@zama-fhe/sdk 3.6.0 → 3.7.0-alpha.2

package/dist/esm/relayer-B6Zo6EkX.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"relayer-B6Zo6EkX.js","names":[],"sources":["../../src/utils/error.ts","../../src/errors/base.ts","../../src/errors/relayer.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/** Coerce an unknown caught value to an Error instance. */\nexport function toError(error: unknown): Error {\n  if (error instanceof Error) {\n    return error;\n  }\n  if (typeof error === \"object\" && error !== null && \"message\" in error) {\n    return new Error(String(error.message));\n  }\n  return new Error(String(error));\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true if the error is a contract call revert (as opposed to a network/transport error).\n * Detects viem's ContractFunctionExecutionError / ContractFunctionRevertedError\n * and ethers' CALL_EXCEPTION.\n */\nexport function isContractCallError(error: unknown): boolean {\n  if (!(error instanceof Error)) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  // viem: ContractFunctionExecutionError, ContractFunctionRevertedError\n  if (\n    error.name === \"ContractFunctionExecutionError\" ||\n    error.name === \"ContractFunctionRevertedError\"\n  ) {\n    return true;\n  }\n  // ethers: error.code === \"CALL_EXCEPTION\"\n  if (\"code\" in error && error.code === \"CALL_EXCEPTION\") {\n    return true;\n  }\n  // Fallback: common revert message patterns from various providers\n  const msg = error.message.toLowerCase();\n  return msg.includes(\"execution reverted\") || msg.includes(\"call revert exception\");\n}\n\n/** JSON-RPC error code providers use for rate limiting (\"limit exceeded\"). */\nconst JSON_RPC_LIMIT_EXCEEDED = -32005;\n\n/** Properties that may nest a lower-level cause across viem / ethers / fetch. */\nconst NESTED_ERROR_KEYS = [\"cause\", \"error\", \"info\"] as const;\n\n/**\n * Walk an error and its nested causes (`cause` / `error` / `info`, as used by\n * viem, ethers, and fetch wrappers), applying `predicate` to each object node.\n * Returns the first node for which `predicate` returns true, or `undefined`.\n * Depth-bounded to avoid pathological / cyclic structures.\n */\nfunction findInErrorChain(\n  error: unknown,\n  predicate: (node: Record<string, unknown>) => boolean,\n  depth = 6,\n): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {\n  if (depth < 0 || error === null || error === undefined || typeof error !== \"object\") {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n  const node = error as Record<string, unknown>;\n  if (predicate(node)) {\n    return node;\n  }\n  for (const key of NESTED_ERROR_KEYS) {\n    const next = node[key];\n    if (next !== undefined && next !== null && typeof next === \"object\") {\n      const found = findInErrorChain(next, predicate, depth - 1);\n      if (found) {\n        return found;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Classification detectors\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Structured (unambiguous) consumer rate-limit signal across the RPC providers\n * the SDK reads through:\n * - JSON-RPC `-32005` (\"limit exceeded\");\n * - viem-style numeric `status: 429`, and viem's own `shouldRetry` shape where\n *   the JSON-RPC error `code` is `429`;\n * - ethers' 429, which surfaces as `code: \"SERVER_ERROR\"` with the status only\n *   in `info.responseStatus` (a string like `\"429 Too Many Requests\"`) and no\n *   numeric top-level status — the leading code is parsed out of it.\n *\n * Deliberately NOT `statusCode: 429` — that is the relayer / node-fetch HTTP\n * shape, which stays {@link RelayerRequestFailedError} (SDK-236), so a relayer\n * 429 is never mistaken for a consumer-RPC throttle.\n */\nfunction nodeHasStructuredRateLimit(node: Record<string, unknown>): boolean {\n  if (node.code === JSON_RPC_LIMIT_EXCEEDED || node.status === 429 || node.code === 429) {\n    return true;\n  }\n  // ethers: `code: \"SERVER_ERROR\"`, status lives in `info.responseStatus`.\n  if (node.code === \"SERVER_ERROR\" && typeof node.info === \"object\" && node.info !== null) {\n    const responseStatus = (node.info as Record<string, unknown>).responseStatus;\n    if (typeof responseStatus === \"string\" && /^\\s*429\\b/.test(responseStatus)) {\n      return true;\n    }\n  }\n  return false;\n}\n\nfunction nodeIsRpcRateLimit(node: Record<string, unknown>): boolean {\n  if (nodeHasStructuredRateLimit(node)) {\n    return true;\n  }\n  // Message fallback for providers without a structured code. Deliberately\n  // narrow (specific throttling phrases, no bare \"429\") to avoid false positives\n  // that would turn a terminal error into a retryable one.\n  if (typeof node.message === \"string\") {\n    const msg = node.message.toLowerCase();\n    return (\n      msg.includes(\"too many requests\") || msg.includes(\"rate limit\") || msg.includes(\"rate-limit\")\n    );\n  }\n  return false;\n}\n\n/**\n * True when a failure originates from `@fhevm/sdk`'s relayer transport. Every\n * relayer error it throws — `RelayerResponseStatusError`, `RelayerResponseApiError`,\n * `RelayerMaxRetryError`, `RelayerTimeoutError`, … — carries the `Relayer` `name`\n * prefix. Such errors stay the relayer's domain ({@link RelayerRequestFailedError}\n * / SDK-236), never {@link RpcRateLimitError}, even on a 429 (which `@fhevm/sdk`\n * retries internally, honoring `Retry-After`, before surfacing).\n */\nexport function isRelayerError(error: unknown): boolean {\n  return (\n    findInErrorChain(\n      error,\n      (node) => typeof node.name === \"string\" && node.name.startsWith(\"Relayer\"),\n    ) !== undefined\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * True when the failure is an `@fhevm/sdk` relayer *timeout* (`RelayerTimeoutError`,\n * thrown when a request exceeds the relayer's global deadline without a verdict).\n * Unlike a terminal 4xx/5xx, the operation itself is safe to retry, so callers map\n * it to a {@link RelayerRequestFailedError} with `retryable: true` — mirroring the\n * former `WorkerTimeoutError`, which was likewise documented retryable.\n */\nexport function isRelayerTimeoutError(error: unknown): boolean {\n  return findInErrorChain(error, (node) => node.name === \"RelayerTimeoutError\") !== undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * True if the error is the consumer's RPC provider throttling an on-chain read\n * (HTTP 429 / JSON-RPC -32005). Relayer-originated 429s are excluded.\n */\nexport function isRpcRateLimitError(error: unknown): boolean {\n  if (isRelayerError(error)) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return findInErrorChain(error, nodeIsRpcRateLimit) !== undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Like {@link isRpcRateLimitError} but only matches an unambiguous **structured**\n * signal (`-32005` or a viem `status: 429`), ignoring message text. The classifier\n * promotes this ahead of any HTTP status, while a message-only throttle is only\n * trusted when no status is present — so a relayer HTTP error whose body happens\n * to say \"rate limit\" still maps to {@link RelayerRequestFailedError}.\n */\nexport function hasStructuredRpcRateLimitSignal(error: unknown): boolean {\n  if (isRelayerError(error)) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return findInErrorChain(error, nodeHasStructuredRateLimit) !== undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Transport-error signatures of the consumer's own RPC client (viem / ethers).\n * The SDK's on-chain reads (the ACL `persistAllowed` pre-check) go through that\n * client, which already retries transport faults internally — so a failure\n * carrying one of these shapes must NOT be retried again by the SDK on top.\n */\nfunction nodeHasConsumerRpcSignature(node: Record<string, unknown>): boolean {\n  // ethers transient transport codes.\n  const code = node.code;\n  if (code === \"NETWORK_ERROR\" || code === \"SERVER_ERROR\" || code === \"TIMEOUT\") {\n    return true;\n  }\n  // viem transport error classes, matched by `name`.\n  const name = node.name;\n  return (\n    name === \"HttpRequestError\" ||\n    name === \"RpcRequestError\" ||\n    name === \"TimeoutError\" ||\n    name === \"WebSocketRequestError\"\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * True when a failure originates from the **consumer's RPC provider** (viem /\n * ethers) rather than the relayer. Keeps the SDK's relayer retry from\n * double-retrying transport faults the integrator's client already retried.\n * A relayer error (`Relayer*`) is never consumer-RPC.\n */\nexport function isConsumerRpcError(error: unknown): boolean {\n  if (isRelayerError(error)) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (hasStructuredRpcRateLimitSignal(error)) {\n    return true;\n  }\n  return findInErrorChain(error, nodeHasConsumerRpcSignature) !== undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * `@fhevm/sdk`'s ACL gate (`checkPersistAllowed`) throws an `AclUserDecryptionError`\n * when the requesting actor isn't allowed: `User <a> is not authorized to decrypt\n * handle <h>!`. Matching that phrase is what lets {@link wrapDecryptError} surface\n * a typed NotEntitledError with the parsed handle.\n *\n * Deliberately excludes the sibling `Dapp contract <a> is not authorized to\n * **user** decrypt handle <h>!` — a dapp ACL misconfig, intentionally left to\n * DecryptionFailedError. The differentiator is the inserted \"user\": the actor\n * message reads \"…to decrypt handle\", the dapp message \"…to user decrypt handle\",\n * so keying on \"is not authorized to decrypt handle\" matches only the former.\n *\n * The `error.test.ts` drift guard reads the installed `@fhevm/sdk` source and\n * fails loudly if the message is reworded.\n */\nexport function isNotEntitledMessage(message: string): boolean {\n  return message.toLowerCase().includes(\"is not authorized to decrypt handle\");\n}\n\n/**\n * `@fhevm/sdk`'s `verifyTkmsPublicKey` throws `invalid TransportKeyPairKeyPair`\n * when a stored transport key pair can't be re-derived under the current TKMS\n * version — the signal that the persisted key pair is stale (typically after a\n * KMS/TKMS rotation) and must be evicted and regenerated. Matching it lets the\n * signing and decrypt paths surface a typed {@link InvalidTransportKeyPairError}\n * and self-heal the vault entry.\n */\nexport function isInvalidTransportKeyPairMessage(message: string): boolean {\n  return message.toLowerCase().includes(\"invalid transportkeypair\");\n}\n\n/**\n * `@fhevm/sdk`'s V2 (unified) permit unsigned-payload builder\n * (`createUnsignedDecryptionPermitEip712V2`) resolves the connected chain's\n * on-chain KMS context into an `extraData` version and asserts it's at least\n * `EXTRA_DATA_V2` — the encoding only a protocol v0.14+ `ProtocolConfig`\n * contract produces. Matching this signal (before any wallet prompt) lets the\n * signing path surface a typed {@link UnifiedPermitNotSupportedError} instead\n * of a generic `SigningFailedError`.\n */\nexport function isUnsupportedUnifiedPermitMessage(message: string): boolean {\n  return message.toLowerCase().includes(\"invalid extradata version\");\n}\n\n/**\n * `@fhevm/sdk`'s V2 decrypt dispatch (`fetchKmsSigncryptedSharesV2`) checks the\n * connected relayer's resolved feature set and throws this before ever issuing\n * the `/v3/user-decrypt` request when the relayer instance hasn't deployed that\n * route — distinct from {@link isUnsupportedUnifiedPermitMessage}, which fires\n * at *signing* time because the *chain* itself hasn't upgraded. This fires at\n * *decrypt* time even on a fully upgraded chain, because this particular relayer\n * instance lags behind it. Matching this signal lets the decrypt path surface a\n * typed {@link UnifiedDecryptionUnsupportedError}.\n */\nexport function isUnifiedDecryptionUnsupportedMessage(message: string): boolean {\n  return message.toLowerCase().includes(\"does not support unified (v2) decryption permits\");\n}\n\n/**\n * 4-byte selector of `InvalidKmsContext(uint256)`, the revert ProtocolConfig\n * raises when the KMS signers read resolves an unknown or revoked context.\n * The `error.test.ts` drift guard recomputes it from the Solidity signature.\n */\nexport const INVALID_KMS_CONTEXT_SELECTOR = \"0x77ddbe81\";\n\n/** Revert-data fields across clients: viem's `raw`/`signature`, ethers' `data`. */\nconst REVERT_DATA_KEYS = [\"data\", \"raw\", \"signature\"] as const;\n\nfunction nodeHasInvalidKmsContextRevert(node: Record<string, unknown>): boolean {\n  for (const key of REVERT_DATA_KEYS) {\n    const value = node[key];\n    if (typeof value === \"string\" && value.toLowerCase().startsWith(INVALID_KMS_CONTEXT_SELECTOR)) {\n      return true;\n    }\n  }\n  // Text-only fallback for wrappers that stringify the revert instead of\n  // carrying the data fields above.\n  if (typeof node.message === \"string\") {\n    const msg = node.message.toLowerCase();\n    return msg.includes(INVALID_KMS_CONTEXT_SELECTOR) || msg.includes(\"invalidkmscontext\");\n  }\n  return false;\n}\n\n/**\n * True when a failure is the on-chain KMS signers read reverting with\n * `InvalidKmsContext`: the permit's KMS context has been revoked (or never\n * existed), so every permit signed under it is permanently dead. The decrypt\n * path uses this to evict the permit and re-grant under the current context.\n *\n * The installed `@fhevm/sdk` performs that read without the error in its ABI,\n * so the revert arrives as raw data; the selector is matched anywhere in the\n * cause chain, with a message fallback for text-only providers.\n */\nexport function isRevokedKmsContextError(error: unknown): boolean {\n  return findInErrorChain(error, nodeHasInvalidKmsContextRevert) !== undefined;\n}\n\n/** Parse the on-chain handle out of the not-entitled message. */\nexport function parseHandleFromMessage(message: string): string | undefined {\n  return /handle (0x[0-9a-fA-F]{64})/.exec(message)?.[1];\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse an HTTP `Retry-After` header value into **seconds** (the SDK's duration\n * unit and the header's own unit), or `undefined` when absent/unparseable. Per\n * RFC 9110 the value is either a non-negative number of seconds (`\"120\"`) or an\n * HTTP-date; a past date floors to `0`.\n */\nexport function parseRetryAfterHeader(value: string | null | undefined): number | undefined {\n  if (value === null || value === undefined) {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n  const trimmed = value.trim();\n  if (trimmed === \"\") {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n  // delta-seconds: a non-negative integer (already the unit we want).\n  if (/^\\d+$/.test(trimmed)) {\n    return Number(trimmed);\n  }\n  // HTTP-date — an IMF-fixdate always carries alphabetic day/month names, so\n  // require a letter before deferring to the lenient Date.parse.\n  if (/[a-zA-Z]/.test(trimmed)) {\n    const dateMs = Date.parse(trimmed);\n    if (!Number.isNaN(dateMs)) {\n      return Math.max(0, Math.round((dateMs - Date.now()) / 1000));\n    }\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\n/** Read a `Retry-After` header (→ seconds) off a `Headers`-like object, if present. */\nexport function readRetryAfterHeader(headers: unknown): number | undefined {\n  if (headers === null || typeof headers !== \"object\") {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n  const get = (headers as { get?: unknown }).get;\n  if (typeof get !== \"function\") {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n  return parseRetryAfterHeader(\n    (get as (name: string) => string | null).call(headers, \"Retry-After\"),\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * A node's **relayer** `Retry-After` header (seconds), read from a wrapped fetch\n * `Response` (the relayer's `cause.response.headers`). The SDK owns the\n * relayer fetch, so parsing the header there is legitimate.\n *\n * The viem/chain side (`HttpRequestError.headers`) is deliberately **not** read:\n * for consumer RPC the integrator's viem/ethers transport already honors\n * `Retry-After` in its own retry loop (and retries) before the error ever\n * surfaces, so re-reading it here would re-implement a transport concern.\n * Chain-RPC backoff is configured on the consumer's transport (`chain.network`).\n */\nfunction retryAfterFromHeader(node: Record<string, unknown>): number | undefined {\n  const response = node.response;\n  if (response !== null && typeof response === \"object\") {\n    return readRetryAfterHeader((response as Record<string, unknown>).headers);\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * True for a well-formed server-driven retry delay, in seconds: a finite,\n * positive number. Shared by the chain-walking extractor below and the public\n * {@link retryAfterSeconds} accessor (`errors/base.ts`), so a malformed value\n * (`0`, negative, `NaN`) is rejected the same way everywhere instead of being\n * handed unchanged to a `setTimeout` backoff.\n */\nexport function isValidRetryAfterSeconds(value: unknown): value is number {\n  return typeof value === \"number\" && Number.isFinite(value) && value > 0;\n}\n\n/**\n * A single node's server-driven retry delay (seconds): a numeric `retryAfter`\n * (a non-positive synthetic value is ignored), else a `Retry-After` header.\n */\nfunction retryAfterFromNode(node: Record<string, unknown>): number | undefined {\n  if (isValidRetryAfterSeconds(node.retryAfter)) {\n    return node.retryAfter;\n  }\n  return retryAfterFromHeader(node);\n}\n\n/**\n * Best-effort extraction of a server-driven retry delay, in **seconds**, from\n * anywhere in an error's cause chain. Reads a numeric `retryAfter` property and\n * the **relayer's** `Retry-After` header (`cause.response.headers`). The\n * consumer-RPC/chain side is intentionally not read — viem/ethers own that\n * backoff (see {@link retryAfterFromHeader}). `undefined` when absent.\n */\nexport function extractRetryAfter(error: unknown): number | undefined {\n  const node = findInErrorChain(error, (n) => retryAfterFromNode(n) !== undefined);\n  return node ? retryAfterFromNode(node) : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract an HTTP status code from an error or anywhere in its cause chain.\n * Relayer SDK errors may carry a `status` or `statusCode` property; walking the\n * full chain (rather than just depth-1) keeps this in step with the other\n * chain-walking detectors and avoids a depth asymmetry between them.\n */\nexport function extractHttpStatus(error: unknown): number | undefined {\n  const node = findInErrorChain(\n    error,\n    (n) => typeof n.statusCode === \"number\" || typeof n.status === \"number\",\n  );\n  if (!node) {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n  return (typeof node.statusCode === \"number\" ? node.statusCode : node.status) as number;\n}\n\n/**\n * A JSON-RPC / EIP-1193 numeric error code (e.g. `4001` for user rejection, or a\n * wallet/provider code like `-32603`) found anywhere in a signing failure's cause\n * chain. Gives a signing error a structured, groupable field instead of leaving\n * the code buried in free-text `message` or an opaque nested `cause`.\n *\n * Skips `-1`: viem's own `UnknownRpcError` fallback code for errors it can't\n * classify, not an RPC-provided code. Reporting it as `rpcCode` would read as\n * a real (if odd) wallet error code, so the chain walk continues past it in\n * case a real code is nested deeper (e.g. in `cause`).\n */\nexport function extractRpcErrorCode(error: unknown): number | undefined {\n  const node = findInErrorChain(error, (n) => typeof n.code === \"number\" && n.code !