@yagyeshvyas/vibeguard 1.13.0 → 1.13.1

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (103) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +11 -0
  2. package/README.md +18 -2
  3. package/bin/cli.js +2753 -2753
  4. package/ci/vibeguard.yml +42 -42
  5. package/package.json +1 -1
  6. package/scripts/counts.js +93 -93
  7. package/scripts/postinstall.js +26 -26
  8. package/src/auto.js +427 -427
  9. package/src/daemon.js +343 -343
  10. package/src/dashboard.js +278 -278
  11. package/src/engine.js +297 -297
  12. package/src/hook.js +151 -151
  13. package/src/install.js +298 -298
  14. package/src/integrity.json +1 -1
  15. package/src/plugin.js +182 -182
  16. package/src/privacy-audit.js +272 -272
  17. package/src/repl.js +150 -150
  18. package/src/report.js +331 -331
  19. package/src/rules-pack.js +3068 -3068
  20. package/src/rules.js +1822 -1822
  21. package/src/sbom.js +193 -193
  22. package/src/scanner.js +1032 -1032
  23. package/src/shell-guard.js +302 -302
  24. package/src/slopsquat.js +144 -144
  25. package/src/trace.js +220 -220
  26. package/src/.vibeguard/cache/file-hashes.json +0 -60
  27. package/src/.vibeguard/latest-snapshot.json +0 -36
  28. package/src/.vibeguard/mcp-pins.json +0 -1
  29. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/auto.js +0 -428
  30. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/daemon.js +0 -344
  31. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/dashboard.js +0 -279
  32. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/engine.js +0 -297
  33. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/hook.js +0 -151
  34. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/install.js +0 -299
  35. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/manifest.json +0 -65
  36. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/mcp-server.js +0 -2051
  37. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/plugin.js +0 -168
  38. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/pre-deploy.js +0 -362
  39. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/repl.js +0 -150
  40. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/rules.js +0 -1611
  41. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/sbom.js +0 -164
  42. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/shell-guard.js +0 -292
  43. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/slopsquat.js +0 -144
  44. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/trace.js +0 -220
  45. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/auto.js +0 -428
  46. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/daemon.js +0 -344
  47. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/engine.js +0 -297
  48. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/install.js +0 -299
  49. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/manifest.json +0 -37
  50. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/mcp-server.js +0 -2055
  51. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/plugin.js +0 -168
  52. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/pre-deploy.js +0 -362
  53. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/trace.js +0 -220
  54. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/auto.js +0 -428
  55. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/daemon.js +0 -344
  56. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/dashboard.js +0 -279
  57. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/engine.js +0 -297
  58. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/hook.js +0 -151
  59. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/install.js +0 -299
  60. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/manifest.json +0 -65
  61. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/mcp-server.js +0 -2055
  62. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/plugin.js +0 -168
  63. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/pre-deploy.js +0 -362
  64. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/repl.js +0 -150
  65. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/rules.js +0 -1611
  66. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/sbom.js +0 -164
  67. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/shell-guard.js +0 -292
  68. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/slopsquat.js +0 -144
  69. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/trace.js +0 -220
  70. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/auto.js +0 -428
  71. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/daemon.js +0 -344
  72. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/dashboard.js +0 -279
  73. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/engine.js +0 -297
  74. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/hook.js +0 -151
  75. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/install.js +0 -299
  76. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/manifest.json +0 -65
  77. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/mcp-server.js +0 -2054
  78. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/plugin.js +0 -168
  79. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/pre-deploy.js +0 -362
  80. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/repl.js +0 -150
  81. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/rules.js +0 -1611
  82. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/sbom.js +0 -164
  83. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/shell-guard.js +0 -292
  84. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/slopsquat.js +0 -144
  85. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/trace.js +0 -220
  86. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/auto.js +0 -428
  87. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/daemon.js +0 -344
  88. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/engine.js +0 -297
  89. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/install.js +0 -299
  90. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/manifest.json +0 -37
  91. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/mcp-server.js +0 -2055
  92. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/plugin.js +0 -168
  93. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/pre-deploy.js +0 -362
  94. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/trace.js +0 -220
  95. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/auto.js +0 -428
  96. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/daemon.js +0 -344
  97. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/engine.js +0 -297
  98. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/manifest.json +0 -33
  99. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/mcp-server.js +0 -2055
  100. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/rules.js +0 -1611
  101. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/shell-guard.js +0 -292
  102. package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/trace.js +0 -220
  103. package/src/.vibeguard-baseline.json +0 -5226
@@ -1,292 +0,0 @@
1
- 'use strict';
2
-
3
- /*
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- * src/shell-guard.js — Shell-level pre-execution guard with anti-evasion.
