@youdie006/prodex 0.40.17 → 0.40.18

package/dist/cli.js

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import { getTokenExpiryStatus, loadLocalConfig, resolveProdexCwd } from "./confi
 import { startHttpMcpServer } from "./http-mcp.js";
 import { createMcpToolHandlers } from "./mcp-tools.js";
 import { runMcpServer } from "./mcp.js";
+import { execNpm } from "../scripts/npm-command.mjs";
 import { BridgeStore } from "./store.js";
 import { printHelpIfRequested, assertNoExtraArgs, assertOnlyOptions, formatCliCommand, formatSourceCliOption, isHelpSubcommand, readFlag, resolveCwdFlag, resolveExistingPathFlag, resolveOptionalFileFlag, shellQuote, unknownSubcommandError, unknownTopLevelCommandError } from "./cli-args.js";
 import { listRawResultsForInspection, listTasksForInspection, runReceiptsCommand, runResultsCommand, runSessionsCommand, runTasksCommand } from "./cli-ledger.js";
@@ -711,7 +712,7 @@ async function readReleasePackageJson(packageJsonPath) {
 }
 async function readReleasePackStatus(cwd, packageJson, sourceCli, releaseHintCwd) {
     try {
-        const { stdout } = await execFileAsync(commandForPlatform("npm"), ["pack", "--json", "--dry-run", "--ignore-scripts"], {
+        const { stdout } = await execNpm(["pack", "--json", "--dry-run", "--ignore-scripts"], {
             cwd,
             timeout: 120_000,
             maxBuffer: 20 * 1024 * 1024
@@ -872,9 +873,6 @@ function writeCommandOutput(output, write) {
     for (const line of trimmed.split(/\r?\n/))
         write(line);
 }
-function commandForPlatform(command) {
-    return process.platform === "win32" && command === "npm" ? "npm.cmd" : command;
-}
 function firstErrorLine(error) {
     const failed = typeof error === "object" && error !== null ? error : {};
     const stderr = firstOutputLine(failed.stderr);

package/dist/config.js

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import { isIP } from "node:net";
 import path from "node:path";
 import { z } from "zod";
 import { SCHEMA_VERSION } from "./schema.js";
+import { ensureBridgeGitignore } from "./bridge-gitignore.js";
 import { readVerifiedUtf8File, writeVerifiedUtf8File } from "./safe-file.js";
 const BRIDGE_DIRECTORY_MODE = 0o700;
 const BrowserDefaultsSchema = z.object({
@@ -329,30 +330,7 @@ async function ensureBridgeLocalFiles(cwd) {
     const bridgeDir = path.join(cwd, ".bridge");
     await ensurePrivateBridgeDirectory(cwd);
     const ignorePath = path.join(bridgeDir, ".gitignore");
-    let current = "";
-    try {
-        current = await readVerifiedUtf8File(ignorePath, () => assertBridgeGitignoreTargetSafe(cwd));
-    }
-    catch (error) {
-        if (!isMissingFileError(error))
-            throw error;
-    }
-    const required = [
-        "tasks/*.json",
-        "results/*.json",
-        "sessions/*.json",
-        "receipts/*.json",
-        "artifacts/*",
-        "config.local.json",
-        "receipt-key.local",
-        "!.gitignore"
-    ];
-    const lines = new Set(current.split(/\r?\n/).filter(Boolean));
-    for (const line of required)
-        lines.add(line);
-    await writeVerifiedUtf8File(ignorePath, `${Array.from(lines).join("\n")}\n`, () => assertBridgeGitignoreTargetSafe(cwd), {
-        create: true
-    });
+    await ensureBridgeGitignore(ignorePath, () => assertBridgeGitignoreTargetSafe(cwd));
 }
 async function ensurePrivateBridgeDirectory(cwd) {
     await mkdir(path.join(cwd, ".bridge"), { recursive: true, mode: BRIDGE_DIRECTORY_MODE });
@@ -362,7 +340,9 @@ async function chmodPrivateBridgeDirectory(cwd) {
     const bridgeDir = path.join(cwd, ".bridge");
     const handle = await openNoFollowDirectory(bridgeDir, ".bridge");
     try {
-        await handle.chmod(BRIDGE_DIRECTORY_MODE);
+        // Windows uses inherited ACLs; POSIX modes do not restrict Windows access.
+        if (process.platform !== "win32")
+            await handle.chmod(BRIDGE_DIRECTORY_MODE);
         await assertDirectoryHandle(handle, ".bridge");
     }
     finally {
@@ -421,9 +401,17 @@ async function openNoFollowDirectory(dirPath, label) {
     const noFollowFlag = typeof constants.O_NOFOLLOW === "number" ? constants.O_NOFOLLOW : 0;
     const directoryFlag = typeof constants.O_DIRECTORY === "number" ? constants.O_DIRECTORY : 0;
     try {
+        const before = await lstat(dirPath, { bigint: true });
+        if (before.isSymbolicLink() || !before.isDirectory()) {
+            throw new Error(`${label} must be a real directory and must not be a symlink`);
+        }
         const handle = await open(dirPath, constants.O_RDONLY | directoryFlag | noFollowFlag);
         try {
             await assertDirectoryHandle(handle, label);
+            const opened = await handle.stat({ bigint: true });
+            if (opened.dev !== before.dev || opened.ino !== before.ino) {
+                throw new Error(`${label} changed while opening the directory`);
+            }
             return handle;
         }
         catch (error) {

