[], opts: {
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+ tag: string;
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+ revoked?: Set<string>;
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+ }): CustodyCheck;
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+ /** The human answer: origin, every custodian, every step. */
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+ export declare function custodySummary(entries: Entry[]): {
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+ origin: string | null;
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+ custodians: string[];
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+ steps: string[];
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+ };
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+ export {};
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+ //# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map
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package/dist/index.js ADDED
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+ /**
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+ * @zanii/custody — supply-chain provenance: co-signed custody chains for physical goods.
3
+ *
4
+ * "Where did this actually come from" without any party trusting another's database.
5
+ * A **handoff** (factory → shipper → customs → retailer) is a 2-party co-signed a2a
6
+ * receipt (live at `POST /v1/interactions`); a **multi-party event** (an inspection
7
+ * witnessed by N parties) is a swarm receipt (`POST /v1/swarm`). This package adds the
8
+ * *item layer* on top — no new crypto, no new server verification:
9
+ *
10
+ * - `itemTag(itemId, namespace)` — pseudonymous item identity (the serial/batch never
11
+ * appears on-ledger; competitors can't enumerate volumes; any holder of the real id
12
+ * can find + verify the item's history via the subject index, `GET /v1/subjects/{tag}`).
13
+ * - `buildHandoff` / `buildCustodyEvent` — receipt bodies stamped with the item tag,
14
+ * sensitive details (weights, values, docs) salt-committed, disclosable later.
15
+ * - `verifyCustodyChain` — the custody-specific check on top of receipt validity:
16
+ * **continuity** — the receiver of handoff *n* is the giver of handoff *n+1*,
17
+ * timestamps monotonic; returns the first break.
18
+ *
19
+ * Honest limit (the oracle problem, stated plainly): cryptography verifies
20
+ * **attestations, not atoms**. A chain proves who signed for the goods at each step,
21
+ * under whose authority, in what order, unalterable after the fact — it cannot prove
22
+ * box contents weren't swapped by a party willing to sign falsely. What changes: fraud
23
+ * now requires a specific, identified party to sign a false statement with their
24
+ * accountable key. Detection becomes attribution. Bind the physical world (seals,
25
+ * weights, photos) in the salted `evidence` payload, disclosable via `@zanii/redact`.
26
+ */
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+ import { buildA2ABody, jcsHash, saltedPayloadHash, verifyA2AReceipt, } from '@zanii/core';
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+ import { verifySwarmReceipt, buildSwarmBody } from '@zanii/swarm';
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+ /** Pseudonymous, namespace-scoped item identity. Deterministic (RFC 8785), cross-language. */
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+ export function itemTag(itemId, namespace) {
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+ if (!itemId || !namespace)
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+ throw new Error('itemId and namespace are required');
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+ return jcsHash({ v: 1, type: 'item_tag', namespace, item: itemId });
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+ }
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+ /** Build the co-signable handoff body. Giver + receiver sign it; submit via `POST /v1/interactions`. */
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+ export function buildHandoff(input) {
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+ if (!input.step)
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+ throw new Error('step is required');
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+ const tag = input.tag ?? itemTag(input.itemId ?? '', input.namespace ?? '');
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+ const { payload_hash, nonce } = saltedPayloadHash(JSON.stringify(input.evidence ?? {}));
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+ const body = buildA2ABody({
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+ action: 'handoff',
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+ target: `custody.handoff.${input.step}`,
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+ payloadHash: payload_hash,
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+ ts: input.ts,
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+ initiator: input.from,
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+ responder: input.to,
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+ });
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+ // Stamped INSIDE the co-signed body: both signatures cover the item tag.
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+ body.subject_tag = tag;
51
+ return { body, tag, nonce };
52
+ }
53
+ /** Build the N-party event body (swarm). Participants sign it; submit via `POST /v1/swarm`. */
54
+ export function buildCustodyEvent(input) {
55
+ const tag = input.tag ?? itemTag(input.itemId ?? '', input.namespace ?? '');
56
+ const { payload_hash, nonce } = saltedPayloadHash(JSON.stringify(input.evidence ?? {}));
57
+ const body = buildSwarmBody({
58
+ task: `custody.event.${input.kind}`,
59
+ target: input.target,
60
+ participants: input.participants,
61
+ threshold: input.threshold,
62
+ ts: input.ts,
63
+ payloadHash: payload_hash,
64
+ });
65
+ body.subject_tag = tag; // inside the signed body — every co-signer covers the item tag
66
+ return { body, tag, nonce };
67
+ }
68
+ function isSwarm(e) {
69
+ return e.type === 'swarm';
70
+ }
71
+ /**
72
+ * Verify an item's custody chain: every entry cryptographically valid AND stamped with
73
+ * this item's tag, handoffs continuous (receiver of *n* = giver of *n+1*), timestamps
74
+ * monotonic. Events are validated + tag-matched but don't transfer custody.