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- *
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- * Scans a command string BEFORE it runs. Normalizes obfuscation attempts,
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- * then matches against danger patterns. If blocked, returns { blocked: true }.
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- *
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- * Anti-evasion layers (applied in order, all checked):
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- * 1. Base64 decode: echo "cm0gLXJmIC8" | base64 -d | sh -> rm -rf /
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- * 2. Env-var indirection: RM="rm -rf"; $RM / -> blocked
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- * 3. Subshell expansion: $(echo rm) -rf / -> rm -rf /
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- * 4. Backtick eval: `echo rm` -rf / -> rm -rf /
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- * 5. Hex/unicode escapes: \x72\x6d -> rm
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- * 6. rm obfuscation: rm -r -f, rm --recursive --force, /bin/rm, r""m
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- * 7. Path splitting: /bin/r""m -rf /, /sbin/r''m
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- * 8. Quoted command: "rm" -rf /, 'rm' -rf /
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- * 9. Variable concatenation: r=m; ${r}m -rf / -> blocked
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- *
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- * IMPORTANT: This catches accidental/AI-mistake dangerous commands. A
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- * determined adversary with knowledge of the patterns can still evade
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- * (no static guard is unbreakable). This stops the agent from nuking
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- * your machine — it is NOT sandbox escape prevention.
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- *
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- * 100% local. Zero network. Zero dependencies.
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- */
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-
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- const path = require('path');
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-
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- // ─── Anti-evasion normalizer ──────────────────────────────────────────────
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-
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- // One normalization pass. Run repeatedly to a fixpoint by normalizeCommand so
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- // layered obfuscation (a var expanding to another var, base64 decoding to a
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- // quoted command) unwinds step by step instead of in one brittle sweep.
35
- function normalizeOnce(cmd) {
36
- let normalized = cmd;
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-
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- // Layer 1: Base64 decode — catch "echo <base64> | base64 -d | sh"
39
- const b64Match = normalized.match(/echo\s+["']?([A-Za-z0-9+/=]{8,})["']?\s*\|\s*(?:base64|b64)\s+-d\s*\|/i);
40
- if (b64Match) {
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- try {
42
- const decoded = Buffer.from(b64Match[1], 'base64').toString('utf8');
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- normalized = normalized.replace(b64Match[0], decoded);
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- } catch {}
45
- }
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-
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- // Layer 2: Env-var indirection — collect EVERY assignment and substitute all
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- // references. The original code matched only the FIRST assignment (non-global),
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- // so `A=rm; B=-rf; $A $B /` slipped through. We now sweep all of them, quoted
50
- // and bare, then substitute $VAR and ${VAR}.
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- const assignAll = {};
52
- const quotedAssign = /(\w+)=(["'])([^"']*)\2/g;
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- let qa;
54
- while ((qa = quotedAssign.exec(normalized)) !== null) assignAll[qa[1]] = qa[3];
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- const bareAssign = /(?:^|[;\s])(\w+)=([^"'\s;|&]+)/g;
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- let ba;
57
- while ((ba = bareAssign.exec(normalized)) !== null) {
58
- if (!(ba[1] in assignAll)) assignAll[ba[1]] = ba[2];
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- }
60
- for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(assignAll)) {
61
- if (/rm|sudo|chmod|mkfs|dd\s|shutdown|reboot|curl|wget|-rf?\b/i.test(value)) {
62
- normalized = normalized.replace(new RegExp('\\$\\{?' + name + '\\}?\\b', 'g'), value);
63
- }
64
- }
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- // Strip the assignment statements themselves so they don't linger as noise.