== -1);\n  return node ? (node.code as number) : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * The `name` of the error class a signing failure was thrown as (e.g. viem's\n * `InvalidParamsRpcError`, an EIP-1193 `ProviderRpcError`) — a stable,\n * library-level classification an observability integration can group and alert\n * on. Deliberately reads only the top-level error, not the full cause chain: a\n * wallet's own internal error class name is inconsistent across wallets and\n * buried at an arbitrary depth, so it is not guessed at here — the full chain\n * remains available via the wrapped error's `cause` for manual inspection.\n */\nexport function extractWalletErrorName(error: unknown): string | undefined {\n  return error instanceof Error && error.name !== \"Error\" ? error.name : undefined;\n}\n","import { isValidRetryAfterSeconds } from \"../utils/error\";\n\n/**\n * Typed error codes thrown by the SDK.\n * Use `error.code` or `instanceof` to programmatically handle specific failure modes.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * try {\n *   await token.confidentialTransfer(\"0xTo\", 100n);\n * } catch (e) {\n *   if (e instanceof SigningRejectedError) {\n *     // User rejected the wallet signature\n *   }\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport const ZamaErrorCode = {\n  /** User rejected the wallet signature prompt. */\n  SigningRejected: \"SIGNING_REJECTED\",\n  /** Wallet signature failed for a reason other than rejection. */\n  SigningFailed: \"SIGNING_FAILED\",\n  /** FHE encryption failed. */\n  EncryptionFailed: \"ENCRYPTION_FAILED\",\n  /** FHE decryption failed. */\n  DecryptionFailed: \"DECRYPTION_FAILED\",\n  /** Encryption offload was required (`offloadEncrypt: true`) but the worker is unavailable. */\n  EncryptOffloadUnavailable: \"ENCRYPT_OFFLOAD_UNAVAILABLE\",\n  /** On-chain transaction reverted. */\n  TransactionReverted: \"TRANSACTION_REVERTED\",\n  /** Transport key pair has expired and needs regeneration. */\n  TransportKeyPairExpired: \"KEYPAIR_EXPIRED\",\n  /** Relayer rejected transport key pair (stale, expired, or malformed). */\n  InvalidTransportKeyPair: \"INVALID_KEYPAIR\",\n  /** The permit's KMS context was revoked on-chain; the SDK's evict-and-regrant retry also failed. */\n  RevokedKmsContext: \"REVOKED_KMS_CONTEXT\",\n  /** No FHE ciphertext exists for this account (never shielded). */\n  NoCiphertext: \"NO_CIPHERTEXT\",\n  /** Relayer HTTP request failed. */\n  RelayerRequestFailed: \"RELAYER_REQUEST_FAILED\",\n  /** The configured signer/account is not entitled (ACL) to decrypt this encrypted value. Don't retry — wait for a grant. */\n  NotEntitled: \"NOT_ENTITLED\",\n  /** The consumer's RPC provider rate-limited an on-chain read (e.g. HTTP 429 / JSON-RPC -32005). Retryable. */\n  RpcRateLimited: \"RPC_RATE_LIMITED\",\n  /** SDK configuration is invalid (e.g. forbidden chain ID, unsupported type). */\n  Configuration: \"CONFIGURATION\",\n  /** Delegation cannot target self (delegate === msg.sender). */\n  DelegationSelfNotAllowed: \"DELEGATION_SELF_NOT_ALLOWED\",\n  /** Only one delegate/revoke per (delegator, delegate, contract) per block. */\n  DelegationCooldown: \"DELEGATION_COOLDOWN\",\n  /** No active delegation found for this (delegator, delegate, contract) tuple. */\n  DelegationNotFound: \"DELEGATION_NOT_FOUND\",\n  /** The delegation has expired. */\n  DelegationExpired: \"DELEGATION_EXPIRED\",\n  /** Confidential (cToken) balance is insufficient for the requested operation. */\n  InsufficientConfidentialBalance: \"INSUFFICIENT_CONFIDENTIAL_BALANCE\",\n  /** ERC-20 balance is insufficient for the requested shield amount. */\n  InsufficientERC20Balance: \"INSUFFICIENT_ERC20_BALANCE\",\n  /** ERC-20 allowance granted to the wrapper is insufficient for the requested wrap amount. */\n  InsufficientAllowance: \"INSUFFICIENT_ALLOWANCE\",\n  /** Balance validation could not be performed (no cached credentials and decryption not possible). */\n  BalanceCheckUnavailable: \"BALANCE_CHECK_UNAVAILABLE\",\n  /** Public ERC-20 read (e.g. balanceOf) failed due to a network or contract error. */\n  ERC20ReadFailed: \"ERC20_READ_FAILED\",\n  /** The new expiration date equals the current one — no on-chain change needed. */\n  DelegationExpiryUnchanged: \"DELEGATION_EXPIRY_UNCHANGED\",\n  /** Delegate address cannot be the contract address. */\n  DelegationDelegateEqualsContract: \"DELEGATION_DELEGATE_EQUALS_CONTRACT\",\n  /** Delegate address cannot be the wildcard address — it's only valid as `contractAddress`. */\n  DelegationDelegateCannotBeWildcard: \"DELEGATION_DELEGATE_CANNOT_BE_WILDCARD\",\n  /** Contract address cannot be the sender address. */\n  DelegationContractIsSelf: \"DELEGATION_CONTRACT_IS_SELF\",\n  /** The ACL contract is paused. */\n  AclPaused: \"ACL_PAUSED\",\n  /** Expiration date is too soon (must be at least 1 hour in the future). */\n  DelegationExpirationTooSoon: \"DELEGATION_EXPIRATION_TOO_SOON\",\n  /** Delegation exists on-chain but hasn't propagated to the gateway yet. */\n  DelegationNotPropagated: \"DELEGATION_NOT_PROPAGATED\",\n  /** Signer and provider are connected to different chains. */\n  ChainMismatch: \"CHAIN_MISMATCH\",\n  /** Operation requires a signer but none is configured. */\n  SignerNotConfigured: \"SIGNER_NOT_CONFIGURED\",\n  /** Operation requires a connected wallet account. */\n  WalletNotConnected: \"WALLET_NOT_CONNECTED\",\n  /** Wallet account discovery is still resolving. */\n  WalletAccountNotReady: \"WALLET_ACCOUNT_NOT_READY\",\n  /** Wrapping or unwrapping the transport private key with `transportKeyPairDerivationSecret` failed. */\n  KeyWrappingFailed: \"KEY_WRAPPING_FAILED\",\n  /** The transport key pair changed between `preparePermit` and `registerPermit`. */\n  TransportKeyPairChanged: \"TRANSPORT_KEY_PAIR_CHANGED\",\n  /** A prepared permit's `chainId` does not match the chain `registerPermit` is running against. */\n  PreparedPermitChainMismatch: \"PREPARED_PERMIT_CHAIN_MISMATCH\",\n  /** A prepared permit's validity window elapsed before its signature was registered. */\n  PreparedPermitExpired: \"PREPARED_PERMIT_EXPIRED\",\n  /** V2 (unified) decryption permits — including wildcard permits — need protocol v0.14+; the connected chain hasn't upgraded yet. */\n  UnifiedPermitNotSupported: \"UNIFIED_PERMIT_NOT_SUPPORTED\",\n  /** A stored V2/wildcard permit's scope is needed, but the connected relayer instance doesn't support unified decryption yet. */\n  UnifiedDecryptionUnsupported: \"UNIFIED_DECRYPTION_UNSUPPORTED\",\n  /** `invalidateDecryptionSignatures` was given a cutoff at or below the account's current one; the ACL only moves it forward. */\n  InvalidationTimestampTooLow: \"INVALIDATION_TIMESTAMP_TOO_LOW\",\n  /** `invalidateDecryptionSignatures` was given a cutoff in the future; the ACL only accepts now or earlier. */\n  InvalidationTimestampInFuture: \"INVALIDATION_TIMESTAMP_IN_FUTURE\",\n  /** The unwrap request was already finalized on-chain; there is nothing left to resume. */\n  UnshieldAlreadyFinalized: \"UNSHIELD_ALREADY_FINALIZED\",\n} as const;\n\n/** Union of all {@link ZamaErrorCode} string values. */\nexport type ZamaErrorCode = (typeof ZamaErrorCode)[keyof typeof ZamaErrorCode];\n\n/** Identity type that fails to instantiate unless `T` maps every {@link ZamaErrorCode} to a `boolean`. */\ntype Complete<T extends Record<ZamaErrorCode, boolean>> = T;\n\n/**\n * Default retryability for each {@link ZamaErrorCode}. `Complete` fails the build\n * if a new code is added without an entry here — the same exhaustiveness guard\n * `matchZamaError`'s `ErrorForCode` map uses (see `match.ts`) — so a new\n * transient (or terminal) cause can't silently default to the wrong signal.\n *\n * {@link RelayerRequestFailedError} is the one exception: its retryability\n * depends on the HTTP status (only a 429 is retryable), not just the code, so\n * it overrides this default via the constructor's `retryable` option instead\n * of being read from here.\n */\nconst RETRYABLE_BY_CODE: Complete<Record<ZamaErrorCode, boolean>> = {\n  [ZamaErrorCode.SigningRejected]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.SigningFailed]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.EncryptionFailed]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.DecryptionFailed]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.EncryptOffloadUnavailable]: false, // the worker realm is unusable for this page; a retry hits the same environment\n  [ZamaErrorCode.TransactionReverted]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.TransportKeyPairExpired]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.InvalidTransportKeyPair]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.RevokedKmsContext]: false, // the retry already re-granted; a blind retry re-hits the stale validity cache\n  [ZamaErrorCode.NoCiphertext]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.RelayerRequestFailed]: false, // conditional — see doc above\n  [ZamaErrorCode.NotEntitled]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.RpcRateLimited]: true,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.Configuration]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.DelegationSelfNotAllowed]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.DelegationCooldown]: true, // per-block timing gate, resolves on next-block retry\n  [ZamaErrorCode.DelegationNotFound]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.DelegationExpired]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.InsufficientConfidentialBalance]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.InsufficientERC20Balance]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.InsufficientAllowance]: false, // terminal: caller must approve a larger allowance\n  [ZamaErrorCode.BalanceCheckUnavailable]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.ERC20ReadFailed]: false, // conservative: conflates network (transient) and contract (terminal) faults, see class doc\n  [ZamaErrorCode.DelegationExpiryUnchanged]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.DelegationDelegateEqualsContract]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.DelegationDelegateCannotBeWildcard]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.DelegationContractIsSelf]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.AclPaused]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.DelegationExpirationTooSoon]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.DelegationNotPropagated]: true,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.ChainMismatch]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.SignerNotConfigured]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.WalletNotConnected]: false,\n  [ZamaErrorCode.WalletAccountNotReady]: true, // async wallet-account discovery still resolving\n  [ZamaErrorCode.KeyWrappingFailed]: false, // a transportKeyPairDerivationSecret mismatch or environment capability issue, not transient\n  [ZamaErrorCode.TransportKeyPairChanged]: false, // caller must re-run preparePermit against the current key pair\n  [ZamaErrorCode.PreparedPermitChainMismatch]: false, // caller must register against the chain the permit was prepared for\n  [ZamaErrorCode.PreparedPermitExpired]: false, // caller must re-run preparePermit for a fresh validity window\n  [ZamaErrorCode.UnifiedPermitNotSupported]: false, // resolves only once the chain itself upgrades to protocol v0.14+\n  [ZamaErrorCode.UnifiedDecryptionUnsupported]: false, // resolves only once this relayer instance deploys /v3/user-decrypt, or the caller falls back to a V1 permit\n  [ZamaErrorCode.InvalidationTimestampTooLow]: false, // the caller must pass a strictly later cutoff; retrying the same one always reverts\n  [ZamaErrorCode.InvalidationTimestampInFuture]: false, // the caller must pass a cutoff no later than now\n  [ZamaErrorCode.UnshieldAlreadyFinalized]: false, // the funds already arrived; the stale pointer is cleared\n};\n\n/**\n * Base error thrown by all SDK operations.\n * Carries a {@link ZamaErrorCode} for programmatic error handling.\n * Prefer catching specific subclasses (e.g. {@link EncryptionFailedError}).\n */\nexport class ZamaError extends Error {\n  /** Machine-readable error code. */\n  readonly code: ZamaErrorCode;\n\n  /**\n   * Whether the operation that threw this error is safe to retry. Defaults to\n   * {@link RETRYABLE_BY_CODE}'s entry for `code`; only {@link RelayerRequestFailedError}\n   * overrides it per-instance (its retryability depends on the HTTP status).\n   * Prefer {@link isRetryable} over reading this directly, so a new `unknown`\n   * caught value doesn't need an `instanceof ZamaError` check first.\n   */\n  readonly retryable: boolean;\n\n  constructor(\n    code: ZamaErrorCode,\n    message: string,\n    options?: ErrorOptions & { retryable?: boolean },\n  ) {\n    super(message, options);\n    Object.setPrototypeOf(this, new.target.prototype);\n    this.name = \"ZamaError\";\n    this.code = code;\n    this.retryable = options?.retryable ?? 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Set only on\n   * back-pressure (HTTP 429) responses that carry the header; `undefined`\n   * otherwise. Implies {@link ZamaError.retryable}.\n   */\n  readonly retryAfter: number | undefined;\n\n  constructor(\n    message: string,\n    statusCode?: number,\n    options?: ErrorOptions & { retryAfter?: number; retryable?: boolean },\n  ) {\n    // Retryable on relayer back-pressure (HTTP 429) by default, or when the\n    // caller forces it (a relayer timeout has no status but is safe to retry).\n    const retryable = options?.retryable ?? statusCode === 429;\n    super(ZamaErrorCode.RelayerRequestFailed, message, { ...options, retryable });\n    this.name = \"RelayerRequestFailedError\";\n    this.statusCode = statusCode;\n    // Keep the two fields consistent: a delay only makes sense when retryable,\n    // and only a 429 actually carries a server-supplied `Retry-After`.\n    this.retryAfter = retryable ? options?.retryAfter : undefined;\n  }\n}\n\n/** SDK configuration is invalid (e.g. forbidden chain ID, unsupported type). */\nexport class ConfigurationError extends ZamaError {\n  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package/dist/esm/token-BMQ6xlrk.js

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import{i as e,r as t,t as n,w as r}from"./relayer-B6Zo6EkX.js";import{$ as i,A as a,D as o,E as s,M as c,Q as l,S as u,T as d,U as f,Z as p,at as m,b as h,dt as g,ht as _,it as v,l as y,m as b,ot as x,rt as S,tt as C,u as w,v as T,w as E,x as D}from"./wrappers-registry-BfQr2QHn.js";import{r as O,t as k}from"./encryption-DJljZ2oV.js";import{t as A}from"./assertions-Ca1ePdRJ.js";import{getAddress as j}from"viem";var M=class extends t{retryAfter;constructor(t,n){let{retryAfter:r,...i}=n??{};super(e.RpcRateLimited,t,i),this.name=`RpcRateLimitError`,this.retryAfter=r}},N=class extends t{operation;signerChainId;providerChainId;constructor({operation:t,signerChainId:n,providerChainId:r},i){super(e.ChainMismatch,`Operation "${t}" requires signer and provider to be on the same chain, but signer is on chain ${n} and provider is on chain ${r}.`,i),this.name=`ChainMismatchError`,this.operation=t,this.signerChainId=n,this.providerChainId=r}},P=class extends t{requested;available;token;constructor(t,n,r){super(e.InsufficientConfidentialBalance,t,r),this.name=`InsufficientConfidentialBalanceError`,this.requested=n.requested,this.available=n.available,this.token=n.token}},F=class extends t{requested;available;token;constructor(t,n,r){super(e.InsufficientERC20Balance,t,r),this.name=`InsufficientERC20BalanceError`,this.requested=n.requested,this.available=n.available,this.token=n.token}},I=class extends t{requested;available;token;constructor(t,n,r){super(e.InsufficientAllowance,t,r),this.name=`InsufficientAllowanceError`,this.requested=n.requested,this.available=n.available,this.token=n.token}},L=class extends t{constructor(t,n){super(e.BalanceCheckUnavailable,t,n),this.name=`BalanceCheckUnavailableError`}},R=class extends t{constructor(t,n){super(e.ERC20ReadFailed,t,n),this.name=`ERC20ReadFailedError`}};function z(e){return e instanceof x||e instanceof m||e instanceof n||e instanceof M||e instanceof g||e instanceof _}const B={ebool:0,euint8:2,euint16:3,euint32:4,euint64:5,euint128:6,eaddress:7,euint256:8},V={0:`ebool`,2:`euint8`,3:`euint16`,4:`euint32`,5:`euint64`,6:`euint128`,7:`eaddress`,8:`euint256`},H={0:2,2:8,3:16,4:32,5:64,6:128,7:160,8:256};Object.freeze(B),Object.freeze(V),Object.freeze(H),Object.freeze({2:0,8:2,16:3,32:4,64:5,128:6,160:7,256:8});function U(e){switch(e){case 0:case 2:case 3:case 4:case 5:case 6:case 7:case 8:return!0;default:return!1}}function W(e){if(!U(e))throw Error(`Invalid FheType id '${e}'`);let t=H[e];if(t<2)throw Error(`Invalid FheType encryption bit width: ${t}. Minimum is 2 bits.`);return t}const G=`0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000`;function K(e){return e===`0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000`||e===`0x`}function q(e){let t;try{t=BigInt(e)}catch{return 256}let n=Number(t>>8n&255n);return U(n)?W(n):256}function J(e,t=2048){let n=[],r=[],i=0;for(let a of e){let e=q(a);r.length>0&&i+e>t&&(n.push(r),r=[],i=0),r.push(a),i+=e}return r.length>0&&n.push(r),n}async function Y(e,t,n){if(!t)throw new i(e);let r;try{r=t.requireWalletAccount(e)}catch(n){if(!(n instanceof C)||!t.refreshWalletAccount)throw n;await t.refreshWalletAccount(),r=t.requireWalletAccount(e)}let a=await n.getChainId();if(r.chainId!==a)throw new N({operation:e,signerChainId:r.chainId,providerChainId:a});return r}async function X(e,t,n){return(await Y(e,t,n)).chainId}async function Z(e,t=1/0){if(Number.isFinite(t)&&t<=0)throw Error(`maxConcurrency must be a positive number`);if(!Number.isFinite(t)||t>=e.length)return Promise.all(e.map(e=>e()));let n=Array.from({length:e.length}),r=0;async function i(){for(;r<e.length;){let t=r++;e[t]&&(n[t]=await e[t]())}}return await Promise.all(Array.from({length:t},i)),n}async function Q(e){let{operation:n,signer:r,provider:i,config:a,emit:o,onSubmitted:s,logger:c}=e,u=l[n];try{let e=await r.writeContract(a);return o(u.submittedEvent(e)),f(`${n}: onSubmitted`,()=>s?.(e),c),{txHash:e,receipt:await i.waitForTransactionReceipt(e)}}catch(e){let r=e instanceof t?e:new v(`Transaction failed during ${n}`,{cause:e});throw o({type:p.TransactionError,operation:n,error:r}),r}}var $=class e{sdk;address;constructor(e,t){this.sdk=e,this.address=j(t)}#e(e){return S(this.sdk.signer,e)}async name(){return this.sdk.provider.readContract(h(this.address))}async symbol(){return this.sdk.provider.readContract(D(this.address))}async decimals(){return this.sdk.provider.readContract(T(this.address))}async isConfidential(){return this.sdk.provider.readContract(b(this.address,y))}async isWrapper(){return this.sdk.provider.readContract(b(this.address,w))}async balanceOf(e){let t=j(e),n=await this.readConfidentialBalanceOf(t),r=(await this.sdk.decryption.decryptValues([{encryptedValue:n,contractAddress:this.address}]))[n];if(r===void 0)throw new k(`Decryption returned no value for ${n}`);return A(r,`balanceOf: result[encryptedValue]`),r}async confidentialBalanceOf(e){return this.readConfidentialBalanceOf(j(e))}async decryptBalanceAs({delegatorAddress:e,accountAddress:t}){await X(`decryptBalanceAs`,this.sdk.signer,this.sdk.provider);let n=j(e),r=t?j(t):n,i=await this.readConfidentialBalanceOf(r);if(K(i))return 0n;let a=(await this.sdk.decryption.delegatedDecryptValues([{encryptedValue:i,contractAddress:this.address}],n,r))[i];if(a===void 0)throw new k(`Delegated decryption returned no value for ${i}`);return A(a,`decryptBalanceAs: result[encryptedValue]`),a}static async batchBalancesOf(n,i){let a=new Map,o=new Map;if(n.length===0)return{results:a,errors:o};let s=e.assertSameSdk(n);await X(`batchBalancesOf`,s.signer,s.provider),await s.permits.grantPermit(n.map(e=>e.address));let c=!1,l,u=await Z(n.map(e=>async()=>{if(c)return{status:`aborted`};try{return{status:`fulfilled`,value:await e.balanceOf(i)}}catch(e){return z(e)?(c=!0,l??=e,{status:`aborted`}):{status:`rejected`,reason:e}}}),5);if(l!==void 0)throw l;for(let e=0;e<n.length;e++){let i=n[e].address,s=u[e];if(s.status!