package/dist/repo.js

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
 export function findRipgrep(env = process.env, exists = existsSync) {
     const pathDirs = (env.PATH ?? "").split(path.delimiter).filter(Boolean);
     const home = env.HOME ?? env.USERPROFILE ?? "";
+    const executable = process.platform === "win32" ? "rg.exe" : "rg";
     const fallbackDirs = [
         "/usr/bin",
         "/usr/local/bin",
@@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ export function findRipgrep(env = process.env, exists = existsSync) {
         ...(home ? [path.join(home, ".cargo", "bin"), path.join(home, ".local", "bin")] : [])
     ];
     for (const dir of [...pathDirs, ...fallbackDirs]) {
-        const candidate = path.join(dir, "rg");
+        const candidate = path.join(dir, executable);
         try {
             if (exists(candidate))
                 return candidate;
@@ -47,6 +48,9 @@ export function assertRepoRelativePath(repoPath) {
     if (path.isAbsolute(repoPath)) {
         throw new Error("Path must be repo-relative, not absolute");
     }
+    if (process.platform === "win32" && repoPath.includes(":")) {
+        throw new Error("Path must not use a Windows alternate data stream");
+    }
     const normalized = path.posix.normalize(repoPath.replaceAll("\\", "/"));
     if (normalized === "." || normalized.startsWith("../") || normalized === "..") {
         throw new Error("Path must stay inside the repo-relative root");
@@ -191,11 +195,14 @@ function parseRipgrepJsonMatch(line) {
     if (!isRipgrepJsonMatch(event))
         return undefined;
     return {
-        path: event.data.path.text.replace(/^\.\//, ""),
+        path: normalizeRipgrepMatchPath(event.data.path.text),
         line: event.data.line_number,
         text: stripOneTrailingLineEnding(event.data.lines.text)
     };
 }
+function normalizeRipgrepMatchPath(matchPath) {
+    return matchPath.split(path.sep).join("/").replace(/^\.\//, "");
+}
 function isRipgrepJsonMatch(value) {
     if (!isRecord(value) || value.type !== "match" || !isRecord(value.data))
         return false;