66
- normalized = normalized.replace(/(?:^|[;\s])(\w+)=(?:(["'])[^"']*\2|[^"'\s;|&]+)\s*/g, ' ');
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-
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- // Layer 3: Subshell expansion — $(echo rm) -> rm
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- normalized = normalized.replace(/\$\(\s*echo\s+([^)]+)\s*\)/g, '$1');
70
- // $(printf "rm") -> rm
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- normalized = normalized.replace(/\$\(\s*printf\s+["']([^"']+)["']\s*\)/g, '$1');
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-
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- // Layer 4: Backtick eval — `echo rm` -> rm
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- normalized = normalized.replace(/`\s*echo\s+([^`]+)\s*`/g, '$1');
75
- normalized = normalized.replace(/`\s*printf\s+["']([^"']+)["']\s*`/g, '$1');
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-
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- // Layer 5: Hex/unicode escapes — \x72\x6d -> rm
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- normalized = normalized.replace(/\\x([0-9a-f]{2})/gi, (m, hex) => {
79
- try { return String.fromCharCode(parseInt(hex, 16)); } catch { return m; }
80
- });
81
- // \u0072 -> r
82
- normalized = normalized.replace(/\\u([0-9a-f]{4})/gi, (m, hex) => {
83
- try { return String.fromCharCode(parseInt(hex, 16)); } catch { return m; }
84
- });
85
-
86
- // Layer 5b: $IFS word-splitting — rm$IFS-rf$IFS/ -> rm -rf /
87
- normalized = normalized.replace(/\$\{?IFS\}?/g, ' ');
88
-
89
- // Layer 6: rm obfuscation — rm -r -f, rm --recursive --force, /bin/rm, /sbin/rm
90
- // Normalize rm flags: -r -f, -fr, -rf, -Rf, --recursive --force all -> -rf
91
- normalized = normalized.replace(/\brm\s+(?:-[a-zA-Z]*r[a-zA-Z]*f[a-zA-Z]*|-[a-zA-Z]*f[a-zA-Z]*r[a-zA-Z]*|--recursive(?:\s+--force)?)\b/i, 'rm -rf');
92
- normalized = normalized.replace(/\brm\s+-r\s+-f\b/i, 'rm -rf');
93
- normalized = normalized.replace(/\brm\s+-f\s+-r\b/i, 'rm -rf');
94
- normalized = normalized.replace(/\brm\s+--recursive\s+--force\b/i, 'rm -rf');
95
- // /bin/rm, /sbin/rm, /usr/bin/rm -> rm
96
- normalized = normalized.replace(/(?:\/usr)?(?:\/bin\/|\/sbin\/)rm\b/g, 'rm');
97
-
98
- // Layer 7: String concatenation — r""m, r''m, r\m -> rm
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- // Remove quotes and backslashes between letters to detect split commands
100
- normalized = normalized.replace(/([a-zA-Z])["'\\]+([a-zA-Z])/g, '$1$2');
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-
102
- // Layer 8: Quoted command — "rm", 'rm' -> rm
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- normalized = normalized.replace(/["']([a-z]{2,})["']/gi, (m, inner) => inner);
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-
105
- return normalized;
106
- }
107
-
108
- function normalizeCommand(cmd) {
109
- if (!cmd || typeof cmd !== 'string') return cmd || '';
110
- let current = cmd;
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- // Iterate to a fixpoint (bounded at 5) so layered obfuscation unwinds fully.
112
- // The bound guards against pathological input causing an unbounded loop.