==`aborted`)if(s.status===`fulfilled`)a.set(i,s.value);else{let e=s.reason,n=e instanceof t?e:new k(r(e).message,{cause:e});o.set(i,n)}}if(o.size===n.length)throw o.values().next().value??new k(`All token balance decryptions failed`);return{results:a,errors:o}}static async batchDecryptBalancesAs(t,n){if(t.length===0)return new Map;let i=e.assertSameSdk(t),a=new Map,o=new Map,s=n.accountAddress?j(n.accountAddress):j(n.delegatorAddress),c=n.maxConcurrency??10;if(n.encryptedValues&&t.length!==n.encryptedValues.length)throw new k(`tokens.length (${t.length}) must equal encryptedValues.length (${n.encryptedValues.length})`);let l=n.encryptedValues??await e.readBalanceHandlesBatch(t,s,o,c),u=[];for(let[e,n]of t.entries()){let t=l[e];!t||o.has(n.address)||(K(t)?a.set(n.address,0n):u.push({token:n,encryptedValue:t}))}if(u.length>0){let e=await i.decryption.delegatedBatchDecryptValues({encryptedInputs:u.map(({token:e,encryptedValue:t})=>({encryptedValue:t,contractAddress:e.address})),delegatorAddress:n.delegatorAddress,accountAddress:n.accountAddress,maxConcurrency:c});for(let[t,n]of e.items.entries()){let e=u[t];if(!e)continue;if(n.error){o.set(e.token.address,n.error);continue}let r=n.value;if(r===void 0){o.set(e.token.address,new k(`Batch delegated decryption returned no value for ${n.encryptedValue} on token ${e.token.address}`));continue}A(r,`batchDecryptBalancesAs: result[encryptedValue]`),a.set(e.token.address,r)}}if(o.size===0)return a;if(n.onError){let e=[];for(let[t,i]of o)try{a.set(t,n.onError(i,t))}catch(n){e.push({address:t,error:r(n)})}if(e.length>0){let t=e.map(({address:e,error:t})=>`${e}: ${t.message}`).join(`; `);throw new k(`Batch delegated decryption onError callback failed for ${e.length} token(s): ${t}`,{cause:e[0]?.error})}return a}let d=Array.from(o.entries()),f=d.map(([e,t])=>`${e}: ${t.message}`).join(`; `);throw new k(`Batch delegated decryption failed for ${o.size} token(s): ${f}`,{cause:d[0]?.[1]})}static async readBalanceHandlesBatch(e,n,i,a){let o=!1,s,c=await Z(e.map(e=>async()=>{if(o)return{status:`aborted`};try{return{status:`fulfilled`,value:await e.readConfidentialBalanceOf(n)}}catch(e){return z(e)?(o=!0,s??=e,{status:`aborted`}):{status:`rejected`,reason:e}}}),a);if(s!==void 0)throw s;let l=[];for(let[n,a]of e.entries()){let e=c[n];if(!(!e||e.status===`aborted`)){if(e.status===`fulfilled`){l[n]=e.value;continue}i.set(a.address,e.reason instanceof t?e.reason:new k(r(e.reason).message,{cause:e.reason}))}}return l}async confidentialTransfer(e,t,n){this.#e(`confidentialTransfer`);let r=await Y(`confidentialTransfer`,this.sdk.signer,this.sdk.provider),{skipBalanceCheck:i=!1,onEncryptComplete:a,onTransferSubmitted:o}=n??{},s=j(e);i||await this.assertConfidentialBalance(t);let{encryptedValues:c,inputProof:l}=await this.sdk.encrypt({values:[{value:t,type:`euint64`}],contractAddress:this.address,userAddress:j(r.address)});if(f(`transfer: onEncryptComplete`,()=>a?.(),this.sdk.logger),c.length===0)throw new O(`Encryption returned no encrypted values`);return this.submitTransaction({operation:`transfer`,config:d(this.address,s,c[0],l),onSubmitted:o})}async confidentialTransferFrom(e,t,n,r){this.#e(`confidentialTransferFrom`);let i=await Y(`confidentialTransferFrom`,this.sdk.signer,this.sdk.provider),a=j(e),s=j(t),{encryptedValues:c,inputProof:l}=await this.sdk.encrypt({values:[{value:n,type:`euint64`}],contractAddress:this.address,userAddress:j(i.address)});if(f(`transferFrom: onEncryptComplete`,()=>r?.onEncryptComplete?.(),this.sdk.logger),c.length===0)throw new O(`Encryption returned no encrypted values`);return this.submitTransaction({operation:`transferFrom`,config:o(this.address,a,s,c[0],l),onSubmitted:r?.onTransferSubmitted})}async confidentialTransferAndCall(e,t,n,r){this.#e(`confidentialTransferAndCall`);let i=await Y(`confidentialTransferAndCall`,this.sdk.signer,this.sdk.provider),{skipBalanceCheck:a=!1,onEncryptComplete:o,onTransferSubmitted:s}=r??{},c=j(e);a||await this.assertConfidentialBalance(t);let{encryptedValues:l,inputProof:u}=await this.sdk.encrypt({values:[{value:t,type:`euint64`}],contractAddress:this.address,userAddress:j(i.address)});if(f(`transferAndCall: onEncryptComplete`,()=>o?.(),this.sdk.logger),l.length===0)throw new O(`Encryption returned no encrypted values`);return this.submitTransaction({operation:`transferAndCall`,config:E(this.address,c,l[0],u,n),onSubmitted:s})}async confidentialTransferFromAndCall(e,t,n,r,i){this.#e(`confidentialTransferFromAndCall`);let a=await Y(`confidentialTransferFromAndCall`,this.sdk.signer,this.sdk.provider),o=j(e),c=j(t),{encryptedValues:l,inputProof:u}=await this.sdk.encrypt({values:[{value:n,type:`euint64`}],contractAddress:this.address,userAddress:j(a.address)});if(f(`transferFromAndCall: onEncryptComplete`,()=>i?.onEncryptComplete?.(),this.sdk.logger),l.length===0)throw new O(`Encryption returned no encrypted values`);return this.submitTransaction({operation:`transferFromAndCall`,config:s(this.address,o,c,l[0],u,r),onSubmitted:i?.onTransferSubmitted})}async setOperator(e,t){this.#e(`setOperator`),await X(`setOperator`,this.sdk.signer,this.sdk.provider);let n=j(e);return this.submitTransaction({operation:`setOperator`,config:c(this.address,n,t)})}async isOperator(e,t){return this.sdk.provider.readContract(a(this.address,j(e),j(t)))}async readConfidentialBalanceOf(e){return await this.sdk.provider.readContract(u(this.address,e))}async assertConfidentialBalance(e){if(e===0n)return;let n;try{let e=await Y(`assertConfidentialBalance`,this.sdk.signer,this.sdk.provider);n=await this.balanceOf(j(e.address))}catch(e){throw e instanceof t?e:new L(`Balance validation failed (token: ${this.address})`,{cause:e})}if(n<e)throw new P(`Insufficient confidential balance: requested ${e}, available ${n} (token: ${this.address})`,{requested:e,available:n,token:this.address})}emit(e){this.sdk.emitEvent(e,this.address)}async submitTransaction(e){let{operation:t,config:n,onSubmitted:r}=e;return Q({operation:t,signer:this.#e(t),provider:this.sdk.provider,config:n,emit:e=>this.emit(e),onSubmitted:r,logger:this.sdk.logger})}static assertSameSdk(e){let t=e[0].sdk;for(let r=1;r<e.length;r++)if(e[r].sdk!==t)throw new n(`All tokens in a batch operation must share the same ZamaSDK instance`);return t}};export{X as a,K as c,R as d,I as f,M as g,N as h,Y as i,z as l,F as m,Q as n,G as o,P as p,Z as r,J as s,$ as t,L as u};
+//# sourceMappingURL=token-BMQ6xlrk.js.map

package/dist/esm/{token-BejFVO8m.js.map → token-BMQ6xlrk.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"token-BejFVO8m.js","names":["#requireSigner","submitSdkTransaction"],"sources":["../../src/errors/rpc.ts","../../src/errors/chain.ts","../../src/errors/balance.ts","../../src/errors/fatal-batch.ts","../../src/utils/fhe-type.ts","../../src/utils/handles.ts","../../src/utils/alignment.ts","../../src/utils/concurrency.ts","../../src/utils/submit-transaction.ts","../../src/token/token.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { ZamaError, ZamaErrorCode } from \"./base\";\n\n/**\n * The consumer's RPC provider rate-limited an on-chain read the SDK performs\n * during decryption (e.g. the ACL check) — HTTP 429 or JSON-RPC `-32005`. An\n * RPC-endpoint problem, **not** a decryption/entitlement failure, and safe to\n * **retry**. Kept distinct from the relayer's own back-pressure\n * ({@link RelayerRequestFailedError}).\n *\n * Backoff for chain RPC is owned by the consumer's transport: viem/ethers\n * already honor the `Retry-After` header and retry internally before this error\n * surfaces, so it is configured on the transport you pass via `chain.network`\n * (not re-implemented here).\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * try {\n *   await sdk.decryption.decryptValues([{ encryptedValue, contractAddress }]);\n * } catch (e) {\n *   if (e instanceof RpcRateLimitError) {\n *     // back off and retry; consider a higher-throughput RPC endpoint\n *   }\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport class RpcRateLimitError extends ZamaError {\n  /**\n   * Suggested delay before retrying, in **seconds**, when a numeric `retryAfter`\n   * is present on the error. Usually `undefined` for chain RPC: the `Retry-After`\n   * header is consumed by the consumer's viem/ethers transport (which owns the\n   * backoff), not surfaced here — see the class doc.\n   */\n  readonly retryAfter: number | undefined;\n\n  constructor(message: string, options?: ErrorOptions & { retryAfter?: number }) {\n    const { retryAfter, ...errorOptions } = options ?? {};\n    super(ZamaErrorCode.RpcRateLimited, message, errorOptions);\n    this.name = \"RpcRateLimitError\";\n    this.retryAfter = retryAfter;\n  }\n}\n","import { ZamaError, ZamaErrorCode } from \"./base\";\n\n/**\n * Thrown when the signer and provider are connected to different chains at the\n * start of a write operation.\n *\n * Every write method runs a chain-alignment pre-flight check. If\n * `signer.getChainId()` and `provider.getChainId()` return different values,\n * this error is thrown before any RPC mutation is attempted.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * try {\n *   await token.shield(1000n);\n * } catch (e) {\n *   if (e instanceof ChainMismatchError) {\n *     console.error(\n *       `Signer is on chain ${e.signerChainId} but provider is on chain ${e.providerChainId}`,\n *     );\n *   }\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport class ChainMismatchError extends ZamaError {\n  /** Name of the operation that triggered the check. */\n  readonly operation: string;\n  /** Chain ID the signer is connected to. */\n  readonly signerChainId: number;\n  /** Chain ID the provider is connected to. */\n  readonly providerChainId: number;\n\n  constructor(\n    {\n      operation,\n      signerChainId,\n      providerChainId,\n    }: { operation: string; signerChainId: number; providerChainId: number },\n    options?: ErrorOptions,\n  ) {\n    super(\n      ZamaErrorCode.ChainMismatch,\n      `Operation \"${operation}\" requires signer and provider to be on the same chain, ` +\n        `but signer is on chain ${signerChainId} and provider is on chain ${providerChainId}.`,\n      options,\n    );\n    this.name = \"ChainMismatchError\";\n    this.operation = operation;\n    this.signerChainId = signerChainId;\n    this.providerChainId = providerChainId;\n  }\n}\n","import type { Address } from \"viem\";\nimport { ZamaError, ZamaErrorCode } from \"./base\";\n\n/** Structured details shared by balance-related errors. */\nexport interface BalanceErrorDetails {\n  /** Amount the caller requested, in the token's base units. */\n  readonly requested: bigint;\n  /** Amount available at the time of the check, in the token's base units. */\n  readonly available: bigint;\n  /** Address of the token contract involved. */\n  readonly token: Address;\n}\n\n/** Confidential (cToken) balance is insufficient for the requested operation. */\nexport class InsufficientConfidentialBalanceError extends ZamaError {\n  /** The amount the caller requested. */\n  readonly requested: bigint;\n  /** The available balance at the time of the check. */\n  readonly available: bigint;\n  /** The token contract address. */\n  readonly token: Address;\n\n  constructor(message: string, details: BalanceErrorDetails, options?: ErrorOptions) {\n    super(ZamaErrorCode.InsufficientConfidentialBalance, message, options);\n    this.name = \"InsufficientConfidentialBalanceError\";\n    this.requested = details.requested;\n    this.available = details.available;\n    this.token = details.token;\n  }\n}\n\n/** ERC-20 balance is insufficient for the requested shield amount. */\nexport class InsufficientERC20BalanceError extends ZamaError {\n  /** The amount the caller requested. */\n  readonly requested: bigint;\n  /** The available balance at the time of the check. */\n  readonly available: bigint;\n  /** The ERC-20 token contract address. */\n  readonly token: Address;\n\n  constructor(message: string, details: BalanceErrorDetails, options?: ErrorOptions) {\n    super(ZamaErrorCode.InsufficientERC20Balance, message, options);\n    this.name = \"InsufficientERC20BalanceError\";\n    this.requested = details.requested;\n    this.available = details.available;\n    this.token = details.token;\n  }\n}\n\n/** ERC-20 allowance granted to the wrapper is insufficient for the requested wrap amount. */\nexport class InsufficientAllowanceError extends ZamaError {\n  /** The amount the caller requested. */\n  readonly requested: bigint;\n  /** The allowance available at the time of the check. */\n  readonly available: bigint;\n  /** The underlying ERC-20 token contract address. */\n  readonly token: Address;\n\n  constructor(message: string, details: BalanceErrorDetails, options?: ErrorOptions) {\n    super(ZamaErrorCode.InsufficientAllowance, message, options);\n    this.name = \"InsufficientAllowanceError\";\n    this.requested = details.requested;\n    this.available = details.available;\n    this.token = details.token;\n  }\n}\n\n/** Balance validation could not be performed (no cached credentials and decryption not possible). */\nexport class BalanceCheckUnavailableError extends ZamaError {\n  constructor(message: string, options?: ErrorOptions) {\n    super(ZamaErrorCode.BalanceCheckUnavailable, message, options);\n    this.name = \"BalanceCheckUnavailableError\";\n  }\n}\n\n/** A public ERC-20 read (e.g. balanceOf) failed due to a network or contract error. */\nexport class ERC20ReadFailedError extends ZamaError {\n  constructor(message: string, options?: ErrorOptions) {\n    super(ZamaErrorCode.ERC20ReadFailed, message, options);\n    this.name = \"ERC20ReadFailedError\";\n  }\n}\n","import { KeyWrappingError, RevokedKmsContextError } from \"./credential\";\nimport { ConfigurationError } from \"./relayer\";\nimport { RpcRateLimitError } from \"./rpc\";\nimport { SigningRejectedError, SigningFailedError } from \"./signing\";\n\n/**\n * Returns `true` for errors that should abort an entire batch operation\n * rather than be recorded per-item — wallet signature rejected, signing\n * infrastructure broken, SDK misconfigured, the RPC provider throttling, or\n * transport key pair wrapping unusable for the whole session (wrong or missing\n * `transportKeyPairDerivationSecret`, `crypto.subtle` unavailable).\n * These are systemic failures that won't recover within the same call; for a\n * rate-limit in particular, the per-item retry loop would only amplify the\n * throttle by re-hitting the already-rate-limited endpoint. A revoked KMS\n * context is likewise batch-wide: every item's permit shares the dead context,\n * and the per-item loop would trigger one evict-and-regrant wallet prompt per\n * item instead of the one the batch attempt already spent.\n *\n * Callers iterating over a batch (e.g. per-token decrypt) should rethrow when\n * this predicate is true so the whole batch aborts, and record the error\n * per-item otherwise.\n */\nexport function isFatalBatchError(error: unknown): boolean {\n  return (\n    error instanceof SigningRejectedError ||\n    error instanceof SigningFailedError ||\n    error instanceof ConfigurationError ||\n    error instanceof RpcRateLimitError ||\n    error instanceof KeyWrappingError ||\n    error instanceof RevokedKmsContextError\n  );\n}\n","// Copied from @zama-fhe/relayer-sdk/src/sdk/FheType.ts\n// Pure utility functions with zero WASM dependency.\n// Adapted to use simple errors instead of RelayerErrorBase hierarchy.\n\n////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////\n// Types (from types/primitives.d.ts)\n////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////\n\nexport interface FheTypeNameToIdMap {\n  ebool: 0;\n  //euint4: 1; deprecated\n  euint8: 2;\n  euint16: 3;\n  euint32: 4;\n  euint64: 5;\n  euint128: 6;\n  eaddress: 7;\n  euint256: 8;\n}\n\nexport interface FheTypeIdToNameMap {\n  0: \"ebool\";\n  //1: 'euint4'; deprecated\n  2: \"euint8\";\n  3: \"euint16\";\n  4: \"euint32\";\n  5: \"euint64\";\n  6: \"euint128\";\n  7: \"eaddress\";\n  8: \"euint256\";\n}\n\nexport interface FheTypeEncryptionBitwidthToIdMap {\n  2: FheTypeNameToIdMap[\"ebool\"];\n  8: FheTypeNameToIdMap[\"euint8\"];\n  16: FheTypeNameToIdMap[\"euint16\"];\n  32: FheTypeNameToIdMap[\"euint32\"];\n  64: FheTypeNameToIdMap[\"euint64\"];\n  128: FheTypeNameToIdMap[\"euint128\"];\n  160: FheTypeNameToIdMap[\"eaddress\"];\n  256: FheTypeNameToIdMap[\"euint256\"];\n}\n\nexport type FheTypeIdToEncryptionBitwidthMap = {\n  [K in keyof FheTypeEncryptionBitwidthToIdMap as FheTypeEncryptionBitwidthToIdMap[K]]: K;\n};\n\ntype Prettify<T> = { [K in keyof T]: T[K] } & {};\n\nexport type FheTypeName = Prettify<keyof FheTypeNameToIdMap>;\nexport type FheTypeId = Prettify<keyof FheTypeIdToNameMap>;\nexport type EncryptionBits = Prettify<keyof FheTypeEncryptionBitwidthToIdMap>;\n\n////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////\n// Lookup Maps\n////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////\n\nconst MINIMUM_ENCRYPTION_BIT_WIDTH = 2;\n\nconst FheTypeNameToId: FheTypeNameToIdMap = {\n  ebool: 0,\n  //euint4: 1, deprecated\n  euint8: 2,\n  euint16: 3,\n  euint32: 4,\n  euint64: 5,\n  euint128: 6,\n  eaddress: 7,\n  euint256: 8,\n} as const;\n\nconst FheTypeIdToName: FheTypeIdToNameMap = {\n  0: \"ebool\",\n  //1: 'euint4', deprecated\n  2: \"euint8\",\n  3: \"euint16\",\n  4: \"euint32\",\n  5: \"euint64\",\n  6: \"euint128\",\n  7: \"eaddress\",\n  8: \"euint256\",\n} as const;\n\nconst FheTypeIdToEncryptionBitwidth: FheTypeIdToEncryptionBitwidthMap = {\n  0: 2,\n  //1:?, euint4 deprecated\n  2: 8,\n  3: 16,\n  4: 32,\n  5: 64,\n  6: 128,\n  7: 160,\n  8: 256,\n} as const;\n\nconst EncryptionBitwidthToFheTypeId: FheTypeEncryptionBitwidthToIdMap = {\n  2: 0,\n  8: 2,\n  16: 3,\n  32: 4,\n  64: 5,\n  128: 6,\n  160: 7,\n  256: 8,\n} as const;\n\nObject.freeze(FheTypeNameToId);\nObject.freeze(FheTypeIdToName);\nObject.freeze(FheTypeIdToEncryptionBitwidth);\nObject.freeze(EncryptionBitwidthToFheTypeId);\n\n////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////\n// Type Guards\n////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////\n\nexport function isFheTypeId(value: unknown): value is FheTypeId {\n  switch (value as FheTypeId) {\n    case 0:\n    case 2:\n    case 3:\n    case 4:\n    case 5:\n    case 6:\n    case 7:\n    case 8:\n      return true;\n    default:\n      return false;\n  }\n}\n\nexport function isFheTypeName(value: unknown): value is FheTypeName {\n  if (typeof value !== \"string\") {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return value in FheTypeNameToId;\n}\n\nexport function isEncryptionBits(value: unknown): value is EncryptionBits {\n  if (typeof value !== \"number\") {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return value in EncryptionBitwidthToFheTypeId;\n}\n\n////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////\n// Converters\n////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////\n\nexport function fheTypeIdFromEncryptionBits(bitwidth: number): FheTypeId {\n  if (!isEncryptionBits(bitwidth)) {\n    throw new Error(`Invalid encryption bits ${bitwidth}`);\n  }\n  return EncryptionBitwidthToFheTypeId[bitwidth];\n}\n\nexport function fheTypeIdFromName(name: string): FheTypeId {\n  if (!isFheTypeName(name)) {\n    throw new Error(`Invalid FheType name '${name}'`);\n  }\n  return FheTypeNameToId[name];\n}\n\nexport function fheTypeNameFromId(id: number): FheTypeName {\n  if (!isFheTypeId(id)) {\n    throw new Error(`Invalid FheType id '${id}'`);\n  }\n  return FheTypeIdToName[id];\n}\n\nexport function encryptionBitsFromFheTypeId(typeId: number): EncryptionBits {\n  if (!isFheTypeId(typeId)) {\n    throw new Error(`Invalid FheType id '${typeId}'`);\n  }\n  const bw = FheTypeIdToEncryptionBitwidth[typeId];\n  if (bw < MINIMUM_ENCRYPTION_BIT_WIDTH) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Invalid FheType encryption bit width: ${bw}. Minimum is ${MINIMUM_ENCRYPTION_BIT_WIDTH} bits.