@yolo-labs/yolobridge 0.18.0 → 0.20.0

package/dist/approved-paths.js

@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
+/**
+ * The approval list that bounds which paths the ATTACHED AGENT will send files
+ * from.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ READ THIS BEFORE RELYING ON IT: THIS IS NOT A SECURITY BOUNDARY.
+ *
+ * The attached agent runs as the SAME OS USER as this CLI and normally has
+ * shell access. It can therefore run `yolo-bridge allow /` itself, or simply
+ * edit `approved-paths.json`. The principal this list constrains can rewrite
+ * the list. No amount of care in the containment checks below changes that —
+ * they are checks against a mistake, not against an adversary who is already
+ * inside the same trust domain. (Found by codex review, gpt-5.6-sol, before
+ * this had any consumer; an earlier version of this comment claimed a
+ * "structural invariant" and was wrong.)
+ *
+ * The same reasoning cuts the other way and is why the feature is still worth
+ * having: an agent with a PTY can already `curl -T` any readable file to any
+ * host. Nothing here can stop a determined or injected agent from exfiltrating,
+ * because it never needed our upload path to do it.
+ *
+ * WHAT THIS ACTUALLY BUYS, stated so nobody over-trusts it:
+ *
+ *   - It stops ACCIDENTS. An agent casually sending `~/.aws/credentials`
+ *     because it seemed relevant is the common case, and this prevents it.
+ *   - It keeps the credentialed path deliberate. Sending through OUR upload,
+ *     with the operator's workspace credential, requires an explicit act rather
+ *     than being the path of least resistance.
+ *   - It is an AUDIT SURFACE. Approvals are visible in `yolo-bridge status`, so
+ *     a grant that was widened — by the operator or by an agent — is legible
+ *     rather than silent.
+ *
+ * WHAT IT DOES NOT BUY: protection against a cloud-originated prompt injection
+ * that instructs the agent to widen the list first. If that threat is the one
+ * that matters, the approval has to come from a channel the LOCAL AGENT cannot
+ * reach — the operator approving in their own authenticated webapp session
+ * would qualify, since an injected local agent cannot click it. That is a
+ * different design, deliberately not this one, and it still would not stop
+ * `curl`.
+ */
+import * as fs from 'node:fs';
+import * as path from 'node:path';
+import { configDir, loadAttachment as loadAttachmentDefault, defaultIO } from './config-store.js';
+function approvalsPath(env) {
+    return path.join(configDir(env), 'approved-paths.json');
+}
+export const defaultResolver = {
+    realpath(p) {
+        try {
+            return fs.realpathSync(p);
+        }
+        catch {
+            return undefined;
+        }
+    },
+    isDirectory(p) {
+        try {
+            return fs.statSync(p).isDirectory();
+        }
+        catch {
+            return false;
+        }
+    },
+};
+/**
+ * Is `candidate` inside `root`?
+ *
+ * ⚠️ BOTH SIDES MUST ALREADY BE REALPATHS. This function does no resolution —
+ * that is the caller's job — because the containment check is worthless on
+ * unresolved input: a symlink sitting inside an approved directory and pointing
+ * at `~/.ssh/id_rsa` passes a naive `startsWith` every time.
+ *
+ * The separator is not decoration either. Without it an approval of
+ * `/home/yolo/projA` also covers `/home/yolo/projA-secrets`.
+ */
+export function isWithinRoot(candidateRealpath, rootRealpath) {
+    if (candidateRealpath === rootRealpath)
+        return true;
+    const root = rootRealpath.endsWith(path.sep) ? rootRealpath : rootRealpath + path.sep;
+    return candidateRealpath.startsWith(root);
+}
+export function loadApprovals(env = process.env, io = defaultIO) {
+    const raw = io.readFile(approvalsPath(env));
+    if (!raw)
+        return [];
+    try {
+        const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
+        if (!Array.isArray(parsed?.approvals))
+            return [];
+        return parsed.approvals.filter((a) => !!a && typeof a.path === 'string' && typeof a.workspaceId === 'string');
+    }
+    catch {
+        // A corrupt list must not be read as "everything is approved". Empty is the
+        // safe reading, and the operator can re-add.
+        return [];
+    }
+}
+function saveApprovals(approvals, env = process.env, io = defaultIO) {
+    io.writeFile(approvalsPath(env), `${JSON.stringify({ approvals }, null, 2)}\n`);
+}
+/**
+ * Approve a path for one workspace.
+ *
+ * Resolved and existence-checked HERE rather than at send time, so the operator
+ * finds out about a typo now instead of when a send mysteriously fails.