113
- for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
114
- const next = normalizeOnce(current);
115
- if (next === current) break;
116
- current = next;
117
- }
118
- return current.replace(/[ \t]+/g, ' ').trim();
119
- }
120
-
121
- // ─── Danger patterns (matched against BOTH raw AND normalized) ───────────
122
-
123
- const DANGEROUS_COMMANDS = [
124
- { re: /\brm\s+-rf\b/i, reason: 'rm -rf can delete entire directory trees', severity: 'critical' },
125
- { re: /\brm\s+-rf\s+\/(?:\s|$)/i, reason: 'rm -rf / — catastrophic deletion of root filesystem', severity: 'critical' },
126
- { re: /\brm\s+-rf\s+~(?:\s|$|\/)/i, reason: 'rm -rf ~ — deleting home directory', severity: 'critical' },
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- { re: /\brm\s+-rf\s+\.(?:\s|$)/i, reason: 'rm -rf . — deleting current directory', severity: 'critical' },
128
- { re: /\brm\s+-rf\s+\.\.(?:\s|$)/i, reason: 'rm -rf .. — deleting parent directory', severity: 'critical' },
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- { re: /\bsudo\b/i, reason: 'sudo escalates privileges — agents should not use sudo', severity: 'high' },
130
- { re: /\bchmod\s+777\b/i, reason: 'chmod 777 grants world write — insecure', severity: 'high' },
131
- { re: /\bmkfs\b/i, reason: 'mkfs formats filesystem — destructive', severity: 'critical' },
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- { re: /\bdd\s+if=/i, reason: 'dd can overwrite disks — destructive', severity: 'critical' },
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- { re: /\bdd\s+.*of=\/dev\//i, reason: 'dd writing directly to device — destructive', severity: 'critical' },
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- { re: /\bshutdown\b/i, reason: 'shutdown stops the machine', severity: 'critical' },
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- { re: /\breboot\b/i, reason: 'reboot restarts the machine', severity: 'critical' },
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- { re: /\bhalt\b/i, reason: 'halt stops the machine', severity: 'critical' },
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- { re: /\bpoweroff\b/i, reason: 'poweroff stops the machine', severity: 'critical' },
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- { re: /:\s*\(\s*\)\s*\{\s*:\s*\|\s*:\s*&\s*\}\s*;/i, reason: 'fork bomb detected', severity: 'critical' },
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- { re: /\b(?:curl|wget)\b.*\|\s*(?:sh|bash|zsh)\b/i, reason: 'curl|sh — remote code execution via pipe to shell', severity: 'critical' },
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- { re: /\b(?:curl|wget)\b.*(?:169\.254\.169\.254|metadata\.google\.internal)/i, reason: 'cloud metadata service access — credential theft', severity: 'critical' },
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- { re: /\bnc\s+-l/i, reason: 'nc -l opens a listener — reverse shell risk', severity: 'high' },
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- { re: /\b(?:python|python3|node|ruby|perl)\s+-c\s+['"]\s*(?:import|require)\s+(?:os|subprocess|child_process)/i, reason: 'inline script importing OS modules — potential injection', severity: 'high' },
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- { re: /\bkill(?:\s+-9)?\s+-1\b/i, reason: 'kill -1 kills all processes — system-wide kill', severity: 'critical' },
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- { re: /\bpkill\s+-9\b/i, reason: 'pkill -9 force kills processes — destructive', severity: 'high' },
145
- { re: /\biotop\s+--only\b/i, reason: 'iotop in batch mode can cause system instability', severity: 'low' },
146
- // Anti-evasion: base64 pipe to shell
147
- { re: /\|\s*(?:base64|b64)\s+-d\s*\|/i, reason: 'base64 decode piped to shell — obfuscated command execution', severity: 'critical' },
148