`,\n    );\n  }\n  return bw;\n}\n\nexport function encryptionBitsFromFheTypeName(name: string): EncryptionBits {\n  if (!isFheTypeName(name)) {\n    throw new Error(`Invalid FheType name '${name}'`);\n  }\n  const bw = FheTypeIdToEncryptionBitwidth[FheTypeNameToId[name]];\n  if (bw < MINIMUM_ENCRYPTION_BIT_WIDTH) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Invalid FheType encryption bit width: ${bw}. Minimum is ${MINIMUM_ENCRYPTION_BIT_WIDTH} bits.`,\n    );\n  }\n  return bw;\n}\n","import type { EncryptedValue } from \"../relayer/types\";\nimport { encryptionBitsFromFheTypeId, isFheTypeId } from \"./fhe-type\";\n\n/** All-zero encrypted-value sentinel — a 32-byte zero handle representing the cleartext value `0`. */\nexport const ZERO_ENCRYPTED_VALUE =\n  \"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000\" as const;\n\n/**\n * Check whether an encrypted value represents the zero value.\n */\nexport function isEncryptedValueZero(encryptedValue: string): boolean {\n  return encryptedValue === ZERO_ENCRYPTED_VALUE || encryptedValue === \"0x\";\n}\n\n/**\n * Per-request cleartext-bit budget enforced by the KMS gateway, mirrored from\n * `@fhevm/sdk`'s `MAX_KMS_DECRYPT_DECRYPTION_BIT_LIMIT` (protocol-level constant,\n * not imported — see {@link MAX_CONTRACTS_PER_PERMIT} for why). Internal: decrypt\n * requests are chunked to respect it automatically, so callers never need this value.\n */\nexport const MAX_DECRYPTION_REQUEST_BITS = 2048;\n\n/** Max encryption bit width among all currently-known FHE types (euint256). */\nconst MAX_KNOWN_ENCRYPTION_BITS = 256;\n\n/**\n * Cleartext bit cost of decrypting a single handle, derived from its FHE\n * type (encoded at bits 8-15 of the handle — the same layout `@fhevm/sdk`'s\n * `FhevmHandle` decodes, byte 30 of the 32-byte handle).\n *\n * Falls back to {@link MAX_KNOWN_ENCRYPTION_BITS} for an unrecognized type\n * byte, or for a value that isn't parseable hex at all, instead of throwing.\n * A real on-chain handle is always well-formed with a valid type byte, so\n * this fallback only ever fires for synthetic test/placeholder handles —\n * deliberately more permissive than the relayer's own strict validation so\n * chunking stays safe without requiring every test fixture to encode a real\n * FHE handle. Do not tighten this to match relayer semantics.\n */\nexport function encryptionBitsForHandle(encryptedValue: EncryptedValue): number {\n  let handleValue: bigint;\n  try {\n    handleValue = BigInt(encryptedValue);\n  } catch {\n    return MAX_KNOWN_ENCRYPTION_BITS;\n  }\n  const typeByte = Number((handleValue >> 8n) & 0xffn);\n  return isFheTypeId(typeByte) ? encryptionBitsFromFheTypeId(typeByte) : MAX_KNOWN_ENCRYPTION_BITS;\n}\n\n/**\n * Split `handles` into groups whose cumulative cleartext-bit cost never\n * exceeds `maxBits`, preserving input order. Unlike {@link chunkContracts}\n * (fixed-size slices), a greedy accumulate-until-exceeded walk is required\n * since per-handle cost varies by FHE type. A handle whose own cost exceeds\n * `maxBits` still gets a solo chunk — always makes forward progress.\n */\nexport function chunkHandlesByBitBudget(\n  handles: readonly EncryptedValue[],\n  maxBits: number = MAX_DECRYPTION_REQUEST_BITS,\n): EncryptedValue[][] {\n  const chunks: EncryptedValue[][] = [];\n  let current: EncryptedValue[] = [];\n  let currentBits = 0;\n\n  for (const handle of handles) {\n    const bits = encryptionBitsForHandle(handle);\n    if (current.length > 0 && currentBits + bits > maxBits) {\n      chunks.push(current);\n      current = [];\n      currentBits = 0;\n    }\n    current.push(handle);\n    currentBits += bits;\n  }\n  if (current.length > 0) {\n    chunks.push(current);\n  }\n  return chunks;\n}\n","import {\n  ChainMismatchError,\n  SignerNotConfiguredError,\n  WalletAccountNotReadyError,\n} from \"../errors\";\nimport type { GenericProvider, GenericSigner, WalletAccount } from \"../types\";\n\n/**\n * Pre-flight guard for signer-required operations. Resolves the connected\n * wallet account (refreshing once if the signer reports it isn't ready) and\n * verifies the signer's chain matches the provider's.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport async function requireAlignedWalletAccount(\n  operation: string,\n  signer: GenericSigner | undefined,\n  provider: GenericProvider,\n): Promise<WalletAccount> {\n  if (!signer) {\n    throw new SignerNotConfiguredError(operation);\n  }\n  let account: WalletAccount;\n  try {\n    account = signer.requireWalletAccount(operation);\n  } catch (error) {\n    if (!(error instanceof WalletAccountNotReadyError) || !signer.refreshWalletAccount) {\n      throw error;\n    }\n    await signer.refreshWalletAccount();\n    account = signer.requireWalletAccount(operation);\n  }\n  const providerChainId = await provider.getChainId();\n  if (account.chainId !== providerChainId) {\n    throw new ChainMismatchError({ operation, signerChainId: account.chainId, providerChainId });\n  }\n  return account;\n}\n\n/**\n * Variant of {@link requireAlignedWalletAccount} that returns only the aligned\n * chain ID. Useful when a write path only needs to ensure signer/provider\n * coherence and doesn't otherwise consume the account.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport async function requireChainAlignment(\n  operation: string,\n  signer: GenericSigner | undefined,\n  provider: GenericProvider,\n): Promise<number> {\n  return (await requireAlignedWalletAccount(operation, signer, provider)).chainId;\n}\n","/**\n * Execute an array of async thunks with bounded concurrency.\n * Defaults to `Infinity` (equivalent to `Promise.all`).\n */\nexport async function pLimit<T>(\n  fns: (() => Promise<T>)[],\n  maxConcurrency = Infinity,\n): Promise<T[]> {\n  if (Number.isFinite(maxConcurrency) && maxConcurrency <= 0) {\n    throw new Error(\"maxConcurrency must be a positive number\");\n  }\n  if (!Number.isFinite(maxConcurrency) || maxConcurrency >= fns.length) {\n    return Promise.all(fns.map((f) => f()));\n  }\n\n  const results: T[] = Array.from({ length: fns.length });\n  let index = 0;\n\n  async function worker() {\n    while (index < fns.length) {\n      const i = index++;\n      if (fns[i]) {\n        results[i] = await fns[i]();\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: maxConcurrency }, worker));\n  return results;\n}\n","import type { Hex } from \"viem\";\nimport { TransactionRevertedError, ZamaError } from \"../errors\";\nimport type { TransactionOperation, ZamaSDKEventInput } from \"../events/sdk-events\";\nimport { transactionOperationMetadata, ZamaSDKEvents } from \"../events/sdk-events\";\nimport type {\n  GenericLogger,\n  GenericProvider,\n  GenericSigner,\n  TransactionResult,\n  WriteContractConfig,\n} from \"../types\";\nimport { swallow } from \"./swallow\";\n\n/**\n * Shared write-transaction pipeline for SDK calls that submit a transaction.\n *\n * On success: writes the tx, emits the per-operation submitted event from\n * {@link transactionOperationMetadata}, fires `onSubmitted`, waits for the\n * receipt, and returns `{ txHash, receipt }`.\n *\n * On failure: emits a {@link ZamaSDKEvents.TransactionError} event with the\n * transaction-level error it will throw, then throws it. Existing `ZamaError`\n * instances are rethrown as-is; all other failures are wrapped in\n * `TransactionRevertedError` with the original error as `cause`.\n */\nexport async function submitTransaction(params: {\n  operation: TransactionOperation;\n  signer: GenericSigner;\n  provider: GenericProvider;\n  config: WriteContractConfig;\n  emit: (input: ZamaSDKEventInput) => void;\n  onSubmitted?: (txHash: Hex) => void;\n  logger: GenericLogger;\n}): Promise<TransactionResult> {\n  const { operation, signer, provider, config, emit, onSubmitted, logger } = params;\n  const metadata = transactionOperationMetadata[operation];\n\n  try {\n    const txHash = await signer.writeContract(config);\n    emit(metadata.submittedEvent(txHash));\n    void swallow(`${operation}: onSubmitted`, () => onSubmitted?.(txHash), logger);\n    const receipt = await provider.waitForTransactionReceipt(txHash);\n    return { txHash, receipt };\n  } catch (error) {\n    const failure =\n      error instanceof ZamaError\n        ? error\n        : new TransactionRevertedError(`Transaction failed during ${operation}`, { cause: error });\n\n    emit({ type: ZamaSDKEvents.TransactionError, operation, error: failure });\n    throw failure;\n  }\n}\n","import { type Address, getAddress, type Hex } from \"viem\";\nimport {\n  confidentialBalanceOfContract,\n  confidentialTransferAndCallContract,\n  confidentialTransferContract,\n  confidentialTransferFromAndCallContract,\n  confidentialTransferFromContract,\n  decimalsContract,\n  ERC7984_INTERFACE_ID,\n  ERC7984_WRAPPER_INTERFACE_ID,\n  isOperatorContract,\n  nameContract,\n  setOperatorContract,\n  supportsInterfaceContract,\n  symbolContract,\n} from \"../contracts\";\nimport {\n  BalanceCheckUnavailableError,\n  ConfigurationError,\n  DecryptionFailedError,\n  EncryptionFailedError,\n  InsufficientConfidentialBalanceError,\n  isFatalBatchError,\n  requireConfigured,\n  ZamaError,\n} from \"../errors\";\nimport type { TransactionOperation, ZamaSDKEventInput } from \"../events/sdk-events\";\nimport type { EncryptedValue } from \"../relayer/types\";\nimport { toError } from \"../utils\";\nimport { requireAlignedWalletAccount, requireChainAlignment } from \"../utils/alignment\";\nimport { assertBigint } from \"../utils/assertions\";\nimport { pLimit } from \"../utils/concurrency\";\nimport { isEncryptedValueZero } from \"../utils/handles\";\nimport { submitTransaction as submitSdkTransaction } from \"../utils/submit-transaction\";\nimport { swallow } from \"../utils/swallow\";\nimport type {\n  GenericSigner,\n  TransactionResult,\n  TransferCallbacks,\n  TransferOptions,\n  WriteContractConfig,\n} from \"../types\";\nimport type { ZamaSDK } from \"../zama-sdk\";\n\n/** Options for {@link Token.batchDecryptBalancesAs}. */\nexport interface BatchDecryptAsOptions {\n  /** The address of the account that delegated decryption rights. */\n  delegatorAddress: Address;\n  /** Pre-fetched encrypted values. When omitted, they are fetched from the chain. */\n  encryptedValues?: EncryptedValue[];\n  /**\n   * The account whose on-chain balance to read. Defaults to the delegator\n   * address, which is the common case (the delegator grants permission to\n   * decrypt their own balance). Only set this when the account differs\n   * from the delegator.\n   *\n   * Matches the `account` parameter of `confidentialBalanceOf(account)` on-chain.\n   */\n  accountAddress?: Address;\n  /** Maximum number of concurrent decrypt calls. Default: 10. */\n  maxConcurrency?: number;\n  /** Called when decryption fails for a single token. Return a fallback bigint. */\n  onError?: (error: Error, address: Address) => bigint;\n}\n\n/** Result of {@link Token.batchBalancesOf}. */\nexport interface BatchBalancesResult {\n  /** Successfully decrypted balances, keyed by token address. */\n  results: Map<Address, bigint>;\n  /** Per-token errors for tokens that failed to decrypt. */\n  errors: Map<Address, ZamaError>;\n}\n\n/**\n * High-level interface for an ERC-7984 confidential token.\n * Hides FHE complexity (encryption, decryption, EIP-712 signing) behind\n * familiar ERC-20-like methods.\n *\n * For ERC-7984 wrappers (shield/unshield), use {@link WrappedToken} instead —\n * it extends `Token` with wrapper-specific operations.\n *\n * Decryption, credentials, caching, and event emission are handled by the\n * owning {@link ZamaSDK} — this class only exposes token-scoped helpers\n * that delegate to `sdk.decryption.decryptValues` and `sdk.permits.grantPermit`.\n */\nexport class Token {\n  /** The SDK instance this token operates through. */\n  readonly sdk: ZamaSDK;\n  /** Checksummed address of the confidential token contract. */\n  readonly address: Address;\n\n  constructor(sdk: ZamaSDK, address: Address) {\n    this.sdk = sdk;\n    this.address = getAddress(address);\n  }\n\n  /** Resolve `sdk.signer` or throw {@link SignerNotConfiguredError} tagged with `operation`. */\n  #requireSigner(operation: string): GenericSigner {\n    return requireConfigured(this.sdk.signer, operation);\n  }\n\n  // METADATA\n\n  /** Read the token name from the contract. */\n  async name(): Promise<string> {\n    return this.sdk.provider.readContract(nameContract(this.address));\n  }\n\n  /** Read the token symbol from the contract. */\n  async symbol(): Promise<string> {\n    return this.sdk.provider.readContract(symbolContract(this.address));\n  }\n\n  /** Read the token decimals from the contract. */\n  async decimals(): Promise<number> {\n    return this.sdk.provider.readContract(decimalsContract(this.address));\n  }\n\n  // ERC-165 DISCOVERY\n\n  /**\n   * ERC-165 check for {@link ERC7984_INTERFACE_ID} support.\n   *\n   * @returns `true` if the contract implements the ERC-7984 confidential token interface.\n   */\n  async isConfidential(): Promise<boolean> {\n    return this.sdk.provider.readContract(\n      supportsInterfaceContract(this.address, ERC7984_INTERFACE_ID),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * ERC-165 check for IERC7984ERC20Wrapper support.\n   *\n   * @returns `true` if the contract implements the ERC-7984 wrapper interface\n   *   ({@link ERC7984_WRAPPER_INTERFACE_ID}, `0x1f1c62b2`).\n   */\n  async isWrapper(): Promise<boolean> {\n    return this.sdk.provider.readContract(\n      supportsInterfaceContract(this.address, ERC7984_WRAPPER_INTERFACE_ID),\n    );\n  }\n\n  // BALANCES\n\n  /**\n   * Decrypt and return the plaintext balance for the given owner.\n   * Acquires FHE credentials via a wallet signature if none are cached.\n   *\n   * @param owner - Balance owner address.\n   * @returns The decrypted plaintext balance as a bigint.\n   * @throws if FHE decryption fails. {@link DecryptionFailedError}\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```ts\n   * const balance = await token.balanceOf(\"0xOwner\");\n   * ```\n   */\n  async balanceOf(owner: Address): Promise<bigint> {\n    const ownerAddress = getAddress(owner);\n    const encryptedValue = await this.readConfidentialBalanceOf(ownerAddress);\n    const result = await this.sdk.decryption.decryptValues([\n      { encryptedValue, contractAddress: this.address },\n    ]);\n    const value = result[encryptedValue];\n    if (value === undefined) {\n      throw new DecryptionFailedError(`Decryption returned no value for ${encryptedValue}`);\n    }\n    assertBigint(value, \"balanceOf: result[encryptedValue]\");\n    return value;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Return the raw encrypted balance without decrypting.\n   *\n   * @param owner - Balance owner address.\n   * @returns The encrypted balance as a hex string.\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```ts\n   * const encryptedValue = await token.confidentialBalanceOf(\"0xOwner\");\n   * ```\n   */\n  async confidentialBalanceOf(owner: Address): Promise<EncryptedValue> {\n    return this.readConfidentialBalanceOf(getAddress(owner));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Decrypt the balance of a delegator using delegated decryption credentials.\n   * The connected signer acts as the delegatee who has been granted permission\n   * by the delegator to decrypt their balance.\n   *\n   * Clear values are cached in storage keyed by `(account, token, encryptedValue)`.\n   * Because every on-chain balance change produces a new encrypted value,\n   * stale cache entries are never served. Cache write failures are silently\n   * ignored — they do not affect the returned value.\n   *\n   * @param delegatorAddress - The address of the account that delegated decryption rights.\n   * @param accountAddress - The account whose on-chain balance to read. Defaults\n   *   to the delegator address.\n   * @returns The decrypted plaintext balance as a bigint.\n   * @throws if no active delegation exists. {@link DelegationNotFoundError}\n   * @throws if the delegation has expired. {@link DelegationExpiredError}\n   * @throws if delegated decryption fails. {@link DecryptionFailedError}\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```ts\n   * const balance = await token.decryptBalanceAs({\n   *   delegatorAddress: \"0xDelegator\",\n   * });\n   * ```\n   */\n  async decryptBalanceAs({\n    delegatorAddress,\n    accountAddress,\n  }: {\n    delegatorAddress: Address;\n    accountAddress?: Address;\n  }): Promise<bigint> {\n    await requireChainAlignment(\"decryptBalanceAs\", this.sdk.signer, this.sdk.provider);\n    const normalizedDelegator = getAddress(delegatorAddress);\n    const normalizedAccount = accountAddress ? getAddress(accountAddress) : normalizedDelegator;\n\n    const encryptedValue = await this.readConfidentialBalanceOf(normalizedAccount);\n    if (isEncryptedValueZero(encryptedValue)) {\n      return 0n;\n    }\n\n    const result = await this.sdk.decryption.delegatedDecryptValues(\n      [{ encryptedValue, contractAddress: this.address }],\n      normalizedDelegator,\n      normalizedAccount,\n    );\n\n    const value = result[encryptedValue];\n    if (value === undefined) {\n      throw new DecryptionFailedError(\n        `Delegated decryption returned no value for ${encryptedValue}`,\n      );\n    }\n    assertBigint(value, \"decryptBalanceAs: result[encryptedValue]\");\n    return value;\n  }\n\n  // BATCH STATICS\n\n  /**\n   * Decrypt confidential balances for multiple tokens in parallel, returning\n   * successes and per-token errors separately. Pre-authorizes all token\n   * addresses in a single wallet signature, then delegates each decrypt to\n   * `sdk.decryption.decryptValues`.\n   *\n   * Tokens that fail to decrypt land in `errors`; the batch keeps going.\n   *\n   * @param tokens - Array of {@link Token} instances bound to the same SDK.\n   * @param owner - Balance owner address.\n   * @returns `{ results, errors }` partitioning the per-token outcomes.\n   * @throws A failure that affects the whole session (rejected signature,\n   * misconfiguration, RPC rate limit, key unwrapping failure, revoked KMS\n   * context) rejects the call instead of landing in `errors`.\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```ts\n   * const { results, errors } = await Token.batchBalancesOf(tokens, owner);\n   * ```\n   */\n  static async batchBalancesOf(tokens: Token[], owner: Address): Promise<BatchBalancesResult> {\n    const results = new Map<Address, bigint>();\n    const errors = new Map<Address, ZamaError>();\n    if (tokens.length === 0) {\n      return { results, errors };\n    }\n\n    const sdk = Token.assertSameSdk(tokens);\n    // Fail fast on chain mismatch before prompting the wallet for a signature.\n    await requireChainAlignment(\"batchBalancesOf\", sdk.signer, sdk.provider);\n    // Pre-authorize the full token set in one wallet signature so subsequent\n    // per-token decryptValues calls reuse the cached credentials.\n    await sdk.permits.grantPermit(tokens.map((t) => t.address));\n\n    // `pLimit` cannot cancel calls that already started. The shared flag stops\n    // the queued tokens from starting once a fatal error is seen, so they do\n    // not each trigger their own recovery wallet prompt.\n    let aborted = false;\n    let fatal: unknown;\n\n    const outcomes = await pLimit(\n      tokens.map((t) => async () => {\n        if (aborted) {\n          return { status: \"aborted\" as const };\n        }\n        try {\n          return { status: \"fulfilled\" as const, value: await t.balanceOf(owner) };\n        } catch (reason) {\n          // A fatal error (rejected signature, revoked KMS context, rate\n          // limit) would fail every token: stop the batch.\n          if (isFatalBatchError(reason)) {\n            aborted = true;\n            fatal ??