75
+ */
76
+ export function verifyCustodyChain(entries, opts) {
77
+ const reasons = [];
78
+ const custodians = [];
79
+ let holder = null;
80
+ let lastTs = '';
81
+ let handoffs = 0;
82
+ let events = 0;
83
+ entries.forEach((e, i) => {
84
+ if (isSwarm(e)) {
85
+ events += 1;
86
+ const check = verifySwarmReceipt(e, { revoked: opts.revoked });
87
+ if (!check.ok)
88
+ reasons.push(`entry ${i} (event): ${check.error}`);
89
+ if (e.body.subject_tag !== opts.tag)
90
+ reasons.push(`entry ${i} (event): wrong or missing item tag`);
91
+ return;
92
+ }
93
+ const r = e;
94
+ handoffs += 1;
95
+ const check = verifyA2AReceipt(r, { revoked: opts.revoked });
96
+ if (!check.ok) {
97
+ reasons.push(`entry ${i} (handoff): ${check.error}`);
98
+ return;
99
+ }
100
+ if (r.subject_tag !== opts.tag)
101
+ reasons.push(`entry ${i} (handoff): wrong or missing item tag`);
102
+ if (holder === null) {
103
+ custodians.push(r.initiator.agent_id);
104
+ }
105
+ else if (r.initiator.agent_id !== holder) {
106
+ reasons.push(`entry ${i} (handoff): custody break — giver ${r.initiator.agent_id} is not the current holder ${holder}`);
107
+ }
108
+ if (lastTs && r.ts < lastTs)
109
+ reasons.push(`entry ${i} (handoff): timestamp goes backwards`);
110
+ holder = r.responder.agent_id;
111
+ custodians.push(holder);
112
+ lastTs = r.ts;
113
+ });
114
+ if (handoffs === 0)
115
+ reasons.push('no handoffs in chain');
116
+ return { ok: reasons.length === 0, reasons, custodians, handoffs, events };
117
+ }
118
+ /** The human answer: origin, every custodian, every step. */
119
+ export function custodySummary(entries) {
120
+ const steps = [];
121
+ const custodians = [];
122
+ let origin = null;
123
+ for (const e of entries) {
124
+ if (isSwarm(e)) {
125
+ steps.push(String(e.body.task));
126
+ continue;
127
+ }
128
+ const r = e;
129
+ if (origin === null)
130
+ origin = r.initiator.agent_id;
131
+ steps.push(r.target);
132
+ if (!custodians.includes(r.initiator.agent_id))
133
+ custodians.push(r.initiator.agent_id);
134
+ if (!custodians.includes(r.responder.agent_id))
135
+ custodians.push(r.responder.agent_id);
136
+ }
137
+ return { origin, custodians, steps };
138
+ }
139
+ //# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/package.json ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
1
+ {
2
+ "name": "@zanii/custody",
3
+ "version": "0.1.0",
4
+ "description": "Supply-chain provenance: co-signed custody chains for physical goods. Each handoff (factory→shipper→customs→retailer) is a 2-party co-signed receipt, multi-party events are N-party swarm receipts, and item history is a pseudonymous verifiable slice — no party trusts another's database.",
5
+ "license": "Apache-2.0",
6
+ "homepage": "https://ledger.zanii.agency",
7
+ "type": "module",
8
+ "main": "./dist/index.js",
9
+ "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
10
+ "exports": {
11
+ ".": {
12
+ "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
13
+ "import": "./dist/index.js"
14
+ }
15
+ },
16
+ "files": [
17
+ "dist",
18
+ "src",
19
+ "README.md",
20
+ "LICENSE"
21
+ ],
22
+ "publishConfig": {
23
+ "access": "public"
24
+ },
25
+ "engines": {
26
+ "node": ">=18"
27
+ },
28
+ "devDependencies": {
29
+ "@types/node": "^26.1.0",
30
+ "typescript": "^5.8.2",
31
+ "vitest": "^3.0.9"
32
+ },
33
+ "dependencies": {
34
+ "@zanii/core": "0.4.0",
35
+ "@zanii/swarm": "0.2.0"
36
+ },
37
+ "scripts": {
38
+ "build": "tsc -p tsconfig.build.json",
39
+ "test": "vitest run",
40
+ "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit"
41
+ }
42
+ }
package/src/index.ts ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * @zanii/custody — supply-chain provenance: co-signed custody chains for physical goods.
3
+ *
4
+ * "Where did this actually come from" without any party trusting another's database.
