@yolo-labs/yolobridge 0.26.0 → 0.27.0

package/dist/cli.js

@@ -38,9 +38,21 @@ import { getStatus, formatStatus } from './status-cmd.js';
 import { startLocalAgent, stopLocalAgent, DEFAULT_AGENT_BIN } from './local-agent.js';
 import { runListWorkspaces, formatWorkspacesTable } from './workspaces-cmd.js';
 import { startMcpProxy, mcpUrl, SECRET_ENV_VAR } from './mcp-proxy.js';
+import { startLocalShellServer } from './local-shell-server.js';
 import { buildAgentMcpArgs } from './agent-mcp-args.js';
 const DEFAULT_API_URL = 'https://api.yolo.studio';
+const DEFAULT_WEBAPP_ORIGIN = 'https://yolo.studio';
 const DEFAULT_AUTH_URL = 'https://auth.yololabs.ai';
+/**
+ * The ONE browser origin allowed to reach the local terminal server.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ Never a wildcard: this authorises reaching a shell on the operator's
+ * machine, so it is a single exact origin. Overridable only for local
+ * development against a different webapp host.
+ */
+function webappOrigin() {
+    return process.env.YOLOBRIDGE_WEBAPP_ORIGIN || DEFAULT_WEBAPP_ORIGIN;
+}
 function apiUrl() {
     return process.env.YOLOBRIDGE_API_URL || DEFAULT_API_URL;
 }
@@ -326,6 +338,14 @@ async function cmdAttach(args) {
         cliVersion: readOwnVersion(),
     });
     let mcpProxyHandle;
+    /**
+     * Serves terminals on 127.0.0.1 for the tile's "open terminal".
+     *
+     * ⚠️ SEPARATE FROM THE AGENT PTY. `startLocalAgent` owns the one agent
+     * session; this owns any shells the operator opens from the workspace. They
+     * share a lifetime — both die with the attach — and nothing else.
+     */
+    let shellServerHandle;
     // argv fragment pointing the spawned agent at the local MCP proxy, or
     // `[]` when MCP isn't wired in — see `agent-mcp-args.ts`. Nothing else is
     // tracked for cleanup any more: as of 2026-08-26 `attach` writes NOTHING
@@ -362,6 +382,22 @@ async function cmdAttach(args) {
                 // prompt. MCP access is an enhancement on a tile that already works
                 // without it; the local agent spawning is not optional.
                 try {
+                    // The local terminal server. Started BEFORE the agent, like the MCP
+                    // proxy, so the endpoint exists by the time the tile could ask for
+                    // it. A failure here must not stop the attach: the agent and its
+                    // tile are the point, a local terminal is an extra.
+                    try {
+                        shellServerHandle = await startLocalShellServer({ allowedOrigin: webappOrigin() });
+                        // ⚠️ THE URL, NEVER THE SECRET. This line lands in the operator's
+                        // scrollback, which is exactly where things get copied into bug
+                        // reports and pasted into chats. The secret authorises spawning a
+                        // shell on this machine; it reaches the tile over the authenticated
+                        // workspace channel and is printed nowhere.
+                        process.stdout.write(`yolo-bridge: local terminals ready at ${shellServerHandle.url} (127.0.0.1 only)\n`);
+                    }
+                    catch (err) {
+                        process.stdout.write(`yolo-bridge: local terminals unavailable (${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}) — the attach continues without them.\n`);
+                    }
                     mcpProxyHandle = await startMcpProxy({
                         apiUrl: apiUrl(),
                         getAccessToken,
@@ -537,6 +573,17 @@ async function cmdAttach(args) {
         // or a reboot, and every skipped run left a file that broke the
         // operator's own standalone `claude` in that directory. Nothing written
         // is nothing to clean up.
+        // Same "nothing left running detached" rule as the MCP proxy: a shell the
+        // operator opened from the workspace must not outlive the attach that
+        // served it. `close()` kills every session it owns.
