@yahyahammad/venastine 0.2.0 → 0.3.9
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/.env.example +9 -4
- package/CONFIG_ARCHITECTURE.md +2030 -0
- package/LICENSE +201 -201
- package/NOTICE +1 -1
- package/README.md +1034 -895
- package/agents/builtin/build.md +73 -0
- package/agents/builtin/compactor.md +75 -75
- package/agents/builtin/explore.md +77 -77
- package/agents/builtin/general.md +80 -0
- package/agents/builtin/pipeline-reviewer.md +100 -100
- package/agents/builtin/plan.md +106 -88
- package/agents/builtin/review.md +74 -74
- package/agents/builtin/test.md +65 -0
- package/agents/builtin/writer.md +67 -0
- package/agents/manager.py +68 -2
- package/agents/subagent_tool.py +472 -238
- package/agents/tui_commands.py +238 -151
- package/bin/venastine.mjs +150 -4
- package/bin/venastine.py +71 -0
- package/cli_commands.py +838 -0
- package/config.py +95 -1198
- package/config.yaml +1103 -0
- package/config_edit.py +1301 -0
- package/config_schema.py +971 -0
- package/config_update.py +749 -0
- package/core/agent_activity.py +256 -118
- package/core/ansi.py +452 -0
- package/core/approval.py +137 -115
- package/core/call_view.py +364 -0
- package/core/cancel.py +121 -0
- package/core/chatgpt_auth.py +747 -0
- package/core/claims_view.py +107 -0
- package/core/client.py +2715 -1559
- package/core/commands.py +460 -0
- package/core/compaction.py +1735 -971
- package/core/config_loader.py +1982 -1563
- package/core/connect.py +686 -0
- package/core/events.py +123 -61
- package/core/file_mentions.py +280 -0
- package/core/interaction.py +411 -328
- package/core/line_pattern.py +128 -0
- package/core/loop.py +2566 -1490
- package/core/memory.py +482 -370
- package/core/pipeline_models.py +190 -176
- package/core/provider_errors.py +234 -0
- package/core/reasoning/authorization.py +130 -130
- package/core/reasoning/base.py +219 -219
- package/core/reasoning/confidence_scoring.py +484 -468
- package/core/reasoning/events.py +149 -149
- package/core/reasoning/json_retry.py +19 -1
- package/core/reasoning/orchestrator.py +1561 -1382
- package/core/reasoning/output_writer.py +345 -286
- package/core/reasoning/payload_validation.py +524 -398
- package/core/reasoning/pipeline_storage.py +88 -22
- package/core/reasoning/review.py +659 -615
- package/core/reasoning/scholar.py +458 -434
- package/core/reasoning/source_corpus.py +433 -327
- package/core/reasoning/source_scoring.py +855 -855
- package/core/replay.py +315 -183
- package/core/session.py +36 -12
- package/core/session_view.py +259 -0
- package/core/session_wake.py +259 -0
- package/core/shell_sessions.py +1553 -0
- package/core/workspace_trust.py +1 -1
- package/credentials.py +148 -20
- package/database.py +333 -252
- package/{PRIVACY.md → docs/PRIVACY.md} +78 -66
- package/docs/SECURITY.md +108 -0
- package/docs/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +148 -0
- package/env_secrets.py +50 -9
- package/json_store.py +343 -123
- package/logging_setup.py +295 -185
- package/main.py +3433 -1961
- package/mcp_client/client.py +733 -499
- package/mcp_client/config.py +126 -21
- package/mcp_client/registration.py +343 -182
- package/memories/manager.py +147 -132
- package/memories/tui_commands.py +319 -244
- package/package.json +303 -73
- package/project_init/config_files.py +282 -278
- package/project_init/generator.py +728 -564
- package/project_init/manifest.py +18 -6
- package/project_init/tui_commands.py +147 -144
- package/prompts/critic_pass.md +24 -24
- package/prompts/revalidate.md +25 -25
- package/prompts/revise.md +2 -0
- package/prompts/source_grounding.md +66 -66
- package/prompts/system_prompts.py +316 -262
- package/providers.json.example +4 -2
- package/pyproject.toml +149 -100
- package/requirements.txt +295 -72
- package/safety/policy_enforcement.py +1082 -746
- package/security/askpass.py +419 -0
- package/security/capability.py +207 -177
- package/security/confine.py +484 -0
- package/security/hosted.py +182 -0
- package/security/permissions.py +237 -190
- package/security/posture.py +124 -12
- package/security/protected_paths.py +501 -309
- package/security/sandbox.py +4108 -985
- package/security/secrets.py +855 -0
- package/skills/builtin/math/formal-specification.md +67 -67
- package/skills/builtin/math/numerical-methods.md +66 -66
- package/skills/builtin/research/experiment-design.md +62 -62
- package/skills/builtin/research/reproducibility.md +55 -55
- package/skills/builtin/research/source-evaluation.md +70 -70
- package/skills/builtin/research/statistical-inference.md +63 -63
- package/skills/builtin/research/technical-writing.md +59 -59
- package/skills/builtin/software/code-review.md +61 -61
- package/skills/builtin/software/debugging.md +61 -61
- package/skills/builtin/software/test-design.md +67 -67
- package/skills/tui_commands.py +110 -111
- package/storage.py +1338 -1005
- package/tools/base.py +161 -1
- package/tools/builtin/_math_common.py +667 -377
- package/tools/builtin/_net_common.py +225 -19