= reason;\n            return { status: \"aborted\" as const };\n          }\n          return { status: \"rejected\" as const, reason };\n        }\n      }),\n      5,\n    );\n\n    // Some tokens were never attempted after the abort, so a partial result\n    // would be wrong: reject the whole call.\n    if (fatal !== undefined) {\n      throw fatal;\n    }\n\n    for (let i = 0; i < tokens.length; i++) {\n      const tokenAddress = tokens[i]!.address;\n      const outcome = outcomes[i]!;\n      if (outcome.status === \"aborted\") {\n        continue;\n      }\n      if (outcome.status === \"fulfilled\") {\n        results.set(tokenAddress, outcome.value);\n      } else {\n        const reason = outcome.reason;\n        const error =\n          reason instanceof ZamaError\n            ? reason\n            : new DecryptionFailedError(toError(reason).message, { cause: reason });\n        errors.set(tokenAddress, error);\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Total failure: surface the first error so callers know nothing decrypted.\n    if (errors.size === tokens.length) {\n      const firstError = errors.values().next().value;\n      throw firstError ?? new DecryptionFailedError(\"All token balance decryptions failed\");\n    }\n\n    return { results, errors };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Batch decrypt confidential balances as a delegate across multiple tokens.\n   * Mirrors {@link batchBalancesOf} but uses delegated credentials.\n   *\n   * **Error handling:** If a per-token decryption fails and no `onError` callback\n   * is provided, errors are collected and thrown as an aggregated\n   * `DecryptionFailedError`. When the relayer returns no value for an encrypted value,\n   * a `DecryptionFailedError` is thrown for that token (never silently returns `0n`).\n   * Pass `onError: () => 0n` to opt into the silent zero behavior.\n   *\n   * @param tokens - Array of Token instances to decrypt balances for.\n   * @param options - Delegated decryption configuration.\n   * @returns A Map from token address to decrypted balance.\n   * @throws if no active delegation exists. {@link DelegationNotFoundError}\n   * @throws if the delegation has expired. {@link DelegationExpiredError}\n   * @throws if any decryption fails and no `onError` is provided. {@link DecryptionFailedError}\n   * @throws A failure that affects the whole session (rejected signature, RPC\n   * rate limit, revoked KMS context) rejects the call even when `onError` is\n   * provided.\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```ts\n   * const balances = await Token.batchDecryptBalancesAs(tokens, {\n   *   delegatorAddress: \"0xDelegator\",\n   *   onError: (err, addr) => { console.error(addr, err); return 0n; },\n   * });\n   * ```\n   */\n  static async batchDecryptBalancesAs(\n    tokens: Token[],\n    options: BatchDecryptAsOptions,\n  ): Promise<Map<Address, bigint>> {\n    if (tokens.length === 0) {\n      return new Map();\n    }\n\n    const sdk = Token.assertSameSdk(tokens);\n    const results = new Map<Address, bigint>();\n    const errors = new Map<Address, ZamaError>();\n    const normalizedAccount = options.accountAddress\n      ? getAddress(options.accountAddress)\n      : getAddress(options.delegatorAddress);\n    const maxConcurrency = options.maxConcurrency ?? 10;\n    if (options.encryptedValues && tokens.length !== options.encryptedValues.length) {\n      throw new DecryptionFailedError(\n        `tokens.length (${tokens.length}) must equal encryptedValues.length (${options.encryptedValues.length})`,\n      );\n    }\n    const resolvedEncryptedValues =\n      options.encryptedValues ??\n      (await Token.readBalanceHandlesBatch(tokens, normalizedAccount, errors, maxConcurrency));\n\n    const decryptRequests: Array<{ token: Token; encryptedValue: EncryptedValue }> = [];\n    for (const [index, token] of tokens.entries()) {\n      const encryptedValue = resolvedEncryptedValues[index];\n      if (!encryptedValue || errors.has(token.address)) {\n        continue;\n      }\n      if (isEncryptedValueZero(encryptedValue)) {\n        // Zero balance → skip the relayer; no decryption needed.\n        results.set(token.address, 0n);\n      } else {\n        decryptRequests.push({ token, encryptedValue });\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (decryptRequests.length > 0) {\n      const decrypted = await sdk.decryption.delegatedBatchDecryptValues({\n        encryptedInputs: decryptRequests.map(({ token, encryptedValue }) => ({\n          encryptedValue,\n          contractAddress: token.address,\n        })),\n        delegatorAddress: options.delegatorAddress,\n        accountAddress: options.accountAddress,\n        maxConcurrency,\n      });\n\n      for (const [index, item] of decrypted.items.entries()) {\n        const request = decryptRequests[index];\n        if (!request) {\n          continue;\n        }\n        if (item.error) {\n          errors.set(request.token.address, item.error);\n          continue;\n        }\n        const value = item.value;\n        if (value === undefined) {\n          errors.set(\n            request.token.address,\n            new DecryptionFailedError(\n              `Batch delegated decryption returned no value for ${item.encryptedValue} on token ${request.token.address}`,\n            ),\n          );\n          continue;\n        }\n        assertBigint(value, \"batchDecryptBalancesAs: result[encryptedValue]\");\n        results.set(request.token.address, value);\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (errors.size === 0) {\n      return results;\n    }\n\n    if (options.onError) {\n      const callbackErrors: Array<{ address: Address; error: Error }> = [];\n      for (const [address, error] of errors) {\n        try {\n          results.set(address, options.onError(error, address));\n        } catch (callbackError) {\n          callbackErrors.push({ address, error: toError(callbackError) });\n        }\n      }\n      if (callbackErrors.length > 0) {\n        const message = callbackErrors\n          .map(({ address, error }) => `${address}: ${error.message}`)\n          .join(\"; \");\n        throw new DecryptionFailedError(\n          `Batch delegated decryption onError callback failed for ${callbackErrors.length} token(s): ${message}`,\n          { cause: callbackErrors[0]?.error },\n        );\n      }\n      return results;\n    }\n\n    const errorEntries = Array.from(errors.entries());\n    const message = errorEntries.map(([addr, e]) => `${addr}: ${e.message}`).join(\"; \");\n    throw new DecryptionFailedError(\n      `Batch delegated decryption failed for ${errors.size} token(s): ${message}`,\n      { cause: errorEntries[0]?.[1] },\n    );\n  }\n\n  private static async readBalanceHandlesBatch(\n    tokens: Token[],\n    accountAddress: Address,\n    errors: Map<Address, ZamaError>,\n    maxConcurrency: number,\n  ): Promise<Array<EncryptedValue | undefined>> {\n    // `pLimit` cannot cancel calls that already started. The shared flag stops\n    // the queued tokens from re-hitting an endpoint that already failed for\n    // the whole batch.\n    let aborted = false;\n    let fatal: unknown;\n\n    const outcomes = await pLimit(\n      tokens.map((token) => async () => {\n        if (aborted) {\n          return { status: \"aborted\" as const };\n        }\n        try {\n          return {\n            status: \"fulfilled\" as const,\n            value: await token.readConfidentialBalanceOf(accountAddress),\n          };\n        } catch (reason) {\n          if (isFatalBatchError(reason)) {\n            aborted = true;\n            fatal ??= reason;\n            return { status: \"aborted\" as const };\n          }\n          return { status: \"rejected\" as const, reason };\n        }\n      }),\n      maxConcurrency,\n    );\n\n    if (fatal !== undefined) {\n      throw fatal;\n    }\n\n    const encryptedValues: Array<EncryptedValue | undefined> = [];\n    for (const [index, token] of tokens.entries()) {\n      const outcome = outcomes[index];\n      if (!outcome || outcome.status === \"aborted\") {\n        continue;\n      }\n      if (outcome.status === \"fulfilled\") {\n        encryptedValues[index] = outcome.value;\n        continue;\n      }\n      errors.set(\n        token.address,\n        outcome.reason instanceof ZamaError\n          ? outcome.reason\n          : new DecryptionFailedError(toError(outcome.reason).message, { cause: outcome.reason }),\n      );\n    }\n    return encryptedValues;\n  }\n\n  // WRITE OPERATIONS\n\n  /**\n   * Confidential transfer. Encrypts the amount via FHE, then calls the contract.\n   *\n   * By default, the SDK validates the confidential balance before submitting.\n   * If a cached plaintext balance exists it is used; otherwise, if credentials\n   * are cached, it decrypts on the fly. Set `skipBalanceCheck: true` to bypass\n   * this validation (e.g. for smart wallets).\n   *\n   * @param to - Recipient address.\n   * @param amount - Plaintext amount to transfer (encrypted automatically via FHE).\n   * @param options - Optional: `skipBalanceCheck` (default `false`).\n   * @returns The transaction hash and mined receipt.\n   * @throws if signer and provider are on different chains. {@link ChainMismatchError}\n   * @throws if the balance is less than `amount`. {@link InsufficientConfidentialBalanceError}\n   * @throws if balance validation requires decryption that is not possible. {@link BalanceCheckUnavailableError}\n   * @throws if FHE encryption fails. {@link EncryptionFailedError}\n   * @throws if the on-chain transfer reverts. {@link TransactionRevertedError}\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```ts\n   * const txHash = await token.confidentialTransfer(\"0xRecipient\", 1000n);\n   * ```\n   */\n  async confidentialTransfer(\n    to: Address,\n    amount: bigint,\n    options?: TransferOptions,\n  ): Promise<TransactionResult> {\n    this.#requireSigner(\"confidentialTransfer\");\n    const account = await requireAlignedWalletAccount(\n      \"confidentialTransfer\",\n      this.sdk.signer,\n      this.sdk.provider,\n    );\n    const { skipBalanceCheck = false, onEncryptComplete, onTransferSubmitted } = options ?? {};\n\n    const normalizedTo = getAddress(to);\n\n    if (!skipBalanceCheck) {\n      await this.assertConfidentialBalance(amount);\n    }\n\n    const { encryptedValues, inputProof } = await this.sdk.encrypt({\n      values: [{ value: amount, type: \"euint64\" }],\n      contractAddress: this.address,\n      userAddress: getAddress(account.address),\n    });\n    void swallow(\"transfer: onEncryptComplete\", () => onEncryptComplete?.(), this.sdk.logger);\n\n    if (encryptedValues.length === 0) {\n      throw new EncryptionFailedError(\"Encryption returned no encrypted values\");\n    }\n\n    return this.submitTransaction({\n      operation: \"transfer\",\n      config: confidentialTransferContract(\n        this.address,\n        normalizedTo,\n        encryptedValues[0]!,\n        inputProof,\n      ),\n      onSubmitted: onTransferSubmitted,\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Operator encrypted transfer on behalf of another address.\n   * The caller must be an approved operator for `from`.\n   *\n   * @param from - The address to transfer from (caller must be an approved operator).\n   * @param to - Recipient address.\n   * @param amount - Plaintext amount to transfer (encrypted automatically via FHE).\n   * @returns The transaction hash and mined receipt.\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```ts\n   * const txHash = await token.confidentialTransferFrom(\"0xFrom\", \"0xTo\", 500n);\n   * ```\n   */\n  async confidentialTransferFrom(\n    from: Address,\n    to: Address,\n    amount: bigint,\n    callbacks?: TransferCallbacks,\n  ): Promise<TransactionResult> {\n    this.#requireSigner(\"confidentialTransferFrom\");\n    const account = await requireAlignedWalletAccount(\n      \"confidentialTransferFrom\",\n      this.sdk.signer,\n      this.sdk.provider,\n    );\n    const normalizedFrom = getAddress(from);\n    const normalizedTo = getAddress(to);\n\n    // The input proof is verified against msg.sender, so it binds to the caller, not `from`.\n    const { encryptedValues, inputProof } = await this.sdk.encrypt({\n      values: [{ value: amount, type: \"euint64\" }],\n      contractAddress: this.address,\n      userAddress: getAddress(account.address),\n    });\n    void swallow(\n      \"transferFrom: onEncryptComplete\",\n      () => callbacks?.onEncryptComplete?.(),\n      this.sdk.logger,\n    );\n\n    if (encryptedValues.length === 0) {\n      throw new EncryptionFailedError(\"Encryption returned no encrypted values\");\n    }\n\n    return this.submitTransaction({\n      operation: \"transferFrom\",\n      config: confidentialTransferFromContract(\n        this.address,\n        normalizedFrom,\n        normalizedTo,\n        encryptedValues[0]!,\n        inputProof,\n      ),\n      onSubmitted: callbacks?.onTransferSubmitted,\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * ERC-7984 `confidentialTransferAndCall`: encrypted transfer that also invokes\n   * the recipient's receiver hook (`onConfidentialTransferReceived`) in a single\n   * transaction. The caller crafts the opaque `data` payload — the SDK does not\n   * encode, validate, or interpret it.\n   *\n   * Balance validation follows the same rules as {@link Token.confidentialTransfer}.\n   *\n   * @param to - Recipient address. Must implement the ERC-7984 receiver hook.\n   * @param amount - Plaintext amount to transfer (encrypted automatically via FHE).\n   * @param data - Opaque bytes forwarded to the recipient's receiver hook.\n   * @param options - Optional: `skipBalanceCheck` (default `false`).\n   * @returns The transaction hash and mined receipt.\n   *\n   * @throws if signer and provider are on different chains. {@link ChainMismatchError}\n   * @throws if the balance is less than `amount`. {@link InsufficientConfidentialBalanceError}\n   * @throws if balance validation requires decryption that is not possible. {@link BalanceCheckUnavailableError}\n   * @throws if FHE encryption fails. {@link EncryptionFailedError}\n   * @throws if the on-chain transfer reverts. {@link TransactionRevertedError}\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```ts\n   * const txHash = await token.confidentialTransferAndCall(\n   *   \"0xRecipient\",\n   *   1000n,\n   *   \"0xabcd\", // caller-encoded payload forwarded to the receiver hook\n   * );\n   * ```\n   */\n  async confidentialTransferAndCall(\n    to: Address,\n    amount: bigint,\n    data: Hex,\n    options?: TransferOptions,\n  ): Promise<TransactionResult> {\n    this.#requireSigner(\"confidentialTransferAndCall\");\n    const account = await requireAlignedWalletAccount(\n      \"confidentialTransferAndCall\",\n      this.sdk.signer,\n      this.sdk.provider,\n    );\n    const { skipBalanceCheck = false, onEncryptComplete, onTransferSubmitted } = options ?? {};\n\n    const normalizedTo = getAddress(to);\n\n    if (!skipBalanceCheck) {\n      await this.assertConfidentialBalance(amount);\n    }\n\n    const { encryptedValues, inputProof } = await this.sdk.encrypt({\n      values: [{ value: amount, type: \"euint64\" }],\n      contractAddress: this.address,\n      userAddress: getAddress(account.address),\n    });\n    void swallow(\n      \"transferAndCall: onEncryptComplete\",\n      () => onEncryptComplete?.(),\n      this.sdk.logger,\n    );\n\n    if (encryptedValues.length === 0) {\n      throw new EncryptionFailedError(\"Encryption returned no encrypted values\");\n    }\n\n    return this.submitTransaction({\n      operation: \"transferAndCall\",\n      config: confidentialTransferAndCallContract(\n        this.address,\n        normalizedTo,\n        encryptedValues[0]!,\n        inputProof,\n        data,\n      ),\n      onSubmitted: onTransferSubmitted,\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * ERC-7984 `confidentialTransferFromAndCall`: operator-initiated encrypted\n   * transfer that also invokes the recipient's receiver hook in a single\n   * transaction. The caller must be an approved operator for `from` and crafts\n   * the opaque `data` payload — the SDK does not encode or interpret it.\n   *\n   * @param from - The address to transfer from (caller must be an approved operator).\n   * @param to - Recipient address. Must implement the ERC-7984 receiver hook.\n   * @param amount - Plaintext amount to transfer (encrypted automatically via FHE).\n   * @param data - Opaque bytes forwarded to the recipient's receiver hook.\n   * @param callbacks - Optional progress callbacks.\n   * @returns The transaction hash and mined receipt.\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```ts\n   * const txHash = await token.confidentialTransferFromAndCall(\n   *   \"0xFrom\",\n   *   \"0xRecipient\",\n   *   500n,\n   *   \"0xabcd\",\n   * );\n   * ```\n   */\n  async confidentialTransferFromAndCall(\n    from: Address,\n    to: Address,\n    amount: bigint,\n    data: Hex,\n    callbacks?: TransferCallbacks,\n  ): Promise<TransactionResult> {\n    this.#requireSigner(\"confidentialTransferFromAndCall\");\n    const account = await requireAlignedWalletAccount(\n      \"confidentialTransferFromAndCall\",\n      this.sdk.signer,\n      this.sdk.provider,\n    );\n    const normalizedFrom = getAddress(from);\n    const normalizedTo = getAddress(to);\n\n    // The input proof is verified against msg.sender, so it binds to the caller, not `from`.\n    const { encryptedValues, inputProof } = await this.sdk.encrypt({\n      values: [{ value: amount, type: \"euint64\" }],\n      contractAddress: this.address,\n      userAddress: getAddress(account.address),\n    });\n    void swallow(\n      \"transferFromAndCall: onEncryptComplete\",\n      () => callbacks?.onEncryptComplete?.(),\n      this.sdk.logger,\n    );\n\n    if (encryptedValues.length === 0) {\n      throw new EncryptionFailedError(\"Encryption returned no encrypted values\");\n    }\n\n    return this.submitTransaction({\n      operation: \"transferFromAndCall\",\n      config: confidentialTransferFromAndCallContract(\n        this.address,\n        normalizedFrom,\n        normalizedTo,\n        encryptedValues[0]!,\n        inputProof,\n        data,\n      ),\n      onSubmitted: callbacks?.onTransferSubmitted,\n    });\n  }\n\n  // OPERATOR APPROVAL\n\n  /**\n   * Set operator approval for the confidential token.\n   * Defaults to 1 hour from now if `until` is not specified.\n   *\n   * @param operator - The address to set as an operator.\n   * @param until - Optional Unix timestamp for approval expiry. Defaults to now + 1 hour.\n   * @returns The transaction hash and mined receipt.\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```ts\n   * const txHash = await token.setOperator(\"0xOperator\");\n   * ```\n   */\n  async setOperator(operator: Address, until?: number): Promise<TransactionResult> {\n    this.#requireSigner(\"setOperator\");\n    await requireChainAlignment(\"setOperator\", this.sdk.signer, this.sdk.provider);\n    const normalizedOperator = getAddress(operator);\n    return this.submitTransaction({\n      operation: \"setOperator\",\n      config: setOperatorContract(this.address, normalizedOperator, until),\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Check if a spender is an approved operator for a given holder.\n   *\n   * @param holder - The token holder address.\n   * @param spender - The address to check operator approval for.\n   * @returns `true` if the spender is an approved operator for the holder.