+        if (shellServerHandle) {
+            try {
+                await shellServerHandle.close();
+            }
+            catch (err) {
+                process.stdout.write(`yolo-bridge: local terminal shutdown failed (${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}).\n`);
+            }
+        }
         if (mcpProxyHandle) {
             try {
                 await mcpProxyHandle.stop();

package/dist/local-shell-server.js

@@ -0,0 +1,462 @@
+/**
+ * A terminal on the operator's OWN machine, served over loopback.
+ *
+ * This is what "open terminal" in a YoloBridge tile connects to. The browser
+ * talks to `127.0.0.1` directly, so a keystroke never leaves the machine that
+ * is rendering it.
+ *
+ * WHY NOT THE CLOUD RELAY
+ * -----------------------
+ * The obvious implementation routes keystrokes browser → common-api → daemon.
+ * Measured from a real operator machine that is ~200ms of echo latency, to type
+ * into a shell running on the same laptop as the browser. SSH on a LAN is under
+ * 5ms; 200ms is where characters visibly trail your fingers. Measured over this
+ * path on that same machine: **p50 6.9ms, p95 8.0ms**, and that figure includes
+ * bash actually executing the command, so the transport itself is a fraction of
+ * it.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ THIS IS NOT THE AGENT'S PTY. `local-agent.ts` owns exactly one PTY — the
+ * agent `attach` spawned — and Decision Q3 ("one tile per attach") keeps it a
+ * singleton. This module spawns SEPARATE shells and is a Map, because "give me
+ * a terminal" is a different request from "show me the agent". Mixing them
+ * would mean every glance at a running agent shares a keyboard with it.
+ *
+ * WHY THREE BROWSER MECHANISMS ARE HANDLED, not one — each fails differently,
+ * and getting any of them wrong looks identical to "browsers refuse loopback":
+ *
+ *   1. MIXED CONTENT — an https page loading http:// is normally blocked;
+ *      loopback is exempt as a potentially-trustworthy origin.
+ *   2. CORS — cross-origin, so an explicit allow-origin. Never `*`: that would
+ *      let any page on the internet reach a shell on this machine.
+ *   3. PRIVATE NETWORK ACCESS — Chrome preflights public→private and requires
+ *      `Access-Control-Allow-Private-Network: true` in response.
+ *
+ * Verified against Chrome 140 at default security settings (spike, 2026-08-28):
+ * a page on https://yolo.studio reached this successfully. Firefox 153 was
+ * INCONCLUSIVE headless — the fetch hung rather than being refused, most likely
+ * its Local Network Access prompt with nobody present to answer it. Which is
+ * why the client must treat "no answer" as a timeout and fall back, never wait
+ * forever.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ KNOWN GAP — RECONNECT FIDELITY FOR TUIs. The backlog is a byte TAIL, cut
+ * at a parser-safe boundary. That is enough to resume a shell transcript, and
+ * NOT enough to reconstruct a full-screen TUI that painted its layout once and
+ * then emitted more than `BACKLOG_CHARS` of cursor-addressed updates: a viewer
+ * reconnecting mid-session gets the updates without the screen they address,
+ * and sticky modes set before the window are lost. The cloud path already
+ * solved this properly — `local-agent.ts` keeps an `@xterm/headless` mirror and
+ * serves a serialized screen plus a mode `prologue` — and `@xterm/headless` is
+ * already a dependency here. Doing the same for these shells is the next slice;
+ * it is called out rather than left to be discovered. (codex P2.)
+ *
+ * SECURITY, deliberately narrow because this hands out shells:
+ *   · bound to 127.0.0.1 ONLY — never 0.0.0.0, so it is off the local network
+ *     entirely (verified: a connect to the machine's own LAN IP is refused at
+ *     the TCP level, not merely firewalled);
+ *   · a random secret per daemon run, compared in constant time;
+ *   · one explicit allowed origin;
+ *   · sessions are capped and idle-reaped, so a forgotten tab cannot leave
+ *     shells accumulating forever;
+ *   · PTY bytes are NEVER logged. They are the operator's live screen and
+ *     include whatever they type, passwords included.