- package/tools/builtin/arxiv.py +497 -39
- package/tools/builtin/ask_user.py +231 -213
- package/tools/builtin/discrete_math.py +35 -4
- package/tools/builtin/fetch_url.py +371 -153
- package/tools/builtin/file_ops.py +720 -412
- package/tools/builtin/geometry.py +48 -12
- package/tools/builtin/get_time.py +2 -2
- package/tools/builtin/linear_algebra.py +66 -23
- package/tools/builtin/load_skill.py +76 -66
- package/tools/builtin/logic.py +171 -12
- package/tools/builtin/pin.py +227 -193
- package/tools/builtin/probability_stats.py +12 -16
- package/tools/builtin/project_docs.py +464 -405
- package/tools/builtin/remember.py +175 -158
- package/tools/builtin/shell.py +980 -461
- package/tools/builtin/shell_sessions.py +613 -0
- package/tools/builtin/symbolic_math.py +80 -10
- package/tools/builtin/todo.py +149 -147
- package/tools/builtin/web_search.py +191 -13
- package/tools/context.py +159 -136
- package/tools/isolation.py +107 -34
- package/tools/registry.py +1242 -925
- package/tui/app.py +8318 -4100
- package/tui/app.tcss +747 -556
- package/tui/commands.py +26 -170
- package/tui/diffs.py +34 -13
- package/tui/history.py +128 -128
- package/tui/hosted_driver.py +102 -0
- package/tui/markdown.py +1329 -1279
- package/tui/meters.py +364 -268
- package/tui/ravens.py +146 -146
- package/tui/screens.py +1255 -943
- package/tui/themes.py +599 -559
- package/tui/widgets.py +3813 -2332
- package/SECURITY.md +0 -88
- package/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +0 -100
package/security/posture.py
CHANGED
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@@ -28,9 +28,11 @@ WHAT THE GUARANTEE IS, AND IS NOT
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Stated precisely, because a half-understood control is worse than none
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(UN4). The posture CANNOT be changed by:
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* any tool call -- nothing writes `config.
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-
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-
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* any tool call -- nothing writes `config.yaml`, where the values
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live, or `config.py`, which reads them, without an approval prompt:
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both are outside the workspace and `_file_approval_check`
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hard-returns True there. `write` and `edit` are globally denied on
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top of that;
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* `settings.json` at either tier -- the keys are rejected BY NAME, the
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way G7 rejects `shell_approval_mode`, because a project's settings
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beat the user's and arrive with a directory you cloned;
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@@ -50,10 +52,29 @@ ORDERING IS SELF-ENFORCING (UN2)
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--------------------------------
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`current()` marks the posture bound. `apply_cli()` raises if folding in
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the command line would now CHANGE it. So a wrong call order in `main.py`
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-
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matters because the failure mode of getting it wrong is a run that
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would be a LOUD startup failure rather than a silently stale posture --
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which matters because the failure mode of getting it wrong is a run that
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believes it is safer than it is, and that is invisible.
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AND THAT GUARD IS DORMANT ON EVERY SHIPPED LAUNCH (batch 142).
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`main.py` calls `apply_cli()` with NO ARGUMENTS -- it is the only
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production call -- so `supplied` is always empty, `candidate` always
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equals `_posture`, and `candidate != _posture` is never true. Measured:
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`current()` then `apply_cli()` does not raise, while the control
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`apply_cli(shell_approval_mode="never")` does. There is no live harm and
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that is the same fact as the finding -- with nothing folded in, a
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premature reader reads the right value anyway -- but a reader creeping
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above that line today produces nothing at all.
