@zackbart/connecta 0.37.1 → 0.38.0

package/dist/routes/credentials.js

@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ function credentialRequest(context, connectorId, action) {
         if (request.method === "DELETE") {
             // Clearing nothing is refused, as testing nothing is, so the route
             // agrees with the operator contract, which offers `clear` only once a
-            // value is stored in the caller's partition (#837). A value that cannot
+            // value is stored in the caller's partition. A value that cannot
             // be read may still be cleared: removing it is how one recovers.
             const stored = yield* Effect.tryPromise({
                 try: () => vault.metadata(connectorId, owner),

package/dist/routes/mcp.js

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ const deadlineResponses = new WeakSet();
 /**
  * The most a `subscriptions/listen` classification reads. A listen is a small
  * JSON-RPC request; this read happens before request admission, so it is
- * bounded by this fixed cap rather than by the host's body limit (#857).
+ * bounded by this fixed cap rather than by the host's body limit.
  */
 export const MAX_LISTEN_CLASSIFICATION_BYTES = 64 * 1024;
 /**
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ function admitted(controller, signal) {
     }), (lease) => Effect.sync(() => lease.release()), { interruptible: true });
 }
 /**
- * 404 for any `?toolkit=` value, kept after the feature's retirement (#178).
+ * 404 for any `?toolkit=` value, kept after the feature's retirement.
  *
  * Toolkits are gone, but the URLs that named them are not: clients were handed
  * MCP endpoint URLs with `?toolkit=` baked in, and nothing about upgrading the
@@ -409,6 +409,7 @@ function serveMcp(request, requestSignal, requestScope, opts, baseUrl, actor, re
             credentialHandoffUrl: opts.config.ui?.credentialHandoffUrl(baseUrl),
             ...(activity ? { activity } : {}),
             defaultToolTimeoutMs: opts.config.calls.defaultTimeoutMs ?? opts.config.execute.hostCallTimeoutMs,
+            maxProgramResultChars: opts.config.execute.maxResultChars,
             probeTimeoutMs: opts.config.discovery.probeTimeoutMs,
             discoveryConcurrency: opts.config.discovery.concurrency,
             requestSignal,
@@ -638,7 +639,7 @@ export function createMcpRoute(opts) {
             }));
             // A request naming `subscriptions/listen` defers its permit: nothing of
             // its body is read until auth and endpoint admission pass, and then at
-            // most MAX_LISTEN_CLASSIFICATION_BYTES (#857). Only a body-confirmed
+            // most MAX_LISTEN_CLASSIFICATION_BYTES. Only a body-confirmed
             // modern listen goes without a permit; trusting the header alone would
             // let a legacy tools/call bypass the pool, so anything else takes one
             // after classification. Every other request takes its permit here,

package/dist/routes/oauth-management.js

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ function oauthManagementRequest(context, connectorId) {
         const registry = yield* managementRegistry(context, authz);
         const connector = registry.getConnector(connectorId);
         const disconnectAuth = connector?.disconnectAuth?.bind(connector);
-        // Each verb needs only its own hooks (#837): connecting needs the whole
+        // Each verb needs only its own hooks: connecting needs the whole
         // flow, through the callback's state check; disconnecting needs only
         // disconnectAuth, so a grant provisioned out of band can still be dropped.
         const connects = Boolean(connector?.startAuth && connector.finishAuth && connector.verifyState);

package/dist/routes/operator.js

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import { bytesToHex } from "../bytes.js";
 // The Effect plumbing the operator and activity data routes share.
 //
 // Each JSON route under /ui/* is one Effect program, run at its Promise edge
@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ export function operatorViewerKey(context, authz) {
         ]));
         const signingKey = key;
         const digest = yield* attempt(() => crypto.subtle.sign("HMAC", signingKey, identity));
-        return Array.from(new Uint8Array(digest), (byte) => byte.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
+        return bytesToHex(new Uint8Array(digest));
     }), {
         timeoutMs: 500,
         signal: context.request.signal,
@@ -101,7 +102,7 @@ export function scopeFor(authz, authenticated, connectorIds = "all") {
     };
 }
 /**
- * The whole registry, for a maintainer only (#837). Everyone else gets the
+ * The whole registry, for a maintainer only. Everyone else gets the
  * private 404 plain `/mcp` gives them.
  */
 export function visibleRegistry({ opts }, authz) {
@@ -111,7 +112,7 @@ export function visibleRegistry({ opts }, authz) {
     return Effect.succeed(opts.registry.scoped(scopeFor(authz, opts.config.auth.length > 0)));
 }
 /**
- * The connectors a connector-auth route may resolve (#837): every connector
+ * The connectors a connector-auth route may resolve: every connector
  * for a maintainer, the connectors of their pools for a pool member, and the
  * private 404 for anyone else. mayManageConnector still decides each action.
  */