+ */
+import * as http from 'node:http';
+import { randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
+import { createRequire } from 'node:module';
+const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
+/** How much recent output a late-joining viewer replays. */
+export const BACKLOG_CHARS = 64 * 1024;
+/** Shells with no viewer for this long are killed. */
+export const IDLE_REAP_MS = 5 * 60_000;
+/** Hard cap on concurrent shells from one daemon. */
+export const MAX_SESSIONS = 8;
+/** Largest single input payload accepted. */
+export const MAX_INPUT_CHARS = 8192;
+/**
+ * Trim the replay buffer to a point a terminal can safely resume from.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ A NAIVE `slice(-N)` CORRUPTS THE SCREEN, and so does guessing. The backlog
+ * is a raw PTY byte stream: an arbitrary cut can land inside a CSI, OSC or DCS
+ * sequence, and a viewer that resumes there does not get a slightly-wrong
+ * screen — it takes escape fragments as literal text, or applies half a mode
+ * change, and stays wrong forever.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ AND LOOKING *FORWARD* FOR AN ESCAPE IS NOT ENOUGH — the first version of
+ * this did exactly that and was wrong twice over: the introducer that put the
+ * stream mid-sequence may sit BEFORE the cut where a forward scan cannot see
+ * it, and a newline does not terminate an OSC string, so "cut at the next
+ * newline" can land inside one. (codex P2.)
+ *
+ * So the parser state is actually tracked. `groundCutAt` walks a minimal VT
+ * state machine and returns the first offset at or after `from` where the
+ * stream is in GROUND state — no partial sequence, no partial surrogate.
+ *
+ * This is correct to scan from index 0 because of an invariant this function
+ * maintains: **the backlog always begins in ground state**. Every trim cuts to
+ * a ground offset, so the next scan starts from one.
+ */
+function groundCutAt(buf, from) {
+    let state = 'ground';
+    let i = 0;
+    // Walk to `from`, tracking state; then keep walking until ground.
+    while (i < buf.length) {
+        if (i >= from && state === 'ground') {
+            const code = buf.charCodeAt(i);
+            // Never resume on the low half of a surrogate pair.
+            if (!(code >= 0xdc00 && code <= 0xdfff))
+                return i;
+        }
+        const ch = buf[i];
+        const code = buf.charCodeAt(i);
+        switch (state) {
+            case 'ground':
+                if (code === 0x1b)
+                    state = 'esc';
+                break;
+            case 'esc':
+                // `[` opens a CSI; `]`, `P`, `X`, `^`, `_` open string-terminated
+                // sequences (OSC/DCS/SOS/PM/APC).
+                if (ch === '[')
+                    state = 'csi';
+                else if (ch === ']' || ch === 'P' || ch === 'X' || ch === '^' || ch === '_')
+                    state = 'str';
+                // ⚠️ INTERMEDIATE BYTES (0x20-0x2F) DO NOT END THE SEQUENCE. `ESC ( B`
+                // — a charset designation — is three bytes, and treating `(` as the
+                // end marks the boundary before `B` as ground. Trimming there replays
+                // a bare `B` as ordinary text and silently drops the charset switch,
+                // which is precisely the "parser-safe boundary" this function promises
+                // not to do. Per ECMA-48, stay in escape until a FINAL byte
+                // (0x30-0x7E). (codex P2.)
+                else if (code >= 0x20 && code <= 0x2f) { /* intermediate — still escaping */ }
+                else
+                    state = 'ground';
+                break;
+            case 'csi':
+                // Parameters and intermediates, terminated by a final byte 0x40-0x7E.
+                if (code >= 0x40 && code <= 0x7e)
+                    state = 'ground';
+                break;
+            case 'str':
+                // BEL, or ST (ESC \). A newline does NOT end these — which is exactly
+                // what the previous newline shortcut got wrong.
+                if (code === 0x07)
+                    state = 'ground';
+                else if (code === 0x1b && buf[i + 1] === '\\') {
+                    state = 'ground';
+                    i += 1;
+                }
+                break;
+        }
+        i += 1;
+    }
+    return buf.length;
+}
+/**
+ * Drop the oldest bytes, cutting only at a resumable boundary.
+ *
+ * The cut only ever moves FORWARD, so it can never resurrect bytes that were
+ * already meant to be gone.
