@yieldfabric/wallet 0.2.1 → 0.2.3

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -524,6 +524,10 @@ interface WalletRuntimeConfig extends ModeConfig {
      *  cache reset + `userChanged` event dispatch here. Hosts that
      *  don't use Apollo can omit this. */
     onSessionBootstrapped?: (userId: string) => void | Promise<void>;
+    /** Runs BEFORE the session is torn down on `logout` / `logoutAll`,
+     *  while the token is still valid — the host forgets this device's push
+     *  subscription here. Failures are swallowed; sign-out always proceeds. */
+    onBeforeLogout?: () => void | Promise<void>;
     /** Optional toast / error reporting hooks for wallet-internal
      *  events that the host might want to surface (background poller
      *  failures, queue subscription drops, etc.). */
@@ -3469,7 +3473,8 @@ groupId?: string): Promise<string>;
  *
  *   1. Email not confirmed                     → 'email-required'
  *      (Averer signups skip this; Averer is already an identity gate)
- *   2. < 1 off-chain signing key               → 'wallets-required'
+ *   2. < 1 off-chain signing key, not deferred → 'wallets-required'
+ *      ("Skip for now" defers it on this device: `deferKeyStep`)
  *   3. Identity verification required but not done → 'identity-required'
  *   4. Profile (display_name + avatar) not completed → 'profile-required'
  *   5. Billing unavailable in a direct plan context → 'service-unavailable'
@@ -3493,11 +3498,13 @@ groupId?: string): Promise<string>;
  *   already a verified-identity ceremony, so we do not add a second
  *   email-code gate on top of it.
  *
- * - **Signing key before identity.** A user without a signing key has no way to act on
- *   the platform anyway, and capturing the key first means the identity
- *   step (Stripe KYC) can stamp itself against an established signer
- *   rather than a "naked" account. Also gives the user something
- *   tangible before being asked for government-issued ID.
+ * - **Signing key before identity, and optional.** Offering the key first
+ *   gives the user something tangible before being asked for
+ *   government-issued ID. It can be skipped: an email user acts through
+ *   their platform-managed key, signing permission follows verification
+ *   (auth's capability gate), and auth stores a FIRST key for an
+ *   email-confirmed person without signing permission, so a key added
+ *   later needs no carve-out either.
  *
  * - **Identity second.** Stripe Identity returns first_name, last_name,
  *   dob, and address as `verified_outputs`, which the auth side projects
@@ -3539,6 +3546,11 @@ groupId?: string): Promise<string>;
 interface OnboardingSnapshot {
     profileCompleted: boolean;
     keyCount: number;
+    /** The person chose to add a key later (the key step's "Skip for now").
+     *  A key is optional: storing one is not an on-chain act, and signing
+     *  permission follows verification (auth's capability gate), never keys.
+     *  Absent reads as not deferred. */
+    keyDeferred?: boolean;
     /** Current auth email ownership state. Synthetic wallet-only emails
      *  must be replaced before they can be confirmed. */
     emailVerified: boolean;
@@ -3575,14 +3587,6 @@ interface OnboardingSnapshot {
      *  fetch failed (treated as NOT exempt — fail-safe). */
     role: string | null;
 }
-/** Drop the cache and notify every mounted hook instance to re-fetch.
- *  Call after any mutation that could change the user's onboarding
- *  state — wallet add/remove, profile patch, lockdown finalize,
- *  identity-verification submission, etc.
- *
- *  The subscriber fan-out is critical: without it, sibling consumers
- *  of `useOnboardingState` keep their stale React state and continue
- *  rendering against an out-of-date decision. */
 declare function invalidateOnboardingState(): void;
 /** Backwards-compatible alias for the now-removed wallet-only API.
  *  Callers don't need to know the cache covers both signals now. */

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -524,6 +524,10 @@ interface WalletRuntimeConfig extends ModeConfig {
      *  cache reset + `userChanged` event dispatch here. Hosts that
      *  don't use Apollo can omit this. */
     onSessionBootstrapped?: (userId: string) => void | Promise<void>;
+    /** Runs BEFORE the session is torn down on `logout` / `logoutAll`,
+     *  while the token is still valid — the host forgets this device's push
+     *  subscription here. Failures are swallowed; sign-out always proceeds. */
+    onBeforeLogout?: () => void | Promise<void>;
     /** Optional toast / error reporting hooks for wallet-internal
      *  events that the host might want to surface (background poller
      *  failures, queue subscription drops, etc.). */
@@ -3469,7 +3473,8 @@ groupId?: string): Promise<string>;
  *
  *   1. Email not confirmed                     → 'email-required'
  *      (Averer signups skip this; Averer is already an identity gate)
- *   2. < 1 off-chain signing key               → 'wallets-required'
+ *   2. < 1 off-chain signing key, not deferred → 'wallets-required'
+ *      ("Skip for now" defers it on this device: `deferKeyStep`)
  *   3. Identity verification required but not done → 'identity-required'
  *   4. Profile (display_name + avatar) not completed → 'profile-required'
  *   5. Billing unavailable in a direct plan context → 'service-unavailable'
@@ -3493,11 +3498,13 @@ groupId?: string): Promise<string>;
  *   already a verified-identity ceremony, so we do not add a second
  *   email-code gate on top of it.
  *
- * - **Signing key before identity.** A user without a signing key has no way to act on
- *   the platform anyway, and capturing the key first means the identity
- *   step (Stripe KYC) can stamp itself against an established signer
- *   rather than a "naked" account. Also gives the user something
- *   tangible before being asked for government-issued ID.
+ * - **Signing key before identity, and optional.** Offering the key first
+ *   gives the user something tangible before being asked for
+ *   government-issued ID. It can be skipped: an email user acts through
+ *   their platform-managed key, signing permission follows verification
+ *   (auth's capability gate), and auth stores a FIRST key for an
+ *   email-confirmed person without signing permission, so a key added
+ *   later needs no carve-out either.
  *
  * - **Identity second.** Stripe Identity returns first_name, last_name,
  *   dob, and address as `verified_outputs`, which the auth side projects
@@ -3539,6 +3546,11 @@ groupId?: string): Promise<string>;
 interface OnboardingSnapshot {
     profileCompleted: boolean;
     keyCount: number;
+    /** The person chose to add a key later (the key step's "Skip for now").
+     *  A key is optional: storing one is not an on-chain act, and signing
+     *  permission follows verification (auth's capability gate), never keys.
+     *  Absent reads as not deferred. */
+    keyDeferred?: boolean;
     /** Current auth email ownership state. Synthetic wallet-only emails
      *  must be replaced before they can be confirmed. */
     emailVerified: boolean;
@@ -3575,14 +3587,6 @@ interface OnboardingSnapshot {
      *  fetch failed (treated as NOT exempt — fail-safe). */
     role: string | null;
 }
-/** Drop the cache and notify every mounted hook instance to re-fetch.
- *  Call after any mutation that could change the user's onboarding
- *  state — wallet add/remove, profile patch, lockdown finalize,
- *  identity-verification submission, etc.
- *
- *  The subscriber fan-out is critical: without it, sibling consumers
- *  of `useOnboardingState` keep their stale React state and continue
- *  rendering against an out-of-date decision. */
 declare function invalidateOnboardingState(): void;
 /** Backwards-compatible alias for the now-removed wallet-only API.
  *  Callers don't need to know the cache covers both signals now. */