5
+ * A **handoff** (factory → shipper → customs → retailer) is a 2-party co-signed a2a
6
+ * receipt (live at `POST /v1/interactions`); a **multi-party event** (an inspection
7
+ * witnessed by N parties) is a swarm receipt (`POST /v1/swarm`). This package adds the
8
+ * *item layer* on top — no new crypto, no new server verification:
9
+ *
10
+ * - `itemTag(itemId, namespace)` — pseudonymous item identity (the serial/batch never
11
+ * appears on-ledger; competitors can't enumerate volumes; any holder of the real id
12
+ * can find + verify the item's history via the subject index, `GET /v1/subjects/{tag}`).
13
+ * - `buildHandoff` / `buildCustodyEvent` — receipt bodies stamped with the item tag,
14
+ * sensitive details (weights, values, docs) salt-committed, disclosable later.
15
+ * - `verifyCustodyChain` — the custody-specific check on top of receipt validity:
16
+ * **continuity** — the receiver of handoff *n* is the giver of handoff *n+1*,
17
+ * timestamps monotonic; returns the first break.
18
+ *
19
+ * Honest limit (the oracle problem, stated plainly): cryptography verifies
20
+ * **attestations, not atoms**. A chain proves who signed for the goods at each step,
21
+ * under whose authority, in what order, unalterable after the fact — it cannot prove
22
+ * box contents weren't swapped by a party willing to sign falsely. What changes: fraud
23
+ * now requires a specific, identified party to sign a false statement with their
24
+ * accountable key. Detection becomes attribution. Bind the physical world (seals,
25
+ * weights, photos) in the salted `evidence` payload, disclosable via `@zanii/redact`.
26
+ */
27
+ import {
28
+ buildA2ABody, jcsHash, saltedPayloadHash, verifyA2AReceipt,
29
+ type A2AReceipt, type DelegationCert, type VerifyResult,
30
+ } from '@zanii/core';
31
+ import { verifySwarmReceipt, buildSwarmBody, type SwarmBody, type SwarmLedgerReceipt } from '@zanii/swarm';
32
+
33
+ /** Pseudonymous, namespace-scoped item identity. Deterministic (RFC 8785), cross-language. */
34
+ export function itemTag(itemId: string, namespace: string): string {
35
+ if (!itemId || !namespace) throw new Error('itemId and namespace are required');
36
+ return jcsHash({ v: 1, type: 'item_tag', namespace, item: itemId });
37
+ }
38
+
39
+ export interface HandoffInput {
40
+ /** The raw item id (serial/batch/EPC — opaque string, caller normalizes)… */
41
+ itemId?: string;
42
+ namespace?: string;
43
+ /** …or a precomputed `itemTag`. */
44
+ tag?: string;
45
+ /** Custody step, e.g. `factory-out`, `customs-in`. Becomes `custody.handoff.<step>`. */
46
+ step: string;
47
+ /** Giver / receiver party stubs: `{ agent_id, delegation, prev }` (no sig yet). */
48
+ from: { agent_id: string; delegation: DelegationCert[]; prev: string | null };
49
+ to: { agent_id: string; delegation: DelegationCert[]; prev: string | null };
50
+ ts: string;
51
+ /** Sensitive details (location, weights, seals, docs) — salt-committed, never raw on-ledger. */
52
+ evidence?: Record<string, unknown>;
53
+ }
54
+
55
+ export interface HandoffDraft {
56
+ /** The a2a body both parties sign (stamped with the item tag; sign with `signA2ABody`). */
57
+ body: Record<string, unknown>;
58
+ tag: string;
59
+ /** Keep to later prove the evidence with `verifyPayload` (evidence is always salt-committed). */
60
+ nonce: string;
61
+ }
62
+
63
+ /** Build the co-signable handoff body. Giver + receiver sign it; submit via `POST /v1/interactions`. */
64
+ export function buildHandoff(input: HandoffInput): HandoffDraft {
65
+ if (!input.step) throw new Error('step is required');
66
+ const tag = input.tag ?? itemTag(input.itemId ?? '', input.namespace ?? '');
67
+ const { payload_hash, nonce } = saltedPayloadHash(JSON.stringify(input.evidence ?? {}));
68
+ const body = buildA2ABody({
69
+ action: 'handoff',
70
+ target: `custody.handoff.${input.step}`,
71
+ payloadHash: payload_hash,
72
+ ts: input.ts,
73
+ initiator: input.from,
74
+ responder: input.to,
75
+ }) as unknown as Record<string, unknown>;
76
+ // Stamped INSIDE the co-signed body: both signatures cover the item tag.