\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```ts\n   * if (await token.isOperator(\"0xHolder\", \"0xSpender\")) {\n   *   // spender can call transferFrom on behalf of holder\n   * }\n   * ```\n   */\n  async isOperator(holder: Address, spender: Address): Promise<boolean> {\n    return this.sdk.provider.readContract(\n      isOperatorContract(this.address, getAddress(holder), getAddress(spender)),\n    );\n  }\n\n  // PROTECTED HELPERS\n\n  /**\n   * Read the on-chain encrypted balance for a given owner.\n   *\n   * @internal\n   */\n  protected async readConfidentialBalanceOf(owner: Address): Promise<EncryptedValue> {\n    return await this.sdk.provider.readContract(confidentialBalanceOfContract(this.address, owner));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Pre-flight check: decrypt the confidential balance and compare against the\n   * requested amount. If credentials are cached the decrypt happens silently;\n   * if not, throws {@link BalanceCheckUnavailableError} instead of triggering\n   * a surprise EIP-712 popup.\n   *\n   * @internal\n   */\n  protected async assertConfidentialBalance(amount: bigint): Promise<void> {\n    if (amount === 0n) {\n      return;\n    }\n\n    let balance: bigint;\n    try {\n      const account = await requireAlignedWalletAccount(\n        \"assertConfidentialBalance\",\n        this.sdk.signer,\n        this.sdk.provider,\n      );\n      balance = await this.balanceOf(getAddress(account.address));\n    } catch (error) {\n      if (error instanceof ZamaError) {\n        throw error;\n      }\n      throw new BalanceCheckUnavailableError(`Balance validation failed (token: ${this.address})`, {\n        cause: error,\n      });\n    }\n\n    if (balance < amount) {\n      throw new InsufficientConfidentialBalanceError(\n        `Insufficient confidential balance: requested ${amount}, available ${balance} (token: ${this.address})`,\n        { requested: amount, available: balance, token: this.address },\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Emit a token-scoped event through the owning {@link ZamaSDK} so that\n   * subscribers see a unified stream.\n   *\n   * @internal\n   */\n  protected emit(input: ZamaSDKEventInput): void {\n    this.sdk.emitEvent(input, this.address);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Submit a token-scoped write transaction through the shared SDK transaction\n   * pipeline. Callers keep pre-flight and operation-specific work local.\n   *\n   * @internal\n   */\n  protected async submitTransaction(params: {\n    operation: TransactionOperation;\n    config: WriteContractConfig;\n    onSubmitted?: (txHash: Hex) => void;\n  }): Promise<TransactionResult> {\n    const { operation, config, onSubmitted } = params;\n    return submitSdkTransaction({\n      operation,\n      signer: this.#requireSigner(operation),\n      provider: this.sdk.provider,\n      config,\n      emit: (input) => this.emit(input),\n      onSubmitted,\n      logger: this.sdk.logger,\n    });\n  }\n\n  /** Verify all tokens share the same SDK instance and return it. */\n  private static assertSameSdk(tokens: Token[]): ZamaSDK {\n    const sdk = tokens[0]!.sdk;\n    for (let i = 1; i < tokens.length; i++) {\n      if (tokens[i]!.sdk !== sdk) {\n        throw new ConfigurationError(\n          \"All tokens in a batch operation must share the same ZamaSDK instance\",\n        );\n      }\n    }\n    return sdk;\n  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+{"version":3,"file":"token-BMQ6xlrk.js","names":["#requireSigner","submitSdkTransaction"],"sources":["../../src/errors/rpc.ts","../../src/errors/chain.ts","../../src/errors/balance.ts","../../src/errors/fatal-batch.ts","../../src/utils/fhe-type.ts","../../src/utils/handles.ts","../../src/utils/alignment.ts","../../src/utils/concurrency.ts","../../src/utils/submit-transaction.ts","../../src/token/token.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { ZamaError, ZamaErrorCode } from \"./base\";\n\n/**\n * The consumer's RPC provider rate-limited an on-chain read the SDK performs\n * during decryption (e.g. the ACL check) — HTTP 429 or JSON-RPC `-32005`. An\n * RPC-endpoint problem, **not** a decryption/entitlement failure, and safe to\n * **retry**. Kept distinct from the relayer's own back-pressure\n * ({@link RelayerRequestFailedError}).\n *\n * Backoff for chain RPC is owned by the consumer's transport: viem/ethers\n * already honor the `Retry-After` header and retry internally before this error\n * surfaces, so it is configured on the transport you pass via `chain.network`\n * (not re-implemented here).\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * try {\n *   await sdk.decryption.decryptValues([{ encryptedValue, contractAddress }]);\n * } catch (e) {\n *   if (e instanceof RpcRateLimitError) {\n *     // back off and retry; consider a higher-throughput RPC endpoint\n *   }\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport class RpcRateLimitError extends ZamaError {\n  /**\n   * Suggested delay before retrying, in **seconds**, when a numeric `retryAfter`\n   * is present on the error. Usually `undefined` for chain RPC: the `Retry-After`\n   * header is consumed by the consumer's viem/ethers transport (which owns the\n   * backoff), not surfaced here — see the class doc.\n   */\n  readonly retryAfter: number | undefined;\n\n  constructor(message: string, options?: ErrorOptions & { retryAfter?: number }) {\n    const { retryAfter, ...errorOptions } = options ?? {};\n    super(ZamaErrorCode.RpcRateLimited, message, errorOptions);\n    this.name = \"RpcRateLimitError\";\n    this.retryAfter = retryAfter;\n  }\n}\n","import { ZamaError, ZamaErrorCode } from \"./base\";\n\n/**\n * Thrown when the signer and provider are connected to different chains at the\n * start of a write operation.\n *\n * Every write method runs a chain-alignment pre-flight check. If\n * `signer.getChainId()` and `provider.getChainId()` return different values,\n * this error is thrown before any RPC mutation is attempted.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * try {\n *   await token.shield(1000n);\n * } catch (e) {\n *   if (e instanceof ChainMismatchError) {\n *     console.error(\n *       `Signer is on chain ${e.signerChainId} but provider is on chain ${e.providerChainId}`,\n *     );\n *   }\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport class ChainMismatchError extends ZamaError {\n  /** Name of the operation that triggered the check. */\n  readonly operation: string;\n  /** Chain ID the signer is connected to. */\n  readonly signerChainId: number;\n  /** Chain ID the provider is connected to. */\n  readonly providerChainId: number;\n\n  constructor(\n    {\n      operation,\n      signerChainId,\n      providerChainId,\n    }: { operation: string; signerChainId: number; providerChainId: number },\n    options?: ErrorOptions,\n  ) {\n    super(\n      ZamaErrorCode.ChainMismatch,\n      `Operation \"${operation}\" requires signer and provider to be on the same chain, ` +\n        `but signer is on chain ${signerChainId} and provider is on chain ${providerChainId}.`,\n      options,\n    );\n    this.name = \"ChainMismatchError\";\n    this.operation = operation;\n    this.signerChainId = signerChainId;\n    this.providerChainId = providerChainId;\n  }\n}\n","import type { Address } from \"viem\";\nimport { ZamaError, ZamaErrorCode } from \"./base\";\n\n/** Structured details shared by balance-related errors. */\nexport interface BalanceErrorDetails {\n  /** Amount the caller requested, in the token's base units. */\n  readonly requested: bigint;\n  /** Amount available at the time of the check, in the token's base units. */\n  readonly available: bigint;\n  /** Address of the token contract involved. */\n  readonly token: Address;\n}\n\n/** Confidential (cToken) balance is insufficient for the requested operation. */\nexport class InsufficientConfidentialBalanceError extends ZamaError {\n  /** The amount the caller requested. */\n  readonly requested: bigint;\n  /** The available balance at the time of the check. */\n  readonly available: bigint;\n  /** The token contract address. */\n  readonly token: Address;\n\n  constructor(message: string, details: BalanceErrorDetails, options?: ErrorOptions) {\n    super(ZamaErrorCode.InsufficientConfidentialBalance, message, options);\n    this.name = \"InsufficientConfidentialBalanceError\";\n    this.requested = details.requested;\n    this.available = details.available;\n    this.token = details.token;\n  }\n}\n\n/** ERC-20 balance is insufficient for the requested shield amount. */\nexport class InsufficientERC20BalanceError extends ZamaError {\n  /** The amount the caller requested. */\n  readonly requested: bigint;\n  /** The available balance at the time of the check. */\n  readonly available: bigint;\n  /** The ERC-20 token contract address. */\n  readonly token: Address;\n\n  constructor(message: string, details: BalanceErrorDetails, options?: ErrorOptions) {\n    super(ZamaErrorCode.InsufficientERC20Balance, message, options);\n    this.name = \"InsufficientERC20BalanceError\";\n    this.requested = details.requested;\n    this.available = details.available;\n    this.token = details.token;\n  }\n}\n\n/** ERC-20 allowance granted to the wrapper is insufficient for the requested wrap amount. */\nexport class InsufficientAllowanceError extends ZamaError {\n  /** The amount the caller requested. */\n  readonly requested: bigint;\n  /** The allowance available at the time of the check. */\n  readonly available: bigint;\n  /** The underlying ERC-20 token contract address. */\n  readonly token: Address;\n\n  constructor(message: string, details: BalanceErrorDetails, options?: ErrorOptions) {\n    super(ZamaErrorCode.InsufficientAllowance, message, options);\n    this.name = \"InsufficientAllowanceError\";\n    this.requested = details.requested;\n    this.available = details.available;\n    this.token = details.token;\n  }\n}\n\n/** Balance validation could not be performed (no cached credentials and decryption not possible). */\nexport class BalanceCheckUnavailableError extends ZamaError {\n  constructor(message: string, options?: ErrorOptions) {\n    super(ZamaErrorCode.BalanceCheckUnavailable, message, options);\n    this.name = \"BalanceCheckUnavailableError\";\n  }\n}\n\n/** A public ERC-20 read (e.g. balanceOf) failed due to a network or contract error. */\nexport class ERC20ReadFailedError extends ZamaError {\n  constructor(message: string, options?: ErrorOptions) {\n    super(ZamaErrorCode.ERC20ReadFailed, message, options);\n    this.name = \"ERC20ReadFailedError\";\n  }\n}\n","import { KeyWrappingError, RevokedKmsContextError } from \"./credential\";\nimport { ConfigurationError } from \"./relayer\";\nimport { RpcRateLimitError } from \"./rpc\";\nimport { SigningRejectedError, SigningFailedError } from \"./signing\";\n\n/**\n * Returns `true` for errors that should abort an entire batch operation\n * rather than be recorded per-item — wallet signature rejected, signing\n * infrastructure broken, SDK misconfigured, the RPC provider throttling, or\n * transport key pair wrapping unusable for the whole session (wrong or missing\n * `transportKeyPairDerivationSecret`, `crypto.subtle` unavailable).\n * These are systemic failures that won't recover within the same call; for a\n * rate-limit in particular, the per-item retry loop would only amplify the\n * throttle by re-hitting the already-rate-limited endpoint. A revoked KMS\n * context is likewise batch-wide: every item's permit shares the dead context,\n * and the per-item loop would trigger one evict-and-regrant wallet prompt per\n * item instead of the one the batch attempt already spent.\n *\n * Callers iterating over a batch (e.g. per-token decrypt) should rethrow when\n * this predicate is true so the whole batch aborts, and record the error\n * per-item otherwise.\n */\nexport function isFatalBatchError(error: unknown): boolean {\n  return (\n    error instanceof SigningRejectedError ||\n    error instanceof SigningFailedError ||\n    error instanceof ConfigurationError ||\n    error instanceof RpcRateLimitError ||\n    error instanceof KeyWrappingError ||\n    error instanceof RevokedKmsContextError\n  );\n}\n","// Copied from @zama-fhe/relayer-sdk/src/sdk/FheType.ts\n// Pure utility functions with zero WASM dependency.\n// Adapted to use simple errors instead of RelayerErrorBase hierarchy.\n\n////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////\n// Types (from types/primitives.d.ts)\n////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////\n\nexport interface FheTypeNameToIdMap {\n  ebool: 0;\n  //euint4: 1; deprecated\n  euint8: 2;\n  euint16: 3;\n  euint32: 4;\n  euint64: 5;\n  euint128: 6;\n  eaddress: 7;\n  euint256: 8;\n}\n\nexport interface FheTypeIdToNameMap {\n  0: \"ebool\";\n  //1: 'euint4'; deprecated\n  2: \"euint8\";\n  3: \"euint16\";\n  4: \"euint32\";\n  5: \"euint64\";\n  6: \"euint128\";\n  7: \"eaddress\";\n  8: \"euint256\";\n}\n\nexport interface FheTypeEncryptionBitwidthToIdMap {\n  2: FheTypeNameToIdMap[\"ebool\"];\n  8: FheTypeNameToIdMap[\"euint8\"];\n  16: FheTypeNameToIdMap[\"euint16\"];\n  32: FheTypeNameToIdMap[\"euint32\"];\n  64: FheTypeNameToIdMap[\"euint64\"];\n  128: FheTypeNameToIdMap[\"euint128\"];\n  160: FheTypeNameToIdMap[\"eaddress\"];\n  256: FheTypeNameToIdMap[\"euint256\"];\n}\n\nexport type FheTypeIdToEncryptionBitwidthMap = {\n  [K in keyof FheTypeEncryptionBitwidthToIdMap as FheTypeEncryptionBitwidthToIdMap[K]]: K;\n};\n\ntype Prettify<T> = { [K in keyof T]: T[K] } & {};\n\nexport type FheTypeName = Prettify<keyof FheTypeNameToIdMap>;\nexport type FheTypeId = Prettify<keyof FheTypeIdToNameMap>;\nexport type EncryptionBits = Prettify<keyof FheTypeEncryptionBitwidthToIdMap>;\n\n////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////\n// Lookup Maps\n////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////\n\nconst MINIMUM_ENCRYPTION_BIT_WIDTH = 2;\n\nconst FheTypeNameToId: FheTypeNameToIdMap = {\n  ebool: 0,\n  //euint4: 1, deprecated\n  euint8: 2,\n  euint16: 3,\n  euint32: 4,\n  euint64: 5,\n  euint128: 6,\n  eaddress: 7,\n  euint256: 8,\n} as const;\n\nconst FheTypeIdToName: FheTypeIdToNameMap = {\n  0: \"ebool\",\n  //1: 'euint4', deprecated\n  2: \"euint8\",\n  3: \"euint16\",\n  4: \"euint32\",\n  5: \"euint64\",\n  6: \"euint128\",\n  7: \"eaddress\",\n  8: \"euint256\",\n} as const;\n\nconst FheTypeIdToEncryptionBitwidth: FheTypeIdToEncryptionBitwidthMap = {\n  0: 2,\n  //1:?, euint4 deprecated\n  2: 8,\n  3: 16,\n  4: 32,\n  5: 64,\n  6: 128,\n  7: 160,\n  8: 256,\n} as const;\n\nconst EncryptionBitwidthToFheTypeId: FheTypeEncryptionBitwidthToIdMap = {\n  2: 0,\n  8: 2,\n  16: 3,\n  32: 4,\n  64: 5,\n  128: 6,\n  160: 7,\n  256: 8,\n} as const;\n\nObject.freeze(FheTypeNameToId);\nObject.freeze(FheTypeIdToName);\nObject.freeze(FheTypeIdToEncryptionBitwidth);\nObject.freeze(EncryptionBitwidthToFheTypeId);\n\n////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////\n// Type Guards\n////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////\n\nexport function isFheTypeId(value: unknown): value is FheTypeId {\n  switch (value as FheTypeId) {\n    case 0:\n    case 2:\n    case 3:\n    case 4:\n    case 5:\n    case 6:\n    case 7:\n    case 8:\n      return true;\n    default:\n      return false;\n  }\n}\n\nexport function isFheTypeName(value: unknown): value is FheTypeName {\n  if (typeof value !== \"string\") {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return value in FheTypeNameToId;\n}\n\nexport function isEncryptionBits(value: unknown): value is EncryptionBits {\n  if (typeof value !== \"number\") {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return value in EncryptionBitwidthToFheTypeId;\n}\n\n////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////\n// Converters\n////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////\n\nexport function fheTypeIdFromEncryptionBits(bitwidth: number): FheTypeId {\n  if (!isEncryptionBits(bitwidth)) {\n    throw new Error(`Invalid encryption bits ${bitwidth}`);\n  }\n  return EncryptionBitwidthToFheTypeId[bitwidth];\n}\n\nexport function fheTypeIdFromName(name: string): FheTypeId {\n  if (!isFheTypeName(name)) {\n    throw new Error(`Invalid FheType name '${name}'`);\n  }\n  return FheTypeNameToId[name];\n}\n\nexport function fheTypeNameFromId(id: number): FheTypeName {\n  if (!isFheTypeId(id)) {\n    throw new Error(`Invalid FheType id '${id}'`);\n  }\n  return FheTypeIdToName[id];\n}\n\nexport function encryptionBitsFromFheTypeId(typeId: number): EncryptionBits {\n  if (!isFheTypeId(typeId)) {\n    throw new Error(`Invalid FheType id '${typeId}'`);\n  }\n  const bw = FheTypeIdToEncryptionBitwidth[typeId];\n  if (bw < MINIMUM_ENCRYPTION_BIT_WIDTH) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Invalid FheType encryption bit width: ${bw}. Minimum is ${MINIMUM_ENCRYPTION_BIT_WIDTH} bits.`,\n    );\n  }\n  return bw;\n}\n\nexport function encryptionBitsFromFheTypeName(name: string): EncryptionBits {\n  if (!isFheTypeName(name)) {\n    throw new Error(`Invalid FheType name '${name}'`);\n  }\n  const bw = FheTypeIdToEncryptionBitwidth[FheTypeNameToId[name]];\n  if (bw < MINIMUM_ENCRYPTION_BIT_WIDTH) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Invalid FheType encryption bit width: ${bw}. Minimum is ${MINIMUM_ENCRYPTION_BIT_WIDTH} bits.`,\n    );\n  }\n  return bw;\n}\n","import type { EncryptedValue } from \"../relayer/types\";\nimport { encryptionBitsFromFheTypeId, isFheTypeId } from \"./fhe-type\";\n\n/** All-zero encrypted-value sentinel — a 32-byte zero handle representing the cleartext value `0`. */\nexport const ZERO_ENCRYPTED_VALUE =\n  \"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000\" as const;\n\n/**\n * Check whether an encrypted value represents the zero value.\n */\nexport function isEncryptedValueZero(encryptedValue: string): boolean {\n  return encryptedValue === ZERO_ENCRYPTED_VALUE || encryptedValue === \"0x\";\n}\n\n/**\n * Per-request cleartext-bit budget enforced by the KMS gateway, mirrored from\n * `@fhevm/sdk`'s `MAX_KMS_DECRYPT_DECRYPTION_BIT_LIMIT` (protocol-level constant,\n * not imported — see {@link MAX_CONTRACTS_PER_PERMIT} for why). Internal: decrypt\n * requests are chunked to respect it automatically, so callers never need this value.\n */\nexport const MAX_DECRYPTION_REQUEST_BITS = 2048;\n\n/** Max encryption bit width among all currently-known FHE types (euint256). */\nconst MAX_KNOWN_ENCRYPTION_BITS = 256;\n\n/**\n * Cleartext bit cost of decrypting a single handle, derived from its FHE\n * type (encoded at bits 8-15 of the handle — the same layout `@fhevm/sdk`'s\n * `FhevmHandle` decodes, byte 30 of the 32-byte handle).\n *\n * Falls back to {@link MAX_KNOWN_ENCRYPTION_BITS} for an unrecognized type\n * byte, or for a value that isn't parseable hex at all, instead of throwing.\n * A real on-chain handle is always well-formed with a valid type byte, so\n * this fallback only ever fires for synthetic test/placeholder handles —\n * deliberately more permissive than the relayer's own strict validation so\n * chunking stays safe without requiring every test fixture to encode a real\n * FHE handle. Do not tighten this to match relayer semantics.\n */\nexport function encryptionBitsForHandle(encryptedValue: EncryptedValue): number {\n  let handleValue: bigint;\n  try {\n    handleValue = BigInt(encryptedValue);\n  } catch {\n    return MAX_KNOWN_ENCRYPTION_BITS;\n  }\n  const typeByte = Number((handleValue >> 8n) & 0xffn);\n  return isFheTypeId(typeByte) ? encryptionBitsFromFheTypeId(typeByte) : MAX_KNOWN_ENCRYPTION_BITS;\n}\n\n/**\n * Split `handles` into groups whose cumulative cleartext-bit cost never\n * exceeds `maxBits`, preserving input order. Unlike {@link chunkContracts}\n * (fixed-size slices), a greedy accumulate-until-exceeded walk is required\n * since per-handle cost varies by FHE type. A handle whose own cost exceeds\n * `maxBits` still gets a solo chunk — always makes forward progress.