package/dist/safe-file.js

@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ export async function readVerifiedUtf8File(filePath, validate, options = {}) {
         const content = await readHandleUtf8(handle, filePath, options.maxBytes);
         if (options.mode !== undefined) {
             await testHooks.beforeChmod?.(filePath, "read");
+            await assertSafeOpenFile(handle, filePath, "read");
             await handle.chmod(options.mode);
         }
         await validate();
@@ -108,6 +109,7 @@ export async function writeVerifiedUtf8File(filePath, content, validate, options
         await testHooks.afterWrite?.(filePath, "write");
         if (options.mode !== undefined) {
             await testHooks.beforeChmod?.(filePath, "write");
+            await assertSafeOpenFile(handle, filePath, "write");
             await handle.chmod(options.mode);
         }
         await validate();
@@ -131,16 +133,17 @@ export async function replaceVerifiedUtf8File(filePath, content, validate, verif
         const latestContent = await readHandleUtf8(handle, filePath, options.maxBytes);
         await verifyCurrentContent(latestContent);
         await testHooks.beforeWrite?.(filePath, "write");
-        await replaceByVerifiedTempFile(filePath, content, validate, options, {
-            beforeOpenAlreadyRan: true,
-            beforeWriteAlreadyRan: true,
-            parentSnapshot,
-            skipExistingTargetCheck: true
-        });
     }
     finally {
         await handle.close();
     }
+    // Windows cannot replace some files while their verification handle is open.
+    await replaceByVerifiedTempFile(filePath, content, validate, options, {
+        beforeOpenAlreadyRan: true,
+        beforeWriteAlreadyRan: true,
+        parentSnapshot,
+        skipExistingTargetCheck: true
+    });
 }
 async function replaceByVerifiedTempFile(filePath, content, validate, options = {}, hookState = {}) {
     await validate();
@@ -159,6 +162,7 @@ async function replaceByVerifiedTempFile(filePath, content, validate, options =
             await writeHandleUtf8(tmpHandle, tmpPath, content);
             if (options.mode !== undefined) {
                 await testHooks.beforeChmod?.(filePath, "write");
+                await assertSafeOpenFile(tmpHandle, tmpPath, "write");
                 await tmpHandle.chmod(options.mode);
             }
         }
@@ -182,6 +186,7 @@ async function replaceByVerifiedTempFile(filePath, content, validate, options =
     }
 }
 async function readHandleUtf8(handle, filePath, maxBytes) {
+    await assertOpenFileMatchesPath(handle, filePath, "read");
     const stat = await handle.stat();
     if (!stat.isFile()) {
         throw new Error("Target path is not a regular file");
@@ -205,7 +210,7 @@ async function readHandleUtf8(handle, filePath, maxBytes) {
 }
 async function writeHandleUtf8(handle, filePath, content) {
     const replacement = Buffer.from(content, "utf8");
-    await assertSafeOpenFile(handle, filePath);
+    await assertSafeOpenFile(handle, filePath, "write");
     await handle.truncate(0);
     let offset = 0;
     while (offset < replacement.length) {
@@ -216,11 +221,36 @@ async function writeHandleUtf8(handle, filePath, content) {
         offset += bytesWritten;
     }
 }
-async function assertSafeOpenFile(handle, filePath) {
-    const stat = await handle.stat();
-    if (!stat.isFile()) {
+async function assertOpenFileMatchesPath(handle, filePath, operation) {
+    const handleStat = await handle.stat({ bigint: true });
+    if (!handleStat.isFile()) {
+        throw new Error("Target path is not a regular file");
+    }
+    let pathStat;
+    try {
+        pathStat = await lstat(filePath, { bigint: true });
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        if (isMissingFileError(error)) {
+            throw new Error(`Target path changed during ${operation} file operation`);
+        }
+        throw error;
+    }
+    if (pathStat.isSymbolicLink()) {
+        throw new Error(`Target path is a symlink or changed during ${operation} file operation`);
+    }
+    if (!pathStat.isFile()) {
         throw new Error("Target path is not a regular file");
     }
+    const handleIdentity = { dev: BigInt(handleStat.dev), ino: BigInt(handleStat.ino) };
+    const pathIdentity = { dev: BigInt(pathStat.dev), ino: BigInt(pathStat.ino) };
+    if (!sameFileIdentity(handleIdentity, pathIdentity)) {
+        throw new Error(`Target path changed during ${operation} file operation`);
+    }
+}
+async function assertSafeOpenFile(handle, filePath, operation) {
+    await assertOpenFileMatchesPath(handle, filePath, operation);
+    const stat = await handle.stat();
     assertNotHardLinked(filePath, stat.nlink);
 }
 function assertNotHardLinked(filePath, linkCount) {
@@ -271,8 +301,10 @@ async function captureParentSnapshot(filePath) {
     };
 }
 async function openStableNoFollow(filePath, flags, operation, parentSnapshot, mode) {
-    if (!parentSnapshot)
-        return openNoFollow(filePath, flags, operation, mode);
+    if (!parentSnapshot) {
+        const handle = await openNoFollow(filePath, flags, operation, mode);
+        return verifyOpenedHandle(handle, filePath, operation);
+    }
     if (process.platform !== "linux") {
         const actualParentBeforeOpen = await realpath(parentSnapshot.path);
         if (actualParentBeforeOpen !== parentSnapshot.realPath) {
@@ -284,6 +316,7 @@ async function openStableNoFollow(filePath, flags, operation, parentSnapshot, mo
             if (actualParentAfterOpen !== parentSnapshot.realPath) {
                 throw new Error(`Parent directory changed during ${operation} file operation`);
             }
+            await assertOpenFileMatchesPath(handle, filePath, operation);
             return handle;
         }
         catch (error) {
@@ -298,12 +331,23 @@ async function openStableNoFollow(filePath, flags, operation, parentSnapshot, mo
         if (actualParent !== parentSnapshot.realPath) {
             throw new Error(`Parent directory changed during ${operation} file operation`);
         }
-        return await openNoFollow(path.join(parentFdPath, path.basename(filePath)), flags, operation, mode);
+        const handle = await openNoFollow(path.join(parentFdPath, path.basename(filePath)), flags, operation, mode);
+        return await verifyOpenedHandle(handle, filePath, operation);
     }
     finally {
         await parentHandle.close();
     }
 }
+async function verifyOpenedHandle(handle, filePath, operation) {
+    try {
+        await assertOpenFileMatchesPath(handle, filePath, operation);
+        return handle;
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        await handle.close().catch(() => undefined);
+        throw error;
+    }
+}
 async function openNoFollowDirectory(dirPath, operation) {
     const noFollowFlag = typeof constants.O_NOFOLLOW === "number" ? constants.O_NOFOLLOW : 0;
     const directoryFlag = typeof constants.O_DIRECTORY === "number" ? constants.O_DIRECTORY : 0;