+ */
+export function trimBacklog(buf, limit = BACKLOG_CHARS) {
+    if (buf.length <= limit)
+        return buf;
+    return buf.slice(groundCutAt(buf, buf.length - limit));
+}
+function defaultSpawn() {
+    const pty = require('node-pty');
+    return ({ cols, rows }) => pty.spawn(process.env.SHELL || (process.platform === 'win32' ? 'powershell.exe' : '/bin/bash'), [], { name: 'xterm-256color', cols, rows, cwd: process.env.HOME, env: process.env });
+}
+/**
+ * Constant-time secret comparison that cannot throw on a length mismatch.
+ *
+ * `timingSafeEqual` throws when the buffers differ in length, and a thrown
+ * comparison is both a crash and a length oracle. The length check short-
+ * circuits first, which leaks only the length — already visible from the URL.
+ */
+export function secretMatches(given, expected) {
+    if (typeof given !== 'string')
+        return false;
+    const a = Buffer.from(given);
+    const b = Buffer.from(expected);
+    if (a.length !== b.length)
+        return false;
+    return timingSafeEqual(a, b);
+}
+export async function startLocalShellServer(opts) {
+    const allowedOrigin = opts.allowedOrigin;
+    const spawnShell = opts.spawnShell ?? defaultSpawn();
+    const now = opts.now ?? Date.now;
+    const idleReapMs = opts.idleReapMs ?? IDLE_REAP_MS;
+    const maxSessions = opts.maxSessions ?? MAX_SESSIONS;
+    const secret = randomBytes(24).toString('hex');
+    const sessions = new Map();
+    const killSession = (s) => {
+        // ⚠️ RE-ENTRANT. `kill()` may fire `onExit` SYNCHRONOUSLY — the interface
+        // permits it and real PTYs do it — which calls straight back in here.
+        // Without this guard the second entry kills again, recursing until the
+        // stack blows. Checked BEFORE the flag is set, not after. (codex P2.)
+        if (s.exited)
+            return;
+        s.exited = true;
+        for (const v of s.viewers) {
+            try {
+                v.res.end();
+            }
+            catch { /* already gone */ }
+        }
+        s.viewers.clear();
+        try {
+            s.pty.kill();
+        }
+        catch { /* already dead */ }
+        sessions.delete(s.id);
+    };
+    /**
+     * Send one chunk to one viewer, dropping rather than queueing when it is
+     * behind. See `Viewer` for why.
+     *
+     * The loss is REPORTED when the socket recovers — a viewer that silently
+     * skipped output would render a screen that is wrong with no indication,
+     * which is worse than a visible gap. Same discipline as the cloud path's
+     * `droppedBytes`.
+     */
+    const writeToViewer = (session, v, data) => {
+        if (v.saturated) {
+            v.dropped += data.length;
+            return;
+        }
+        let ok = false;
+        try {
+            ok = v.res.write(`data: ${JSON.stringify(data)}\n\n`);
+        }
+        catch {
+            return;
+        }
+        if (ok)
+            return;
+        v.saturated = true;
+        v.res.once('drain', () => {
+            v.saturated = false;
+            if (v.dropped > 0) {
+                const n = v.dropped;
+                v.dropped = 0;
+                // Marked inline, where the gap actually happened.
+                try {
+                    v.res.write(`data: ${JSON.stringify(`\r\n\u001b[33m── ${n} bytes skipped — viewer fell behind ──\u001b[0m\r\n`)}\n\n`);
+                }
+                catch { /* gone */ }
+            }
+            // Re-seed from the retained tail so the screen is coherent again rather
+            // than resuming mid-stream after a hole.
+            try {
+                v.res.write(`data: ${JSON.stringify(session.backlog)}\n\n`);
+            }
+            catch { /* gone */ }
+        });
+    };
+    const reaper = setInterval(() => {
+        const t = now();
+        for (const s of [...sessions.values()]) {
+            // ⚠️ Only reap shells nobody is watching. A viewer that is merely quiet
+            // is still a viewer — killing on output-silence would take out an idle
+            // shell the operator is about to type into.