+ */
+export function approvePath(rawPath, workspaceId, env = process.env, io = defaultIO, resolver = defaultResolver, now = () => new Date()) {
+    const resolved = resolver.realpath(path.resolve(rawPath));
+    if (!resolved) {
+        return { ok: false, message: `No such path: ${rawPath}` };
+    }
+    const existing = loadApprovals(env, io);
+    if (existing.some((a) => a.workspaceId === workspaceId && a.path === resolved)) {
+        return {
+            ok: true,
+            alreadyPresent: true,
+            approved: existing.find((a) => a.workspaceId === workspaceId && a.path === resolved),
+        };
+    }
+    const approved = {
+        path: resolved,
+        raw: rawPath,
+        workspaceId,
+        approvedAt: now().toISOString(),
+    };
+    saveApprovals([...existing, approved], env, io);
+    return { ok: true, approved, alreadyPresent: false };
+}
+/** Remove one approval. Matches on the RESOLVED path, so removing by the same
+ *  spelling the operator approved with works even through a symlink. */
+export function revokePath(rawPath, workspaceId, env = process.env, io = defaultIO, resolver = defaultResolver) {
+    // Match on the RESOLVED path only. Matching the stored `raw` spelling as well
+    // looked convenient and was data loss: approving `output` from two different
+    // working directories stores two distinct resolved paths with the SAME raw
+    // spelling, so revoking either removed both. (codex P2, gpt-5.6-sol.)
+    //
+    // Two candidates, because an approved directory may since have been deleted —
+    // realpath then fails, and the operator must still be able to revoke the
+    // dangling grant by its absolute path.
+    const absolute = path.resolve(rawPath);
+    const resolved = resolver.realpath(absolute);
+    const before = loadApprovals(env, io);
+    const after = before.filter((a) => {
+        if (a.workspaceId !== workspaceId)
+            return true;
+        return !(a.path === absolute || (resolved !== undefined && a.path === resolved));
+    });
+    if (after.length !== before.length)
+        saveApprovals(after, env, io);
+    return { removed: before.length - after.length };
+}
+export function listApprovals(workspaceId, env = process.env, io = defaultIO) {
+    return loadApprovals(env, io).filter((a) => a.workspaceId === workspaceId);
+}
+/**
+ * May the AGENT send this path?
+ *
+ * A check against a MISTAKE, not against an adversary — see the module header.
+ * The agent can rewrite the list this consults.
+ *
+ * `implicitRoots` is the daemon's own working directory: the project the agent
+ * is already operating in, whose files it can read anyway. Everything else
+ * needs an explicit `yolo-bridge allow`.
+ *
+ * Fails closed on anything it cannot resolve — a path that does not exist, or a
+ * broken symlink, is not approved.
+ */
+export function checkPathApproved(rawPath, workspaceId, implicitRoots = [], env = process.env, io = defaultIO, resolver = defaultResolver) {
+    const resolved = resolver.realpath(path.resolve(rawPath));
+    if (!resolved)
+        return { approved: false, reason: `No such file: ${rawPath}` };
+    // Implicit roots are resolved too — the working directory can itself be
+    // reached through a symlink.
+    const roots = [];
+    for (const r of implicitRoots) {
+        const rr = resolver.realpath(path.resolve(r));
+        if (rr)
+            roots.push(rr);
+    }
+    for (const a of loadApprovals(env, io)) {
+        if (a.workspaceId === workspaceId)
+            roots.push(a.path);
+    }
+    for (const root of roots) {
+        if (isWithinRoot(resolved, root))
+            return { approved: true, root, resolvedPath: resolved };
+    }
+    return {
+        approved: false,
+        reason: `${path.basename(resolved)} is outside every approved path for this workspace. `
+            + 'Approve it from your own shell with `yolo-bridge allow <path>`.',
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * POSIX single-quoting for a path we print back as a COPYABLE command.
+ *
+ * Media directories routinely contain spaces (`~/My Footage/`), which alone
+ * makes an unquoted suggestion wrong. The sharper reason is that a path is
+ * attacker-influenceable in a way the operator would not expect — an agent can
+ * create a directory — and an unquoted `;` in a line the operator copies runs.
+ * Single quotes are literal in POSIX shells; the `'\''` dance closes, escapes
+ * one quote, and reopens. (codex P2, gpt-5.6-sol.)
+ */
+export function shellQuote(value) {
+    return `'${value.replace(/'/g, `'\\''`)}'`;
+}
+/**
+ * `yolo-bridge allow` — add, list or remove an approved path.
+ *
+ * Requires an attachment, because an approval is scoped to ONE workspace. A
+ * machine that attaches to several workspaces should not have a grant made for
+ * one silently apply to the others.