package/dist/store-writer.js

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 //
 // Everything after the anchoring uses the same helpers the in-process path uses,
 // on relative names.
-import { closeSync, constants, fstatSync, openSync } from "node:fs";
+import { closeSync, constants, fstatSync, lstatSync, openSync } from "node:fs";
 import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
 import { link, lstat, readdir, rename, rm } from "node:fs/promises";
 import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
@@ -34,7 +34,22 @@ function sameIdentity(a, b) {
 function openDirectoryHere(name) {
     const directoryFlag = typeof constants.O_DIRECTORY === "number" ? constants.O_DIRECTORY : 0;
     const noFollowFlag = typeof constants.O_NOFOLLOW === "number" ? constants.O_NOFOLLOW : 0;
-    return openSync(name, constants.O_RDONLY | directoryFlag | noFollowFlag);
+    const before = lstatSync(name, { bigint: true });
+    if (before.isSymbolicLink() || !before.isDirectory()) {
+        throw new Error("Anchored writer expected a real directory, not a symlink");
+    }
+    const fd = openSync(name, constants.O_RDONLY | directoryFlag | noFollowFlag);
+    try {
+        const opened = fstatSync(fd, { bigint: true });
+        if (opened.dev !== before.dev || opened.ino !== before.ino || !opened.isDirectory()) {
+            throw new Error("Anchored writer directory changed while opening");
+        }
+        return fd;
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        closeSync(fd);
+        throw error;
+    }
 }
 function currentDirectoryIdentity() {
     const fd = openDirectoryHere(".");
@@ -55,10 +70,10 @@ export function anchorCurrentDirectory(anchor, segments) {
         throw new Error("Anchored writer was not started in the directory the caller validated");
     }
     for (const segment of segments) {
-        if (segment.length === 0 || segment === "." || segment === ".." || segment.includes("/")) {
+        if (segment.length === 0 || segment === "." || segment === ".." || /[\\/]/.test(segment) || (process.platform === "win32" && segment.includes(":"))) {
             throw new Error(`Anchored writer refuses to descend into ${JSON.stringify(segment)}`);
         }
-        // O_NOFOLLOW proves the name is a real directory rather than a symlink, and
+        // The no-follow/identity checks reject symlinks and Windows junctions, and
         // the identity check after chdir proves we landed on that same directory
         // and not on something swapped in between the two calls.
         const fd = openDirectoryHere(segment);
@@ -100,7 +115,7 @@ export async function runAnchoredJob(job) {
         }
     };
     const { fileName } = job;
-    if (fileName.length === 0 || fileName.includes("/") || fileName === "." || fileName === "..") {
+    if (fileName.length === 0 || /[\\/]/.test(fileName) || (process.platform === "win32" && fileName.includes(":")) || fileName === "." || fileName === "..") {
         throw new Error(`Anchored writer refuses the file name ${JSON.stringify(fileName)}`);
     }
     if (job.op === "deleteIfPresent") {