- { re: /\|\s*(?:sh|bash|zsh|python|python3|node|perl|ruby)\b/i, reason: 'piping to interpreter — potential remote code execution', severity: 'high' },
149
- ];
150
-
151
- const SECRET_PATTERNS = [
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- { re: /\bsk-proj-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b/i, type: 'OpenAI API key' },
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- { re: /\bsk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b/i, type: 'Anthropic API key' },
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- { re: /\bsk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}\b/i, type: 'Stripe secret key' },
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- { re: /\bAKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}\b/, type: 'AWS access key' },
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- { re: /\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}\b/i, type: 'GitHub token' },
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- { re: /\bglpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b/i, type: 'GitLab token' },
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- { re: /\bxox[bpoa]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\b/i, type: 'Slack token' },
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- { re: /-----BEGIN\s+(?:RSA\s+|EC\s+)?PRIVATE\s+KEY-----/i, type: 'Private key' },
160
- ];
161
-
162
- const SENSITIVE_PATHS = [
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- /\.env\b/i,
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- /\.ssh\b/i,
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- /\.aws\b/i,
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- /\.gnupg\b/i,
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- /\.npmrc\b/i,
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- /\.gitconfig\b/i,
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- /\/etc\/passwd/i,
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- /\/etc\/shadow/i,
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- /\/etc\/sudoers/i,
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- /\/etc\/ssh\//i,
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- /~\/\.ssh\//i,
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- ];
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-
176
- const EXFIL_PATTERNS = [
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- { re: /\b(?:curl|wget|nc|netcat)\b.*(?:\bapi\.|webhook|callback|exfil|upload|send)/i, reason: 'Potential data exfiltration via network tool to external endpoint' },
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- { re: /\b(?:curl|wget)\b.*-d\s.*(?:token|key|password|secret|credential)/i, reason: 'Sending secrets via curl/wget POST data' },
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- { re: /\b(?:curl|wget)\b.*--data\b.*(?:token|key|password|secret|credential)/i, reason: 'Sending secrets via curl/wget --data' },
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- { re: /\b(?:scp|rsync)\b.*@(?:\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})/i, reason: 'File transfer to raw IP — potential exfiltration' },
181
- { re: /\b(?:curl|wget)\b.*-F\s.*(?:token|key|password|secret)/i, reason: 'Sending secrets via curl/wget multipart form' },
182
- ];
183
-
184
- // ─── Main check function ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
185
-
186
- function checkCommand(cmd) {
187
- if (!cmd || typeof cmd !== 'string') return { blocked: false, allowed: true };
188
- const trimmed = cmd.trim();
189
-
190
- // Skip empty lines and comments
191
- if (!trimmed || trimmed.startsWith('#')) return { blocked: false, allowed: true };
192
-
193
- // Normalize for anti-evasion
194
- const normalized = normalizeCommand(trimmed);
195
-
196
- // Check BOTH the raw command AND the normalized version
197