package/dist/routes/shared.d.ts

@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ export declare function authorize(request: Request, baseUrl: string, auth: reado
     response: Response;
 }>;
 /**
- * Admission at an agent endpoint, `/agent/<pool>` (#837). Only the built-in
+ * Admission at an agent endpoint, `/agent/<pool>`. Only the built-in
  * agent credential adapters are consulted: Clerk and Access never run, cookies and Clerk
  * handshake parameters are stripped, and the runtime context, which carries
  * Access's `ctx.access` even on a bypassed path, is never passed. Anything but
@@ -88,31 +88,31 @@ export declare function authorizeAgent(request: Request, baseUrl: string, auth:
 /** Human routes reject machine credentials before any verification or storage I/O. */
 export declare function authorizeUiIdentity(request: Request, baseUrl: string, auth: readonly InboundAuth[], purpose: string, runtimeContext?: RuntimeExecutionContext, logger?: Logger): Promise<Awaited<ReturnType<typeof authorize>>>;
 export declare function isSameOrigin(request: Request, baseUrl: string): boolean;
-export declare function withSecurityHeaders(response: Response, requestUrl: URL, _path: string): Response;
+export declare function withSecurityHeaders(response: Response, requestUrl: URL): Response;
 type AuthorizedIdentity = Extract<Awaited<ReturnType<typeof authorize>>, {
     ok: true;
 }>;
 /**
- * Plain `/mcp` and every operator route admit a maintainer (#837). An open
+ * Plain `/mcp` and every operator route admit a maintainer. An open
  * deployment has no inbound auth and so no maintainers: its one anonymous
  * caller keeps the whole default endpoint, as the startup warning says.
  */
 export declare function admitsMaintainer(opts: ServerOptions, authz: AuthorizedIdentity): boolean;
 /**
  * The declared pool `/mcp/<name>` serves to this person, or undefined for the
- * same 404. An agent is never admitted here, even when listed (#837).
+ * same 404. An agent is never admitted here, even when listed.
  */
 export declare function memberPool(opts: ServerOptions, name: string, identity: Readonly<AuthenticatedIdentity>): ResolvedPool | undefined;
 /** The declared pool `/agent/<name>` serves to this agent, or undefined for the same 404. */
 export declare function agentPool(opts: ServerOptions, name: string, identity: Readonly<AuthenticatedIdentity>): ResolvedPool | undefined;
 /**
- * The connectors of every pool this identity is a member of (#837): what a
+ * The connectors of every pool this identity is a member of: what a
  * pool member may ever manage, and only their personal ones among these.
  */
 export declare function memberConnectors(opts: ServerOptions, identity: Readonly<AuthenticatedIdentity>): "all" | ReadonlySet<string>;
 /**
  * Whether this identity may start, finish, or remove a connector's auth
- * (#837). Only an interactive person ever may; an agent or any other machine
+ * Only an interactive person ever may; an agent or any other machine
  * credential manages nothing. Shared auth is deployment-wide, so it takes a
  * maintainer. A personal connector takes a stable principal that is a
  * maintainer, whose plain `/mcp` includes it, or a member of a pool that
@@ -124,10 +124,10 @@ export declare function mayManageConnector(opts: ServerOptions, authz: Authorize
     id: string;
     authScope?: "shared" | "personal";
 }): boolean;
-/** Agent token list, issue, rotate, and revoke: an interactive maintainer only (#837). */
+/** Agent token list, issue, rotate, and revoke: an interactive maintainer only. */
 export declare function managesAgentTokens(opts: ServerOptions, authz: AuthorizedIdentity): boolean;
 /**
- * Activity reads: a maintainer principal, interactive or not (#837). Members
+ * Activity reads: a maintainer principal, interactive or not. Members
  * and agents read none, and an open deployment has no maintainer.
  */
 export declare function readsActivity(opts: ServerOptions, authz: AuthorizedIdentity): boolean;