+ */
+export function runAllow(args, deps = {}) {
+    const { env, io, resolver } = deps;
+    const loadAttachmentFn = deps.loadAttachmentImpl
+        ?? ((e, i) => loadAttachmentDefault(e, i));
+    const attachment = loadAttachmentFn(env, io);
+    if (!attachment) {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            reason: 'not-attached',
+            message: 'No active attachment — run `yolo-bridge attach` first. Approvals are scoped to one workspace.',
+        };
+    }
+    const workspaceId = attachment.workspaceId;
+    if (args.includes('--list') || args.length === 0) {
+        const approvals = listApprovals(workspaceId, env, io);
+        if (!approvals.length) {
+            return {
+                ok: true,
+                lines: [
+                    'No approved paths for this workspace.',
+                    '',
+                    'The attached agent can send files from the daemon\'s working directory.',
+                    'To let it send from anywhere else:  yolo-bridge allow <path>',
+                ],
+            };
+        }
+        return {
+            ok: true,
+            lines: [
+                `Approved paths (${approvals.length}) — the attached agent may send files from these:`,
+                ...approvals.map((a) => `  ${a.path}${a.raw !== a.path ? `   (added as ${a.raw})` : ''}`),
+            ],
+        };
+    }
+    const removeIdx = args.indexOf('--remove');
+    if (removeIdx !== -1) {
+        const target = args[removeIdx + 1];
+        if (!target)
+            return { ok: false, reason: 'error', message: '`--remove` needs a path.' };
+        const { removed } = revokePath(target, workspaceId, env, io, resolver);
+        return removed
+            ? { ok: true, lines: [`Removed ${removed} approval(s) for ${target}.`] }
+            : { ok: false, reason: 'error', message: `${target} was not an approved path for this workspace.` };
+    }
+    const target = args.find((a) => !a.startsWith('-'));
+    if (!target)
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'error', message: 'A path is required.' };
+    const result = approvePath(target, workspaceId, env, io, resolver);
+    if (!result.ok)
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'error', message: result.message };
+    if (result.alreadyPresent) {
+        return { ok: true, lines: [`Already approved: ${result.approved.path}`] };
+    }
+    return {
+        ok: true,
+        lines: [
+            `Approved: ${result.approved.path}`,
+            'The attached agent may now send files from here. Remove it with:',
+            // The RESOLVED path, not what was typed: a relative spelling is ambiguous
+            // across working directories, and pasting it later could revoke a
+            // different grant than the one just made.
+            `  yolo-bridge allow --remove ${shellQuote(result.approved.path)}`,
+        ],
+    };
+}

package/dist/cli.js

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ import { hostname } from 'node:os';
 import { runLogin } from './login-cmd.js';
 import { runAttachFromDisk, pickWorkspaceFromDisk } from './attach-cmd.js';
 import { runShare } from './share-cmd.js';
+import { runAllow } from './approved-paths.js';
 import { runDetach } from './detach-cmd.js';
 import { getStatus, formatStatus } from './status-cmd.js';
 import { startLocalAgent, stopLocalAgent, DEFAULT_AGENT_BIN } from './local-agent.js';
@@ -100,6 +101,9 @@ function printHelp() {
         '                         RESUMES it (same tile) instead of adding a duplicate; --fresh skips',
         '                         that check entirely.',
         '  detach                 Detach the current workspace attachment.',
+        '  allow <path>           Let the ATTACHED AGENT send files from this path. You type',
+        '                         this; nothing in the cloud can. Also --list and --remove <path>.',
+        '                         The daemon\'s own working directory is always allowed.',
         '  share <path>           Share a local file with the attached workspace, so a cloud',
         '                         agent can see it. Push only — nothing reads your disk remotely.',
         '  status                 Print local login/attach state.',
@@ -345,6 +349,18 @@ async function cmdAttach(args) {
                         // guess which studio_list_tiles row is itself — and a backwards
                         // guess sends the prompt into its OWN input.
                         callerTileId: tileId,
+                        // Tools the proxy serves ITSELF (local-mcp-tools.ts). A cloud tool
+                        // cannot read this machine's disk, so sharing a local file is the
+                        // one thing that has to be answered here.
+                        //
+                        // `implicitRoots` is the directory the daemon was launched in — the
+                        // project the agent is already working in and can read anyway.
+                        // Anything outside needs `yolo-bridge allow`.
+                        localTools: {
+                            workspaceId,
+                            implicitRoots: [process.cwd()],
+                            commonApiBaseUrl: apiUrl(),
+                        },
                         log: (line) => process.stdout.write(`${line}\n`),
                     });
                     // Command-line MCP configuration, never a file in the project
@@ -550,6 +566,15 @@ function cmdStatus() {
     process.stdout.write(`${formatStatus(getStatus())}\n`);
     return 0;
 }
+function cmdAllow(args) {
+    const result = runAllow(args);
+    if (!result.ok) {
+        process.stderr.write(`yolo-bridge allow: ${result.message}\n`);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    process.stdout.write(`${result.lines.join('\n')}\n`);
+    return 0;
+}
 async function cmdShare(args) {
     const rawPath = args[0];
     if (!rawPath || rawPath.startsWith('-')) {
@@ -619,6 +644,8 @@ async function main() {
             return cmdAttach(rest);
         case 'detach':
             return cmdDetach();
+        case 'allow':
+            return cmdAllow(rest);
         case 'share':
             return cmdShare(rest);
         case 'status':

package/dist/local-mcp-tools.js

@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+/**
+ * Tools the daemon serves ITSELF, instead of forwarding to the cloud MCP.