- const inputs = [trimmed, normalized];
198
- const violations = [];
199
- const seen = new Set(); // dedupe violations across raw + normalized
200
-
201
- for (const input of inputs) {
202
- // 1. Dangerous commands
203
- for (const { re, reason, severity } of DANGEROUS_COMMANDS) {
204
- if (re.test(input)) {
205
- const key = reason;
206
- if (!seen.has(key)) {
207
- seen.add(key);
208
- violations.push({ type: 'dangerous_command', reason, severity, pattern: re.source });
209
- }
210
- }
211
- }
212
-
213
- // 2. Secret exfiltration
214
- for (const { re, reason } of EXFIL_PATTERNS) {
215
- if (re.test(input)) {
216
- const key = reason;
217
- if (!seen.has(key)) {
218
- seen.add(key);
219
- violations.push({ type: 'exfiltration', reason, severity: 'high', pattern: re.source });
220
- }
221
- }
222
- }
223
-
224
- // 3. Secrets in command
225
- for (const { re, type } of SECRET_PATTERNS) {
226
- if (re.test(input)) {
227
- const key = type;
228
- if (!seen.has(key)) {
229
- seen.add(key);
230
- violations.push({ type: 'secret_exposure', reason: `Secret detected in command: ${type}`, severity: 'critical', pattern: re.source });
231
- }
232
- }
233
- }
234
-
235
- // 4. Sensitive file access
236
- for (const re of SENSITIVE_PATHS) {
237
- if (re.test(input)) {
238
- const match = input.match(re)[0];
239
- const key = 'path:' + match;
240
- if (!seen.has(key)) {
241
- seen.add(key);
242
- violations.push({ type: 'sensitive_path', reason: `Access to sensitive path: ${match}`, severity: 'high', pattern: re.source });
243
- }
244
- }
245
- }
246
- }
247
-
248
- // 5. Prompt injection in shell (e.g., agent putting LLM output into eval)
249
- for (const input of inputs) {
250
- if (/\beval\s+["'].*(?:ignore|disregard|forget|system prompt)/i.test(input)) {
251
- violations.push({ type: 'prompt_injection', reason: 'eval with prompt injection pattern — agent may be compromised', severity: 'critical' });
252
- break;
253
- }
254
- }
255
-
256
- // 6. Obfuscation detection — flag suspicious patterns even if we can't decode them
257
- if (/[a-zA-Z]\[([0-9a-f]{1,2})\]/i.test(trimmed)) {
258
- violations.push({ type: 'obfuscation', reason: 'Bash escape sequence $\'\\xNN\' detected — possible command obfuscation', severity: 'high' });
259
- }
260
- if (trimmed.includes('eval ') && trimmed.includes('$((')) {
261
- violations.push({ type: 'obfuscation', reason: 'eval with arithmetic expansion — possible obfuscation', severity: 'high' });
262
- }
263
-
264
- if (violations.length === 0) return { blocked: false, allowed: true };
265
-
266
- return {
267
- blocked: true,
268
- allowed: false,
269
- violations,
270
- reason: violations[0].reason,
271
- severity: violations[0].severity,
272
- command: trimmed.slice(0, 200),
273
- normalized: normalized !== trimmed ? normalized.slice(0, 200) : undefined,
274
- };
275
- }
276
-
277
- // ─── Batch check (for scripts) ─────────────────────────────────────────────
278
-
279
- function checkScript(content) {
280
- if (!content || typeof content !== 'string') return { blocked: false, findings: [] };
281
- const lines = content.split(/\r?\n/);
282
- const findings = [];
283
- for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
284
- const result = checkCommand(lines[i]);
285
- if (result.blocked) {
286
- findings.push({ line: i + 1, ...result });
287
- }
288
- }
289
- return { blocked: findings.length > 0, findings };
290
- }
291
-
292
- module.exports = { checkCommand, checkScript, normalizeCommand, DANGEROUS_COMMANDS, SECRET_PATTERNS, SENSITIVE_PATHS, EXFIL_PATTERNS };
@@ -1,220 +0,0 @@
1
- 'use strict';
2
-
3
- /*
4
- * Prompt tracing — link findings back to the AI prompt that generated them.
5
- *
6
- * Reads Cursor (.cursor/), Claude Code, and Windsurf session history files.
7
- * Scans for security-relevant behavior patterns in AI agent transcripts.