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WHAT ENFORCES UN2 TODAY is
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`test_posture.py::test_no_module_reads_the_posture_at_import`, a source
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scan, which is what AGENTS.md names as the pin. The scan covers IMPORT
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time only, not a reader placed inside `main()` above the `apply_cli()`
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call. The guard below becomes live the day the first posture flag
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exists (`--unsafe` is written about in this module and in
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`test_posture.py` as though it did), and `TestApplyCliOrdering` keeps it
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working for that day -- which is why it is kept rather than removed.
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The predicate is "a change after a read", not "a read", and the
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difference is not a softening. The guard exists to catch *something acted
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on the config-only value*; if the command line produces the posture that
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@@ -68,7 +89,10 @@ Never calling `apply_cli()` at all -- a library import, a bare test --
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leaves the config-derived default, which is the safe posture.
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This module imports `config` and the stdlib and nothing else, per
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ARCHITECTURE's rule for `security/`.
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ARCHITECTURE's rule for `security/`. Note that `config` is now a shim over
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`config.yaml` and so pulls in `ruamel.yaml` and `pydantic` transitively --
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the rule this sentence states is about what `security/` may NAME, and that
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is unchanged: `config` and the stdlib.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import contextlib
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import dataclasses
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import os
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from collections.abc import Iterator
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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from typing import Any
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from typing import Any
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import config
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@@ -95,7 +120,7 @@ class Posture:
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legal statement anywhere in the process.
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"""
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# "always" / "tiered" / "never" -- validated at bind time, so a typo
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# "always" / "tiered" / "contained" / "never" -- validated at bind time, so a typo
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# is a startup failure and never a policy that quietly means
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# something else (the argument capability.validate_mode makes).
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shell_approval_mode: str
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# records that it is not defended against because it cannot be.
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allow_insecure_fallback: bool
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auto_approve_fallback: bool
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# ROADMAP_v3 §49 slice 3 (SS35). Whether a command may run in WSL at
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# all. Frozen here rather than read live for the reason the whole
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# module exists, and the reason it belongs here rather than beside
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# `wsl_distro` in plain config: a distro NAME decides where a command
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# lands, and this decides whether it may leave the container.
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allow_wsl_backend: bool
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# ROADMAP_v3 §49 slice 4 (SS46). Whether a command may run on the
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# configured remote host at all. Here rather than beside `ssh_host` in
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# plain config for `allow_wsl_backend`'s reason, with one more: the
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# other SSH keys say WHERE a command would land, and this one says
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# whether this machine may run agent commands on a machine it cannot
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# inspect.
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allow_ssh_backend: bool
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# Master switch for pattern-based redaction of what leaves a tool.
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redact_tool_outputs: bool
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# VENASTINE_REDACT_OFF, the per-run weakening of the line above.
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"SHELL_APPROVAL_MODE is 'never' -- no shell command is "
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"ever asked about, including one that reads outside the "
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"workspace on the host"))
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elif self.shell_approval_mode == "contained":
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# §48 (CE4). Not a network or host-read weakening -- both still
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# ask -- but anything the container confines runs unasked,
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# including code the agent wrote itself, and in a workspace that
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# holds a `.venastine/` that code can read it.
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reasons.append((
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"shell: contained",
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"SHELL_APPROVAL_MODE is 'contained' -- a command that runs "
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"in the container without network runs without asking, "
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"including code the agent wrote itself; host reads and "
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"network commands still ask"))
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# §48 (CE6). Under "always" the pair is NOT "no ask": the mode check
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# returns before the fallback opt-in is ever read, so every command
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# asks, the host fallback included. Measured, and the badge said
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# otherwise -- so under "always" the pair reports as the fallback
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# alone, which is what it actually is.
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if (self.allow_insecure_fallback and self.auto_approve_fallback
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and self.shell_approval_mode != "always"):
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reasons.append((
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"host shell, no ask",
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"ALLOW_INSECURE_SANDBOX_FALLBACK and "
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elif self.allow_insecure_fallback:
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reasons.append((
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"host shell fallback",
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"ALLOW_INSECURE_SANDBOX_FALLBACK is on -- if
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"
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"network isolation"))
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"ALLOW_INSECURE_SANDBOX_FALLBACK is on -- if no container "
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"runtime (Docker or Podman) can run the sandbox, commands "
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"run on the host with no filesystem or network isolation"))
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# ROADMAP_v3 §49 slice 3 (SS41). Reported when it is ENABLED rather
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# than when it is used: the badge describes what this process may
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# do, and a user reading it after a WSL command has already run has
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# read it too late. It is its own pair rather than folded into the
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# fallback's, because the two are different weakenings -- the
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# fallback is the host when there is no container, and this is a
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# Linux userland the agent can ask for while one is running.