+ *
+ * WHY ANY TOOL IS LOCAL. `mcp-proxy.ts` forwards the attached agent's MCP
+ * traffic to the cloud `yolo-studio-mcp`, and the agent already has full
+ * workspace-wide scope there. But a cloud tool executes in the cloud and cannot
+ * read the operator's disk. Sharing a local file is therefore the one thing the
+ * proxy has to answer on its own.
+ *
+ * TWO PROPERTIES THIS FILE EXISTS TO KEEP:
+ *
+ *   1. A local call is NEVER FORWARDED, so the operator's file never becomes a
+ *      cloud request, and no delegated cloud token is minted for it. The
+ *      interception in `mcp-proxy.ts` runs BEFORE `getToken()` for exactly this
+ *      reason — see the call site.
+ *   2. The upload opens the RESOLVED path the approval check returned, never
+ *      the string the agent passed. Checking one path and opening another is
+ *      how symlink containment gets defeated: an in-tree link can be repointed
+ *      between the two.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ THE APPROVAL LIST IS NOT A SECURITY BOUNDARY. The agent runs as the same
+ * OS user with shell access, so it can widen the list itself, and it could
+ * already `curl -T` a file out without us. What this buys is that ACCIDENTS are
+ * prevented, the credentialed path stays deliberate, and grants are auditable.
+ * Do not write a message here claiming more than that.
+ */
+import { checkPathApproved } from './approved-paths.js';
+import { runShare, describeShareFailure } from './share-cmd.js';
+/** Namespaced so it can never collide with a forwarded cloud tool name. */
+export const SHARE_FILE_TOOL = 'yolobridge_share_file';
+export const LOCAL_TOOL_DEFINITIONS = [
+    {
+        name: SHARE_FILE_TOOL,
+        description: 'Send a file from the LOCAL machine this agent is running on up to the cloud workspace, '
+            + 'so a cloud agent can see it. Push only — this cannot read paths the operator has not '
+            + 'approved, and nothing in the cloud can pull files from this machine.',
+        inputSchema: {
+            type: 'object',
+            properties: {
+                path: {
+                    type: 'string',
+                    description: 'Path to the local file to send. Must be inside an approved directory.',
+                },
+            },
+            required: ['path'],
+            additionalProperties: false,
+        },
+    },
+];
+function toolResult(id, text, isError = false) {
+    return {
+        jsonrpc: '2.0',
+        id,
+        result: { content: [{ type: 'text', text }], ...(isError ? { isError: true } : {}) },
+    };
+}
+/** Is this parsed JSON-RPC message a call to one of our local tools? */
+export function isLocalToolCall(msg) {
+    const m = msg;
+    if (!m || m.method !== 'tools/call')
+        return false;
+    return typeof m.params?.name === 'string'
+        && LOCAL_TOOL_DEFINITIONS.some((t) => t.name === m.params.name);
+}
+/**
+ * Run one local tool call and produce its JSON-RPC response.
+ *
+ * Errors come back as a tool result with `isError`, not a JSON-RPC error: a
+ * refused path is a normal answer the agent should read and act on, not a
+ * protocol fault.
+ */
+export async function runLocalToolCall(msg, ctx) {
+    // A message with NO `id` is a notification: JSON-RPC says do the work and
+    // send nothing back. `msg.id ?? null` would have turned that into a normal
+    // reply carrying `id: null` — a spurious entry in a batch, and a body where a
+    // notification-only request expects none. An EXPLICIT null id is a different
+    // thing and still gets answered. (codex P2, gpt-5.6-sol.)
+    const isNotification = !('id' in msg);
+    const id = msg.id ?? null;
+    const name = msg.params?.name;
+    const args = msg.params?.arguments ?? {};
+    if (name !== SHARE_FILE_TOOL) {
+        return isNotification ? undefined : toolResult(id, `Unknown local tool: ${String(name)}`, true);
+    }
+    const rawPath = typeof args.path === 'string' ? args.path : '';
+    if (!rawPath)
+        return isNotification ? undefined : toolResult(id, 'A `path` is required.', true);
+    const check = (ctx.checkImpl ?? checkPathApproved)(rawPath, ctx.workspaceId, ctx.implicitRoots);
+    if (!check.approved || !check.resolvedPath) {
+        return isNotification ? undefined : toolResult(id, check.reason ?? `${rawPath} is not an approved path.`, true);
+    }
+    try {
+        // Property 2: open what the check RESOLVED, not what the caller passed.
+        const result = await (ctx.shareImpl ?? runShare)(check.resolvedPath, {
+            commonApiBaseUrl: ctx.commonApiBaseUrl,
+            // The approval was checked against THIS workspace. The attachment on disk
+            // can have been replaced by a second `attach` since the proxy started, so
+            // bind the upload to the same workspace or refuse. (codex P2.)