8
- *
9
- * Two capabilities:
10
- * 1. Trace a finding back to the AI prompt that likely generated the code
11
- * 2. Behavior analysis: detect blind approvals, high delegation, risky patterns
12
- */
13
-
14
- const fs = require('fs');
15
- const path = require('path');
16
-
17
- const SESSION_DIRS = [
18
- '.cursor',
19
- '.cursor/projects',
20
- '.windsurf',
21
- '.claude',
22
- '.continue',
23
- ];
24
-
25
- function findSessionFiles(root) {
26
- const files = [];
27
- for (const dir of SESSION_DIRS) {
28
- const absDir = path.join(root, dir);
29
- if (!fs.existsSync(absDir)) continue;
30
- try {
31
- walkAndCollect(absDir, files, /\.(?:json|jsonl|md|txt)$/i);
32
- } catch (err) { console.error(err); }
33
- }
34
- return files;
35
- }
36
-
37
- function walkAndCollect(dir, out, extRe) {
38
- let entries;
39
- try {
40
- entries = fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true });
41
- } catch { return; }
42
- for (const e of entries) {
43
- const full = path.join(dir, e.name);
44
- if (e.isDirectory()) walkAndCollect(full, out, extRe);
45
- else if (e.isFile() && extRe.test(e.name)) out.push(full);
46
- }
47
- }
48
-
49
- function parseSession(filepath) {
50
- const content = fs.readFileSync(filepath, 'utf8');
51
- const messages = [];
52
-
53
- // Try JSONL format (one JSON object per line)
54
- if (filepath.endsWith('.jsonl')) {
55
- for (const line of content.split('\n')) {
56
- try {
57
- const obj = JSON.parse(line);
58
- if (obj.role || obj.type || obj.message) messages.push(obj);
59
- } catch (err) { console.error(err); }
60
- }
61
- }
62
-
63
- // Try JSON array
64
- if (messages.length === 0 && filepath.endsWith('.json')) {
65
- try {
66
- const arr = JSON.parse(content);
67
- if (Array.isArray(arr)) messages.push(...arr);
68
- else messages.push(arr);
69
- } catch {}
70
- }
71
-
72
- // Try markdown/text (split by user/assistant markers)
73
- if (messages.length === 0) {
74
- const parts = content.split(/^(?:User|Human|Assistant|AI|>>>)[:\s]/m);
75
- parts.forEach((p, i) => {
76
- if (p.trim()) messages.push({ role: i % 2 === 0 ? 'user' : 'assistant', content: p.trim() });
77
- });
78
- }
79
-
80
- return { file: filepath, messages };
81
- }
82
-
83
- const RISKY_BEHAVIORS = [
84
- {
85
- id: 'behavior.blind-approval',
86
- re: /(?:yes|ok|sure|go ahead|do it|approve|sounds good|perfect|great)\s*[!.?\s]*$/i,
87
- risk: 'medium',
88
- desc: 'Blind approval of AI suggestion without review',
89
- },
90
- {
91
- id: 'behavior.high-delegation',
92
- re: /(?:do\s+(?:all|everything|the\s+whole)|build\s+(?:the\s+entire|all)|write\s+(?:all|every|the\s+complete)|implement\s+(?:all|everything|the\s+entire))/i,
93
- risk: 'medium',
94
- desc: 'High delegation — asking AI to do everything at once reduces review quality',
95
- },
96
- {
97
- id: 'behavior.skip-tests',
98
- re: /(?:skip|don'?t\s+need|no\s+need\s+for)\s+(?:tests?|testing|validation)/i,
99
- risk: 'high',
100
- desc: 'Requesting code without tests',
101
- },
102
- {
103
- id: 'behavior.skip-auth',
104
- re: /(?:skip|don'?t\s+(?:need|worry\s+about)|no\s+need\s+for)\s+(?:auth|authentication|authorization|security)/i,
105
- risk: 'high',
106
- desc: 'Explicitly requesting to skip authentication/security',
107
- },
108
- {
109
- id: 'behavior.hardcode-secrets',
110
- re: /(?:just\s+)?(?:hardcode|hard-code|put\s+(?:the\s+)?(?:password|secret|token|key|api\s+key)\s+(?:directly\s+)?(?:in|here))/i,
111
- risk: 'high',
112
- desc: 'Asking AI to hardcode secrets',
113
- },
114
- {
115
- id: 'behavior.disable-security',
116
- re: /(?:disable|turn\s+off|remove|skip|bypass)\s+(?:security|validation|sanitization|escaping|CORS|helmet|CSRF)/i,
117
- risk: 'high',
118