\n */\nexport function chunkHandlesByBitBudget(\n  handles: readonly EncryptedValue[],\n  maxBits: number = MAX_DECRYPTION_REQUEST_BITS,\n): EncryptedValue[][] {\n  const chunks: EncryptedValue[][] = [];\n  let current: EncryptedValue[] = [];\n  let currentBits = 0;\n\n  for (const handle of handles) {\n    const bits = encryptionBitsForHandle(handle);\n    if (current.length > 0 && currentBits + bits > maxBits) {\n      chunks.push(current);\n      current = [];\n      currentBits = 0;\n    }\n    current.push(handle);\n    currentBits += bits;\n  }\n  if (current.length > 0) {\n    chunks.push(current);\n  }\n  return chunks;\n}\n","import {\n  ChainMismatchError,\n  SignerNotConfiguredError,\n  WalletAccountNotReadyError,\n} from \"../errors\";\nimport type { GenericProvider, GenericSigner, WalletAccount } from \"../types\";\n\n/**\n * Pre-flight guard for signer-required operations. Resolves the connected\n * wallet account (refreshing once if the signer reports it isn't ready) and\n * verifies the signer's chain matches the provider's.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport async function requireAlignedWalletAccount(\n  operation: string,\n  signer: GenericSigner | undefined,\n  provider: GenericProvider,\n): Promise<WalletAccount> {\n  if (!signer) {\n    throw new SignerNotConfiguredError(operation);\n  }\n  let account: WalletAccount;\n  try {\n    account = signer.requireWalletAccount(operation);\n  } catch (error) {\n    if (!(error instanceof WalletAccountNotReadyError) || !signer.refreshWalletAccount) {\n      throw error;\n    }\n    await signer.refreshWalletAccount();\n    account = signer.requireWalletAccount(operation);\n  }\n  const providerChainId = await provider.getChainId();\n  if (account.chainId !== providerChainId) {\n    throw new ChainMismatchError({ operation, signerChainId: account.chainId, providerChainId });\n  }\n  return account;\n}\n\n/**\n * Variant of {@link requireAlignedWalletAccount} that returns only the aligned\n * chain ID. Useful when a write path only needs to ensure signer/provider\n * coherence and doesn't otherwise consume the account.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport async function requireChainAlignment(\n  operation: string,\n  signer: GenericSigner | undefined,\n  provider: GenericProvider,\n): Promise<number> {\n  return (await requireAlignedWalletAccount(operation, signer, provider)).chainId;\n}\n","/**\n * Execute an array of async thunks with bounded concurrency.\n * Defaults to `Infinity` (equivalent to `Promise.all`).\n */\nexport async function pLimit<T>(\n  fns: (() => Promise<T>)[],\n  maxConcurrency = Infinity,\n): Promise<T[]> {\n  if (Number.isFinite(maxConcurrency) && maxConcurrency <= 0) {\n    throw new Error(\"maxConcurrency must be a positive number\");\n  }\n  if (!Number.isFinite(maxConcurrency) || maxConcurrency >= fns.length) {\n    return Promise.all(fns.map((f) => f()));\n  }\n\n  const results: T[] = Array.from({ length: fns.length });\n  let index = 0;\n\n  async function worker() {\n    while (index < fns.length) {\n      const i = index++;\n      if (fns[i]) {\n        results[i] = await fns[i]();\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: maxConcurrency }, worker));\n  return results;\n}\n","import type { Hex } from \"viem\";\nimport { TransactionRevertedError, ZamaError } from \"../errors\";\nimport type { TransactionOperation, ZamaSDKEventInput } from \"../events/sdk-events\";\nimport { transactionOperationMetadata, ZamaSDKEvents } from \"../events/sdk-events\";\nimport type {\n  GenericLogger,\n  GenericProvider,\n  GenericSigner,\n  TransactionResult,\n  WriteContractConfig,\n} from \"../types\";\nimport { swallow } from \"./swallow\";\n\n/**\n * Shared write-transaction pipeline for SDK calls that submit a transaction.\n *\n * On success: writes the tx, emits the per-operation submitted event from\n * {@link transactionOperationMetadata}, fires `onSubmitted`, waits for the\n * receipt, and returns `{ txHash, receipt }`.\n *\n * On failure: emits a {@link ZamaSDKEvents.TransactionError} event with the\n * transaction-level error it will throw, then throws it. Existing `ZamaError`\n * instances are rethrown as-is; all other failures are wrapped in\n * `TransactionRevertedError` with the original error as `cause`.\n */\nexport async function submitTransaction(params: {\n  operation: TransactionOperation;\n  signer: GenericSigner;\n  provider: GenericProvider;\n  config: WriteContractConfig;\n  emit: (input: ZamaSDKEventInput) => void;\n  onSubmitted?: (txHash: Hex) => void;\n  logger: GenericLogger;\n}): Promise<TransactionResult> {\n  const { operation, signer, provider, config, emit, onSubmitted, logger } = params;\n  const metadata = transactionOperationMetadata[operation];\n\n  try {\n    const txHash = await signer.writeContract(config);\n    emit(metadata.submittedEvent(txHash));\n    void swallow(`${operation}: onSubmitted`, () => onSubmitted?.(txHash), logger);\n    const receipt = await provider.waitForTransactionReceipt(txHash);\n    return { txHash, receipt };\n  } catch (error) {\n    const failure =\n      error instanceof ZamaError\n        ? error\n        : new TransactionRevertedError(`Transaction failed during ${operation}`, { cause: error });\n\n    emit({ type: ZamaSDKEvents.TransactionError, operation, error: failure });\n    throw failure;\n  }\n}\n","import { type Address, getAddress, type Hex } from \"viem\";\nimport {\n  confidentialBalanceOfContract,\n  confidentialTransferAndCallContract,\n  confidentialTransferContract,\n  confidentialTransferFromAndCallContract,\n  confidentialTransferFromContract,\n  decimalsContract,\n  ERC7984_INTERFACE_ID,\n  ERC7984_WRAPPER_INTERFACE_ID,\n  isOperatorContract,\n  nameContract,\n  setOperatorContract,\n  supportsInterfaceContract,\n  symbolContract,\n} from \"../contracts\";\nimport {\n  BalanceCheckUnavailableError,\n  ConfigurationError,\n  DecryptionFailedError,\n  EncryptionFailedError,\n  InsufficientConfidentialBalanceError,\n  isFatalBatchError,\n  requireConfigured,\n  ZamaError,\n} from \"../errors\";\nimport type { TransactionOperation, ZamaSDKEventInput } from \"../events/sdk-events\";\nimport type { EncryptedValue } from \"../relayer/types\";\nimport { toError } from \"../utils\";\nimport { requireAlignedWalletAccount, requireChainAlignment } from \"../utils/alignment\";\nimport { assertBigint } from \"../utils/assertions\";\nimport { pLimit } from \"../utils/concurrency\";\nimport { isEncryptedValueZero } from \"../utils/handles\";\nimport { submitTransaction as submitSdkTransaction } from \"../utils/submit-transaction\";\nimport { swallow } from \"../utils/swallow\";\nimport type {\n  GenericSigner,\n  TransactionResult,\n  TransferCallbacks,\n  TransferOptions,\n  WriteContractConfig,\n} from \"../types\";\nimport type { ZamaSDK } from \"../zama-sdk\";\n\n/** Options for {@link Token.batchDecryptBalancesAs}. */\nexport interface BatchDecryptAsOptions {\n  /** The address of the account that delegated decryption rights. */\n  delegatorAddress: Address;\n  /** Pre-fetched encrypted values. When omitted, they are fetched from the chain. */\n  encryptedValues?: EncryptedValue[];\n  /**\n   * The account whose on-chain balance to read. Defaults to the delegator\n   * address, which is the common case (the delegator grants permission to\n   * decrypt their own balance). Only set this when the account differs\n   * from the delegator.\n   *\n   * Matches the `account` parameter of `confidentialBalanceOf(account)` on-chain.\n   */\n  accountAddress?: Address;\n  /** Maximum number of concurrent decrypt calls. Default: 10. */\n  maxConcurrency?: number;\n  /** Called when decryption fails for a single token. Return a fallback bigint. */\n  onError?: (error: Error, address: Address) => bigint;\n}\n\n/** Result of {@link Token.batchBalancesOf}. */\nexport interface BatchBalancesResult {\n  /** Successfully decrypted balances, keyed by token address. */\n  results: Map<Address, bigint>;\n  /** Per-token errors for tokens that failed to decrypt. */\n  errors: Map<Address, ZamaError>;\n}\n\n/**\n * High-level interface for an ERC-7984 confidential token.\n * Hides FHE complexity (encryption, decryption, EIP-712 signing) behind\n * familiar ERC-20-like methods.\n *\n * For ERC-7984 wrappers (shield/unshield), use {@link WrappedToken} instead —\n * it extends `Token` with wrapper-specific operations.\n *\n * Decryption, credentials, caching, and event emission are handled by the\n * owning {@link ZamaSDK} — this class only exposes token-scoped helpers\n * that delegate to `sdk.decryption.decryptValues` and `sdk.permits.grantPermit`.\n */\nexport class Token {\n  /** The SDK instance this token operates through. */\n  readonly sdk: ZamaSDK;\n  /** Checksummed address of the confidential token contract. */\n  readonly address: Address;\n\n  constructor(sdk: ZamaSDK, address: Address) {\n    this.sdk = sdk;\n    this.address = getAddress(address);\n  }\n\n  /** Resolve `sdk.signer` or throw {@link SignerNotConfiguredError} tagged with `operation`. */\n  #requireSigner(operation: string): GenericSigner {\n    return requireConfigured(this.sdk.signer, operation);\n  }\n\n  // METADATA\n\n  /** Read the token name from the contract. */\n  async name(): Promise<string> {\n    return this.sdk.provider.readContract(nameContract(this.address));\n  }\n\n  /** Read the token symbol from the contract. */\n  async symbol(): Promise<string> {\n    return this.sdk.provider.readContract(symbolContract(this.address));\n  }\n\n  /** Read the token decimals from the contract. */\n  async decimals(): Promise<number> {\n    return this.sdk.provider.readContract(decimalsContract(this.address));\n  }\n\n  // ERC-165 DISCOVERY\n\n  /**\n   * ERC-165 check for {@link ERC7984_INTERFACE_ID} support.\n   *\n   * @returns `true` if the contract implements the ERC-7984 confidential token interface.\n   */\n  async isConfidential(): Promise<boolean> {\n    return this.sdk.provider.readContract(\n      supportsInterfaceContract(this.address, ERC7984_INTERFACE_ID),\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * ERC-165 check for IERC7984ERC20Wrapper support.\n   *\n   * @returns `true` if the contract implements the ERC-7984 wrapper interface\n   *   ({@link ERC7984_WRAPPER_INTERFACE_ID}, `0x1f1c62b2`).\n   */\n  async isWrapper(): Promise<boolean> {\n    return this.sdk.provider.readContract(\n      supportsInterfaceContract(this.address, ERC7984_WRAPPER_INTERFACE_ID),\n    );\n  }\n\n  // BALANCES\n\n  /**\n   * Decrypt and return the plaintext balance for the given owner.\n   * Acquires FHE credentials via a wallet signature if none are cached.\n   *\n   * @param owner - Balance owner address.\n   * @returns The decrypted plaintext balance as a bigint.\n   * @throws if FHE decryption fails. {@link DecryptionFailedError}\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```ts\n   * const balance = await token.balanceOf(\"0xOwner\");\n   * ```\n   */\n  async balanceOf(owner: Address): Promise<bigint> {\n    const ownerAddress = getAddress(owner);\n    const encryptedValue = await this.readConfidentialBalanceOf(ownerAddress);\n    const result = await this.sdk.decryption.decryptValues([\n      { encryptedValue, contractAddress: this.address },\n    ]);\n    const value = result[encryptedValue];\n    if (value === undefined) {\n      throw new DecryptionFailedError(`Decryption returned no value for ${encryptedValue}`);\n    }\n    assertBigint(value, \"balanceOf: result[encryptedValue]\");\n    return value;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Return the raw encrypted balance without decrypting.\n   *\n   * @param owner - Balance owner address.\n   * @returns The encrypted balance as a hex string.\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```ts\n   * const encryptedValue = await token.confidentialBalanceOf(\"0xOwner\");\n   * ```\n   */\n  async confidentialBalanceOf(owner: Address): Promise<EncryptedValue> {\n    return this.readConfidentialBalanceOf(getAddress(owner));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Decrypt the balance of a delegator using delegated decryption credentials.\n   * The connected signer acts as the delegatee who has been granted permission\n   * by the delegator to decrypt their balance.\n   *\n   * Clear values are cached in storage keyed by `(account, token, encryptedValue)`.\n   * Because every on-chain balance change produces a new encrypted value,\n   * stale cache entries are never served. Cache write failures are silently\n   * ignored — they do not affect the returned value.\n   *\n   * @param delegatorAddress - The address of the account that delegated decryption rights.\n   * @param accountAddress - The account whose on-chain balance to read. Defaults\n   *   to the delegator address.\n   * @returns The decrypted plaintext balance as a bigint.\n   * @throws if no active delegation exists. {@link DelegationNotFoundError}\n   * @throws if the delegation has expired. {@link DelegationExpiredError}\n   * @throws if delegated decryption fails. {@link DecryptionFailedError}\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```ts\n   * const balance = await token.decryptBalanceAs({\n   *   delegatorAddress: \"0xDelegator\",\n   * });\n   * ```\n   */\n  async decryptBalanceAs({\n    delegatorAddress,\n    accountAddress,\n  }: {\n    delegatorAddress: Address;\n    accountAddress?: Address;\n  }): Promise<bigint> {\n    await requireChainAlignment(\"decryptBalanceAs\", this.sdk.signer, this.sdk.provider);\n    const normalizedDelegator = getAddress(delegatorAddress);\n    const normalizedAccount = accountAddress ? getAddress(accountAddress) : normalizedDelegator;\n\n    const encryptedValue = await this.readConfidentialBalanceOf(normalizedAccount);\n    if (isEncryptedValueZero(encryptedValue)) {\n      return 0n;\n    }\n\n    const result = await this.sdk.decryption.delegatedDecryptValues(\n      [{ encryptedValue, contractAddress: this.address }],\n      normalizedDelegator,\n      normalizedAccount,\n    );\n\n    const value = result[encryptedValue];\n    if (value === undefined) {\n      throw new DecryptionFailedError(\n        `Delegated decryption returned no value for ${encryptedValue}`,\n      );\n    }\n    assertBigint(value, \"decryptBalanceAs: result[encryptedValue]\");\n    return value;\n  }\n\n  // BATCH STATICS\n\n  /**\n   * Decrypt confidential balances for multiple tokens in parallel, returning\n   * successes and per-token errors separately. Pre-authorizes all token\n   * addresses in a single wallet signature, then delegates each decrypt to\n   * `sdk.decryption.decryptValues`.\n   *\n   * Tokens that fail to decrypt land in `errors`; the batch keeps going.\n   *\n   * @param tokens - Array of {@link Token} instances bound to the same SDK.\n   * @param owner - Balance owner address.\n   * @returns `{ results, errors }` partitioning the per-token outcomes.\n   * @throws A failure that affects the whole session (rejected signature,\n   * misconfiguration, RPC rate limit, key unwrapping failure, revoked KMS\n   * context) rejects the call instead of landing in `errors`.\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```ts\n   * const { results, errors } = await Token.batchBalancesOf(tokens, owner);\n   * ```\n   */\n  static async batchBalancesOf(tokens: Token[], owner: Address): Promise<BatchBalancesResult> {\n    const results = new Map<Address, bigint>();\n    const errors = new Map<Address, ZamaError>();\n    if (tokens.length === 0) {\n      return { results, errors };\n    }\n\n    const sdk = Token.assertSameSdk(tokens);\n    // Fail fast on chain mismatch before prompting the wallet for a signature.\n    await requireChainAlignment(\"batchBalancesOf\", sdk.signer, sdk.provider);\n    // Pre-authorize the full token set in one wallet signature so subsequent\n    // per-token decryptValues calls reuse the cached credentials.\n    await sdk.permits.grantPermit(tokens.map((t) => t.address));\n\n    // `pLimit` cannot cancel calls that already started. The shared flag stops\n    // the queued tokens from starting once a fatal error is seen, so they do\n    // not each trigger their own recovery wallet prompt.\n    let aborted = false;\n    let fatal: unknown;\n\n    const outcomes = await pLimit(\n      tokens.map((t) => async () => {\n        if (aborted) {\n          return { status: \"aborted\" as const };\n        }\n        try {\n          return { status: \"fulfilled\" as const, value: await t.balanceOf(owner) };\n        } catch (reason) {\n          // A fatal error (rejected signature, revoked KMS context, rate\n          // limit) would fail every token: stop the batch.\n          if (isFatalBatchError(reason)) {\n            aborted = true;\n            fatal ??= reason;\n            return { status: \"aborted\" as const };\n          }\n          return { status: \"rejected\" as const, reason };\n        }\n      }),\n      5,\n    );\n\n    // Some tokens were never attempted after the abort, so a partial result\n    // would be wrong: reject the whole call.\n    if (fatal !== undefined) {\n      throw fatal;\n    }\n\n    for (let i = 0; i < tokens.length; i++) {\n      const tokenAddress = tokens[i]!.address;\n      const outcome = outcomes[i]!;\n      if (outcome.status === \"aborted\") {\n        continue;\n      }\n      if (outcome.status === \"fulfilled\") {\n        results.set(tokenAddress, outcome.value);\n      } else {\n        const reason = outcome.reason;\n        const error =\n          reason instanceof ZamaError\n            ? reason\n            : new DecryptionFailedError(toError(reason).message, { cause: reason });\n        errors.set(tokenAddress, error);\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Total failure: surface the first error so callers know nothing decrypted.\n    if (errors.size === tokens.length) {\n      const firstError = errors.values().next().value;\n      throw firstError ?? new DecryptionFailedError(\"All token balance decryptions failed\");\n    }\n\n    return { results, errors };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Batch decrypt confidential balances as a delegate across multiple tokens.\n   * Mirrors {@link batchBalancesOf} but uses delegated credentials.\n   *\n   * **Error handling:** If a per-token decryption fails and no `onError` callback\n   * is provided, errors are collected and thrown as an aggregated\n   * `DecryptionFailedError`. When the relayer returns no value for an encrypted value,\n   * a `DecryptionFailedError` is thrown for that token (never silently returns `0n`).\n   * Pass `onError: () => 0n` to opt into the silent zero behavior.\n   *\n   * @param tokens - Array of Token instances to decrypt balances for.\n   * @param options - Delegated decryption configuration.\n   * @returns A Map from token address to decrypted balance.\n   * @throws if no active delegation exists. {@link DelegationNotFoundError}\n   * @throws if the delegation has expired. {@link DelegationExpiredError}\n   * @throws if any decryption fails and no `onError` is provided. {@link DecryptionFailedError}\n   * @throws A failure that affects the whole session (rejected signature, RPC\n   * rate limit, revoked KMS context) rejects the call even when `onError` is\n   * provided.\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```ts\n   * const balances = await Token.batchDecryptBalancesAs(tokens, {\n   *   delegatorAddress: \"0xDelegator\",\n   *   onError: (err, addr) => { console.error(addr, err); return 0n; },\n   * });\n   * ```\n   */\n  static async batchDecryptBalancesAs(\n    tokens: Token[],\n    options: BatchDecryptAsOptions,\n  ): Promise<Map<Address, bigint>> {\n    if (tokens.length === 0) {\n      return new Map();\n    }\n\n    const sdk = Token.assertSameSdk(tokens);\n    const results = new Map<Address, bigint>();\n    const errors = new Map<Address, ZamaError>();\n    const normalizedAccount = options.accountAddress\n      ? getAddress(options.accountAddress)\n      : getAddress(options.delegatorAddress);\n    const maxConcurrency = options.maxConcurrency ?? 