@yawlabs/lemonsqueezy-mcp 0.10.7 → 0.10.10

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -2,6 +2,52 @@
 
 All notable changes to `@yawlabs/lemonsqueezy-mcp` are documented here. The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/) and versioning follows [SEMVER.md](./SEMVER.md).
 
+## [0.10.10] -- 2026-05-22
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **`release.sh` no longer demands a workstation npm session for CI-publish flows.** The pre-flight `npm whoami` gate was a vestige of the local-only-deploy era (added in `53de878`); when CI publishing was restored in `e3ef87a` the gate was kept but the publish itself moved to CI's org-level `NPM_TOKEN`, so the workstation never uses that credential. Blocked the v0.10.10 release attempt with "npm is not authenticated" despite the intended publish path not needing it. Mirrors `tailscale-mcp/release.sh`, which never had the gate.
+
+### Security
+
+- **Webhook `url` restricted to http/https schemes.** `ls_create_webhook` and `ls_update_webhook` previously accepted any string up to 10k chars; `z.string().url()` alone would have additionally accepted every URL-parseable scheme (`mailto:`, `file:`, `javascript:`, `ftp:`, `chrome-extension:`, ...). Anything non-http(s) stored as a webhook target is unreachable in the best case and an injection sink in the worst. The new `httpsUrlSchema` chains `.url()` with a `.refine()` enforcing `^https?://`, applied on both tools.
+- **`ls_update_webhook` secret rotation gated as destructive.** Rotating the signing secret silently breaks signature verification on every receiver until they redeploy with the new value. The tool now declares an `isDestructive` predicate flagging any `secret` change, routing those calls through `checkDestructiveRateLimit` + audit logging via the wrapper's existing duck-typed integration. URL and events changes stay on the regular path.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **`ls_update_webhook` rejects empty PATCH locally.** Calling with only `webhookId` and no fields to change previously sent an empty `attributes: {}` PATCH that the API would 422 with a less clear message. The handler now throws `"ls_update_webhook requires at least one of: url, events, secret"` before the round-trip.
+- **`ls_update_webhook` description warns about secret rotation.** The tool-level description now calls out that setting `secret` is destructive (rate-limited and audited) so LLM callers see the consequence before invoking.
+
+### Tests
+
+- **Regression coverage for the `events.min(1)` fix** (`f7374bd`): schema-rejection tests on both `ls_create_webhook` and `ls_update_webhook` lock in the empty-array rejection.
+- **URL validation coverage**: non-URL string rejection on both tools, four non-http(s) schemes (`mailto:`, `file:`, `javascript:`, `ftp:`) rejected on both tools, http and https explicit acceptance.
+- **`ls_update_webhook` predicate tests** mirror the `ls_update_license_key` shape: secret-only as destructive, url-only and events-only as non-destructive, empty input as non-destructive.
+- **`ls_update_webhook` URL-encoding** test added in parallel to the existing `ls_delete_webhook` coverage.
+- **Handler-side empty-PATCH rejection** test asserts the new error message.
+
+## [0.10.9] -- 2026-05-22
+
+### Changed
+
+- **Webhook `events` array now requires at least one entry.** `ls_create_webhook` and `ls_update_webhook` previously let an empty array pass local Zod validation, so a no-op webhook configuration only failed at the LemonSqueezy API as a 422. The new `.min(1)` makes the rejection local with a clearer message; on update, the field stays optional but, when supplied, must be non-empty.
+
+## [0.10.8] -- 2026-05-19
+
+### Security
+
+- **Sink response body size guard extended to the error branch.** `sinkRequest` in `src/tools/sink.ts` previously only size-checked 2xx response bodies; a misbehaving sink returning a giant 4xx/5xx body could still buffer the whole thing into memory before any limit fired. A new `readBodyOrSizeError` helper pre-checks `Content-Length` against the 10 MB cap and is applied to both the error and success branches. The post-read length check on the 2xx path is retained as belt-and-braces against a lying `Content-Length`.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **2xx body-read mid-stream failures now collapse to the uniform `{ ok: false, error }` shape.** Previously a socket reset partway through reading the body propagated as an exception out of `sinkRequest`, surfacing as a less-informative error via the wrapper's catch-all. The 2xx body read is now wrapped in a try/catch that returns `Sink response body read failed: <message>` -- consistent with every other failure mode in the function.
+- **`src/secret.ts` cache-hit branch tightened.** The test-mode cache-hit branch previously called `announceTestModeOnce()` redundantly (the flag is set on the first miss, so the cache-hit call was dead). Removed the call and the now-obsolete defensive comment.
+
+### Tests
+
+- **Sink coverage expanded** to pin `authorityClass` per tool (`read` for `ls_sink_events_list` / `ls_sink_stats`, `mutate` for `ls_sink_event_mark_processed`), 4xx-oversized-Content-Length, 2xx-lying-Content-Length, and 2xx mid-stream body-read failures. `stubFetch` gained an optional `responseHeaders` field so error-branch tests no longer override `globalThis.fetch` inline.
+- **`parseCommand` contract pinned** in `src/secret.test.ts` for the four tokenizer edges that the rest of the suite only touched by accident: unterminated quote, all-quotes-collapse-to-empty, quoted-args-with-spaces (both quote styles), and quote-then-bare-word concatenation. Also added a 64 KB `maxBuffer` overflow test that exercises the `execFile` `ERR_CHILD_PROCESS_STDIO_MAXBUFFER` rewrap path.
+
 ## [0.10.7] -- 2026-05-16
 