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if self.allow_wsl_backend:
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# ROADMAP_v3 §49 slice 5b (SS65). The last clause used to read
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# "Only a read-only command inside the workspace runs there
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# without asking" unconditionally, and that is FALSE when the
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# fallback opt-in is on -- measured against the real gate, where
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# `rm -rf /home` on WSL answers asks=False, because WSL is
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# UNCONTAINED and the opt-in sits above the capability rule.
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# A badge that overstates what asks is worse than no badge, and
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# this is §48 (CE6)'s correction applied to a second pair.
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if (self.auto_approve_fallback
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and self.shell_approval_mode not in ("always", "never")):
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asking = ("AUTO_APPROVE_SANDBOX_FALLBACK is on as well, so "
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"NOTHING there asks first -- that opt-in answers "
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"for the whole backend, not only for the host "
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"fallback it is named after. Running as root is "
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"the one exception and always asks")
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else:
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asking = ("Only a read-only command inside the workspace "
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"runs there without asking, and a command that "
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"runs as root always asks")
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reasons.append((
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"wsl backend",
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"ALLOW_WSL_BACKEND is on -- the agent can ask for a command "
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"to run in WSL, which is not a sandbox: it reaches this "
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"harness's own config and authority files, has no memory or "
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"process limits, and can start Windows programs with your "
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"full authority. " + asking))
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# SS55. A THIRD pair, not a widening of the WSL one, because the
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# three weakenings are different: the fallback is the host when
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# there is no container, WSL is a Linux userland beside a running
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# one, and this is a machine that is not this machine at all. A
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# user who reads "uncontained" has to be able to tell which.
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if self.allow_ssh_backend:
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reasons.append((
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"ssh backend",
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"ALLOW_SSH_BACKEND is on -- the agent can ask for a command "
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"to run on the configured remote host, which this harness "
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"cannot inspect: no isolation, no memory or process limits, "
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"and credentials it did not issue. Nothing runs there "
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"without asking you first -- running as root included "
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"(slice 5b) -- and `write` still saves locally while the "
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"shell runs remotely"))
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if not self.redact_tool_outputs:
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reasons.append((
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"no redaction",
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shell_approval_mode=config.SHELL_APPROVAL_MODE,
|
|
198
302
|
allow_insecure_fallback=bool(config.ALLOW_INSECURE_SANDBOX_FALLBACK),
|
|
199
303
|
auto_approve_fallback=bool(config.AUTO_APPROVE_SANDBOX_FALLBACK),
|
|
304
|
+
allow_wsl_backend=bool(config.ALLOW_WSL_BACKEND),
|
|
305
|
+
allow_ssh_backend=bool(config.ALLOW_SSH_BACKEND),
|
|
200
306
|
redact_tool_outputs=bool(config.REDACT_TOOL_OUTPUTS),
|
|
201
307
|
redact_off_env=_redact_off_from_env(),
|
|
202
308
|
)
|
|
@@ -261,6 +367,12 @@ def apply_cli(**overrides: Any) -> Posture:
|
|
|
261
367
|
# the read alone would also make `main()` un-callable twice in one
|
|
262
368
|
# interpreter, which the suite does constantly -- and a guard that
|
|
263
369
|
# forces the tests to work around it stops being read as a guard.
|
|
370
|
+
#
|
|
371
|
+
# DORMANT UNTIL THE FIRST POSTURE FLAG EXISTS (batch 142). No shipped
|
|
372
|
+
# launch passes an override, so `supplied` is {} and this cannot
|
|
373
|
+
# fire. The predicate is NOT the thing to revisit -- raising on the
|
|
374
|
+
# read alone was tried and was wrong twice, and the paragraph above
|
|
375
|
+
# is why. See the module docstring for what enforces UN2 meanwhile.
|
|
264
376
|
if _read and candidate != _posture:
|
|
265
377
|
raise RuntimeError(
|
|
266
378
|
"security.posture.apply_cli() would CHANGE the posture after it "
|