package/dist/routes/shared.js

@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ const authorizeNative = /* @__PURE__ */ registerAuth(authorize, function (reques
             return { ok: false, response: privateJson({ error: "authenticated user required" }, { status: 403 }) };
         }
         // Every caller of this function is a human route. Agents reach pools only at
-        // `/agent/<pool>` (#837), so a workload or `cta_` credential refuses here
+        // `/agent/<pool>`, so a workload or `cta_` credential refuses here
         // without verification, and never falls back to a cookie, session or Access context.
         if (machineCredential) {
             return {
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ function agentChallenge() {
     };
 }
 /**
- * Admission at an agent endpoint, `/agent/<pool>` (#837). Only the built-in
+ * Admission at an agent endpoint, `/agent/<pool>`. Only the built-in
  * agent credential adapters are consulted: Clerk and Access never run, cookies and Clerk
  * handshake parameters are stripped, and the runtime context, which carries
  * Access's `ctx.access` even on a bypassed path, is never passed. Anything but
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ export function isSameOrigin(request, baseUrl) {
         return false;
     }
 }
-export function withSecurityHeaders(response, requestUrl, _path) {
+export function withSecurityHeaders(response, requestUrl) {
     const headers = response.headers.get("Content-Type")?.toLowerCase().startsWith("text/html")
         ? htmlSecurityHeaders(response.headers)
         : new Headers(response.headers);
@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ export function withSecurityHeaders(response, requestUrl, _path) {
     });
 }
 /**
- * Plain `/mcp` and every operator route admit a maintainer (#837). An open
+ * Plain `/mcp` and every operator route admit a maintainer. An open
  * deployment has no inbound auth and so no maintainers: its one anonymous
  * caller keeps the whole default endpoint, as the startup warning says.
  */
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ export function admitsMaintainer(opts, authz) {
 }
 /**
  * The declared pool `/mcp/<name>` serves to this person, or undefined for the
- * same 404. An agent is never admitted here, even when listed (#837).
+ * same 404. An agent is never admitted here, even when listed.
  */
 export function memberPool(opts, name, identity) {
     if (identity.agent !== undefined)
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ export function agentPool(opts, name, identity) {
     return pool?.members.some((member) => member.kind === "agent" && isMember(member, identity)) ? pool : undefined;
 }
 /**
- * The connectors of every pool this identity is a member of (#837): what a
+ * The connectors of every pool this identity is a member of: what a
  * pool member may ever manage, and only their personal ones among these.
  */
 export function memberConnectors(opts, identity) {
@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ export function memberConnectors(opts, identity) {
 }
 /**
  * Whether this identity may start, finish, or remove a connector's auth
- * (#837). Only an interactive person ever may; an agent or any other machine
+ * Only an interactive person ever may; an agent or any other machine
  * credential manages nothing. Shared auth is deployment-wide, so it takes a
  * maintainer. A personal connector takes a stable principal that is a
  * maintainer, whose plain `/mcp` includes it, or a member of a pool that
@@ -454,12 +454,12 @@ export function mayManageConnector(opts, authz, connector) {
     const pools = memberConnectors(opts, identity);
     return pools === "all" || pools.has(connector.id);
 }
-/** Agent token list, issue, rotate, and revoke: an interactive maintainer only (#837). */
+/** Agent token list, issue, rotate, and revoke: an interactive maintainer only. */
 export function managesAgentTokens(opts, authz) {
     return (authz.identity.interactive && authz.identity.agent === undefined && isMaintainer(opts.maintainers, authz.identity));
 }
 /**
- * Activity reads: a maintainer principal, interactive or not (#837). Members
+ * Activity reads: a maintainer principal, interactive or not. Members
  * and agents read none, and an open deployment has no maintainer.
  */
 export function readsActivity(opts, authz) {