 ### Security
@@ -343,7 +389,10 @@ Hardening pass for unattended automation against live billing flows.
 
 Initial release. 59 tools covering all 17 LemonSqueezy API resources.
 
-[Unreleased]: https://github.com/YawLabs/lemonsqueezy-mcp/compare/v0.10.7...HEAD
+[Unreleased]: https://github.com/YawLabs/lemonsqueezy-mcp/compare/v0.10.9...HEAD
+[0.10.10]: https://github.com/YawLabs/lemonsqueezy-mcp/compare/v0.10.9...v0.10.10
+[0.10.9]: https://github.com/YawLabs/lemonsqueezy-mcp/compare/v0.10.8...v0.10.9
+[0.10.8]: https://github.com/YawLabs/lemonsqueezy-mcp/compare/v0.10.7...v0.10.8
 [0.10.7]: https://github.com/YawLabs/lemonsqueezy-mcp/compare/v0.10.6...v0.10.7
 [0.10.6]: https://github.com/YawLabs/lemonsqueezy-mcp/compare/v0.10.5...v0.10.6
 [0.10.5]: https://github.com/YawLabs/lemonsqueezy-mcp/compare/v0.10.4...v0.10.5

package/dist/index.js

@@ -30653,10 +30653,7 @@ async function loadApiKey() {
   if (testRaw && testRaw.trim() !== "") {
     const fingerprint2 = fingerprintFor("test", testRaw);
     const hit2 = fromCache(fingerprint2);
-    if (hit2 !== null) {
-      announceTestModeOnce();
-      return hit2;
-    }
+    if (hit2 !== null) return hit2;
     announceTestModeOnce();
     intoCache(fingerprint2, testRaw);
     return testRaw;
@@ -31863,6 +31860,16 @@ function loadSinkConfig() {
 function isToolHandlerResponse(value) {
   return "ok" in value;
 }
+async function readBodyOrSizeError(res) {
+  const contentLength = res.headers.get("content-length");
+  if (contentLength) {
+    const declared = Number.parseInt(contentLength, 10);
+    if (Number.isFinite(declared) && declared > MAX_BODY_SIZE_BYTES) {
+      return { ok: false, declared };
+    }
+  }
+  return { ok: true, text: await res.text() };
+}
 function buildSinkPath(path, params) {
   const parts = [];
   for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(params)) {
@@ -31897,7 +31904,12 @@ async function sinkRequest(config2, method, pathAndQuery) {
   if (!res.ok) {
     let body = "";
     try {
-      body = await res.text();
+      const readResult2 = await readBodyOrSizeError(res);
+      if (readResult2.ok) {
+        body = readResult2.text;
+      } else {
+        body = `[body too large: ${readResult2.declared} bytes exceeds ${MAX_BODY_SIZE_BYTES} byte limit]`;
+      }
     } catch {
     }
     let detail = body;
@@ -31923,7 +31935,20 @@ async function sinkRequest(config2, method, pathAndQuery) {
       error: `Sink returned ${res.status}: ${detail || res.statusText}`
     };
   }
-  const text = await res.text();
+  let readResult;
+  try {
+    readResult = await readBodyOrSizeError(res);
+  } catch (err) {
+    const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
+    return { ok: false, error: `Sink response body read failed: ${message}` };
+  }
+  if (!readResult.ok) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      error: `Sink response body too large: ${readResult.declared} bytes exceeds ${MAX_BODY_SIZE_BYTES} byte limit`
+    };
+  }
+  const text = readResult.text;
   if (!text.trim()) return { ok: true, data: {} };
   if (text.length > MAX_BODY_SIZE_BYTES) {
     return {
@@ -32516,6 +32541,7 @@ var variantTools = [
 ];
 