+            expectedWorkspaceId: ctx.workspaceId,
+            write: () => { },
+        });
+        if (isNotification)
+            return undefined;
+        if (!result.ok)
+            return toolResult(id, result.message, true);
+        return toolResult(id, `Shared as asset ${result.assetId}. It is now visible in the cloud workspace.`);
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        return isNotification ? undefined : toolResult(id, describeShareFailure(err), true);
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Split an incoming body into "answered here" and "still needs the cloud".
+ *
+ * Handles the batch form because `injectToken` already has to, and a batch that
+ * mixes a local tool with cloud tools must not lose either half.
+ *
+ * Returns `undefined` when nothing is local — the overwhelmingly common case,
+ * so the normal path pays one `JSON.parse` and nothing else.
+ */
+export async function interceptLocalTools(rawBody, ctx) {
+    let parsed;
+    try {
+        parsed = JSON.parse(rawBody);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    if (!Array.isArray(parsed)) {
+        if (!isLocalToolCall(parsed))
+            return undefined;
+        const response = await runLocalToolCall(parsed, ctx);
+        // A notification produced no response; there is still nothing to forward.
+        return response
+            ? { localResponse: JSON.stringify(response), localIds: [parsed.id ?? null] }
+            : { localIds: [] };
+    }
+    const localIdx = parsed.map((m, i) => (isLocalToolCall(m) ? i : -1)).filter((i) => i >= 0);
+    if (!localIdx.length)
+        return undefined;
+    const responses = [];
+    for (const i of localIdx) {
+        const r = await runLocalToolCall(parsed[i], ctx);
+        if (r)
+            responses.push(r);
+    }
+    const remainder = parsed.filter((_, i) => !localIdx.includes(i));
+    return {
+        localResponse: responses.length ? JSON.stringify(responses) : undefined,
+        forwardBody: remainder.length ? JSON.stringify(remainder) : undefined,
+        localIds: localIdx.map((i) => parsed[i]?.id ?? null),
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Does this request contain a `tools/list`, whose reply we must rewrite to
+ * advertise the locally-served tools?
+ */
+export function requestWantsToolsList(rawBody) {
+    try {
+        const parsed = JSON.parse(rawBody);
+        const messages = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : [parsed];
+        return messages.some((m) => m?.method === 'tools/list');
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+const SSE_DATA = /^data:\s?(.*)$/;
+export function parseRpcEnvelope(text) {
+    const trimmed = text.trimStart();
+    // Plain JSON — the common case.
+    if (trimmed.startsWith('{') || trimmed.startsWith('[')) {
+        try {
+            const parsed = JSON.parse(text);
+            const wasArray = Array.isArray(parsed);
+            return {
+                messages: wasArray ? parsed : [parsed],
+                rebuild: (m) => JSON.stringify(wasArray ? m : (m[0] ?? null)),
+            };
+        }
+        catch {
+            return undefined;
+        }
+    }
+    // SSE framing: one or more `data:` lines, blank-line separated.
+    if (!/(^|\n)data:/.test(text))
+        return undefined;
+    const lines = text.split(/\r?\n/);
+    const dataIdx = [];
+    const messages = [];
+    lines.forEach((line, i) => {
+        const m = SSE_DATA.exec(line);
+        if (!m)
+            return;
+        try {
+            messages.push(JSON.parse(m[1]));
+            dataIdx.push(i);
+        }
+        catch {
+            /* a non-JSON data line (a keepalive, say) is left exactly as it is */
+        }
+    });
+    if (!messages.length)
+        return undefined;
+    return {
+        messages,
+        rebuild: (next) => {
+            const out = [...lines];
+            // Rewrite the frames we parsed, in order...
+            next.slice(0, dataIdx.length).forEach((msg, i) => {
+                out[dataIdx[i]] = `data: ${JSON.stringify(msg)}`;
+            });
+            // ...and append any EXTRA messages as their own frames, so a merged-in
+            // local result reaches a client that negotiated a stream.
+            const extra = next.slice(dataIdx.length);
+            const tail = extra.map((msg) => `event: message\ndata: ${JSON.stringify(msg)}\n`);
+            return tail.length ? `${out.join('\n').replace(/\n*$/, '\n\n')}${tail.join('\n')}\n` : out.join('\n');
+        },
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Add our tools to an upstream `tools/list` reply, so the agent can discover
+ * them alongside the cloud ones.
+ *
+ * Returns the text unchanged on anything unexpected — a malformed or
+ * error-shaped upstream reply must pass through untouched rather than be
+ * rewritten into something that only looks well-formed.