package/dist/routes/ui-config.js

@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ function maintainerRead(context, authz) {
             .map(([id, tools]) => [id, Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(tools).filter(([name]) => validName(name)))]));
         // A pool owner is a Workspace mailbox address. Only an authenticated
         // maintainer reads it; an open deployment's anonymous caller, which this
-        // route admits, gets null, the same as an unset owner (#837).
+        // route admits, gets null, the same as an unset owner.
         const ownersVisible = opts.config.auth.length > 0 && isMaintainer(opts.maintainers, authz.identity);
         config.pools = config.pools.map((pool) => ({
             ...pool,

package/dist/routes/ui.js

@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ function summary(context) {
         const authz = yield* authorized(context);
         const registry = yield* visibleRegistry(context, authz);
         const { visible, mayManage, permissions, activityEnabled, credentialManagement } = operatorView(context, authz, registry);
-        // Only maintainers reach here (#837); setup commands are offered for every
+        // Only maintainers reach here; setup commands are offered for every
         // declared pool, since they administer them all.
         const pools = [...opts.pools.keys()];
         return privateJson({

package/dist/runtime/call-admission.js

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 // block: the one place outside its instance methods that may read its private
 // bookkeeping, and one that emits nothing into the `.d.ts`.
 //
-// The two controllers stay separate on purpose (#453): request admission
+// The two controllers stay separate on purpose: request admission
 // bounds executor work, this bounds calls to one downstream connector, and a
 // shared queue between them was refused.
 import { Effect } from "effect";

package/dist/runtime/call.js

@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ function ended() {
     return new ConnectorCallError("connector_call_failed", "This call has ended; a capability kept from it can no longer be used.", { retryable: false });
 }
 /** Build one call's services. Invocation calls this in the scoped attempt that owns the permit (B.1). */
-export function openCall(inputs) {
+function openCall(inputs) {
     let open = true;
     const parentSignal = inputs.parent ? Context.get(inputs.parent.services, Signal) : undefined;
     const parents = [inputs.signal, parentSignal, inputs.requestSignal].filter((signal) => signal !== undefined);

package/dist/runtime/settlement.js

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 // it was created.") when the Worker's compatibility date is 2025-06-16 or
 // later, in releases since September 2026. The refusal throws out of the call
 // that completed the Deferred, failing the request that released a slot, and
-// the waiter never resumes (#1106). Awaiting a Promise around that wait is no
+// the waiter never resumes. Awaiting a Promise around that wait is no
 // help: the fiber waiting on the Deferred inside the Promise is resumed in the
 // completing request just the same.
 //

package/dist/runtime/shared-read.js

@@ -1,18 +1,5 @@
-// One read that several readers in one request wait on, each on its own terms.
-//
-// Discovery and the registry both coalesce a connector's catalog read inside
-// one request, so a search, a describe, and the call after them cost one
-// downstream listing. The read used to run under whichever reader asked
-// first: its signal was the read's signal, so a short-deadline call that
-// happened to start the read failed a search that joined it with the call's
-// timeout, and a cancelled search cancelled a read others were still waiting
-// on (#571).
-//
-// So the read owns its signal. Each reader waits under its own cancellation,
-// and the read is cancelled only when no reader is left to want it. Nothing
-// here is shared across requests: a SharedRead lives in one request's map and
-// is waited on only by that request's fibers, which is why a plain count of
-// readers is enough and no edge is needed between them.
+// Request-local catalog reads own their signal. Each reader waits under its own
+// cancellation; the read is cancelled only when no reader remains (INV-7).
 import { Deferred, Effect, Exit } from "effect";
 import { forkRequest } from "./run.js";
 import { requestOwner } from "./request-scope.js";