10;\n    if (options.encryptedValues && tokens.length !== options.encryptedValues.length) {\n      throw new DecryptionFailedError(\n        `tokens.length (${tokens.length}) must equal encryptedValues.length (${options.encryptedValues.length})`,\n      );\n    }\n    const resolvedEncryptedValues =\n      options.encryptedValues ??\n      (await Token.readBalanceHandlesBatch(tokens, normalizedAccount, errors, maxConcurrency));\n\n    const decryptRequests: Array<{ token: Token; encryptedValue: EncryptedValue }> = [];\n    for (const [index, token] of tokens.entries()) {\n      const encryptedValue = resolvedEncryptedValues[index];\n      if (!encryptedValue || errors.has(token.address)) {\n        continue;\n      }\n      if (isEncryptedValueZero(encryptedValue)) {\n        // Zero balance → skip the relayer; no decryption needed.\n        results.set(token.address, 0n);\n      } else {\n        decryptRequests.push({ token, encryptedValue });\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (decryptRequests.length > 0) {\n      const decrypted = await sdk.decryption.delegatedBatchDecryptValues({\n        encryptedInputs: decryptRequests.map(({ token, encryptedValue }) => ({\n          encryptedValue,\n          contractAddress: token.address,\n        })),\n        delegatorAddress: options.delegatorAddress,\n        accountAddress: options.accountAddress,\n        maxConcurrency,\n      });\n\n      for (const [index, item] of decrypted.items.entries()) {\n        const request = decryptRequests[index];\n        if (!request) {\n          continue;\n        }\n        if (item.error) {\n          errors.set(request.token.address, item.error);\n          continue;\n        }\n        const value = item.value;\n        if (value === undefined) {\n          errors.set(\n            request.token.address,\n            new DecryptionFailedError(\n              `Batch delegated decryption returned no value for ${item.encryptedValue} on token ${request.token.address}`,\n            ),\n          );\n          continue;\n        }\n        assertBigint(value, \"batchDecryptBalancesAs: result[encryptedValue]\");\n        results.set(request.token.address, value);\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (errors.size === 0) {\n      return results;\n    }\n\n    if (options.onError) {\n      const callbackErrors: Array<{ address: Address; error: Error }> = [];\n      for (const [address, error] of errors) {\n        try {\n          results.set(address, options.onError(error, address));\n        } catch (callbackError) {\n          callbackErrors.push({ address, error: toError(callbackError) });\n        }\n      }\n      if (callbackErrors.length > 0) {\n        const message = callbackErrors\n          .map(({ address, error }) => `${address}: ${error.message}`)\n          .join(\"; \");\n        throw new DecryptionFailedError(\n          `Batch delegated decryption onError callback failed for ${callbackErrors.length} token(s): ${message}`,\n          { cause: callbackErrors[0]?.error },\n        );\n      }\n      return results;\n    }\n\n    const errorEntries = Array.from(errors.entries());\n    const message = errorEntries.map(([addr, e]) => `${addr}: ${e.message}`).join(\"; \");\n    throw new DecryptionFailedError(\n      `Batch delegated decryption failed for ${errors.size} token(s): ${message}`,\n      { cause: errorEntries[0]?.[1] },\n    );\n  }\n\n  private static async readBalanceHandlesBatch(\n    tokens: Token[],\n    accountAddress: Address,\n    errors: Map<Address, ZamaError>,\n    maxConcurrency: number,\n  ): Promise<Array<EncryptedValue | undefined>> {\n    // `pLimit` cannot cancel calls that already started. The shared flag stops\n    // the queued tokens from re-hitting an endpoint that already failed for\n    // the whole batch.\n    let aborted = false;\n    let fatal: unknown;\n\n    const outcomes = await pLimit(\n      tokens.map((token) => async () => {\n        if (aborted) {\n          return { status: \"aborted\" as const };\n        }\n        try {\n          return {\n            status: \"fulfilled\" as const,\n            value: await token.readConfidentialBalanceOf(accountAddress),\n          };\n        } catch (reason) {\n          if (isFatalBatchError(reason)) {\n            aborted = true;\n            fatal ??= reason;\n            return { status: \"aborted\" as const };\n          }\n          return { status: \"rejected\" as const, reason };\n        }\n      }),\n      maxConcurrency,\n    );\n\n    if (fatal !== undefined) {\n      throw fatal;\n    }\n\n    const encryptedValues: Array<EncryptedValue | undefined> = [];\n    for (const [index, token] of tokens.entries()) {\n      const outcome = outcomes[index];\n      if (!outcome || outcome.status === \"aborted\") {\n        continue;\n      }\n      if (outcome.status === \"fulfilled\") {\n        encryptedValues[index] = outcome.value;\n        continue;\n      }\n      errors.set(\n        token.address,\n        outcome.reason instanceof ZamaError\n          ? outcome.reason\n          : new DecryptionFailedError(toError(outcome.reason).message, { cause: outcome.reason }),\n      );\n    }\n    return encryptedValues;\n  }\n\n  // WRITE OPERATIONS\n\n  /**\n   * Confidential transfer. Encrypts the amount via FHE, then calls the contract.\n   *\n   * By default, the SDK validates the confidential balance before submitting.\n   * If a cached plaintext balance exists it is used; otherwise, if credentials\n   * are cached, it decrypts on the fly. Set `skipBalanceCheck: true` to bypass\n   * this validation (e.g. for smart wallets).\n   *\n   * @param to - Recipient address.\n   * @param amount - Plaintext amount to transfer (encrypted automatically via FHE).\n   * @param options - Optional: `skipBalanceCheck` (default `false`).\n   * @returns The transaction hash and mined receipt.\n   * @throws if signer and provider are on different chains. {@link ChainMismatchError}\n   * @throws if the balance is less than `amount`. {@link InsufficientConfidentialBalanceError}\n   * @throws if balance validation requires decryption that is not possible. {@link BalanceCheckUnavailableError}\n   * @throws if FHE encryption fails. {@link EncryptionFailedError}\n   * @throws if the on-chain transfer reverts. {@link TransactionRevertedError}\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```ts\n   * const txHash = await token.confidentialTransfer(\"0xRecipient\", 1000n);\n   * ```\n   */\n  async confidentialTransfer(\n    to: Address,\n    amount: bigint,\n    options?: TransferOptions,\n  ): Promise<TransactionResult> {\n    this.#requireSigner(\"confidentialTransfer\");\n    const account = await requireAlignedWalletAccount(\n      \"confidentialTransfer\",\n      this.sdk.signer,\n      this.sdk.provider,\n    );\n    const { skipBalanceCheck = false, onEncryptComplete, onTransferSubmitted } = options ?? {};\n\n    const normalizedTo = getAddress(to);\n\n    if (!skipBalanceCheck) {\n      await this.assertConfidentialBalance(amount);\n    }\n\n    const { encryptedValues, inputProof } = await this.sdk.encrypt({\n      values: [{ value: amount, type: \"euint64\" }],\n      contractAddress: this.address,\n      userAddress: getAddress(account.address),\n    });\n    void swallow(\"transfer: onEncryptComplete\", () => onEncryptComplete?.(), this.sdk.logger);\n\n    if (encryptedValues.length === 0) {\n      throw new EncryptionFailedError(\"Encryption returned no encrypted values\");\n    }\n\n    return this.submitTransaction({\n      operation: \"transfer\",\n      config: confidentialTransferContract(\n        this.address,\n        normalizedTo,\n        encryptedValues[0]!,\n        inputProof,\n      ),\n      onSubmitted: onTransferSubmitted,\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Operator encrypted transfer on behalf of another address.\n   * The caller must be an approved operator for `from`.\n   *\n   * @param from - The address to transfer from (caller must be an approved operator).\n   * @param to - Recipient address.\n   * @param amount - Plaintext amount to transfer (encrypted automatically via FHE).\n   * @returns The transaction hash and mined receipt.\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```ts\n   * const txHash = await token.confidentialTransferFrom(\"0xFrom\", \"0xTo\", 500n);\n   * ```\n   */\n  async confidentialTransferFrom(\n    from: Address,\n    to: Address,\n    amount: bigint,\n    callbacks?: TransferCallbacks,\n  ): Promise<TransactionResult> {\n    this.#requireSigner(\"confidentialTransferFrom\");\n    const account = await requireAlignedWalletAccount(\n      \"confidentialTransferFrom\",\n      this.sdk.signer,\n      this.sdk.provider,\n    );\n    const normalizedFrom = getAddress(from);\n    const normalizedTo = getAddress(to);\n\n    // The input proof is verified against msg.sender, so it binds to the caller, not `from`.\n    const { encryptedValues, inputProof } = await this.sdk.encrypt({\n      values: [{ value: amount, type: \"euint64\" }],\n      contractAddress: this.address,\n      userAddress: getAddress(account.address),\n    });\n    void swallow(\n      \"transferFrom: onEncryptComplete\",\n      () => callbacks?.onEncryptComplete?.(),\n      this.sdk.logger,\n    );\n\n    if (encryptedValues.length === 0) {\n      throw new EncryptionFailedError(\"Encryption returned no encrypted values\");\n    }\n\n    return this.submitTransaction({\n      operation: \"transferFrom\",\n      config: confidentialTransferFromContract(\n        this.address,\n        normalizedFrom,\n        normalizedTo,\n        encryptedValues[0]!,\n        inputProof,\n      ),\n      onSubmitted: callbacks?.onTransferSubmitted,\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * ERC-7984 `confidentialTransferAndCall`: encrypted transfer that also invokes\n   * the recipient's receiver hook (`onConfidentialTransferReceived`) in a single\n   * transaction. The caller crafts the opaque `data` payload — the SDK does not\n   * encode, validate, or interpret it.\n   *\n   * Balance validation follows the same rules as {@link Token.confidentialTransfer}.\n   *\n   * @param to - Recipient address. Must implement the ERC-7984 receiver hook.\n   * @param amount - Plaintext amount to transfer (encrypted automatically via FHE).\n   * @param data - Opaque bytes forwarded to the recipient's receiver hook.\n   * @param options - Optional: `skipBalanceCheck` (default `false`).\n   * @returns The transaction hash and mined receipt.\n   *\n   * @throws if signer and provider are on different chains. {@link ChainMismatchError}\n   * @throws if the balance is less than `amount`. {@link InsufficientConfidentialBalanceError}\n   * @throws if balance validation requires decryption that is not possible. {@link BalanceCheckUnavailableError}\n   * @throws if FHE encryption fails. {@link EncryptionFailedError}\n   * @throws if the on-chain transfer reverts. {@link TransactionRevertedError}\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```ts\n   * const txHash = await token.confidentialTransferAndCall(\n   *   \"0xRecipient\",\n   *   1000n,\n   *   \"0xabcd\", // caller-encoded payload forwarded to the receiver hook\n   * );\n   * ```\n   */\n  async confidentialTransferAndCall(\n    to: Address,\n    amount: bigint,\n    data: Hex,\n    options?: TransferOptions,\n  ): Promise<TransactionResult> {\n    this.#requireSigner(\"confidentialTransferAndCall\");\n    const account = await requireAlignedWalletAccount(\n      \"confidentialTransferAndCall\",\n      this.sdk.signer,\n      this.sdk.provider,\n    );\n    const { skipBalanceCheck = false, onEncryptComplete, onTransferSubmitted } = options ?? {};\n\n    const normalizedTo = getAddress(to);\n\n    if (!skipBalanceCheck) {\n      await this.assertConfidentialBalance(amount);\n    }\n\n    const { encryptedValues, inputProof } = await this.sdk.encrypt({\n      values: [{ value: amount, type: \"euint64\" }],\n      contractAddress: this.address,\n      userAddress: getAddress(account.address),\n    });\n    void swallow(\n      \"transferAndCall: onEncryptComplete\",\n      () => onEncryptComplete?.(),\n      this.sdk.logger,\n    );\n\n    if (encryptedValues.length === 0) {\n      throw new EncryptionFailedError(\"Encryption returned no encrypted values\");\n    }\n\n    return this.submitTransaction({\n      operation: \"transferAndCall\",\n      config: confidentialTransferAndCallContract(\n        this.address,\n        normalizedTo,\n        encryptedValues[0]!,\n        inputProof,\n        data,\n      ),\n      onSubmitted: onTransferSubmitted,\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * ERC-7984 `confidentialTransferFromAndCall`: operator-initiated encrypted\n   * transfer that also invokes the recipient's receiver hook in a single\n   * transaction. The caller must be an approved operator for `from` and crafts\n   * the opaque `data` payload — the SDK does not encode or interpret it.\n   *\n   * @param from - The address to transfer from (caller must be an approved operator).\n   * @param to - Recipient address. Must implement the ERC-7984 receiver hook.\n   * @param amount - Plaintext amount to transfer (encrypted automatically via FHE).\n   * @param data - Opaque bytes forwarded to the recipient's receiver hook.\n   * @param callbacks - Optional progress callbacks.\n   * @returns The transaction hash and mined receipt.\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```ts\n   * const txHash = await token.confidentialTransferFromAndCall(\n   *   \"0xFrom\",\n   *   \"0xRecipient\",\n   *   500n,\n   *   \"0xabcd\",\n   * );\n   * ```\n   */\n  async confidentialTransferFromAndCall(\n    from: Address,\n    to: Address,\n    amount: bigint,\n    data: Hex,\n    callbacks?: TransferCallbacks,\n  ): Promise<TransactionResult> {\n    this.#requireSigner(\"confidentialTransferFromAndCall\");\n    const account = await requireAlignedWalletAccount(\n      \"confidentialTransferFromAndCall\",\n      this.sdk.signer,\n      this.sdk.provider,\n    );\n    const normalizedFrom = getAddress(from);\n    const normalizedTo = getAddress(to);\n\n    // The input proof is verified against msg.sender, so it binds to the caller, not `from`.\n    const { encryptedValues, inputProof } = await this.sdk.encrypt({\n      values: [{ value: amount, type: \"euint64\" }],\n      contractAddress: this.address,\n      userAddress: getAddress(account.address),\n    });\n    void swallow(\n      \"transferFromAndCall: onEncryptComplete\",\n      () => callbacks?.onEncryptComplete?.(),\n      this.sdk.logger,\n    );\n\n    if (encryptedValues.length === 0) {\n      throw new EncryptionFailedError(\"Encryption returned no encrypted values\");\n    }\n\n    return this.submitTransaction({\n      operation: \"transferFromAndCall\",\n      config: confidentialTransferFromAndCallContract(\n        this.address,\n        normalizedFrom,\n        normalizedTo,\n        encryptedValues[0]!,\n        inputProof,\n        data,\n      ),\n      onSubmitted: callbacks?.onTransferSubmitted,\n    });\n  }\n\n  // OPERATOR APPROVAL\n\n  /**\n   * Set operator approval for the confidential token.\n   * Defaults to 1 hour from now if `until` is not specified.\n   *\n   * @param operator - The address to set as an operator.\n   * @param until - Optional Unix timestamp for approval expiry. Defaults to now + 1 hour.\n   * @returns The transaction hash and mined receipt.\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```ts\n   * const txHash = await token.setOperator(\"0xOperator\");\n   * ```\n   */\n  async setOperator(operator: Address, until?: number): Promise<TransactionResult> {\n    this.#requireSigner(\"setOperator\");\n    await requireChainAlignment(\"setOperator\", this.sdk.signer, this.sdk.provider);\n    const normalizedOperator = getAddress(operator);\n    return this.submitTransaction({\n      operation: \"setOperator\",\n      config: setOperatorContract(this.address, normalizedOperator, until),\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Check if a spender is an approved operator for a given holder.\n   *\n   * @param holder - The token holder address.\n   * @param spender - The address to check operator approval for.\n   * @returns `true` if the spender is an approved operator for the holder.\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```ts\n   * if (await token.isOperator(\"0xHolder\", \"0xSpender\")) {\n   *   // spender can call transferFrom on behalf of holder\n   * }\n   * ```\n   */\n  async isOperator(holder: Address, spender: Address): Promise<boolean> {\n    return this.sdk.provider.readContract(\n      isOperatorContract(this.address, getAddress(holder), getAddress(spender)),\n    );\n  }\n\n  // PROTECTED HELPERS\n\n  /**\n   * Read the on-chain encrypted balance for a given owner.\n   *\n   * @internal\n   */\n  protected async readConfidentialBalanceOf(owner: Address): Promise<EncryptedValue> {\n    return await this.sdk.provider.readContract(confidentialBalanceOfContract(this.address, owner));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Pre-flight check: decrypt the confidential balance and compare against the\n   * requested amount. If credentials are cached the decrypt happens silently;\n   * if not, throws {@link BalanceCheckUnavailableError} instead of triggering\n   * a surprise EIP-712 popup.\n   *\n   * @internal\n   */\n  protected async assertConfidentialBalance(amount: bigint): Promise<void> {\n    if (amount === 0n) {\n      return;\n    }\n\n    let balance: bigint;\n    try {\n      const account = await requireAlignedWalletAccount(\n        \"assertConfidentialBalance\",\n        this.sdk.signer,\n        this.sdk.provider,\n      );\n      balance = await this.balanceOf(getAddress(account.address));\n    } catch (error) {\n      if (error instanceof ZamaError) {\n        throw error;\n      }\n      throw new BalanceCheckUnavailableError(`Balance validation failed (token: ${this.address})`, {\n        cause: error,\n      });\n    }\n\n    if (balance < amount) {\n      throw new InsufficientConfidentialBalanceError(\n        `Insufficient confidential balance: requested ${amount}, available ${balance} (token: ${this.address})`,\n        { requested: amount, available: balance, token: this.address },\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Emit a token-scoped event through the owning {@link ZamaSDK} so that\n   * subscribers see a unified stream.\n   *\n   * @internal\n   */\n  protected emit(input: ZamaSDKEventInput): void {\n    this.sdk.emitEvent(input, this.address);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Submit a token-scoped write transaction through the shared SDK transaction\n   * pipeline. Callers keep pre-flight and operation-specific work local.\n   *\n   * @internal\n   */\n  protected async submitTransaction(params: {\n    operation: TransactionOperation;\n    config: WriteContractConfig;\n    onSubmitted?: (txHash: Hex) => void;\n  }): Promise<TransactionResult> {\n    const { operation, config, onSubmitted } = params;\n    return submitSdkTransaction({\n      operation,\n      signer: this.#requireSigner(operation),\n      provider: this.sdk.provider,\n      config,\n      emit: (input) => this.emit(input),\n      onSubmitted,\n      logger: this.sdk.logger,\n    });\n  }\n\n  /** Verify all tokens share the same SDK instance and return it. */\n  private static assertSameSdk(tokens: Token[]): ZamaSDK {\n    const sdk = tokens[0]!.sdk;\n    for (let i = 1; i < tokens.length; i++) {\n      if (tokens[i]!.sdk !== sdk) {\n        throw new ConfigurationError(\n          \"All tokens in a batch operation must share the same ZamaSDK instance\",\n        );\n      }\n    }\n    return sdk;\n  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