package/dist/store.js

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import { createHash, createHmac, randomBytes, randomUUID, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
 import { createRequire } from "node:module";
 import { registerBridgeRoot } from "./registry.js";
+import { ensureBridgeGitignore } from "./bridge-gitignore.js";
 import { closeSync, constants, existsSync, openSync, readdirSync } from "node:fs";
 import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
 import { link, lstat, mkdir, open, readdir, realpath, rename, rm, stat } from "node:fs/promises";
@@ -841,31 +842,7 @@ export class BridgeStore {
     }
     async ensureBridgeGitignore() {
         const ignorePath = path.join(this.bridgeDir, ".gitignore");
-        let current = "";
-        try {
-            current = await readVerifiedUtf8File(ignorePath, () => this.assertBridgeGitignoreTargetSafe());
-        }
-        catch (error) {
-            if (!isErrorCode(error, "ENOENT"))
-                throw error;
-        }
-        const required = [
-            "tasks/*.json",
-            "results/*.json",
-            "sessions/*.json",
-            "receipts/*.json",
-            "artifacts/*",
-            "config.local.json",
-            "receipt-key.local",
-            "last-browser-send",
-            "!.gitignore"
-        ];
-        const lines = new Set(current.split(/\r?\n/).filter(Boolean));
-        for (const line of required)
-            lines.add(line);
-        await writeVerifiedUtf8File(ignorePath, `${Array.from(lines).join("\n")}\n`, () => this.assertBridgeGitignoreTargetSafe(), {
-            create: true
-        });
+        await ensureBridgeGitignore(ignorePath, () => this.assertBridgeGitignoreTargetSafe());
     }
     async hasReadyBridgeStorageReadOnly() {
         try {
@@ -1025,6 +1002,12 @@ export class BridgeStore {
             throw new Error(`Bridge record path must stay under .bridge/${kind}`);
         }
         await this.assertStorageDirIsRealDirectory(kind);
+        if (job.op === "cleanupTempHardLinks") {
+            await storeTestHooks.beforeRecordTempCleanup?.(kind, filePath);
+        }
+        else if (job.op === "writeByRename" || job.op === "linkIfAbsent") {
+            await storeTestHooks.beforeRecordRename?.(kind, filePath);
+        }
         const outcome = await runAnchoredWrite(this.bridgeDir, [kind], {
             ...job,
             fileName: path.basename(filePath),
@@ -1549,9 +1532,17 @@ async function openNoFollowDirectory(dirPath, label) {
     const noFollowFlag = typeof constants.O_NOFOLLOW === "number" ? constants.O_NOFOLLOW : 0;
     const directoryFlag = typeof constants.O_DIRECTORY === "number" ? constants.O_DIRECTORY : 0;
     try {
+        const before = await lstat(dirPath, { bigint: true });
+        if (before.isSymbolicLink() || !before.isDirectory()) {
+            throw new Error(`${label} must be a real directory and must not be a symlink`);
+        }
         const handle = await open(dirPath, constants.O_RDONLY | directoryFlag | noFollowFlag);
         try {
             await assertOpenDirectoryHandle(handle);
+            const opened = await handle.stat({ bigint: true });
+            if (opened.dev !== before.dev || opened.ino !== before.ino) {
+                throw new Error(`${label} changed while opening the directory`);
+            }
             return handle;
         }
         catch (error) {
@@ -1574,7 +1565,9 @@ async function ensurePrivateDirectory(dirPath, label) {
 async function chmodPrivateDirectory(dirPath, label) {
     const handle = await openNoFollowDirectory(dirPath, label);
     try {
-        await handle.chmod(BRIDGE_DIRECTORY_MODE);
+        // Windows uses inherited ACLs; fchmod on a read-only directory is EPERM.
+        if (process.platform !== "win32")
+            await handle.chmod(BRIDGE_DIRECTORY_MODE);
         await assertOpenDirectoryHandle(handle);
     }
     finally {

package/dist/tui-run.js

@@ -382,5 +382,5 @@ function cancel(io) {
 }
 /** Quote only what a shell would need quoted, so the echo can be pasted. */
 export function formatCommand(args) {
-    return args.map(shellQuote).join(" ");
+    return args.map((arg) => shellQuote(arg)).join(" ");
 }

package/docs/cli-reference.md

@@ -33,7 +33,9 @@ Not implemented:
 
 This section connects coding agents (Claude, Codex, ChatGPT Projects) to the bridge over MCP. It is not required for the standalone terminal flow above — if you only want Pro answers in your terminal, the [Quickstart](#quickstart-a-pro-second-opinion-from-your-terminal) is complete on its own.
 