package/dist/sent-secrets.d.ts

@@ -224,7 +224,6 @@ export declare function agentOutputOperations<T extends Record<string, (...args:
 /** Slot reads cover custom handlers too, including keys put in query strings. A field named
  * as an identifier (an application or client ID, a username, a public key) is matched whole. */
 export declare function registerCredentialValues(secrets: SentSecrets, values: import("./types.js").ConnectorCredentialValues | null): void;
-export declare function trackCredentialReads(ctx: ConnectorContext): void;
 /** A connector's result or error as it enters: every connector's credentials and the
  * request's private arguments, under payload rules. */
 export declare function redactSentSecrets<T>(ctx: ConnectorContext, value: T): T;
@@ -235,7 +234,7 @@ export declare function requestSentSecrets(ctx: ConnectorContext): SentSecrets;
  * extracted from. Redact it whole first: a cut through an echoed form can leave a remnant
  * shorter than any fragment the output boundary matches, and a normalized number or
  * extracted substring may no longer hold the form at all. */
-export declare function redactBeforeCut<T>(ctx: ConnectorContext, value: T): T;
+export declare const redactBeforeCut: typeof redactSentSecrets;
 /** Base64, or base64url with `url`, of bytes or UTF-8 text Connecta returns to an agent: a
  * download, an attachment, a REST body, a page cursor. Every such encoding goes through here,
  * since no later pass reads through an encoding the output does not declare: the content is

package/dist/sent-secrets.js

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import { Effect } from "effect";
 import { classificationCode, ConnectorCallError } from "./errors.js";
 import { credentialUrlViews } from "./credential-url.js";
 import { RequestScope, requestOwner } from "./runtime/request-scope.js";
-import { viewSecrets, wrapViewCredentials } from "./runtime/call.js";
+import { viewSecrets } from "./runtime/call.js";
 import { visitPrivateCallArguments } from "./argument-redaction.js";
 import { keptErrorName, redactedCopyOf } from "./redaction-identity.js";
 import { REDACTED } from "./redaction-marker.js";
@@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ function headerSpace(text, at) {
 }
 /**
  * The echo's spans with the value of every sensitive header line (`headerLine`'s names) added,
- * read on the text before the echo is replaced (#703). An echoed private value can take part of a
+ * read on the text before the echo is replaced. An echoed private value can take part of a
  * header's name, its `:`, or a credential prefix such as `Bearer `, so the line cannot be read
  * after replacement; read here, the whole value goes, every cookie pair and any short tail with
  * it. A line that is not a sensitive header keeps its text. One forward pass; nothing is kept.
@@ -2512,9 +2512,6 @@ export function registerCredentialValues(secrets, values) {
             secrets.add(value);
     }
 }
-export function trackCredentialReads(ctx) {
-    wrapViewCredentials(ctx);
-}
 /** A connector's result or error as it enters: every connector's credentials and the
  * request's private arguments, under payload rules. */
 export function redactSentSecrets(ctx, value) {
@@ -2530,9 +2527,7 @@ export function requestSentSecrets(ctx) {
  * extracted from. Redact it whole first: a cut through an echoed form can leave a remnant
  * shorter than any fragment the output boundary matches, and a normalized number or
  * extracted substring may no longer hold the form at all. */
-export function redactBeforeCut(ctx, value) {
-    return requestSentSecrets(ctx).redact(value);
-}
+export const redactBeforeCut = redactSentSecrets;
 /** Base64, or base64url with `url`, of bytes or UTF-8 text Connecta returns to an agent: a
  * download, an attachment, a REST body, a page cursor. Every such encoding goes through here,
  * since no later pass reads through an encoding the output does not declare: the content is

package/dist/server.js

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ export function createFetchHandler(opts) {
             // Which sandbox, not how it is tuned: `connecta doctor` reports the
             // executor it just exercised rather than assuming one, and a
             // deployment whose executor identifies as nothing omits the key
-            // instead of inviting a guess (#368).
+            // instead of inviting a guess.
             ...(opts.executorName !== undefined ? { executor: { name: opts.executorName } } : {}),
             admission: {
                 policy: "global-fifo",
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ export function createFetchHandler(opts) {
         const defer = runtimeContext ? runtimeContext.waitUntil.bind(runtimeContext) : undefined;
         const originRefusal = routeMcp.rejectOrigin(request);
         if (originRefusal) {
-            return Effect.succeed(withSecurityHeaders(originRefusal, url, path));
+            return Effect.succeed(withSecurityHeaders(originRefusal, url));
         }
         // Container and orchestrator probes reach /health over plain HTTP on
         // loopback, where no proxy has set X-Forwarded-Proto. Redirecting them to
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ export function createFetchHandler(opts) {
             return Effect.succeed(withSecurityHeaders(new Response(null, {
                 status: 308,
                 headers: { Location: target.toString() },
-            }), url, path));
+            }), url));
         }
         const context = {
             request,
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ export function createFetchHandler(opts) {
             defer,
             runtimeContext,
         };
-        return Effect.map(route(context), (response) => withSecurityHeaders(response, url, path));
+        return Effect.map(route(context), (response) => withSecurityHeaders(response, url));
     });
     return function fetch(request, runtimeContext) {
         return runEdge(serve(request, runtimeContext), { signal: request.signal });