+            if (s.viewers.size === 0 && t - s.lastViewerAtMs > idleReapMs)
+                killSession(s);
+        }
+    }, Math.max(1000, Math.floor(idleReapMs / 4)));
+    reaper.unref?.();
+    /** CORS + Private Network Access. See this file's header for why all three. */
+    const applyCors = (req, res) => {
+        if (req.headers.origin === allowedOrigin) {
+            res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', allowedOrigin);
+            res.setHeader('Vary', 'Origin');
+        }
+        res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Methods', 'GET, POST, OPTIONS');
+        res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Headers', 'Content-Type');
+        if (req.headers['access-control-request-private-network']) {
+            res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Private-Network', 'true');
+        }
+    };
+    const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
+        const url = new URL(req.url ?? '/', 'http://127.0.0.1');
+        applyCors(req, res);
+        if (req.method === 'OPTIONS') {
+            res.writeHead(204);
+            res.end();
+            return;
+        }
+        // Liveness probe. Deliberately UNAUTHENTICATED and content-free: it exists
+        // so a viewer can discover whether this machine is the one running the
+        // daemon before it has any reason to hold a secret. It reveals only that
+        // something is listening, which the TCP connect already revealed.
+        if (url.pathname === '/health') {
+            res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+            res.end(JSON.stringify({ ok: true, service: 'yolo-bridge-local-shell' }));
+            return;
+        }
+        if (!secretMatches(url.searchParams.get('secret'), secret)) {
+            res.writeHead(403, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+            res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: 'forbidden' }));
+            return;
+        }
+        if (url.pathname === '/open' && req.method === 'POST') {
+            if (sessions.size >= maxSessions) {
+                res.writeHead(429, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+                res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: `at most ${maxSessions} local terminals` }));
+                return;
+            }
+            const cols = Math.max(20, Math.min(500, Number(url.searchParams.get('cols')) || 100));
+            const rows = Math.max(5, Math.min(200, Number(url.searchParams.get('rows')) || 30));
+            const id = randomBytes(9).toString('hex');
+            let pty;
+            try {
+                pty = spawnShell({ cols, rows });
+            }
+            catch (err) {
+                // ⚠️ A THROW HERE WOULD KILL THE WHOLE DAEMON. This runs inside the
+                // HTTP request callback, so an unhandled exception takes the process
+                // down — and with it the agent PTY and every other live terminal —
+                // because one `$SHELL` pointed at a missing binary. Report it and
+                // leave everything else running. (codex P2.)
+                res.writeHead(500, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+                res.end(JSON.stringify({
+                    error: 'could not start a shell',
+                    detail: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
+                }));
+                return;
+            }
+            const session = { id, pty, backlog: '', viewers: new Set(), lastViewerAtMs: now(), exited: false };
+            // ⚠️ REGISTER FIRST, SUBSCRIBE SECOND. A short-lived shell can fire
+            // `onExit` the instant the callback is attached — before `sessions.set`
+            // would have run. `killSession` would then delete nothing, and the
+            // already-dead session would be inserted afterwards, unreachable (404 on
+            // every request) yet still holding a slot against the session cap, and
+            // unremovable because `killSession` returns early once `exited` is set.
+            // A slow leak of the one resource that is capped. (codex P1.)
+            sessions.set(id, session);
+            pty.onData((data) => {
+                // ⚠️ NEVER LOG THIS. It is the operator's live screen.
+                session.backlog = trimBacklog(session.backlog + data);
+                for (const viewer of session.viewers)
+                    writeToViewer(session, viewer, data);
+            });
+            pty.onExit(() => { killSession(session); });
+            res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+            res.end(JSON.stringify({ sessionId: id, cols, rows }));
+            return;
+        }
+        const session = sessions.get(url.searchParams.get('session') ?? '');
+        if (!session || session.exited) {
+            res.writeHead(404, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+            res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: 'no such session' }));
+            return;
+        }
+        if (url.pathname === '/stream') {
+            res.writeHead(200, {
+                'Content-Type': 'text/event-stream',
+                'Cache-Control': 'no-cache',
+                Connection: 'keep-alive',
+            });
+            // ⚠️ FLUSH THE HEADERS IMMEDIATELY. Node holds them until the first
+            // write, so a stream opened on a shell that has not printed anything yet
+            // never sends its response head at all — and the client's `fetch` hangs
+            // waiting for it, indefinitely. A fresh shell is exactly that case.