+ */
+export function augmentToolsList(requestBody, responseText) {
+    let request;
+    try {
+        request = JSON.parse(requestBody);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return responseText;
+    }
+    const requests = Array.isArray(request) ? request : [request];
+    const listIds = new Set(requests
+        .filter((m) => m?.method === 'tools/list')
+        .map((m) => m?.id)
+        .filter((id) => id !== undefined));
+    if (!listIds.size)
+        return responseText;
+    const envelope = parseRpcEnvelope(responseText);
+    if (!envelope)
+        return responseText;
+    let changed = false;
+    for (const m of envelope.messages) {
+        if (!listIds.has(m?.id))
+            continue;
+        if (!Array.isArray(m?.result?.tools))
+            continue;
+        // Paginated discovery: a client that follows `nextCursor` aggregates every
+        // page, so appending on each one yields duplicate tool names and an
+        // ambiguous or rejected registration. Add them to the FINAL page only, so
+        // they appear exactly once across the sequence. (codex P2.)
+        if (m.result.nextCursor !== undefined && m.result.nextCursor !== null)
+            continue;
+        const present = new Set(m.result.tools.map((t) => t?.name));
+        for (const def of LOCAL_TOOL_DEFINITIONS) {
+            if (!present.has(def.name)) {
+                m.result.tools.push({ ...def });
+                changed = true;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return changed ? envelope.rebuild(envelope.messages) : responseText;
+}

package/dist/mcp-proxy.js

@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
  * proxy serves have disjoint capabilities — see `providedSecrets` below.
  */
 import * as http from 'node:http';
+import { interceptLocalTools, augmentToolsList, parseRpcEnvelope } from './local-mcp-tools.js';
 import { randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
 const DEFAULT_MCP_URL = 'https://services.yolo.studio';
 export function mcpUrl() {
@@ -275,7 +276,7 @@ export async function startMcpProxy(opts) {
             res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: 'missing or invalid proxy credential' }));
             return;
         }
-        handleRequest(req, res, upstream, tokenCache.getToken, tokenCache.forceRefresh, fetchImpl, tracker, log).catch((err) => {
+        handleRequest(req, res, upstream, tokenCache.getToken, tokenCache.forceRefresh, fetchImpl, tracker, log, opts.localTools).catch((err) => {
             log(`yolo-bridge: local MCP proxy error: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`);
             if (!res.headersSent) {
                 res.writeHead(502, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
@@ -495,6 +496,39 @@ function mergeRetryResponses(originalResponseText, retryResponseText, retriedIds
         return originalResponseText;
     }
 }
+/**
+ * Answer a mixed batch whose CLOUD half could not be sent, without discarding
+ * the local half that already ran.
+ *
+ * The local calls have side effects — a file is uploaded by the time we get
+ * here — so silently 503ing the whole batch would hide a completed upload and
+ * invite the client to repeat it. Each un-forwardable id gets an explicit
+ * JSON-RPC error instead. (codex P2, gpt-5.6-sol.)
+ */
+export function mergeLocalWithRemoteFailure(localResponseText, forwardBody, message) {
+    const local = (() => {
+        try {
+            const parsed = JSON.parse(localResponseText);
+            return Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : [parsed];
+        }
+        catch {
+            return [];
+        }
+    })();
+    const failures = [];
+    try {
+        const pending = JSON.parse(forwardBody ?? '[]');
+        for (const m of (Array.isArray(pending) ? pending : [pending])) {
+            if (m?.id === undefined)
+                continue;
+            failures.push({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: m.id, error: { code: -32000, message } });
+        }
+    }
+    catch {
+        /* nothing forwardable to describe */
+    }
+    return JSON.stringify([...local, ...failures]);
+}
 async function forwardOnce(upstream, method, headers, body, fetchImpl, tracker) {
     return tracker.run(async (signal) => {
         const res = await fetchImpl(`${upstream}/mcp`, { method, headers, body, signal });
@@ -568,23 +602,72 @@ function hasValidSecret(req, secret) {
     }
     return valid;
 }
-async function handleRequest(req, res, upstream, getToken, forceRefresh, fetchImpl, tracker, log) {
+async function handleRequest(req, res, upstream, getToken, forceRefresh, fetchImpl, tracker, log, localTools) {
     const method = req.method ?? 'POST';
     const body = method === 'POST' || method === 'DELETE' ? await readBody(req) : undefined;
+    // ── Locally-served tools ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // BEFORE `getToken()` deliberately: a local call must never mint a delegated
+    // CLOUD credential, and must never leave this machine. A body that contains
+    // no local tool call falls straight through, paying one JSON.parse.
+    let forwardedAfterLocal = body;
+    let localResponseText;
+    if (localTools && method === 'POST' && body) {
+        const intercepted = await interceptLocalTools(body, localTools);
+        if (intercepted) {
+            if (!intercepted.forwardBody) {
+                if (!intercepted.localResponse) {
+                    // Every local message was a NOTIFICATION, which must not be answered.
+                    // 202 with an empty body is what the MCP Streamable HTTP transport
+                    // returns for a notification-only POST. (codex P2.)