package/dist/skills.js

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import { bytesToHex, utf8Length } from "./bytes.js";
 import { duringViewEffect } from "./runtime/call.js";
 import { RequestScope, requestOwner } from "./runtime/request-scope.js";
 import { upwardStep } from "./upward.js";
@@ -9,7 +10,7 @@ import { runEdge, withDeadlineEffect } from "./runtime/run.js";
 import { closeScopeOnExit } from "./runtime/connector-scope.js";
 import { sentSecretsForRequest } from "./sent-secrets.js";
 const ROUTE = "Choose a route before discovery. One known-address read uses call_tool; one known-address write uses call_destructive_tool. Unknown-address read-only work starts with execute_code to discover, call, and return the answer; use the same route for reduction, multiple or dependent calls, loops, joins, or branches. Keep discovery and calls together when schemas suffice; do not return catalog matches alone. Sample unfamiliar reads.";
-const RECOVERY = 'When an auth error includes a handoff, give it to the user or operator. Use authorize_connector for a fresh link. Page resultId notices and format:"paged" handles with connecta.result(handleOrId, { page? }). Fetch skills({ name: "usage" }) only for missing guidance or program repair.';
+const RECOVERY = 'When an auth error includes a handoff, give it to the user or operator. Use authorize_connector for a fresh link. Page resultId notices and format:"paged" handles with connecta.result(handleOrId, { page? }). Missing guidance/repair only: skills tool "usage" or connecta.skill("usage").';
 /**
  * The always-loaded MCP `instructions` string. An endpoint is writable or
  * read-only: a writable one lets programs and call_destructive_tool write,
@@ -328,25 +329,6 @@ const MAX_SKILL_CATALOG_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
 const MAX_SKILLS = 1_024;
 const encoder = new TextEncoder();
 const PRIVATE = { resultType: "complete", ttlMs: 0, cacheScope: "private" };
-/** Bound metadata before cloning it, without another payload-sized byte array. */
-function jsonBytes(value) {
-    const json = JSON.stringify(value);
-    let bytes = 0;
-    for (let i = 0; i < json.length; i++) {
-        const code = json.charCodeAt(i);
-        if (code < 0x80)
-            bytes++;
-        else if (code < 0x800)
-            bytes += 2;
-        else if (code >= 0xd800 && code <= 0xdbff && json.charCodeAt(i + 1) >= 0xdc00 && json.charCodeAt(i + 1) <= 0xdfff) {
-            bytes += 4;
-            i++;
-        }
-        else
-            bytes += 3;
-    }
-    return bytes;
-}
 function localRecord(name, uri, description, content, aliases) {
     return { entry: { uri, frontmatter: { name, description }, resources: "dynamic" }, content, aliases };
 }
@@ -369,12 +351,7 @@ const localRecordsNative = /* @__PURE__ */ registerAuth(localRecords, function (
             (a.id < b.id ? -1 : a.id > b.id ? 1 : 0)), (connector) => authFlow(function* () {
             const name = validSkillName(connector.id)
                 ? connector.id
-                : `connector-${[
-                    ...new Uint8Array(yield* upwardStep(authInvoke(crypto.subtle, "digest", ["SHA-256", encoder.encode(connector.id)]))),
-                ]
-                    .map((byte) => byte.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))
-                    .join("")
-                    .slice(0, 48)}`;
+                : `connector-${bytesToHex(new Uint8Array(yield* upwardStep(authInvoke(crypto.subtle, "digest", ["SHA-256", encoder.encode(connector.id)])))).slice(0, 48)}`;
             const description = connectorGuideSummary(connector);