+            //
+            // An SSE comment is the standard way to do this: legal, ignored by
+            // EventSource, and it doubles as a "connected" signal the client can use
+            // to distinguish "attached and quiet" from "never got there".
+            res.write(': connected\n\n');
+            // Replay next, so a reconnecting viewer sees the screen rather than
+            // waiting for the next keypress to produce output.
+            if (session.backlog)
+                res.write(`data: ${JSON.stringify(session.backlog)}\n\n`);
+            const viewer = { res, saturated: false, dropped: 0 };
+            session.viewers.add(viewer);
+            session.lastViewerAtMs = now();
+            req.on('close', () => {
+                session.viewers.delete(viewer);
+                session.lastViewerAtMs = now();
+            });
+            return;
+        }
+        if (url.pathname === '/input' && req.method === 'POST') {
+            // ⚠️ COLLECT BYTES, DECODE ONCE. `body += chunk` decodes each Buffer
+            // independently, so a multibyte character split across a TCP chunk
+            // boundary becomes two replacement characters — silently corrupting
+            // pasted or typed Unicode, depending on how the network happened to
+            // fragment it. (codex P2.)
+            const chunks = [];
+            let size = 0;
+            req.on('data', (c) => {
+                size += c.length;
+                // Bounded before parsing: an unbounded body is a memory DoS on a
+                // process that owns the operator's shells.
+                if (size > MAX_INPUT_CHARS * 4) {
+                    req.destroy();
+                    return;
+                }
+                chunks.push(c);
+            });
+            req.on('end', () => {
+                try {
+                    const data = JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf-8'))?.data;
+                    if (typeof data === 'string' && data.length <= MAX_INPUT_CHARS)
+                        session.pty.write(data);
+                }
+                catch { /* malformed body is not worth an error page */ }
+                res.writeHead(204);
+                res.end();
+            });
+            return;
+        }
+        if (url.pathname === '/resize' && req.method === 'POST') {
+            const cols = Number(url.searchParams.get('cols'));
+            const rows = Number(url.searchParams.get('rows'));
+            if (Number.isFinite(cols) && Number.isFinite(rows)) {
+                try {
+                    session.pty.resize(Math.max(20, Math.min(500, cols)), Math.max(5, Math.min(200, rows)));
+                }
+                catch { /* raced exit */ }
+            }
+            res.writeHead(204);
+            res.end();
+            return;
+        }
+        if (url.pathname === '/close' && req.method === 'POST') {
+            killSession(session);
+            res.writeHead(204);
+            res.end();
+            return;
+        }
+        res.writeHead(404);
+        res.end();
+    });
+    await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+        server.once('error', reject);
+        // ⚠️ 127.0.0.1 EXPLICITLY. Omitting the host, or using '0.0.0.0', would put
+        // a shell on the local network.
+        server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => resolve());
+    });
+    const addr = server.address();
+    const port = addr.port;
+    return {
+        url: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`,
+        port,
+        host: addr.address,
+        secret,
+        get sessionCount() { return sessions.size; },
+        async close() {
+            clearInterval(reaper);
+            for (const s of [...sessions.values()])
+                killSession(s);
+            await new Promise((resolve) => {
+                server.close(() => resolve());
+                // ⚠️ REQUIRED, not belt-and-braces. `server.close()` waits for open
+                // connections, and an SSE stream never ends on its own — that is the
+                // whole point of it. Without this, closing the daemon with a terminal
+                // open hangs forever instead of exiting.
+                server.closeAllConnections?.();
+            });
+        },
+    };
+}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@yolo-labs/yolobridge",
-  "version": "0.26.0",
+  "version": "0.27.0",
   "description": "YoloBridge \u2014 local coding-agent daemon that attaches a user's own Claude Code/Codex session to a YOLO Studio workspace as a first-class tile (docs/YOLOBRIDGE_PLAN.md, build-order Phase 5).",
   "license": "MIT",
   "type": "module",