-Requires Node.js 20 or newer, `git`, and `ripgrep` (`rg`) on PATH. The optional visible-browser adapter needs a Chromium-family browser: PATH binaries (`google-chrome`, `chromium`, `chromium-browser`, `microsoft-edge`, `brave-browser`), standard macOS app bundles, Windows Program Files/LOCALAPPDATA installs, and Windows-host browsers under WSL are all probed automatically; anything else via `PRODEX_CHROME=/path/to/browser`.
+Requires Node.js 20 or newer, `git`, and `ripgrep` (`rg`) on PATH. The optional browser adapter probes PATH binaries (`google-chrome`, `chromium`, `chromium-browser`, `microsoft-edge`, `brave-browser`), native macOS app bundles, and native Windows Program Files/LOCALAPPDATA installs. Set `PRODEX_CHROME` for another executable. WSL uses Linux browser paths, not automatic Windows-host browser discovery. Do not share one profile between native Windows Chrome and Linux Chrome. See [platform verification](platform-verification.md) and [local storage permissions](../SECURITY.md#local-storage-permissions).
+
+Native Windows command examples use PowerShell quoting, including doubled apostrophes inside single-quoted arguments. Use PowerShell 7 for compound examples containing `&&`; these examples are not `cmd.exe` commands. Internal CLI/MCP child processes receive literal argument arrays without a shell.
 
 Install from npm — **note the scope**. The unscoped `prodex` on npm is an unrelated third-party package; do **not** install it. Use the scoped name:
 