77
+ body.subject_tag = tag;
78
+ return { body, tag, nonce };
79
+ }
80
+
81
+ export interface CustodyEventInput {
82
+ itemId?: string;
83
+ namespace?: string;
84
+ tag?: string;
85
+ /** e.g. `customs-inspection`. Becomes task `custody.event.<kind>`. */
86
+ kind: string;
87
+ target: string;
88
+ participants: string[];
89
+ threshold: number;
90
+ ts: string;
91
+ evidence?: Record<string, unknown>;
92
+ }
93
+
94
+ /** Build the N-party event body (swarm). Participants sign it; submit via `POST /v1/swarm`. */
95
+ export function buildCustodyEvent(input: CustodyEventInput): { body: SwarmBody & { subject_tag?: string }; tag: string; nonce: string } {
96
+ const tag = input.tag ?? itemTag(input.itemId ?? '', input.namespace ?? '');
97
+ const { payload_hash, nonce } = saltedPayloadHash(JSON.stringify(input.evidence ?? {}));
98
+ const body = buildSwarmBody({
99
+ task: `custody.event.${input.kind}`,
100
+ target: input.target,
101
+ participants: input.participants,
102
+ threshold: input.threshold,
103
+ ts: input.ts,
104
+ payloadHash: payload_hash,
105
+ }) as SwarmBody & { subject_tag?: string };
106
+ body.subject_tag = tag; // inside the signed body — every co-signer covers the item tag
107
+ return { body, tag, nonce };
108
+ }
109
+
110
+ export interface CustodyCheck {
111
+ ok: boolean;
112
+ reasons: string[];
113
+ /** Ordered custodian DIDs (giver of the first handoff, then each receiver). */
114
+ custodians: string[];
115
+ handoffs: number;
116
+ events: number;
117
+ }
118
+
119
+ type Entry = A2AReceipt | SwarmLedgerReceipt | Record<string, unknown>;
120
+
121
+ function isSwarm(e: Entry): e is SwarmLedgerReceipt {
122
+ return (e as { type?: string }).type === 'swarm';
123
+ }
124
+
125
+ /**
126
+ * Verify an item's custody chain: every entry cryptographically valid AND stamped with
127
+ * this item's tag, handoffs continuous (receiver of *n* = giver of *n+1*), timestamps
128
+ * monotonic. Events are validated + tag-matched but don't transfer custody.
129
+ */
130
+ export function verifyCustodyChain(entries: Entry[], opts: { tag: string; revoked?: Set<string> }): CustodyCheck {
131
+ const reasons: string[] = [];
132
+ const custodians: string[] = [];
133
+ let holder: string | null = null;
134
+ let lastTs = '';
135
+ let handoffs = 0;
136
+ let events = 0;
137
+ entries.forEach((e, i) => {
138
+ if (isSwarm(e)) {
139
+ events += 1;
140
+ const check: VerifyResult = verifySwarmReceipt(e, { revoked: opts.revoked });
141
+ if (!check.ok) reasons.push(`entry ${i} (event): ${check.error}`);
142
+ if ((e.body as { subject_tag?: string }).subject_tag !== opts.tag) reasons.push(`entry ${i} (event): wrong or missing item tag`);
143
+ return;
144
+ }
145
+ const r = e as A2AReceipt & { subject_tag?: string };
146
+ handoffs += 1;
147
+ const check = verifyA2AReceipt(r, { revoked: opts.revoked });
148
+ if (!check.ok) {
149
+ reasons.push(`entry ${i} (handoff): ${check.error}`);
150
+ return;
151
+ }
152
+ if (r.subject_tag !== opts.tag) reasons.push(`entry ${i} (handoff): wrong or missing item tag`);
153
+ if (holder === null) {
154
+ custodians.push(r.initiator.agent_id);
155
+ } else if (r.initiator.agent_id !== holder) {
156
+ reasons.push(`entry ${i} (handoff): custody break — giver ${r.initiator.agent_id} is not the current holder ${holder}`);
157
+ }
158
+ if (lastTs && r.ts < lastTs) reasons.push(`entry ${i} (handoff): timestamp goes backwards`);
159
+ holder = r.responder.agent_id;
160
+ custodians.push(holder);
161
+ lastTs = r.ts;
162
+ });
163
+ if (handoffs === 0) reasons.push('no handoffs in chain');
164
+ return { ok: reasons.length === 0, reasons, custodians, handoffs, events };
165
+ }
166
+
167
+ /** The human answer: origin, every custodian, every step. */
168
+ export function custodySummary(entries: Entry[]): { origin: string | null; custodians: string[]; steps: string[] } {
169
+ const steps: string[] = [];
170
+ const custodians: string[] = [];
171
+ let origin: string | null = null;
172
+ for (const e of entries) {
173
+ if (isSwarm(e)) {
174
+ steps.push(String(e.body.task));
175
+ continue;
176
+ }
177
+ const r = e as A2AReceipt;
178
+ if (origin === null) origin = r.initiator.agent_id;
179
+ steps.push(r.target);
180
+ if (!custodians.includes(r.initiator.agent_id)) custodians.push(r.initiator.agent_id);
181
+ if (!custodians.includes(r.responder.agent_id)) custodians.push(r.responder.agent_id);
182
+ }
183
+ return { origin, custodians, steps };
184
+ }