 // src/tools/webhooks.ts
+var httpsUrlSchema = external_exports3.string().url().max(1e4).refine((u) => /^https?:\/\//i.test(u), { message: "url must start with http:// or https://" });
 var webhookTools = [
   {
     name: "ls_get_webhook",
@@ -32566,8 +32592,8 @@ var webhookTools = [
     },
     inputSchema: external_exports3.object({
       storeId: lsIdSchema.describe("The store ID"),
-      url: external_exports3.string().max(1e4).describe("The URL to send webhook events to"),
-      events: external_exports3.array(external_exports3.string()).describe(
+      url: httpsUrlSchema.describe("The URL to send webhook events to (must be a valid http/https URL)"),
+      events: external_exports3.array(external_exports3.string()).min(1).describe(
         "Event types to subscribe to (e.g. ['order_created', 'subscription_created', 'subscription_updated', 'subscription_cancelled', 'subscription_payment_success', 'subscription_payment_failed', 'license_key_created'])"
       ),
       secret: external_exports3.string().min(6).max(40).describe("A signing secret for verifying webhook payloads")
@@ -32591,7 +32617,7 @@ var webhookTools = [
   {
     name: "ls_update_webhook",
     authorityClass: "webhook",
-    description: "Update an existing webhook's URL, events, or secret.",
+    description: "Update an existing webhook's URL, events, or secret. Setting `secret` rotates the signing secret and breaks signature verification on the receiver until they update their copy -- this is treated as destructive (rate-limited and audited).",
     annotations: {
       title: "Update webhook",
       readOnlyHint: false,
@@ -32599,10 +32625,15 @@ var webhookTools = [
       idempotentHint: true,
       openWorldHint: true
     },
+    // Rotating the signing secret silently breaks signature verification on
+    // every receiver until they redeploy with the new value. URL and events
+    // changes are observable on the next event but don't break anything in
+    // flight, so they stay on the regular path.
+    isDestructive: (input) => input.secret !== void 0,
     inputSchema: external_exports3.object({
       webhookId: lsIdSchema.describe("The webhook ID to update"),
-      url: external_exports3.string().max(1e4).optional().describe("New URL to send webhook events to"),
-      events: external_exports3.array(external_exports3.string()).optional().describe("Updated list of event types to subscribe to"),
+      url: httpsUrlSchema.optional().describe("New URL to send webhook events to (must be a valid http/https URL)"),
+      events: external_exports3.array(external_exports3.string()).min(1).optional().describe("Updated list of event types to subscribe to"),
       secret: external_exports3.string().min(6).max(40).optional().describe("New signing secret")
     }),
     handler: async (input) => {
@@ -32610,6 +32641,9 @@ var webhookTools = [
       if (input.url !== void 0) attributes.url = input.url;
       if (input.events !== void 0) attributes.events = input.events;
       if (input.secret !== void 0) attributes.secret = input.secret;
+      if (Object.keys(attributes).length === 0) {
+        throw new Error("ls_update_webhook requires at least one of: url, events, secret");
+      }
       return apiPatch(`/webhooks/${encodePath(input.webhookId)}`, {
         data: {
           type: "webhooks",
@@ -32806,7 +32840,7 @@ function readAuditLogResource(uri) {
 }
 
 // src/index.ts
-var version2 = true ? "0.10.7" : (await null).createRequire(import.meta.url)("../package.json").version;
+var version2 = true ? "0.10.10" : (await null).createRequire(import.meta.url)("../package.json").version;
 var subcommand = process.argv[2];
 if (subcommand === "version" || subcommand === "--version") {
   console.log(version2);

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@yawlabs/lemonsqueezy-mcp",
-  "version": "0.10.7",
+  "version": "0.10.10",
   "mcpName": "io.github.YawLabs/lemonsqueezy-mcp",
   "description": "LemonSqueezy MCP server for managing your store from AI assistants",
   "license": "MIT",