- desc: 'Asking AI to disable security features',
119
- },
120
- {
121
- id: 'behavior.trust-input',
122
- re: /(?:trust\s+the\s+(?:user|client|input)|user\s+input\s+is\s+(?:safe|trusted|fine)|don'?t\s+validate)/i,
123
- risk: 'high',
124
- desc: 'Expressing trust in user/client input without validation',
125
- },
126
- {
127
- id: 'behavior.excessive-iter',
128
- re: /(?:again|redo|try\s+again|different\s+approach|start\s+over)/i,
129
- risk: 'low',
130
- desc: 'Excessive iteration on AI output — possible degradation of review quality',
131
- threshold: 10,
132
- },
133
- ];
134
-
135
- function analyzeBehavior(messages) {
136
- const behaviors = [];
137
- let userMessages = 0;
138
- let approvals = 0;
139
- let iterations = 0;
140
-
141
- for (const msg of messages) {
142
- const role = msg.role || msg.type || '';
143
- const content = msg.content || msg.message || msg.text || '';
144
- if (typeof content !== 'string') continue;
145
- if (!/user|human/i.test(role)) continue;
146
- userMessages++;
147
-
148
- for (const b of RISKY_BEHAVIORS) {
149
- if (b.re.test(content)) {
150
- if (b.id === 'behavior.blind-approval') approvals++;
151
- if (b.id === 'behavior.excessive-iter') iterations++;
152
- if (b.id === 'behavior.excessive-iter' && iterations < (b.threshold || 10)) continue;
153
- behaviors.push({
154
- id: b.id,
155
- risk: b.risk,
156
- message: b.desc,
157
- snippet: content.slice(0, 200),
158
- });
159
- }
160
- }
161
- }
162
-
163
- const delegationRatio = userMessages > 0 ? approvals / userMessages : 0;
164
- const risk = delegationRatio > 0.6 ? 'high' : delegationRatio > 0.3 ? 'medium' : 'low';
165
-
166
- return {
167
- totalUserMessages: userMessages,
168
- approvals,
169
- iterations,
170
- delegationRatio: Math.round(delegationRatio * 100) / 100,
171
- risk,
172
- behaviors,
173
- recommendation:
174
- risk === 'high'
175
- ? 'High blind-approval ratio — review AI suggestions more carefully before accepting'
176
- : risk === 'medium'
177
- ? 'Moderate delegation — ensure each AI suggestion is reviewed'
178
- : 'Good review discipline — keep validating AI output',
179
- };
180
- }
181
-
182
- function traceFindingsToPrompts(findings, sessions) {
183
- const traces = [];
184
- for (const f of findings) {
185
- const matching = [];
186
- for (const session of sessions) {
187
- for (const msg of session.messages) {
188
- const content = msg.content || msg.message || '';
189
- if (typeof content !== 'string') continue;
190
- const snippet = f.snippet || '';
191
- if (snippet && content.includes(snippet.slice(0, 30))) {
192
- matching.push({ file: session.file, role: msg.role, snippet: content.slice(0, 200) });
193
- }
194
- const titleWords = (f.title || '').split(/\s+/).filter((w) => w.length > 4);
195
- if (titleWords.length > 0 && titleWords.every((w) => content.toLowerCase().includes(w.toLowerCase()))) {
196
- matching.push({ file: session.file, role: msg.role, snippet: content.slice(0, 200) });
197
- }
198
- }
199
- }
200
- if (matching.length > 0) {
201
- traces.push({ finding: f.ruleId, file: f.file, line: f.line, matches: matching });
202
- }
203
- }
204
- return traces;
205
- }
206
-
207
- function trace(root, findings) {
208
- const sessionFiles = findSessionFiles(root);
209
- if (sessionFiles.length === 0) {
210
- return { sessions: 0, behavior: null, traces: [] };
211
- }
212
-
213
- const sessions = sessionFiles.map(parseSession);
214
- const behavior = analyzeBehavior(sessions.flatMap((s) => s.messages));
215
- const traces = traceFindingsToPrompts(findings, sessions);
216
-
217
- return { sessions: sessions.length, behavior, traces };
218
- }
219
-
220
- module.exports = { trace, analyzeBehavior, findSessionFiles, parseSession, RISKY_BEHAVIORS };