             const root = `skill://connecta/connectors/${encodeURIComponent(name)}`;
             const content = `---\n${JSON.stringify({ name, description }, null, 2)}\n---\n\n${connectorGuide(connector)}`;
@@ -474,11 +451,7 @@ const withManifestNative = /* @__PURE__ */ registerAuth(withManifest, function (
         const bytes = encoder.encode(record.content);
         if (bytes.length > MAX_SKILL_BYTES)
             throw new ConnectorCallError("unavailable", "Local skill exceeds the byte bound.");
-        const digest = [
-            ...new Uint8Array(yield* upwardStep(authInvoke(crypto.subtle, "digest", ["SHA-256", bytes]))),
-        ]
-            .map((byte) => byte.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))
-            .join("");
+        const digest = bytesToHex(new Uint8Array(yield* upwardStep(authInvoke(crypto.subtle, "digest", ["SHA-256", bytes]))));
         return {
             ...record,
             entry: {
@@ -723,7 +696,7 @@ export class SkillsRegistry {
                 const records = yield* upwardStep(Effect.forEach(yield* upwardStep(self.local), (record) => authCall(withManifest, [record]), {
                     concurrency: "unbounded",
                 }));
-                let catalogBytes = jsonBytes(records.map((record) => record.entry));
+                let catalogBytes = utf8Length(JSON.stringify(records.map((record) => record.entry)));
                 // Bounded sequential connector reads avoid unbounded fan-out and finish
                 // cleanup before a later connector's failure can end the whole listing.
                 for (const connector of self.registry.listConnectors()) {
@@ -736,7 +709,7 @@ export class SkillsRegistry {
                     if (!Array.isArray(entries) || records.length + entries.length > MAX_SKILLS)
                         throw new ConnectorCallError("unavailable", "Downstream skills listing exceeds its bound.");
                     for (const original of entries) {
-                        if (catalogBytes + jsonBytes(original) + 1 > MAX_SKILL_CATALOG_BYTES)
+                        if (catalogBytes + utf8Length(JSON.stringify(original)) + 1 > MAX_SKILL_CATALOG_BYTES)
                             throw new ConnectorCallError("unavailable", "Skills listing exceeds its byte bound.");
                         const entry = structuredClone(original);
                         validateEntry(entry);
@@ -758,14 +731,14 @@ export class SkillsRegistry {
                         if (records.some((record) => record.entry.uri === uri))
                             throw new ConnectorCallError("unavailable", "Downstream skills listing contains duplicate entries.");
                         const mapped = { ...entry, uri, resources };
-                        catalogBytes += jsonBytes(mapped) + 1;
+                        catalogBytes += utf8Length(JSON.stringify(mapped)) + 1;
                         if (catalogBytes > MAX_SKILL_CATALOG_BYTES)
                             throw new ConnectorCallError("unavailable", "Skills listing exceeds its byte bound.");
                         records.push({ entry: mapped, aliases: [], connector, files });
                     }
                 }
                 if (records.length > MAX_SKILLS ||
-                    jsonBytes(records.map((record) => record.entry)) > MAX_SKILL_CATALOG_BYTES) {
+                    utf8Length(JSON.stringify(records.map((record) => record.entry))) > MAX_SKILL_CATALOG_BYTES) {
                     throw new ConnectorCallError("unavailable", "Skills listing exceeds its byte or entry bound.");
                 }
                 // Keep the old investigation guide behind every connector and downstream