package/docs/platform-verification.md

@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+# Platform Verification
+
+Open source does not mean every operating system, architecture, filesystem, or
+browser version has been tested. This record distinguishes configured CI jobs,
+completed checks, installed versions, and live account-dependent behavior.
+
+## 0.40.18 verification
+
+Branch: `fix/cross-platform-verification`.
+Tracking PR: <https://github.com/youdie006/prodex/pull/6>.
+Verified runtime commit: `ba9551be75586b7ab603964a6cbf117483578766`.
+Completed six-job CI: <https://github.com/youdie006/prodex/actions/runs/34980308069>.
+Final release/publication and machine installation records are kept in the
+version-specific GitHub Release; this source verification is not an installation
+or an existing-client reconnection claim.
+
+| Environment | Completed result at verified runtime commit | Scope |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Ubuntu 24.04 x64, Node 20/22/24 | PASS | Each job: 1,614 passed, 0 failed, 3 platform exclusions; full release verification and headless smoke |
+| macOS 15 ARM, Node 22 | PASS | 1,613 passed, 0 failed, 4 platform exclusions; full release verification and headless smoke |
+| macOS 15 Intel, Node 22 | PASS | 1,613 passed, 0 failed, 4 platform exclusions; full release verification and headless smoke |
+| Windows Server 2025 x64, Node 22 | PASS | 1,615 passed, 0 failed, 4 platform exclusions; metadata, installed-package verification and headless smoke |
+| Windows 11 x64, Node 22.22.0 | Partial native verification | Actual installed command and fresh MCP passed; 42 CLI/product checks and 7 service-error checks passed. Local full security fixtures require file-symlink privileges and are not claimed as passed |
+| WSL Linux x64, Node 22.22.0 | PASS | Full release verification: 1,614 passed, 0 failed, 3 platform exclusions; earlier real headless browser smoke also passed |
+| Physical M3 macOS ARM, Node 22.22.3 | PASS | Full release verification: 1,613 passed, 0 failed, 4 platform exclusions; earlier real headless browser smoke also passed |
+
+## Earlier attempts
+
+Initial matrix commit: `37b1684795271f69afdca492562d99aa9c203e6d`.
+CI run: <https://github.com/youdie006/prodex/actions/runs/34964947086>.
+Integrated compatibility commit: `8569391d525e15e16e67665dbc19e04da53ee042`.
+Integrated CI run: <https://github.com/youdie006/prodex/actions/runs/34970055803>.
+Candidate commit: `33646bd4cdffca376f332f103f3c5a00932cf767`.
+Candidate CI run: <https://github.com/youdie006/prodex/actions/runs/34974010179>.
+Follow-up commit: `afec42d3e7f9f4e82601db6fe553dd742664f54d`.
+Follow-up CI run: <https://github.com/youdie006/prodex/actions/runs/34976162000>.
+
+The Windows initialization and junction regressions failed before correction and
+passed afterward. Additional native checks reproduced file replacement and
+concurrent initialization failures; their six focused regressions now pass.
+The additional concurrent gitignore replacement regression passed on native
+Windows after both initializers adopted the same verified, idempotent write path.
+The later 48-test Windows run also passed the original concurrent follow-up
+reservation test, npm credential-isolated dry runs, and anchored writer checks.
+M3's first integrated command incorrectly exported `PRODEX_NO_AUTO_LOGIN=1`,
+which disabled five mocked recovery tests. The complete release-verification
+command passed after removing that conflicting harness override. No account
+browser or login profile was used by those mocked tests.
+The initial Windows suite also lacks file-symlink creation privileges on this
+machine. This is recorded separately from product failures; no security test is
+declared passed by ignoring an `EPERM` error. Directory-junction checks can run
+without granting administrator privileges or changing Windows Developer Mode.
+
+Candidate 0.40.18 uses the unique root bin `prodex.mjs`: native npm produced
+archive modes 0755 for that bin and 0644 for `dist/cli.js` and `LICENSE`.
+The native metadata check and independent tar-header inspection passed. An
+initial root name `cli.js` was rejected because npm also marked the same-named
+nested compiled file executable. Strict release checks were not relaxed.
+WSL's installed-package smoke passed for the corrected 0.40.18 candidate.
+At that point, final candidate CI and installation checks were still pending.
+Native Windows focused reruns passed the 11 CLI regressions, two browser-send
+and profile cases, and all 21 release-pack tests. The candidate package smoke
+passed its formerly failing archive-mode check, then stopped at a real file
+symlink creation `EPERM`; that run is partial, not a package-smoke pass.
+The three link-swap regressions now assert their fixture was actually installed,
+so an unsupported symlink operation cannot masquerade as a rejected attack.
+
+One local staging attempt began before its source archive finished writing and
+failed with a truncated TypeScript file. That invalid snapshot was discarded;
+the complete archive was extracted and source hashes checked before rerunning.
+This was a verification setup failure, not accepted product evidence.
+
+The candidate Windows CI failure was reproduced locally by inheriting uppercase
+`NPM_EXECPATH`. It silently displaced explicit lowercase overrides, causing real
+npm to run instead of the intended fixture. After normalizing environment names
+before subprocess creation, the native npm/release suites passed 54 tests with
+one POSIX-only exclusion; their two file-symlink cases still failed with `EPERM`.
+The matching WSL checks passed 91 tests with one Windows-only exclusion.
+Follow-up changes also canonicalize Windows temporary paths, retain private-mode
+assertions only where POSIX modes apply, bound Windows file concurrency to four,
+and give the four-consult approval-renewal test a separate 60-second deadline.
+Those corrections required the subsequent complete matrix before publication.
+
+Follow-up commit `afec42d3e7f9f4e82601db6fe553dd742664f54d` was tested in
+<https://github.com/youdie006/prodex/actions/runs/34976162000>. Ubuntu Node
+20/22/24 and macOS ARM passed. Windows passed 1,597 tests with 8 failures and
+4 platform exclusions: every failure was an unhandled process-inspection error
+in product diagnostics. The strict Windows identity parser correctly refused
+incomplete process records, but diagnostics incorrectly aborted the rest of the
+report. The new regression reproduced that crash before correction. The fix
+reports an unknown-identity blocker without login/reset guidance, keeps shutdown
+ownership checks strict, and isolates refused-connection fixtures from the host's
+real process table. Focused checks passed on native Windows (42 tests) and WSL
+(49 tests); typecheck and the npm-helper declaration type probe also passed.
+macOS Intel passed 1,600 tests with 4 exclusions and three 30-second timeouts:
+the paired project-warning cases, paired terminal-state cases, and eight-task
+concurrent creation. The independent cases are now separate tests, and the
+concurrent case retains all eight tasks with a dedicated 60-second deadline.
+All five affected cases passed on WSL after this test-only correction. The
+subsequent complete matrix passed; no global or production timeout was raised.
+The two affected storage/send files also passed all 178 tests on physical M3.
+
+The user subsequently reported a rendered Cloudflare 502 page. Seven focused
+regressions verify service-error classification, exclusion of ordinary chat
+content, genuine authentication/protection precedence, and no automatic resend
+after submission on both WSL and native Windows. The full affected browser,
+process and product-check files passed 173 tests on WSL; typecheck passed.
+The page error itself is upstream; these
+simulated checks do not establish restored ChatGPT availability or a new live
+Pro answer, and no visible login window or account profile reset was attempted.
+
+The same `afec42d` snapshot passed full `CI=1 npm run release:verify` on WSL
+(1,604 tests, 3 platform exclusions) and physical M3 (1,603 tests, 4 exclusions),
+including installed-package checks. Native Windows installed the candidate into
+a temporary consumer path containing spaces; its actual `prodex.cmd` launched a
+fresh non-tmux MCP, reported 0.40.18 and 20 tools, and read the intended explicit
+working-directory fixture. The transport exited and left no matching child
+process. These are isolated candidate installs, not global deployment or public
+publication. Existing account browsers and the attached MCP were not restarted.
+
+## What each check proves
+
+- Unit/integration tests: local ledger, routing, path policy, and simulated UI.
+- Package smoke: installed CLI and MCP transports against disposable local data.
+- Browser launch smoke: a fresh headless profile with `about:blank`, CDP readiness,
+  script evaluation, owned-process shutdown, and cleanup. No ChatGPT login.
+- Live Pro verification: a separate, manually triggered account test with request
+  identity, model evidence, and saved result validation. None of the checks above
+  substitutes for this test.
+
+## Limits and prerequisites
+
+- Node 20+, Git, ripgrep, and a supported Chromium-family browser are prerequisites.
+- Virtual display requires Linux/WSL, Xvfb and xauth. Native macOS and Windows do
+  not support this mode; they must report that limitation without opening a window.
+- WSL uses a Linux browser/profile. Native Windows browser discovery is not WSL
+  cross-host browser support.
+- Native Windows storage inherits Windows ACLs. See [SECURITY.md](../SECURITY.md#local-storage-permissions).
+- Generated native Windows commands target PowerShell, not `cmd.exe`; compound
+  examples with `&&` require PowerShell 7. Internal subprocesses use literal argv.
+- Authentication, CAPTCHA, Cloudflare, permissions, and usage limits remain
+  explicit blockers. No automatic visible fallback or protection bypass is tested.
+- ARM Windows, Linux ARM, BSD, containers without browser dependencies, and every
+  historical OS/browser version are not covered by this matrix.
+
+## Installation and running processes
+
+At the start of this work WSL and M3 had CLI 0.40.17 installed. The MCP attached to
+the existing Codex client still had 0.40.16 loaded. Updating a package on disk does
+not reconnect that MCP or change an already-running browser's mode. No client
+restart has been performed in this verification task.
+
+The previously verified WSL no-desktop-window session uses ordinary headed Chrome
+on a private virtual display. It is not pure headless Chrome. M3's prior pure
+headless ChatGPT check stopped at Cloudflare. Neither installing this branch nor
+passing a no-account browser launch test removes that account-dependent blocker.
+
+After the reported 502, bounded read-only probes on 2026-09-15 at approximately
+14:38 UTC used the tested candidate adapter against the existing dedicated
+browsers. WSL was reachable with saved-login signals and a composer, with no
+blocker. M3 was reachable but returned `cloudflare_check`, not a 502. Neither
+probe opened a browser, changed profiles, reloaded a page, logged in, or sent a
+prompt. WSL readiness does not prove the upstream error's cause or a new Pro
+answer; M3 authenticated pure-headless access remains blocked.

