@yagyeshvyas/vibeguard 1.1.0 → 1.2.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +57 -0
- package/README.md +564 -499
- package/bin/cli.js +91 -3
- package/package.json +4 -3
- package/src/action-guard.js +220 -0
- package/src/agent-scan.js +192 -0
- package/src/integrity.js +74 -0
- package/src/integrity.json +22 -0
- package/src/interceptor.js +42 -7
- package/src/mcp-audit.js +245 -0
- package/src/mcp-server.js +70 -0
package/CHANGELOG.md
CHANGED
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@@ -6,6 +6,41 @@ Format based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/).
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## [Unreleased]
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### Added
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- Self-integrity verification. `vibeguard self-check` now cryptographically
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verifies the CONTENT of its critical security modules (action-guard,
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shell-guard, interceptor, firewall, rules, scanner, taint, mcp-audit, …)
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against a shipped SHA-256 manifest (`src/integrity.json`), not just that they
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load. Detects a patched/neutered guard — e.g. `inspectAction` rewritten to
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always allow, or a rule file gutted — which a load-only check missed. Manifest
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is regenerated on `prepublishOnly` (and via `npm run integrity`). Honest limit:
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detects source tampering, not a full chain of trust; verify npm provenance for
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the trust anchor. `src/integrity.js`, `scripts/gen-integrity.js`.
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- Agent Action Firewall — `vibeguard guard-action` + `guard_action` MCP tool +
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`src/action-guard.js` (`inspectAction`). Real-time "nothing leaks" guard:
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inspect any agent action (shell / network / file-write / prompt / MCP call)
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BEFORE it runs and block secret or personal-data exfiltration. Hard rule — an
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API key or PII (email, SSN, credit card, phone) never leaves to an external
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host: secrets blocked unconditionally, PII blocked (or warn), local/allowlisted
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hosts permitted. Also blocks cloud-metadata credential theft, secrets written
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to web-served paths, and secrets in LLM prompts. `sanitizeOutbound()` redacts
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instead of dropping. 100% offline, fail-closed on the block path. A guard, not
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a sandbox.
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- `vibeguard agent-scan` — AI Agent Security Posture (new `agent_scan` MCP tool
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too). One graded verdict — "is my AI-agent setup safe?" — aggregating every
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agent-era check into threat categories: MCP-server trust, PII/secret leakage
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to LLM providers, LLM output reaching exec/eval/SQL/DOM, prompt injection,
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agent capability/loop safety, and hallucinated dependencies. Pure offline
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orchestration of already-tested modules (mcp-audit + ai-guard + the `ai.*`
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rule family). `--fail-on <level>` to gate CI.
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- `vibeguard mcp-audit` — MCP server security audit (new `mcp_audit` MCP tool
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too). Audits the MCP servers an agent is configured to trust
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(`.mcp.json` / `.cursor/mcp.json` / `.vscode/mcp.json`) for tool poisoning
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(prompt injection in server args/descriptions), unpinned auto-install
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(`npx -y` rug-pull surface), remote-code / shell commands, hardcoded secrets
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in `env`, over-broad filesystem grants, and **definition drift** — a server
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whose config changed since you approved it (classic MCP rug-pull). 100%
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offline: reads config only, never runs a server. Pins server-definition
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hashes under `.vibeguard/mcp-pins.json`; `--pin` re-baselines after review.
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- `vibeguard scan --staged` — scan only git-staged files. Ideal for a
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pre-commit hook: fast and scoped to exactly what's being committed. Per-file
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only (cross-file analysis skipped, and the CLI says so).
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@@ -68,7 +103,29 @@ Format based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/).
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introduces a false negative (bails on alternation, ignores optional/grouped
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literals). Guarded by unit tests + a throughput regression test.
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### Fixed
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- Interceptor: wrapped `fs.readFileSync` called itself instead of the saved
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original, causing infinite recursion / stack overflow on any uncached file
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read after activation. Now calls the original. Regression test added.
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### Changed
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- Agent Action Firewall now blocks UNKNOWN-format secrets, not just known vendor
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patterns. An outbound field named like a credential (`apiKey`, `secret`,
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`password`, `client_secret`, `private_key`, `access_key`, …) carrying a
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high-entropy value is blocked from leaving to an external host — so a custom
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API key or session secret that matches no known regex can't exfiltrate either.
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Precise by design: the credential NAME plus real entropy avoids false
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positives on content hashes, UUIDs, ids, env-var references, and low-entropy
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placeholders (all verified). Ambiguous names (token/bearer/session) are
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intentionally excluded to avoid breaking legitimate auth traffic.
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- Runtime interceptor now delegates to the unified Agent Action Firewall
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(`action-guard.inspectAction`). Every wrapped `fetch` / `http` / `exec` /
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`execSync` call is checked with the hardened, shared logic — so obfuscated
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commands (base64, `$IFS`, variable indirection) and secrets embedded in a
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request URL are now blocked at runtime, which the interceptor's old naive
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`.includes()` check missed. `CONFIG.allowDomains` are honored as trusted
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destinations. Protection is automatic once the interceptor is active — no
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per-call `guard_action` needed.
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- Python taint analysis rewritten as single-pass taint propagation (still pure
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JS — no external parser, keeps VibeGuard zero-dependency and offline). Tracks
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tainted variables through intermediate assignments (`q = "..." + data` →
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