+                    res.writeHead(202);
+                    res.end();
+                    return;
+                }
+                // Nothing left for the cloud — answer entirely from here.
+                res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+                res.end(intercepted.localResponse);
+                return;
+            }
+            // A batch that mixed local and cloud tools: forward only the remainder,
+            // and merge our answers back in below so neither half is lost.
+            forwardedAfterLocal = intercepted.forwardBody;
+            localResponseText = intercepted.localResponse;
+        }
+    }
     const headers = { Accept: 'application/json, text/event-stream' };
     const incomingContentType = req.headers['content-type'];
     if (typeof incomingContentType === 'string')
         headers['Content-Type'] = incomingContentType;
     else if (body)
         headers['Content-Type'] = 'application/json';
-    let forwardedBody = body;
-    if (method === 'POST' && body) {
+    // ⚠️ DO NOT narrow the Accept header to make the rewrites below easier.
+    //
+    // An earlier attempt asked for `application/json` only on requests whose
+    // response gets rewritten, to dodge SSE framing. That would have broken tool
+    // discovery outright: the MCP SDK's
+    // `WebStandardStreamableHTTPServerTransport.handlePostRequest` returns 406
+    // unless the client accepts BOTH `application/json` and `text/event-stream`
+    // (verified in the installed SDK 1.29.0, not assumed — codex P1,
+    // gpt-5.6-sol). The rewrites handle both shapes instead; see
+    // `parseRpcEnvelope`.
+    let forwardedBody = forwardedAfterLocal;
+    if (method === 'POST' && forwardedAfterLocal) {
         try {
             const token = await getToken();
-            forwardedBody = injectToken(body, token);
+            forwardedBody = injectToken(forwardedAfterLocal, token);
         }
         catch (err) {
             log(`yolo-bridge: MCP token unavailable: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`);
+            // The local half of a mixed batch has ALREADY RUN by this point — the
+            // file is uploaded. Dropping its reply would leave the client never
+            // learning the assetId and retrying the batch, uploading the same file
+            // again. So answer with what actually happened: local results, plus an
+            // explicit error for each id we could not forward. (codex P2.)
+            if (localResponseText) {
+                res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+                res.end(mergeLocalWithRemoteFailure(localResponseText, forwardedAfterLocal, 'MCP token unavailable'));
+                return;
+            }
             res.writeHead(503, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
             res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: 'MCP token unavailable', code: 'MCP_TOKEN_UNAVAILABLE', retryable: true }));
             return;
@@ -597,7 +680,12 @@ async function handleRequest(req, res, upstream, getToken, forceRefresh, fetchIm
     // isUnauthorizedToolResult's doc comment) — a real 401 from this upstream
     // has never actually been observed; the in-band case is the one that
     // matters in practice.
-    if (method === 'POST' && body && (result.status === 401 || isUnauthorizedToolResult(result.text))) {
+    // ⚠️ Every path below uses `forwardedAfterLocal`, NEVER `body`. The original
+    // still contains any locally-intercepted call, and re-forwarding it on a
+    // retry would send the operator's local file path to the cloud — breaking the
+    // local-only invariant on the one path that skips the interception. (codex
+    // P1, gpt-5.6-sol.)
+    if (method === 'POST' && forwardedAfterLocal && (result.status === 401 || isUnauthorizedToolResult(result.text))) {
         log(`yolo-bridge: MCP upstream reported an invalid/expired token (status ${result.status}), force-refreshing`);
         try {
             const refreshed = await forceRefresh();
@@ -607,7 +695,7 @@ async function handleRequest(req, res, upstream, getToken, forceRefresh, fetchIm
             // 200-with-mixed-results batch (Codex review, 2026-08-24, round 20)
             // needs the narrower partial-batch retry below -- see
             // `buildUnauthorizedRetryBatch`'s doc comment.
-            const retryBatch = result.status === 401 ? null : buildUnauthorizedRetryBatch(body, result.text);
+            const retryBatch = result.status === 401 ? null : buildUnauthorizedRetryBatch(forwardedAfterLocal, result.text);
             if (retryBatch) {
                 const reinjected = injectToken(retryBatch.requestSubset, refreshed);
                 const retryResult = await forwardOnce(upstream, method, headers, reinjected, fetchImpl, tracker);
@@ -631,7 +719,7 @@ async function handleRequest(req, res, upstream, getToken, forceRefresh, fetchIm
                     : { ...result, text: mergedText };
             }
             else {
-                const reinjected = injectToken(body, refreshed);
+                const reinjected = injectToken(forwardedAfterLocal, refreshed);
                 result = await forwardOnce(upstream, method, headers, reinjected, fetchImpl, tracker);
             }
         }
@@ -639,10 +727,56 @@ async function handleRequest(req, res, upstream, getToken, forceRefresh, fetchIm
             log(`yolo-bridge: MCP token refresh failed: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`);
         }
     }
+    let outText = result.text;
+    // A `tools/list` reply from the cloud does not know about the tools this
+    // daemon serves itself, so add them — otherwise the agent can only call them
+    // by guessing they exist.