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@youdie006/prodex",
-  "version": "0.40.17",
+  "version": "0.40.18",
   "description": "Local receipt bus for coordinating Codex execution with ChatGPT Pro/Projects consultation.",
   "author": "youdie006",
   "license": "MIT",
@@ -26,18 +26,22 @@
   ],
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {
-    "prodex": "dist/cli.js"
+    "prodex": "prodex.mjs"
   },
   "exports": {},
   "files": [
+    "prodex.mjs",
     "dist",
     "LICENSE",
     "README.md",
+    "SECURITY.md",
     "docs/claude.md",
     "docs/clients.md",
     "docs/http-mcp.md",
     "docs/releasing.md",
     "docs/cli-reference.md",
+    "docs/platform-verification.md",
+    "scripts/npm-command.mjs",
     "scripts/release-check.mjs",
     "scripts/release-pack.mjs"
   ],
@@ -49,6 +53,7 @@
     "release:pack": "node scripts/release-pack.mjs",
     "release:verify": "node scripts/release-check.mjs --verification-only",
     "smoke:package": "node scripts/package-smoke.mjs",
+    "smoke:browser": "node scripts/browser-launch-smoke.mjs",
     "test": "vitest run",
     "typecheck": "tsc -p tsconfig.json --noEmit",
     "prepack": "npm run build",