package/dist/sqlite.d.ts

@@ -27,22 +27,3 @@ export declare function sqliteStorage(database: SqliteDatabase): KVStorage;
  * older than `retentionDays`.
  */
 export declare function sqliteActivityStore(database: SqliteDatabase, options?: SqliteActivityOptions): ActivityStore;
-export interface StateFileImport {
-    /** Entries copied into the database. */
-    imported: number;
-    /** Entries left alone because the database already held their key. */
-    kept: number;
-    /** Entries whose TTL had already passed. */
-    expired: number;
-}
-/**
- * One-shot migration from the 0.28 `fileStorage` JSON state file: copy every
- * live entry, with its expiry, into the database's key-value table. Run it
- * once, with the old deployment stopped, before the first start on SQLite.
- *
- * Keys the database already holds are kept, so a second run copies nothing
- * twice and never overwrites state written since. The file is read, never
- * changed; delete it once the deployment is verified. A file that is not a
- * state file throws before anything is written.
- */
-export declare function importStateFile(database: SqliteDatabase, statePath: string, now?: number): StateFileImport;

package/dist/sqlite.js

@@ -4,12 +4,11 @@
 // install. `sqliteStorage` is the deployment's `KVStorage` and
 // `sqliteActivityStore` its activity history; both create their tables on
 // first use. Node-only: nothing reachable from the root entry imports this.
-import { chmodSync, closeSync, mkdirSync, openSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { chmodSync, closeSync, mkdirSync, openSync } from "node:fs";
 import { dirname, resolve } from "node:path";
 import { DatabaseSync } from "node:sqlite";
 import { effectSqlDriver, sqlDriverEdge, sqlSync } from "./storage/sql-driver.js";
-import { validateStorageKey } from "./storage/keys.js";
-import { KV_SCHEMA, sqlActivityStore, sqlStorage, } from "./storage/sql.js";
+import { sqlActivityStore, sqlStorage, } from "./storage/sql.js";
 /** Milliseconds a write waits for another process's write lock. */
 const BUSY_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000;
 /**
@@ -100,83 +99,3 @@ export function sqliteStorage(database) {
 export function sqliteActivityStore(database, options) {
     return sqlActivityStore(sqliteDriver(database), "sqlite", options);
 }
-/**
- * One-shot migration from the 0.28 `fileStorage` JSON state file: copy every
- * live entry, with its expiry, into the database's key-value table. Run it
- * once, with the old deployment stopped, before the first start on SQLite.
- *
- * Keys the database already holds are kept, so a second run copies nothing
- * twice and never overwrites state written since. The file is read, never
- * changed; delete it once the deployment is verified. A file that is not a
- * state file throws before anything is written.
- */
-export function importStateFile(database, statePath, now = Date.now()) {
-    const text = readFileSync(statePath, "utf8");
-    // The file holds stored state (tokens, sealed credentials), and these
-    // errors reach the operator's terminal, so they name the file and an entry's
-    // position, never a key or the parser's account, which quotes the text.
-    let loaded;
-    try {
-        loaded = JSON.parse(text);
-    }
-    catch {
-        throw new TypeError(`${statePath} is not a connecta state file: it is not valid JSON`);
-    }
-    if (loaded === null || typeof loaded !== "object" || Array.isArray(loaded)) {
-        throw new TypeError(`${statePath} is not a connecta state file`);
-    }
-    const entries = Object.entries(loaded);
-    for (const [index, [key, entry]] of entries.entries()) {
-        validateStorageKey(key);
-        const valid = entry !== null &&
-            typeof entry === "object" &&
-            typeof entry.value === "string" &&
-            (!("exp" in entry) || Number.isFinite(entry.exp));
-        if (!valid) {
-            throw new TypeError(`${statePath} is not a connecta state file: entry ${index + 1} has no string value`);
-        }
-    }
-    let db;
-    let transaction = false;
-    let step = "open the SQLite database";
-    const result = { imported: 0, kept: 0, expired: 0 };
-    try {
-        db = typeof database === "string" ? openSqlite(database) : database;
-        step = "begin the import transaction";
-        db.exec("BEGIN IMMEDIATE");
-        transaction = true;
-        step = "prepare the key-value table";
-        for (const statement of KV_SCHEMA)
-            db.exec(statement);
-        const insert = db.prepare(`INSERT INTO connecta_kv (key, value, expires_at_ms) VALUES (?, ?, ?)
-       ON CONFLICT (key) DO NOTHING`);
-        for (const [index, [key, entry]] of entries.entries()) {
-            step = `import entry ${index + 1} into the key-value table`;
-            const { value, exp } = entry;
-            if (exp !== undefined && exp <= now) {
-                result.expired += 1;
-                continue;
-            }
-            if (Number(insert.run(key, value, exp === undefined ? null : Math.ceil(exp)).changes) > 0) {
-                result.imported += 1;
-            }
-            else {
-                result.kept += 1;
-            }
-        }
-        step = "commit the import transaction";
-        db.exec("COMMIT");
-    }
-    catch {
-        if (transaction) {
-            try {
-                db.exec("ROLLBACK");
-            }
-            catch {
-                // Rollback errors can contain stored text too. Report the failed step.
-            }
-        }
-        throw new Error(`State import failed: could not ${step}`);
-    }
-    return result;
-}