+    if (localTools && method === 'POST' && forwardedAfterLocal) {
+        outText = augmentToolsList(forwardedAfterLocal, outText);
+    }
+    // Re-join the halves of a mixed batch. Order does not matter to a JSON-RPC
+    // client (ids correlate the replies), but LOSING one half would.
+    //
+    // ⚠️ STATUS MATTERS AS MUCH AS BODY. The local half already uploaded a file.
+    // If we propagate a non-2xx from the cloud half, a client may reject the whole
+    // HTTP response without reading it and retry the batch — uploading the same
+    // file twice. So once a local result exists, this answers 200 and reports the
+    // cloud failure per-id inside the body. (codex P1, gpt-5.6-sol.)
+    let outStatus = result.status;
+    if (localResponseText) {
+        let merged;
+        if (result.status >= 200 && result.status < 300) {
+            // The upstream half may be plain JSON or an SSE stream — it chooses. The
+            // envelope puts our local results back in whichever shape the client is
+            // already reading, instead of discarding the cloud half on a failed
+            // JSON.parse (codex P2).
+            const envelope = parseRpcEnvelope(outText);
+            if (envelope) {
+                try {
+                    const local = JSON.parse(localResponseText);
+                    merged = envelope.rebuild([
+                        ...envelope.messages,
+                        ...(Array.isArray(local) ? local : [local]),
+                    ]);
+                }
+                catch {
+                    merged = undefined;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        outText = merged
+            ?? mergeLocalWithRemoteFailure(localResponseText, forwardedAfterLocal, `upstream MCP request failed (status ${result.status})`);
+        outStatus = 200;
+    }
     const outHeaders = {};
     const contentType = result.headers.get('content-type');
     if (contentType)
         outHeaders['Content-Type'] = contentType;
-    res.writeHead(result.status, outHeaders);
-    res.end(result.text);
+    // Only force JSON when we could NOT preserve the upstream's shape (the
+    // failure-merge path emits a plain array). A successful merge keeps whatever
+    // framing the upstream chose, so the header must keep matching it.
+    if (localResponseText && !outText.includes('data:'))
+        outHeaders['Content-Type'] = 'application/json';
+    res.writeHead(outStatus, outHeaders);
+    res.end(outText);
 }

package/dist/share-cmd.js

@@ -185,6 +185,14 @@ export async function runShare(rawPath, deps) {
     if (!attachment) {
         return { ok: false, reason: 'not-attached', message: 'No active attachment — run `yolo-bridge attach` first.' };
     }
+    if (deps.expectedWorkspaceId && attachment.workspaceId !== deps.expectedWorkspaceId) {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            reason: 'workspace-changed',
+            message: 'This machine is now attached to a different workspace than the one this request was '
+                + 'authorised against. Nothing was sent. Re-run `yolo-bridge attach` or retry.',
+        };
+    }
     const scopedToken = attachment.scopedToken;
     if (!scopedToken) {
         // Nothing on this machine can mint one for an existing attachment, so say

package/dist/status-cmd.js

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
  * longer invisible just because it can't be printed to the screen.
  */
 import { loadAuth, loadAttachment } from './config-store.js';
+import { listApprovals } from './approved-paths.js';
 import { loadConnectionState, formatConnectionEvent } from './connection-state.js';
 export function getStatus(deps = {}) {
     const now = deps.now ?? Date.now;
@@ -31,6 +32,11 @@ export function getStatus(deps = {}) {
         loggedIn: Boolean(auth),
         attached: Boolean(attachment),
     };
+    if (attachment) {
+        const approvals = listApprovals(attachment.workspaceId, deps.env, deps.io);
+        if (approvals.length)
+            report.approvedPaths = approvals.map((a) => a.path);
+    }
     if (auth) {
         report.tokenExpiresAtMs = auth.expiresAtMs;
         report.tokenExpired = auth.expiresAtMs <= now();
@@ -78,5 +84,11 @@ export function formatStatus(report) {
             }
         }
     }
+    if (report.approvedPaths?.length) {
+        lines.push(`Agent may send files from (${report.approvedPaths.length} approved path(s)):`);
+        for (const p of report.approvedPaths)
+            lines.push(`  ${p}`);
+        lines.push('(plus the daemon\'s working directory. Change with `yolo-bridge allow`.)');
+    }
     return lines.join('\n');
 }

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@yolo-labs/yolobridge",
-  "version": "0.18.0",
+  "version": "0.20.0",
   "description": "YoloBridge — local coding-agent daemon that attaches a user's own Claude Code/Codex session to a YOLO Studio workspace as a first-class tile (docs/YOLOBRIDGE_PLAN.md, build-order Phase 5).",
   "license": "MIT",
   "type": "module",